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27058 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: One does not write on anything connected to the ground. If he wrote on anything connected, detached it, signed, and delivered it, it is valid, but Rebbi Jehudah declares it invalid unless both writing and signing took place when it was detached. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra says, one writes neither on erased papyrus nor on διφθέρα because these can be falsified but the Sages declare valid.
MISHNAH: One does not write on anything connected to the ground. If he wrote on anything connected, detached it, signed, and delivered it, it is valid, but Rebbi Jehudah declares it invalid unless both writing and signing took place when it was detached. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra says, one writes neither on erased papyrus nor on διφθέρα because these can be falsified but the Sages declare valid.
MISHNAH: One does not write on anything connected to the ground. If he wrote on anything connected, detached it, signed, and delivered it, it is valid, but Rebbi Jehudah declares it invalid unless both writing and signing took place when it was detached. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra says, one writes neither on erased papyrus nor on διφθέρα because these can be falsified but the Sages declare valid.
MISHNAH: One does not write on anything connected to the ground. If he wrote on anything connected, detached it, signed, and delivered it, it is valid, but Rebbi Jehudah declares it invalid unless both writing and signing took place when it was detached. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra says, one writes neither on erased papyrus nor on διφθέρα because these can be falsified but the Sages declare valid.
HALAKHAH: “One does not write on anything connected to the ground,” etc. This does not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. Samuel bar Abba asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected it again, detached it, and delivered it to her; what does Rebbi Jehudah say? Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Abin asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected again, signed, and detached it, and delivered it to her; what do the rabbis say?
Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? About bills of divorce. But for contracts even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it makes no difference; they disagree both about bills of divorce and contracts. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: If the witnesses [sign] on the erasure, do the Sages declare it valid? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: The Sages follow the argument of Rebbi Eleazar, for he explains that the document is on the erasure and the witnesses on a smooth surface. Samuel said, everything is on the erasure. Does not Rebbi Jehudah say it correctly? Rebbi Abba said, it is recognizable whether there was an erasure once or twice.
Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? About bills of divorce. But for contracts even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it makes no difference; they disagree both about bills of divorce and contracts. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: If the witnesses [sign] on the erasure, do the Sages declare it valid? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: The Sages follow the argument of Rebbi Eleazar, for he explains that the document is on the erasure and the witnesses on a smooth surface. Samuel said, everything is on the erasure. Does not Rebbi Jehudah say it correctly? Rebbi Abba said, it is recognizable whether there was an erasure once or twice.
Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? About bills of divorce. But for contracts even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it makes no difference; they disagree both about bills of divorce and contracts. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: If the witnesses [sign] on the erasure, do the Sages declare it valid? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: The Sages follow the argument of Rebbi Eleazar, for he explains that the document is on the erasure and the witnesses on a smooth surface. Samuel said, everything is on the erasure. Does not Rebbi Jehudah say it correctly? Rebbi Abba said, it is recognizable whether there was an erasure once or twice.
Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? About bills of divorce. But for contracts even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it makes no difference; they disagree both about bills of divorce and contracts. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: If the witnesses [sign] on the erasure, do the Sages declare it valid? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: The Sages follow the argument of Rebbi Eleazar, for he explains that the document is on the erasure and the witnesses on a smooth surface. Samuel said, everything is on the erasure. Does not Rebbi Jehudah say it correctly? Rebbi Abba said, it is recognizable whether there was an erasure once or twice.
Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? About bills of divorce. But for contracts even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it makes no difference; they disagree both about bills of divorce and contracts. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: If the witnesses [sign] on the erasure, do the Sages declare it valid? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: The Sages follow the argument of Rebbi Eleazar, for he explains that the document is on the erasure and the witnesses on a smooth surface. Samuel said, everything is on the erasure. Does not Rebbi Jehudah say it correctly? Rebbi Abba said, it is recognizable whether there was an erasure once or twice.
Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? About bills of divorce. But for contracts even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it makes no difference; they disagree both about bills of divorce and contracts. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: If the witnesses [sign] on the erasure, do the Sages declare it valid? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: The Sages follow the argument of Rebbi Eleazar, for he explains that the document is on the erasure and the witnesses on a smooth surface. Samuel said, everything is on the erasure. Does not Rebbi Jehudah say it correctly? Rebbi Abba said, it is recognizable whether there was an erasure once or twice.
Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? About bills of divorce. But for contracts even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it makes no difference; they disagree both about bills of divorce and contracts. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: If the witnesses [sign] on the erasure, do the Sages declare it valid? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: The Sages follow the argument of Rebbi Eleazar, for he explains that the document is on the erasure and the witnesses on a smooth surface. Samuel said, everything is on the erasure. Does not Rebbi Jehudah say it correctly? Rebbi Abba said, it is recognizable whether there was an erasure once or twice.
Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? About bills of divorce. But for contracts even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it makes no difference; they disagree both about bills of divorce and contracts. He explains it if the document is on a smooth surface and the witnesses on the erasure. It is difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: If the witnesses [sign] on the erasure, do the Sages declare it valid? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: The Sages follow the argument of Rebbi Eleazar, for he explains that the document is on the erasure and the witnesses on a smooth surface. Samuel said, everything is on the erasure. Does not Rebbi Jehudah say it correctly? Rebbi Abba said, it is recognizable whether there was an erasure once or twice.
After it was delivered to her, could it not be considered as if written in her name from the start? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi [Abin bar Ḥiyya]: It follows Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “If one said to a craftsman, make me two bells, one for the ground and one for an animal, make me two mats, one to sit on and one for a tent, make me two sheets, one to lie on and one for [a pattern], only if he designated them in purity. Rebbi Simeon declares them pure unless he designated them for impurity.” As he said there, only if it was a utensil from the start, so he says, unless it was a divorce in her name from the start.
