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7915 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
If one’s wall was near his fellow’s garden and it fell down and his fellow said to him, “Clear away your stones”, and he answered, “They have become yours”, they do not listen to him. If after the other (the owner of the garden) had accepted he (the owner of the wall) said to him, “Here is your expenditures and I will take back what is mine”, they do not listen to him. If one hired a laborer to help him in his work with chopped straw and stubble, and the laborer said to him, “Give me my wages”, and he said to him, “Take as your wages that with which you have labored”, they do not listen to him. If after the other (the employee) had accepted he (the employer) said to him, “Here are your wages and I will take what is mine”, they do not listen to him. One who removes his manure into the public domain: from the time he removes it another may take it to manure [his fields]. One may not soak clay or make bricks in the public domain, but clay may be kneaded in the public domain but not bricks. One who builds in the public domain: one brings the stones and another builds (immediately). And if he causes damage, he pays what he has damaged. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “He may, indeed, make preparation for his work for thirty days [in the public domain].
If one’s wall was near his fellow’s garden and it fell down and his fellow said to him, “Clear away your stones”, and he answered, “They have become yours”, they do not listen to him. If after the other (the owner of the garden) had accepted he (the owner of the wall) said to him, “Here is your expenditures and I will take back what is mine”, they do not listen to him. If one hired a laborer to help him in his work with chopped straw and stubble, and the laborer said to him, “Give me my wages”, and he said to him, “Take as your wages that with which you have labored”, they do not listen to him. If after the other (the employee) had accepted he (the employer) said to him, “Here are your wages and I will take what is mine”, they do not listen to him. One who removes his manure into the public domain: from the time he removes it another may take it to manure [his fields]. One may not soak clay or make bricks in the public domain, but clay may be kneaded in the public domain but not bricks. One who builds in the public domain: one brings the stones and another builds (immediately). And if he causes damage, he pays what he has damaged. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “He may, indeed, make preparation for his work for thirty days [in the public domain].
If there were two gardens [in terraces] one above the other and vegetables grew between them: Rabbi Meir says: “They belong to the upper garden.” Rabbi Judah says: “They belong to the lower garden.” Rabbi Meir said: “If [the owner of] the upper garden wished to remove his soil there would be no vegetables.” Rabbi Judah said: “If [the owner of] the lower garden wished to fill up his garden [with soil] there would be no vegetables. Rabbi Meir said: “Since each is able to thwart the other, we should consider from where these vegetables derive their life.” Rabbi Shimon said: “Whatever [the owner of ] the upper garden can take by stretching out his hand belongs to him, and the rest belongs to [the owner of] the lower garden.
If there were two gardens [in terraces] one above the other and vegetables grew between them: Rabbi Meir says: “They belong to the upper garden.” Rabbi Judah says: “They belong to the lower garden.” Rabbi Meir said: “If [the owner of] the upper garden wished to remove his soil there would be no vegetables.” Rabbi Judah said: “If [the owner of] the lower garden wished to fill up his garden [with soil] there would be no vegetables. Rabbi Meir said: “Since each is able to thwart the other, we should consider from where these vegetables derive their life.” Rabbi Shimon said: “Whatever [the owner of ] the upper garden can take by stretching out his hand belongs to him, and the rest belongs to [the owner of] the lower garden.
The same is true with a garden: in a place where the custom is to build a fence, they can obligate him to do so. However, in a valley, where it is not customary to build a fence, they cannot obligate him to do so. But if he wants to [build a fence] he must gather into his own portion and build, and he puts a finishing on the outside of the wall. Therefore if the wall falls, the place and the stones belong to him. If they acted with each other’s consent, they should build the wall in the middle and put a finishing on both sides. Therefore if the wall falls, the place and the stones belong to them both.
If the wall of a courtyard fell down they obligate each of the partners to help in building it up to a height of four cubits. He is presumed to have paid [his share] unless the other brings proof that he has not paid. [If the fence was built] four cubits or higher, they do not obligate him [to help in building it.] If [the one who did not contribute] built another wall near it, even if he did not put a roof upon it, they obligate him to share in all of the costs. He is presumed not to have paid [his share] unless he brings proof that he has.
A person’s ladder must not be kept within four cubits of [his neighbor’s] dovecote, lest a marten (a small animal that eats doves) should jump in. His wall may not be built four cubits from [his neighbor’s] roof-gutter, so that the other can set up his ladder [to clean it out]. A dovecote may not be kept within fifty cubits of a town, and none may build a dovecote in his own domain unless his ground extends fifty cubits in every direction. Rabbi Judah says: Four kor’s space of ground, which is the length of a pigeon’s flight. But if he had bought it [and it was built already in that place] and there was only a quarter-kab’s space of ground, he has a right to the dovecote.
