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8347 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
Rebbi Mana said it without attribution; Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: We did state two principles which do not compare. “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds”; one has to bring four sacrifices. “There are two kinds of appearances of skin disease which are four kinds”; one has to bring two sacrifices. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin explained it otherwise: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds” was said by Rebbi Aqiba; “there are two kinds of appearances of skin disease which are four kinds” by Rebbi Ismael. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: why do I need to follow Rebbi Ismael? Does it not come even following Rebbi Aqiba? Knowing and forgetting about impurity of the Sanctuary is the same as knowing and forgetting about impurity of sancta. He told him, does not Rebbi Ismael have forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary, and we want to follow Rebbi Aqiba? Sometimes there is forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one sacrifice. How is this? If one became impure, realized it, then forgot about impurity, entered the Sanctuary, and left; then he became aware. Here is forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one sacrifice. Sometimes there are many forgettings of impurity and many forgettings of the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one [sacrifice]. How [is this]? If one became impure and realized it, then forgot and while being oblivious of impurity entered the Sanctuary and left; then he became aware. He said, there is no sacrifice due for this impurity. Again he became impure and realized it, then forgot and while being oblivious of impurity entered the Sanctuary and left even several times; in the end he became aware. Here are many forgettings of impurity and forgettings of the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one [sacrifice].
And from where that it speaks only about the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta? He warned and punished about impurity and required a sacrifice about impurity. Since punishment and warning spelled out later on refer to impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta, also when He made liable for a sacrifice it is about impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, since it says, I did not eat from it in my deep mourning, I could think that an Israel who ate tithe in deep mourning should bring a sacrifice. The verse says, from thes e. For some of these he is liable, for some of these he is not liable. I will exclude tithe which is not a deadly sin but will not exclude heave which is a deadly sin as it is said, they would die from it for they desecrated it. The verse says from thes e; for some of these he is liable, for some of these he is not liable. Or since there [one speaks about] heave, also here heave. But did you not learn it from foreign worship? Since foreign worship teaches about all transgressions in the Torah, to say that as foreign worship is special that one is liable for extirpation if done intentionally and for a sacrifice if done unintentionally. This excludes heave which only is a deadly sin.
And from where that it speaks only about the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta? He warned and punished about impurity and required a sacrifice about impurity. Since punishment and warning spelled out later on refer to impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta, also when He made liable for a sacrifice it is about impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, since it says, I did not eat from it in my deep mourning, I could think that an Israel who ate tithe in deep mourning should bring a sacrifice. The verse says, from thes e. For some of these he is liable, for some of these he is not liable. I will exclude tithe which is not a deadly sin but will not exclude heave which is a deadly sin as it is said, they would die from it for they desecrated it. The verse says from thes e; for some of these he is liable, for some of these he is not liable. Or since there [one speaks about] heave, also here heave. But did you not learn it from foreign worship? Since foreign worship teaches about all transgressions in the Torah, to say that as foreign worship is special that one is liable for extirpation if done intentionally and for a sacrifice if done unintentionally. This excludes heave which only is a deadly sin.
Rebbi Ḥanina said before Rebbi Mana: Did you learn this from foreign worship? Then one should learn from foreign worship that for everything one needs one knowledge! He told him, foreign worship requires a fixed value [sacrifice] but the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta an increasing or decreasing one. One cannot infer about a fixed value [sacrifice] from an increasing and decreasing one, nor for an increasing or decreasing from a fixed value one. How did you understand to say that the verse speaks about impurity of Sanctuary sancta? It is said here an impure animal and it is said further on an impure animal. Since an impure animal mentioned there is about impurity of Sanctuary sancta, so an impure animal mentioned here is about impurity of Sanctuary sancta. Not only Sanctuary sancta; from where the impurity of the Sanctuary? “The verse says: his impurity is on him. How did you understand to explain it? About an impure person who ate pure [meat], or a pure person who ate impure [meat]? The verse says: his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Rebbi says, he ate, his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Rebbi Ḥiyya says, sancta are mentioned in the plural but impurity is mentioned in the singular. How can I uphold his impurity is on him? Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Rebbi Meїr says, the verse only speaks of one from whom impurity separates. This excludes meat from which impurity does not separate.”
Rebbi Ḥanina said before Rebbi Mana: Did you learn this from foreign worship? Then one should learn from foreign worship that for everything one needs one knowledge! He told him, foreign worship requires a fixed value [sacrifice] but the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta an increasing or decreasing one. One cannot infer about a fixed value [sacrifice] from an increasing and decreasing one, nor for an increasing or decreasing from a fixed value one. How did you understand to say that the verse speaks about impurity of Sanctuary sancta? It is said here an impure animal and it is said further on an impure animal. Since an impure animal mentioned there is about impurity of Sanctuary sancta, so an impure animal mentioned here is about impurity of Sanctuary sancta. Not only Sanctuary sancta; from where the impurity of the Sanctuary? “The verse says: his impurity is on him. How did you understand to explain it? About an impure person who ate pure [meat], or a pure person who ate impure [meat]? The verse says: his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Rebbi says, he ate, his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Rebbi Ḥiyya says, sancta are mentioned in the plural but impurity is mentioned in the singular. How can I uphold his impurity is on him? Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Rebbi Meїr says, the verse only speaks of one from whom impurity separates. This excludes meat from which impurity does not separate.”
