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27058 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable.”
An elder rebelling against the ruling of the court [is strangled], for it says, “If there arise a matter too hard for you for judgement […you shall promptly repair to the place that the Lord your God will have chosen, and appear before the levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case, you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the Lord chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you. You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left. Should a man act presumptuously and disregard the priest charged with serving there the Lord your God, or the magistrate, that man shall die” (Deut. 17:8-13, JPS translation). Three courts of law were there, one situated at the entrance to the Temple mount, another at the door of the [Temple] court, and the third in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. They [first] went to the court which is at the entrance to the Temple mount, and he [the rebellious elder] stated, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this first court] had heard [a ruling on the matter], they state it. If not, they go to the [second court] which is at the entrance of the Temple court, and he declares, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this second court] had heard [a ruling on the matter] they state it; if not, they all proceed to the great court of the Chamber of Hewn Stone from whence instruction issued to all Israel, for it says, [you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you] from that place that the Lord chose (Deut. 17:10). If he returned to his town and taught again as he did before, he is not liable. But if he gave a practical decision, he is guilty, for it says, “Should a man act presumptuously” (Deut. 17:12) he is liable only for a practical ruling. But if a disciple gave a practical decision [opposed to the court], he is exempt: thus his stringency is his leniency.
An elder rebelling against the ruling of the court [is strangled], for it says, “If there arise a matter too hard for you for judgement […you shall promptly repair to the place that the Lord your God will have chosen, and appear before the levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case, you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the Lord chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you. You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left. Should a man act presumptuously and disregard the priest charged with serving there the Lord your God, or the magistrate, that man shall die” (Deut. 17:8-13, JPS translation). Three courts of law were there, one situated at the entrance to the Temple mount, another at the door of the [Temple] court, and the third in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. They [first] went to the court which is at the entrance to the Temple mount, and he [the rebellious elder] stated, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this first court] had heard [a ruling on the matter], they state it. If not, they go to the [second court] which is at the entrance of the Temple court, and he declares, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this second court] had heard [a ruling on the matter] they state it; if not, they all proceed to the great court of the Chamber of Hewn Stone from whence instruction issued to all Israel, for it says, [you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you] from that place that the Lord chose (Deut. 17:10). If he returned to his town and taught again as he did before, he is not liable. But if he gave a practical decision, he is guilty, for it says, “Should a man act presumptuously” (Deut. 17:12) he is liable only for a practical ruling. But if a disciple gave a practical decision [opposed to the court], he is exempt: thus his stringency is his leniency.
He [the rebellious elder] was executed neither by his local court nor by the court at Yavneh, but rather was taken to the great court in Jerusalem and kept there until the [next] festival and executed on the festival, for it says, “And all the people shall hear and fear, and do no more presumptuously” (Deut. 17:13), according to the words of Rabbi Akiba. Rabbi Judah says: “His judgment must not be delayed, but he is executed immediately, and proclamations are written and sent by messengers to all places, “So and so has been sentenced to death at the court.”
How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers? [If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years.
How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers? [If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years.
Witnesses are not condemned as perjurers until they themselves are incriminated; How so? If they said: “We testify that so and so killed a person” and others said to them: “How could you testify to that, as that murdered person or that [alleged] murderer was with us on that very day, at such and such a place?” [then] the witnesses are not condemned as perjurers. But, if these [other] witnesses said: “How could you testify to that, as on that very day, you were with us at such and such a place?’ [then] the former are condemned as perjurers, and are executed by their [the other witnesses] word.
Witnesses are not condemned as perjurers until they themselves are incriminated; How so? If they said: “We testify that so and so killed a person” and others said to them: “How could you testify to that, as that murdered person or that [alleged] murderer was with us on that very day, at such and such a place?” [then] the witnesses are not condemned as perjurers. But, if these [other] witnesses said: “How could you testify to that, as on that very day, you were with us at such and such a place?’ [then] the former are condemned as perjurers, and are executed by their [the other witnesses] word.
“A person shall be put to death only on the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses” (Deuteronomy 17:6). If the testimony is sufficiently established by two witnesses, why does Scripture [further] specify three? This is to compare two to three: just as three are competent to incriminate two as perjurers, so are two competent to incriminate three as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Shimon says: “Just as two witnesses are not put to death until both have been incriminated as perjurers, so three are not put to death until all three have been incriminated as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Akiba says: “The third witness was only mentioned in order to be stringent upon him and make his judgement the same as the other two. And if Scripture thus penalizes one who consorts with those who commit a transgression, as [if he is actually] one of those who commits the transgression, how much more so shall he who consorts with those who perform commandments receive a reward as [if he is actually] one of those who performs the commandments!”
If two persons see him [the transgressor] from one window and two other persons see him from another window and one standing in the middle warns him, then, if some on one side and some on the other side can see one another, they constitute together one body of evidence, but if they cannot [see one another], they are two bodies of evidence. Consequently, if one of these is found to be a perjurer, both [the transgressor] and those two witnesses are put to death, while other group of witnesses is exempt. Rabbi Yose says: “He is never put to death unless two witnesses had warned him, as it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses..” (Deut. 17:6). Another interpretation: “By the mouth of two witnesses”: that the Sanhedrin shall not hear the evidence from the mouth of an interpreter.
If two persons see him [the transgressor] from one window and two other persons see him from another window and one standing in the middle warns him, then, if some on one side and some on the other side can see one another, they constitute together one body of evidence, but if they cannot [see one another], they are two bodies of evidence. Consequently, if one of these is found to be a perjurer, both [the transgressor] and those two witnesses are put to death, while other group of witnesses is exempt. Rabbi Yose says: “He is never put to death unless two witnesses had warned him, as it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses..” (Deut. 17:6). Another interpretation: “By the mouth of two witnesses”: that the Sanhedrin shall not hear the evidence from the mouth of an interpreter.
The following go into banishment: one who kills in error. If [for instance] while he was pushing a roller [on the roof] and it fell down and killed somebody; If while he was lowering a cask it fell down and killed somebody; If while coming down a ladder he fell on somebody and killed him, he goes into banishment. But, if while he was pulling up the roller it fell back and killed somebody; If while he was raising a cask and the rope snapped and the cask fell and killed somebody; If while going up a ladder he fell down and killed somebody, he does not go into banishment. This is the general principle: [whenever the death was caused] in the course of a downward movement, he goes into banishment, but [if it was caused] not in the course of a downward movement, he does not go into banishment. If the iron slipped from its heft and killed [somebody]: Rabbi says, “He does not go into banishment.” And the Sages say: “He goes into banishment.” If it flew from the log being split: Rabbi says, “He goes into banishment.” And the Sages say: “He does not go into banishment.”