If a young pigeon is found within fifty cubits it belongs to the owner of the dovecote; but if it is found beyond fifty cubits it belongs to who finds it. If it is found between two dovecotes: if it is nearer to this one than it belongs him [that owns this dovecote]; and if it is nearer to the other, it belongs to him [that owns the other dovecote]; and if it is at a like distance from either, they share it.
If a young pigeon is found within fifty cubits it belongs to the owner of the dovecote; but if it is found beyond fifty cubits it belongs to who finds it. If it is found between two dovecotes: if it is nearer to this one than it belongs him [that owns this dovecote]; and if it is nearer to the other, it belongs to him [that owns the other dovecote]; and if it is at a like distance from either, they share it.
A tree may not be grown within twenty five cubits of a cistern, or within fifty cubits if it is a carob or a sycamore, whether it is higher or on the same level. If the cistern was there first the tree shall be cut down and compensation given. If the tree was there first it shall not be cut down. If it is in doubt which was there first, the tree shall not be cut down. Rabbi Yose says: “Even if the cistern was there before the tree it should not be cut down, since this one dug within his own domain and the other planted within his own domain.”
A person may not plant a tree near another’s field unless it is four cubits away, no matter whether it be a vine or any other kind of tree. If there was a wall between, each may plant up to the wall on either side. If its roots entered within the other’s property, the other may cut them away to a depth of three handbreadths so that they shall not hinder the plough. If he dug a cistern, trench or cave, he may cut them away as far down as he digs, and the wood shall belong to him.
A person may not plant a tree near another’s field unless it is four cubits away, no matter whether it be a vine or any other kind of tree. If there was a wall between, each may plant up to the wall on either side. If its roots entered within the other’s property, the other may cut them away to a depth of three handbreadths so that they shall not hinder the plough. If he dug a cistern, trench or cave, he may cut them away as far down as he digs, and the wood shall belong to him.
A person may not plant a tree near another’s field unless it is four cubits away, no matter whether it be a vine or any other kind of tree. If there was a wall between, each may plant up to the wall on either side. If its roots entered within the other’s property, the other may cut them away to a depth of three handbreadths so that they shall not hinder the plough. If he dug a cistern, trench or cave, he may cut them away as far down as he digs, and the wood shall belong to him.
An act of possession without which there is no claim [on the ownership of the property] is not valid possession [to establish ownership]. How is this so? If he said to him: “What are you doing on my property? And the other answered: “No one ever said anything to me”, this is not valid possession [to establish ownership]. [If he said to him]: “You sold it to me”, “You gave it to me as a gift”, “Your father sold it to me”, “Your father gave it to me as a gift”, this is valid possession [to establish ownership]. He who holds possession [for three years] due to inheritance [from the previous owner], does not need to make a claim. Craftsmen, partners, sharecroppers and guardians cannot establish ownership through possession. A man cannot establish ownership through possession of his wife’s property, nor may a wife establish ownership through possession of her husband’s property, nor a father of his son’s property, nor a son of his father’s property. When is this so [that one needs three years to establish ownership]? When the person attempts to acquire the land through possession. But, when the property was given as a gift, or when brothers shared a piece of their inheritance, or when one claimed title by possession to the property of a convert [who died without inheritors], then if the claimant has shut in, walled up or broken down anything, this counts as securing ownership through possession.
A gutter spout cannot cause title through possession [so that the spout may still be moved] but title through possession may be claimed to its place [so that the place must be left for its present purpose]. A gutter can give title through possession. An Egyptian ladder cannot give title through possession but a Tyrian ladder can. An Egyptian window cannot give title through possession but a Tyrian window can. What is an Egyptian window? Any through which a man’s head may not enter. Rabbi Judah says: “If it has a frame, even though a man’s head cannot enter through it, it can give title through possession.” A projection, if it extends a handbreadth or more can give title through possession, and the other [into whose premises it projects] can protest against it. But if it is less than a handbreadth it cannot give title through possession and the other cannot protest against it.
A gutter spout cannot cause title through possession [so that the spout may still be moved] but title through possession may be claimed to its place [so that the place must be left for its present purpose]. A gutter can give title through possession. An Egyptian ladder cannot give title through possession but a Tyrian ladder can. An Egyptian window cannot give title through possession but a Tyrian window can. What is an Egyptian window? Any through which a man’s head may not enter. Rabbi Judah says: “If it has a frame, even though a man’s head cannot enter through it, it can give title through possession.” A projection, if it extends a handbreadth or more can give title through possession, and the other [into whose premises it projects] can protest against it. But if it is less than a handbreadth it cannot give title through possession and the other cannot protest against it.
If he had a garden behind his fellow’s garden, he may go in and out only at the time when others are accustomed to go in and out. And he may not bring in merchants, or enter through it into another field. [The owner of] the outer garden may plant seeds on the path. But, if with the other’s consent, he has been given a path at the side [of the other’s garden] he may go in and out when he wishes. And he may bring in merchants, but he may not enter through it into another field. And neither of them has the right to plant seeds on the path.