“He shall atone for the Sanctuary from the impurities of the Children of Israel, etc. In this aspect I have three impurities. The impurity of foreign worship as it is said, to defile My Sanctuary. Sexual offenses as it is said, not to act in the rules of abominations. Spilling of blood as it is said, do not defile the Land. I could think that this he-goat atones for all these impurities, the verse says, from the impurities, not all impurities. We find that the verse treated the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta separately; also here we treat only the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta separately, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, from its place it is decided, as it is said, he shall atone for the Sanctuary from the impurities of the Children of Israel, any impurity in the Sanctuary. I could think that this he-goat atones for these impurities, the verse says, and their crimes. These are the rebellions, for so it says, the king of Moab rebelled against me.
MISHNAH: If there is no knowledge at the start but there is knowledge at the end, the he-goat brought outside or the Day of Atonement atone as it is said, in addition to the atoning purification offering; what the one atones for the other atones for. Since the one inside atones only on matters which were known, also the outside one should atone only on matters which were known.
MISHNAH: If there is no knowledge at the start but there is knowledge at the end, the he-goat brought outside or the Day of Atonement atone as it is said, in addition to the atoning purification offering; what the one atones for the other atones for. Since the one inside atones only on matters which were known, also the outside one should atone only on matters which were known.
HALAKHAH: “But about where there is no knowledge,” etc. Halakhah 5: “Rebbi Simeon used to say,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah is and one goat’s he-goat sin offering for the Eternal. This he-goat atones for a sin known only to the Eternal. I have not only the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon; from where the he-goats of the holidays? Rebbi Ze`ira said, and a he-goat, the copula adds to the prior subject. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He gave it to you to lift the sins of the congregation. Where do we hold? If about Naḥshon’s he-goat, it atoned for his tribe. If about the he-goat of the Day of (Atonement), there is nothing similar in later generations. But we must deal with the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon. What about it? It is said here “lifting sin” and it is said there “lifting sin”, Aaron shall lift the sin of the sancta”. Since there it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers, also here it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers. What did you see to say, “for the pure person who ate impure”, maybe we should say for the impure person who ate pure? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, Rebbi Jehudah splits the argument of Rebbi Meїr; Rebbi Simeon splits the argument of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that the he-goat brought inside does not atone; rather it suspends. This parallels Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, he shall make it a purification offering. He fixed it for suspension, that it could not be changed.
HALAKHAH: “But about where there is no knowledge,” etc. Halakhah 5: “Rebbi Simeon used to say,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah is and one goat’s he-goat sin offering for the Eternal. This he-goat atones for a sin known only to the Eternal. I have not only the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon; from where the he-goats of the holidays? Rebbi Ze`ira said, and a he-goat, the copula adds to the prior subject. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He gave it to you to lift the sins of the congregation. Where do we hold? If about Naḥshon’s he-goat, it atoned for his tribe. If about the he-goat of the Day of (Atonement), there is nothing similar in later generations. But we must deal with the he-goat of the Day of the New Moon. What about it? It is said here “lifting sin” and it is said there “lifting sin”, Aaron shall lift the sin of the sancta”. Since there it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers, also here it is the sinfulness of the offerings not the sins of the offerers. What did you see to say, “for the pure person who ate impure”, maybe we should say for the impure person who ate pure? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, Rebbi Jehudah splits the argument of Rebbi Meїr; Rebbi Simeon splits the argument of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that the he-goat brought inside does not atone; rather it suspends. This parallels Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, he shall make it a purification offering. He fixed it for suspension, that it could not be changed.
A he-goat which was not brought on the holiday should be brought on the Day of the New Moon. If it was not brought on the Day of the New Moon it should be brought in the future since from the start public sacrifices were dedicated only to be brought onto the outside altar.
“They asked him, could they be brought one for the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of the Sages [imply] that one may change; the words of Rebbi Simeon [imply] that one may not change. The words of the Sages [imply] that one may change, and you say “could they be brought one for the other”? They objected to him according to his argument. According to your argument, since you say that one may not change, could they be brought one for the other? Rebbi Yose said, since public sacrifices are designated only by use. Rebbi Yudan said, it was stated thus: “For the purpose of the sacrifice for which it is brought it was sanctified from the beginning.”
HALAKHAH: “They said to him, did not the teacher use to say,” etc. Rebbi Yose the Southerner said before Rebbi Jonah: Would it not have been necessary to state, if it is so then those of the Days of the New Moon could be brought on the Day of Atonement since one increases holiness but one does not diminish; but those of the Day of Atonement cannot be brought on the Days of the New Moon since one does not diminish holiness. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Bun explained it by another explanation: if it is so then those of the Day of Atonement could be brought on the Days of the New Moon, for included in their atoning is the atoning of the Days of the New Moon, but those of the days of the New Moon cannot be brought on the Day of Atonement, for they atone only their atonement. For if anybody ate five olive-sized pieces of fat and dedicated four sacrifices, being of the impression that he had dedicated five, did he atone? Or if he ate four olive sized pieces of fat, dedicated five sacrifices, being of the impression that he had dedicated four, not so much more? And so “Rebbi Simeon used to say, thirty-two rams are brought for the public every year. Thirty one outside, they are eaten. One inside which is not eaten. And the scapegoat. Twelve for the twelve months of the year. Eight on Tabernacles, seven on Passover, two on Pentecost, one for the day and one for the bread. One on New Year’s Day and one on the Day of Atonement.” When Moses heard this he said, it follows that anybody for whom the doubt of a transgression arises should bring all these sacrifices! Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: When the Holy One, praise to Him, said to Moses, he shall confess on it etc., he started and said, A Song of confession, inspired by he shall confess on it.
