19814 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:8

MISHNAH: “You are permitted to any man except to my father and your father, to my brother and your brother, to a slave, a Gentile,” or anybody she is unable to contract a preliminary marriage with, it is valid. “You are permitted to any man except as a widow to the High Priest, a divorcee or one having received ḥalȋṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite girl to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a a bastard or a Gibeonite,” or anybody she could contract a preliminary marriage with even if it is sinful, it is invalid. The essence of the bill of divorce: You are herewith permitted to any man. Rebbi Jehudah says: This shall be for you from me a divorce scroll and a letter of abandonment, to enable you to marry any man you desire. The essence of the bill of manumission: You are a free person, you are on your own.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:8

MISHNAH: “You are permitted to any man except to my father and your father, to my brother and your brother, to a slave, a Gentile,” or anybody she is unable to contract a preliminary marriage with, it is valid. “You are permitted to any man except as a widow to the High Priest, a divorcee or one having received ḥalȋṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite girl to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a a bastard or a Gibeonite,” or anybody she could contract a preliminary marriage with even if it is sinful, it is invalid. The essence of the bill of divorce: You are herewith permitted to any man. Rebbi Jehudah says: This shall be for you from me a divorce scroll and a letter of abandonment, to enable you to marry any man you desire. The essence of the bill of manumission: You are a free person, you are on your own.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:12

HALAKHAH: “You are permitted to any man,” etc. There really is no questionable divorce here. What are questionable qiddušin? As we have stated there: If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, those are questionable qiddušin. And here, if he threw the divorce document to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that is a questionable divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:12

HALAKHAH: “You are permitted to any man,” etc. There really is no questionable divorce here. What are questionable qiddušin? As we have stated there: If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, those are questionable qiddušin. And here, if he threw the divorce document to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that is a questionable divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:13

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ḥalaphta from Haifa: Any who were married on the basis of such a document should not leave in order not to give a bad reputation to her children. His daughter who was married outside on the basis of such a document should not leave in order to damage her co-wife to her father. Her co-wife who was married outside on the basis of such a document has to leave. His daughter who married his brother [on the basis of such a document has to leave. Her co-wife who was married to his brother] on the basis of such a document, or even to her father, should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:16

Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥa in the name of Rav: This is Rebbi Meїr’s. Why did you have to say this? Rebbi Mana said, since Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: “This entire Chapter is Rebbi Meїr’s except for ‘if he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city.’ ” You should not come to say that the first is Rebbi Meїr’s, the second the rabbis’. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s. Rebbi Yose said, since Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar, that you should not be led to say the same here. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:16

Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥa in the name of Rav: This is Rebbi Meїr’s. Why did you have to say this? Rebbi Mana said, since Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: “This entire Chapter is Rebbi Meїr’s except for ‘if he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city.’ ” You should not come to say that the first is Rebbi Meїr’s, the second the rabbis’. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s. Rebbi Yose said, since Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar, that you should not be led to say the same here. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:16

Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥa in the name of Rav: This is Rebbi Meїr’s. Why did you have to say this? Rebbi Mana said, since Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: “This entire Chapter is Rebbi Meїr’s except for ‘if he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city.’ ” You should not come to say that the first is Rebbi Meїr’s, the second the rabbis’. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s. Rebbi Yose said, since Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar, that you should not be led to say the same here. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:22

HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:22

HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:25

A document which has an erasure or insertion in its main part is invalid; in the routine matter it is valid; but if it was mentioned later it is valid even in the main part. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, one has to mention it at least in the second line before the end of the text. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav: One has to mention the essence of the document with it. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: If one did not mention the essence of the document with it. The argument of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There, Rebbi Ba said in the name of Rav Jeremiah: Disqualified witnesses do not constitute remote testimony since they came only to support the document’s validity. And here, he says so? There, in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah, here in the name of Rav.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:26

If somebody contests the signature of the witnesses or the signature of the judges. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: If he wants to certify it from the handwriting of the witnesses it is certified, from the handwriting of the judges it is certified; I am saying that even from one witness and one judge it is certified. If he gave permission to the scribe to write and to the witnesses to sign, Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jeremiah: The witnesses have to write: “This loan is from the first of Nisan but we wrote at a later date.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: The confirmation of the judges is valid even if it is at some distance. Rebbi Mana said, is that correct? Could he then not certify from one handwriting? Rav said: The judges have to write: We certified this in the presence of X and Y. Why? So they can be convicted of perjury. But then also on which date, at which time, at which place? A judgment was given before Rav and this was not written. Rebbi Ḥaggai said: The judges have to know the parties. It happened that they falsified.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:27

