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The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:24

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not say “his” but [ ]. In which respect? In case the heir took it, one removes it from his hand. Does one have the same rule for the creditor? Was it not stated: If either the heir or the creditor took it, one takes it from their hands? Rebbi Aḥa bar Ulla said, let us hear from the following: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas, [the creditor] adds another denar and redeems these properties.” Not necessarily a denar, but anything, that a dedication should not be seen to be profanated without redemption. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One would be guilty of complete larceny. That is difficult. If one would be guilty of complete larceny, should if not be redeemed for its full value? If it can be redeemed for less than its full value, one should not be guilty of complete larceny! What are we talking about? If it is connected to the ground, can there be larceny about real estate? But we talk about standing grain. Since if the administrator misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand; the administrator and the heir follow the same rule. Also if the heir misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The same rule holds for an ox. Can you say that an ox is real estate? Rebbi Tanḥum bar Mari in the name of Rebbi Yose: They made the rules for an ox parallel those of dedications that lost their value. Here, you say one takes it from his hand, but there you say, one does not take it from his hand. Since you diminished the woman’s power in that her ketubah is a lien only on the properties of her first husband, you strengthened her power in this matter that if the heir came and took it, one removes it from his hand. It was stated thus: Trees and cutting, old or young, one removes from their hands.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:5

If she sold produce connected to the ground: Rav Aḥa said, as if she sold harvested [produce]; Rebbi Yose said, as if she sold a tenth of the ground. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, she cannot sell the produce. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Rebbi Immi asked: If another person had written [real estate] over to her, would he not receive the revenue? If he himself wrote, not so much more! He said only “wrote over”, but not “sold”. What is the difference between one who writes and one who sells? He tried to find a reason to hide food from the wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:12

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:14

MISHNAH: If somebody died and left his wife, a creditor, and heirs, and he was owed a deposit or a debt by a third party, Rebbi Ṭarphon says, these should be given to the weakest among them. Rebbi Aqiba says, one does not show mercy in law! But these should be given to the heirs for all others have to swear, only the heirs do not have to swear.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:17

MISHNAH: If he left produce taken from the ground, the one who takes them first acquires them. If the widow acquired more than her ketubah sum, or the creditor more than his claim, the remainder, Rebbi Ṭarphon says, should be given to the weakest among them. Rebbi Aqiba says, one does not show mercy in law! But it should be given to the heirs since all others have to swear, only the heirs do not have to swear.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:24

HALAKHAH: “If he wrote to her: “I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about properties over which she exercised control during her husband’s lifetime but even about properties over which she exercised control after her husband’s death are the heirs prevented from making her swear.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:27

HALAKHAH: ““I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, only if she was made a steward during her husband’s lifetime. But if she was appointed as a steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can(not) make her swear. That is the Mishnah: if she was not appointed a steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If she was appointed a steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past. What is “about the past”? From the time of death to the time of burial. And Rebbi Yose said, even if he appointed her as steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can make her swear. But did we not state: “If he did not appoint her as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If he appointed her as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future but cannot make her swear for the past.” He explains it about the first case. But if it is about the first case, Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about property over which she had control during her husband’s lifetime but even about property over which she acquired control after her husband’s death the heirs cannot make her swear. Explain it, from the time of death to the time of burial. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The heirs cannot make her swear from the time of death to the time of burial. Bar Qappara stated: That she should not abandon him and leave for her family.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:27

HALAKHAH: ““I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, only if she was made a steward during her husband’s lifetime. But if she was appointed as a steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can(not) make her swear. That is the Mishnah: if she was not appointed a steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If she was appointed a steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past. What is “about the past”? From the time of death to the time of burial. And Rebbi Yose said, even if he appointed her as steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can make her swear. But did we not state: “If he did not appoint her as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If he appointed her as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future but cannot make her swear for the past.” He explains it about the first case. But if it is about the first case, Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about property over which she had control during her husband’s lifetime but even about property over which she acquired control after her husband’s death the heirs cannot make her swear. Explain it, from the time of death to the time of burial. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The heirs cannot make her swear from the time of death to the time of burial. Bar Qappara stated: That she should not abandon him and leave for her family.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:32

It was stated: If an heir’s father held a compromised promissory note, the son collects without swearing. In that the son’s power is greater than the father’s, since the son collects without swearing while the father can collect only by swearing. Rebbi Eleazar said, nevertheless he has to execute an heir’s oath, “that our father did not charge us, that our father did not tell us, that we did not find a document among our father’s documents that this note was paid.” Rebbi Hoshaia asked, does the baraita follow the House of Shammai? For the House of Shammai say, “she collects her ketubah and does not drink.” Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the House of Shammai is: Bring my husband and I shall drink! But here, it would be in order that even his father would not have to swear. They instituted a rule that he has to swear. They instituted that for him, but not for his son. When he died, you put his son on the biblical rule.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:34

“If she had compromised her ketubah, she shall not be able to collect without an oath,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due, and some say, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should jump to marry her. Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, here about an adult orphan, there about an underage orphan.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:34

“If she had compromised her ketubah, she shall not be able to collect without an oath,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due, and some say, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should jump to marry her. Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, here about an adult orphan, there about an underage orphan.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:34

“If she had compromised her ketubah, she shall not be able to collect without an oath,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due, and some say, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should jump to marry her. Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, here about an adult orphan, there about an underage orphan.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:35

MISHNAH: If she had compromised her ketubah, how is that? If her ketubah was 1‘000 zuz and he said to her, you received your ketubah, but she says, I received only one mina, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. If one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, how is that? If her ketubah was 1‘000 zuz and he said to her, you received your ketubah, but she says, I received nothing, and one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From encumbered property, how is that? If he sold his real estate to others and she collects from the buyers, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From orphans’ property, how is that? If he died and left his estate to the orphans, if she is paid out by the orphans she shall not be able to collect without an oath. Not in his presence, how is that? If he went overseas and she collects in his absence, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. Rebbi Simeon says, any time she asks for her ketubah, the heirs can require an oath from her. If she does not ask for her ketubah, the heirs cannot require an oath from her.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:38