The following go into banishment: one who kills in error. If [for instance] while he was pushing a roller [on the roof] and it fell down and killed somebody; If while he was lowering a cask it fell down and killed somebody; If while coming down a ladder he fell on somebody and killed him, he goes into banishment. But, if while he was pulling up the roller it fell back and killed somebody; If while he was raising a cask and the rope snapped and the cask fell and killed somebody; If while going up a ladder he fell down and killed somebody, he does not go into banishment. This is the general principle: [whenever the death was caused] in the course of a downward movement, he goes into banishment, but [if it was caused] not in the course of a downward movement, he does not go into banishment. If the iron slipped from its heft and killed [somebody]: Rabbi says, “He does not go into banishment.” And the Sages say: “He goes into banishment.” If it flew from the log being split: Rabbi says, “He goes into banishment.” And the Sages say: “He does not go into banishment.”
The father goes into banishment for [the death of] his son, and the son goes into banishment for [that of] his father. All go into banishment for [the death of] an Israelite, and Israelites go into banishment on their account, except for a resident alien. And a resident alien does not go into banishment except for [the death of another] resident alien. A blind person does not go into banishment, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir says: “He goes into banishment.” An enemy does not go into banishment. Rabbi Yose bar Judah says: “An enemy is executed, for it is as if he has been warned.” Rabbi Shimon says: “There is an enemy that goes into banishment and there is an enemy that does not go into banishment: wherever it can be said that he had killed [his victim] wittingly, he goes not into banishment, and where he had slain unwittingly, he goes into banishment.
To where are they banished? To the cities of refuge, to the three cities situated on the far side of the Jordan and the three cities situated in Canaan, as it says, “Three cities shall be designated beyond the Jordan, and the other three shall be designated in the land of Canaan” (Numbers 35:14). Not until three cities were selected in the land of Israel did the [first] three cities beyond the jordan receive fugitives, as it says, “Six cities of refuge in all” (Numbers 35:13), until all six could simultaneously receive fugitives.
And direct roads were made leading from one to the other, as it says, “You shall prepare the way and divide the borders of your land into three parts” (Deut. 19:3). And they delegate to him two disciples of the Sages [as escorts] in case anyone attempted to slay him on the way, and that they might speak to him. Rabbi Meir says: “He may [even] plead his cause himself, as it says, “And this is the word of the manslayer” (Deut. 19:4).
A manslayer who went to his city of his refuge and the men of that city wished to do him honor, should [refuse] by saying to them, “I am a manslayer!”. If they say to him, “Nevertheless” he should accept from them [the proffered honor], as it is said: “and this is the word of the manslayer.” They used to pay rent to the Levites, according to the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir says: “They did not pay them rent.” And [on his return home] he returns to the office he formerly held, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: “He does not return to the office he formerly held.”
And these are liable to be flogged: One who had relations with his sister, or his father's sister, or his mother's sister, or his wife's sister, or his brother's wife, or his father's brother's wife, or a menstruant; A high priest who marries a widow, an ordinary priest who marries a divorcee or a halutzah; An Israelite who marries a mamzereth or natinah, or an Israelite woman who is married to a mamzer or a natin. In the case of a [woman who is both] a divorcee and a widow [a high priest] is liable on two counts. But in the case of a [woman who is both] a divorcee and a halutzah, an ordinary priest is liable only on one count.
And these are liable to be flogged: One who had relations with his sister, or his father's sister, or his mother's sister, or his wife's sister, or his brother's wife, or his father's brother's wife, or a menstruant; A high priest who marries a widow, an ordinary priest who marries a divorcee or a halutzah; An Israelite who marries a mamzereth or natinah, or an Israelite woman who is married to a mamzer or a natin. In the case of a [woman who is both] a divorcee and a widow [a high priest] is liable on two counts. But in the case of a [woman who is both] a divorcee and a halutzah, an ordinary priest is liable only on one count.
An unclean person who ate holy meat (Leviticus 7:20, 12:4); One who entered the sanctuary while unclean (Leviticus 12:4, Numbers 5:3, 19:13); One who ate forbidden fat or blood (Leviticus 3:16, 7:23-27); Or leftover sacrificial meats (Leviticus 19:6-8); Or sacrifices that had been offered up with improper intention (Leviticus 7:18); Or [an offering] that has became unclean (Leviticus 7:19); One who slaughters, or offers up a sacrifice, outside the Temple precincts (Leviticus 17:4); One who ate leavened [bread] during Passover (Exodus 12:15,; One who partakes of food [or drink] or does work on the Day of Atonement (Leviticus 23:27-31); One who puts together the ingredients for the [anointing] oil, or the ingredients for the incense, or anoints with the oil for anointing (Exodus 30:22-28): One who eats an animal that died a natural death (Deuteronomy 14:21); Or was improperly slaughtered (Exodus 22:30); Or any of the [creatures deemed] ‘abominable’ and ‘teeming’ (Leviticus 11:11,. One who eats non-tithed produce, or first-tithe from which heave offering has not been removed, or unredeemed second-tithe, or unredeemed sanctified property. How much untithed produce is one to eat to become liable? Rabbi Shimon says: “Any amount.” The Sages say: “An olive's size.” Rabbi Shimon said to them: “Do you not admit that if one ate the minutest ant that he would be liable? They said to him: “[Only] because it is a whole creature.” He said to them: “Even a grain of wheat is a whole entity.”
If a man makes a baldness on his head, or rounds the corner of his head, or mars the corner of his beard, or makes one cutting [in his flesh] for the dead, he is liable [to a flogging]. If he makes one cutting for five dead, or five cuttings for one, he is liable for each one. On [rounding] the head [he is liable] for two corners, one for one side and one for the other; On [marring] the beard [he is liable] for two [corners] on one side, for two on the other side, and for one lower down. Rabbi Eliezer says: “If they were all taken off at the same time he is liable only on one count.” And he is only liable if he takes off with a razor; Rabbi Eliezer says: “Even if he picks off the hairs with tweezers, or with pincers, he is liable.