If he had a garden behind his fellow’s garden, he may go in and out only at the time when others are accustomed to go in and out. And he may not bring in merchants, or enter through it into another field. [The owner of] the outer garden may plant seeds on the path. But, if with the other’s consent, he has been given a path at the side [of the other’s garden] he may go in and out when he wishes. And he may bring in merchants, but he may not enter through it into another field. And neither of them has the right to plant seeds on the path.
If a man said to his fellow, “I will sell you half of the field”, it must be divided between them into portions of equal value, and the buyer takes half of the field [which the other allots to him]. [If he said, “I will sell you] the southern half”, the field must be divided between them into portions of equal value, and the buyer takes the southern half. He accepts responsibility for [providing the ground] for the dividing wall and the large and small ditches. How large is the large ditch? Six handbreadths. And the small ditch? Three handbreadths.
If a man said, “This is my son”, he is believed. If [he said], “This is my brother”, he is not believed, yet the other may join him in his portion. If he died the property returns to its place. If he inherited property from elsewhere the other’s brothers inherit it together with him. If a man died and a testament was found bound to his thigh, this counts as nothing. But if [he had delivered it and] through it granted title to another, whether of his heirs or of those who are not his heirs, his words are valid.
If a man said, “This is my son”, he is believed. If [he said], “This is my brother”, he is not believed, yet the other may join him in his portion. If he died the property returns to its place. If he inherited property from elsewhere the other’s brothers inherit it together with him. If a man died and a testament was found bound to his thigh, this counts as nothing. But if [he had delivered it and] through it granted title to another, whether of his heirs or of those who are not his heirs, his words are valid.
If he left elder daughters and younger daughters, the elder daughters may not care for themselves at the cost of the younger daughters, nor may the younger daughters claim maintenance at the cost of the elder daughters, rather they all share alike. If the elder daughters married [and took each her dowry from the common inheritance] so too the younger daughters may marry [and take each a dowry from the common inheritance]. If the younger daughters said, “We will marry in the way you married”, they do not listen to them, for what their father gave them, he has given. A greater stringency applies to daughters than to sons, since daughters can claim maintenance at the cost of the sons, but they cannot claim maintenance at the cost of the [other daughters].
If a man’s debt document was erased, he must have witnesses testify with regards to the loan, and come before the court to make this attestation: “So and so, the son of so and so, his debt document was erased on such and such a day, and so and so and so and so are his witnesses.” If a man had paid part of his debt, Rabbi Judah says: “He should exchange the debt document for a new one.” Rabbi Yose says: “He should write a receipt.” Rabbi Judah said: “It turns out that this one (the debtor) will have to guard his receipt from mice.” Rabbi Yose said to him: “That’s good for him, as long as the rights of the other (the creditor) have not been damaged.
If there were two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bath house or an olive press, if the father had made them for hire, the profit is split equally. But if he made them for his own use alone, the rich brother may say to the poor brother, “Buy for yourself slaves and they can wash in the bath house” or “Buy for yourself olives and prepare them in the olive press.” If there were two in the same town, and one’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon and other’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon, neither can bring forth a debt document on the other, and another person cannot bring forth a debt document against them. And if some person finds amongst his documents a document that states, “The [debt] document of Joseph ben Shimon is paid”, both of their [debt] documents are paid. What should they do? They should write their names to the third generation. And if the names are the same through the third generation, they should give themselves a sign. And if their signs are the same, they should write “Cohen”. If a man said to his son, “One of my debt documents is paid and I do not know which one”, then all are deemed to be paid. If two documents were found [amongst his documents] written to the same debtor, then the large one is paid and the small one is not paid. If a man lent money to his fellow on a guarantor’s security, he may not exact payment from the guarantor. But if he had said, “On the condition that I may exact payment from whom I wish”, then he may exact payment from the guarantor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If the borrower had property, in neither case can he exact payment from the guarantor.” Moreover, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel used to say: “If a man was a guarantor for a woman’s ketubah and her husband divorced her, the husband must vow to derive no further benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of the guarantor and take his wife back again.”
If there were two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bath house or an olive press, if the father had made them for hire, the profit is split equally. But if he made them for his own use alone, the rich brother may say to the poor brother, “Buy for yourself slaves and they can wash in the bath house” or “Buy for yourself olives and prepare them in the olive press.” If there were two in the same town, and one’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon and other’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon, neither can bring forth a debt document on the other, and another person cannot bring forth a debt document against them. And if some person finds amongst his documents a document that states, “The [debt] document of Joseph ben Shimon is paid”, both of their [debt] documents are paid. What should they do? They should write their names to the third generation. And if the names are the same through the third generation, they should give themselves a sign. And if their signs are the same, they should write “Cohen”. If a man said to his son, “One of my debt documents is paid and I do not know which one”, then all are deemed to be paid. If two documents were found [amongst his documents] written to the same debtor, then the large one is paid and the small one is not paid. If a man lent money to his fellow on a guarantor’s security, he may not exact payment from the guarantor. But if he had said, “On the condition that I may exact payment from whom I wish”, then he may exact payment from the guarantor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If the borrower had property, in neither case can he exact payment from the guarantor.” Moreover, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel used to say: “If a man was a guarantor for a woman’s ketubah and her husband divorced her, the husband must vow to derive no further benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of the guarantor and take his wife back again.”