Alexis said before Rebbi Mana: We act much better than you do. We send edicts. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He answered him, we also act in this way, we have the herald announce for thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He said to him, think of it, if he was in distant corners. He said to him, we send three letters, one after thirty days, one after the next thirty days, and one after the next thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. Rebbi Ḥanina said, that is, if he was present at the trial and then fled. But if he was not present at the trial, we cannot irrevocably give away, but only announce.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:39

You find that one may say that Ḥanan and Rebbi Simeon said the same thing. Just as Ḥanan said, she shall swear only at the end, so Rebbi Simeon says, she shall swear only at the end. Just as you say, practice follows Ḥanan, so here practice follows Rebbi Simeon.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:39

You find that one may say that Ḥanan and Rebbi Simeon said the same thing. Just as Ḥanan said, she shall swear only at the end, so Rebbi Simeon says, she shall swear only at the end. Just as you say, practice follows Ḥanan, so here practice follows Rebbi Simeon.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:44

MISHNAH: Two bills of divorce and two ketubot, she collects two ketubot. Two ketubot and one bill of divorce, or one ketubah and two bills of divorce, or one ketubah, and a bill of divorce, and death; she collects only one ketubah since a person who divorces his wife and takes her back, takes her back on the basis of her prior ketubah. If a minor was married off by his father, [his wife’s] ketubah is valid since he kept her by that understanding. If a proselyte converted together with his wife, her ketubah is valid since he kept her by that understanding.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:45

HALAKHAH: “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah,” etc. “Two bills of divorce and two ketubot” etc. But only if the bill of divorce is dated between the two ketubot. So far if they are equal. If one was for a mina, the other for 200 [zuz]? Rav Huna and Rav Jeremiah and Rav Ḥisda. One said, she collects the first one. The other said, she collects the second one and the excess she collects from the date of the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:48

One understands a proselyte. A minor? Can a minor divorce? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I explained it following what Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Only if he slept with her when he regained sight or became sane mentally. And here, if he slept with her after he reached adulthood.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:3

It says only, “she died”. Therefore, if she was divorced, her status is that of a creditor. As it was stated: “He married a woman and wrote her a ketubah. He divorced her but did not pay the ketubah. He married another woman and wrote her a ketubah. He took back the first one and wrote her a ketubah in addition to the first ketubah. The [second ketubah] of the first [wife] has precedence over that of the second [wife] and her heirs, and the second [wife] and her heirs have precedence over the heirs of the first.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:6

How is that? If he preliminarily married Rachel, definitively married Leah, and only then definitively married Rachel. In the opinion of the rabbis, Rachel has precedence; in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah she does not have precedence. They say, even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that since in the end he definitively married Rachel, Rachel has precedence. To what can this be compared? To one who took out a loan from another person and said to him, if I have not paid it back by twelve months, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you. If the twelfth month arrived and he has not paid back, his properties become mortgaged from that moment on. But if he said, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you only after twelve months, they become mortgaged only after twelve months. The status of the days in between is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the properties became pledged by the document. In the rabbis’ opinion, the properties became pledged by the money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:6

How is that? If he preliminarily married Rachel, definitively married Leah, and only then definitively married Rachel. In the opinion of the rabbis, Rachel has precedence; in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah she does not have precedence. They say, even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that since in the end he definitively married Rachel, Rachel has precedence. To what can this be compared? To one who took out a loan from another person and said to him, if I have not paid it back by twelve months, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you. If the twelfth month arrived and he has not paid back, his properties become mortgaged from that moment on. But if he said, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you only after twelve months, they become mortgaged only after twelve months. The status of the days in between is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the properties became pledged by the document. In the rabbis’ opinion, the properties became pledged by the money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:6

How is that? If he preliminarily married Rachel, definitively married Leah, and only then definitively married Rachel. In the opinion of the rabbis, Rachel has precedence; in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah she does not have precedence. They say, even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that since in the end he definitively married Rachel, Rachel has precedence. To what can this be compared? To one who took out a loan from another person and said to him, if I have not paid it back by twelve months, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you. If the twelfth month arrived and he has not paid back, his properties become mortgaged from that moment on. But if he said, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you only after twelve months, they become mortgaged only after twelve months. The status of the days in between is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the properties became pledged by the document. In the rabbis’ opinion, the properties became pledged by the money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:7

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to two women who both died, and then he died, and the orphans demand their mothers’ ketubot, if [the estate] is sufficient only for both ketubot they split evenly. If there was an excess denar, these take their mother’s ketubah and those take their mother’s ketubah. If the orphans say, we accept the properties of our father for the value of an extra denar in order to take their mother’s ketubah; one does not listen to them but one appraises the properties in court.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:12

HALAKHAH: “If the estate contained expected property,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree about the basic claim of the two ketubot. Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. But for the excess denar everybody agrees that it is movable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everybody agrees about the basic claim of the two ketubot that it must be real estate. Where do they disagree? About the excess denar, where Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rav: But in Syria they routinely collect from bronze and bedspreads. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only from bedspreads of that night. Rav Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The people in Arabia routinely collect from camels and spices. Similarly, only from spices of that night? Rebbi Ḥuna’s widow collected from movables following her place’s custom.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:12

HALAKHAH: “If the estate contained expected property,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree about the basic claim of the two ketubot. Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. But for the excess denar everybody agrees that it is movable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everybody agrees about the basic claim of the two ketubot that it must be real estate. Where do they disagree? About the excess denar, where Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rav: But in Syria they routinely collect from bronze and bedspreads. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only from bedspreads of that night. Rav Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The people in Arabia routinely collect from camels and spices. Similarly, only from spices of that night? Rebbi Ḥuna’s widow collected from movables following her place’s custom.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:13

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to three women when he died, the ketubah of one was a mina, of the other one 200, and of the other one 300. If the estate is only 100, they divide equally. If it was 200, the one who claims a mina takes 50, and those who claim 200 and 300 each take three gold denars. If it was 300, the one who claims a mina takes 50, the one who claims 200 takes a mina, and the one who claims 300 takes six gold denars. Similarly, if three who invested together lost or gained they would split in this manner.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:14

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to three women,” etc. Samuel said, sharpness of the judges. As in the case of two mortgages written on one field, to whom the court wants to hand it over in possession they hand it over. The Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If the estate is only 100, they divide equally.” Was this said for the sharpness of the judges? And did we not state: If the heirs inherited an instrument of indebtedness, the male firstborn takes a double portion; and if an instrument of indebtedness was presented to them, the male firstborn pays a double portion. Was this said for the sharpness of the judges? Rebbi Abin in the name of Samuel: There is no difference, whether two mortgages were written on one field or one mortgage was written on two fields, on whom the court decide they hand it over in possession.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:17