If a man makes a baldness on his head, or rounds the corner of his head, or mars the corner of his beard, or makes one cutting [in his flesh] for the dead, he is liable [to a flogging]. If he makes one cutting for five dead, or five cuttings for one, he is liable for each one. On [rounding] the head [he is liable] for two corners, one for one side and one for the other; On [marring] the beard [he is liable] for two [corners] on one side, for two on the other side, and for one lower down. Rabbi Eliezer says: “If they were all taken off at the same time he is liable only on one count.” And he is only liable if he takes off with a razor; Rabbi Eliezer says: “Even if he picks off the hairs with tweezers, or with pincers, he is liable.
If a man makes a baldness on his head, or rounds the corner of his head, or mars the corner of his beard, or makes one cutting [in his flesh] for the dead, he is liable [to a flogging]. If he makes one cutting for five dead, or five cuttings for one, he is liable for each one. On [rounding] the head [he is liable] for two corners, one for one side and one for the other; On [marring] the beard [he is liable] for two [corners] on one side, for two on the other side, and for one lower down. Rabbi Eliezer says: “If they were all taken off at the same time he is liable only on one count.” And he is only liable if he takes off with a razor; Rabbi Eliezer says: “Even if he picks off the hairs with tweezers, or with pincers, he is liable.
If a man makes a baldness on his head, or rounds the corner of his head, or mars the corner of his beard, or makes one cutting [in his flesh] for the dead, he is liable [to a flogging]. If he makes one cutting for five dead, or five cuttings for one, he is liable for each one. On [rounding] the head [he is liable] for two corners, one for one side and one for the other; On [marring] the beard [he is liable] for two [corners] on one side, for two on the other side, and for one lower down. Rabbi Eliezer says: “If they were all taken off at the same time he is liable only on one count.” And he is only liable if he takes off with a razor; Rabbi Eliezer says: “Even if he picks off the hairs with tweezers, or with pincers, he is liable.
If a man makes a baldness on his head, or rounds the corner of his head, or mars the corner of his beard, or makes one cutting [in his flesh] for the dead, he is liable [to a flogging]. If he makes one cutting for five dead, or five cuttings for one, he is liable for each one. On [rounding] the head [he is liable] for two corners, one for one side and one for the other; On [marring] the beard [he is liable] for two [corners] on one side, for two on the other side, and for one lower down. Rabbi Eliezer says: “If they were all taken off at the same time he is liable only on one count.” And he is only liable if he takes off with a razor; Rabbi Eliezer says: “Even if he picks off the hairs with tweezers, or with pincers, he is liable.
If a man makes a baldness on his head, or rounds the corner of his head, or mars the corner of his beard, or makes one cutting [in his flesh] for the dead, he is liable [to a flogging]. If he makes one cutting for five dead, or five cuttings for one, he is liable for each one. On [rounding] the head [he is liable] for two corners, one for one side and one for the other; On [marring] the beard [he is liable] for two [corners] on one side, for two on the other side, and for one lower down. Rabbi Eliezer says: “If they were all taken off at the same time he is liable only on one count.” And he is only liable if he takes off with a razor; Rabbi Eliezer says: “Even if he picks off the hairs with tweezers, or with pincers, he is liable.
He who writes an incision on his skin [is flogged]. If he writes [on his flesh] without incising, or incises without writing, he is not liable, until he writes and incises with ink, eye-paint or anything that lasts. Rabbi Shimon ben Judah says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: “He is not liable until he has written there the name [of a god], as it is says: “Nor shall you incise any marks on yourselves; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:28).
He who writes an incision on his skin [is flogged]. If he writes [on his flesh] without incising, or incises without writing, he is not liable, until he writes and incises with ink, eye-paint or anything that lasts. Rabbi Shimon ben Judah says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: “He is not liable until he has written there the name [of a god], as it is says: “Nor shall you incise any marks on yourselves; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:28).
He who writes an incision on his skin [is flogged]. If he writes [on his flesh] without incising, or incises without writing, he is not liable, until he writes and incises with ink, eye-paint or anything that lasts. Rabbi Shimon ben Judah says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: “He is not liable until he has written there the name [of a god], as it is says: “Nor shall you incise any marks on yourselves; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:28).
If he has been defiling himself for the dead all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not defile yourself! Do not defile yourself!” and he did defile himself [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was shaving all day he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not shave, Do not shave” and he did shave [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was wearing a garment of mixed linen and wool all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not put it on! Do not put it on!” and he takes it off and puts it on, he is liable on each instance.
If he has been defiling himself for the dead all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not defile yourself! Do not defile yourself!” and he did defile himself [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was shaving all day he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not shave, Do not shave” and he did shave [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was wearing a garment of mixed linen and wool all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not put it on! Do not put it on!” and he takes it off and puts it on, he is liable on each instance.
If he has been defiling himself for the dead all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not defile yourself! Do not defile yourself!” and he did defile himself [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was shaving all day he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not shave, Do not shave” and he did shave [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was wearing a garment of mixed linen and wool all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not put it on! Do not put it on!” and he takes it off and puts it on, he is liable on each instance.
If he has been defiling himself for the dead all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not defile yourself! Do not defile yourself!” and he did defile himself [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was shaving all day he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not shave, Do not shave” and he did shave [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was wearing a garment of mixed linen and wool all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not put it on! Do not put it on!” and he takes it off and puts it on, he is liable on each instance.
If he has been defiling himself for the dead all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not defile yourself! Do not defile yourself!” and he did defile himself [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was shaving all day he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not shave, Do not shave” and he did shave [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was wearing a garment of mixed linen and wool all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not put it on! Do not put it on!” and he takes it off and puts it on, he is liable on each instance.
If he has been defiling himself for the dead all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not defile yourself! Do not defile yourself!” and he did defile himself [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was shaving all day he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not shave, Do not shave” and he did shave [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was wearing a garment of mixed linen and wool all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not put it on! Do not put it on!” and he takes it off and puts it on, he is liable on each instance.
It is possible for one to plough one furrow and become liable for eight prohibited acts: If he ploughs with an ox and donkey [yoked together] (2+3) and these were sanctified [animals], [the plough being drawn over] diverse mixed-seed sown] in a vineyard, during the sabbatical year, on a festival-day, [the plower being] a priest and a nazirite and the plot being situated on a defiled area. Hanania ben Hakinai says: “He may also have been wearing a garment mixed of wool and linen.” They said too him: “This is not of the same category.” He said to them: “Even the nazirite is not in the same category.”