A positive commandment, even if he did not repent. A prohibition? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, only if he repented. If one said, “the elevation offering does not atone,” does the elevation offering not atone? It atones even against his will. If one said, “the Day of Atonement does not atone,” does the Day of Atonement not atone? It atones even against his will. “I cannot accept that it atone for me,” it does not atone against his will. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Hillel said, the opposite is reasonable. It is not up to a person to tell the King, “you do not reign.”
Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Ismael, and Rebbi Aqiba. But the Sages say that the scapegoat pardons. How does it pardon? Rebbi Ze`ira said, by and by. Rebbi Ḥanania said, at the end. What is between them? If somebody died in-between. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira, he already was pardoned. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥanina, he was not pardoned. Rebbi Ze`ira said, a baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina: There is strength in the he-goat which is not in the Day of Atonement, and in the Day of Atonement which is not in the he-goat: The Day of Atonement pardons without a he-goat, but the he-goat does not atone without the Day of Atonement. The he-goat pardons immediately but the Day of Atonement only at nightfall. Rebbi Huna said, the question was raised before Rebbi Jeremiah and he said, explain it if they intended to bring another he-goat but they did not bring it. Rebbi Yose said, but does the Holy One, praise to Him, not see into the future? Then He should pardon immediately.
Rebbi Jeremiah said that Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: Justice protects the one on the straight path. Evil deeds will pursue the sinner. He will watch over the feet of His pious ones. While He makes scoffers targets of scoffing. Fences are made fences and doors doors. Is it so that fences make fences and doors doors? But so it is: Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac: If a person is careful the first, second, and third times not to commit a sin, then the Holy One, praise to Him, will watch over him, as it is said, all this God will do twice, three times with a man. Rebbi Ze`ira said, but only if the person does not revert [to sin]. What is the reason? It does not say the triple thread “will never snap” but rather will not quickly snap. If you work on it, it will split.
MISHNAH: Together Israel, Cohanim, and the Anointed Priest. What is the difference between Israel and a Cohen or the Anointed Priest? Only that the blood of the bull atones for Cohanim in matters of the Sanctuary and its sancta. Rebbi Simeon says, just as the blood of the he-goat which is brought inside atones for Israel, so the blood of the bull atones for the Cohanim. Just as the confession of the scapegoat atones for Israel, so the confession of the bull atones for Cohanim.
The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There, he said, if part of the sin was atoned, all of the sin was atoned. And here he says so? Rebbi Joḥanan said this only for the last realization which does not require any sacrifice.
MISHNAH: Whether one entered the courtyard or the addition to the courtyard, because one adds to the city and the temple courtyards only by King and Prophet, and Urim and Tummim, and the Synhedrion of Seventy-One, and two thanksgiving offerings, and song, with the Court walking and the two thanksgiving offerings after them. The inner one is eaten but the outer one is burned. Any [addition] which was not made with all these, one who was entering there is not liable for it.
MISHNAH: An oath that I shall not eat, when he ate and drank he is liable only for one. An oath that I shall not eat or drink, when he ate and drank he is liable for two.
Rebbi Yose understood all this from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate and drank he is liable only for one.” The colleagues said before Rebbi Yose, but it is said following this, “an oath that I shall not eat nor drink, when he ate and drank” should he be liable only for one? Rebbi Yose told them, if somebody said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf, and he continued, an oath that I shall not eat this other loaf, when he ate both of them would he not be guilty on two counts?
Rebbi Yose understood all this from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate and drank he is liable only for one.” The colleagues said before Rebbi Yose, but it is said following this, “an oath that I shall not eat nor drink, when he ate and drank” should he be liable only for one? Rebbi Yose told them, if somebody said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf, and he continued, an oath that I shall not eat this other loaf, when he ate both of them would he not be guilty on two counts?
Rebbi Abba understood all this from the following: “If he ate and drank in one forgetting he is liable only once.”
MISHNAH: An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate wheat bread, and barley bread, and spelt bread, he is liable only once. An oath that I shall eat neither wheat bread, nor barley bread, nor spelt bread; when he ate wheat bred, and barley bread, and spelt bread, he is liable for each single one. An oath that I shall not drink; if he drank many kinds he is liable only for one. An oath that I shall drink neither wine, nor oil, not date syrup, if he drank he is liable for each single one.
MISHNAH: An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate wheat bread, and barley bread, and spelt bread, he is liable only once. An oath that I shall eat neither wheat bread, nor barley bread, nor spelt bread; when he ate wheat bred, and barley bread, and spelt bread, he is liable for each single one. An oath that I shall not drink; if he drank many kinds he is liable only for one. An oath that I shall drink neither wine, nor oil, not date syrup, if he drank he is liable for each single one.
HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall eat neither,” etc. “An oath that I shall not eat bread” and he wrapped it in reed leaves or grape leaves and ate, he is liable only once. “An oath that I shall not eat bread nor grape skin nor grape seeds, and he wrapped it in grape skins and grape seeds, he is liable for each one, and if he was a nazir he is liable for three. Rebbi Joḥanan said, in comprehensive form. But in detail, no oaths fall on prohibitions. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even in comprehensive form no oaths fall on prohibitions.
Rebbi Ḥinena asked: Why did he not say, “an oath if I would eat of X” without detail? Because of Rebbi Simeon. But if following Rebbi Simeon, how could we state the Day of Atonement, since Rebbi Simeon stated, you shall deprive yourselves, of what is (forbidden) to you, not of what is (permitted) to you. Only one has a fixed rate sacrifice, the other a variable one.
They objected, is there not impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta which need a variable rate [sacrifice] and did the Tanna not state it? We come to state only things carrying a liability to extirpation; there is no extirpation for oaths.
They objected, there is no extirpation for larceny and it was stated! We come to state only things which cannot become permitted after being forbidden. Oaths may become permitted after being forbidden. This implies that there are no categories of work for the day of Atonement, for if anybody violated all of them in one forgetting he is liable only for one [sacrifice] for all of them. But if anybody violated each of them separately, would he not be liable for each single one?
They objected, there is no extirpation for larceny and it was stated! We come to state only things which cannot become permitted after being forbidden. Oaths may become permitted after being forbidden. This implies that there are no categories of work for the day of Atonement, for if anybody violated all of them in one forgetting he is liable only for one [sacrifice] for all of them. But if anybody violated each of them separately, would he not be liable for each single one?
Not only unspecified, but even “X”. Not only comprehensive but even in detail. Not only in the future but also in the past. Not only the rabbis but even Rebbi Aqiba. Not only carcass and torn meat but even dust.
Not only unspecified, but even “X”. Not only comprehensive but even in detail. Not only in the future but also in the past. Not only the rabbis but even Rebbi Aqiba. Not only carcass and torn meat but even dust.
Not only unspecified, but even “X”. Not only comprehensive but even in detail. Not only in the future but also in the past. Not only the rabbis but even Rebbi Aqiba. Not only carcass and torn meat but even dust.
Not only unspecified, but even “X”. Not only comprehensive but even in detail. Not only in the future but also in the past. Not only the rabbis but even Rebbi Aqiba. Not only carcass and torn meat but even dust.
Not only unspecified, but even “X”. Not only comprehensive but even in detail. Not only in the future but also in the past. Not only the rabbis but even Rebbi Aqiba. Not only carcass and torn meat but even dust.
MISHNAH: Whether matters of himself, or matters of others, or material matters, or immaterial matters. How is this? An oath that I shall give to X, or that I shall not give, that I gave, or that I did not give, that I shall sleep, or that I shall not sleep, that I slept, or that I did not sleep, that I shall throw a pebble into the sea, or that I shall not throw, that I threw, or that I did not throw. Rebbi Ismael said, he is liable only for the future, for it is said to cause evil or cause good. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, if it is so then this refers only to matters of causing evil or good; from where matters which do not refer to causing evil or good? He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the additional text of the verse is for this, the additional text of the verse is for the other.
MISHNAH: Whether matters of himself, or matters of others, or material matters, or immaterial matters. How is this? An oath that I shall give to X, or that I shall not give, that I gave, or that I did not give, that I shall sleep, or that I shall not sleep, that I slept, or that I did not sleep, that I shall throw a pebble into the sea, or that I shall not throw, that I threw, or that I did not throw. Rebbi Ismael said, he is liable only for the future, for it is said to cause evil or cause good. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, if it is so then this refers only to matters of causing evil or good; from where matters which do not refer to causing evil or good? He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the additional text of the verse is for this, the additional text of the verse is for the other.
How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.
How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.
How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.
How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.
MISHNAH: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it, an oath that I shall not eat it;” he is liable only once. This is the blurted oath where in case it be intentional one is liable for flogging, and if unintentional for a variable sacrifice.
Abime the brother of Ḥefa said, I had studied Nedarim and Ševuot; Ḥefa wanted to examine him. He had before him five loaves and said, an oath that I would not eat this loaf. He returned and said, these two. He returned and said, these three. He returned and said, these four. He returned and said, these five. Then he ate the first. He said to him, he is liable for each single one. He answered, he is liable only once, for when he mentioned the first he made it like carcass meat; the following make an oath fall on something prohibited and oaths cannot fall on prohibitions.
Ḥefa continued to examine him. He had before him five loaves and said, an oath that I would not eat these five loaves. He returned and said, these four. He returned and said, these three. He returned and said, these two. He returned and said, this one, and ate the first one. He said to him, he is liable only once. He answered, he is liable for each single one; if somebody said “an oath if I would eat five loaves” and he ate four, is he not free from liability?
“If I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press.” Did not the snake of king Sapor swallow camels and carts? When they wanted to kill it, they filled camel bags with straw and put glowing coals inside; it swallowed them and died. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, I saw the hide of a snake made over eight spaces between pillars. Rebbi Samuel ben Jacob said, I saw the hide of a snake covering a state coach. Samuel said, square. If square one could state even a small one. Rebbi Yudan the father of Rebbi Mattaniah said, so it is. It is the way of this Tanna to use only big words, as we have stated: “A flying camel.” Could he not have stated, “a flying rat”?
