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The Mishnah
These may eat [of the fruits among which they work] by the law of the Torah: one who works on that which is still connected to the ground [may eat of it] when the work is finished [at the time of harvest]; and one who works on that which is already detached from the ground [may eat of it] before the work is completely finished. This applies only to that which grows from the ground. These are they that may not eat; one that works on what is still growing while the work is still unfinished; and one that works on what is already detached from the ground after the work is finished, and [one may not eat] of what does not grow from the soil.
If one was working with his hands but not with his feet, with his feet but not with his hands, or even with his shoulders only, he still may eat. Rabbi Yose bar Rabbi Judah says, “Only if he works with both his hands and his feet.”
If one was working with his hands but not with his feet, with his feet but not with his hands, or even with his shoulders only, he still may eat. Rabbi Yose bar Rabbi Judah says, “Only if he works with both his hands and his feet.”
If one swapped a cow for a donkey, and it gave birth, So too if one sold his slave and she gave birth, [And] one (the seller) says, “It was born before I sold her”, and the other (the buyer) says, “It was born after I bought her”, they shall divide [the value of what was born]. If one had two slaves, one large and the other small, or two fields, one large and the other small,[And he sold one of them], If the buyer says, “I bought the large one” and the other says, “I don’t know”, the buyer can rightly claim the large one. If the seller said, “I sold the small one” and the buyer said, “I do not know”, he may only take the small one. If one said, “It was the large one” and the other said, “It was the small one”, the seller must take an oath that it was the small one that he sold [and the buyer can only take the small one]. If one said, “I do not know”, and the other said, “I do not know”, they shall divide the value [of both slaves or fields].
If one swapped a cow for a donkey, and it gave birth, So too if one sold his slave and she gave birth, [And] one (the seller) says, “It was born before I sold her”, and the other (the buyer) says, “It was born after I bought her”, they shall divide [the value of what was born]. If one had two slaves, one large and the other small, or two fields, one large and the other small,[And he sold one of them], If the buyer says, “I bought the large one” and the other says, “I don’t know”, the buyer can rightly claim the large one. If the seller said, “I sold the small one” and the buyer said, “I do not know”, he may only take the small one. If one said, “It was the large one” and the other said, “It was the small one”, the seller must take an oath that it was the small one that he sold [and the buyer can only take the small one]. If one said, “I do not know”, and the other said, “I do not know”, they shall divide the value [of both slaves or fields].
If one rented a house to his fellow, he is obligated to provide it with a door, a bolt a lock and anything which is the work of a craftsman. However, that which is not the work of a craftsman, the tenant must make himself. The manure [which collects in the courtyard] belongs to the owner of the house, and the tenant can only claim the refuse from the oven and the stove.
If one leased a field from his fellow and it was not fruitful, if there was enough produce to make a heap, he must still tend to it. Rabbi Judah says: “What type of measure is a ‘heap’? Rather, [he must tend to it] only if it yields as much grain as was sown there.”
If one lent one’s fellow, he may exact a pledge from him only with the permission of a court, and he may not enter his house to take the pledge, as it is states, “You shall stand outside” (Deut. 24:1. If the borrower had two utensils, he may take one but must give back the other. And he must give back the pillow at night and the plow during the day. And if the creditor dies he need not return the pledge to his heirs. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “Even to the debtor himself he need only return the pledge within thirty days [of the loan], and after thirty days he may sell it with the consent of the court. A pledge may not be taken from a widow, whether she be rich or poor, as it states, “Do not take the a widow’s garment as a pledge” (Deut. 24:17). If one takes a millstone as a pledge he violates a negative commandment and he is also in violation of both parts [of the millstone], as it states, “Do not take a mill or an upper millstone as a pledge” (Deut. 24:6). And they didn’t say just an upper millstone or a mill but anything that is necessary for food, as it states, “for that would be taking someone’s life as a pledge” (ibid.).
If one lent one’s fellow, he may exact a pledge from him only with the permission of a court, and he may not enter his house to take the pledge, as it is states, “You shall stand outside” (Deut. 24:1. If the borrower had two utensils, he may take one but must give back the other. And he must give back the pillow at night and the plow during the day. And if the creditor dies he need not return the pledge to his heirs. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “Even to the debtor himself he need only return the pledge within thirty days [of the loan], and after thirty days he may sell it with the consent of the court. A pledge may not be taken from a widow, whether she be rich or poor, as it states, “Do not take the a widow’s garment as a pledge” (Deut. 24:17). If one takes a millstone as a pledge he violates a negative commandment and he is also in violation of both parts [of the millstone], as it states, “Do not take a mill or an upper millstone as a pledge” (Deut. 24:6). And they didn’t say just an upper millstone or a mill but anything that is necessary for food, as it states, “for that would be taking someone’s life as a pledge” (ibid.).
One may not set up an oven inside a house unless there is a space of four cubits above it. If he sets it up in the upper room, the flooring beneath it must be three handbreadths deep, or for a stove one handbreadth. And if it causes damage [to the floor] he must pay for the damage caused. Rabbi Shimon says: “They only mentioned these measurements so that if the object caused damage he would be exempt.”
A person’s ladder must not be kept within four cubits of [his neighbor’s] dovecote, lest a marten (a small animal that eats doves) should jump in. His wall may not be built four cubits from [his neighbor’s] roof-gutter, so that the other can set up his ladder [to clean it out]. A dovecote may not be kept within fifty cubits of a town, and none may build a dovecote in his own domain unless his ground extends fifty cubits in every direction. Rabbi Judah says: Four kor’s space of ground, which is the length of a pigeon’s flight. But if he had bought it [and it was built already in that place] and there was only a quarter-kab’s space of ground, he has a right to the dovecote.
Animal carcasses, graves and tanneries must be distanced fifty cubits from a town. A tannery may be set up only to the east of a town. Rabbi Akiva says: “It may be set up on any side save the west, and it must be distanced fifty cubits [from the town].
If a man sold a courtyard, he has also sold its houses, cisterns, trenches and caves, but not the movable property. But if he had said: “It and all that is in it” all of these are also sold. But in neither case has he sold the bath-house, or the olive press that are in it. Rabbi Eliezer says: “If a man sold a courtyard, he has sold only the air (the open spaces) of the courtyard.
But [one who sold a field] has not sold the stones that are not necessary to it or the canes in a vineyard that are not necessary to it or the produce that is already picked from the ground. But if he had said, “It and all that is in it” all of these are sold also. But in neither case has he sold any partition of reeds that covers a quarter-kav’s space of ground, or the watchman’s hut if it was not fastened down with mortar, or grafted carob trees or cropped sycamores, or any cistern or winepress or dovecote, whether they are lying waste or in use. And [the seller] must purchase [from the buyer] a way thereto, according to Rabbi Akiva. But the sages say: “He need not.” And Rabbi Akiva agrees that if he had said, “Excepting these”, he need not buy himself a way thereto. If he had sold them (the cistern, winepress or dovecote) to another, Rabbi Akiva says: “He [that bought them] need not buy himself a way thereto. But the Sages say: “He must buy himself a way thereto.” When is this so? With regards to he that sells his field. But if he gives it as a gift, he gives everything that is in it. If brothers who divided [an inheritance] came into possession of a field, they come into possession of everything that is in it. If a man secured title by possession of the property of a convert, and secured title by possession of the [convert’s] field, he secures title to everything that is in it. If a man dedicated a field [to the Temple] he has dedicated everything in it. Rabbi Shimon says: “If a man dedicated a field, he has dedicated only the grafted carob trees and cropped sycamores.”
If a man sold wine or oil to his fellow, and its value rose or fell, if [the price rose or fell] before the measure was filled up, it belongs to the seller, [and he may refuse to sell except at the higher price]. But if [the price rose or fell] after the measure was filled up, it belongs to the buyer [and he may refuse to buy except at the lower price]. If there was a middleman between them, and the jar broke, it is broken to [the loss of] the middleman. [After emptying the measure] the seller must let three more drops drip [for the buyer]. If he then turned the measure over and drained it off, what flows out belongs to the seller. The shopkeeper is not obligated to let three more drops drip. Rabbi Judah says: “[Only] on the eve of Shabbath as it becomes dark is he exempt.”
If he had a cistern behind his fellow’s house, he may go in and out only at the time when others are accustomed to go in and out. And he may not bring in his cattle and let them drink from his cistern, rather he must draw water and let them drink outside. He and the owner of the house should each make themselves a lock.