The High Priest can judge and be judged; he can testify and others can testify against him. He can perform halitzah for another’s wife and others can perform halitzah for his wife or contract levirate marriage with his widow, but he cannot contract levirate marriage since he is forbidden to marry a widow. If any of his near kin die he may not follow after the bier, rather when the bearers are not visible, he is visible, when they are visible he is not visible, and he may go out with them as far as the city gate, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says, “He may not leave the Temple, as it says, “Nor shall he go out of the Sanctuary”. And when he comforts other mourners the custom is for all of the people to pass by, the one after the other, while the appointed [priest] stands between him and the people. And when he receives comfort from others, all the people say to him, “Let us be your atonement”, and he says to them, “May you be blessed by Heaven.” When they feed him the funeral meal all the people sit around on the ground and he sits on a stool.
The High Priest can judge and be judged; he can testify and others can testify against him. He can perform halitzah for another’s wife and others can perform halitzah for his wife or contract levirate marriage with his widow, but he cannot contract levirate marriage since he is forbidden to marry a widow. If any of his near kin die he may not follow after the bier, rather when the bearers are not visible, he is visible, when they are visible he is not visible, and he may go out with them as far as the city gate, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says, “He may not leave the Temple, as it says, “Nor shall he go out of the Sanctuary”. And when he comforts other mourners the custom is for all of the people to pass by, the one after the other, while the appointed [priest] stands between him and the people. And when he receives comfort from others, all the people say to him, “Let us be your atonement”, and he says to them, “May you be blessed by Heaven.” When they feed him the funeral meal all the people sit around on the ground and he sits on a stool.
Cases concerning property [are decided] by three [judges]. This [litigant] chooses one and this [litigant] chooses one and then the two of them choose another, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “The two judges choose the other judge.” This [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, and this [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid and experts, he cannot invalidate them. This [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses and this [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid, he cannot invalidate them.
If one litigant said to the other, “I accept my father as trustworthy”, or “I accept your father as trustworthy”, or “I accept three herdsman as trustworthy”, Rabbi Meir says, “He may retract.” But the Sages say, “He cannot retract.” If one must take an oath before his fellow, and his fellow said to him, “Vow to me by the life of your head”, Rabbi Meir says, “He may retract.” But the Sages say, “He cannot retract.”
And these are they which are not qualified [to be witnesses or judges]: A dice player, a usurer, pigeon racers, or traffickers in Seventh Year produce. Rabbi Shimon said: “In the beginning they called them ‘gatherers’ of Seventh Year produce, but after the oppressors grew many they changed this and called them ‘traffickers’ of Seventh Year produce.” Rabbi Judah said: “This applies only if they have no other trade, but if they have some other trade other than that, they are not disqualified.”
And these are they which are not qualified [to be witnesses or judges]: A dice player, a usurer, pigeon racers, or traffickers in Seventh Year produce. Rabbi Shimon said: “In the beginning they called them ‘gatherers’ of Seventh Year produce, but after the oppressors grew many they changed this and called them ‘traffickers’ of Seventh Year produce.” Rabbi Judah said: “This applies only if they have no other trade, but if they have some other trade other than that, they are not disqualified.”
And these are they which are not qualified [to be witnesses or judges]: A dice player, a usurer, pigeon racers, or traffickers in Seventh Year produce. Rabbi Shimon said: “In the beginning they called them ‘gatherers’ of Seventh Year produce, but after the oppressors grew many they changed this and called them ‘traffickers’ of Seventh Year produce.” Rabbi Judah said: “This applies only if they have no other trade, but if they have some other trade other than that, they are not disqualified.”
How do they check the witnesses? They bring them in and warn them, and then they take them out and leave behind the most important of [the witnesses]. And they would say to him: “State [for us], how do you know that this one is in debt to this one?” If he said, “He said to me, ‘I am in debt to him’, or ‘So-and-so said to me that he was in debt to him’”, he has said nothing. He must be able to say, “In our presence he acknowledged to the other one that he owed him 200 zuz.” Afterward they bring in the second witness and check him. If their words were found to agree, the judges discuss the matter. If two say, “He is not guilty” and one says, “He is guilty”, he is not guilty. If two say, “He is guilty” and one says, “He is not guilty”, he is guilty. If one says, “He is not guilty”, and one says, “He is guilty”, and even if two declared him not guilty or declared him guilty while one said, “I do not know”, they must add more judges.
