on
27058 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nehemiah of Bet D’li who said to me, “I heard that in the land of Israel no one, permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, except Rabbi Judah ben Bava”. “That is so”, I told him. He said to me, “Tell them in my name: ‘You know that this country is in confusion because of marauders. I have received a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder: that they allow a [married] woman to remarry on the evidence of one witness’”. And when I came and recounted the conversation in the presence of Rabban Gamaliel he rejoiced at my words and exclaimed, “We have found a match for Rabbi Judah ben Bava!” As a result of this talk Rabban Gamaliel remembered that some men were once killed at Tel Arza, and that Rabban Gamaliel the Elder had allowed their wives to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and the law was established that they allow a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and on the testimony of one [who states that he has heard] from another witness, from a slave, from a woman or from a female slave. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua say: a woman is not be allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Akiva ruled: [a woman is not allowed to marry again] on the evidence of a woman, on that of a slave, on that of a female slave or on that of relatives. They said to him: It once happened that a number of Levites went to Tsoar, the city of palms, and one of them became ill on the way, and they left him in an inn. When they returned they asked the [female] innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” And she replied, “He is dead and I buried him”, and they allowed his wife to remarry. Should not then a priest’s wife [be believed at least as much] as an innkeeper!” He answered them: When she will [give such evidence] as the innkeeper [gave] she will be believed, for the innkeeper had brought out to them [the dead man’s] staff, his bag and the Torah scroll which he had with him.
Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nehemiah of Bet D’li who said to me, “I heard that in the land of Israel no one, permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, except Rabbi Judah ben Bava”. “That is so”, I told him. He said to me, “Tell them in my name: ‘You know that this country is in confusion because of marauders. I have received a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder: that they allow a [married] woman to remarry on the evidence of one witness’”. And when I came and recounted the conversation in the presence of Rabban Gamaliel he rejoiced at my words and exclaimed, “We have found a match for Rabbi Judah ben Bava!” As a result of this talk Rabban Gamaliel remembered that some men were once killed at Tel Arza, and that Rabban Gamaliel the Elder had allowed their wives to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and the law was established that they allow a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and on the testimony of one [who states that he has heard] from another witness, from a slave, from a woman or from a female slave. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua say: a woman is not be allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Akiva ruled: [a woman is not allowed to marry again] on the evidence of a woman, on that of a slave, on that of a female slave or on that of relatives. They said to him: It once happened that a number of Levites went to Tsoar, the city of palms, and one of them became ill on the way, and they left him in an inn. When they returned they asked the [female] innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” And she replied, “He is dead and I buried him”, and they allowed his wife to remarry. Should not then a priest’s wife [be believed at least as much] as an innkeeper!” He answered them: When she will [give such evidence] as the innkeeper [gave] she will be believed, for the innkeeper had brought out to them [the dead man’s] staff, his bag and the Torah scroll which he had with him.
Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nehemiah of Bet D’li who said to me, “I heard that in the land of Israel no one, permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, except Rabbi Judah ben Bava”. “That is so”, I told him. He said to me, “Tell them in my name: ‘You know that this country is in confusion because of marauders. I have received a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder: that they allow a [married] woman to remarry on the evidence of one witness’”. And when I came and recounted the conversation in the presence of Rabban Gamaliel he rejoiced at my words and exclaimed, “We have found a match for Rabbi Judah ben Bava!” As a result of this talk Rabban Gamaliel remembered that some men were once killed at Tel Arza, and that Rabban Gamaliel the Elder had allowed their wives to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and the law was established that they allow a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and on the testimony of one [who states that he has heard] from another witness, from a slave, from a woman or from a female slave. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua say: a woman is not be allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Akiva ruled: [a woman is not allowed to marry again] on the evidence of a woman, on that of a slave, on that of a female slave or on that of relatives. They said to him: It once happened that a number of Levites went to Tsoar, the city of palms, and one of them became ill on the way, and they left him in an inn. When they returned they asked the [female] innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” And she replied, “He is dead and I buried him”, and they allowed his wife to remarry. Should not then a priest’s wife [be believed at least as much] as an innkeeper!” He answered them: When she will [give such evidence] as the innkeeper [gave] she will be believed, for the innkeeper had brought out to them [the dead man’s] staff, his bag and the Torah scroll which he had with him.
Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nehemiah of Bet D’li who said to me, “I heard that in the land of Israel no one, permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, except Rabbi Judah ben Bava”. “That is so”, I told him. He said to me, “Tell them in my name: ‘You know that this country is in confusion because of marauders. I have received a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder: that they allow a [married] woman to remarry on the evidence of one witness’”. And when I came and recounted the conversation in the presence of Rabban Gamaliel he rejoiced at my words and exclaimed, “We have found a match for Rabbi Judah ben Bava!” As a result of this talk Rabban Gamaliel remembered that some men were once killed at Tel Arza, and that Rabban Gamaliel the Elder had allowed their wives to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and the law was established that they allow a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and on the testimony of one [who states that he has heard] from another witness, from a slave, from a woman or from a female slave. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua say: a woman is not be allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Akiva ruled: [a woman is not allowed to marry again] on the evidence of a woman, on that of a slave, on that of a female slave or on that of relatives. They said to him: It once happened that a number of Levites went to Tsoar, the city of palms, and one of them became ill on the way, and they left him in an inn. When they returned they asked the [female] innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” And she replied, “He is dead and I buried him”, and they allowed his wife to remarry. Should not then a priest’s wife [be believed at least as much] as an innkeeper!” He answered them: When she will [give such evidence] as the innkeeper [gave] she will be believed, for the innkeeper had brought out to them [the dead man’s] staff, his bag and the Torah scroll which he had with him.
Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nehemiah of Bet D’li who said to me, “I heard that in the land of Israel no one, permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, except Rabbi Judah ben Bava”. “That is so”, I told him. He said to me, “Tell them in my name: ‘You know that this country is in confusion because of marauders. I have received a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder: that they allow a [married] woman to remarry on the evidence of one witness’”. And when I came and recounted the conversation in the presence of Rabban Gamaliel he rejoiced at my words and exclaimed, “We have found a match for Rabbi Judah ben Bava!” As a result of this talk Rabban Gamaliel remembered that some men were once killed at Tel Arza, and that Rabban Gamaliel the Elder had allowed their wives to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and the law was established that they allow a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and on the testimony of one [who states that he has heard] from another witness, from a slave, from a woman or from a female slave. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua say: a woman is not be allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Akiva ruled: [a woman is not allowed to marry again] on the evidence of a woman, on that of a slave, on that of a female slave or on that of relatives. They said to him: It once happened that a number of Levites went to Tsoar, the city of palms, and one of them became ill on the way, and they left him in an inn. When they returned they asked the [female] innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” And she replied, “He is dead and I buried him”, and they allowed his wife to remarry. Should not then a priest’s wife [be believed at least as much] as an innkeeper!” He answered them: When she will [give such evidence] as the innkeeper [gave] she will be believed, for the innkeeper had brought out to them [the dead man’s] staff, his bag and the Torah scroll which he had with him.
Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nehemiah of Bet D’li who said to me, “I heard that in the land of Israel no one, permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, except Rabbi Judah ben Bava”. “That is so”, I told him. He said to me, “Tell them in my name: ‘You know that this country is in confusion because of marauders. I have received a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder: that they allow a [married] woman to remarry on the evidence of one witness’”. And when I came and recounted the conversation in the presence of Rabban Gamaliel he rejoiced at my words and exclaimed, “We have found a match for Rabbi Judah ben Bava!” As a result of this talk Rabban Gamaliel remembered that some men were once killed at Tel Arza, and that Rabban Gamaliel the Elder had allowed their wives to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and the law was established that they allow a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and on the testimony of one [who states that he has heard] from another witness, from a slave, from a woman or from a female slave. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua say: a woman is not be allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Akiva ruled: [a woman is not allowed to marry again] on the evidence of a woman, on that of a slave, on that of a female slave or on that of relatives. They said to him: It once happened that a number of Levites went to Tsoar, the city of palms, and one of them became ill on the way, and they left him in an inn. When they returned they asked the [female] innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” And she replied, “He is dead and I buried him”, and they allowed his wife to remarry. Should not then a priest’s wife [be believed at least as much] as an innkeeper!” He answered them: When she will [give such evidence] as the innkeeper [gave] she will be believed, for the innkeeper had brought out to them [the dead man’s] staff, his bag and the Torah scroll which he had with him.
Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nehemiah of Bet D’li who said to me, “I heard that in the land of Israel no one, permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, except Rabbi Judah ben Bava”. “That is so”, I told him. He said to me, “Tell them in my name: ‘You know that this country is in confusion because of marauders. I have received a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder: that they allow a [married] woman to remarry on the evidence of one witness’”. And when I came and recounted the conversation in the presence of Rabban Gamaliel he rejoiced at my words and exclaimed, “We have found a match for Rabbi Judah ben Bava!” As a result of this talk Rabban Gamaliel remembered that some men were once killed at Tel Arza, and that Rabban Gamaliel the Elder had allowed their wives to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and the law was established that they allow a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and on the testimony of one [who states that he has heard] from another witness, from a slave, from a woman or from a female slave. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua say: a woman is not be allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Akiva ruled: [a woman is not allowed to marry again] on the evidence of a woman, on that of a slave, on that of a female slave or on that of relatives. They said to him: It once happened that a number of Levites went to Tsoar, the city of palms, and one of them became ill on the way, and they left him in an inn. When they returned they asked the [female] innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” And she replied, “He is dead and I buried him”, and they allowed his wife to remarry. Should not then a priest’s wife [be believed at least as much] as an innkeeper!” He answered them: When she will [give such evidence] as the innkeeper [gave] she will be believed, for the innkeeper had brought out to them [the dead man’s] staff, his bag and the Torah scroll which he had with him.
Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nehemiah of Bet D’li who said to me, “I heard that in the land of Israel no one, permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, except Rabbi Judah ben Bava”. “That is so”, I told him. He said to me, “Tell them in my name: ‘You know that this country is in confusion because of marauders. I have received a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder: that they allow a [married] woman to remarry on the evidence of one witness’”. And when I came and recounted the conversation in the presence of Rabban Gamaliel he rejoiced at my words and exclaimed, “We have found a match for Rabbi Judah ben Bava!” As a result of this talk Rabban Gamaliel remembered that some men were once killed at Tel Arza, and that Rabban Gamaliel the Elder had allowed their wives to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and the law was established that they allow a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and on the testimony of one [who states that he has heard] from another witness, from a slave, from a woman or from a female slave. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua say: a woman is not be allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Akiva ruled: [a woman is not allowed to marry again] on the evidence of a woman, on that of a slave, on that of a female slave or on that of relatives. They said to him: It once happened that a number of Levites went to Tsoar, the city of palms, and one of them became ill on the way, and they left him in an inn. When they returned they asked the [female] innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” And she replied, “He is dead and I buried him”, and they allowed his wife to remarry. Should not then a priest’s wife [be believed at least as much] as an innkeeper!” He answered them: When she will [give such evidence] as the innkeeper [gave] she will be believed, for the innkeeper had brought out to them [the dead man’s] staff, his bag and the Torah scroll which he had with him.
Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nehemiah of Bet D’li who said to me, “I heard that in the land of Israel no one, permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, except Rabbi Judah ben Bava”. “That is so”, I told him. He said to me, “Tell them in my name: ‘You know that this country is in confusion because of marauders. I have received a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder: that they allow a [married] woman to remarry on the evidence of one witness’”. And when I came and recounted the conversation in the presence of Rabban Gamaliel he rejoiced at my words and exclaimed, “We have found a match for Rabbi Judah ben Bava!” As a result of this talk Rabban Gamaliel remembered that some men were once killed at Tel Arza, and that Rabban Gamaliel the Elder had allowed their wives to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and the law was established that they allow a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and on the testimony of one [who states that he has heard] from another witness, from a slave, from a woman or from a female slave. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua say: a woman is not be allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Akiva ruled: [a woman is not allowed to marry again] on the evidence of a woman, on that of a slave, on that of a female slave or on that of relatives. They said to him: It once happened that a number of Levites went to Tsoar, the city of palms, and one of them became ill on the way, and they left him in an inn. When they returned they asked the [female] innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” And she replied, “He is dead and I buried him”, and they allowed his wife to remarry. Should not then a priest’s wife [be believed at least as much] as an innkeeper!” He answered them: When she will [give such evidence] as the innkeeper [gave] she will be believed, for the innkeeper had brought out to them [the dead man’s] staff, his bag and the Torah scroll which he had with him.
Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nehemiah of Bet D’li who said to me, “I heard that in the land of Israel no one, permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, except Rabbi Judah ben Bava”. “That is so”, I told him. He said to me, “Tell them in my name: ‘You know that this country is in confusion because of marauders. I have received a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder: that they allow a [married] woman to remarry on the evidence of one witness’”. And when I came and recounted the conversation in the presence of Rabban Gamaliel he rejoiced at my words and exclaimed, “We have found a match for Rabbi Judah ben Bava!” As a result of this talk Rabban Gamaliel remembered that some men were once killed at Tel Arza, and that Rabban Gamaliel the Elder had allowed their wives to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and the law was established that they allow a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and on the testimony of one [who states that he has heard] from another witness, from a slave, from a woman or from a female slave. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua say: a woman is not be allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Akiva ruled: [a woman is not allowed to marry again] on the evidence of a woman, on that of a slave, on that of a female slave or on that of relatives. They said to him: It once happened that a number of Levites went to Tsoar, the city of palms, and one of them became ill on the way, and they left him in an inn. When they returned they asked the [female] innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” And she replied, “He is dead and I buried him”, and they allowed his wife to remarry. Should not then a priest’s wife [be believed at least as much] as an innkeeper!” He answered them: When she will [give such evidence] as the innkeeper [gave] she will be believed, for the innkeeper had brought out to them [the dead man’s] staff, his bag and the Torah scroll which he had with him.
Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nehemiah of Bet D’li who said to me, “I heard that in the land of Israel no one, permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, except Rabbi Judah ben Bava”. “That is so”, I told him. He said to me, “Tell them in my name: ‘You know that this country is in confusion because of marauders. I have received a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder: that they allow a [married] woman to remarry on the evidence of one witness’”. And when I came and recounted the conversation in the presence of Rabban Gamaliel he rejoiced at my words and exclaimed, “We have found a match for Rabbi Judah ben Bava!” As a result of this talk Rabban Gamaliel remembered that some men were once killed at Tel Arza, and that Rabban Gamaliel the Elder had allowed their wives to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and the law was established that they allow a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and on the testimony of one [who states that he has heard] from another witness, from a slave, from a woman or from a female slave. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua say: a woman is not be allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Akiva ruled: [a woman is not allowed to marry again] on the evidence of a woman, on that of a slave, on that of a female slave or on that of relatives. They said to him: It once happened that a number of Levites went to Tsoar, the city of palms, and one of them became ill on the way, and they left him in an inn. When they returned they asked the [female] innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” And she replied, “He is dead and I buried him”, and they allowed his wife to remarry. Should not then a priest’s wife [be believed at least as much] as an innkeeper!” He answered them: When she will [give such evidence] as the innkeeper [gave] she will be believed, for the innkeeper had brought out to them [the dead man’s] staff, his bag and the Torah scroll which he had with him.
A virgin is married on the fourth day [of the week] and a widow on the fifth day, for twice in the week the courts sit in the towns, on the second day [of the week] and on the fifth day, so that if he [the husband] had a claim as to the virginity [of the bride] he could go early [on the morning of the fifth day of the week] to the court.
A virgin is married on the fourth day [of the week] and a widow on the fifth day, for twice in the week the courts sit in the towns, on the second day [of the week] and on the fifth day, so that if he [the husband] had a claim as to the virginity [of the bride] he could go early [on the morning of the fifth day of the week] to the court.
A virgin is married on the fourth day [of the week] and a widow on the fifth day, for twice in the week the courts sit in the towns, on the second day [of the week] and on the fifth day, so that if he [the husband] had a claim as to the virginity [of the bride] he could go early [on the morning of the fifth day of the week] to the court.
A virgin is married on the fourth day [of the week] and a widow on the fifth day, for twice in the week the courts sit in the towns, on the second day [of the week] and on the fifth day, so that if he [the husband] had a claim as to the virginity [of the bride] he could go early [on the morning of the fifth day of the week] to the court.
A virgin is married on the fourth day [of the week] and a widow on the fifth day, for twice in the week the courts sit in the towns, on the second day [of the week] and on the fifth day, so that if he [the husband] had a claim as to the virginity [of the bride] he could go early [on the morning of the fifth day of the week] to the court.
The following are believed to testifying when they are grown-up about what they saw when they were minors: A person is believed to say “This is the handwriting of my father”, “This is the handwriting of my teacher”, “This is the handwriting of my brother”; “I remember that that woman went out with a hinuma and an uncovered head”; “That that man used to go out from school to immerse in order to eat terumah”; “That he used to take a share with us at the threshing floor”; “That this place was a bet ha-peras”; “That up to here we used to go on Shabbat”; But a man is not believed when he says: “So-and-so had a path in this place”; “That man had a place of standing up and eulogy in this place”.
How is [the compensation that is paid for] embarrassment [reckoned]? It all depends on the status of the offender and the offended. How is [the compensation that is paid for] blemish [reckoned]? She is regarded as if she were a slave to be sold in the market place [and it is estimated] how much she was worth then and how much she is worth now. The fine is the same for all. And any sum that is fixed in the Torah remains the same for all.
He who declares, “I seduced the daughter of so-and-so” must pay compensation for embarrassment and blemish on his own admission but need not pay the fine. He who declares, “I have stolen” must make restitution for the principal on his own evidence but need not repay double, fourfold or fivefold. [He who declares,] “My ox has killed so-and-so” or “the ox of so-and-so” must make restitution on his own evidence. [If he said] “My ox has killed the slave of so-and-so” he need not make restitution on his own evidence. This is the general rule: whoever pays more than the actual cost of the damage he has done need not pay it on his own evidence.
He who declares, “I seduced the daughter of so-and-so” must pay compensation for embarrassment and blemish on his own admission but need not pay the fine. He who declares, “I have stolen” must make restitution for the principal on his own evidence but need not repay double, fourfold or fivefold. [He who declares,] “My ox has killed so-and-so” or “the ox of so-and-so” must make restitution on his own evidence. [If he said] “My ox has killed the slave of so-and-so” he need not make restitution on his own evidence. This is the general rule: whoever pays more than the actual cost of the damage he has done need not pay it on his own evidence.
He who declares, “I seduced the daughter of so-and-so” must pay compensation for embarrassment and blemish on his own admission but need not pay the fine. He who declares, “I have stolen” must make restitution for the principal on his own evidence but need not repay double, fourfold or fivefold. [He who declares,] “My ox has killed so-and-so” or “the ox of so-and-so” must make restitution on his own evidence. [If he said] “My ox has killed the slave of so-and-so” he need not make restitution on his own evidence. This is the general rule: whoever pays more than the actual cost of the damage he has done need not pay it on his own evidence.
He who declares, “I seduced the daughter of so-and-so” must pay compensation for embarrassment and blemish on his own admission but need not pay the fine. He who declares, “I have stolen” must make restitution for the principal on his own evidence but need not repay double, fourfold or fivefold. [He who declares,] “My ox has killed so-and-so” or “the ox of so-and-so” must make restitution on his own evidence. [If he said] “My ox has killed the slave of so-and-so” he need not make restitution on his own evidence. This is the general rule: whoever pays more than the actual cost of the damage he has done need not pay it on his own evidence.
He who declares, “I seduced the daughter of so-and-so” must pay compensation for embarrassment and blemish on his own admission but need not pay the fine. He who declares, “I have stolen” must make restitution for the principal on his own evidence but need not repay double, fourfold or fivefold. [He who declares,] “My ox has killed so-and-so” or “the ox of so-and-so” must make restitution on his own evidence. [If he said] “My ox has killed the slave of so-and-so” he need not make restitution on his own evidence. This is the general rule: whoever pays more than the actual cost of the damage he has done need not pay it on his own evidence.
A wife’s find and her handiwork belong to her husband. And [concerning] her inheritance: He has the usufruct during her lifetime. [Any compensation for] an embarrassment or blemish [that may have been inflicted upon] her belongs to her. Rabbi Judah ben Batera says: [if the embarrassment or blemish was inflicted upon her] on a hidden place [on her body] she receives two-thirds while he receives one-third; if on an open place [on her body] he receives two-thirds and she receives one-third. His share is to be given to him immediately, but with hers land is to be bought and he enjoys the usufruct.
A wife’s find and her handiwork belong to her husband. And [concerning] her inheritance: He has the usufruct during her lifetime. [Any compensation for] an embarrassment or blemish [that may have been inflicted upon] her belongs to her. Rabbi Judah ben Batera says: [if the embarrassment or blemish was inflicted upon her] on a hidden place [on her body] she receives two-thirds while he receives one-third; if on an open place [on her body] he receives two-thirds and she receives one-third. His share is to be given to him immediately, but with hers land is to be bought and he enjoys the usufruct.