After it was delivered to her, could it not be considered as if written in her name from the start? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi [Abin bar Ḥiyya]: It follows Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “If one said to a craftsman, make me two bells, one for the ground and one for an animal, make me two mats, one to sit on and one for a tent, make me two sheets, one to lie on and one for [a pattern], only if he designated them in purity. Rebbi Simeon declares them pure unless he designated them for impurity.” As he said there, only if it was a utensil from the start, so he says, unless it was a divorce in her name from the start.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.
MISHNAH: If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it, if he finds it on the spot it is valid, otherwise it is invalid. If he finds it in a small bag or in a box, if he recognizes it, it is valid. If somebody transports a bill of divorce from an old or sick man, he delivers it to her under the presumption that the man is alive. The daughter of an Israel who is married to a Cohen and whose husband went overseas, may eat heave under the presumption that he is alive. If somebody sends his purification offering from overseas, it is sacrificed under the presumption that he is alive.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it,” etc. What means “on the spot”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as nobody passed by there. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: as long as three people did not pass by there. If a Gentile passed by there? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana transported a bill of divorce; he lost it and a Saracen found it. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan; they declared [the bill] valid. This means that if a Gentile passed by it is valid. Could we say that he had a mark to identify it? But was it not stated: There are no marks for bills of divorce. That is, if he said, two or three lines. But here, the ה in it had a spot. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Why is it invalid here? I say, it was another [husband] whose name was like his name. Think of it, if they checked out that entire place and did not find another man whose name was like his name! But it is because of the severity of adultery. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry”? Rebbi Mana told him: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid, the other invalid. He lost the valid one and threw away the invalid. When he found it, I say that what he found was the invalid bill.
Bar Qappara stated: Even if he left [the man] when he was 100 years old and spent another 100 years on the way, he delivers it to her under the presumption that he is alive.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Eleazar ben Parṭa said three things before the Sages and they confirmed his words: [People in] a city which was surrounded by palisades, on a ship in emergency at sea, or a person about to be judged, are presumed to be alive. But on [people in] a city conquered from palisades, a ship lost at sea, or a person led to execution, one puts the restrictions of the living and the dead: neither an Israel’s daughter married to a Cohen nor a Cohen’s daughter married to an Israel may eat heave.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Eleazar ben Parṭa said three things before the Sages and they confirmed his words: [People in] a city which was surrounded by palisades, on a ship in emergency at sea, or a person about to be judged, are presumed to be alive. But on [people in] a city conquered from palisades, a ship lost at sea, or a person led to execution, one puts the restrictions of the living and the dead: neither an Israel’s daughter married to a Cohen nor a Cohen’s daughter married to an Israel may eat heave.
They added three additional cases: One who was dragged away by a wild animal, one who was swept away by a river, and one buried by a collapse. One puts the restrictions of the living and the dead on her: neither an Israel’s daughter married to a Cohen nor a Cohen’s daughter married to an Israel may eat heave.
MISHNAH: If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account, he can proceed on the assumption that they are alive and does not worry whether the Cohen or Levite died or the poor person became rich. If they died, he has to receive permission from the heirs; if the loan was executed in court he does not need permission.
MISHNAH: If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account, he can proceed on the assumption that they are alive and does not worry whether the Cohen or Levite died or the poor person became rich. If they died, he has to receive permission from the heirs; if the loan was executed in court he does not need permission.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate, but from his own he may separate.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate, but from his own he may separate.
Does this not disagree with Rav? Since Rav said, an heir is like a holder of encumbered property. Just as a loan given before witnesses cannot be collected from encumbered property, so it cannot be collected from heirs. He explains it for a documented loan. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A loan given before witnesses can be collected from heirs, on condition that they inherited real estate. As those from the house of Rav Neḥemiah, who lent money to the public. The case came before the rabbis who said, the public is neither all rich nor all poor.
MISHNAH: If somebody sets aside produce to be used for future heave and tithes, or money to be used for Second Tithe, can refer to them on the presumption that they exist. If they were lost, one worries about them for 24 hours back, the words of Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Jehudah says, three times a year one has to check the wine: At the time of East wind after Tabernacles, when the vines blossom, and when fluid starts to enter unripe grapes.
For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.
For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.
Rebbi Crispus asked: Does he check every year or only once every three years? Let us hear from the following: If somebody sells unspecified wine to another person, he has to warrant it until after Tabernacles. Rebbi Yudan said, explain it for those Galileans who harvest only after the beginning of Tabernacles and you cannot deduce anything. That which was said, “old from the preceding year, very old aged three years”, should we say because of the tasting? This means that any time it is declared old he has to warrant it for two years. This means that very old [wine] has to be warranted until Tabernacles. This means that he has to check every year. How does he check? May one check one amphora on which all others depend that they would not become vinegar? Rebbi Shammai said, there are people who knock on the barrel from the outside and know what is inside.
Rebbi Crispus asked: Does he check every year or only once every three years? Let us hear from the following: If somebody sells unspecified wine to another person, he has to warrant it until after Tabernacles. Rebbi Yudan said, explain it for those Galileans who harvest only after the beginning of Tabernacles and you cannot deduce anything. That which was said, “old from the preceding year, very old aged three years”, should we say because of the tasting? This means that any time it is declared old he has to warrant it for two years. This means that very old [wine] has to be warranted until Tabernacles. This means that he has to check every year. How does he check? May one check one amphora on which all others depend that they would not become vinegar? Rebbi Shammai said, there are people who knock on the barrel from the outside and know what is inside.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody sent a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. This disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates the agent appointed by him by a declaration. He explains it by the stringency of the rules of incest. If he appointed an agent to deliver the bill of divorce, the latter has to deliver it in the presence of two [witnesses]; the agent is not counted as one of the two. If another agent went to invalidate the bill of divorce, he has to invalidate it in the presence of two [witnesses] and the agent is counted as one of the two. If he met him on the road and asked him, what about the bill of divorce I gave you? He answered, I delivered it to her. While they were talking there, he dropped it. He said, did you not tell me that you delivered it to her? He explained, I delivered it to her and she said, keep it for me. What? Can he be believed since it is in his power to divorce, or can he not be believed because it is in his hand? If the agent fell sick, how do you treat this? By the rules of divorces or the rules of preliminary marriages? By the rules of divorces one can divorce through the agency of anybody. By the rules of preliminary marriages one cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.