It is possible for one to plough one furrow and become liable for eight prohibited acts: If he ploughs with an ox and donkey [yoked together] (2+3) and these were sanctified [animals], [the plough being drawn over] diverse mixed-seed sown] in a vineyard, during the sabbatical year, on a festival-day, [the plower being] a priest and a nazirite and the plot being situated on a defiled area. Hanania ben Hakinai says: “He may also have been wearing a garment mixed of wool and linen.” They said too him: “This is not of the same category.” He said to them: “Even the nazirite is not in the same category.”
How do they lash him? His two hands are tied to a pillar on either side of it and the minister of the synagogue grabs his clothing, if they are torn, they are torn; if they are ripped open, they are ripped open, until he exposes the offender’s chest. And a stone is placed behind the offender, the minister of the synagogue stands on it, a strap of cowhide in his hands, doubled over into two, and redoubled, and two straps that rise and fall attached to it.
How do they lash him? His two hands are tied to a pillar on either side of it and the minister of the synagogue grabs his clothing, if they are torn, they are torn; if they are ripped open, they are ripped open, until he exposes the offender’s chest. And a stone is placed behind the offender, the minister of the synagogue stands on it, a strap of cowhide in his hands, doubled over into two, and redoubled, and two straps that rise and fall attached to it.
All who have incurred [the penalty of] kareth, on being flogged are exempt from their punishment of kareth, for it says, “[He may be given up to forty lashes, but not more] ... lest your brother shall be dishonored before your eyes” (Deut. 25;3) once he has been lashed he is [considered] “your brother”, the words of Rabbi Hananiah ben Gamaliel. Rabbi Hananiah ben Gamaliel said: “Just as one who transgresses one transgression forfeits his life, how much more does one who performs one commandment have his life granted him.” Rabbi Shimon says: “You can learn this from its own passage; as it says: “[All who do any of those abhorrent things] such persons shall be cut off from their people” (Lev. 18:29), and it says: “You shall keep my statutes and my ordinances which if a man do, he shall live by them” (Lev. 18:5), which means that one who desists from transgressing is granted reward like one who performs a precept. Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi says: Behold [the Torah] says, “But makes sure that you do not partake of the blood; for the blood is the life, and you must not consume the life with the flesh…[that it may go well with you and with your descendents to come..” (Deut. 12:23-25”-- now, if in the case of blood which a person’s soul loathes, anyone who refrains from it receives reward, how much more so in regard to robbery and sexual sin for which a person’s soul craves and longs shall one who refrains from them acquire merit for himself and for generations and generations to come, to the end of all generations!
Oaths are of two kinds, subdivided into four; The laws concerning the discovery of having contracted uncleanness are of two kinds, subdivided into four; The laws concerning carrying on the Sabbath are of two kinds, subdivided into four. The symptoms of negas are of two kinds, subdivided into four.
Where there is knowledge at the beginning and at the end but forgetfulness between, a “sliding scales” sacrifice is brought. Where there is knowledge at the beginning but not at the end, the goat which is [sacrificed and its blood sprinkled] within [the Holy of Holies on the Day of Atonement] together with the Day of Atonement itself hold the sin in suspense until it become known to the sinner, and he brings the “sliding scale” sacrifice.
Where there is no knowledge at the beginning but there is knowledge at the end, the goat sacrificed on the outer altar together with the day of atonement bring atonement, for it says: “[one he-goat for a sin-offering] beside the sin-offering of atonement” (Numbers 29:1: for that which this goat [prepared inside the Holy of Holies] atones this goat [prepared outside] atones: just as the ‘inner’ goat atones only for a sin where there was knowledge [at the beginning], so the “outer” goat atones only for a sin where there was knowledge [at the end].
Where there is no knowledge [of the impurity] either at the beginning or at the end, the goats offered as sin-offerings on festivals and new months bring atonement, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: “The festival goats atone [for such sins] and not the new moon goats. And for what do the new month goats bring atonement? For a pure man who ate impure holy food.” Rabbi Meir says: “All the goats have equal powers of atonement for imparting impurity to the Temple and holy food. Rabbi Shimon used to say: “The new month goats bring atonement for a pure man who ate impure holy food; and the festival goats atone for transgression of the laws of impurity where there was no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end; and the ‘outer’ goat of the Day of Atonement atones for transgression of these laws where there was no knowledge at the beginning but there was knowledge at the end. They said to him: “Is it permitted to offer up the goat set apart for one day on another?” He said to them: “Let it be offered.” They said to him: “Since they are not equal in the atonement they bring how can they take each other's place?” He replied: “They are all at least equal [in the wider sense] in that they bring atonement for transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food.”
Where there is no knowledge [of the impurity] either at the beginning or at the end, the goats offered as sin-offerings on festivals and new months bring atonement, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: “The festival goats atone [for such sins] and not the new moon goats. And for what do the new month goats bring atonement? For a pure man who ate impure holy food.” Rabbi Meir says: “All the goats have equal powers of atonement for imparting impurity to the Temple and holy food. Rabbi Shimon used to say: “The new month goats bring atonement for a pure man who ate impure holy food; and the festival goats atone for transgression of the laws of impurity where there was no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end; and the ‘outer’ goat of the Day of Atonement atones for transgression of these laws where there was no knowledge at the beginning but there was knowledge at the end. They said to him: “Is it permitted to offer up the goat set apart for one day on another?” He said to them: “Let it be offered.” They said to him: “Since they are not equal in the atonement they bring how can they take each other's place?” He replied: “They are all at least equal [in the wider sense] in that they bring atonement for transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food.”
Rabbi Shimon ben Judah said in his name [of Rabbi Shimon (bar Yohai)]: “The new month goats bring atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food; the festival goats, in addition to bringing atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food, atone also for a case where there was no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end; the ‘outer’ goat of the Day of Atonement, in addition to bringing atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food and for a case where there was no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end, atones also for a case where there was no knowledge at the beginning but there was knowledge at the end. They said to him: “Is it permitted to offer up the goat set apart for one day on another?” He said, “Yes.” They [further] said to him: “Granted that the Day of Atonement goat may be offered up on the new month, but how can the new month goat be offered up on the Day of Atonement to bring atonement for a sin that is not within its scope?” He replied: “They are all at least equal [in the wider sense] in that they bring atonement for transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food.”