MISHNAH: It is valid if some of the text remained and was written in the second column, with the witnesses signing below. If the witnesses signed on top of the page, or at the sides, or on the other side for a simple document, it is invalid. If [two bills of divorce] start at the same place and the witnesses are in the middle, both are invalid. If the start of one bill is next to the end of the other and the witnesses are at the end, the bill whose witnesses are read with the end is valid. A bill of divorce written in Hebrew with its witnesses signing in Greek, written in Greek with its witnesses signing in Hebrew, or one witness signing in Hebrew and one in Greek, or the scribe wrote with one witness, is valid. “X, witness” is valid. “The son of Y, witness” is valid. “X the son of Y”, but he did not write “witness”, is valid. If he wrote his or her surname, it is valid; that is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:27

MISHNAH: It is valid if some of the text remained and was written in the second column, with the witnesses signing below. If the witnesses signed on top of the page, or at the sides, or on the other side for a simple document, it is invalid. If [two bills of divorce] start at the same place and the witnesses are in the middle, both are invalid. If the start of one bill is next to the end of the other and the witnesses are at the end, the bill whose witnesses are read with the end is valid. A bill of divorce written in Hebrew with its witnesses signing in Greek, written in Greek with its witnesses signing in Hebrew, or one witness signing in Hebrew and one in Greek, or the scribe wrote with one witness, is valid. “X, witness” is valid. “The son of Y, witness” is valid. “X the son of Y”, but he did not write “witness”, is valid. If he wrote his or her surname, it is valid; that is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:27

MISHNAH: It is valid if some of the text remained and was written in the second column, with the witnesses signing below. If the witnesses signed on top of the page, or at the sides, or on the other side for a simple document, it is invalid. If [two bills of divorce] start at the same place and the witnesses are in the middle, both are invalid. If the start of one bill is next to the end of the other and the witnesses are at the end, the bill whose witnesses are read with the end is valid. A bill of divorce written in Hebrew with its witnesses signing in Greek, written in Greek with its witnesses signing in Hebrew, or one witness signing in Hebrew and one in Greek, or the scribe wrote with one witness, is valid. “X, witness” is valid. “The son of Y, witness” is valid. “X the son of Y”, but he did not write “witness”, is valid. If he wrote his or her surname, it is valid; that is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:27

MISHNAH: It is valid if some of the text remained and was written in the second column, with the witnesses signing below. If the witnesses signed on top of the page, or at the sides, or on the other side for a simple document, it is invalid. If [two bills of divorce] start at the same place and the witnesses are in the middle, both are invalid. If the start of one bill is next to the end of the other and the witnesses are at the end, the bill whose witnesses are read with the end is valid. A bill of divorce written in Hebrew with its witnesses signing in Greek, written in Greek with its witnesses signing in Hebrew, or one witness signing in Hebrew and one in Greek, or the scribe wrote with one witness, is valid. “X, witness” is valid. “The son of Y, witness” is valid. “X the son of Y”, but he did not write “witness”, is valid. If he wrote his or her surname, it is valid; that is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:27

MISHNAH: It is valid if some of the text remained and was written in the second column, with the witnesses signing below. If the witnesses signed on top of the page, or at the sides, or on the other side for a simple document, it is invalid. If [two bills of divorce] start at the same place and the witnesses are in the middle, both are invalid. If the start of one bill is next to the end of the other and the witnesses are at the end, the bill whose witnesses are read with the end is valid. A bill of divorce written in Hebrew with its witnesses signing in Greek, written in Greek with its witnesses signing in Hebrew, or one witness signing in Hebrew and one in Greek, or the scribe wrote with one witness, is valid. “X, witness” is valid. “The son of Y, witness” is valid. “X the son of Y”, but he did not write “witness”, is valid. If he wrote his or her surname, it is valid; that is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:30

Rav said: Judges may sign even if they cannot read, but no witnesses may sign unless they know how to read. He said, such should come over me if I ever acted thus. Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Did no Greek document come before Rav that he could confirm it by its signatures? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “A bill of divorce written in Hebrew with its witnesses signing in Greek, written in Greek with its witnesses signing in Hebrew, or one witness signing in Hebrew and one in Greek, is valid.” He explains that they knew how to read but not how to sign; or if they knew both [languages], they could sign in either one of their choice.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:30

Rav said: Judges may sign even if they cannot read, but no witnesses may sign unless they know how to read. He said, such should come over me if I ever acted thus. Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Did no Greek document come before Rav that he could confirm it by its signatures? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “A bill of divorce written in Hebrew with its witnesses signing in Greek, written in Greek with its witnesses signing in Hebrew, or one witness signing in Hebrew and one in Greek, is valid.” He explains that they knew how to read but not how to sign; or if they knew both [languages], they could sign in either one of their choice.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:31

Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is Rebbi Jehudah’s. Rebbi Yose said, you should not infer that the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan is that he differs, but he answered him following his argument. Lengthwise. That is what he said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Since pairing is infrequent, there was no pairing. So is the Mishnah: “If the scribe wrote with one witness, is it valid. “X” is valid. “The son of Y” is valid. “X the son of Y” but he did not write “witness”, is valid. If he wrote his or her surname, it is invalid. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even if he wrote “he is it”, it is valid. Rebbi Abbahu wrote א. Rav Ḥisda wrote ס. Samuel wrote a palm branch.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:33

HALAKHAH: “That is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write. A forced bill of divorce among Jews is valid, from Gentiles it is invalid”. Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies from the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalȋṣah in the case of a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him for up to 30 days shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:34

Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Jews who forced in the manner of Gentiles make invalid, even if he says, I shall not feed nor provide. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Gentiles who forced in the manner of Jews are valid, even if he says, I shall not feed nor provide. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says this: “Gentiles may tell him, whip him, and tell him, do what the Jews tell you to do.” Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Issy: If somebody says: “I shall not feed nor provide”, one forces him to divorce. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Abbahu: Does one force? He said to him, do you still have doubts? If one forces because of a foul smell, so much more because of sustenance! Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Yasa came in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody says: “I shall not feed and I shall not provide”, one tells him: Either feed and provide, or divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:35

MISHNAH: If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced, except if there was an excuse. What would be an excuse? Mr. X divorced his wife conditionally, or he threw valuables for preliminary marriage to her and it was doubtful whether it was closer to her than to him; that is an excuse.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:36

HALAKHAH: “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married”. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If lights are burning and people talk. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected before Rebbi Yasa: But did we not state: “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced”? Can you say that lights are burning? No, people talk. So here also, people talk. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the title was checked and found to be from the mouth of women or minors, the title is abolished. Rav said, they permitted only in case of a hearsay witness.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:38

HALAKHAH: Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted. Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her.” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:1

MISHNAH: A wife may be acquired in three ways; she regains her autonomy in two ways. She is acquired by money, or by a document, or by intercourse. By money, the House of Shammai say, by a denar or a denar’s value; but the House of Hillel say, by a peruṭa or a peruṭa’s value. How much is a peruṭa? One eighth of an Italic assarius. She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce or by the husband’s death. A sister-in-law is acquired by intercourse; she regains her autonomy by ḥaliṣah or by the brother-in-law’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:1

MISHNAH: A wife may be acquired in three ways; she regains her autonomy in two ways. She is acquired by money, or by a document, or by intercourse. By money, the House of Shammai say, by a denar or a denar’s value; but the House of Hillel say, by a peruṭa or a peruṭa’s value. How much is a peruṭa? One eighth of an Italic assarius. She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce or by the husband’s death. A sister-in-law is acquired by intercourse; she regains her autonomy by ḥaliṣah or by the brother-in-law’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:1

MISHNAH: A wife may be acquired in three ways; she regains her autonomy in two ways. She is acquired by money, or by a document, or by intercourse. By money, the House of Shammai say, by a denar or a denar’s value; but the House of Hillel say, by a peruṭa or a peruṭa’s value. How much is a peruṭa? One eighth of an Italic assarius. She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce or by the husband’s death. A sister-in-law is acquired by intercourse; she regains her autonomy by ḥaliṣah or by the brother-in-law’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:1

MISHNAH: A wife may be acquired in three ways; she regains her autonomy in two ways. She is acquired by money, or by a document, or by intercourse. By money, the House of Shammai say, by a denar or a denar’s value; but the House of Hillel say, by a peruṭa or a peruṭa’s value. How much is a peruṭa? One eighth of an Italic assarius. She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce or by the husband’s death. A sister-in-law is acquired by intercourse; she regains her autonomy by ḥaliṣah or by the brother-in-law’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:1

MISHNAH: A wife may be acquired in three ways; she regains her autonomy in two ways. She is acquired by money, or by a document, or by intercourse. By money, the House of Shammai say, by a denar or a denar’s value; but the House of Hillel say, by a peruṭa or a peruṭa’s value. How much is a peruṭa? One eighth of an Italic assarius. She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce or by the husband’s death. A sister-in-law is acquired by intercourse; she regains her autonomy by ḥaliṣah or by the brother-in-law’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:1

MISHNAH: A wife may be acquired in three ways; she regains her autonomy in two ways. She is acquired by money, or by a document, or by intercourse. By money, the House of Shammai say, by a denar or a denar’s value; but the House of Hillel say, by a peruṭa or a peruṭa’s value. How much is a peruṭa? One eighth of an Italic assarius. She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce or by the husband’s death. A sister-in-law is acquired by intercourse; she regains her autonomy by ḥaliṣah or by the brother-in-law’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:2

HALAKHAH: “A wife may be acquired in three ways,” etc. So is the Mishnah: Either by money, or by document, or by intercourse. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated as follows: Not only by all three together, but even by any one of them.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:2