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to four women when he died, the first one precedes the second, the second the third, and the third the fourth. The first one swears to the second, the second to the third, and the third to the fourth; the fourth is paid out without an oath. Ben Nanas said, should she be preferred because she is the last one? She also should be paid only after an oath. If all [ketubot] were executed on the same day, one who precedes another one even if only by an hour has acquired [precedence]; therefore in Jerusalem one used to note hours. If [the documents] were all executed at the same hour and there is only one mina, they split evenly.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:17

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to four women when he died, the first one precedes the second, the second the third, and the third the fourth. The first one swears to the second, the second to the third, and the third to the fourth; the fourth is paid out without an oath. Ben Nanas said, should she be preferred because she is the last one? She also should be paid only after an oath. If all [ketubot] were executed on the same day, one who precedes another one even if only by an hour has acquired [precedence]; therefore in Jerusalem one used to note hours. If [the documents] were all executed at the same hour and there is only one mina, they split evenly.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:17

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to four women when he died, the first one precedes the second, the second the third, and the third the fourth. The first one swears to the second, the second to the third, and the third to the fourth; the fourth is paid out without an oath. Ben Nanas said, should she be preferred because she is the last one? She also should be paid only after an oath. If all [ketubot] were executed on the same day, one who precedes another one even if only by an hour has acquired [precedence]; therefore in Jerusalem one used to note hours. If [the documents] were all executed at the same hour and there is only one mina, they split evenly.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:21

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two wives,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody borrowed from two persons and the second comes and says to him, get up and let us settle, and [the borrower] says, will not in the end the first hear of it and come to foreclose, he [the second lender] may say let us settle, and if he forecloses, he forecloses. If he settled, one may assume that the first will come and foreclose. If he settled with the first, Rebbi Phineas said, such a case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who said, he settled. Rebbi Yose said, did he not write “what I shall acquire”? It happens only with an heir. Rebbi Ḥanina said, even with a creditor it can happen if he did not write “anything I shall acquire”, or if he said, “you shall not be paid except from this.” Rav Mattaniah said, this follows him who said, for ketubah but not for stipulations. But for him who said, for ketubah and for stipulations, does it not return?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:5

Rav said, if a dying person said, do not bury me, he is buried as a charge on public charity. Rebbi Immi asked, how could one think that others are provided for by his property and he is buried as a charge on public charity? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.” Explain it, if they inherited real estate. As it was stated: “If he left male and female slaves, mortgages, and movables, anybody who takes them first acquires them and he shall be buried by public charity.” Because he took it first. Therefore, if he did not take it first one removes from his hand. Explain it, if he said, bury me. As Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: If a dead person was buried who had not said “bury me”, even though others came and took [of his property] one removes from their hands. If they took real estate. In fact, what you say, one removes from their hands, if they took real estate. But if they took movables, one does not remove from their hands, if it was a loan by witnesses. But for a documented loan, whether they took real estate or movables one does not remove from their hands. For Rebbi Abba, the son of Rav Huna, said: They made the words of a bedridden person equal to those of a healthy person who wrote and delivered. But only if he died from that illness, not if he recovered. And if he was explicit and said, give field X to Y. If he said, give field X to Y? Is it as if he was explicit or only if he said, the Northern half, the Southern half? Rebbi Yudan asked: If he said, burn me by pagan rites and give half of field X to Y. Since they do not burn, do they give? Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: A sick person who said, my daughters shall be supported. Would the daughters not be supported anyway? No, it is necessary, for otherwise would they be supported from pledged real estate or would they be supported from movables? Rebbi Yudan [ ] there came a case before Rebbi Yose about a bedridden person who had said, my documents shall be given to X. He said to him, the bedridden can only transfer property which is acquired either by a document or by taking hold. But these are acquired by a document and by taking hold. As it was stated: “A ship is acquired by taking hold in the opinion of everybody. Rebbi Nathan says a ship and documents are acquired by a document and by taking hold. If he wrote and did not take hold, or took hold without writing [a transfer document] he did not do anything unless he both writes and takes hold.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:5

Rav said, if a dying person said, do not bury me, he is buried as a charge on public charity. Rebbi Immi asked, how could one think that others are provided for by his property and he is buried as a charge on public charity? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.” Explain it, if they inherited real estate. As it was stated: “If he left male and female slaves, mortgages, and movables, anybody who takes them first acquires them and he shall be buried by public charity.” Because he took it first. Therefore, if he did not take it first one removes from his hand. Explain it, if he said, bury me. As Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: If a dead person was buried who had not said “bury me”, even though others came and took [of his property] one removes from their hands. If they took real estate. In fact, what you say, one removes from their hands, if they took real estate. But if they took movables, one does not remove from their hands, if it was a loan by witnesses. But for a documented loan, whether they took real estate or movables one does not remove from their hands. For Rebbi Abba, the son of Rav Huna, said: They made the words of a bedridden person equal to those of a healthy person who wrote and delivered. But only if he died from that illness, not if he recovered. And if he was explicit and said, give field X to Y. If he said, give field X to Y? Is it as if he was explicit or only if he said, the Northern half, the Southern half? Rebbi Yudan asked: If he said, burn me by pagan rites and give half of field X to Y. Since they do not burn, do they give? Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: A sick person who said, my daughters shall be supported. Would the daughters not be supported anyway? No, it is necessary, for otherwise would they be supported from pledged real estate or would they be supported from movables? Rebbi Yudan [ ] there came a case before Rebbi Yose about a bedridden person who had said, my documents shall be given to X. He said to him, the bedridden can only transfer property which is acquired either by a document or by taking hold. But these are acquired by a document and by taking hold. As it was stated: “A ship is acquired by taking hold in the opinion of everybody. Rebbi Nathan says a ship and documents are acquired by a document and by taking hold. If he wrote and did not take hold, or took hold without writing [a transfer document] he did not do anything unless he both writes and takes hold.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:5