Rabbi Shimon ben Judah said in his name [of Rabbi Shimon (bar Yohai)]: “The new month goats bring atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food; the festival goats, in addition to bringing atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food, atone also for a case where there was no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end; the ‘outer’ goat of the Day of Atonement, in addition to bringing atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food and for a case where there was no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end, atones also for a case where there was no knowledge at the beginning but there was knowledge at the end. They said to him: “Is it permitted to offer up the goat set apart for one day on another?” He said, “Yes.” They [further] said to him: “Granted that the Day of Atonement goat may be offered up on the new month, but how can the new month goat be offered up on the Day of Atonement to bring atonement for a sin that is not within its scope?” He replied: “They are all at least equal [in the wider sense] in that they bring atonement for transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food.”
Rabbi Shimon ben Judah said in his name [of Rabbi Shimon (bar Yohai)]: “The new month goats bring atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food; the festival goats, in addition to bringing atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food, atone also for a case where there was no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end; the ‘outer’ goat of the Day of Atonement, in addition to bringing atonement for a pure person who ate impure holy food and for a case where there was no knowledge either at the beginning or at the end, atones also for a case where there was no knowledge at the beginning but there was knowledge at the end. They said to him: “Is it permitted to offer up the goat set apart for one day on another?” He said, “Yes.” They [further] said to him: “Granted that the Day of Atonement goat may be offered up on the new month, but how can the new month goat be offered up on the Day of Atonement to bring atonement for a sin that is not within its scope?” He replied: “They are all at least equal [in the wider sense] in that they bring atonement for transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food.”
For intentional transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food, the goat offered inside [the Holy of Holies] on the Day of Atonement together with the Day of Atonement itself bring atonement. For other transgressions of the Torah, light and grave, intentional and unintentional, known and unknown, positive and negative, those punishable by kareth and those punishable by death imposed by the court for all these the scapegoat [sent out on the Day of Atonement] brings atonement.
For intentional transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food, the goat offered inside [the Holy of Holies] on the Day of Atonement together with the Day of Atonement itself bring atonement. For other transgressions of the Torah, light and grave, intentional and unintentional, known and unknown, positive and negative, those punishable by kareth and those punishable by death imposed by the court for all these the scapegoat [sent out on the Day of Atonement] brings atonement.
[The scapegoat] brings atonement to Israelites, priests, and the anointed high priest alike. What [then] is the difference between Israelites, priests, and the anointed high priest? [None], save that the bullock [offered on the Day of Atonement] brings atonement to the priests for transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food. Rabbi Shimon says: “Just as the blood of the goat that is offered within [the Holy of Holies] brings atonement for Israelites, so the blood of the bullock [offered on the Day of Atonement] brings atonement for priests; and just as the confession of sins pronounced over the scapegoat brings atonement for Israelites, so the confession pronounced over the bullock brings atonement for priests.
[The scapegoat] brings atonement to Israelites, priests, and the anointed high priest alike. What [then] is the difference between Israelites, priests, and the anointed high priest? [None], save that the bullock [offered on the Day of Atonement] brings atonement to the priests for transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food. Rabbi Shimon says: “Just as the blood of the goat that is offered within [the Holy of Holies] brings atonement for Israelites, so the blood of the bullock [offered on the Day of Atonement] brings atonement for priests; and just as the confession of sins pronounced over the scapegoat brings atonement for Israelites, so the confession pronounced over the bullock brings atonement for priests.
What is a vain oath? If he swore that which is contrary to the facts known to people, saying of a pillar of stone that it is of gold; or of a man that he is a woman; or of a woman that she is a man. If he swore concerning a thing which is impossible, [for instance if he said,] “If I have not seen a camel flying in the air”, or “If I have not seen a serpent as thick as the beam of the olive press”. If he said to witnesses, “Come and bear testimony for me”, [and they replied,] “We swear that we will not bear testimony for you”. If he swore to annul a commandment, [for example] not to make a sukkah, or not to take a lulav, or not to put on tefillin. These are vain oaths, for which one is liable, for intentional transgression, lashes, and for unintentional transgression one is exempt.
A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and non-relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and those not qualified, [whether uttered] before the court, or not before the court, [but it must be uttered] with a man's own mouth. And he is liable, for intentional transgression, stripes, and for unintentional transgression he is exempt. [In the case of] both this and that [oath], if he was adjured by the mouth of others, he is liable. How so? If he said, “I have not eaten today,” or, “I have not put on tefillin today” [and the another person said,] “I adjure thee,” and he said, “Amen!”, he is liable [if his oath was false].
“I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that so-and-so owes me full damages, or half damages, or double payment, or four or five payment; Or that so-and-so raped my daughter, or seduced my daughter; Or that my son struck me; Or that my neighbor injured me, or set fire to my haystack on the Day of Atonement”; [And they deny knowledge of testimony] they are liable.
"I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that I am a priest, or, that I am a levite, or, that I am not the son of a divorced woman, or, that I am not the son of a halutzah; That so-and-so is a priest, or, that so-and-so is a levite, or, that he is not the son of a divorced woman, or, that he is not the son of a halutzah; That so-and-so violated his daughter, or seduced his daughter; That my son injured me; That my neighbor injured me, or set fire to my haystack on the Sabbath" [And they deny knowledge of testimony] they are exempt.
“You raped or seduced my daughter” and the other says, “I did not rape, nor seduce,” “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. Rabbi Shimon exempts him, for he does not pay a fine on his own admission. They said to him: “Even though he does not pay a fine on his own admission, he still pays for the shame and blemish [to the girl], based on his own admission.
“You raped or seduced my daughter” and the other says, “I did not rape, nor seduce,” “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. Rabbi Shimon exempts him, for he does not pay a fine on his own admission. They said to him: “Even though he does not pay a fine on his own admission, he still pays for the shame and blemish [to the girl], based on his own admission.
“You raped or seduced my daughter” and the other says, “I did not rape, nor seduce,” “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. Rabbi Shimon exempts him, for he does not pay a fine on his own admission. They said to him: “Even though he does not pay a fine on his own admission, he still pays for the shame and blemish [to the girl], based on his own admission.