It was stated: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, there is nothing square from the six Days of Creation. Rebbi Berekhiah objected: Did we not state: “The body of baheret is like a square Cilician grit. The place for a grit is nine lentils. The space for a lentil is four hairwidths; in all 36 hairwidths.” Rebbi (Yosna) said, that in itself says that there is no square. Why was it stated “squared”? That he should square it. And כגעה? It is full of knots. But there is the bunch of pila! It is round below. Some wanted to say, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said this only about creatures, There is square in foods, there is no square in creatures.
HALAKHAH: “A blurted oath,” etc. “ ‘An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it’, he is liable only once”. Something which would be forbidden for vows and is permitted for oaths. Not on this was it said but on the following: “Whether matters of himself, or matters of others,” as Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: ‘An oath that X gave a mina to Y.’ If it turns out that he had not given, since it is not in his hand for the future it is not in his hand for the past. It was found stated on both cases: This is more stringent for the past than for the future: If he says “I shall not eat, I shall not eat,” he is liable only once. “I did not eat, I did not eat,” he is liable for each single time.
HALAKHAH: “A blurted oath,” etc. “ ‘An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it’, he is liable only once”. Something which would be forbidden for vows and is permitted for oaths. Not on this was it said but on the following: “Whether matters of himself, or matters of others,” as Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: ‘An oath that X gave a mina to Y.’ If it turns out that he had not given, since it is not in his hand for the future it is not in his hand for the past. It was found stated on both cases: This is more stringent for the past than for the future: If he says “I shall not eat, I shall not eat,” he is liable only once. “I did not eat, I did not eat,” he is liable for each single time.
“An oath that I shall not eat this loaf today; an oath that I shall not eat it today.” Then he ate it. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is twice liable. Is he only once liable in Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion? Even Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that he only emphasizes the prohibitions.
“An oath that I shall not eat this loaf today; an oath that I shall not eat it today.” Then he ate it. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is twice liable. Is he only once liable in Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion? Even Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that he only emphasizes the prohibitions.
This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.
MISHNAH: An oath about testimony applies to men but not to women, to unrelated persons but not to relatives, to qualified but not to disqualified ones; it applies only to those admitted to testify, in court and out of court, and by the person’s own words. By the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by the person’s own words or by the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court. They are liable both for intentional [violation of the] oath and for erroneous one, and for intentional [refusal of] testimony, but one is not liable unintentionally. What is one liable for if intentional? A variable value sacrifice.
MISHNAH: An oath about testimony applies to men but not to women, to unrelated persons but not to relatives, to qualified but not to disqualified ones; it applies only to those admitted to testify, in court and out of court, and by the person’s own words. By the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by the person’s own words or by the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court. They are liable both for intentional [violation of the] oath and for erroneous one, and for intentional [refusal of] testimony, but one is not liable unintentionally. What is one liable for if intentional? A variable value sacrifice.
MISHNAH: An oath about testimony applies to men but not to women, to unrelated persons but not to relatives, to qualified but not to disqualified ones; it applies only to those admitted to testify, in court and out of court, and by the person’s own words. By the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by the person’s own words or by the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court. They are liable both for intentional [violation of the] oath and for erroneous one, and for intentional [refusal of] testimony, but one is not liable unintentionally. What is one liable for if intentional? A variable value sacrifice.
So far only fathers and sons; from where the other relatives? Rebbi Ze`ira says, and sons includes the remaining relatives.
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
MISHNAH: What is an oath about testimony? One said to witnesses, come and testify for me. “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” or they said to him, we do not know any testimony for you, “I am asking you to take an oath upon this;” if they said “Amen”, they are liable. If he asked them five times outside of court to take an oath; when they came to court and admitted it they are not liable. If they deny, they are liable for each single one. If he asked them five times in court to take an oath and the refused, they are liable only once. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative liable for an oath about testimony formulated by himself? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by himself for an oath about testimony only from oaths about deposits, and since there relatives are liable, so they also are here? Rebbi Yose said, can relatives here be inferred from relatives there?
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times in his own words and let him swear five times by the mouth of others, what? Since Rebbi Meїr considered “in his own words” as if in court, would they determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request? It should come like the following: “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. Should they be liable? The verse says, and he heard the voice of an imprecation. Only one who hears an imprecation. This excludes those who did not hear a voice.” Would he be liable from his own mouth for real estate? From his own mouth would he be liable for fines? From his own mouth would he be liable for a variable value sacrifice?
HALAKHAH: “If both of them disavowed simultaneously,” etc. If they dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to disavowe in court. This is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, his sacrifice for the Eternal for his vow of nazir; that his vow of nazir precede his sacrifice, not that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. If they were sworn to out of court, dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to renege in court, how do you treat this? As if his sin did precede his sacrifice or since the are liable only in court as if their sacrifice did precede their sin?
If they were ten. There are Tannaïm who state, the first one is liable and all the rest are not liable. There are Tannaïm who state, the last one is not liable and all the rest are liable. The one who said, the first one is liable and all the rest are not liable, holds with him who said, the testimony can be verified by the remaining [witnesses]. The one who said, the last one is not liable and all the rest are liable, holds with him who said, testimony that was partially invalidated is totally invalidated. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “if there were two groups of witnesses.” He only said “two”. Therefore if there had been one, testimony that was partially invalidated it is totally invalidated.
MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit, and a loan, and robbery, and a lost object.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit, and a common venture, and robbery, and a lost object;” they are liable for each single one. “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt;” they are liable for each single one.
MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit, and a loan, and robbery, and a lost object.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit, and a common venture, and robbery, and a lost object;” they are liable for each single one. “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt;” they are liable for each single one.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.
MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that Mr. X promised to give me 200 zuz but did not give them to me.” These are not liable since one is liable only for an (oath about) money similar to a deposit. “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me when you know testimony for me.” These are not liable since the oath preceded the testimony. If he stood in the synagogue and said, “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me if you know testimony for me.” These are not liable.
Why? Because he does not know them, or because he does not intend to ask them? What is the difference between them? If he obligated them in pairs of two. If you would say because he does not know them, he knows them. Therefore the reason only can be that he does not intend to ask them.
HALAKHAH: “If he said to two persons, I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Rebbi Mana understood it from the following, “or one of them was a relative or disqualified.” Therefore, unless one of them was a relative or disqualified, they are liable. And he knows who they are. Therefore the reason can only be that he does not intend them. Rebbi Yose understood it from the preceding, “since the oath preceded the testimony.” Therefore, if the oath did not precede the testimony, they are liable. And he knows who they are. Therefore the reason can only be that he does not intend them.
HALAKHAH: “If he said to two persons, I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Rebbi Mana understood it from the following, “or one of them was a relative or disqualified.” Therefore, unless one of them was a relative or disqualified, they are liable. And he knows who they are. Therefore the reason can only be that he does not intend them. Rebbi Yose understood it from the preceding, “since the oath preceded the testimony.” Therefore, if the oath did not precede the testimony, they are liable. And he knows who they are. Therefore the reason can only be that he does not intend them.
HALAKHAH: “If he sent through his slave,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, why does the verse say, if he does not tell, he has to carry his iniquity? Not, from the mouth of the claimant. Our Mishnah needs what Rebbi Eleazar said, and what Rebbi Eleazar said needs our Mishnah. If we had stated but Rebbi Eleazar had not stated, we would have said that they are liable if they had heard from the claimant but had sworn to the defendant. Therefore what Rebbi Eleazar said is necessary. If Rebbi Eleazar had stated but we had not stated, we would have instructed that they are liable if they heard it from the defendant but had sworn to the claimant. Therefore one needs our Mishnah and needs what Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they heard from the claimant and swore to the claimant.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meïr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive. “May He not punish you if you come and testify for me.” Therefore, if you do not come and testify for me He shall punish you. There is not only an imprecation accompanied by an oath. From where one not accompanied by an oath be like one which is accompanied by an oath? The verse says, and heard an imprecation, and heard a voice, to make one without imprecation like one with an imprecation. Therefore not an imprecation without an oath. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no difference; an imprecation without oath is the same as an oath without an imprecation.
MISHNAH: An oath about a deposit applies to men and women, unrelated persons and relatives, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. From the mouth of another he is liable only if he denies in court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by his own mouth or the mouth of others, from the moment that he denies, he is liable. He is liable for intent about the oath, or error about it with intent about the deposit, but he is not liable for error about the latter. What is he liable for in case of intentional violation? A reparation offering in the value of two Šeqalim.
Rebbi La: Both Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both are saying, there is no ”witnesses “here. Why? Because they might die. But might not a document be lost? Therefore, the reason can only be that they might forget their testimony. There, we have stated: “Where is my ox? He told him, it is lost. I want you to swear, he said, Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed himself, he has to pay the value, and the fifth, and the reparation sacrifice.” The Mishnah [applies] if he does not know that there are witnesses. He comes to tell you, even if he knows that there are witnesses. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “If there were two groups of witnesses, if the first group reneged and after this the second, both are liable.” One understands that the first group becomes liable. Why the second? Not because they might forget their testimony? [Here also, because they (are commanded) to forget their testimony.]
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative not liable for an oath about deposits formulated by others? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by others for an oath about deposits only from oaths about testimony, and since there relatives are not liable, so they neither are here? Rebbi Yose said, relatives here can be inferred from non-relatives there.
Rebbi Yudan the Cappadocian asked: He made him swear five times by the formulation of others out of the court: would he not be liable only once? Rebbi Yose said, is this not the Mishnah: “Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they can come back and admit?” But here, since they cannot come back and admit, they are liable only once.
Rebbi Yudan the Cappadocian asked: He made him swear five times by the formulation of others out of the court: would he not be liable only once? Rebbi Yose said, is this not the Mishnah: “Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they can come back and admit?” But here, since they cannot come back and admit, they are liable only once.
MISHNAH: If five people were claiming from him and said to him, give us the deposit which you are holding for us. “An oath that I am not holding anything of yours’ ”; he is liable only once. “An oath that I am not holding anything of you, and of you, and of you;” he is liable for each one separately. Rebbi Eliezer says, on condition that he repeat “an oath” at the end. Rebbi Simeon says, not unless he repeat “an oath” for each single one.
Rebbi Joḥanan said: The words of Rebbi Eleazar, only if he mentioned “oath” at the start and at the end. The words of the Sages, if he mentioned “oath” at the start but not at the end. Or if he mentioned it at the end but not at the start in the opinion of the rabbis he brings a sacrifice for each single one, in Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one sacrifice for everything. If he mentions “oath” at the start but did not mention it at the end, does the oath fall on the middle ones? Come and see: If he had mentioned it at the start and the end, did he mention it for the middle ones? But you are saying that it is valid; so here it is valid.
