23 occurrences across the corpus

The Mishnah

Mishnah Kiddushin 1:5

Property which has security is acquired by money, by deed or by possession. [Property] which does not have security is acquired only by being drawn [to the purchaser]. Property which does not have security may be acquired in conjunction with property which does have security by money, deed, or possession; And it obligates the property which provides security, to take an oath concerning them.

Mishnah Shevuot 7:1

All whom the Torah obligates to take an oath, take an oath, and do not pay. But these take an oath, and receive [payment]: the hired laborer, he who has been robbed, he who has been wounded, and he whose opponent is suspected of taking a false oath, and the shopkeeper with his account book. “The hired laborer” How so? [If] he says to him [his employer], “Give me my wages which you owe me,” and he replies, “I have given,” and the other says, “I have not received it,” he [the laborer] takes an oath and collects his wages. Rabbi Judah says: “[There is no oath] unless there is partial admission: How so? If he says to him, “Give me my wages, fifty denarii, which you owe me,” and the other says, “You have received a gold denar (25 silver denar).”

Mishnah Chullin 12:2

An unclean bird one is not obligated to let it go. If an unclean bird was sitting on the eggs of a clean bird, or a clean bird on the eggs of an unclean bird, one is not obligated to let it go. As to a male partridge: Rabbi Eliezer obligates [one to let it go]. But the sages exempt.

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Peah 4:23

MISHNAH: A Non-Jew who harvested his field and later converted is free from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and peah. Rebbi Jehudah obligates him for forgotten sheaves because that applies only at the time of binding the sheaves.

Jerusalem Talmud Peah 4:43

Rebbi Joḥanan said: It is by Rebbi Jehudah ben Ḥagra, as it was stated: “A Gentile who converted but had cut grain before he converted is free; after he converted, he is obligated. If it is in doubt, he is free. Rebbi Jehudah ben Ḥagra obligates him.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it agrees with everybody: A Jew, who is obligated in principle, is also obligated in doubtful cases; a Gentile, who is not obligated in principle, is not obligated in doubt. Rebbi Joḥanan said: So did Rebbi Meïr argue with Rebbi Jehudah ben Ḥagra, do you not agree with me that gleanings in doubt are gleanings? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: So did Rebbi Meïr argue with the Sages, do you not agree with me that gleanings in doubt are gleanings?

Jerusalem Talmud Peah 5:14

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, this follows Rebbi Yose, as we have stated there: “For Rebbi Yose says that everything whose replacement is in the hand of the Cohen is freed from the obligatory gifts, but Rebbi Meïr obligates him.” Rebbi Abba said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that he has to empower the priest. Rebbi Yose said, the statement of Rebbi Abba contradicts Rebbi Simeon bar Laqish since we have stated here: “He has to give the poor rights to the entire stack; then he gives tithes for one ear and gives to him.” Rebbi Abba said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that he has to empower the priest, hence this is not from the words of Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Mana said, the Mishnah itself testifies that it is by Rebbi Yose. The first Tanna wants to say that he transfers as property to the poor not the entire stack but only one ear. The other Tanna wants to say that he transfers the entire stack as property to the poor. The first Tanna wants to say that this is like the transfer of property from one’s right hand to his left hand; it is no transfer. The other Tanna wants to say that it is not transferring property from one’s right hand to his left hand; it is transfer.

Jerusalem Talmud Demai 1:14

It was stated: “Rebbi Jehudah said, in earlier times, vinegar in Judea was exempt from tithes. Since they made all their wine in purity for Temple offerings, it never got sour; they made vinegar from the skins of grapes. But now, since wine turns sour, it is obligated.” The argument of Rebbi Jehudah is inverted since we stated there: “If one makes after-wine and puts in a given volume of water, if he finds exactly the same volume it is free, but Rebbi Jehudah obligates him.” And here he says so! Rebbi La said, in earlier times when grapes were plentiful, their skins were not counted as anything, but now that grapes are not plentiful, the skins are important.