HALAKHAH: “A wife may be acquired in three ways,” etc. So is the Mishnah: Either by money, or by document, or by intercourse. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated as follows: Not only by all three together, but even by any one of them.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:11

“A man.” Why does the verse say, “any man”? To include that Gentiles who committed adultery or incest by Gentile rules should be judged by Gentile law, but if they committed adultery with a Jewishwoman, one judges them by Jewish law. Rebbi Eleazar said, of all of them there is only the Jewish betrothed, for if he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty, with a betrothed Gentile woman he cannot be prosecuted. If he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty. How is he found to be guilty? By their rules or by Jewish rules? If you say by Jewish rules, by two witnesses, 23 judges, after warning, and by stoning. If you say by their rules, by one witness, one judge, without warning, and by the sword.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:11

“A man.” Why does the verse say, “any man”? To include that Gentiles who committed adultery or incest by Gentile rules should be judged by Gentile law, but if they committed adultery with a Jewishwoman, one judges them by Jewish law. Rebbi Eleazar said, of all of them there is only the Jewish betrothed, for if he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty, with a betrothed Gentile woman he cannot be prosecuted. If he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty. How is he found to be guilty? By their rules or by Jewish rules? If you say by Jewish rules, by two witnesses, 23 judges, after warning, and by stoning. If you say by their rules, by one witness, one judge, without warning, and by the sword.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:14

Rebbi Yose asked: What is the legal status of “touching” a male? What is the legal status of “touching” an animal? Were not all incest prohibitions inferred from the menstruating woman? The male is included; the animal is included. So far, for Israel. For Gentiles? Rebbi Mana said, not from this: “He shall cling to his wife”? Not in any way to somebody else’s wife, not in any way to a male or an animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:15

So we have established that Gentiles have no preliminary marriage. Do they have divorce? Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi and Rebbi Ḥanin in the name of the great Rebbi Ḥuna of Sepphoris: Either they have no divorce, or either of them may divorce the other. Rebbi Joḥanan from Sepphoris, Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena, in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman: “For the divorcer is hateful, says the Eternal, Israel’s God.” In Israel I gave divorce, I did not give divorce among the nations of the world. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Phineas: In the entire paragraph it is written “the Eternal, Sabaot”; only here it is written “Israel’s God.” To teach you that the Holy One, praise to Him, did lend his name only to Jewish divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:17

By a document. This means, by a document which is not worth a peruṭah, but a document which is worth a peruṭah is money’s worth. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in this respect: “Not only a document which is worth a peruṭah since a woman can have herself preliminarily married by anything which is worth a peruṭah. But even if he wrote it on an ostrakon or on papyrus and gave it to her, she is preliminarily married.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:18

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:20

The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. It is written: “If a person give to his neighbor money or vessels to watch over.” If to teach that the court will not act on less that a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written: “To incur liability for it”? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. (Why does the verse say, “without silver”?) From there, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two obols. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? “Or vessels”; since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret “or vessels”? As we have stated: Rebbi Nathan says, “or vessels”, to include all kinds of vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is guilty. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two perutot, that the claim should be about a perutah’s worth and the confession about a perutah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two obols, also “vessels” means two oboli’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:20

The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. It is written: “If a person give to his neighbor money or vessels to watch over.” If to teach that the court will not act on less that a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written: “To incur liability for it”? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. (Why does the verse say, “without silver”?) From there, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two obols. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? “Or vessels”; since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret “or vessels”? As we have stated: Rebbi Nathan says, “or vessels”, to include all kinds of vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is guilty. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two perutot, that the claim should be about a perutah’s worth and the confession about a perutah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two obols, also “vessels” means two oboli’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:20

The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. It is written: “If a person give to his neighbor money or vessels to watch over.” If to teach that the court will not act on less that a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written: “To incur liability for it”? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. (Why does the verse say, “without silver”?) From there, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two obols. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? “Or vessels”; since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret “or vessels”? As we have stated: Rebbi Nathan says, “or vessels”, to include all kinds of vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is guilty. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two perutot, that the claim should be about a perutah’s worth and the confession about a perutah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two obols, also “vessels” means two oboli’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:20

The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. It is written: “If a person give to his neighbor money or vessels to watch over.” If to teach that the court will not act on less that a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written: “To incur liability for it”? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. (Why does the verse say, “without silver”?) From there, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two obols. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? “Or vessels”; since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret “or vessels”? As we have stated: Rebbi Nathan says, “or vessels”, to include all kinds of vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is guilty. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two perutot, that the claim should be about a perutah’s worth and the confession about a perutah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two obols, also “vessels” means two oboli’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:21