A wife’s find and her handiwork belong to her husband. And [concerning] her inheritance: He has the usufruct during her lifetime. [Any compensation for] an embarrassment or blemish [that may have been inflicted upon] her belongs to her. Rabbi Judah ben Batera says: [if the embarrassment or blemish was inflicted upon her] on a hidden place [on her body] she receives two-thirds while he receives one-third; if on an open place [on her body] he receives two-thirds and she receives one-third. His share is to be given to him immediately, but with hers land is to be bought and he enjoys the usufruct.
A wife’s find and her handiwork belong to her husband. And [concerning] her inheritance: He has the usufruct during her lifetime. [Any compensation for] an embarrassment or blemish [that may have been inflicted upon] her belongs to her. Rabbi Judah ben Batera says: [if the embarrassment or blemish was inflicted upon her] on a hidden place [on her body] she receives two-thirds while he receives one-third; if on an open place [on her body] he receives two-thirds and she receives one-third. His share is to be given to him immediately, but with hers land is to be bought and he enjoys the usufruct.
If a man betrothed a woman on condition that she was under no vows and she was found to be under vows, she is not betrothed. If he married her without making any conditions and she was found to be under vows, she leaves without her ketubah. [If a woman was betrothed] on condition that she has no bodily defects, and she was found to have defects, she is not betrothed. If he married her without making any conditions and she was found to have defects, she leaves without her ketubah. All defects which disqualify priests also disqualify women.
If a man betrothed a woman on condition that she was under no vows and she was found to be under vows, she is not betrothed. If he married her without making any conditions and she was found to be under vows, she leaves without her ketubah. [If a woman was betrothed] on condition that she has no bodily defects, and she was found to have defects, she is not betrothed. If he married her without making any conditions and she was found to have defects, she leaves without her ketubah. All defects which disqualify priests also disqualify women.
If a woman came into the possession of property before she was betrothed, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away and her act is legally valid. If she came into the possession of property after she was betrothed, Bet Shammai says: she may sell it, and Beth Hillel says: she may not sell it. Both agree that if she had sold it or given it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Judah said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also acquire her property?” If she came into the possession of property after she was married, both agree that, even if she had sold it or given it away, the husband may seize it from the buyers. [If she came into possession] before she married and then she married, Rabban Gamaliel says: if she sold it or gave it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Hanina ben Akavya said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also gain acquires her property?” He replied, “We are embarrassed with regard to her new possessions and you wish to roll over on us her old ones as well?”
If his brother left money, land shall be bought with it and he enjoys the usufruct. Rabbi Meir says, the land is to be valued as to how much it is worth with the produce and how much without the produce, and with the difference land should be bought and the husband is entitled to the usufruct. [If the his brother left] produce that was detached from the ground, land shall be bought [out of the proceeds] and he enjoys the usufruct. The Sages say: produce attached to the ground belongs to the husband but that which is detached from the ground belongs to the first person who takes it: [If it was] produce attached to the ground: If he [seized it] first he acquires ownership; and if she [seized it] first land shall be bought with it and he enjoys the usufruct. If he married her she is his wife in every respect save that her ketubah remains a debt on her first husband’s estate.
He cannot say to her, “Behold your ketubah lies on the table’, rather all of his property has on it a lien from her kethubah. So too, a man may not say to his wife, behold your ketubah lies on the table, but all of his property has on it a lien from her ketubah. If he divorced her she is entitled only to her ketubah. If he remarried her she is like all other wives, and is entitled only to her ketubah.
He cannot say to her, “Behold your ketubah lies on the table’, rather all of his property has on it a lien from her kethubah. So too, a man may not say to his wife, behold your ketubah lies on the table, but all of his property has on it a lien from her ketubah. If he divorced her she is entitled only to her ketubah. If he remarried her she is like all other wives, and is entitled only to her ketubah.
He cannot say to her, “Behold your ketubah lies on the table’, rather all of his property has on it a lien from her kethubah. So too, a man may not say to his wife, behold your ketubah lies on the table, but all of his property has on it a lien from her ketubah. If he divorced her she is entitled only to her ketubah. If he remarried her she is like all other wives, and is entitled only to her ketubah.
He cannot say to her, “Behold your ketubah lies on the table’, rather all of his property has on it a lien from her kethubah. So too, a man may not say to his wife, behold your ketubah lies on the table, but all of his property has on it a lien from her ketubah. If he divorced her she is entitled only to her ketubah. If he remarried her she is like all other wives, and is entitled only to her ketubah.
If a husband writes to his wife, “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property”, he may enjoy its usufruct during her lifetime and, when she dies, he is her heir. If so, why might he have written to her, “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property”? That if she sold it or gave it away her act is valid. If he wrote, “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property and upon their produce”, he may not enjoy their usufruct during her lifetime but, when she dies, he inherits her. Rabbi Judah says: he may in all cases enjoy the usufruct from the usufruct unless he wrote to her: “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property and upon its produce and the produce of its produce and so on without end.” If he wrote, “I have no claim whatsoever upon your property, its produce and the produce of its produce during your lifetime and after your death”, he may neither enjoy it produce during her lifetime nor does he inherit her when she dies. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: when she dies he inherits her because [by his declaration] he is making a condition which is contrary to what is written in the Torah and whenever a man makes a condition which is contrary to what is written in the Torah, his condition is null and void.
A woman who impairs her kethubah is not paid except by an oath. If one witness testifies against her that [her kethubah] has been paid, she is not be paid except by an oath. From the property of orphans, from property with a lien on it and [from the property of] an husband who is not present she is not paid except by an oath.
“A woman who impairs her kethubah”: How is this so? If her ketubah was for a thousand zuz and [her husband] said to her, “You have already received your kethubah”, and she says, “I received only a maneh”, she is not paid [the balance] except by an oath. “If one witness testifies against her that [her kethubah] has been paid”: How is this so? If her ketubah was for a thousand zuz and [her husband] said to her, “You have already received your ketubah”, and she says, “I have not received it” and one witness testifies against her that [the ketubah] has been paid, she is not paid except by an oath. “From property with a lien on it”: How is this so? He had sold his property to others and she seeks to recover payment from the buyers, she is not paid except by an oath. “From the property of orphans”: How is this so? He died and left his estate to his orphans and she seeks to recover payment from the orphans, she is not paid except by an oath. “An husband who is not present” How is this so? If her husband went to a country beyond the sea and she seeks to recover payment in his absence, she is not paid except by an oath. Rabbi Shimon says: whenever she claims her ketubah the heirs may impose an oath upon her but whenever she does not claim her ketubah the heirs can not impose an oath upon her.
If she produced a get without a ketubah, she collects her kethubah. [If she produced her] ketubah without a get, and she says, “My get was lost”, and he says, “My receipt was lost”, and also a creditor who produced a debt document that was unaccompanied by a prosbul, these are not paid back. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: from the time of danger a woman collects her ketubah with out a get and a creditor collects [his debt] without a prosbul. [A woman who produced] two letters of divorce and two ketuboth collects two kethuboth. Two kethuboth and one get or one kethubah and two gittin, or a kethubah, a get and [evidence of her husband’s] death, she collects one kethubah only, for a man who divorces his wife and then remarries her contracts his second marriage on the condition of the first kethubah. A minor whose his father had given him in marriage, the ketubah of his wife is valid, since it is on this condition that he kept her as his wife. A convert who converted with his wife, the kethubah remains valid, since it is on this condition that he kept her as his wife.