There, we have stated: “One writes a bill of divorce for a man even if his wife is not with him, and a receipt for a woman even if her husband is not with her, and the husband pays the fee.” Rebbi Abba said, he has to know both of them. Rebbi La said, he has to know the husband for the bill of divorce and the wife for her receipt. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi [ ]: Think of it, if he brought another woman and divorced by means of her. He said to him, let the witnesses come and testify. But did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say that they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been cross-examined in court? There, if they said, we did not sign at all. But here if they say, we signed this but not that. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “In earlier times, his name and her name and the names of his and her towns could change.” If he knows them, why would he change their names? There are people who know others by sight but do not know their names. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Ilai: “Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one should write Mr. X and all his names, Mrs. Y and all her names, because of the public good.” The Mishnah about one who is forced to divorce, Rebbi Ila speaks about one who divorces on his initiative; some want to say if he divorces at another place.
MISHNAH: A widow can be paid from the orphans’ property only by an oath. When they avoided letting her swear, Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that she should make a vow on the instruction of the orphans for anything they would decide on and collect her ketubah, and that witnesses sign the bill of divorce because of the public good. Hillel instituted prozbol for the public good.
MISHNAH: A widow can be paid from the orphans’ property only by an oath. When they avoided letting her swear, Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that she should make a vow on the instruction of the orphans for anything they would decide on and collect her ketubah, and that witnesses sign the bill of divorce because of the public good. Hillel instituted prozbol for the public good.
HALAKHAH: “A widow can be paid from the orphans’ property only,” etc. Earlier they swore falsely and buried their children, since it is written: “For vain [vows] I smote your children.” In addition, they fear vows more than oaths. If she transgressed and swore? Rav Huna said, if she swore, she swore. Rav said to his daughter-in-law: If I were not a person readily making concessions, even the cover on your head would be my property. Samuel said, she acquires the garments which she is wearing. A Mishnah supports Samuel: “Neither his wife’s garments nor his children’s are his property.”
Rav Huna said, why did they require a date on the bill of divorce? Because of an actual case. It so happened that a man was married to his sister’s daughter who committed adultery when she was still married. He predated the bill of divorce and said, it is better she should be judged as single rather than as a married woman.
Rav Huna said, I asked before Rebbi Jacob ben Aḥa: Following him who says tithes are from their words. But following him who says tithes are from the Torah, does Hillel institute anything against the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose said, from the moment that Israel was exiled to Babylonia, did they not become free from all commandments connected with the Land, but the remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose turned and said, (Deut. 15:2) “this is the word of the abandonment, remit” as long as abandonment is followed in the Land as a word of the Torah, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah, but when abandonment is followed in the Land as their word, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from their word. There, they say that even one who holds that tithes are from the Torah will hold that the Sabbatical is from their word. (Deut. 15:2): “This is the word of the remission, remit!” Rebbi says, two remissions are the Sabbatical and the Jubilee. As long as the Jubilee is operative, the Sabbatical is from words of the Torah. If the Jubilees are abolished, the Sabbatical is operative from their words. When were the Jubilees abolished? (Lev. 25:10) “For all its inhabitants.” In the time when they lived on it, not when they went from it into exile. If they lived on it but did (not) intermingle, the tribe of Judah in Benjamin, and the tribe of Benjamin in Judah, I could think that the Jubilee was operative. The verse mentions its inhabitants, “All its inhabitants;” you find that when the tribes of Reuben, Gad, and half the tribe of Manasseh went into exile, the Jubilees were disestablished.
Rav Huna said, I asked before Rebbi Jacob ben Aḥa: Following him who says tithes are from their words. But following him who says tithes are from the Torah, does Hillel institute anything against the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose said, from the moment that Israel was exiled to Babylonia, did they not become free from all commandments connected with the Land, but the remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose turned and said, (Deut. 15:2) “this is the word of the abandonment, remit” as long as abandonment is followed in the Land as a word of the Torah, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah, but when abandonment is followed in the Land as their word, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from their word. There, they say that even one who holds that tithes are from the Torah will hold that the Sabbatical is from their word. (Deut. 15:2): “This is the word of the remission, remit!” Rebbi says, two remissions are the Sabbatical and the Jubilee. As long as the Jubilee is operative, the Sabbatical is from words of the Torah. If the Jubilees are abolished, the Sabbatical is operative from their words. When were the Jubilees abolished? (Lev. 25:10) “For all its inhabitants.” In the time when they lived on it, not when they went from it into exile. If they lived on it but did (not) intermingle, the tribe of Judah in Benjamin, and the tribe of Benjamin in Judah, I could think that the Jubilee was operative. The verse mentions its inhabitants, “All its inhabitants;” you find that when the tribes of Reuben, Gad, and half the tribe of Manasseh went into exile, the Jubilees were disestablished.
Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasa’s name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meїr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.
HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.
HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.
HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.
HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.
HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.
There, we have stated: “One does not marry women on a holiday.” Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of refraining from being fruitful and increase. They asked before Rebbi Yose: May a slave marry a woman on a holiday? He told them, let us hear from the following: “Shall he be alone? But the world was created only for procreation and increase!” And Rebbi Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Anybody commanded to be fruitful and increase is forbidden to marry on a holiday.