“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:21

“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:22

In this matter, it was stated: “About anybody who wanted to take upon himself the stringencies both of the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel it was said: ‘The silly one walks in darkness’. The leniencies of both of them, he is called wicked. Either following the words of the House of Shammai in their leniencies and stringencies, or following the words of the House of Hillel in their leniencies and stringencies.” That is, before there came the disembodied voice. But after the disembodied voice was heard, “practice follows the House of Hillel forever.” And any who transgress the words of the House of Hillel are deserving of death. It was stated: There came the disembodied voice and said: Both of them are the words of God, but practice follows the House of Hillel. Where was the disembodied voice heard? Rebbi Bebai in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The disembodied voice was heard at Yabneh.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:25

Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Mana. Rebbi Ḥanina says, bronze remained in its place, silver increased or decreased in value. Rebbi Mana said, silver remained in its place, bronze increased or decreased in value. In Rebbi Ḥanina’s opinion, with one as six women always can contract a preliminary marriage. In Rebbi Mana’s opinion, sometimes six, sometimes eight.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:25

Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Mana. Rebbi Ḥanina says, bronze remained in its place, silver increased or decreased in value. Rebbi Mana said, silver remained in its place, bronze increased or decreased in value. In Rebbi Ḥanina’s opinion, with one as six women always can contract a preliminary marriage. In Rebbi Mana’s opinion, sometimes six, sometimes eight.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:27

“She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce,” as it is written: “He shall write her a bill of divorce.” “Or the husband’s death,” as it is written: “Or if the latter husband dies.” So far, if the latter one dies, [what about] the death of the former? Since the latter’s death releases her, even though his death does not cause a complete release, it is only logical that the former’s death should release her since his death will cause a complete release. Rebbi Ḥuna said, the verse implies that death releases, as it is written: “If brothers live together and one of them dies childless, etc.” Therefore, if he had a child, death releases. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if you would say that death does not release, how could we find a widow for a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah for a common priest? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, explain it for a sister-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:27

“She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce,” as it is written: “He shall write her a bill of divorce.” “Or the husband’s death,” as it is written: “Or if the latter husband dies.” So far, if the latter one dies, [what about] the death of the former? Since the latter’s death releases her, even though his death does not cause a complete release, it is only logical that the former’s death should release her since his death will cause a complete release. Rebbi Ḥuna said, the verse implies that death releases, as it is written: “If brothers live together and one of them dies childless, etc.” Therefore, if he had a child, death releases. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if you would say that death does not release, how could we find a widow for a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah for a common priest? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, explain it for a sister-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:27

“She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce,” as it is written: “He shall write her a bill of divorce.” “Or the husband’s death,” as it is written: “Or if the latter husband dies.” So far, if the latter one dies, [what about] the death of the former? Since the latter’s death releases her, even though his death does not cause a complete release, it is only logical that the former’s death should release her since his death will cause a complete release. Rebbi Ḥuna said, the verse implies that death releases, as it is written: “If brothers live together and one of them dies childless, etc.” Therefore, if he had a child, death releases. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if you would say that death does not release, how could we find a widow for a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah for a common priest? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, explain it for a sister-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:29

Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:29

Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:30

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as a wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for the preliminary marriage of a woman. Just as preliminary marriage acquires completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:31

Rebbi Isaac asked: Why do we not say: “either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife?” He turned around and said: Did we state “by her own ḥalîṣah”? Not “by her own ḥalîṣah”! But here either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife. But did we not state, “by intercourse”? Can you say, either by her own intercourse or the intercourse of her cowife? The Mishnah speaks of one sister-in-law; the problem arises for two sisters-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:31

Rebbi Isaac asked: Why do we not say: “either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife?” He turned around and said: Did we state “by her own ḥalîṣah”? Not “by her own ḥalîṣah”! But here either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife. But did we not state, “by intercourse”? Can you say, either by her own intercourse or the intercourse of her cowife? The Mishnah speaks of one sister-in-law; the problem arises for two sisters-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:31

Rebbi Isaac asked: Why do we not say: “either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife?” He turned around and said: Did we state “by her own ḥalîṣah”? Not “by her own ḥalîṣah”! But here either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife. But did we not state, “by intercourse”? Can you say, either by her own intercourse or the intercourse of her cowife? The Mishnah speaks of one sister-in-law; the problem arises for two sisters-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:33

Can she regain her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years]? What is the problem? Following Rebbi Aqiba? But Rebbi Aqiba said that the verse speaks about a woman half slave and half free engaged to be married by a free man. Therefore, his problem is following Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael said that the verse speaks about a Canaanite slave girl married to a Hebrew slave, since this is marriage sanctioned by the Torah: “If his master give him a wife.” But his problem is whether she regains her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years] for him who says that the Hebrew slave does not serve the heir.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:33