Rebbi Yudan from Cappadocia asked: What about “an oath that neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt I am holding for you”? Is it as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. “I am not holding for you wheat, or barley, or spelt, an oath,” is this as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. Is it so if this were a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall not eat; I shall not eat, an oath”? In the rabbis’ opinion he brings a sacrifice for each one. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion does he bring one for the entirety? Even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that he is only emphasizing the prohibitions. It only would be problematic if it were about the past. “An oath that I did not eat; I did not eat, an oath.” In the rabbis’ opinion he brings two sacrifices (for each one). In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one (for each).
Rebbi Yudan from Cappadocia asked: What about “an oath that neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt I am holding for you”? Is it as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. “I am not holding for you wheat, or barley, or spelt, an oath,” is this as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. Is it so if this were a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall not eat; I shall not eat, an oath”? In the rabbis’ opinion he brings a sacrifice for each one. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion does he bring one for the entirety? Even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that he is only emphasizing the prohibitions. It only would be problematic if it were about the past. “An oath that I did not eat; I did not eat, an oath.” In the rabbis’ opinion he brings two sacrifices (for each one). In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one (for each).
Rebbi Yudan from Cappadocia asked: What about “an oath that neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt I am holding for you”? Is it as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. “I am not holding for you wheat, or barley, or spelt, an oath,” is this as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. Is it so if this were a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall not eat; I shall not eat, an oath”? In the rabbis’ opinion he brings a sacrifice for each one. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion does he bring one for the entirety? Even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that he is only emphasizing the prohibitions. It only would be problematic if it were about the past. “An oath that I did not eat; I did not eat, an oath.” In the rabbis’ opinion he brings two sacrifices (for each one). In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one (for each).
Rebbi Yudan from Cappadocia asked: What about “an oath that neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt I am holding for you”? Is it as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. “I am not holding for you wheat, or barley, or spelt, an oath,” is this as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. Is it so if this were a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall not eat; I shall not eat, an oath”? In the rabbis’ opinion he brings a sacrifice for each one. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion does he bring one for the entirety? Even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that he is only emphasizing the prohibitions. It only would be problematic if it were about the past. “An oath that I did not eat; I did not eat, an oath.” In the rabbis’ opinion he brings two sacrifices (for each one). In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one (for each).
Rebbi Yose asked: “An oath, an oath that I am not holding for you,” what? Rebbi Yose said, let us hear from the following: “ ‘An oath that I shall not eat this loaf; an oath that I shall not eat it’. Then he ate it. He is liable only once.” Because he mentioned “this”. Therefore, had he not mentioned “this” we would be liable for each one. Is it the same for a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall eat carcass meat, and wheat bread, and barley bread, and spelt bread.” Since he is not liable for carcass meat he is not liable for the remainder.
MISHNAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan, the robbery, and the lost object which you are holding for me.” “An oath that I am not holding anything of yours;” he is liable only once. “An oath that I am holding for you neither a deposit, nor a loan, nor a robbery, nor a lost object;” he is liable for each separate item. “Give me the wheat, and the barley, and the spelt, which you are holding for me.” “An oath that I am not holding anything for you,” he is liable only for one. “An oath that I am not holding wheat, and barley, and spelt, for you,” he is liable for each single one. Rebbi Meїr says, even if he says, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,” he is liable for each single one.
MISHNAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan, the robbery, and the lost object which you are holding for me.” “An oath that I am not holding anything of yours;” he is liable only once. “An oath that I am holding for you neither a deposit, nor a loan, nor a robbery, nor a lost object;” he is liable for each separate item. “Give me the wheat, and the barley, and the spelt, which you are holding for me.” “An oath that I am not holding anything for you,” he is liable only for one. “An oath that I am not holding wheat, and barley, and spelt, for you,” he is liable for each single one. Rebbi Meїr says, even if he says, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,” he is liable for each single one.
HALAKHAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi (Yasa) will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a baraita supports what the colleagues said. “A woman made a vow as a nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I’; the first woman’s husband heard it and dissolved [the vow] for her; the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. If she said, ‘my intention was only to be like her,’ both are permitted.” Because she said, “to be like her, in her state”. Therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state”, the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where the essence is not an oath, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? What Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest, if he connects: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.
“Give me the wheat, and the barley,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Jehudah imply collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. How is this? A detail wheat, a detail barley, a detail spelt. Collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. Detail a third wheat, detail a third barley, detail a third spelt, are these taken together? Come and see; although he holds many details, even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. In which respect? To make him liable for sacrifices. If he held four kinds, two kinds in one detail, two kinds on two details. even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. As Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything. What means “collectively”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, “X divorces Y and Z U.” What means “collectively”? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A.” Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately that he needs the typical text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit from this one; a qorban for this one and a qorban for that one.’ Each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.”
“Give me the wheat, and the barley,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Jehudah imply collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. How is this? A detail wheat, a detail barley, a detail spelt. Collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. Detail a third wheat, detail a third barley, detail a third spelt, are these taken together? Come and see; although he holds many details, even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. In which respect? To make him liable for sacrifices. If he held four kinds, two kinds in one detail, two kinds on two details. even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. As Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything. What means “collectively”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, “X divorces Y and Z U.” What means “collectively”? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A.” Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately that he needs the typical text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit from this one; a qorban for this one and a qorban for that one.’ Each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.”