There, we have stated: “One does not marry women on a holiday.” Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of refraining from being fruitful and increase. They asked before Rebbi Yose: May a slave marry a woman on a holiday? He told them, let us hear from the following: “Shall he be alone? But the world was created only for procreation and increase!” And Rebbi Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Anybody commanded to be fruitful and increase is forbidden to marry on a holiday.
There, we have stated: “One does not marry women on a holiday.” Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of refraining from being fruitful and increase. They asked before Rebbi Yose: May a slave marry a woman on a holiday? He told them, let us hear from the following: “Shall he be alone? But the world was created only for procreation and increase!” And Rebbi Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Anybody commanded to be fruitful and increase is forbidden to marry on a holiday.
“His field”, except if it was mortgaged. “His vineyard”, except Temple property. Where do we hold? If somebody caused damage and then dedicated to the Temple, that is what we have stated: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas.” If somebody dedicated to the Temple and then caused damage, that is what we have stated: “ ‘His neighbor’s ox’ but not the ox of Temple property.” Rebbi Yudan said, explain it if an ox of Temple property grazed on a private field. Rebbi Mana told him, we require Temple real estate and you say “on a private field”? But we must hold about one who said: I am obligating myself for 100 minas to the Temple; then went and caused damage. You should not say that between damages and a loan given before witnesses damages are privileged, and here damages are privileged against the Temple; therefore it was necessary to say “his vineyard”, except Temple property.
“His field”, except if it was mortgaged. “His vineyard”, except Temple property. Where do we hold? If somebody caused damage and then dedicated to the Temple, that is what we have stated: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas.” If somebody dedicated to the Temple and then caused damage, that is what we have stated: “ ‘His neighbor’s ox’ but not the ox of Temple property.” Rebbi Yudan said, explain it if an ox of Temple property grazed on a private field. Rebbi Mana told him, we require Temple real estate and you say “on a private field”? But we must hold about one who said: I am obligating myself for 100 minas to the Temple; then went and caused damage. You should not say that between damages and a loan given before witnesses damages are privileged, and here damages are privileged against the Temple; therefore it was necessary to say “his vineyard”, except Temple property.
“The best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay,” i. e., the party responsible for the damage, the words of Rebbi Ismael. Rebbi Aqiba says, “the best of his field and the best of his vineyard”, of the person suffering the damage. It is difficult for Rebbi Aqiba, he suffered damage, and you say so? But the court see what the field was worth before it was damaged and estimates accordingly. As it was stated, it is possible if the grazing was on best quality land, one estimates from best quality, from lowest quality one estimates from lowest quality. How is this? The best of the lowest quality is quite good. If you say so you provide a windfall for the person suffering the damage. One looks at the field as if it was full of first quality [produce] and estimates for him from the best quality land; least quality one estimates from least quality land. It turns out that he pays with best quality for best quality and from least quality for least quality. From where has Rebbi Aqiba that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land”? It is not from the Torah, it is a decree. “Why did they say, ‘for tort victims one estimates with best quality land’? Because of the robbers. That a man should say, why should I have robbed [land] in my hand, or land subject to a suit for damages on my hand? Tomorrow, the court will see my good field, take it from me, and support it by the verse, ‘the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay.’ ” So far his real estate. His pledge was inferred from his real estate. Since his real estate [is taken] from the best quality, also his pledge [is taken] from the best.
“The best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay,” i. e., the party responsible for the damage, the words of Rebbi Ismael. Rebbi Aqiba says, “the best of his field and the best of his vineyard”, of the person suffering the damage. It is difficult for Rebbi Aqiba, he suffered damage, and you say so? But the court see what the field was worth before it was damaged and estimates accordingly. As it was stated, it is possible if the grazing was on best quality land, one estimates from best quality, from lowest quality one estimates from lowest quality. How is this? The best of the lowest quality is quite good. If you say so you provide a windfall for the person suffering the damage. One looks at the field as if it was full of first quality [produce] and estimates for him from the best quality land; least quality one estimates from least quality land. It turns out that he pays with best quality for best quality and from least quality for least quality. From where has Rebbi Aqiba that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land”? It is not from the Torah, it is a decree. “Why did they say, ‘for tort victims one estimates with best quality land’? Because of the robbers. That a man should say, why should I have robbed [land] in my hand, or land subject to a suit for damages on my hand? Tomorrow, the court will see my good field, take it from me, and support it by the verse, ‘the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay.’ ” So far his real estate. His pledge was inferred from his real estate. Since his real estate [is taken] from the best quality, also his pledge [is taken] from the best.
HALAKHAH: “One cannot collect for usufruct,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due, and some say, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should be eager to marry her. Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there about an adult orphan, here about an underage orphan.
HALAKHAH: “One cannot collect for usufruct,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due, and some say, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should be eager to marry her. Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there about an adult orphan, here about an underage orphan.
Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi; Levi went and gave it to Jehudah as a gift. Then Simeon foreclosed it from Jehudah. Jehudah has no regress on Levi since it was a gift. Levi has regress on Reuben since it was a sale. Did he not give it away as a gift? He can say to him, it was my intention to give it to him so he would return me favors. Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and gave it to Levi as a gift; Levi sold it to Jehudah. Jehudah has regress on Levi since he sold it; Levi has no regress on Reuben since it was a gift; as Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: No easement is created by a gift.
Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi; Levi went and gave it to Jehudah as a gift. Then Simeon foreclosed it from Jehudah. Jehudah has no regress on Levi since it was a gift. Levi has regress on Reuben since it was a sale. Did he not give it away as a gift? He can say to him, it was my intention to give it to him so he would return me favors. Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and gave it to Levi as a gift; Levi sold it to Jehudah. Jehudah has regress on Levi since he sold it; Levi has no regress on Reuben since it was a gift; as Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: No easement is created by a gift.
Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi; Levi went and gave it to Jehudah as a gift. Then Simeon foreclosed it from Jehudah. Jehudah has no regress on Levi since it was a gift. Levi has regress on Reuben since it was a sale. Did he not give it away as a gift? He can say to him, it was my intention to give it to him so he would return me favors. Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and gave it to Levi as a gift; Levi sold it to Jehudah. Jehudah has regress on Levi since he sold it; Levi has no regress on Reuben since it was a gift; as Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: No easement is created by a gift.
Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi; Levi went and gave it to Jehudah as a gift. Then Simeon foreclosed it from Jehudah. Jehudah has no regress on Levi since it was a gift. Levi has regress on Reuben since it was a sale. Did he not give it away as a gift? He can say to him, it was my intention to give it to him so he would return me favors. Reuben robbed a field from Simeon and gave it to Levi as a gift; Levi sold it to Jehudah. Jehudah has regress on Levi since he sold it; Levi has no regress on Reuben since it was a gift; as Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: No easement is created by a gift.
What is the situation of grandchildren? Rebbi Mana said, grandchildren are like children. Rebbi Yose said, grandchildren are not like children. Rebbi Samuel, son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Mattaniah were sitting together. They wanted to say, the same situation applies to grandchildren here as there. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said to them, inheritance by biblical law jumped on grandchildren.
There, we have stated: “You have in your hand a mina of my father’s; you have to get from me only 50 denars. He does not have to swear since he is like a person who returns a find.” Rebbi Eleazar said, in this case they instituted a regulation as they instituted for a find, as we have stated: “The finder of a lost object shall not swear because of the public good.” Rebbi Abba said, this Mishnah [applies] when he said to him, you found my two oxen. But if he said, I found your two oxen and returned both of them, but the other said, you returned only one, in that case they did not institute the rule. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In this case they did institute. But in the first case, it is a word of the Torah, as it was stated: I could think that if he said to him, you found my two oxen, but the other said, I found only one, should he be obligated [to swear]? The verse says, “or if he found a find and disowned it;” that excludes this one who did not disown. But if he said to him, I was standing on my roof when I saw you dragging away two tied oxen, two tied oxen you dragged away from me, and he says, only one I dragged away; in that case they made no regulation. Similarly: “I was standing with my father when he was dying and he claimed from you a mina and you agreed to it,” and the other says, “I agreed only for 50;” in that case they made no regulation.
MISHNAH: If orphans rely on a property owner or if their father appointed a guardian for them; these are obligated to tithe their produce. A guardian appointed by the orphans’ father shall be made to swear; if he was appointed by the court he shall not be made to swear. Abba Shaul says, it is the other way around.
HALAKHAH: “If orphans rely on a property owner, etc.” (Num. 18:28) “you” excludes partners, “you” excludes guardians, “you” excludes one who gives heave from what is not his. Did we not state (Terumot 3:3): “Partners who gave heave one after the other?” But one must be for Great Heave, the other for heave of the tithe. Did we not infer the laws of the Great Heave from heave of the tithe? But one is for practice, the other for action. “You” excludes guardians; but did we not state: “Orphans dependent on a home owner, or for whom the father had appointed a guardian, must tithe their produce.” The colleagues say, here for a permanent guardian, there for a temporary guardian. Rebbi Yose asked, does that apply to: “he may sell slaves but not real estate?” But here one deals with an adult orphan, there with an underage orphan.
HALAKHAH: “If orphans rely on a property owner, etc.” (Num. 18:28) “you” excludes partners, “you” excludes guardians, “you” excludes one who gives heave from what is not his. Did we not state (Terumot 3:3): “Partners who gave heave one after the other?” But one must be for Great Heave, the other for heave of the tithe. Did we not infer the laws of the Great Heave from heave of the tithe? But one is for practice, the other for action. “You” excludes guardians; but did we not state: “Orphans dependent on a home owner, or for whom the father had appointed a guardian, must tithe their produce.” The colleagues say, here for a permanent guardian, there for a temporary guardian. Rebbi Yose asked, does that apply to: “he may sell slaves but not real estate?” But here one deals with an adult orphan, there with an underage orphan.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator, fromthe following: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.”
Rav Huna in the name of Rav: If he mixed. If he made a libation and then mixed it, at the start he committed a capital crime and at the end he has to pay? Rebbi Abba objected: Think of it, if he killed somebody and broke the flask, at the start he committed a capital crime and in the end he has to pay? Rebbi Yose objected: Think of it, if he set fire to somebody’s grain stack on the Day of Atonement, at the start he committed a capital crime and in the end he has to pay? “If someone causes anything to become impure, or turn into dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine.
Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rebbi Assi: An underage girl has no definitive marriage to let her eat heave. Rebbi Immi said, a Mishnah said so, “married to a Cohen she eats heave.” Rebbi Abin asked: If she was definitively married but had no intercourse, [the husband] sent her to her father’s house and she grew up, may she eat heave? Let us hear from the following: “Based on her earlier definitive marriage.”
“If somebody stole a log and used it in building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, for the benefit of repenting sinners, that he has to pay its full value.” Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? If he stole it planed, but if he stole and planed it himself, he owes him money. If he stole and planed it on the spot, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody appropriates another person’s ruin and rebuilds it without prermission, one appraises it and his hand is weak. If he wants to take his logs and stones, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It was asked in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: If somebody stores his bundle in somebody else’s ruin and wants to take it from there, does one not listen to him? He had not heard that Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of civilisation. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. We would have thought that they disagree only in the Land, but not outside the Land. Since Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, because of civilisation, this implies that there is no difference between the Land and outside the Land. If he wants to take [the value of] his logs and stones, what is the rule? One tells him, wait until he dwells in it. Samuel said, one pays him immediately.