The more a judge examines the evidence the more he is deserving of praise. Ben Zakkai once checked with regards to the stalks of figs. What is the difference between inquiries and examinations? With regards to inquiries, if one [of the two witnesses] says “I do not know”, their evidence becomes invalid. But if to one of the examinations one answered, “I do not know”, or even if they both answered, “We do not know”, their evidence remains valid. Yet if they contradict each other, whether during the inquiries or examinations, their evidence becomes invalid.
If one said, “On the second of the month”, and the other said, “On the third”, their evidence remains valid, since one may have known that the month was intercalated and the other may not have known that the month was intercalated. If one said, “On the third” and the other said, “On the fifth”, their evidence is invalid. If one said, “At the second hour”, and the other said, “At the third”, their evidence remains valid. If one said, “At the third hour”, and the other said, “At the fifth”, their evidence becomes invalid. Rabbi Judah says: “It remains valid. [But] if one said, ‘At the fifth hour’ and one said ‘At the seventh’, their evidence becomes invalid, since at the fifth hour the sun is in the east and at the seventh it is in the west.”
If one said, “On the second of the month”, and the other said, “On the third”, their evidence remains valid, since one may have known that the month was intercalated and the other may not have known that the month was intercalated. If one said, “On the third” and the other said, “On the fifth”, their evidence is invalid. If one said, “At the second hour”, and the other said, “At the third”, their evidence remains valid. If one said, “At the third hour”, and the other said, “At the fifth”, their evidence becomes invalid. Rabbi Judah says: “It remains valid. [But] if one said, ‘At the fifth hour’ and one said ‘At the seventh’, their evidence becomes invalid, since at the fifth hour the sun is in the east and at the seventh it is in the west.”
If one said, “On the second of the month”, and the other said, “On the third”, their evidence remains valid, since one may have known that the month was intercalated and the other may not have known that the month was intercalated. If one said, “On the third” and the other said, “On the fifth”, their evidence is invalid. If one said, “At the second hour”, and the other said, “At the third”, their evidence remains valid. If one said, “At the third hour”, and the other said, “At the fifth”, their evidence becomes invalid. Rabbi Judah says: “It remains valid. [But] if one said, ‘At the fifth hour’ and one said ‘At the seventh’, their evidence becomes invalid, since at the fifth hour the sun is in the east and at the seventh it is in the west.”
If one said, “On the second of the month”, and the other said, “On the third”, their evidence remains valid, since one may have known that the month was intercalated and the other may not have known that the month was intercalated. If one said, “On the third” and the other said, “On the fifth”, their evidence is invalid. If one said, “At the second hour”, and the other said, “At the third”, their evidence remains valid. If one said, “At the third hour”, and the other said, “At the fifth”, their evidence becomes invalid. Rabbi Judah says: “It remains valid. [But] if one said, ‘At the fifth hour’ and one said ‘At the seventh’, their evidence becomes invalid, since at the fifth hour the sun is in the east and at the seventh it is in the west.”
If one said, “On the second of the month”, and the other said, “On the third”, their evidence remains valid, since one may have known that the month was intercalated and the other may not have known that the month was intercalated. If one said, “On the third” and the other said, “On the fifth”, their evidence is invalid. If one said, “At the second hour”, and the other said, “At the third”, their evidence remains valid. If one said, “At the third hour”, and the other said, “At the fifth”, their evidence becomes invalid. Rabbi Judah says: “It remains valid. [But] if one said, ‘At the fifth hour’ and one said ‘At the seventh’, their evidence becomes invalid, since at the fifth hour the sun is in the east and at the seventh it is in the west.”
The place of stoning was twice a man’s height. One of the witnesses pushed him by the hips, [so that] he was overturned on his heart. He was then turned on his back. If that caused his death, he had fulfilled [his duty]; but if not, the second witness took a stone and threw it on his chest. If he died thereby, he had done [his duty]; but if not, he [the criminal] was stoned by all Israel, for it is says: “The hand of the witnesses shall be first upon him to put him to death, and afterwards the hand of all the people” (Deut. 17:7). All who are stoned are [afterwards] hanged, according to Rabbi Eliezer. But the sages say: “Only the blasphemer and the idolater are hanged.” A man is hanged with his face towards the spectators, but a woman with her face towards the gallows, according to Rabbi Eliezer. But the sages say: a man is hanged, but not a woman. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: “But did not Shimon ben Shetah hang women at ashkelon?” They said: “[On that occasion] he hanged eighty women, even though two must not be tried on the same day. How is he hanged? The post is sunk into the ground with a [cross-] piece branching off [at the top] and he brings his hands together one over the other and hangs him up [thereby]. R. Jose said: the post is leaned against the wall, and he hangs him up the way butchers do. He is immediately let down. If he is left [hanging] over night, a negative command is thereby transgressed, for it says, “You shall not let his corpse remain all night upon the tree, but you must bury him the same day because a hanged body is a curse against god” (Deut. 21:23). As if to say why was he hanged? because he cursed the name [of god]; and so the name of Heaven [God] is profaned.