Rav said, if a dying person said, do not bury me, he is buried as a charge on public charity. Rebbi Immi asked, how could one think that others are provided for by his property and he is buried as a charge on public charity? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.” Explain it, if they inherited real estate. As it was stated: “If he left male and female slaves, mortgages, and movables, anybody who takes them first acquires them and he shall be buried by public charity.” Because he took it first. Therefore, if he did not take it first one removes from his hand. Explain it, if he said, bury me. As Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: If a dead person was buried who had not said “bury me”, even though others came and took [of his property] one removes from their hands. If they took real estate. In fact, what you say, one removes from their hands, if they took real estate. But if they took movables, one does not remove from their hands, if it was a loan by witnesses. But for a documented loan, whether they took real estate or movables one does not remove from their hands. For Rebbi Abba, the son of Rav Huna, said: They made the words of a bedridden person equal to those of a healthy person who wrote and delivered. But only if he died from that illness, not if he recovered. And if he was explicit and said, give field X to Y. If he said, give field X to Y? Is it as if he was explicit or only if he said, the Northern half, the Southern half? Rebbi Yudan asked: If he said, burn me by pagan rites and give half of field X to Y. Since they do not burn, do they give? Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: A sick person who said, my daughters shall be supported. Would the daughters not be supported anyway? No, it is necessary, for otherwise would they be supported from pledged real estate or would they be supported from movables? Rebbi Yudan [ ] there came a case before Rebbi Yose about a bedridden person who had said, my documents shall be given to X. He said to him, the bedridden can only transfer property which is acquired either by a document or by taking hold. But these are acquired by a document and by taking hold. As it was stated: “A ship is acquired by taking hold in the opinion of everybody. Rebbi Nathan says a ship and documents are acquired by a document and by taking hold. If he wrote and did not take hold, or took hold without writing [a transfer document] he did not do anything unless he both writes and takes hold.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:6

MISHNAH: A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage, may sell without court supervision. Rebbi Simeon says, after definitive marriage she may sell without court supervision; after preliminary marriage, she may sell only under court supervision since she has no sustenance and any person who has no claim to sustenance may sell only under court supervision.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:6

MISHNAH: A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage, may sell without court supervision. Rebbi Simeon says, after definitive marriage she may sell without court supervision; after preliminary marriage, she may sell only under court supervision since she has no sustenance and any person who has no claim to sustenance may sell only under court supervision.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:7

HALAKHAH: “A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon is of the opinion that everything depends on sustenance. If he had agreed to sustain her after preliminary marriage, she may sell without court supervision If he had agreed to sustain her after definitive marriage, she may sell only under court supervision. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person is concerned for his widow’s dignity whether after preliminary or after definitive marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:9

Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If she requested her ketubah in court, she lost her claim to sustenance. Rebbi Yose said, but only from a clear mind; not if forced. As in the case of the widow of Rebbi Eudaimon from Mozva to whom they said, Rebbi Abba bar Cohen wants you. She requested her ketubah and lost her sustenance. After the matter became known, it was brought before Rebbi Yose and she returned to her sustenance.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:12

MISHNAH: If she sold her ketubah entirely or partially, or donated her ketubah to another, entirely or partially, she cannot sell the remainder except under court supervision. But the Sages say, she may sell even four or five times, and may sell for sustenance without court supervision but writes in the document that “I sold for sustenance.” A divorcee may sell only under court supervision.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:26

“No usufruct.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, that he has from her only the usufruct. Rebbi Yose the Sidonian stated before Rebbi Jeremiah, in disgreement with Rebbi Jeremiah: “He has the right to what she finds and earns, and to dissolve her vows.” What means “no usufruct”? That she cannot reclaim from him the usufruct he had [from her property].

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:29

There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel; it is invalid from Gentiles.” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:7

If she dies she is not with him. If she was divorced she is not with him. If he took her back? One says, this was stated for the ketubah but not for the stipulations; one says, both for the ketubah and the stipulations, which opinion is valid? “The intelligent ones did write: On condition that I support your daughter for five years the entire time you are with me;” on that it was stated: Only for the first marriage. This parallels what Rebbi Ḥanina said, if somebody marries off his son in a house, the latter acquires the house, but only for a first marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:7

If she dies she is not with him. If she was divorced she is not with him. If he took her back? One says, this was stated for the ketubah but not for the stipulations; one says, both for the ketubah and the stipulations, which opinion is valid? “The intelligent ones did write: On condition that I support your daughter for five years the entire time you are with me;” on that it was stated: Only for the first marriage. This parallels what Rebbi Ḥanina said, if somebody marries off his son in a house, the latter acquires the house, but only for a first marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:18

It is written (Gen. 47:30): “You shall carry me from Egypt and bury me in their burial place.” What would Jacob lose at any place he would prophesy? Rebbi Eleazar gave an inner reason, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi gave an inner reason, Rebbi Ḥanina gave an inner reason. What is the inner reason? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, (Ps. 116:9) “I will walk before the Eternal in the Land of Life.” But the lands of life are only Tyre and its surroundings and Caesarea (maritima) and its surroundings; there is cheap (food), there is plenty. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Bar Qappara, the Land whose dead will live again in the days of the Messiah. What is the reason? (Is. 42:9) “He gives soul to the people on it.” That would mean that our teachers in Babylonia would lose out! Rebbi Simai said, the Holy One, praised be He, walks before them and they roll like wine barrels. When they arrive in the Land of Israel their souls are with them. What is the reason? (Ez. 36:24) “I shall bring you to your soil,” (37:14) “give My spirit into you, and you will live.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:28

HALAKHAH: “All the time she lives in her father’s house,” etc. For the good she received; her properties became delivered during her husband’s lifetime and after 25 years she gave up the claim to her ketubah. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi La: One understands for a woman who has no ketubah. But should a woman who has a ketubah not be able to collect forever? He answered him, it tells you more: Even a woman who has a ketubah collects only up to 25 years. The statement of Rebbi Eleazar says, the creditor collects forever. He said only, “the creditor”; but a woman can collect only up to years. Rebbi Abin said, this is reasonable only for a woman who is not being supported. But for a woman who is being supported, I say that she did not claim it because of her support.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:28