If he had a garden behind his fellow’s garden, he may go in and out only at the time when others are accustomed to go in and out. And he may not bring in merchants, or enter through it into another field. [The owner of] the outer garden may plant seeds on the path. But, if with the other’s consent, he has been given a path at the side [of the other’s garden] he may go in and out when he wishes. And he may bring in merchants, but he may not enter through it into another field. And neither of them has the right to plant seeds on the path.
[If he said, “I will sell you] a kor’s space of soil as measured by a rope”, and he gave him less, the buyer may reduce the price; and if he gave him more, the buyer must give it back. But if he said, “Whether less or more”, even if he gave the buyer a quarter-kab’s space less in every seah’s space, or a quarter kab’s space more in every seah’s space, it becomes his; if [the error] was more than this, a reckoning must be made. What does he (the buyer) give him back? Its value in money; but if the seller wants, he gives him back the land. And why did they say that he could give back its value in money? To strengthen the power of the seller, for if, in a field [containing a kor’s space] there would still have remained to him nine kab’s space, or, in a garden, a half-kab’s space, or according to Rabbi Akiva a quarter-kab’s space, the buyer must give back to him land. And not only must he give back the quarter-kab’s space, but all of the surplus.
If a man writes over his property to his son, he must write, “From today and after my death”, according to Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Yose says, “He need not do so.” If a man writes over his property to his son to be his after his death, the father cannot sell it since it is written over to the son, and the son cannot sell it since it is in the possession of the father. If his father sold the property, it is sold [only] until he dies; if the son sold the property, the buyer has no claim until the father dies. The father harvests the crops and gives them to whomever he wishes, and what he has left harvested belongs to [all] his heirs. If he left elder sons and younger sons, the elder sons may not take care of themselves [from the estate] at the expense of the younger sons, nor may the younger sons claim maintenance at the cost of the elder sons, rather they all share alike. If the elder sons married [at the expense of the estate] so too the younger sons may marry [at the expense of the estate]. If the younger sons said, “We will marry in the way you married”, they do not listen to them, for what their father gave them, he has given.
If a man left sons and daughters and one that was of doubtful gender, if the property was great the males may push him (the one of doubtful gender) onto the females; if the property was small the females may thrust him onto the males. If a man said, “If my wife shall bear a male he shall be given 100 zuz”, and she had a male, he receives 100 zuz. [If he said, “If my wife shall bear a] female she shall be given 200 zuz”, and she had a female, she receives 200 zuz. [If he said, “If may wife shall bear a] male he shall be given 100 zuz and if a female 200 zuz” and she had a male and a female, the male receives 100 zuz and the female 200 zuz. If she had one of doubtful gender, he does not take. But if he said, “Whatsoever my wife shall bear shall be given [such an amount], he receives. If he [the one of doubtful gender] was the only heir, he inherits everything.
If a man divided his property orally, Rabbi Eliezer says: “Whether he was healthy or at the point of death, property for which there is security (land) can be acquired only by money, by a document or by possession; property for which there is no security (movable objects) can be acquired only by being drawn [into the possession of the one acquiring]. They (the Sages) said to him: “It once happened that the mother of the sons of Rokhel was sick and said, ‘Give my veil to my daughter’, and it was worth twelve hundred maneh (1,200 dinars) and she died and they fulfilled her words. He said to them: “May their mother bury the sons of Rokhel.” The Sages say: “On a Sabbath his words remain valid, since he cannot write, but not on a weekday.” Rabbi Joshua says: “If they have stated this rule on the Sabbath, how much more so on a weekday.” Similarly, others may acquire possession on behalf of a minor, but not on behalf of an adult. Rabbi Joshua says: “If they have stated this rule with regards to a minor, how much more so does the rule apply to an adult.
If a man divided his property orally, Rabbi Eliezer says: “Whether he was healthy or at the point of death, property for which there is security (land) can be acquired only by money, by a document or by possession; property for which there is no security (movable objects) can be acquired only by being drawn [into the possession of the one acquiring]. They (the Sages) said to him: “It once happened that the mother of the sons of Rokhel was sick and said, ‘Give my veil to my daughter’, and it was worth twelve hundred maneh (1,200 dinars) and she died and they fulfilled her words. He said to them: “May their mother bury the sons of Rokhel.” The Sages say: “On a Sabbath his words remain valid, since he cannot write, but not on a weekday.” Rabbi Joshua says: “If they have stated this rule on the Sabbath, how much more so on a weekday.” Similarly, others may acquire possession on behalf of a minor, but not on behalf of an adult. Rabbi Joshua says: “If they have stated this rule with regards to a minor, how much more so does the rule apply to an adult.
A simple document requires two witnesses; a sewn document requires three. If a simple document has only one witness, or a sewn document has only two, they are both invalid. If it was written in a debt document: “100 zuz which are 20 sela (=80”, he (the creditor) can claim only 20 sela; if [it was written] “100 zuz which are 30 sela (=120” he (the creditor) can claim only 100 zuz. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver zuzim which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two zuzim. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver selas which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two selas. [If there was written in a debt document] “Darics which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two darics. If at the top was written a “maneh (100” and at the bottom “200 zuz”, or “200 zuz” at the top and “maneh” at the bottom, everything goes according to the bottom amount. If so, why is the figure written at the top of the document? So that, if a letter of the lower figure was erased, they can learn from the upper figure.
A simple document requires two witnesses; a sewn document requires three. If a simple document has only one witness, or a sewn document has only two, they are both invalid. If it was written in a debt document: “100 zuz which are 20 sela (=80”, he (the creditor) can claim only 20 sela; if [it was written] “100 zuz which are 30 sela (=120” he (the creditor) can claim only 100 zuz. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver zuzim which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two zuzim. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver selas which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two selas. [If there was written in a debt document] “Darics which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two darics. If at the top was written a “maneh (100” and at the bottom “200 zuz”, or “200 zuz” at the top and “maneh” at the bottom, everything goes according to the bottom amount. If so, why is the figure written at the top of the document? So that, if a letter of the lower figure was erased, they can learn from the upper figure.
A simple document requires two witnesses; a sewn document requires three. If a simple document has only one witness, or a sewn document has only two, they are both invalid. If it was written in a debt document: “100 zuz which are 20 sela (=80”, he (the creditor) can claim only 20 sela; if [it was written] “100 zuz which are 30 sela (=120” he (the creditor) can claim only 100 zuz. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver zuzim which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two zuzim. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver selas which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two selas. [If there was written in a debt document] “Darics which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two darics. If at the top was written a “maneh (100” and at the bottom “200 zuz”, or “200 zuz” at the top and “maneh” at the bottom, everything goes according to the bottom amount. If so, why is the figure written at the top of the document? So that, if a letter of the lower figure was erased, they can learn from the upper figure.
A simple document requires two witnesses; a sewn document requires three. If a simple document has only one witness, or a sewn document has only two, they are both invalid. If it was written in a debt document: “100 zuz which are 20 sela (=80”, he (the creditor) can claim only 20 sela; if [it was written] “100 zuz which are 30 sela (=120” he (the creditor) can claim only 100 zuz. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver zuzim which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two zuzim. [If there was written in a debt document] “Silver selas which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two selas. [If there was written in a debt document] “Darics which are …”, and the rest was erased, [the creditor can claim] at least two darics. If at the top was written a “maneh (100” and at the bottom “200 zuz”, or “200 zuz” at the top and “maneh” at the bottom, everything goes according to the bottom amount. If so, why is the figure written at the top of the document? So that, if a letter of the lower figure was erased, they can learn from the upper figure.
If a man lent his fellow money by using a document, he may recover the debt from mortgaged property. But if he had lent only before witnesses (and not through a document), he may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If the [creditor] brought forth [a loan document] upon which appeared his (the debtor’s) signature as evidence that he was indebted to him, the creditor may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If a man signed as a guarantor after the signatures of witnesses, the creditor may recover the debt only from [the guarantor’s] unmortgaged property. Such a case came before Rabbi Yishmael and he said, “He may recover only from unmortgaged property”. Ben Nanos said to him: “He may recover the debt neither from mortgaged nor unmortgaged property.” He said to him: “Why?” He answered, “If a man seized a debtor by the throat in the street and his fellow found him and said ‘Leave him alone (and I will pay), he is not liable, since not through trust in him did the creditor lend the debtor money.” Rather which type of guarantor is liable? [If a man said], “Lend him money and I will pay thee”, he is liable, for he lent him the money through his trust in the guarantor. And Rabbi Yishmael said, “He who wants to be wise let him occupy himself with cases dealing with monetary matters, for there is no greater branch of Torah than this; for they are like a welling fountain; and he who wishes to occupy himself with laws concerning monetary matters, let him serve [as a pupil] of Shimon ben Nanos.