R. Meir said: “When man suffers, what expression does the shechinah (God’s presence) use? “My head is too light (a euphemism for heavy) for me, my arm is too light (a euphemism for heavy) for me.” If god is so grieved over the blood of the wicked that is shed, how much more so over the blood of the righteous! And not only of this one [a criminal did the sages not to leave him overnight] but whosoever lets his dead lie over night transgresses a negative commandment. If he kept him over night for the sake of his honor, to procure for him a coffin or a shroud, he does not transgress. And they did not bury him [the executed person] in his ancestral tomb, but two burial places were prepared by the court, one for those who were decapitated or strangled, and the other for those who were stoned or burned.
One who incites [individuals to idolatry] -- this refers to an ordinary person who incites an individual who said, “There is an idol in such and such a place; it eats thus, it drinks thus, it does good [to those who worship it] and harm [to those who do not].” For all who are liable for the death penalty according to the Torah no witnesses are hidden to entrap them, excepting for this one. If he said [these things] to two, they themselves are witnesses against him, and he is brought to court and stoned. But if he said [these things] to one, he should reply, “I have friends who wish to do so likewise [come and propose it to them too].” But if he was cunning and declined to speak before them, witnesses are hidden behind a partition, while he [who was incited] says to him, make your proposal to me now in private. When the inciter says to him (repeats to him what he had already said), the other replies, “How can we abandon our God in heaven to go and serve wood and stones?” Should he retract, it is well. But if he answers, “It is our duty [to worship idols], and is seemly for us”, then the witnesses stationed behind the partition take him to court, and have him stoned. He who incites [individuals to idolatry is one who] is one who says, “I will worship it”, or, “I will go and worship”, or, “let us go and worship”; or, “I will sacrifice [to it]”, “I will go and sacrifice”, “let us go and sacrifice”; “I will burn incense, “I will go and burn incense”; “let us go and burn incense”; or “I will make libations to it”, “I will go and make libations to it”, “let us go and make libations”; “I will prostrate myself before it”, “I will go and prostrate myself”, “let us go and prostrate ourselves”. One who seduces [a whole town to idolatry] is one who says, “Let us go and serve idols”.
A sorcerer, if he actually performs magic, is liable [to death], but not if he merely creates illusions. Rabbi Akiva says in Rabbi Joshua’s name: “If two are gathering cucumbers [by magic] one may be punished and the other exempt: he who really gathers them is punished: while he who produces an illusion is exempt.”
If he stole from his father and ate it on his father’s property, or of strangers and ate it on the property of the strangers, or of strangers and ate on his father’s property, he does not become a “wayward and rebellious son,” until he steals from his father and eats on other’s property. Rabbi Yose bar Yehudah said: “Until he steals from his father and mother.”
Witnesses are not condemned as perjurers until they themselves are incriminated; How so? If they said: “We testify that so and so killed a person” and others said to them: “How could you testify to that, as that murdered person or that [alleged] murderer was with us on that very day, at such and such a place?” [then] the witnesses are not condemned as perjurers. But, if these [other] witnesses said: “How could you testify to that, as on that very day, you were with us at such and such a place?’ [then] the former are condemned as perjurers, and are executed by their [the other witnesses] word.
Witnesses are not condemned as perjurers until they themselves are incriminated; How so? If they said: “We testify that so and so killed a person” and others said to them: “How could you testify to that, as that murdered person or that [alleged] murderer was with us on that very day, at such and such a place?” [then] the witnesses are not condemned as perjurers. But, if these [other] witnesses said: “How could you testify to that, as on that very day, you were with us at such and such a place?’ [then] the former are condemned as perjurers, and are executed by their [the other witnesses] word.
If other witnesses came, and they charged them [with perjury]: then [again] others came, and they [again] charged them [with perjury], even a hundred, they are all to be executed. Rabbi Judah says: “This is a conspiracy and the first set alone is [to be] executed.”
“A person shall be put to death only on the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses” (Deuteronomy 17:6). If the testimony is sufficiently established by two witnesses, why does Scripture [further] specify three? This is to compare two to three: just as three are competent to incriminate two as perjurers, so are two competent to incriminate three as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Shimon says: “Just as two witnesses are not put to death until both have been incriminated as perjurers, so three are not put to death until all three have been incriminated as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Akiba says: “The third witness was only mentioned in order to be stringent upon him and make his judgement the same as the other two. And if Scripture thus penalizes one who consorts with those who commit a transgression, as [if he is actually] one of those who commits the transgression, how much more so shall he who consorts with those who perform commandments receive a reward as [if he is actually] one of those who performs the commandments!”