Samuel said. the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah; the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meïr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meïr, as Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything; “I am greeting X,” he only signed for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed everything? Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated: “Rebbi Meїr says, even if he says, ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt,’ he is liable for each single one;” and nobody says “even” unless he agrees to an earlier statement. Rebbi Ḥinena said, in Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, whether he said, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,” or “wheat, barley, spelt,” it is a general statement and details. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, if he said, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,” it is a general statement and details. If he said “wheat, barley, spelt,” it is a general statement without details.
HALAKHAH: “You raped or seduced my daughter,” etc. Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The words of Rebbi Simeon [imply that] the main claim is for the fine, which is not so for the words of the Sages. Rebbi Illa said, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he claims the fine, shame and diminution; the words of the Sages if he claims shame, diminution, and fine. The rabbis say, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he advances three claims; the words of the Sages if he advances one claim. Rebbi Ze`ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, did you hear explicitly from Rebbi Joḥanan, or from his word? Rebbi Yasa said, for he is of the rabbis’ opinion. Rebbi Mana said, even if he is of Rebbi Illa’s opinion, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he advances one claim; the words of the Sages if he advances three claims. “Not only matters for which he has to pay the capital, from where double payment, quadruple and quintuple payment, the rapist, and the seducer, and the calumniator? The verse says, everything about which one would swear falsely.” Is the calumniator’s not a fine? Rebbi Jeremiah says, this is Rebbi Simeon’s who said, all depends on the collection.
HALAKHAH: “ “You stole my ox,” etc. to the end of the Chapter. Rebbi Isaac asked, should one have to pay the value of the slave by his admission? But what is his problem? Are the entire thirty a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, all the thirty are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “ ‘Your ox killed my slave’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is not liable.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he killed a slave covered with boils. He said to him, but it says afterwards, “ ‘Your ox killed my son’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is liable.” You could explain it if he was covered with boils, then he would not be liable! You cannot do this, as we have stated: “If he killed a human, he has to pay his worth.” Rebbi Ezra said before Rebbi Mana Explain it following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured. He said to him, if following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured, all is a fine
Does one tell him, be in the clear with Heaven? Let us hear from the following: “It happened that Rabban Gamliel knocked out a tooth of his slave Tabi. He came to Rebbi Joshua and said to him, I found a reason to manumit my slave Tabi. He told him, you have nothing in your hand; fines only are imposed through witnesses and in court.” This implies that one does not tell him, be in the clear with Heaven. Rebbi Gamliel ben Rebbi Illai asked before Rebbi Mana, does Rabban Gamliel hold with him who says, one is permitted to manumit? He told him, in itself it says that it is forbidden to manumit, for otherwise he should have manumitted him immediately.
MISHNAH: A judicial oath is about a claim of two silver coins and the acknowledgment of one peruṭah. If the acknowledgment is not of the kind of the claim he is not liable. How is this? “You are holding two silver coins for me;” “I am holding only one peruṭah.” He is not liable. “You are holding two silver coins and a peruṭah for me;” “I am holding only one peruṭah.” He is liable. “You are holding a mina for me,” “I am not holding anything for you,” he is not liable. “You are holding a mina for me,” “I am holding only 50 denar for you,” he is liable. “You are holding a mina for my father,” “I am holding only 50 denar for you,” he is not liable since he is like one returning a lost object.
MISHNAH: A judicial oath is about a claim of two silver coins and the acknowledgment of one peruṭah. If the acknowledgment is not of the kind of the claim he is not liable. How is this? “You are holding two silver coins for me;” “I am holding only one peruṭah.” He is not liable. “You are holding two silver coins and a peruṭah for me;” “I am holding only one peruṭah.” He is liable. “You are holding a mina for me,” “I am not holding anything for you,” he is not liable. “You are holding a mina for me,” “I am holding only 50 denar for you,” he is liable. “You are holding a mina for my father,” “I am holding only 50 denar for you,” he is not liable since he is like one returning a lost object.
MISHNAH: A judicial oath is about a claim of two silver coins and the acknowledgment of one peruṭah. If the acknowledgment is not of the kind of the claim he is not liable. How is this? “You are holding two silver coins for me;” “I am holding only one peruṭah.” He is not liable. “You are holding two silver coins and a peruṭah for me;” “I am holding only one peruṭah.” He is liable. “You are holding a mina for me,” “I am not holding anything for you,” he is not liable. “You are holding a mina for me,” “I am holding only 50 denar for you,” he is liable. “You are holding a mina for my father,” “I am holding only 50 denar for you,” he is not liable since he is like one returning a lost object.
MISHNAH: A judicial oath is about a claim of two silver coins and the acknowledgment of one peruṭah. If the acknowledgment is not of the kind of the claim he is not liable. How is this? “You are holding two silver coins for me;” “I am holding only one peruṭah.” He is not liable. “You are holding two silver coins and a peruṭah for me;” “I am holding only one peruṭah.” He is liable. “You are holding a mina for me,” “I am not holding anything for you,” he is not liable. “You are holding a mina for me,” “I am holding only 50 denar for you,” he is liable. “You are holding a mina for my father,” “I am holding only 50 denar for you,” he is not liable since he is like one returning a lost object.