If a man lent his fellow money by using a document, he may recover the debt from mortgaged property. But if he had lent only before witnesses (and not through a document), he may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If the [creditor] brought forth [a loan document] upon which appeared his (the debtor’s) signature as evidence that he was indebted to him, the creditor may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If a man signed as a guarantor after the signatures of witnesses, the creditor may recover the debt only from [the guarantor’s] unmortgaged property. Such a case came before Rabbi Yishmael and he said, “He may recover only from unmortgaged property”. Ben Nanos said to him: “He may recover the debt neither from mortgaged nor unmortgaged property.” He said to him: “Why?” He answered, “If a man seized a debtor by the throat in the street and his fellow found him and said ‘Leave him alone (and I will pay), he is not liable, since not through trust in him did the creditor lend the debtor money.” Rather which type of guarantor is liable? [If a man said], “Lend him money and I will pay thee”, he is liable, for he lent him the money through his trust in the guarantor. And Rabbi Yishmael said, “He who wants to be wise let him occupy himself with cases dealing with monetary matters, for there is no greater branch of Torah than this; for they are like a welling fountain; and he who wishes to occupy himself with laws concerning monetary matters, let him serve [as a pupil] of Shimon ben Nanos.
If a man lent his fellow money by using a document, he may recover the debt from mortgaged property. But if he had lent only before witnesses (and not through a document), he may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If the [creditor] brought forth [a loan document] upon which appeared his (the debtor’s) signature as evidence that he was indebted to him, the creditor may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If a man signed as a guarantor after the signatures of witnesses, the creditor may recover the debt only from [the guarantor’s] unmortgaged property. Such a case came before Rabbi Yishmael and he said, “He may recover only from unmortgaged property”. Ben Nanos said to him: “He may recover the debt neither from mortgaged nor unmortgaged property.” He said to him: “Why?” He answered, “If a man seized a debtor by the throat in the street and his fellow found him and said ‘Leave him alone (and I will pay), he is not liable, since not through trust in him did the creditor lend the debtor money.” Rather which type of guarantor is liable? [If a man said], “Lend him money and I will pay thee”, he is liable, for he lent him the money through his trust in the guarantor. And Rabbi Yishmael said, “He who wants to be wise let him occupy himself with cases dealing with monetary matters, for there is no greater branch of Torah than this; for they are like a welling fountain; and he who wishes to occupy himself with laws concerning monetary matters, let him serve [as a pupil] of Shimon ben Nanos.
If a man lent his fellow money by using a document, he may recover the debt from mortgaged property. But if he had lent only before witnesses (and not through a document), he may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If the [creditor] brought forth [a loan document] upon which appeared his (the debtor’s) signature as evidence that he was indebted to him, the creditor may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If a man signed as a guarantor after the signatures of witnesses, the creditor may recover the debt only from [the guarantor’s] unmortgaged property. Such a case came before Rabbi Yishmael and he said, “He may recover only from unmortgaged property”. Ben Nanos said to him: “He may recover the debt neither from mortgaged nor unmortgaged property.” He said to him: “Why?” He answered, “If a man seized a debtor by the throat in the street and his fellow found him and said ‘Leave him alone (and I will pay), he is not liable, since not through trust in him did the creditor lend the debtor money.” Rather which type of guarantor is liable? [If a man said], “Lend him money and I will pay thee”, he is liable, for he lent him the money through his trust in the guarantor. And Rabbi Yishmael said, “He who wants to be wise let him occupy himself with cases dealing with monetary matters, for there is no greater branch of Torah than this; for they are like a welling fountain; and he who wishes to occupy himself with laws concerning monetary matters, let him serve [as a pupil] of Shimon ben Nanos.
If a man lent his fellow money by using a document, he may recover the debt from mortgaged property. But if he had lent only before witnesses (and not through a document), he may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If the [creditor] brought forth [a loan document] upon which appeared his (the debtor’s) signature as evidence that he was indebted to him, the creditor may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If a man signed as a guarantor after the signatures of witnesses, the creditor may recover the debt only from [the guarantor’s] unmortgaged property. Such a case came before Rabbi Yishmael and he said, “He may recover only from unmortgaged property”. Ben Nanos said to him: “He may recover the debt neither from mortgaged nor unmortgaged property.” He said to him: “Why?” He answered, “If a man seized a debtor by the throat in the street and his fellow found him and said ‘Leave him alone (and I will pay), he is not liable, since not through trust in him did the creditor lend the debtor money.” Rather which type of guarantor is liable? [If a man said], “Lend him money and I will pay thee”, he is liable, for he lent him the money through his trust in the guarantor. And Rabbi Yishmael said, “He who wants to be wise let him occupy himself with cases dealing with monetary matters, for there is no greater branch of Torah than this; for they are like a welling fountain; and he who wishes to occupy himself with laws concerning monetary matters, let him serve [as a pupil] of Shimon ben Nanos.
A tribe, a false prophet, or the high priest may not be tried save by the court of seventy-one; They may not send forth the people to wage a battle of free choice save by the decision of the court of one and seventy; They may not add to the City [of Jerusalem], or the Courts of the Temple save by the decision of the court of seventy-one; They may not set up sanhedrins for the several tribes save by the decision of the court of one and seventy. And they may not proclaim [any city to be] an Apostate City (ir ha-niddahat) (Deut. 13:13–19] save by the decision of one and seventy. No city on the frontier may be proclaimed an Apostate City, nor three together, but only one or two.
If any of his near kin die he may not go out of the door of his palace. Rabbi Judah says: “If he wishes to follow the bier he may, since we have found that David followed the bier of Avner, as it says, “And King David followed the bier” (II Samuel 3:31) They answered, “That was only to appease the people.” When they feed him the funeral meal all the people sit on the floor and he sits on a couch.
He may send forth the people to a battle waged of free choice by the decision of the court of seventy one. He may break through [the private domain of any man] to make himself a road and none may protest him. The king’s road has no limit. Whatsoever the people take in plunder they must place before him, and he may take first. “And he shall not have many wives” (Deut. 17:17) eighteen only. Rabbi Judah says: “He may take many wives provided they don’t turn his heart away [from worshipping God]. Rabbi Shimon says: “Even one that might turn his heart away, he should not marry. Why then does it say, “He shall not have many wives”, even if they are like Avigayil. “He shall not keep many horses” (Deut. 17:16) enough for his chariot only. “Nor shall he amass silver and gold to excess” (Deut. 17:17) enough to pay his soldier’s wages. He must write a Torah scroll for himself; when he goes forth to battle he shall take it with him, and when he returns he shall bring it back with him; when he sits in judgement it shall be with him, and when he sits to eat it shall be with him, as it says, “Let it remain with him and let him read it all his life” (Deut. 17:19)
He may send forth the people to a battle waged of free choice by the decision of the court of seventy one. He may break through [the private domain of any man] to make himself a road and none may protest him. The king’s road has no limit. Whatsoever the people take in plunder they must place before him, and he may take first. “And he shall not have many wives” (Deut. 17:17) eighteen only. Rabbi Judah says: “He may take many wives provided they don’t turn his heart away [from worshipping God]. Rabbi Shimon says: “Even one that might turn his heart away, he should not marry. Why then does it say, “He shall not have many wives”, even if they are like Avigayil. “He shall not keep many horses” (Deut. 17:16) enough for his chariot only. “Nor shall he amass silver and gold to excess” (Deut. 17:17) enough to pay his soldier’s wages. He must write a Torah scroll for himself; when he goes forth to battle he shall take it with him, and when he returns he shall bring it back with him; when he sits in judgement it shall be with him, and when he sits to eat it shall be with him, as it says, “Let it remain with him and let him read it all his life” (Deut. 17:19)
And these are they which are not qualified [to be witnesses or judges]: A dice player, a usurer, pigeon racers, or traffickers in Seventh Year produce. Rabbi Shimon said: “In the beginning they called them ‘gatherers’ of Seventh Year produce, but after the oppressors grew many they changed this and called them ‘traffickers’ of Seventh Year produce.” Rabbi Judah said: “This applies only if they have no other trade, but if they have some other trade other than that, they are not disqualified.”