If she produced a get without a ketubah, she collects her kethubah. [If she produced her] ketubah without a get, and she says, “My get was lost”, and he says, “My receipt was lost”, and also a creditor who produced a debt document that was unaccompanied by a prosbul, these are not paid back. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: from the time of danger a woman collects her ketubah with out a get and a creditor collects [his debt] without a prosbul. [A woman who produced] two letters of divorce and two ketuboth collects two kethuboth. Two kethuboth and one get or one kethubah and two gittin, or a kethubah, a get and [evidence of her husband’s] death, she collects one kethubah only, for a man who divorces his wife and then remarries her contracts his second marriage on the condition of the first kethubah. A minor whose his father had given him in marriage, the ketubah of his wife is valid, since it is on this condition that he kept her as his wife. A convert who converted with his wife, the kethubah remains valid, since it is on this condition that he kept her as his wife.
If she produced a get without a ketubah, she collects her kethubah. [If she produced her] ketubah without a get, and she says, “My get was lost”, and he says, “My receipt was lost”, and also a creditor who produced a debt document that was unaccompanied by a prosbul, these are not paid back. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: from the time of danger a woman collects her ketubah with out a get and a creditor collects [his debt] without a prosbul. [A woman who produced] two letters of divorce and two ketuboth collects two kethuboth. Two kethuboth and one get or one kethubah and two gittin, or a kethubah, a get and [evidence of her husband’s] death, she collects one kethubah only, for a man who divorces his wife and then remarries her contracts his second marriage on the condition of the first kethubah. A minor whose his father had given him in marriage, the ketubah of his wife is valid, since it is on this condition that he kept her as his wife. A convert who converted with his wife, the kethubah remains valid, since it is on this condition that he kept her as his wife.
If a man who was married to four wives died, his first wife takes precedence over the second, the second over the third and the third over the fourth. The first must take an oath to the second, the second to the third, and the third to the fourth, and the fourth recovers payment without an oath. Ben Nannus says: Should she be rewarded because she is the last? She too may not exact payment except by an oath. If all were issued on the same day then the woman [whose kethubah] preceded that of the other, even if only by one hour, gets [her ketubah first]. And so it was the custom in Jerusalem to write the hours. If all kethuboth were issued at the same hour and the estate is worth no more than a maneh, they divide it equally.
If a man who was married to two wives sold his field, and the first wife wrote to the buyer, “I have no claim whatsoever upon you”, the second wife may take [the field] away from the buyer, and the first wife from the second, and the buyer from the first wife; and so they go on in turn until they arrange a compromise between them. The same law applies also to a creditor and to a woman creditor.
[A minor] who refused her husband, a secondary incest prohibition, or an aylonit is not entitled to a ketubah or to the usufruct [of her dowry] or to maintenance, or to the worn-out articles [of her dowry]. If from the outset he had married on the understanding that she is an aylonit she is entitled to a ketubah. A widow who was married to a high priest, a divorced woman or a halutzah who was married to a regular priest, a mamzereth or a netinah who was married to an Israelite, or the daughter of an Israelite who was married to a Natin or a mamzer is entitled to a ketubah.
If she married, her husband must supply her with maintenance and they give her the cost of her maintenance. If they die, their daughters are maintained out of their free assets only but she must be maintained even out of assigned property, because she is like a creditor. Clever men used to write, “On condition that I shall maintain your daughter for five years while you are with me”.
If a man went to a country beyond the sea and someone came forward and financially supported his wife, Hanan says: he lost his money. The sons of the high priests differed from him and said: let him take an oath as to how much he spent and recover it. Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas agreed with their ruling. Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai said: Hanan has spoken well [the man] put his money on the horn of a deer.
If a man contests [the ownership of] a field and he has signed as a witness on [its deed of sale], Admon says: He can say, “[Litigation with] the second is easier for me, since the first is a more difficult person than he”. But the Sages say: He lost his right. If [the protester] made it a boundary mark [when selling an adjacent piece of land to] another person he has lost his right [to protest].
If one says “Not-unconsecrated food shall I not eat from you”, “Not fit”, or “Not pure”, “Clean” or “Unclean”, “Remnant” or “Piggul he is bound [by his vow]. [If one says, “May it be to me], as the lamb”, “As the Temple pens”, “As the wood [on the altar]”, “As the fire [on the altar]”, “As the altar”, “As the Temple” or “As Jerusalem”; [or] if one vowed by reference to the altar utensils, even though he did not mention “korban”, behold this one was vowed by a korban. Rabbi Judah said: He who says “Jerusalem” has said nothing.
If one says “Not-unconsecrated food shall I not eat from you”, “Not fit”, or “Not pure”, “Clean” or “Unclean”, “Remnant” or “Piggul he is bound [by his vow]. [If one says, “May it be to me], as the lamb”, “As the Temple pens”, “As the wood [on the altar]”, “As the fire [on the altar]”, “As the altar”, “As the Temple” or “As Jerusalem”; [or] if one vowed by reference to the altar utensils, even though he did not mention “korban”, behold this one was vowed by a korban. Rabbi Judah said: He who says “Jerusalem” has said nothing.
And these [vows] are not binding: [One who says] “What I eat of yours shall be unconsecrated”; “As the flesh of the swine”; “As an object of idolatrous worship”; “As hides pierced at the heart”; “As carrion”; “As terefoth”; “As abominations”; “As creeping things”; “As Aaron’s dough”; “As his terumah”--[in all these cases the vow is] not binding. If one says to his wife, “Behold! You are like my mother to me”, he must be given an opening on other grounds, in order that he should not act lightly in such matters. [If one says,] “Konam if I sleep”; “If I speak”; or “If I walk”; or if one says to his wife, “Konam if I cohabit with you,” he is liable to [the biblical prohibition] “he shall not break his word” (Numbers 30:. [If he says,] “I swear] an oath not to sleep”, or, “talk,” or, “walk,” he is forbidden [to do so].
[If he says,] “A korban should be what I do not eat of yours”; “By a korban! If I eat of yours”; “What I do not eat of yours should not be a korban to me” the vow is not binding. [If he says], “An oath [that] I will not eat of yours”; “An oath that I eat of yours”; “No oath [that] I will not eat of yours” his oath is valid. In these instances oaths are more stringent than vows. There is [also] greater stringency in vows than in oaths. How so? If one says, “Konam be the sukkah that I make,”; “The lulav that I take”; “The tefillin that I put on”; as vows they are binding, but as oaths they are not, because one cannot swear to transgress the commandments.