Jerusalem Talmud Maasrot 2:9

That means that the house creates ṭevel for its owner but not for others. Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Neḥemiah said the same thing as we have stated: “Rebbi Neḥemiah says, every [courtyard] in which a person is not ashamed to eat obligates.” Rebbi Yose said, we thought that Rebbi Neḥemiah and the other rabbis disagree about a courtyard in which he would be ashamed to eat anywhere. That means, not one in which he would be ashamed at some place but not at another. Since Rebbi Eleazar said Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Neḥemiah said the same thing, this implies that a place where he would be ashamed is free and one where he would not be ashamed is obligated.

Jerusalem Talmud Maasrot 3:4

It was stated: All that was brought from the field to town became ṭevel. The baraita is Rebbi’s, as it was stated: “ If somebody brought figs from the field to eat them in his unprotected courtyard, then forgot and brought them into his house or the children brought them, he may bring them back to their intended place and eat.” They said that only concerning error; therefore, if intentional it is forbidden. Who stated this? Rebbi! As it was stated: “ If somebody brought figs from the field to eat them on his roof, Rebbi obligates, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah frees.” It is as it was stated, “if somebody transports figs through his courtyard to cut them into pieces;” therefore, if it is not to cut into pieces he is obligated.

Jerusalem Talmud Maasrot 3:19

MISHNAH: Which courtyard is obligated for tithes? Rebbi Ismael says, a Tyrian courtyard in which vessels are guarded. Rebbi Aqiba says, one where one person opens and another one locks it, is free. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, [a courtyard] where one is not ashamed to eat is obligated. Rebbi Yose says, one into which anybody may enter and nobody asks, what are you doing here, is free. Rebbi Jehudah says, if one courtyard is inside another, the inner one is obligated, the outer one is free. Roofs are exempt even if they are in an obligated courtyard. A porter’s lodge, a covered walkway, and a gallery are like the courtyard: obligated if the latter is obligated and free if the latter is free. Sheds, watchtowers, and summer shelters are free. Genezareth huts even though they contain a hand mill or chickens are free. Potter’s huts, the inner one is obligated, the outer one free. Rebbi Yose says, any which is not a dwelling in summer and winter is free. A holiday hut on the holiday Rebbi Jehudah obligates but the Sages free.

Jerusalem Talmud Maasrot 5:18

Rebbi Abun said, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel goes with the argument of his ancestor Rabban Gamliel. As we stated there: “Jews who were sharecroppers for Gentiles in Syria, Rebbi Eliezer obligates their produce for tithes and the Sabbatical but Rabban Gamliel frees.”

Jerusalem Talmud Challah 4:18

MISHNAH: Jews were sharecroppers for Gentiles in Syria; Rebbi Eliezer obligates their produce for tithes and the Sabbatical but Rabban Gamliel exempts them. Rabban Gamliel says there are two ḥallot in Syria but Rebbi Eliezer says one ḥallah. They took the leniency of Rabban Gamliel and the leniency of Rebbi Eliezer but then returned to follow Rabban Gamliel in both cases. Rabban Gamliel says: There are three domains for ḥallah. The Land of Israel up to Akhzib, one ḥallah. From Akhzib to the Euphrates or Amanus, two ḥallot, one for the fire and one for the Cohen. The one for the fire has a measure, the one for the Cohen has no measure. From Euphrates or Amanus inside, two ḥallot, one for the fire and one for the Cohen. The one for the fire has no measure, the one for the Cohen has a measure but a ṭevul yom may eat it. Rebbi Yose says one does not need immersion. But it is forbidden to people suffering from genital flux, and to women during menstruation or after childbirth. It may be eaten at one table with a layman and may be given to any Cohen. The following may be given to any Cohen: ḥērem-dedications, firstlings, the redemption money for a [firstborn] son, the redemption value of a firstling donkey, foreleg, jawbone, and first stomach, the first shearing, oil to burn, Temple sacrifices, and First Fruits. Rebbi Jehudah forbids First Fruits. Heave vetch Rebbi Aqiba permits but the Sages forbid.