These are the relatives [that are not qualified to be witnesses or judges]: A suitor’s father, brother, father’s brother, mother’s brother, sister’s husband, father’s sister’s husband, mother’s sister’s husband, mother’s husband, father-in-law, or wife’s sister’s husband them and their sons and their sons-in-law; also the suitor’s step-son only [but not the stepsons’ sons]. Rabbi Yose said, “Such was the mishnah of Rabbi Akiva, but the first mishnah taught: ‘a suitor’s uncle, or his uncle’s son, and all that are qualified to be his heir. Moreover all that were kinsmen at the time [are disqualified]; but kinsmen that have ceased to be kinsmen become qualified.” Rabbi Judah says: “If a man’s daughter died and left children, her husband still counts as a kinsman.”
Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.
In non-capital cases and those concerning uncleanness and cleanness [the judges declare their opinion] beginning from the eldest, but in capital cases they begin from [them that sit at] the side. All are qualified to try non-capital cases, but not all are qualified to try capital cases, only priests, levites and Israelites that may give [their daughters] in marriage to priests.
How did they admonish witnesses in capital cases? They brought them in and admonished them, [saying], “Perhaps you will say something that is only a supposition or hearsay or secondhand, or even from a trustworthy man. Or perhaps you do not know that we shall check you with examination and inquiry? Know, moreover, that capital cases are not like non-capital cases: in non-capital cases a man may pay money and so make atonement, but in capital cases the witness is answerable for the blood of him [that is wrongfully condemned] and the blood of his descendants [that should have been born to him] to the end of the world.” For so have we found it with Cain that murdered his brother, for it says, “The bloods of your brother cry out” (Gen. 4:10). It doesn’t say, “The blood of your brother”, but rather “The bloods of your brother” meaning his blood and the blood of his descendants. Another saying is, “The bloods of your brother” that his blood was cast over trees and stones. Therefore but a single person was created in the world, to teach that if any man has caused a single life to perish from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had caused a whole world to perish; and anyone who saves a single soul from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had saved a whole world. Again [but a single person was created] for the sake of peace among humankind, that one should not say to another, “My father was greater than your father”. Again, [but a single person was created] against the heretics so they should not say, “There are many ruling powers in heaven”. Again [but a single person was created] to proclaim the greatness of the Holy Blessed One; for humans stamp many coins with one seal and they are all like one another; but the King of kings, the Holy Blessed One, has stamped every human with the seal of the first man, yet not one of them are like another. Therefore everyone must say, “For my sake was the world created.” And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be involved with this trouble”, was it not said, “He, being a witness, whether he has seen or known, [if he does not speak it, then he shall bear his iniquity] (Lev. 5:1). And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be guilty of the blood of this man?,” was it not said, “When the wicked perish there is rejoicing” (Proverbs 11:10).]
They used to examine witnesses with seven inquiries: In what week of years? In what year? In what month? On what date in the month? On what day? In what hour? In what place? Rabbi Yose says: [They only asked:] On what day? In what hour? In what place? [Moreover they asked:] Do you recognize him? Did you warn him? If one had committed idolatry [they asked the witnesses:] What did he worship and how did he worship it?
The place of stoning was twice a man’s height. One of the witnesses pushed him by the hips, [so that] he was overturned on his heart. He was then turned on his back. If that caused his death, he had fulfilled [his duty]; but if not, the second witness took a stone and threw it on his chest. If he died thereby, he had done [his duty]; but if not, he [the criminal] was stoned by all Israel, for it is says: “The hand of the witnesses shall be first upon him to put him to death, and afterwards the hand of all the people” (Deut. 17:7). All who are stoned are [afterwards] hanged, according to Rabbi Eliezer. But the sages say: “Only the blasphemer and the idolater are hanged.” A man is hanged with his face towards the spectators, but a woman with her face towards the gallows, according to Rabbi Eliezer. But the sages say: a man is hanged, but not a woman. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: “But did not Shimon ben Shetah hang women at ashkelon?” They said: “[On that occasion] he hanged eighty women, even though two must not be tried on the same day. How is he hanged? The post is sunk into the ground with a [cross-] piece branching off [at the top] and he brings his hands together one over the other and hangs him up [thereby]. R. Jose said: the post is leaned against the wall, and he hangs him up the way butchers do. He is immediately let down. If he is left [hanging] over night, a negative command is thereby transgressed, for it says, “You shall not let his corpse remain all night upon the tree, but you must bury him the same day because a hanged body is a curse against god” (Deut. 21:23). As if to say why was he hanged? because he cursed the name [of god]; and so the name of Heaven [God] is profaned.
R. Meir said: “When man suffers, what expression does the shechinah (God’s presence) use? “My head is too light (a euphemism for heavy) for me, my arm is too light (a euphemism for heavy) for me.” If god is so grieved over the blood of the wicked that is shed, how much more so over the blood of the righteous! And not only of this one [a criminal did the sages not to leave him overnight] but whosoever lets his dead lie over night transgresses a negative commandment. If he kept him over night for the sake of his honor, to procure for him a coffin or a shroud, he does not transgress. And they did not bury him [the executed person] in his ancestral tomb, but two burial places were prepared by the court, one for those who were decapitated or strangled, and the other for those who were stoned or burned.
The following are stoned: He who has sexual relations with his mother, with his father’s wife, with his daughter-in-law, with a male; with a beast; a woman who commits bestiality with a beast; a blasphemer; an idolater; one who gives of his seed to molech; a necromancer or a wizard; one who desecrates the Sabbath; he who curses his father or mother; he who commits adultery with a betrothed woman; one who incites [individuals to idolatry]; one who seduces [a whole town to idolatry]; a sorcerer; and a wayward and rebellious son. He who has sexual relations with his mother incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his mother and as his father’s wife. R. Judah says: “He is liable in respect of her as his mother only.” He who has sexual relations with his father’s wife incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his father’s wife, and as a married woman, both during his father’s lifetime and after his death, whether she was widowed from betrothal or from marriage. He who has sexual relations with his daughter-in-law incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his daughter-in-law and as a married woman, both during his son’s lifetime and after his death, whether she was widowed from betrothal or from marriage. He who has sexual relations with a male or a beast, and a woman that commits bestiality: if the man has sinned, how has the animal sinned? But because the human was enticed to sin by the animal, therefore scripture ordered that it should be stoned. Another reason is that the animal should not pass through the market, and people say, this is the animal on account of which so and so was stoned.
The blasphemer is punished only if he utters [the divine] name. Rabbi Joshua b. Korcha said: “The whole day [of the trial] the witnesses are examined by means of a substitute for the divine name: ‘may Yose smite Yose.’” When the trial was finished, the accused was not executed on this evidence, but all persons were removed [from court], and the chief witness was told, ‘State literally what you heard.’ Thereupon he did so, [using the divine name]. The judges then arose and tore their garments, which were not to be resewn. The second witness stated: “I too have heard thus” [but not uttering the divine name], and the third says: “I too heard thus.”
The following are burnt: he who has sexual relations with a woman and her daughter, and a priest’s adulterous daughter. There is included in [the prohibition of having relations with] a woman and her daughter his own daughter, his daughter’s daughter, his son’s daughter, his wife’s daughter and the daughter of her daughter or son, his mother-in-law, her mother, and his father-in-law’s mother. The following are decapitated: a murderer, and the inhabitants of a city subverted into worshipping idols. A murderer who slew his fellow with a stone or iron, or kept him down under water or in fire, so that he could not get out of there, is executed. If he pushed him into water or fire, but he could get out of there , yet he died, he is not liable [for the death penalty]. If he set a dog or a snake against him [and they killed him], he is free from death. If he caused a snake to bite him, Rabbi Judah ruled that he is liable [for the death penalty] and the Sages, that he is not. If a man struck his fellow, whether with a stone or with his fist, and they [the experts] declared that he would die, but then its effect lessened [so that it was thought that he would live], only to increase subsequently, so that he died he is liable. Rabbi Nehemiah said that he is exempt, since there is a strong possibility [that he did not die as a result of his injuries].
The following are strangled: One who strikes his father or mother; One who kidnaps a Jew; An elder who rebels against the ruling of the court; A false prophet; One who prophesies in the name of an idol; One who commits adultery; Witnesses who testified falsely [to the adultery of] a priest’s daughter, and the one who has had sexual relations with her. The one who strikes his father or his mother is liable only if he wounds them. In this respect, cursing is more stringent than striking, for one who curses [his/her parents] after death is liable, while one who strikes them after death is not. One who kidnaps a Jew is not liable unless he brings him onto his own property. Rabbi Judah said: “Until he brings him onto his own property and puts him to service, as it says, “If a man is found to have kidnapped a fellow Israelite, enslaving him or selling him” (Deut. 24:7). If he kidnaps his own son. Rabbi Ishmael the son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka declares him liable, but the Sages exempt [him]. If he kidnapped one who was half a slave and half free, Rabbi Judah declares him liable, but the Sages exempt [him].