Can she regain her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years]? What is the problem? Following Rebbi Aqiba? But Rebbi Aqiba said that the verse speaks about a woman half slave and half free engaged to be married by a free man. Therefore, his problem is following Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael said that the verse speaks about a Canaanite slave girl married to a Hebrew slave, since this is marriage sanctioned by the Torah: “If his master give him a wife.” But his problem is whether she regains her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years] for him who says that the Hebrew slave does not serve the heir.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:34

MISHNAH: A Hebrew slave is acquired by money or a document; he regains his autonomy by years, or the Jubilee, or reduction of the amount. The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty. The pierced slave is acquired by piercing; he regains his autonomy in the Jubilee or by the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:34

MISHNAH: A Hebrew slave is acquired by money or a document; he regains his autonomy by years, or the Jubilee, or reduction of the amount. The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty. The pierced slave is acquired by piercing; he regains his autonomy in the Jubilee or by the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:34

MISHNAH: A Hebrew slave is acquired by money or a document; he regains his autonomy by years, or the Jubilee, or reduction of the amount. The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty. The pierced slave is acquired by piercing; he regains his autonomy in the Jubilee or by the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:34

MISHNAH: A Hebrew slave is acquired by money or a document; he regains his autonomy by years, or the Jubilee, or reduction of the amount. The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty. The pierced slave is acquired by piercing; he regains his autonomy in the Jubilee or by the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:35

HALAKHAH: “A Hebrew slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you,” he bracketed the male Hebrew with the female. Since the female Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract, also the male Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract. One understands money since it is written: “She leaves gratis, without money [due].” From where by contract? The female Hebrew is inferred from the free woman, and the male Hebrew from the female. This is a combination of inferences. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who accepts combination of inferences. Following Rebbi Ismael who rejects combination of inferences? It was found that Rebbi Ismael stated: In the case of the word חֻפְשָׁה, “free” is inferred from חֻפְשָׁה. Everywhere Rebbi Ismael rejects combination of inferences and here, he accepts combination of inferences? Rebbi Ismael stated it in the name of the Sages. From where is it derived for Rebbi Ismael? “Sending away, sending away.” Since “sending away” mentioned there means by a contract, also “sending away” here means by a contract. But it does not compare. There it is to gain autonomy, here it is to be acquired by others! Rebbi Mattaniah said, “sale, sale”. Since “sale” mentioned there means by a contract, “sale” here also means by a contract. But since there it is possible by possession, then here it should be possible by possession. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, the male Hebrew is like the female Hebrew.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:35

HALAKHAH: “A Hebrew slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you,” he bracketed the male Hebrew with the female. Since the female Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract, also the male Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract. One understands money since it is written: “She leaves gratis, without money [due].” From where by contract? The female Hebrew is inferred from the free woman, and the male Hebrew from the female. This is a combination of inferences. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who accepts combination of inferences. Following Rebbi Ismael who rejects combination of inferences? It was found that Rebbi Ismael stated: In the case of the word חֻפְשָׁה, “free” is inferred from חֻפְשָׁה. Everywhere Rebbi Ismael rejects combination of inferences and here, he accepts combination of inferences? Rebbi Ismael stated it in the name of the Sages. From where is it derived for Rebbi Ismael? “Sending away, sending away.” Since “sending away” mentioned there means by a contract, also “sending away” here means by a contract. But it does not compare. There it is to gain autonomy, here it is to be acquired by others! Rebbi Mattaniah said, “sale, sale”. Since “sale” mentioned there means by a contract, “sale” here also means by a contract. But since there it is possible by possession, then here it should be possible by possession. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, the male Hebrew is like the female Hebrew.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:35

HALAKHAH: “A Hebrew slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you,” he bracketed the male Hebrew with the female. Since the female Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract, also the male Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract. One understands money since it is written: “She leaves gratis, without money [due].” From where by contract? The female Hebrew is inferred from the free woman, and the male Hebrew from the female. This is a combination of inferences. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who accepts combination of inferences. Following Rebbi Ismael who rejects combination of inferences? It was found that Rebbi Ismael stated: In the case of the word חֻפְשָׁה, “free” is inferred from חֻפְשָׁה. Everywhere Rebbi Ismael rejects combination of inferences and here, he accepts combination of inferences? Rebbi Ismael stated it in the name of the Sages. From where is it derived for Rebbi Ismael? “Sending away, sending away.” Since “sending away” mentioned there means by a contract, also “sending away” here means by a contract. But it does not compare. There it is to gain autonomy, here it is to be acquired by others! Rebbi Mattaniah said, “sale, sale”. Since “sale” mentioned there means by a contract, “sale” here also means by a contract. But since there it is possible by possession, then here it should be possible by possession. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, the male Hebrew is like the female Hebrew.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:38