“You stole my ox,” and he says, “I have not stolen it” “I adjure You,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. “I have stolen it, but I have not killed it or sold it”, “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is exempt. “Your ox killed my ox,” and he says, “It did not kill [your ox]”, “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” and he says, “It did not kill [your slave]”, “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is exempt. He said to him, “You injured me, or bruised me,” and the other says, “I have not injured you or bruised you,” “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. His slave said to him, “You knocked out my tooth, or blinded my eye,” and he said, “I did not knock out [your tooth], or blind [your eye],’ “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is exempt. This is the principle: whenever he pays on his own admission, he is liable; and when he does not pay on his own admission, he is exempt.
“You stole my ox,” and he says, “I have not stolen it” “I adjure You,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. “I have stolen it, but I have not killed it or sold it”, “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is exempt. “Your ox killed my ox,” and he says, “It did not kill [your ox]”, “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” and he says, “It did not kill [your slave]”, “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is exempt. He said to him, “You injured me, or bruised me,” and the other says, “I have not injured you or bruised you,” “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. His slave said to him, “You knocked out my tooth, or blinded my eye,” and he said, “I did not knock out [your tooth], or blind [your eye],’ “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is exempt. This is the principle: whenever he pays on his own admission, he is liable; and when he does not pay on his own admission, he is exempt.
No oath is imposed in a claim by a deaf-mute, imbecile, or minor. And no oath is imposed on a minor. But an oath is imposed when a claim is lodged against a minor, or against the Temple’s property.
If a man lends [money] to his neighbor on a pledge, and the pledge was lost, and he said to him: “I lent you a sela on it, and it [the pledge] was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”, he is exempt. “I lent you a sela” on it, and it was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth three denarii,” he is liable. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says, “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”,” he is exempt. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says: “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth five denarii,” he is liable. And who takes the oath? He who had the deposit, lest, if the other take the oath, this one may bring out the deposit.
If a man lends [money] to his neighbor on a pledge, and the pledge was lost, and he said to him: “I lent you a sela on it, and it [the pledge] was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”, he is exempt. “I lent you a sela” on it, and it was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth three denarii,” he is liable. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says, “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”,” he is exempt. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says: “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth five denarii,” he is liable. And who takes the oath? He who had the deposit, lest, if the other take the oath, this one may bring out the deposit.
If a man lends [money] to his neighbor on a pledge, and the pledge was lost, and he said to him: “I lent you a sela on it, and it [the pledge] was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”, he is exempt. “I lent you a sela” on it, and it was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth three denarii,” he is liable. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says, “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”,” he is exempt. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says: “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth five denarii,” he is liable. And who takes the oath? He who had the deposit, lest, if the other take the oath, this one may bring out the deposit.
If a man lends [money] to his neighbor on a pledge, and the pledge was lost, and he said to him: “I lent you a sela on it, and it [the pledge] was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”, he is exempt. “I lent you a sela” on it, and it was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth three denarii,” he is liable. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says, “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”,” he is exempt. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says: “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth five denarii,” he is liable. And who takes the oath? He who had the deposit, lest, if the other take the oath, this one may bring out the deposit.
If a man lends [money] to his neighbor on a pledge, and the pledge was lost, and he said to him: “I lent you a sela on it, and it [the pledge] was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”, he is exempt. “I lent you a sela” on it, and it was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth three denarii,” he is liable. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says, “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”,” he is exempt. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says: “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth five denarii,” he is liable. And who takes the oath? He who had the deposit, lest, if the other take the oath, this one may bring out the deposit.
If a man lends [money] to his neighbor on a pledge, and the pledge was lost, and he said to him: “I lent you a sela on it, and it [the pledge] was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”, he is exempt. “I lent you a sela” on it, and it was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth three denarii,” he is liable. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says, “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”,” he is exempt. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says: “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth five denarii,” he is liable. And who takes the oath? He who had the deposit, lest, if the other take the oath, this one may bring out the deposit.
If a man lends [money] to his neighbor on a pledge, and the pledge was lost, and he said to him: “I lent you a sela on it, and it [the pledge] was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”, he is exempt. “I lent you a sela” on it, and it was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth three denarii,” he is liable. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says, “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”,” he is exempt. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says: “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth five denarii,” he is liable. And who takes the oath? He who had the deposit, lest, if the other take the oath, this one may bring out the deposit.
If a man lends [money] to his neighbor on a pledge, and the pledge was lost, and he said to him: “I lent you a sela on it, and it [the pledge] was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”, he is exempt. “I lent you a sela” on it, and it was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth three denarii,” he is liable. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says, “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”,” he is exempt. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says: “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth five denarii,” he is liable. And who takes the oath? He who had the deposit, lest, if the other take the oath, this one may bring out the deposit.
If a man lends [money] to his neighbor on a pledge, and the pledge was lost, and he said to him: “I lent you a sela on it, and it [the pledge] was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”, he is exempt. “I lent you a sela” on it, and it was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth three denarii,” he is liable. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says, “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”,” he is exempt. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says: “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth five denarii,” he is liable. And who takes the oath? He who had the deposit, lest, if the other take the oath, this one may bring out the deposit.
“He who has been wounded,” How so? If they testified about a person that another went onto his property whole, and came out wounded, and he said to him, “You have wounded me,” and the other said, “I have not wounded you,” he takes an oath, and receives [damages]. R. Judah says: “[There is no oath] unless there is partial admission: How so? He said to him, you have inflicted on me two wounds,” and the other said, “I inflicted on you only one wound.”
“He who has been wounded,” How so? If they testified about a person that another went onto his property whole, and came out wounded, and he said to him, “You have wounded me,” and the other said, “I have not wounded you,” he takes an oath, and receives [damages]. R. Judah says: “[There is no oath] unless there is partial admission: How so? He said to him, you have inflicted on me two wounds,” and the other said, “I inflicted on you only one wound.”
So too they have said that she who impairs her kethubah [by admitting that it had already been partially paid] cannot receive [the remainder of the] payment except on oath; And that if one witness testifies against her that it [the kethubah] has been paid [in full], she cannot receive payment except on oath; And that from assigned property or orphans’ property she cannot exact payment [for her kethubah] except on oath; And that if she claims [her kethubah] not in his presence, she cannot receive payment except on oath. So, too, orphans cannot receive payment except on oath [namely]: “We swear that our father did not enjoin in his will, neither did our father say unto us, nor did we find [written] among the documents of our father that this document is paid.” Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka says: “Even if the son was born after his father’s death he may take an oath, and collect his claim.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “If there are witnesses that the father said at the time of his death that this document was not paid, he receives [his claim] without an oath.”