Jerusalem Talmud Taanit 4:64

MISHNAH: From the start of Av one restricts happy occasions. The week in which the Ninth of Av falls one is forbidden to barber and to launder, but on Thursday one is permitted for the honor of the Sabbath. In the day before the Ninth of Av a person may not eat two dishes, he may not eat meat nor drink wine. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he shall alterate. Rebbi Jehudah obligates him to turn up his couch but the Sages did not agree with him.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:23

Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free. And why did we state: “Rabban Gamliel obligates him”? This comes to tell you the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he obligates people. Rebbi Abbahu [supported] that of Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, the Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is obligated. Rav followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went with another to court before Rav. He started claiming from him barley, wheat and spelt. Rav told him, charge him with anything you have to charge, and in the end he will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free, did we not state “if he sued him for vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? If he is obligated for vessels about vessels, not so much more vessels for real estate? What does he do with it? He explains it, to transfer an oath to him. But did we not state: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for oil and he admitted vessels, everybody agrees that what he admitted does not refer to the claim, for Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna said in the name of Rav: The Mishnah deals with the case that he sued for vessels full of oil; the ones are full, the others empty. One understands vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abun formulates it as oil bucket. Can one not ask him in the end? If he lost his speech.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:23

Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free. And why did we state: “Rabban Gamliel obligates him”? This comes to tell you the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he obligates people. Rebbi Abbahu [supported] that of Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, the Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is obligated. Rav followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went with another to court before Rav. He started claiming from him barley, wheat and spelt. Rav told him, charge him with anything you have to charge, and in the end he will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free, did we not state “if he sued him for vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? If he is obligated for vessels about vessels, not so much more vessels for real estate? What does he do with it? He explains it, to transfer an oath to him. But did we not state: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for oil and he admitted vessels, everybody agrees that what he admitted does not refer to the claim, for Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna said in the name of Rav: The Mishnah deals with the case that he sued for vessels full of oil; the ones are full, the others empty. One understands vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abun formulates it as oil bucket. Can one not ask him in the end? If he lost his speech.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:24

MISHNAH: If somebody obligates himself about money for his son-in-law but then goes bankrupt, she must wait until her hair grows white. Admon says: “If I had obligated myself, I would have to wait until my hair grows white. My father obligated himself, what can I do? Marry definitively or divorce!” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:25

HALAKHAH: “If somebody obligates himself about money for his son-in-law,” etc. The Mishnah [deals with the case] that he obligated himself in her presence. But if he obligated himself not in her presence, even the rabbis will agree.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:18

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:26

HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate, but from his own he may separate.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 5:2

HALAKHAH: “What is biting,” etc. Rebbi Yannai said, this is interest which is taken away by the judges. They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, can interest be taken away by the judges? He said, if it were so, nothing would be left for the great people of the Land of Israel. Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that no document obligates another. Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if the document exists one subtracts [the interest].

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 1:5

MISHNAH: Somebody’s [property] surrounded another’s on three sides. If he fenced in the first, and the second, and the third sides, one does not hold [the other] liable. Rebbi Yose said, if the latter then fenced in the fourth side, one rolls everything over to him. If the wall of a courtyard collapsed, one obligates him to rebuild up to four cubits. There is a presumption that he gave, unless he brings proof that he did not give. Higher than four cubits one does not obligate him, but if he built an adjacent wall, even though he did not put on roofing, one rolls everything over to him. There is a presumption that he did not give, unless he brings proof that he gave.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:16

MISHNAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” “I am holding for you only a letek of legumes;” he is not liable. “You are holding for me a kor of produce;” “I am holding for you only a letek of legumes;” he is liable since legumes are subsumed under produce. If one sued for wheat and the other acknowledged barley, he is not liable, but Rebbi Simeon declares him liable. Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and the other admitted to pitchers, Admon says since he admitted of the kind of the claim he has to swear. But the Sages say, the admission is not of the kind of the claim. Rabban Gamliel said, I see the words of Admon. If somebody sued for both vessels and real estate; if [the other] admitted the vessels but denied the real estate, or the real estate and denied the vessels, he is not liable. If he admitted part of the real estate he is not liable. Part of the vessels he is liable since non-guaranteed property obligates guaranteed property to be sworn about.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:17

HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.