The order of sale is the following: I X sold my daughter to Y. The order of preliminary marriage is the following: I X gave my daughter to Y in preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: If he switched and said, I Y acquired X’s daughter, I Y took X’s daughter in preliminary marriage? He said to him, what is the difference? But if he changed the language of sale to that of preliminary marriage or vice-versa, he did not do anything.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:40

From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:41

“He regains his autonomy by years.” Some Tannaїm state: He may be sold for less than six [years], but he cannot be sold for more than six. But some Tannaïm state: He may not be sold for less than six [years] or more than to [year] seven. Rebbi Jeremiah said, the reason of that Tanna: Sometimes he is sold two or three years before the Jubilee; then the Jubilee arrives and frees him automatically.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:41

“He regains his autonomy by years.” Some Tannaїm state: He may be sold for less than six [years], but he cannot be sold for more than six. But some Tannaïm state: He may not be sold for less than six [years] or more than to [year] seven. Rebbi Jeremiah said, the reason of that Tanna: Sometimes he is sold two or three years before the Jubilee; then the Jubilee arrives and frees him automatically.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:42

“Or the Jubilee,” as it is written, “in the Jubilee he shall leave.” “Or reduction of the amount,” as it is written: “If there still are many years.” Do we not know that if there are many there are not few, and if there are few there are not many? Rebbi Hila said, sometimes the years are worth more than the wages, sometimes the wages are worth more than the years. How do you explain the following? If he was sold for a mina each and improved so that now he is worth 200 each, from where that one computes for him only by a mina each? The verse says, “according to the years he shall compute his redemption.” We learned that one sold to a Gentile is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed. From where that one sold to an Israel is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed? “Hireling, hireling” for an equal cut. Since the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to a Gentile, so too the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to an Israel. Rebbi says, why does the verse say “he shall be redeemed, he shall be redeemed,” three times? To add all redemptions that they have to follow this order.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:42

“Or the Jubilee,” as it is written, “in the Jubilee he shall leave.” “Or reduction of the amount,” as it is written: “If there still are many years.” Do we not know that if there are many there are not few, and if there are few there are not many? Rebbi Hila said, sometimes the years are worth more than the wages, sometimes the wages are worth more than the years. How do you explain the following? If he was sold for a mina each and improved so that now he is worth 200 each, from where that one computes for him only by a mina each? The verse says, “according to the years he shall compute his redemption.” We learned that one sold to a Gentile is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed. From where that one sold to an Israel is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed? “Hireling, hireling” for an equal cut. Since the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to a Gentile, so too the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to an Israel. Rebbi says, why does the verse say “he shall be redeemed, he shall be redeemed,” three times? To add all redemptions that they have to follow this order.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:43

“If he be not redeemed by these.” Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, by these to freedom, by all others to servitude. Rebbi Aqiba says, by these to servitude, by all others to freedom. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both interpret the same verse: “Unless he be redeemed by these.” Rebbi Yose the Galilean interprets: “Unless he be redeemed by these” but by others he is made to serve before he leaves. Rebbi Aqiba interprets: “Unless he be redeemed by these”, by these he completes before he leaves. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In both cases to freedom. It was stated thus: “If his hand achieves,” his own hand. “Or he found for his redemption.” Since his own hand achieves for himself, what others achieve also is for himself.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:46

“She leaves gratis,” these are the days of adulthood; “without money,” these are the indicators [of adolescence.] Could He not have mentioned only one of them? If only one of them were mentioned, would I not have said that if she leaves with indicators [of adolescence], then certainly in the days of adulthood? But in that case I would have said that they are identical with the days of adulthood. Would this not be logical? She is emancipated from the power of the father and she is emancipated from the power of the master; since she is emancipated from the power of the father by some indicators [of adulthood], she is emancipated from the power of the master by the same indicators. Therefore, it was necessary to say, “she leaves gratis,” these are the days of adulthood, “without money,” these are the indicators [of adolescence.] Or maybe the other way around? Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: “Without money.” At a place where there is money for the father, there is no money for the master.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:50

Is Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah of the opinion that the “allotment” discussed here is preliminary marriage by biblical standards? Rebbi Abun said, it turns out that Rebbi Yose ben Rebi Jehudah agrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. As it was stated: By the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. Just as Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon equates loan and deposit, so Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah equates “allotment” and loan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:50

Is Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah of the opinion that the “allotment” discussed here is preliminary marriage by biblical standards? Rebbi Abun said, it turns out that Rebbi Yose ben Rebi Jehudah agrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. As it was stated: By the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. Just as Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon equates loan and deposit, so Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah equates “allotment” and loan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:53

“If he allots her to his son;” with [the girl’s] agreement. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no agreement here. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said so, the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, even if you say the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, is he not a minor? “If he allots her to his son;” with [the latter’s] agreement. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he allots her to his minor or adult son, with or without the latter’s agreement. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he allots her only to his adult son with the latter’s agreement.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:53