If two persons see him [the transgressor] from one window and two other persons see him from another window and one standing in the middle warns him, then, if some on one side and some on the other side can see one another, they constitute together one body of evidence, but if they cannot [see one another], they are two bodies of evidence. Consequently, if one of these is found to be a perjurer, both [the transgressor] and those two witnesses are put to death, while other group of witnesses is exempt. Rabbi Yose says: “He is never put to death unless two witnesses had warned him, as it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses..” (Deut. 17:6). Another interpretation: “By the mouth of two witnesses”: that the Sanhedrin shall not hear the evidence from the mouth of an interpreter.
If two persons see him [the transgressor] from one window and two other persons see him from another window and one standing in the middle warns him, then, if some on one side and some on the other side can see one another, they constitute together one body of evidence, but if they cannot [see one another], they are two bodies of evidence. Consequently, if one of these is found to be a perjurer, both [the transgressor] and those two witnesses are put to death, while other group of witnesses is exempt. Rabbi Yose says: “He is never put to death unless two witnesses had warned him, as it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses..” (Deut. 17:6). Another interpretation: “By the mouth of two witnesses”: that the Sanhedrin shall not hear the evidence from the mouth of an interpreter.
If two persons see him [the transgressor] from one window and two other persons see him from another window and one standing in the middle warns him, then, if some on one side and some on the other side can see one another, they constitute together one body of evidence, but if they cannot [see one another], they are two bodies of evidence. Consequently, if one of these is found to be a perjurer, both [the transgressor] and those two witnesses are put to death, while other group of witnesses is exempt. Rabbi Yose says: “He is never put to death unless two witnesses had warned him, as it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses..” (Deut. 17:6). Another interpretation: “By the mouth of two witnesses”: that the Sanhedrin shall not hear the evidence from the mouth of an interpreter.
To where are they banished? To the cities of refuge, to the three cities situated on the far side of the Jordan and the three cities situated in Canaan, as it says, “Three cities shall be designated beyond the Jordan, and the other three shall be designated in the land of Canaan” (Numbers 35:14). Not until three cities were selected in the land of Israel did the [first] three cities beyond the jordan receive fugitives, as it says, “Six cities of refuge in all” (Numbers 35:13), until all six could simultaneously receive fugitives.
And direct roads were made leading from one to the other, as it says, “You shall prepare the way and divide the borders of your land into three parts” (Deut. 19:3). And they delegate to him two disciples of the Sages [as escorts] in case anyone attempted to slay him on the way, and that they might speak to him. Rabbi Meir says: “He may [even] plead his cause himself, as it says, “And this is the word of the manslayer” (Deut. 19:4).
If a man makes a baldness on his head, or rounds the corner of his head, or mars the corner of his beard, or makes one cutting [in his flesh] for the dead, he is liable [to a flogging]. If he makes one cutting for five dead, or five cuttings for one, he is liable for each one. On [rounding] the head [he is liable] for two corners, one for one side and one for the other; On [marring] the beard [he is liable] for two [corners] on one side, for two on the other side, and for one lower down. Rabbi Eliezer says: “If they were all taken off at the same time he is liable only on one count.” And he is only liable if he takes off with a razor; Rabbi Eliezer says: “Even if he picks off the hairs with tweezers, or with pincers, he is liable.
If a man makes a baldness on his head, or rounds the corner of his head, or mars the corner of his beard, or makes one cutting [in his flesh] for the dead, he is liable [to a flogging]. If he makes one cutting for five dead, or five cuttings for one, he is liable for each one. On [rounding] the head [he is liable] for two corners, one for one side and one for the other; On [marring] the beard [he is liable] for two [corners] on one side, for two on the other side, and for one lower down. Rabbi Eliezer says: “If they were all taken off at the same time he is liable only on one count.” And he is only liable if he takes off with a razor; Rabbi Eliezer says: “Even if he picks off the hairs with tweezers, or with pincers, he is liable.
For intentional transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food, the goat offered inside [the Holy of Holies] on the Day of Atonement together with the Day of Atonement itself bring atonement. For other transgressions of the Torah, light and grave, intentional and unintentional, known and unknown, positive and negative, those punishable by kareth and those punishable by death imposed by the court for all these the scapegoat [sent out on the Day of Atonement] brings atonement.
If both [persons] denied [knowledge] together, they are both liable. If one after another, the first is liable, and the second exempt. If one denied, and the other admitted, the one who denied is liable. If there were two sets of witnesses, and the first denied, and then the second denied, they are both liable, because the testimony could be upheld by [either of] the two.