An elder rebelling against the ruling of the court [is strangled], for it says, “If there arise a matter too hard for you for judgement […you shall promptly repair to the place that the Lord your God will have chosen, and appear before the levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case, you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the Lord chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you. You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left. Should a man act presumptuously and disregard the priest charged with serving there the Lord your God, or the magistrate, that man shall die” (Deut. 17:8-13, JPS translation). Three courts of law were there, one situated at the entrance to the Temple mount, another at the door of the [Temple] court, and the third in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. They [first] went to the court which is at the entrance to the Temple mount, and he [the rebellious elder] stated, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this first court] had heard [a ruling on the matter], they state it. If not, they go to the [second court] which is at the entrance of the Temple court, and he declares, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this second court] had heard [a ruling on the matter] they state it; if not, they all proceed to the great court of the Chamber of Hewn Stone from whence instruction issued to all Israel, for it says, [you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you] from that place that the Lord chose (Deut. 17:10). If he returned to his town and taught again as he did before, he is not liable. But if he gave a practical decision, he is guilty, for it says, “Should a man act presumptuously” (Deut. 17:12) he is liable only for a practical ruling. But if a disciple gave a practical decision [opposed to the court], he is exempt: thus his stringency is his leniency.
[If they say:] “We testify that so and so is liable to a flogging of forty lashes, and they are found to be perjurers, they receive eighty lashes, because of, “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13) and “You shall do to him as he schemed to do to his fellow” (Deuteronomy 19:19), these are the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, “They receive only forty lashes.” Monetary impositions are shared among the offenders, but the lashes are not shared among the offenders. How so? If they testified that he owed his friend two hundred zuz, and they were found to be perjurers, they divide the corresponding damages proportionately between them. But if they testified that he was liable to a flogging of forty lashes and were found to be perjurers, each one receives forty lashes.
Perjuring witnesses are not to be put to death until [after] the end of the trial. Because the Sadducees say: “[Perjurers were put to death] only after the accused had [actually] been executed, as it says, “ A life for a life” (Deuteronomy 19:21). The [Pharisaic] Sages said to them: “But has not it already been said “You shall do to him as he schemed to do to his fellow” (Deuteronomy 19:19) which implies when his brother is still alive? If so, why does it say “A life for life”? For it might have been that perjurers are liable to be put to death from the moment their testimony had been taken, therefore the Torah states “A life for a life” that is to say that they are not executed until [after] the termination of the trial.
“A person shall be put to death only on the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses” (Deuteronomy 17:6). If the testimony is sufficiently established by two witnesses, why does Scripture [further] specify three? This is to compare two to three: just as three are competent to incriminate two as perjurers, so are two competent to incriminate three as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Shimon says: “Just as two witnesses are not put to death until both have been incriminated as perjurers, so three are not put to death until all three have been incriminated as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Akiba says: “The third witness was only mentioned in order to be stringent upon him and make his judgement the same as the other two. And if Scripture thus penalizes one who consorts with those who commit a transgression, as [if he is actually] one of those who commits the transgression, how much more so shall he who consorts with those who perform commandments receive a reward as [if he is actually] one of those who performs the commandments!”
“A person shall be put to death only on the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses” (Deuteronomy 17:6). If the testimony is sufficiently established by two witnesses, why does Scripture [further] specify three? This is to compare two to three: just as three are competent to incriminate two as perjurers, so are two competent to incriminate three as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Shimon says: “Just as two witnesses are not put to death until both have been incriminated as perjurers, so three are not put to death until all three have been incriminated as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Akiba says: “The third witness was only mentioned in order to be stringent upon him and make his judgement the same as the other two. And if Scripture thus penalizes one who consorts with those who commit a transgression, as [if he is actually] one of those who commits the transgression, how much more so shall he who consorts with those who perform commandments receive a reward as [if he is actually] one of those who performs the commandments!”
Rabbi Yose bar Judah says: “Initially a slayer is sent in advance to [one of] the cities of refuge, whether he had slain in error or with intent and then the court sends and brings him out. Whoever was found guilty of a capital crime the court had executed, and whoever was found not guilty of a capital crime they acquitted. Whoever was found liable to banishment they restored to his place [of refuge] as it says, “And the congregation shall restore him to the city of refuge to which he fled” (Numbers 35:25). All the same are [the deaths of] the high priest who had been anointed with the anointing oil; or had worn many garments, or had retired from his office all make possible the return of the manslayer. Rabbi Judah says also the [death of the] priest who had been anointed for war makes possible the return of the manslayer. Therefore, mothers of high priests would provide food and clothing for them [who had been exiled] that they might not pray for their son’s death. If the high priest died at the conclusion of the trial, the slayer does not go into banishment. If he died before the trial was concluded and another high priest was appointed in his stead and the trial was then concluded, the slayer returns [home from refuge only] after the latter’s death.
And these are liable to be flogged: One who had relations with his sister, or his father's sister, or his mother's sister, or his wife's sister, or his brother's wife, or his father's brother's wife, or a menstruant; A high priest who marries a widow, an ordinary priest who marries a divorcee or a halutzah; An Israelite who marries a mamzereth or natinah, or an Israelite woman who is married to a mamzer or a natin. In the case of a [woman who is both] a divorcee and a widow [a high priest] is liable on two counts. But in the case of a [woman who is both] a divorcee and a halutzah, an ordinary priest is liable only on one count.
An unclean person who ate holy meat (Leviticus 7:20, 12:4); One who entered the sanctuary while unclean (Leviticus 12:4, Numbers 5:3, 19:13); One who ate forbidden fat or blood (Leviticus 3:16, 7:23-27); Or leftover sacrificial meats (Leviticus 19:6-8); Or sacrifices that had been offered up with improper intention (Leviticus 7:18); Or [an offering] that has became unclean (Leviticus 7:19); One who slaughters, or offers up a sacrifice, outside the Temple precincts (Leviticus 17:4); One who ate leavened [bread] during Passover (Exodus 12:15,; One who partakes of food [or drink] or does work on the Day of Atonement (Leviticus 23:27-31); One who puts together the ingredients for the [anointing] oil, or the ingredients for the incense, or anoints with the oil for anointing (Exodus 30:22-28): One who eats an animal that died a natural death (Deuteronomy 14:21); Or was improperly slaughtered (Exodus 22:30); Or any of the [creatures deemed] ‘abominable’ and ‘teeming’ (Leviticus 11:11,. One who eats non-tithed produce, or first-tithe from which heave offering has not been removed, or unredeemed second-tithe, or unredeemed sanctified property. How much untithed produce is one to eat to become liable? Rabbi Shimon says: “Any amount.” The Sages say: “An olive's size.” Rabbi Shimon said to them: “Do you not admit that if one ate the minutest ant that he would be liable? They said to him: “[Only] because it is a whole creature.” He said to them: “Even a grain of wheat is a whole entity.”
If a man makes a baldness on his head, or rounds the corner of his head, or mars the corner of his beard, or makes one cutting [in his flesh] for the dead, he is liable [to a flogging]. If he makes one cutting for five dead, or five cuttings for one, he is liable for each one. On [rounding] the head [he is liable] for two corners, one for one side and one for the other; On [marring] the beard [he is liable] for two [corners] on one side, for two on the other side, and for one lower down. Rabbi Eliezer says: “If they were all taken off at the same time he is liable only on one count.” And he is only liable if he takes off with a razor; Rabbi Eliezer says: “Even if he picks off the hairs with tweezers, or with pincers, he is liable.
If a man makes a baldness on his head, or rounds the corner of his head, or mars the corner of his beard, or makes one cutting [in his flesh] for the dead, he is liable [to a flogging]. If he makes one cutting for five dead, or five cuttings for one, he is liable for each one. On [rounding] the head [he is liable] for two corners, one for one side and one for the other; On [marring] the beard [he is liable] for two [corners] on one side, for two on the other side, and for one lower down. Rabbi Eliezer says: “If they were all taken off at the same time he is liable only on one count.” And he is only liable if he takes off with a razor; Rabbi Eliezer says: “Even if he picks off the hairs with tweezers, or with pincers, he is liable.