“If he allots her to his son;” with [the girl’s] agreement. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no agreement here. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said so, the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, even if you say the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, is he not a minor? “If he allots her to his son;” with [the latter’s] agreement. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he allots her to his minor or adult son, with or without the latter’s agreement. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he allots her only to his adult son with the latter’s agreement.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:54

“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:54

“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:54

“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:54

“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:55

Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:55

Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:55

Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:58

“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:58

“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:60

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:60

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:61

It is written: “His master shall bring him to the judges, or he shall bring him to the door.” How is that? The one who was sold by the court, “his master shall bring him to the judges.” The one who sold himself, “or he shall bring him to the door.” Rebbi Immi asked: It is obvious that the court writes the contract for him who was sold by the court. Who is writing the contract for him who sells himself? It is written: “It shall not be hard in your eyes to send him away free from you; for twice the hire of a hireling he served you for six years.” The hired hand works during the day; he does not work in the night. The Hebrew slave works both day and night. It is written: “He shall not treat him harshly before your eyes,” and you say so? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: His master marries him to a Canaanite slave; it turns out that he serves him day and night. Rebbi Abba bar Mamai asked before Rebbi Immi: Think of it, if he was buying a Cohen! He answered him: Would the case of an Israel not also be permission of something prohibited following Rebbi Simeon? Rebbi Abba bar Mamai here changed his mind.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:61

It is written: “His master shall bring him to the judges, or he shall bring him to the door.” How is that? The one who was sold by the court, “his master shall bring him to the judges.” The one who sold himself, “or he shall bring him to the door.” Rebbi Immi asked: It is obvious that the court writes the contract for him who was sold by the court. Who is writing the contract for him who sells himself? It is written: “It shall not be hard in your eyes to send him away free from you; for twice the hire of a hireling he served you for six years.” The hired hand works during the day; he does not work in the night. The Hebrew slave works both day and night. It is written: “He shall not treat him harshly before your eyes,” and you say so? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: His master marries him to a Canaanite slave; it turns out that he serves him day and night. Rebbi Abba bar Mamai asked before Rebbi Immi: Think of it, if he was buying a Cohen! He answered him: Would the case of an Israel not also be permission of something prohibited following Rebbi Simeon? Rebbi Abba bar Mamai here changed his mind.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:63

Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: At three places teaching circumvents Scripture and at another place the interpretation.The Torah said, “in a scroll”, but practice said on anything separated from the ground. The Torah said, “in dust”, but practice said in anything on which plants grow. The Torah said, “with an awl”, but practice said, even a buck-thorn, even a thorn, even glass. And at one place the interpretation: Rebbi Ismael stated: “It shall be on the seventh day that he shave all his hair,” inclusion. “His head, his beard, and his eyebrows,” detail. Since it continues “and all his hair he shall shave,” it repeats inclusion. Inclusion, detail, and inclusion is judged only by what is similar to the detail. Since the detail is explained as place of bunching and exposed, it should refer only [hair growing] in bunches at exposed places. But practice is that he shaves to be like a gourd. “With an awl”, since an awl is made of metal, so anything made of metal. Rebbi Yose said, this is a large drill. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, that is the engraving-knife. “He shall bring him to the door.” I could think, even if it was lying flat. The verse says, “or to the door-post”. Since the door-post is upright, so also the door has to be upright: a shame to him and to his family.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:66

“He regains his autonomy in the Jubilee,” as it is written: “He leaves in the Jubilee together with his children.” “Or at the master’s death,” as it is written: “He shall be for you a perpetual slave,” all the days of his master’s lifetime.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:67

MISHNAH: A Canaanite slave is acquired by money, or contract, or possession. He gains his autonomy by money through a third party or a document by himself, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, by money also by himself or a document through a third party, if only the money comes from a third party.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:67

MISHNAH: A Canaanite slave is acquired by money, or contract, or possession. He gains his autonomy by money through a third party or a document by himself, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, by money also by himself or a document through a third party, if only the money comes from a third party.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:67

MISHNAH: A Canaanite slave is acquired by money, or contract, or possession. He gains his autonomy by money through a third party or a document by himself, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, by money also by himself or a document through a third party, if only the money comes from a third party.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:67

MISHNAH: A Canaanite slave is acquired by money, or contract, or possession. He gains his autonomy by money through a third party or a document by himself, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, by money also by himself or a document through a third party, if only the money comes from a third party.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:68

HALAKHAH: “A Canaanite slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “They shall be inherited by your children after you, to be possessed as inheritance” This brackets slaves with landed property. Since real estate can be acquired by money, or contract, or possession, so a Canaanite slave can be acquired by money, or contract, or possession.