HALAKHAH: “There was no law of siqariqon in Judea” etc. In earlier times they decided on a persecution in Judea because they had a tradition from their forefathers that Jehudah had killed Esaw, as it is written: “Your hand is on your enemies’ neck.” They went and enslaved them, took their fields and sold them to third parties. The original owners could come and repossess; therefore the land was left absolutely in the hand of the siqariqon since they refrained from buying. “They decreed that the law of siqariqon should not apply in Jehudah. When was this said? About war killings before the war. But about anybody killed in and after the war, the notion of siqariqon does not apply.” But are those killed before the war not like those killed after the war? Explain it that a siqariqon came and robbed and suppressed; there was no time left to write the sales contract before murder engulfed the entire world, that practice should not be partial.
HALAKHAH: “There was no law of siqariqon in Judea” etc. In earlier times they decided on a persecution in Judea because they had a tradition from their forefathers that Jehudah had killed Esaw, as it is written: “Your hand is on your enemies’ neck.” They went and enslaved them, took their fields and sold them to third parties. The original owners could come and repossess; therefore the land was left absolutely in the hand of the siqariqon since they refrained from buying. “They decreed that the law of siqariqon should not apply in Jehudah. When was this said? About war killings before the war. But about anybody killed in and after the war, the notion of siqariqon does not apply.” But are those killed before the war not like those killed after the war? Explain it that a siqariqon came and robbed and suppressed; there was no time left to write the sales contract before murder engulfed the entire world, that practice should not be partial.
“The law of siqariqon always applies in Galilee.” The law of siqariqon does not apply to movables. It was stated: “The law of siqariqon does not apply to foreclosures for a debt and for tenant fees. [A foreclosure for nonpayment of] tenant fees waits twelve months for the owners.” Rebbi Judah ben Pazi said, after twelve months one announces on four consecutive Sabbaths. He explained it in two ways. If he took it from a tenant and gave it to a tenant and the first wants to foreclose, he says to him, are you not a tenant? Leave it for me and what you cut, you cut. If he took it from the owner and gave it to a tenant, the [owner] wants to foreclose, he tells him, what use do you have if you take it from me and he will take it from you, but what I can afford I shall give to you.
Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: So it is: If he sold to a first person and she signed, to a second and a third and she signed, she can collect from the last. If it is insufficient, she collects from the one before the last. If this is insufficient, she collects from the one before the penultimate. On this, Rav said: For property which she brought him in her ketubah. But property which she brought to him as paraphernalia, she collects from any she wants.
(The deaf-mute communicates by sign language.) They say, we had the means to buy; the buyer says, no. Rebbi Yose says, the field is always in the possession of the current owner since the burden of proof is on the claimant.
Following the opinion of the rabbis there it is acceptable since there, they say in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: One to whom one gives a nut and he throws it away, a pebble and he keeps it, what is found in his hand is as if found on a garbage heap; a nut and he keeps it, a pebble and he throws it away, what is robbed from him is robbed because of communal peace; a nut or a pebble he takes, hides them, and produces them later, what is robbed from him is total robbery. He can acquire for himself but not for others. Rav Huna said, just as he can acquire for himself so he can acquire for others. Everybody agrees that his gift is not a gift since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “If a man give.” The gift of a man is a gift, but the gift of a minor is no gift, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, robbing from him is not clear unless he grew two pubic hairs. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that is, to recover from him by a law suit, but to have to bring a sacrifice for [a false] oath only if he grew two pubic hairs. But following the rabbis here, Rebbi Yose asked that even for himself he should not be able to acquire since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “A man to his neighbor”, until he be like his neighbor. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac explained it by the method of the artless. As we have stated there: “For underage children, their buying is buying and their selling selling, for movables.” But did we not state there: “He cannot make them acquire through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is like his hand.” The rabbis of Caesarea say, here a minor with knowledge, there a minor without knowledge.
“If a poor person knocks off [olives] from high up in the olive tree, what is under him falls under the category of robbery, for communal peace; Rebbi Yose says, complete robbery.” That means, on the earth. But if he plucks with his hand, his hand acquires for him.
Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Ammi. One said: “Plough it well then, I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical.” The other one said: “May you succeed” For him who says, plough it well, then I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical, what means “one greets them” in a Jewish way? “May you succeed.” For him who says to the Gentile “may you succeed”? Explanation: Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa and Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman passed by one of the ploughmen in the Sabbatical. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said to him, are you not Jewish? Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa said to him, did not Rebbi teach us (Ps. 129:8): “The passers-by did not say, the blessing of the Eternal be on you,” these are the nations of the world who pass out of the world, they did not say to Israel “the blessing of the Eternal is on you.” What does Israel say to them, “we bless you in the Name of the Eternal.” All blessings that come into the world because of us are not enough for you; not only do you not say, come and take from these blessings for yourselves, but you roll over us pro-rated contributions and fines, head taxes and annonae.
Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Ammi. One said: “Plough it well then, I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical.” The other one said: “May you succeed” For him who says, plough it well, then I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical, what means “one greets them” in a Jewish way? “May you succeed.” For him who says to the Gentile “may you succeed”? Explanation: Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa and Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman passed by one of the ploughmen in the Sabbatical. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said to him, are you not Jewish? Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa said to him, did not Rebbi teach us (Ps. 129:8): “The passers-by did not say, the blessing of the Eternal be on you,” these are the nations of the world who pass out of the world, they did not say to Israel “the blessing of the Eternal is on you.” What does Israel say to them, “we bless you in the Name of the Eternal.” All blessings that come into the world because of us are not enough for you; not only do you not say, come and take from these blessings for yourselves, but you roll over us pro-rated contributions and fines, head taxes and annonae.
Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Is not this disagreement the same as that disagreement, as we have stated there: “If a man was talking with a woman about her bill of divorce or her preliminary marriage and gave her the bill of divorce or [some valuable for] preliminary marriage and did not spell it out, Rebbi Yose says it is sufficient; Rebbi Jehudah says he has to be explicit.” Then Rebbi follows Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Nathan Rebbi Jehudah. He said to him, what do you have in your hand, did not Rebbi Zeïra, Ḥiyya bar Abin, Abba bar Taḥlifa, say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, when do they differ? [If they thought about] other things but if he still was on the same subject, it is a bill of divorce. But here, even if they are still on the same subject there is disagreement.
Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Is not this disagreement the same as that disagreement, as we have stated there: “If a man was talking with a woman about her bill of divorce or her preliminary marriage and gave her the bill of divorce or [some valuable for] preliminary marriage and did not spell it out, Rebbi Yose says it is sufficient; Rebbi Jehudah says he has to be explicit.” Then Rebbi follows Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Nathan Rebbi Jehudah. He said to him, what do you have in your hand, did not Rebbi Zeïra, Ḥiyya bar Abin, Abba bar Taḥlifa, say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, when do they differ? [If they thought about] other things but if he still was on the same subject, it is a bill of divorce. But here, even if they are still on the same subject there is disagreement.
“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
MISHNAH: If somebody says: “Write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife, divorce her, write a letter and deliver to her”, they should write and deliver. “Discharge her, provide for her, treat her according to the law, do what is necessary;” he did not say anything. Earlier, they said that if somebody was led away in a neck-iron when he said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, they should write and deliver. They reconsidered and said, also one who leaves on a ship or in a caravan. Rebbi Simeon from Shezur said, also the dangerously sick.
As the following: Ganiba was lead out to be executed. He said, One should give money to Rebbi Abuna from the wine of Kefar Panaya. They did not give him; they were considering what Rav said, “an heir is like the buyer of encumbered property.” Just as a loan before witnesses cannot be collected from encumbered property, so it cannot be collected from heirs. If they did not give it as payment of a debt, they should have given as a gift! They were considering what Rebbi Eleazar said, for Rebbi Eleazar asked: Does his gift follow the rules of the gift of a sick person? Rebbi Ze‘ira brought Rebbi Isaac from Atosha who stated for him: A gift is like a bill of divorce. Rebbi Abba said to him, perhaps like bills of divorce which one cannot deliver if not delivered during his lifetime, so a gift is not called a gift if not delivered during his lifetime? He said to him, here comes the rabbi with sophistication to let Rebbi Abuna lose money! You cannot, for we have stated there: “Give a mina to X; then he died. One shall give after death.” Following Rebbi Simeon. For Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees, they should give him, as Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A loan before witnesses can be collected from the heirs on condition that they inherited real estate. Rebbi Yose said, that is, if somebody was with him until the moment of his death. But if he goes in and out, I am saying that already he gave him. The word of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it was not given since Rebbi Ḥanina reported this fact: Levi Parisa was going from place to place when Ganiba’s relatives came to eat with him. He said, the money should be given to Rebbi Abuna; they started quarelling with him.
MISHNAH: If somebody was thrown into a cistern and said, anybody hearing my voice should write a bill of divorce for my wife, they should write and deliver. If a healthy person said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, he wants to make fun of her. It happened to a healthy person who had said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, that he went on the roof, fell down, and died. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, the Sages said that if he jumped, it is a bill of divorce; if the wind pushed him, it is no bill of divorce.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody was thrown into a cistern,” etc. Rebbi Ḥanina said, Rebbi Jonathan taught us, only if they saw a man’s shadow. There we have stated: “One testifies by the light of a candle or by the light of the moon and one permits to remarry on the basis of a disembodied voice”, and Rebbi Jonathan said, only if they saw a man’s shadow. Rebbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina, in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: That means, in the fields, but in town even without a man’s shadow. But did we not state: “If somebody had been thrown into a cistern,” and Rebbi Jonathan said, only if they saw a man’s shadow? Rebbi Abin said, damaging spirits were as frequent in cisterns as they are frequent on the fields.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody was thrown into a cistern,” etc. Rebbi Ḥanina said, Rebbi Jonathan taught us, only if they saw a man’s shadow. There we have stated: “One testifies by the light of a candle or by the light of the moon and one permits to remarry on the basis of a disembodied voice”, and Rebbi Jonathan said, only if they saw a man’s shadow. Rebbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina, in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: That means, in the fields, but in town even without a man’s shadow. But did we not state: “If somebody had been thrown into a cistern,” and Rebbi Jonathan said, only if they saw a man’s shadow? Rebbi Abin said, damaging spirits were as frequent in cisterns as they are frequent on the fields.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody had an attack of seizures”, etc. The symptoms of an insane person: One who goes out in the night, stays overnight in a graveyard, tears his clothing, and destroys what one gives to him. Rebbi Huna said, only if all of that is in him since otherwise I say that one who goes out in the night is a man-dog; he who stays overnight in a graveyard burns incense to spirits, he who tears up his clothing is [a choleric person], and he who destroys what one gives to him is a Cynic. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even only one of these symptoms is proof. Rebbi Abun said, what Rebbi Joḥanan said, even only one of these by itself is reasonable for him who destroys what one gives to him; even the greatest idiot does not destroy all one gives to him. The one attacked by seizures does not exhibit any of these signs. What is one attacked by seizures? Rebbi Yose said, a decrepit one. There came a case before Rebbi Yose of a weaver who, when one gave him red on black he was exerting himself, black on red he was exerting himself. This is the cordiacus described by the Sages.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody had an attack of seizures”, etc. The symptoms of an insane person: One who goes out in the night, stays overnight in a graveyard, tears his clothing, and destroys what one gives to him. Rebbi Huna said, only if all of that is in him since otherwise I say that one who goes out in the night is a man-dog; he who stays overnight in a graveyard burns incense to spirits, he who tears up his clothing is [a choleric person], and he who destroys what one gives to him is a Cynic. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even only one of these symptoms is proof. Rebbi Abun said, what Rebbi Joḥanan said, even only one of these by itself is reasonable for him who destroys what one gives to him; even the greatest idiot does not destroy all one gives to him. The one attacked by seizures does not exhibit any of these signs. What is one attacked by seizures? Rebbi Yose said, a decrepit one. There came a case before Rebbi Yose of a weaver who, when one gave him red on black he was exerting himself, black on red he was exerting himself. This is the cordiacus described by the Sages.