If a nazirite has been drinking wine all day, he is liable for only one lashing. If they said to him, “Don’t drink wine”, “Don’t drink wine”, and he kept drinking, he is liable for each instance.
If he has been defiling himself for the dead all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not defile yourself! Do not defile yourself!” and he did defile himself [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was shaving all day he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not shave, Do not shave” and he did shave [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was wearing a garment of mixed linen and wool all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not put it on! Do not put it on!” and he takes it off and puts it on, he is liable on each instance.
If he has been defiling himself for the dead all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not defile yourself! Do not defile yourself!” and he did defile himself [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was shaving all day he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not shave, Do not shave” and he did shave [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was wearing a garment of mixed linen and wool all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not put it on! Do not put it on!” and he takes it off and puts it on, he is liable on each instance.
If he has been defiling himself for the dead all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not defile yourself! Do not defile yourself!” and he did defile himself [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was shaving all day he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not shave, Do not shave” and he did shave [each time], he is liable on each instance. If he was wearing a garment of mixed linen and wool all day, he is liable for only one set of lashes. If they said to him, “Do not put it on! Do not put it on!” and he takes it off and puts it on, he is liable on each instance.
Where there is no knowledge at the beginning but there is knowledge at the end, the goat sacrificed on the outer altar together with the day of atonement bring atonement, for it says: “[one he-goat for a sin-offering] beside the sin-offering of atonement” (Numbers 29:1: for that which this goat [prepared inside the Holy of Holies] atones this goat [prepared outside] atones: just as the ‘inner’ goat atones only for a sin where there was knowledge [at the beginning], so the “outer” goat atones only for a sin where there was knowledge [at the end].
Where there is no knowledge at the beginning but there is knowledge at the end, the goat sacrificed on the outer altar together with the day of atonement bring atonement, for it says: “[one he-goat for a sin-offering] beside the sin-offering of atonement” (Numbers 29:1: for that which this goat [prepared inside the Holy of Holies] atones this goat [prepared outside] atones: just as the ‘inner’ goat atones only for a sin where there was knowledge [at the beginning], so the “outer” goat atones only for a sin where there was knowledge [at the end].
Oaths are two, subdivided into four. “I swear I shall eat”, and “[I swear] I shall not eat”; “[I swear] I have eaten”, and “[I swear] I have not eaten”. “I swear I shall not eat”, and he ate [even] a minute quantity, he is liable, the words of Rabbi Akiva. They [the Sages] said to Rabbi Akiva: “Where do we find that he who eats a minute quantity is liable, that this one should be liable?” Rabbi Akiba said to them: “But where do we find that he who [merely] speaks brings a sacrifice, that this one should bring a sacrifice?” [If a man says,] “I swear I shall not eat” and he ate and drank, he is liable only once. “I swear I shall not eat and I shall not drink,” and he ate and drank, he is liable twice.
“I swear I shall not eat,” and he ate wheat bread, barley bread, and spelt bread, he is liable only once. “I swear I shall not eat wheat bread, barley bread, and spelt bread,” and he ate [all three], he is liable for each one.
“I swear I shall not drink,” and he drank many liquids, he is liable only once. “I swear I shall not drink wine, oil, and honey,” and he drank [all three], he is liable for each one.
It is the same [whether he swears of] things concerning himself, or of things concerning others, or of things which have substance, or of things which have no substance. How so? [If] he said, “I swear that I shall give to so-and-so”, or “I shall not give”; “I have given”, or “I have not given”; “I shall sleep”, or “I shall not sleep”; “I have slept”, or “I have not slept”; “I shall throw a pebble into the sea”, or “I shall not throw”; “I have thrown”, or “I have not thrown”; [he is liable.] Rabbi Ishmael says: “He is liable only for [an oath with regards to] the future, for it says, “To do bad or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4). Rabbi Akiva said to him: “If so, we would know only such cases where doing evil and doing good are applicable; but how do we know such cases where doing evil and doing good are not applicable? He said to him: “From the amplification of the verse.” He said to him: “If the verse amplifies for that, it amplifies for this also.”
It is the same [whether he swears of] things concerning himself, or of things concerning others, or of things which have substance, or of things which have no substance. How so? [If] he said, “I swear that I shall give to so-and-so”, or “I shall not give”; “I have given”, or “I have not given”; “I shall sleep”, or “I shall not sleep”; “I have slept”, or “I have not slept”; “I shall throw a pebble into the sea”, or “I shall not throw”; “I have thrown”, or “I have not thrown”; [he is liable.] Rabbi Ishmael says: “He is liable only for [an oath with regards to] the future, for it says, “To do bad or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4). Rabbi Akiva said to him: “If so, we would know only such cases where doing evil and doing good are applicable; but how do we know such cases where doing evil and doing good are not applicable? He said to him: “From the amplification of the verse.” He said to him: “If the verse amplifies for that, it amplifies for this also.”
“I swear I shall not eat this loaf”; “I swear I shall not eat it”; “I swear I shall not eat it”; and he ate it, he is liable only once. This is the oath of utterance, for which one is liable, for its willful transgression, flogging; and for its unwitting transgression, a sliding scale sacrifice. For a vain oath one is liable for willful transgression, flogging, and for unwitting transgression one is exempt.
The oath of testimony applies to men and not to women, to non-relatives and not to relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and not to those unqualified. And it applies only to those eligible to bear witness. Whether [uttered] in front of the court or not in front of the court, if [uttered] with his own mouth; [but if adjured] by the mouth of others he is not liable unless he denies it before the court, these are the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “Whether [uttered] with his own mouth or [adjured] by the mouth of others he is not liable unless he denies it before the court.”
The oath of testimony: How is it done? If he said to two [persons]: “Come and bear testimony for me”; [and they replied:] “We swear we know no testimony for you”; Or they said to him: “We know no testimony for you”, [and he said:] “I adjure you” and they said, “Amen! “, they are liable. If he adjured them five times outside the court, and the they came to the court and admitted [knowledge of testimony], they are exempt. If they denied, they are liable for each [oath]. If he adjured them five times before the court, and they denied [knowledge of testimony], they are liable only once. Said Rabbi Shimon: “What is the reason? Because they cannot afterwards admit [knowledge].
“I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that there are of mine in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, a stolen object, and a lost object”; [And they respond]: “We swear we know no testimony for you”, they are liable only once. “We swear we know not that there are of yours in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, a stolen object, and a lost object”, they are liable for each one. “I adjure you that you bear testimony for me that there is of mine in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt”; [And they respond]: “We swear we know no testimony for you”, they are liable only once. “We swear we know no testimony for you that there is of yours in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt”, they are liable for each one.
“I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that there are of mine in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, a stolen object, and a lost object”; [And they respond]: “We swear we know no testimony for you”, they are liable only once. “We swear we know not that there are of yours in the possession of so-and-so a deposit, a loan, a stolen object, and a lost object”, they are liable for each one. “I adjure you that you bear testimony for me that there is of mine in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt”; [And they respond]: “We swear we know no testimony for you”, they are liable only once. “We swear we know no testimony for you that there is of yours in the possession of so-and-so a deposit of wheat, barley, and spelt”, they are liable for each one.
[If a man said,] “I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that so-and-so promised to give me two hundred zuz, and did not give me”, they are exempt, for they are liable only for a money claim as [in the case of] deposit.
If five claimed from him, and said to him: “Give us the deposit that we have in your possession,” [and he replied:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession,” he is liable only once. [If he said:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession, nor you, nor you,” he is liable for each one. Rabbi Eliezer says: “Only if he says, ‘I swear’ at the end.” Rabbi Shimon says: “Only if he says, ‘I swear’ to each one.” “Give me the deposit, loan, theft, and lost object that I have in your possession,” [and he replied], “I swear that you do not have these in my possession,” he is liable only once. “I swear that you do not have in my possession a deposit, a loan, a theft, and a lost object,” he is liable for each one. “Give me the wheat, barley, and spelt that I have in your possession”, [and he replied], “I swear that you do not have these in my possession,” he is liable only once. “I swear that you do not have in my possession wheat, barley, and spelt,” he is liable for each one. Rabbi Meir said: “Even if he said, ‘... A grain of wheat, barley and spelt,’ he is liable for each one.