If one vows by herem, and says, “I vowed only by a herem (a of the sea”; [If he says] “By a korban”, and then says, “I vowed only by korbanot (gifts) of kings”; [If he says] “Behold! I myself (atzmi) am a korban”, and then says, “I vowed only by the etzem (bone) which I keep for the purpose of vowing”; [If he says,] “Konam be any benefit my wife has from me”, and then says, “I spoke only of my first wife, whom I have divorced” Regarding none of these [vows] should they inquire [of a sage in order to break them], but if they inquire about them, they are punished and treated strictly, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: they are given an opening on other grounds, in order that they should not act lightly with vows.
Vows of exaggeration: If one says, “Konam if I did not see on this road as many as departed from Egypt”; “If I did not see a snake [as thick as the] the beam of an olive press. Vows in error: [If one says, “Konam,] if I ate or drank”, and then remembered that he had; “If I eat or drink” and then forgot [his vow] and ate or drank; “Konam be any benefit which my wife has from me, because she stole my purse or beat my child, and it was subsequently learnt that she had not beaten him nor stolen”; If one saw people eating [his] figs and said to them, “Let the figs be a korban to you,” and then discovered the people to be his father or his brothers. If others were with them: Beth Shammai says: his father and brothers are permitted, but the rest are forbidden. Beth Hillel says: all are permitted.
He who vows [not to benefit] from those who rest on the Sabbath, is forbidden [to benefit] both from Israelites and Samaritans (Cutheans). If he vows [not to benefit] from garlic eaters, he may not benefit from Israelites and Samaritans (Cutheans). From those who go up to Jerusalem, he is forbidden [to benefit] from Israelites but from Samaritans (Cutheans) he is permitted.
The only difference between one who is under a vow not to benefit at all from his neighbor, and one who is under a vow prohibiting food benefit, is in respect of walking [on his property] and [the use of] utensils not employed in the preparation of food. If a man is under a vow not to derive food benefit from his neighbor, he may not lend him a sifter, sieve, mill-stone or oven, but he may lend him a cloak, ring, garment, and earrings, and whatever is not employed in the preparation of food. In a place where things such as these are rented out, it is forbidden.
If one is forbidden to benefit from his neighbor, and he pays him a visit [in sickness] he must stand, but not sit. He may afford him a cure of life, but not a cure of money. He may bathe together with him in a large bath, but not in a small one. He may sleep in a bed with him. Rabbi Judah said: in summer, but not in winter, because he thereby benefits him. He may [nevertheless] recline with him on a couch. [He may] eat at the same table with him but not out of the same bowl; but he may eat with him out of a bowl which returns. He may not eat with him out of the food trough put before laborers. He may not work with him on the same furrow, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: he may work at a distance from him.
If one is forbidden to benefit from his neighbor, and he pays him a visit [in sickness] he must stand, but not sit. He may afford him a cure of life, but not a cure of money. He may bathe together with him in a large bath, but not in a small one. He may sleep in a bed with him. Rabbi Judah said: in summer, but not in winter, because he thereby benefits him. He may [nevertheless] recline with him on a couch. [He may] eat at the same table with him but not out of the same bowl; but he may eat with him out of a bowl which returns. He may not eat with him out of the food trough put before laborers. He may not work with him on the same furrow, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: he may work at a distance from him.
If they are walking together on the road, and he has nothing to eat, he can make a gift to a third person, and he is permitted [to eat] it. If there is no one else with them, he may put it on a stone or a wall and say, “This is free to whomever desires it”, and the other takes and eats it. Rabbi Yose prohibits this.
If they are walking together on the road, and he has nothing to eat, he can make a gift to a third person, and he is permitted [to eat] it. If there is no one else with them, he may put it on a stone or a wall and say, “This is free to whomever desires it”, and the other takes and eats it. Rabbi Yose prohibits this.
[If he says,] “Until the summer,” or, “Until the summer shall be,” [he is forbidden] until people begin to bring [the figs] home in baskets. “Until the summer [harvest] is past,” [he is forbidden] until the knives are folded up [and put away]. [If he vows,] “Until the harvest,” [he is forbidden] until the people begin reaping the wheat harvest, but not the barley harvest. It all depends on the place where he vowed: if in hill-country, the hill-country [harvest]; if in the valley, the valley harvest.
If one vowed as a betrothed woman, and then was divorced on that day and betrothed [again] on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and last betrothed husband can annul her vows. This is the general rule: as long as she has not passed out into her own control for even one hour, her father and last husband can annul her vows.
If one vowed as a betrothed woman, and then was divorced on that day and betrothed [again] on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and last betrothed husband can annul her vows. This is the general rule: as long as she has not passed out into her own control for even one hour, her father and last husband can annul her vows.
The annulment of vows is the whole day. This may result in a stringency or in a leniency. How is this so? If she vowed on the eve of the Sabbath, he can annul on the eve of the sabbath and on the Sabbath day until nightfall. If she vowed just before nightfall, he can annul only until nightfall: for if night fell and he had not annulled it, he can no longer annul it.
The annulment of vows is the whole day. This may result in a stringency or in a leniency. How is this so? If she vowed on the eve of the Sabbath, he can annul on the eve of the sabbath and on the Sabbath day until nightfall. If she vowed just before nightfall, he can annul only until nightfall: for if night fell and he had not annulled it, he can no longer annul it.
The annulment of vows is the whole day. This may result in a stringency or in a leniency. How is this so? If she vowed on the eve of the Sabbath, he can annul on the eve of the sabbath and on the Sabbath day until nightfall. If she vowed just before nightfall, he can annul only until nightfall: for if night fell and he had not annulled it, he can no longer annul it.
“But every vow of a widow and of a divorcee… shall be binding upon her” (Numbers 30:9). How is this so? If she said, “Behold, I will be a nazirite after thirty days”, even if she married within the thirty days, he cannot annul it. If she vows while in her husband’s domain, he can annul [the vow] for her. How is this so? If she said, “Behold, I will be a nazirite after thirty days,” [and her husband annulled it], even though she was widowed or divorced within the thirty days, it is annulled. If she vowed on one day, and he divorced her on the same day and took her back on the same day, he cannot annul it. This is the general rule: once she has gone into her own domain [even] for a single hour, he cannot annul.
“But every vow of a widow and of a divorcee… shall be binding upon her” (Numbers 30:9). How is this so? If she said, “Behold, I will be a nazirite after thirty days”, even if she married within the thirty days, he cannot annul it. If she vows while in her husband’s domain, he can annul [the vow] for her. How is this so? If she said, “Behold, I will be a nazirite after thirty days,” [and her husband annulled it], even though she was widowed or divorced within the thirty days, it is annulled. If she vowed on one day, and he divorced her on the same day and took her back on the same day, he cannot annul it. This is the general rule: once she has gone into her own domain [even] for a single hour, he cannot annul.
“But every vow of a widow and of a divorcee… shall be binding upon her” (Numbers 30:9). How is this so? If she said, “Behold, I will be a nazirite after thirty days”, even if she married within the thirty days, he cannot annul it. If she vows while in her husband’s domain, he can annul [the vow] for her. How is this so? If she said, “Behold, I will be a nazirite after thirty days,” [and her husband annulled it], even though she was widowed or divorced within the thirty days, it is annulled. If she vowed on one day, and he divorced her on the same day and took her back on the same day, he cannot annul it. This is the general rule: once she has gone into her own domain [even] for a single hour, he cannot annul.