So too they have said that she who impairs her kethubah [by admitting that it had already been partially paid] cannot receive [the remainder of the] payment except on oath; And that if one witness testifies against her that it [the kethubah] has been paid [in full], she cannot receive payment except on oath; And that from assigned property or orphans’ property she cannot exact payment [for her kethubah] except on oath; And that if she claims [her kethubah] not in his presence, she cannot receive payment except on oath. So, too, orphans cannot receive payment except on oath [namely]: “We swear that our father did not enjoin in his will, neither did our father say unto us, nor did we find [written] among the documents of our father that this document is paid.” Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka says: “Even if the son was born after his father’s death he may take an oath, and collect his claim.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “If there are witnesses that the father said at the time of his death that this document was not paid, he receives [his claim] without an oath.”
So too they have said that she who impairs her kethubah [by admitting that it had already been partially paid] cannot receive [the remainder of the] payment except on oath; And that if one witness testifies against her that it [the kethubah] has been paid [in full], she cannot receive payment except on oath; And that from assigned property or orphans’ property she cannot exact payment [for her kethubah] except on oath; And that if she claims [her kethubah] not in his presence, she cannot receive payment except on oath. So, too, orphans cannot receive payment except on oath [namely]: “We swear that our father did not enjoin in his will, neither did our father say unto us, nor did we find [written] among the documents of our father that this document is paid.” Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka says: “Even if the son was born after his father’s death he may take an oath, and collect his claim.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “If there are witnesses that the father said at the time of his death that this document was not paid, he receives [his claim] without an oath.”
So too they have said that she who impairs her kethubah [by admitting that it had already been partially paid] cannot receive [the remainder of the] payment except on oath; And that if one witness testifies against her that it [the kethubah] has been paid [in full], she cannot receive payment except on oath; And that from assigned property or orphans’ property she cannot exact payment [for her kethubah] except on oath; And that if she claims [her kethubah] not in his presence, she cannot receive payment except on oath. So, too, orphans cannot receive payment except on oath [namely]: “We swear that our father did not enjoin in his will, neither did our father say unto us, nor did we find [written] among the documents of our father that this document is paid.” Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka says: “Even if the son was born after his father’s death he may take an oath, and collect his claim.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “If there are witnesses that the father said at the time of his death that this document was not paid, he receives [his claim] without an oath.”
So too they have said that she who impairs her kethubah [by admitting that it had already been partially paid] cannot receive [the remainder of the] payment except on oath; And that if one witness testifies against her that it [the kethubah] has been paid [in full], she cannot receive payment except on oath; And that from assigned property or orphans’ property she cannot exact payment [for her kethubah] except on oath; And that if she claims [her kethubah] not in his presence, she cannot receive payment except on oath. So, too, orphans cannot receive payment except on oath [namely]: “We swear that our father did not enjoin in his will, neither did our father say unto us, nor did we find [written] among the documents of our father that this document is paid.” Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka says: “Even if the son was born after his father’s death he may take an oath, and collect his claim.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “If there are witnesses that the father said at the time of his death that this document was not paid, he receives [his claim] without an oath.”
And why do they record the opinion of a single person among the many, when the halakhah must be according to the opinion of the many? So that if a court prefers the opinion of the single person it may depend on him. For no court may set aside the decision of another court unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in number. If it was greater than it in wisdom but not in number, in number but not in wisdom, it may not set aside its decision, unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in number.
One who exchanges a sela from second tithe in Jerusalem: Beth Shammai says: “Copper coin for the whole sela.” And Beth Hillel says: “Silver for one shekel and copper coin for one shekel.” The disputants before the Sages say: “Silver for three denars and copper coin for one denar.” Rabbi Akiva says: “Silver for three denars and for the fourth silver, copper coin.” Rabbi Tarfon says: “Four aspers in silver.” Shammai says: “He must leave it in the shop and eat on the credit thereof.”
These are subjects concerning which Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai: A woman who came from overseas and said: “My husband died” may be married again; “My husband died [without children]” she must be married by her husband’s brother (the levir). But Beth Hillel says: “We have heard so only in the case of one who came from the harvesting.” Beth Shammai said to them: “It is the same thing in the case of one who came from the harvesting or who came from the olive-picking or who came from overseas; they mentioned harvesting only because that is how it happened.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to Beth Shammai. Beth Shammai says: “She may be married again and take her kethubah payment.” But Beth Hillel says: “She may be married again but may not take her kethubah payment.” Beth Shammai said to them: “You have permitted the graver matter of a forbidden marriage, should you not permit the lighter matter of property?” Beth Hillel said to them: “We have found that brothers do not inherit on her statement.” Beth Shammai said to them: “Do we not infer it from her marriage document in which he writes to her ‘That if you be married to another you shall take what is written for you’?” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.
He also testified concerning a small village in the vicinity of Jerusalem in which there was an old man who used to lend to all the people of the village and write out [the bond] in his own handwriting and others signed it. And when the fact was brought before the Sages they pronounced it legal. Hence, incidentally, you may infer that a wife may write her own bill of divorcement, and a husband may write his own receipt; for the legality of a document depends only on those who sign it. And [he testified] concerning a needle which was found in flesh of a [sacrifice], that the knife and the hands [which had been employed on the flesh] are clean, but the flesh itself is defiled; and if it was found in the excrement, all are clean.
He also testified concerning a small village in the vicinity of Jerusalem in which there was an old man who used to lend to all the people of the village and write out [the bond] in his own handwriting and others signed it. And when the fact was brought before the Sages they pronounced it legal. Hence, incidentally, you may infer that a wife may write her own bill of divorcement, and a husband may write his own receipt; for the legality of a document depends only on those who sign it. And [he testified] concerning a needle which was found in flesh of a [sacrifice], that the knife and the hands [which had been employed on the flesh] are clean, but the flesh itself is defiled; and if it was found in the excrement, all are clean.