If five claimed from him, and said to him: “Give us the deposit that we have in your possession,” [and he replied:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession,” he is liable only once. [If he said:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession, nor you, nor you,” he is liable for each one. Rabbi Eliezer says: “Only if he says, ‘I swear’ at the end.” Rabbi Shimon says: “Only if he says, ‘I swear’ to each one.” “Give me the deposit, loan, theft, and lost object that I have in your possession,” [and he replied], “I swear that you do not have these in my possession,” he is liable only once. “I swear that you do not have in my possession a deposit, a loan, a theft, and a lost object,” he is liable for each one. “Give me the wheat, barley, and spelt that I have in your possession”, [and he replied], “I swear that you do not have these in my possession,” he is liable only once. “I swear that you do not have in my possession wheat, barley, and spelt,” he is liable for each one. Rabbi Meir said: “Even if he said, ‘... A grain of wheat, barley and spelt,’ he is liable for each one.
If five claimed from him, and said to him: “Give us the deposit that we have in your possession,” [and he replied:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession,” he is liable only once. [If he said:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession, nor you, nor you,” he is liable for each one. Rabbi Eliezer says: “Only if he says, ‘I swear’ at the end.” Rabbi Shimon says: “Only if he says, ‘I swear’ to each one.” “Give me the deposit, loan, theft, and lost object that I have in your possession,” [and he replied], “I swear that you do not have these in my possession,” he is liable only once. “I swear that you do not have in my possession a deposit, a loan, a theft, and a lost object,” he is liable for each one. “Give me the wheat, barley, and spelt that I have in your possession”, [and he replied], “I swear that you do not have these in my possession,” he is liable only once. “I swear that you do not have in my possession wheat, barley, and spelt,” he is liable for each one. Rabbi Meir said: “Even if he said, ‘... A grain of wheat, barley and spelt,’ he is liable for each one.
If five claimed from him, and said to him: “Give us the deposit that we have in your possession,” [and he replied:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession,” he is liable only once. [If he said:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession, nor you, nor you,” he is liable for each one. Rabbi Eliezer says: “Only if he says, ‘I swear’ at the end.” Rabbi Shimon says: “Only if he says, ‘I swear’ to each one.” “Give me the deposit, loan, theft, and lost object that I have in your possession,” [and he replied], “I swear that you do not have these in my possession,” he is liable only once. “I swear that you do not have in my possession a deposit, a loan, a theft, and a lost object,” he is liable for each one. “Give me the wheat, barley, and spelt that I have in your possession”, [and he replied], “I swear that you do not have these in my possession,” he is liable only once. “I swear that you do not have in my possession wheat, barley, and spelt,” he is liable for each one. Rabbi Meir said: “Even if he said, ‘... A grain of wheat, barley and spelt,’ he is liable for each one.
If five claimed from him, and said to him: “Give us the deposit that we have in your possession,” [and he replied:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession,” he is liable only once. [If he said:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession, nor you, nor you,” he is liable for each one. Rabbi Eliezer says: “Only if he says, ‘I swear’ at the end.” Rabbi Shimon says: “Only if he says, ‘I swear’ to each one.” “Give me the deposit, loan, theft, and lost object that I have in your possession,” [and he replied], “I swear that you do not have these in my possession,” he is liable only once. “I swear that you do not have in my possession a deposit, a loan, a theft, and a lost object,” he is liable for each one. “Give me the wheat, barley, and spelt that I have in your possession”, [and he replied], “I swear that you do not have these in my possession,” he is liable only once. “I swear that you do not have in my possession wheat, barley, and spelt,” he is liable for each one. Rabbi Meir said: “Even if he said, ‘... A grain of wheat, barley and spelt,’ he is liable for each one.
The oath of the judges [is imposed when] the claim is [at least] two silver coins, and the admission the equivalent of a perutah. And if the admission is not of the same kind as the claim, he is exempt. How is this so? “Two silver ma’ahs of mine are in your possession,” [and the other replies], “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,” he is exempt. “Two silver ma’ahs of mine and a perutah are in your possession,” [and the other replies,] “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,” he is liable. “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession”, [and the other replies], “I have nothing of yours,” he is exempt. “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession”, [and the other replies], “I have of yours only fifty denarii,” he is liable. “You have of my father’s a hundred denarii”, [and the other replies], “I have of his only fifty denarii”, he is exempt, because it is as if he restores a lost object.
The oath of the judges [is imposed when] the claim is [at least] two silver coins, and the admission the equivalent of a perutah. And if the admission is not of the same kind as the claim, he is exempt. How is this so? “Two silver ma’ahs of mine are in your possession,” [and the other replies], “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,” he is exempt. “Two silver ma’ahs of mine and a perutah are in your possession,” [and the other replies,] “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,” he is liable. “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession”, [and the other replies], “I have nothing of yours,” he is exempt. “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession”, [and the other replies], “I have of yours only fifty denarii,” he is liable. “You have of my father’s a hundred denarii”, [and the other replies], “I have of his only fifty denarii”, he is exempt, because it is as if he restores a lost object.
“You have of mine a litra of gold”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a litra of silver,” he is exempt. “You have of mine a golden denar”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a silver denar, or a tresis, or a pundion, or a perutah”, he is liable, for all are one kind of coinage. “You have of mine a kor of grain”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a letek of beans”, he is exempt. “You have of mine a kor of produce”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a letek of beans,” he is liable, for beans are included in produce. If he claimed from him wheat, and the other admitted barley, he is exempt. But Rabban Gamaliel makes him liable. If he claims from his neighbor jars of oil, and he admits [his claim to the empty] jars, Admon says, since he admits to him a portion of the same kind as the claim, he must swear. But the sages say, the admission is not of the same kind as the claim. Rabban Gamaliel said, “I approve the words of Admon. If he claims from him vessels and lands, and he admits the vessels, but denies the lands; or admits the lands, but denies the vessels, he is exempt. If he admits a portion of the lands, he is exempt; a portion of the vessels, he is liable because properties for which there is no security bind properties for which there is security to take an oath for them.
“You have of mine a litra of gold”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a litra of silver,” he is exempt. “You have of mine a golden denar”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a silver denar, or a tresis, or a pundion, or a perutah”, he is liable, for all are one kind of coinage. “You have of mine a kor of grain”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a letek of beans”, he is exempt. “You have of mine a kor of produce”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a letek of beans,” he is liable, for beans are included in produce. If he claimed from him wheat, and the other admitted barley, he is exempt. But Rabban Gamaliel makes him liable. If he claims from his neighbor jars of oil, and he admits [his claim to the empty] jars, Admon says, since he admits to him a portion of the same kind as the claim, he must swear. But the sages say, the admission is not of the same kind as the claim. Rabban Gamaliel said, “I approve the words of Admon. If he claims from him vessels and lands, and he admits the vessels, but denies the lands; or admits the lands, but denies the vessels, he is exempt. If he admits a portion of the lands, he is exempt; a portion of the vessels, he is liable because properties for which there is no security bind properties for which there is security to take an oath for them.
“You have of mine a litra of gold”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a litra of silver,” he is exempt. “You have of mine a golden denar”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a silver denar, or a tresis, or a pundion, or a perutah”, he is liable, for all are one kind of coinage. “You have of mine a kor of grain”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a letek of beans”, he is exempt. “You have of mine a kor of produce”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a letek of beans,” he is liable, for beans are included in produce. If he claimed from him wheat, and the other admitted barley, he is exempt. But Rabban Gamaliel makes him liable. If he claims from his neighbor jars of oil, and he admits [his claim to the empty] jars, Admon says, since he admits to him a portion of the same kind as the claim, he must swear. But the sages say, the admission is not of the same kind as the claim. Rabban Gamaliel said, “I approve the words of Admon. If he claims from him vessels and lands, and he admits the vessels, but denies the lands; or admits the lands, but denies the vessels, he is exempt. If he admits a portion of the lands, he is exempt; a portion of the vessels, he is liable because properties for which there is no security bind properties for which there is security to take an oath for them.
“You have of mine a litra of gold”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a litra of silver,” he is exempt. “You have of mine a golden denar”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a silver denar, or a tresis, or a pundion, or a perutah”, he is liable, for all are one kind of coinage. “You have of mine a kor of grain”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a letek of beans”, he is exempt. “You have of mine a kor of produce”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a letek of beans,” he is liable, for beans are included in produce. If he claimed from him wheat, and the other admitted barley, he is exempt. But Rabban Gamaliel makes him liable. If he claims from his neighbor jars of oil, and he admits [his claim to the empty] jars, Admon says, since he admits to him a portion of the same kind as the claim, he must swear. But the sages say, the admission is not of the same kind as the claim. Rabban Gamaliel said, “I approve the words of Admon. If he claims from him vessels and lands, and he admits the vessels, but denies the lands; or admits the lands, but denies the vessels, he is exempt. If he admits a portion of the lands, he is exempt; a portion of the vessels, he is liable because properties for which there is no security bind properties for which there is security to take an oath for them.