HALAKHAH: “All the time she lives in her father’s house,” etc. For the good she received; her properties became delivered during her husband’s lifetime and after 25 years she gave up the claim to her ketubah. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi La: One understands for a woman who has no ketubah. But should a woman who has a ketubah not be able to collect forever? He answered him, it tells you more: Even a woman who has a ketubah collects only up to 25 years. The statement of Rebbi Eleazar says, the creditor collects forever. He said only, “the creditor”; but a woman can collect only up to years. Rebbi Abin said, this is reasonable only for a woman who is not being supported. But for a woman who is being supported, I say that she did not claim it because of her support.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:28

HALAKHAH: “All the time she lives in her father’s house,” etc. For the good she received; her properties became delivered during her husband’s lifetime and after 25 years she gave up the claim to her ketubah. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi La: One understands for a woman who has no ketubah. But should a woman who has a ketubah not be able to collect forever? He answered him, it tells you more: Even a woman who has a ketubah collects only up to 25 years. The statement of Rebbi Eleazar says, the creditor collects forever. He said only, “the creditor”; but a woman can collect only up to years. Rebbi Abin said, this is reasonable only for a woman who is not being supported. But for a woman who is being supported, I say that she did not claim it because of her support.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:28

HALAKHAH: “All the time she lives in her father’s house,” etc. For the good she received; her properties became delivered during her husband’s lifetime and after 25 years she gave up the claim to her ketubah. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi La: One understands for a woman who has no ketubah. But should a woman who has a ketubah not be able to collect forever? He answered him, it tells you more: Even a woman who has a ketubah collects only up to 25 years. The statement of Rebbi Eleazar says, the creditor collects forever. He said only, “the creditor”; but a woman can collect only up to years. Rebbi Abin said, this is reasonable only for a woman who is not being supported. But for a woman who is being supported, I say that she did not claim it because of her support.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:29

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not only that she claims, but even if she mentions [her claims], as we have stated there: “If she died, her heirs can mention her ketubah for up to 25 years.” He tells you more: Even if she let 25 years minus one day go by before claiming, and then claimed, one gives her another 25 years.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:30

Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One stated this only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects forever. Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she can collect only up to 25 years. This disagreement parallels the following disagreement, as was stated there: “Torts are estimated from choice land, creditor’s claims from average, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable.” Rebbi Jeremiah said to him, this was stated only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz], but a ketubah of 1’000 denar is evaluated in terms of average quality land. But Rebbi Yose said, even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects only from the least valuable land. It turns out that Rebbi Yose follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Jeremiah Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. As we have stated there: “If somebody signs over his property to his sons and signs over some real estate to his wife, she lost her claim to ketubah.” Rav said, if he lets them acquire through her. Samuel says, if he distributes in her presence. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they stated here a relaxation of the laws of ketubah. Rebbi Abba said, the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina is that it applies not only to a ketubah of a mina or two hundred, but even regarding a ketubah of one thousand denar they proclaimed a relaxation of the laws of ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:30

Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One stated this only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects forever. Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she can collect only up to 25 years. This disagreement parallels the following disagreement, as was stated there: “Torts are estimated from choice land, creditor’s claims from average, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable.” Rebbi Jeremiah said to him, this was stated only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz], but a ketubah of 1’000 denar is evaluated in terms of average quality land. But Rebbi Yose said, even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects only from the least valuable land. It turns out that Rebbi Yose follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Jeremiah Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. As we have stated there: “If somebody signs over his property to his sons and signs over some real estate to his wife, she lost her claim to ketubah.” Rav said, if he lets them acquire through her. Samuel says, if he distributes in her presence. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they stated here a relaxation of the laws of ketubah. Rebbi Abba said, the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina is that it applies not only to a ketubah of a mina or two hundred, but even regarding a ketubah of one thousand denar they proclaimed a relaxation of the laws of ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:30

Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One stated this only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects forever. Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she can collect only up to 25 years. This disagreement parallels the following disagreement, as was stated there: “Torts are estimated from choice land, creditor’s claims from average, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable.” Rebbi Jeremiah said to him, this was stated only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz], but a ketubah of 1’000 denar is evaluated in terms of average quality land. But Rebbi Yose said, even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects only from the least valuable land. It turns out that Rebbi Yose follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Jeremiah Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. As we have stated there: “If somebody signs over his property to his sons and signs over some real estate to his wife, she lost her claim to ketubah.” Rav said, if he lets them acquire through her. Samuel says, if he distributes in her presence. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they stated here a relaxation of the laws of ketubah. Rebbi Abba said, the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina is that it applies not only to a ketubah of a mina or two hundred, but even regarding a ketubah of one thousand denar they proclaimed a relaxation of the laws of ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:30

Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One stated this only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects forever. Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she can collect only up to 25 years. This disagreement parallels the following disagreement, as was stated there: “Torts are estimated from choice land, creditor’s claims from average, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable.” Rebbi Jeremiah said to him, this was stated only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz], but a ketubah of 1’000 denar is evaluated in terms of average quality land. But Rebbi Yose said, even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects only from the least valuable land. It turns out that Rebbi Yose follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Jeremiah Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. As we have stated there: “If somebody signs over his property to his sons and signs over some real estate to his wife, she lost her claim to ketubah.” Rav said, if he lets them acquire through her. Samuel says, if he distributes in her presence. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they stated here a relaxation of the laws of ketubah. Rebbi Abba said, the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina is that it applies not only to a ketubah of a mina or two hundred, but even regarding a ketubah of one thousand denar they proclaimed a relaxation of the laws of ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:30

Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One stated this only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects forever. Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she can collect only up to 25 years. This disagreement parallels the following disagreement, as was stated there: “Torts are estimated from choice land, creditor’s claims from average, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable.” Rebbi Jeremiah said to him, this was stated only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz], but a ketubah of 1’000 denar is evaluated in terms of average quality land. But Rebbi Yose said, even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects only from the least valuable land. It turns out that Rebbi Yose follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Jeremiah Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. As we have stated there: “If somebody signs over his property to his sons and signs over some real estate to his wife, she lost her claim to ketubah.” Rav said, if he lets them acquire through her. Samuel says, if he distributes in her presence. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they stated here a relaxation of the laws of ketubah. Rebbi Abba said, the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina is that it applies not only to a ketubah of a mina or two hundred, but even regarding a ketubah of one thousand denar they proclaimed a relaxation of the laws of ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:1