At first they would say that three women must be divorced and receive their ketubah: She who says: “I am defiled to you”; “Heaven is between me and you”; “I have been removed from the Jews.” But subsequently they changed the ruling to prevent her from setting her eye on another and spoiling herself to her husband: She who said, “I am defiled unto you” must bring proof. “Heaven is between me and you” they [shall appease them] by a request. “I have been removed from the Jews” he [the husband] must annul his portion, and she may have relations with him, and she shall be removed from other Jews.
[If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite as the hairs of my head”, or “As the dust of the earth”, or “As the sands of the sea,” he becomes a life-nazirite, and shaves his head every thirty days. Rabbi says: this one does not shave his head every thirty days. The one who shave his head every thirty days is the one who says, “Behold, upon me are naziriteships as the hair on my head”, or “As the dust of the earth”, or “As the sands of the sea.”
[If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite, on condition that I can drink wine, or can have contact with the dead”, he becomes a nazirite, and all these things are forbidden him. [If he says,] “I knew that there is such a thing as naziriteship but I did not know that a nazirite is forbidden to drink wine”, he is bound [to his vow]. Rabbi Shimon releases him. [If he says,] “I knew that a nazirite is forbidden to drink wine, but I imagined that the sages would give me permission, since I cannot do without wine”, or “since [my profession] is to bury the dead”, he is released. Rabbi Shimon binds him [to his vow].
[If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite and I take it upon myself to bring the hair offering of another nazirite”, and his friend heard and said “I too, and I take it upon myself to bring the hair offering of another nazirite”, then, if they are clever they will bring the other’s hair offering; otherwise they must bring hair offerings on behalf of other nazirites.
[If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite [now] and a nazirite when I shall have a son”, and begins to count his own [naziriteship] and then a son is born to him, he completes his own [naziriteship] and then counts the one on account of his son. [If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite when I shall have a son, and a nazirite [on my own account]”, and begins to count his own [naziriteship] and then a son is born to him, he interrupts his own [naziriteship], counts the one on account of his son, and then complete his own.
[If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite [now] and a nazirite when I shall have a son”, and begins to count his own [naziriteship] and then a son is born to him, he completes his own [naziriteship] and then counts the one on account of his son. [If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite when I shall have a son, and a nazirite [on my own account]”, and begins to count his own [naziriteship] and then a son is born to him, he interrupts his own [naziriteship], counts the one on account of his son, and then complete his own.
[If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite [now] and a nazirite when I shall have a son”, and begins to count his own [naziriteship] and then a son is born to him, he completes his own [naziriteship] and then counts the one on account of his son. [If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite when I shall have a son, and a nazirite [on my own account]”, and begins to count his own [naziriteship] and then a son is born to him, he interrupts his own [naziriteship], counts the one on account of his son, and then complete his own.
[If one says] “Behold, I am a nazirite when I shall have a son, and I will be a nazirite for one hundred days [on my own account],”: if a son was born to him before the expiration of seventy days, he loses none of this period; but if after seventy days, it voids [anything over the] seventy days, since there can be no shaving for a period of less than thirty days.
If one says, “Behold, I am a nazirite,” he shaves on the thirty-first day. If he shaved on the thirtieth day, he has fulfilled his obligation. [If, however, he says] “Behold, I am a nazirite for thirty days,” and shaves on the thirtieth day, he has not fulfilled his obligation.
If one says, “Behold, I am a nazirite,” he shaves on the thirty-first day. If he shaved on the thirtieth day, he has fulfilled his obligation. [If, however, he says] “Behold, I am a nazirite for thirty days,” and shaves on the thirtieth day, he has not fulfilled his obligation.
If one says, “Behold, I am a nazirite,” he shaves on the thirty-first day. If he shaved on the thirtieth day, he has fulfilled his obligation. [If, however, he says] “Behold, I am a nazirite for thirty days,” and shaves on the thirtieth day, he has not fulfilled his obligation.
If a man vows two naziriteships, he shaves for the first one on the thirty-first day, and for the second on the sixty-first day. If he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he can shave for the second on the sixtieth day. If he shaved on the day before the sixtieth, he has fulfilled his obligation. For this was the testimony that Rabbi Papias testified concerning one who vows two naziriteships, that if he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he is to shave for the second on the sixtieth day. And if he shaved on the day before the sixtieth day, he has fulfilled his obligation, the thirtieth day counting towards the required number.
If a man vows two naziriteships, he shaves for the first one on the thirty-first day, and for the second on the sixty-first day. If he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he can shave for the second on the sixtieth day. If he shaved on the day before the sixtieth, he has fulfilled his obligation. For this was the testimony that Rabbi Papias testified concerning one who vows two naziriteships, that if he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he is to shave for the second on the sixtieth day. And if he shaved on the day before the sixtieth day, he has fulfilled his obligation, the thirtieth day counting towards the required number.
If a man vows two naziriteships, he shaves for the first one on the thirty-first day, and for the second on the sixty-first day. If he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he can shave for the second on the sixtieth day. If he shaved on the day before the sixtieth, he has fulfilled his obligation. For this was the testimony that Rabbi Papias testified concerning one who vows two naziriteships, that if he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he is to shave for the second on the sixtieth day. And if he shaved on the day before the sixtieth day, he has fulfilled his obligation, the thirtieth day counting towards the required number.
If a man vows two naziriteships, he shaves for the first one on the thirty-first day, and for the second on the sixty-first day. If he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he can shave for the second on the sixtieth day. If he shaved on the day before the sixtieth, he has fulfilled his obligation. For this was the testimony that Rabbi Papias testified concerning one who vows two naziriteships, that if he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he is to shave for the second on the sixtieth day. And if he shaved on the day before the sixtieth day, he has fulfilled his obligation, the thirtieth day counting towards the required number.
If a man vows two naziriteships, he shaves for the first one on the thirty-first day, and for the second on the sixty-first day. If he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he can shave for the second on the sixtieth day. If he shaved on the day before the sixtieth, he has fulfilled his obligation. For this was the testimony that Rabbi Papias testified concerning one who vows two naziriteships, that if he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he is to shave for the second on the sixtieth day. And if he shaved on the day before the sixtieth day, he has fulfilled his obligation, the thirtieth day counting towards the required number.
If a man vows two naziriteships, he shaves for the first one on the thirty-first day, and for the second on the sixty-first day. If he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he can shave for the second on the sixtieth day. If he shaved on the day before the sixtieth, he has fulfilled his obligation. For this was the testimony that Rabbi Papias testified concerning one who vows two naziriteships, that if he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he is to shave for the second on the sixtieth day. And if he shaved on the day before the sixtieth day, he has fulfilled his obligation, the thirtieth day counting towards the required number.
If a man vows two naziriteships, he shaves for the first one on the thirty-first day, and for the second on the sixty-first day. If he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he can shave for the second on the sixtieth day. If he shaved on the day before the sixtieth, he has fulfilled his obligation. For this was the testimony that Rabbi Papias testified concerning one who vows two naziriteships, that if he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he is to shave for the second on the sixtieth day. And if he shaved on the day before the sixtieth day, he has fulfilled his obligation, the thirtieth day counting towards the required number.