The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If he had said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, and afterwards had an attack of seizures and said, do not write, his later words are disregarded.” He explains it: After he regains his sanity, his later words are disregarded. If he gave her a bill of divorce saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If he threw her bill of divorce to her saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Eleazar said that Rebbi Abin asked: If he separated heave from his grain heap and said, it shall be heave only tomorrow but the next day he suffered an attack of seizures, is this the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it: If somebody had been crucified or mortally wounded when he signalled to write a bill of divorce to his wife, one writes and delivers on the assumption that his soul hangs on in him. Is it not impossible that his mind should not have been disturbed for an hour? This disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it.
The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If he had said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, and afterwards had an attack of seizures and said, do not write, his later words are disregarded.” He explains it: After he regains his sanity, his later words are disregarded. If he gave her a bill of divorce saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If he threw her bill of divorce to her saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Eleazar said that Rebbi Abin asked: If he separated heave from his grain heap and said, it shall be heave only tomorrow but the next day he suffered an attack of seizures, is this the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it: If somebody had been crucified or mortally wounded when he signalled to write a bill of divorce to his wife, one writes and delivers on the assumption that his soul hangs on in him. Is it not impossible that his mind should not have been disturbed for an hour? This disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it.
“ ‘From today if I should die, from now if I should die,’ that is a bill of divorce. ‘From today after my death’ is no bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yudan said, the rabbis and our teachers [discussed.] Our teachers objected to the rabbis: Why do you say, it is a bill of divorce? Because he said, “if”! But in the last statement, he said “if” and you say, it is no bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “from today”. We also hold that “from today” is the main point. Rebbi objected to the rabbis. Why do you say, it is not a bill of divorce? Because he said, “from today”! But in the earlier statement, he said “from today” and you say, it is a bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “if”. I also am holding that “if” is the main point. There, they switch attributions. Both Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav say that the words of Rebbi [interpreted] there are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] here: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “on condition.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, “on condition that I die” or “on condition that it be after my death”? He said to him, “on condition that I die.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The words of Rebbi [interpreted] here are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] there: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “after death.”
“ ‘From today if I should die, from now if I should die,’ that is a bill of divorce. ‘From today after my death’ is no bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yudan said, the rabbis and our teachers [discussed.] Our teachers objected to the rabbis: Why do you say, it is a bill of divorce? Because he said, “if”! But in the last statement, he said “if” and you say, it is no bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “from today”. We also hold that “from today” is the main point. Rebbi objected to the rabbis. Why do you say, it is not a bill of divorce? Because he said, “from today”! But in the earlier statement, he said “from today” and you say, it is a bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “if”. I also am holding that “if” is the main point. There, they switch attributions. Both Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav say that the words of Rebbi [interpreted] there are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] here: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “on condition.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, “on condition that I die” or “on condition that it be after my death”? He said to him, “on condition that I die.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The words of Rebbi [interpreted] here are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] there: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “after death.”
“ ‘From today if I should die, from now if I should die,’ that is a bill of divorce. ‘From today after my death’ is no bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yudan said, the rabbis and our teachers [discussed.] Our teachers objected to the rabbis: Why do you say, it is a bill of divorce? Because he said, “if”! But in the last statement, he said “if” and you say, it is no bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “from today”. We also hold that “from today” is the main point. Rebbi objected to the rabbis. Why do you say, it is not a bill of divorce? Because he said, “from today”! But in the earlier statement, he said “from today” and you say, it is a bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “if”. I also am holding that “if” is the main point. There, they switch attributions. Both Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav say that the words of Rebbi [interpreted] there are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] here: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “on condition.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, “on condition that I die” or “on condition that it be after my death”? He said to him, “on condition that I die.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The words of Rebbi [interpreted] here are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] there: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “after death.”
“ ‘From today if I should die, from now if I should die,’ that is a bill of divorce. ‘From today after my death’ is no bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yudan said, the rabbis and our teachers [discussed.] Our teachers objected to the rabbis: Why do you say, it is a bill of divorce? Because he said, “if”! But in the last statement, he said “if” and you say, it is no bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “from today”. We also hold that “from today” is the main point. Rebbi objected to the rabbis. Why do you say, it is not a bill of divorce? Because he said, “from today”! But in the earlier statement, he said “from today” and you say, it is a bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “if”. I also am holding that “if” is the main point. There, they switch attributions. Both Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav say that the words of Rebbi [interpreted] there are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] here: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “on condition.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, “on condition that I die” or “on condition that it be after my death”? He said to him, “on condition that I die.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The words of Rebbi [interpreted] here are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] there: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “after death.”
MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce from today if I should die from this illness;” if he got up, walked on the market, fell ill again and died, one estimates whether he died from the original sickness, in which case it is a bill of divorce; otherwise it is no bill of divorce. She may not be alone with him except in the presence of witnesses, which may be even a male or a female slave except her personal slave girl since she has no shame in the presence of her personal slave girl. What is her status in those days? Rebbi Jehudah says, she is a married woman in all respects. Rebbi Yose says, she is divorced and not divorced.
HALAKHAH: “This is your bill of divorce from today,” etc. If he overate on groats it is as if he died from that illness, hazelnuts alone and he did not get out of bed it is as if he did not die from that illness.
“If he died from that sickness,” and a stone heap fell on him, or a snake bit him, it cannot be a bill of divorce unless he died of that sickness. “If I should not recover from that sickness,” and a stone heap fell on him, or a snake bit him it is a bill of divorce since he did not recover from that sickness.