MISHNAH: Two robbery judges were in Jerusalem, Admon and Ḥanan ben Absalom. Ḥanan said two things and Admon seven. If somebody went overseas and his wife now is demanding sustenance, Ḥanan says that she is made to swear in the end. The High Priests’ sons disagreed with him and said, she is made to swear in the beginning and in the end; Rebbi Dosa ben Hyrkanos endorsed their statement. Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai said, Ḥanan said correctly that she is made to swear only in the end.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:13

Who is the Tanna of “the gain should be given to the sacred fund”? Rebbi Meïr! For Rebbi Meïr said, one commits sacrilege with prohibitions. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands? Let us hear from the following: “If he said, this loaf shall be dedicated, if he or another person ate it, they committed sacrilege; therefore, it can be redeemed. But if he said, it is for me [as if dedicated], if he ate it he committed sacrilege on goodwill but others would not commit sacrilege.” He said only, if he ate it. Therefore, to warm his hands is permitted. The students of Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: That is if he said I shall not eat it nor taste it; if he forbade only eating to himself. But the question was, if somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:13

Who is the Tanna of “the gain should be given to the sacred fund”? Rebbi Meïr! For Rebbi Meïr said, one commits sacrilege with prohibitions. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands? Let us hear from the following: “If he said, this loaf shall be dedicated, if he or another person ate it, they committed sacrilege; therefore, it can be redeemed. But if he said, it is for me [as if dedicated], if he ate it he committed sacrilege on goodwill but others would not commit sacrilege.” He said only, if he ate it. Therefore, to warm his hands is permitted. The students of Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: That is if he said I shall not eat it nor taste it; if he forbade only eating to himself. But the question was, if somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:14

As it was stated: “If somebody went overseas and another person provided for his wife.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, another. Therefore, the father can recover. Rebbi Yose says, neither the father nor a third party can recover. There is a parallel disagreement, as we have stated there: “He has the right to what she finds and to her earnings, to dissolve her vows, and to receive her bill of divorce, but cannot eat usufruct in her lifetime… He is required to pay for her upkeep, her ransom, and her burial.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, the father. Therefore, a third party cannot recover. Rebbi Yose says, both the father or a third party can recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥaggai, both for burial as for upkeep the father can recover, a third party cannot recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, for burial both the father and also a third party can recover because it is unthinkable that his wife should be thrown to the dogs. For sustenance, neither the father nor a third party can recover.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:14

As it was stated: “If somebody went overseas and another person provided for his wife.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, another. Therefore, the father can recover. Rebbi Yose says, neither the father nor a third party can recover. There is a parallel disagreement, as we have stated there: “He has the right to what she finds and to her earnings, to dissolve her vows, and to receive her bill of divorce, but cannot eat usufruct in her lifetime… He is required to pay for her upkeep, her ransom, and her burial.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, the father. Therefore, a third party cannot recover. Rebbi Yose says, both the father or a third party can recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥaggai, both for burial as for upkeep the father can recover, a third party cannot recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, for burial both the father and also a third party can recover because it is unthinkable that his wife should be thrown to the dogs. For sustenance, neither the father nor a third party can recover.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:28

HALAKHAH: “If somebody protests about a field,” etc. Not only if he himself made it a marker for another [field], but even if a third person made it for a fourth, when he signed as a witness, he lost his right.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:30

HALAKHAH: “If somebody went overseas,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, if he sues with reasons. This means, only if four [owners] surround him. Samuel says, even if one surrounds him on all sides. Joshua’s stipulation! “If he was lost in vineyards or fields, he crosses and leaves until he reaches a road to his house, even a plot full of vineyards, for this is one of the conditions under which Joshua distributed the Land to Israel.” Joshua stated this to leave, maybe to enter? Joshua stipulated for a person, perhaps for his cow? Rebbi Yose said, his cow usually returns; since a swarm of bees does not usually return, they treated it as if it were his body.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:41

“He pays her in coin of the Land of Israel.” This implies that the coins of the land of Israel are the best of all countries. This supports him who says that a woman’s ketubah is from the words of the Torah, against Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, as it was stated: A woman’s ketubah is from the words of the Torah. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, a woman’s ketubah is only an institution of the Soferim.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:6

“What is a prohibition? This loaf is for me as the day of my father’s death, as the day X was killed, as the day I saw Jerusalem in ruins; that is the prohibition the Torah spoke of.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav: Both say, only if he had made a vow about that day. Rebbi Yose asked: If only he had made a vow about that day, why a separate prohibition? He should say on that day!

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:6

“What is a prohibition? This loaf is for me as the day of my father’s death, as the day X was killed, as the day I saw Jerusalem in ruins; that is the prohibition the Torah spoke of.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav: Both say, only if he had made a vow about that day. Rebbi Yose asked: If only he had made a vow about that day, why a separate prohibition? He should say on that day!

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:7

“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:7

“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:7

“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:16

HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:29

“Rebbi Jehudah says, he who says ‘like Jerusalem’ did not say anything,” since this one intended to refer only to its wood and stones. “Like the Torah,” that is permitted. “Like the sanctity of the Torah, like what is written in it,” that is forbidden like the sacrifices written in it. There are Tannaїm who state, “like the Torah and what is written in it,” is permitted. Rebbi Abin bar Cahana said, that is Rebbi Simeon’s, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, by the words of Rebbi Simeon, if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is free also for the rest. Rebbi Yose said, it is everybody’s opinion. “Like the Torah”, like the sanctity of the Torah. “Like what is written in it,” like the sanctity of the verses.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:6

HALAKHAH: “Qorbān [shall be] what I shall not eat at your place,” etc. Why did we not state: An oath that I shall eat from you, he is permitted? Only because we stated: “That is more restrictive for oaths than for vows.” We wanted to say about “an oath that I shall not eat of yours,” that the words of the Sages are: he is forbidden. Therefore it was not stated.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:9

MISHNAH: A vow inside a vow is possible, an oath inside an oath is impossible. For example, if one said, I shall be a nazir if I would eat, I shall be a nazir if I would eat, if he eats he is obligated for each pronouncement separately. An oath that I will not eat, an oath that I will not eat, if he eats he is guilty only once.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:10

HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:10

HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:10

HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:15

MISHNAH: If somebody made a vow of ḥerem and said, I referred the vow only to mariner’s nets, or made a vow of qorbān and said, I referred the vow only to the gifts for kings, or said, my bone is qorbān and said, I referred the vow only to the bone that I keep in my house for purposes of vows, [or said] a qônām that my wife may not have any use from me and said, I referred the vow only to my first wife whom I divorced, all these do not need a question. If they do question, one punishes them and makes it difficult for them, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, one finds for them an opening from another place and teaches them that they should not be flippant about vows.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:15

MISHNAH: If somebody made a vow of ḥerem and said, I referred the vow only to mariner’s nets, or made a vow of qorbān and said, I referred the vow only to the gifts for kings, or said, my bone is qorbān and said, I referred the vow only to the bone that I keep in my house for purposes of vows, [or said] a qônām that my wife may not have any use from me and said, I referred the vow only to my first wife whom I divorced, all these do not need a question. If they do question, one punishes them and makes it difficult for them, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, one finds for them an opening from another place and teaches them that they should not be flippant about vows.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:15

MISHNAH: If somebody made a vow of ḥerem and said, I referred the vow only to mariner’s nets, or made a vow of qorbān and said, I referred the vow only to the gifts for kings, or said, my bone is qorbān and said, I referred the vow only to the bone that I keep in my house for purposes of vows, [or said] a qônām that my wife may not have any use from me and said, I referred the vow only to my first wife whom I divorced, all these do not need a question. If they do question, one punishes them and makes it difficult for them, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, one finds for them an opening from another place and teaches them that they should not be flippant about vows.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:15

MISHNAH: If somebody made a vow of ḥerem and said, I referred the vow only to mariner’s nets, or made a vow of qorbān and said, I referred the vow only to the gifts for kings, or said, my bone is qorbān and said, I referred the vow only to the bone that I keep in my house for purposes of vows, [or said] a qônām that my wife may not have any use from me and said, I referred the vow only to my first wife whom I divorced, all these do not need a question. If they do question, one punishes them and makes it difficult for them, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, one finds for them an opening from another place and teaches them that they should not be flippant about vows.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:3

Do the Sages permit all kinds of vows? “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve”! Rebbi Eleazar in the name of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya: Those do not need the permission of a Sage. Rav and Samuel both say that these need the permission of a Sage. Issy objected: Did we not find an opening for vows from there only? Samuel said to him, bind a rope on it. A Mishnah disagrees with Issy: “This one also can dissolve his vow without asking a Sage.” He explains it, that all vows need an opening from another place but these have their openings in themselves. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that is, if they do not insist. But if they did insist they need the permission of a Sage. If one did insist but the other did not insist, since this one’s is invalid, the other one’s also should be invalid. A student of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus said [after] Rebbi Yudan: If one asked a tetradrachma, one was ready to give him three, and another one said a sheqel. (Does he insist?) Since he renounces one denar for this one he may renounce another one for the other one and give it to him for two.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:8

Did not the snake of king Sapor swallow camels and carts? When they wanted to kill it, they filled camel bags with straw and put glowing coals inside; it swallowed them and died. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, I saw a snake skin which filled the space between two columns. Rebbi Samuel bar Jacob said, I saw a snake skin which covered the genii of government. Samuel said, square. Could you say it was not square, why must it be large? Even if it was small! Rebbi Mattaniah said, it is the way of this Tanna to speak only about large things. You should know that it is so, for we have stated: “A flying camel”. Could he not have stated “a flying rat”?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:9

It was stated: “Rabban Gamliel says, there is nothing square from the six days of Creation.” Rebbi Berekhiah objected: Did we not state: “The body of baheret is like a square Italian grit.” Rebbi Bisna said, that in itself says that there is no square. Why did we state that? That he should square it. But there are lice! They are full of knots. But there is the knee of a mountain goat! It is round below. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel spoke only about animals. It was stated so: There is square in foods, there is no square in animals.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:18

MISHNAH: One makes a vow to tax assessors and to people who condemn property and to toll collectors that it is heave even though it is not heave, that it is king’s family’s property even though it is not theirs. The House of Shammai say, one vows anything except an oath, but the House of Hillel say, even an oath. The House of Shammai say, one may not offer a vow, but the House of Hillel say, one may offer. The House of Shammai say, only what he prescribes as vow, but the House of Hillel say, even what he does not prescribe. How is this? They said to him, say: a qônām that my wife cannot have any use from me, and he said: a qônām that my wife and my children cannot have any use from me; the House of Shammai say, his wife is permitted but his children are forbidden; but the House of Hillel say, both are permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:22

HALAKHAH: “These orchard trees shall be qorbān,” etc. If he saw the king’s cutting crew coming near, if he saw fire coming near, and he said: These orchard trees shall be qorbān if they are not cut, this garment shall be qorbān if it is not burned or torn. Were they sanctified retroactively or only for the future? What is the difference? If he used them. If you say that they are sanctified retroactively, he committed larceny. If you say for the future, he did not commit larceny.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:25

HALAKHAH: “One who makes a vow away from the seafaring men,” etc. That you should not say, not from those who go from Acco to Jaffa but those who frequently take to the sea. “From the dwellers on dry land he is forbidden the seafaring men,” not only those who go from Acco to Jaffa but even those who frequently take to the sea. But did he not make a vow regarding the dwellers on dry land? This implies that the seafaring men are part of the dwellers on dry land. If he made a vow away from the seafaring men after thirty days but [a certain mariner] became a land dweller, there is a dispute between Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba. For Rebbi Ismael says, after the vow, and Rebbi Aqiba says, after the prohibition. And about children it is a problem.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:26

MISHNAH: One who makes a vow away from those who see the sun is also forbidden the blind since he intended only that seen by the sun. One who makes a vow away from those who see the sun is also forbidden the blind since he intended only that seen by the sun. One who makes a vow away from those who will be born is permitted those who are already born. From those who are born, Rebbi Meïr permits even those who will be born, but the Sages say, he intended only those in whose nature it is to be born.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:26

MISHNAH: One who makes a vow away from those who see the sun is also forbidden the blind since he intended only that seen by the sun. One who makes a vow away from those who see the sun is also forbidden the blind since he intended only that seen by the sun. One who makes a vow away from those who will be born is permitted those who are already born. From those who are born, Rebbi Meïr permits even those who will be born, but the Sages say, he intended only those in whose nature it is to be born.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:26