If a man vows two naziriteships, he shaves for the first one on the thirty-first day, and for the second on the sixty-first day. If he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he can shave for the second on the sixtieth day. If he shaved on the day before the sixtieth, he has fulfilled his obligation. For this was the testimony that Rabbi Papias testified concerning one who vows two naziriteships, that if he shaved for the first on the thirtieth day, he is to shave for the second on the sixtieth day. And if he shaved on the day before the sixtieth day, he has fulfilled his obligation, the thirtieth day counting towards the required number.
If one says, “Behold, I am a nazirite,” and becomes impure on the thirtieth day, he renders void the whole period. Rabbi Eliezer says: only seven days are void. [If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite for thirty days”, and becomes impure on the thirtieth day, then he renders void the whole period.
If one says, “Behold, I am a nazirite,” and becomes impure on the thirtieth day, he renders void the whole period. Rabbi Eliezer says: only seven days are void. [If one says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite for thirty days”, and becomes impure on the thirtieth day, then he renders void the whole period.
[If he says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite for one hundred days,” and becomes impure on the hundredth day, he renders void the whole period. Rabbi Eliezer says: only thirty days are void. If he becomes impure on the hundred and first day, thirty days are void. Rabbi Eliezer says: only seven days are void.
[If he says,] “Behold, I am a nazirite for one hundred days,” and becomes impure on the hundredth day, he renders void the whole period. Rabbi Eliezer says: only thirty days are void. If he becomes impure on the hundred and first day, thirty days are void. Rabbi Eliezer says: only seven days are void.
If one takes a nazirite vow while in a graveyard, then even if he remains there for thirty days, these do not count, and he does not have to bring the sacrifice [prescribed] for impurity. If he leaves it and re-enters, [the period] counts, and he must bring the sacrifice [prescribed] for impurity. Rabbi Eliezer says: not [if he re-enters] on the same day, for it says, “But the former days shall be void,” (Numbers 6:12) until there are former days.
If one of the kinds of blood has been sprinkled on her behalf, [the husband] can no longer annul [the vow]. Rabbi Akiba says: even if one of the animals has been slaughtered on her behalf, he can no longer annul [the vow]. When is this true? If she is shaving [after observing the naziriteship] in purity, but if she is shaving after ritual defilement, he can [still] annul [the vow], because he can say, “I do not want a disgraced woman.” Rabbi says that he can annul [her vow] even if she is shaving [after observing the naziriteship] in purity, since he can say: “I do not want a woman who is shaved.
If one of the kinds of blood has been sprinkled on her behalf, [the husband] can no longer annul [the vow]. Rabbi Akiba says: even if one of the animals has been slaughtered on her behalf, he can no longer annul [the vow]. When is this true? If she is shaving [after observing the naziriteship] in purity, but if she is shaving after ritual defilement, he can [still] annul [the vow], because he can say, “I do not want a disgraced woman.” Rabbi says that he can annul [her vow] even if she is shaving [after observing the naziriteship] in purity, since he can say: “I do not want a woman who is shaved.
A man may impose a nazirite vow on his son, but a woman cannot impose a nazirite vow on her son. How so? [If the boy] shaves himself or is shaved by his relatives, or if he protests or his relatives protest on his behalf, Then if [the father] had set aside an animal [for the sacrifice]: the sin-offering is left to die, the burnt-offering is offered as an [ordinary] burnt-offering, and the peace-offering is offered as an [ordinary] peace-offering, and it may be eaten for one day [only], and it does not require loaves of bread. If he had a lump sum of money [set aside for the purchase of these sacrifices] it is to be used for voluntary offerings; If he had specified money: The money for the sin-offering is to be taken to the Dead Sea, the use of it is forbidden, but the laws of sacrilege do not apply; The money for the burnt-offering they bring a burnt-offering, and the laws of sacrilege do apply; The money for the peace-offering they bring a peace-offering, and it may be eaten for one day [only], and it does not require loaves of bread.
A man may impose a nazirite vow on his son, but a woman cannot impose a nazirite vow on her son. How so? [If the boy] shaves himself or is shaved by his relatives, or if he protests or his relatives protest on his behalf, Then if [the father] had set aside an animal [for the sacrifice]: the sin-offering is left to die, the burnt-offering is offered as an [ordinary] burnt-offering, and the peace-offering is offered as an [ordinary] peace-offering, and it may be eaten for one day [only], and it does not require loaves of bread. If he had a lump sum of money [set aside for the purchase of these sacrifices] it is to be used for voluntary offerings; If he had specified money: The money for the sin-offering is to be taken to the Dead Sea, the use of it is forbidden, but the laws of sacrilege do not apply; The money for the burnt-offering they bring a burnt-offering, and the laws of sacrilege do apply; The money for the peace-offering they bring a peace-offering, and it may be eaten for one day [only], and it does not require loaves of bread.
A man may impose a nazirite vow on his son, but a woman cannot impose a nazirite vow on her son. How so? [If the boy] shaves himself or is shaved by his relatives, or if he protests or his relatives protest on his behalf, Then if [the father] had set aside an animal [for the sacrifice]: the sin-offering is left to die, the burnt-offering is offered as an [ordinary] burnt-offering, and the peace-offering is offered as an [ordinary] peace-offering, and it may be eaten for one day [only], and it does not require loaves of bread. If he had a lump sum of money [set aside for the purchase of these sacrifices] it is to be used for voluntary offerings; If he had specified money: The money for the sin-offering is to be taken to the Dead Sea, the use of it is forbidden, but the laws of sacrilege do not apply; The money for the burnt-offering they bring a burnt-offering, and the laws of sacrilege do apply; The money for the peace-offering they bring a peace-offering, and it may be eaten for one day [only], and it does not require loaves of bread.
A man can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship but a woman cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] her father’s naziriteship. How so? If a man’s father had been a nazirite, and had set apart a lump sum of money for [the sacrifices of] his naziriteship and died and [the son] said, “Behold, I am a nazirite on condition that I may shave with my father’s money.” Rabbi Yose said: this money is to be used for freewill-offerings, this man cannot shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship. Who is the one who can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship? He who was a nazirite together with his father, and whose father had set apart a lump sum of money for his nazirite [sacrifices] and died. This one can shave [with offerings set aside for] his father’s naziriteship.
He is liable for wine on its own, for grapes on their own, for grape-skins (hartzanim) on their own and for seeds (zagim) on their own. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said: there is no penalty unless he eats two grape-skins and one seed. What are harzanim and what are zagim? Harzanim: those are the outer part, and the zagim are the inner part, according to Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Yose says: that you may not err, [think of] the zug [bell] of an animal, the outer part is called the zug [hood] and the inner part the inbal [clapper].
He is liable for wine on its own, for grapes on their own, for grape-skins (hartzanim) on their own and for seeds (zagim) on their own. Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said: there is no penalty unless he eats two grape-skins and one seed. What are harzanim and what are zagim? Harzanim: those are the outer part, and the zagim are the inner part, according to Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Yose says: that you may not err, [think of] the zug [bell] of an animal, the outer part is called the zug [hood] and the inner part the inbal [clapper].