Rabbi Yishmael declared three things before the Sages in the vineyard at Yavneh: Concerning an egg which was beaten together, and placed on vegetables of terumah that it acts as a connection; but if it was in the form of a helmet it does not act as a connection. And concerning an ear of corn in the harvesting, the top of which reached the standing corn that if it can be reaped together with the standing corn, it belongs to the owner; and if not, it belongs to the poor. And concerning a small garden which was surrounded by a row of vines that if it has space for the grape-gatherer and his basket on one side, and space for the grape-gatherer and his basket on the other side, it may be sown with seed; but if not, it may not be sown with seed.
Rabbi Yishmael declared three things before the Sages in the vineyard at Yavneh: Concerning an egg which was beaten together, and placed on vegetables of terumah that it acts as a connection; but if it was in the form of a helmet it does not act as a connection. And concerning an ear of corn in the harvesting, the top of which reached the standing corn that if it can be reaped together with the standing corn, it belongs to the owner; and if not, it belongs to the poor. And concerning a small garden which was surrounded by a row of vines that if it has space for the grape-gatherer and his basket on one side, and space for the grape-gatherer and his basket on the other side, it may be sown with seed; but if not, it may not be sown with seed.
Rabbi Yishmael declared three things before the Sages in the vineyard at Yavneh: Concerning an egg which was beaten together, and placed on vegetables of terumah that it acts as a connection; but if it was in the form of a helmet it does not act as a connection. And concerning an ear of corn in the harvesting, the top of which reached the standing corn that if it can be reaped together with the standing corn, it belongs to the owner; and if not, it belongs to the poor. And concerning a small garden which was surrounded by a row of vines that if it has space for the grape-gatherer and his basket on one side, and space for the grape-gatherer and his basket on the other side, it may be sown with seed; but if not, it may not be sown with seed.
They stated three things before Rabbi Yishmael, and he pronounced none of them either unlawful or lawful; and Rabbi Joshua ben Matya explained them. One who lances an abscess on the Sabbath: if it was to make an opening he is liable; if it was to bring out the pus, he is exempt. And concerning one who hunts a snake on the Sabbath: that if he was occupied with it in order that it should not bite him, he is innocent; but if that he might use it as a remedy, he is guilty. And concerning Ironian stewpots: that they do not contract impurity when under the same tent as a corpse; but become impure if they are carried by a zav. Rabbi Eliezer ben Zadok says: “Even if they are carried by a zav they remain pure, because they are unfinished.”
They stated three things before Rabbi Yishmael, and he pronounced none of them either unlawful or lawful; and Rabbi Joshua ben Matya explained them. One who lances an abscess on the Sabbath: if it was to make an opening he is liable; if it was to bring out the pus, he is exempt. And concerning one who hunts a snake on the Sabbath: that if he was occupied with it in order that it should not bite him, he is innocent; but if that he might use it as a remedy, he is guilty. And concerning Ironian stewpots: that they do not contract impurity when under the same tent as a corpse; but become impure if they are carried by a zav. Rabbi Eliezer ben Zadok says: “Even if they are carried by a zav they remain pure, because they are unfinished.”
Rabbi Yishmael said three things, and Rabbi Akiba disagreed with him. Garlic or unripe grapes or green ears of grain were being crushed [on the eve of the Sabbath] while it is yet day: Rabbi Yishmael says: “He may finish crushing after it grows dark.” But Rabbi Akiba says: “He may not finish.”
They said three things before Rabbi Akiva, two in the name of Rabbi Eliezer and one in the name of Rabbi Joshua. Two in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: A woman may go out [on the Sabbath adorned] with a “golden-city”; And they that fly pigeons are unfit to bear evidence. And one in the name of Rabbi Joshua: If there was a creeping thing in the mouth of a weasel when it walked over loaves of terumah, and it is doubtful whether it touched them or whether it did not touch them, that about which there is doubt remains pure.
In three cases Rabban Gamaliel was strict like the words of Beth Shammai. One may not wrap up hot food on a festival for the Sabbath; And one may not join together a lamp on a festival; And one may not bake [on festivals] thick loaves but only wafer-cakes. Rabban Gamaliel said: “In all their days, my father’s house never baked large loaves but only wafer-cakes.” They said to him: “What can we do with regards to your father’s house, for they were strict in respect to themselves but were lenient towards Israel to let them bake both large loaves and even charcoal-roasted loaves.”
In three cases Rabban Gamaliel was strict like the words of Beth Shammai. One may not wrap up hot food on a festival for the Sabbath; And one may not join together a lamp on a festival; And one may not bake [on festivals] thick loaves but only wafer-cakes. Rabban Gamaliel said: “In all their days, my father’s house never baked large loaves but only wafer-cakes.” They said to him: “What can we do with regards to your father’s house, for they were strict in respect to themselves but were lenient towards Israel to let them bake both large loaves and even charcoal-roasted loaves.”
In three cases Rabban Gamaliel was strict like the words of Beth Shammai. One may not wrap up hot food on a festival for the Sabbath; And one may not join together a lamp on a festival; And one may not bake [on festivals] thick loaves but only wafer-cakes. Rabban Gamaliel said: “In all their days, my father’s house never baked large loaves but only wafer-cakes.” They said to him: “What can we do with regards to your father’s house, for they were strict in respect to themselves but were lenient towards Israel to let them bake both large loaves and even charcoal-roasted loaves.”
Also he declared three decisions of a lenient character: One may sweep up [on a festival] between the couches, And put spices [on the coals] on a festival; And roast a kid whole on the night of Passover. But the sages forbid them.
Also he declared three decisions of a lenient character: One may sweep up [on a festival] between the couches, And put spices [on the coals] on a festival; And roast a kid whole on the night of Passover. But the sages forbid them.
Also he declared three decisions of a lenient character: One may sweep up [on a festival] between the couches, And put spices [on the coals] on a festival; And roast a kid whole on the night of Passover. But the sages forbid them.
Also he declared three decisions of a lenient character: One may sweep up [on a festival] between the couches, And put spices [on the coals] on a festival; And roast a kid whole on the night of Passover. But the sages forbid them.
Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah allows three things and the Sages forbid them: His cow used to go out with the strap which she had between her horns; One may curry cattle on a festival; And one may grind pepper in its own mill. Rabbi Judah says: one may not curry cattle on a festival, because it may cause a wound, but one may comb them. But the Sages say: one may not curry them, and one may not even comb them.