Rabbi Meir says: “There are things which are [attached] to land, but are not like land.” But the sages do not agree with him. How so? [If one says,] “Ten vines laden with fruit I delivered to you” and the other says, “There were only five”; Rabbi Meir makes him take an oath; But the Sages say: “All that is attached to land is like land.” An oath is imposed only for a thing [defined] by size, weight, or number. How so? [If one says,] “A store room full [of produce] I delivered to you,” or “A purse full [of money] I delivered to you” – and the other says, “I do not know; but what you left you may take,” he is exempt. If one says, “[I gave you produce reaching] up to the moulding [above the window],” and the other says, “Only up to the window,” he is liable.
Rabbi Meir says: “There are things which are [attached] to land, but are not like land.” But the sages do not agree with him. How so? [If one says,] “Ten vines laden with fruit I delivered to you” and the other says, “There were only five”; Rabbi Meir makes him take an oath; But the Sages say: “All that is attached to land is like land.” An oath is imposed only for a thing [defined] by size, weight, or number. How so? [If one says,] “A store room full [of produce] I delivered to you,” or “A purse full [of money] I delivered to you” – and the other says, “I do not know; but what you left you may take,” he is exempt. If one says, “[I gave you produce reaching] up to the moulding [above the window],” and the other says, “Only up to the window,” he is liable.
Rabbi Meir says: “There are things which are [attached] to land, but are not like land.” But the sages do not agree with him. How so? [If one says,] “Ten vines laden with fruit I delivered to you” and the other says, “There were only five”; Rabbi Meir makes him take an oath; But the Sages say: “All that is attached to land is like land.” An oath is imposed only for a thing [defined] by size, weight, or number. How so? [If one says,] “A store room full [of produce] I delivered to you,” or “A purse full [of money] I delivered to you” – and the other says, “I do not know; but what you left you may take,” he is exempt. If one says, “[I gave you produce reaching] up to the moulding [above the window],” and the other says, “Only up to the window,” he is liable.
“He who has been robbed” How so? If they testified of a man that he entered into another’s house to take a pledge without permission, and the other says, “You have taken my vessels, and he says, “I have not taken them,” he takes an oath, and takes back his vessels. Rabbi Judah says: “[There is no oath] unless there is partial admission: How so? He said to him, “You have taken two vessels,” and the other says, “I have taken only one.”
“He who has been wounded,” How so? If they testified about a person that another went onto his property whole, and came out wounded, and he said to him, “You have wounded me,” and the other said, “I have not wounded you,” he takes an oath, and receives [damages]. R. Judah says: “[There is no oath] unless there is partial admission: How so? He said to him, you have inflicted on me two wounds,” and the other said, “I inflicted on you only one wound.”
If a man said to one in the market, “Where is my ox which you have stolen?” and he replied, “I did not steal it,” and witnesses testified against him that he did steal it, he pays double. If he killed it or sold it, he pays four or five times its value. If he saw witnesses coming nearer and nearer, and he said, “I did steal it, but I did not kill or sell it,” he pays only the principal.
These are subjects concerning which Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai: A woman who came from overseas and said: “My husband died” may be married again; “My husband died [without children]” she must be married by her husband’s brother (the levir). But Beth Hillel says: “We have heard so only in the case of one who came from the harvesting.” Beth Shammai said to them: “It is the same thing in the case of one who came from the harvesting or who came from the olive-picking or who came from overseas; they mentioned harvesting only because that is how it happened.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to Beth Shammai. Beth Shammai says: “She may be married again and take her kethubah payment.” But Beth Hillel says: “She may be married again but may not take her kethubah payment.” Beth Shammai said to them: “You have permitted the graver matter of a forbidden marriage, should you not permit the lighter matter of property?” Beth Hillel said to them: “We have found that brothers do not inherit on her statement.” Beth Shammai said to them: “Do we not infer it from her marriage document in which he writes to her ‘That if you be married to another you shall take what is written for you’?” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.
These are subjects concerning which Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai: A woman who came from overseas and said: “My husband died” may be married again; “My husband died [without children]” she must be married by her husband’s brother (the levir). But Beth Hillel says: “We have heard so only in the case of one who came from the harvesting.” Beth Shammai said to them: “It is the same thing in the case of one who came from the harvesting or who came from the olive-picking or who came from overseas; they mentioned harvesting only because that is how it happened.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to Beth Shammai. Beth Shammai says: “She may be married again and take her kethubah payment.” But Beth Hillel says: “She may be married again but may not take her kethubah payment.” Beth Shammai said to them: “You have permitted the graver matter of a forbidden marriage, should you not permit the lighter matter of property?” Beth Hillel said to them: “We have found that brothers do not inherit on her statement.” Beth Shammai said to them: “Do we not infer it from her marriage document in which he writes to her ‘That if you be married to another you shall take what is written for you’?” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.
A vessel of earthenware can protect everything [in it from contracting impurity], according to Beth Hillel. But Beth Shammai says: “It protects only food and liquids and [other] vessels of earthenware.” Beth Hillel said to them: “Why?” Beth Shammai said to them: “Because it is [itself] impure with respect to an ignoramus, and no impure vessel can screen [against impurity].” Beth Hillel said to them: “And did you not pronounce pure the food and liquids inside it?” Beth Shammai said to them: “When we pronounced pure the food and liquids inside it, we pronounced them pure for him [the ignoramus] only, but when you pronounced the vessel pure you pronounced it pure for yourself and for him.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.
A vessel of earthenware can protect everything [in it from contracting impurity], according to Beth Hillel. But Beth Shammai says: “It protects only food and liquids and [other] vessels of earthenware.” Beth Hillel said to them: “Why?” Beth Shammai said to them: “Because it is [itself] impure with respect to an ignoramus, and no impure vessel can screen [against impurity].” Beth Hillel said to them: “And did you not pronounce pure the food and liquids inside it?” Beth Shammai said to them: “When we pronounced pure the food and liquids inside it, we pronounced them pure for him [the ignoramus] only, but when you pronounced the vessel pure you pronounced it pure for yourself and for him.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.
He also testified concerning a small village in the vicinity of Jerusalem in which there was an old man who used to lend to all the people of the village and write out [the bond] in his own handwriting and others signed it. And when the fact was brought before the Sages they pronounced it legal. Hence, incidentally, you may infer that a wife may write her own bill of divorcement, and a husband may write his own receipt; for the legality of a document depends only on those who sign it. And [he testified] concerning a needle which was found in flesh of a [sacrifice], that the knife and the hands [which had been employed on the flesh] are clean, but the flesh itself is defiled; and if it was found in the excrement, all are clean.
A sling whose pocket is woven is susceptible to impurity. If it is of leather, Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas pronounces it not susceptible to impurity, and the Sages pronounce it susceptible to impurity. If its finger-hold is broken off, it is not susceptible to impurity; [But if the] string-handle [only] is broken off it is susceptible to impurity.
In three cases Rabban Gamaliel was strict like the words of Beth Shammai. One may not wrap up hot food on a festival for the Sabbath; And one may not join together a lamp on a festival; And one may not bake [on festivals] thick loaves but only wafer-cakes. Rabban Gamaliel said: “In all their days, my father’s house never baked large loaves but only wafer-cakes.” They said to him: “What can we do with regards to your father’s house, for they were strict in respect to themselves but were lenient towards Israel to let them bake both large loaves and even charcoal-roasted loaves.”
In three cases Rabban Gamaliel was strict like the words of Beth Shammai. One may not wrap up hot food on a festival for the Sabbath; And one may not join together a lamp on a festival; And one may not bake [on festivals] thick loaves but only wafer-cakes. Rabban Gamaliel said: “In all their days, my father’s house never baked large loaves but only wafer-cakes.” They said to him: “What can we do with regards to your father’s house, for they were strict in respect to themselves but were lenient towards Israel to let them bake both large loaves and even charcoal-roasted loaves.”
Beth Shammai says: [produce pronounced] ownerless with respect to the poor [only] is counted as ownerless. But Beth Hillel says: it is not counted as ownerless unless it is made ownerless also with respect to the rich, as in the year of release (shmittah). If all the sheaves of the field were of one kav each and one was of four kavs, and it was forgotten, Beth Shammai says: it does not count as forgotten, And Beth Hillel says: it counts as forgotten.