MISHNAH: One who makes a vow away from those who see the sun is also forbidden the blind since he intended only that seen by the sun. One who makes a vow away from those who see the sun is also forbidden the blind since he intended only that seen by the sun. One who makes a vow away from those who will be born is permitted those who are already born. From those who are born, Rebbi Meïr permits even those who will be born, but the Sages say, he intended only those in whose nature it is to be born.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:29

HALAKHAH: “A qônām that I shall not enjoy from the descendants of Noah; he is permitted Jews and forbidden Gentiles. That I shall not enjoy from the descendants of Abraham; he is forbidden Jews and permitted Gentiles,” etc. Is Ismael not part of Abraham’s seed? “ For in Isaac will be called your seed.” And is not Esaw part of Isaac’s seed? Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said, “in Isaac,” in part of Isaac. Rebbi Huna said, “ב” are two, the son who will be inheriting two worlds, this world and the world to come. Rebbi Gershom in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, “ a star did step out from Jacob,” from whom did a star step out and will appear in the future? From Jacob! Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: In the future world, evil Esaw will put on his prayer shawl and sit with the Just in Paradise, but the Holy One, Praise to Him, draws him away. Why? “ If you climb as high as an eagle or if you would make your nest between stars, from there I would take you down, says the Lord.” But “stars” are only the Just. As you say, “those who justify the many are like stars, eternally.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:35

“The flesh of his prepuce should be circumcized.” Even if it has white skin disease. How can I confirm: “Beware of skin disease to watch it carefully and to do …”? Also at a circumcision. Then how can I confirm: “The flesh of his prepuce should be circumcized”? If there is no white skin disease? The verse says, “the flesh”, even if it has white skin disease. This is simple in the opinion of Rebbi Jonah, who says that a positive commandment supersedes a prohibition even if they are not written together. But in the opinion of Rebbi Yose, who says that a positive commandment supersedes a prohibition only if they are written together? Since it is written “the flesh of his prepuce,” it is as if it were written together.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:1

MISHNAH: The only difference between one who is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another and one who is under a vow about use of food is passing through his real estate and vessels that cannot be used to prepare food. One who is under a vow about use of food should not borrow from him a fine or coarse sieve, a grindstone, or an oven. But he may borrow from him a robe or a stole, nose rings and finger rings, and anything that is not used to prepare food. At a place where one rents out any of these it is forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:2

HALAKHAH: “The only difference between one who is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another,” etc. This means that vessels used to prepare food are forbidden. But did he not make the vow about food? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, so is the Mishnah: The only difference between one who is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another and one who is under a vow about use for food. In the House of Rebbi it was stated thus: “One who is under a vow about use of food should not borrow from him a fine or coarse sieve, a grindstone, or an oven.” It was stated: But he may borrow from him cups and bowls and fruit bowls, since these are not used to prepare food, only to serve food. Pans and pots are forbidden. To mill and to press is forbidden. Cutting is a problem, harvesting is a problem. What kind of usufruct? It was stated: But he may borrow a spade from him. We wanted to say, a spade of a digger. Explain it by a spade for weeding, and you cannot infer anything. Rebbi Abuna said, that ysṭ’, since one removes and separates the bran from flour with it, it is forbidden to borrow from him.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:2

HALAKHAH: “The only difference between one who is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another,” etc. This means that vessels used to prepare food are forbidden. But did he not make the vow about food? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, so is the Mishnah: The only difference between one who is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another and one who is under a vow about use for food. In the House of Rebbi it was stated thus: “One who is under a vow about use of food should not borrow from him a fine or coarse sieve, a grindstone, or an oven.” It was stated: But he may borrow from him cups and bowls and fruit bowls, since these are not used to prepare food, only to serve food. Pans and pots are forbidden. To mill and to press is forbidden. Cutting is a problem, harvesting is a problem. What kind of usufruct? It was stated: But he may borrow a spade from him. We wanted to say, a spade of a digger. Explain it by a spade for weeding, and you cannot infer anything. Rebbi Abuna said, that ysṭ’, since one removes and separates the bran from flour with it, it is forbidden to borrow from him.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:2

HALAKHAH: “The only difference between one who is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another,” etc. This means that vessels used to prepare food are forbidden. But did he not make the vow about food? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, so is the Mishnah: The only difference between one who is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another and one who is under a vow about use for food. In the House of Rebbi it was stated thus: “One who is under a vow about use of food should not borrow from him a fine or coarse sieve, a grindstone, or an oven.” It was stated: But he may borrow from him cups and bowls and fruit bowls, since these are not used to prepare food, only to serve food. Pans and pots are forbidden. To mill and to press is forbidden. Cutting is a problem, harvesting is a problem. What kind of usufruct? It was stated: But he may borrow a spade from him. We wanted to say, a spade of a digger. Explain it by a spade for weeding, and you cannot infer anything. Rebbi Abuna said, that ysṭ’, since one removes and separates the bran from flour with it, it is forbidden to borrow from him.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:9

Who is the Tanna of “the gain should be given to the sacred fund”? Rebbi Meïr! For Rebbi Meïr said, one commits sacrilege with prohibitions. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands? Let us hear from the following: “If he said, this loaf shall be dedicated, if he or another person ate it, they committed sacrilege; therefore, it can be redeemed. But if he said, it is for me [as if dedicated], if he ate it he committed sacrilege on goodwill but others would not commit sacrilege.” He said only, if he ate it. Therefore, to warm his hands is permitted. The students of Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: That is if he said I shall not eat it nor taste it; if he forbade only eating to himself. But the question was, if somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:9

Who is the Tanna of “the gain should be given to the sacred fund”? Rebbi Meïr! For Rebbi Meïr said, one commits sacrilege with prohibitions. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands? Let us hear from the following: “If he said, this loaf shall be dedicated, if he or another person ate it, they committed sacrilege; therefore, it can be redeemed. But if he said, it is for me [as if dedicated], if he ate it he committed sacrilege on goodwill but others would not commit sacrilege.” He said only, if he ate it. Therefore, to warm his hands is permitted. The students of Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: That is if he said I shall not eat it nor taste it; if he forbade only eating to himself. But the question was, if somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:32

So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?