The oath of deposit how? If he said to him: “Give me my deposit which I have in your possession” [and the other replied:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession”; or he replied to him; “You have nothing in my possession,” [and the depositor said:] “I adjure you”, and he responded, “Amen!”, he is liable. If he adjured him five times, whether before the court or not before the court, and he denied, he is liable for each one. Rabbi Shimon said: “What is the reason? Because he can retract and admit.”
“You raped or seduced my daughter” and the other says, “I did not rape, nor seduce,” “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. Rabbi Shimon exempts him, for he does not pay a fine on his own admission. They said to him: “Even though he does not pay a fine on his own admission, he still pays for the shame and blemish [to the girl], based on his own admission.
“You stole my ox,” and he says, “I have not stolen it” “I adjure You,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. “I have stolen it, but I have not killed it or sold it”, “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is exempt. “Your ox killed my ox,” and he says, “It did not kill [your ox]”, “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” and he says, “It did not kill [your slave]”, “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is exempt. He said to him, “You injured me, or bruised me,” and the other says, “I have not injured you or bruised you,” “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. His slave said to him, “You knocked out my tooth, or blinded my eye,” and he said, “I did not knock out [your tooth], or blind [your eye],’ “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is exempt. This is the principle: whenever he pays on his own admission, he is liable; and when he does not pay on his own admission, he is exempt.
The oath of the judges [is imposed when] the claim is [at least] two silver coins, and the admission the equivalent of a perutah. And if the admission is not of the same kind as the claim, he is exempt. How is this so? “Two silver ma’ahs of mine are in your possession,” [and the other replies], “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,” he is exempt. “Two silver ma’ahs of mine and a perutah are in your possession,” [and the other replies,] “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,” he is liable. “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession”, [and the other replies], “I have nothing of yours,” he is exempt. “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession”, [and the other replies], “I have of yours only fifty denarii,” he is liable. “You have of my father’s a hundred denarii”, [and the other replies], “I have of his only fifty denarii”, he is exempt, because it is as if he restores a lost object.
The oath of the judges [is imposed when] the claim is [at least] two silver coins, and the admission the equivalent of a perutah. And if the admission is not of the same kind as the claim, he is exempt. How is this so? “Two silver ma’ahs of mine are in your possession,” [and the other replies], “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,” he is exempt. “Two silver ma’ahs of mine and a perutah are in your possession,” [and the other replies,] “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,” he is liable. “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession”, [and the other replies], “I have nothing of yours,” he is exempt. “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession”, [and the other replies], “I have of yours only fifty denarii,” he is liable. “You have of my father’s a hundred denarii”, [and the other replies], “I have of his only fifty denarii”, he is exempt, because it is as if he restores a lost object.
The oath of the judges [is imposed when] the claim is [at least] two silver coins, and the admission the equivalent of a perutah. And if the admission is not of the same kind as the claim, he is exempt. How is this so? “Two silver ma’ahs of mine are in your possession,” [and the other replies], “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,” he is exempt. “Two silver ma’ahs of mine and a perutah are in your possession,” [and the other replies,] “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,” he is liable. “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession”, [and the other replies], “I have nothing of yours,” he is exempt. “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession”, [and the other replies], “I have of yours only fifty denarii,” he is liable. “You have of my father’s a hundred denarii”, [and the other replies], “I have of his only fifty denarii”, he is exempt, because it is as if he restores a lost object.
The oath of the judges [is imposed when] the claim is [at least] two silver coins, and the admission the equivalent of a perutah. And if the admission is not of the same kind as the claim, he is exempt. How is this so? “Two silver ma’ahs of mine are in your possession,” [and the other replies], “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,” he is exempt. “Two silver ma’ahs of mine and a perutah are in your possession,” [and the other replies,] “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,” he is liable. “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession”, [and the other replies], “I have nothing of yours,” he is exempt. “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession”, [and the other replies], “I have of yours only fifty denarii,” he is liable. “You have of my father’s a hundred denarii”, [and the other replies], “I have of his only fifty denarii”, he is exempt, because it is as if he restores a lost object.
The oath of the judges [is imposed when] the claim is [at least] two silver coins, and the admission the equivalent of a perutah. And if the admission is not of the same kind as the claim, he is exempt. How is this so? “Two silver ma’ahs of mine are in your possession,” [and the other replies], “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,” he is exempt. “Two silver ma’ahs of mine and a perutah are in your possession,” [and the other replies,] “I have nothing of yours in my possession except a perutah,” he is liable. “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession”, [and the other replies], “I have nothing of yours,” he is exempt. “A hundred denarii of mine are in your possession”, [and the other replies], “I have of yours only fifty denarii,” he is liable. “You have of my father’s a hundred denarii”, [and the other replies], “I have of his only fifty denarii”, he is exempt, because it is as if he restores a lost object.
“You have of mine a litra of gold”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a litra of silver,” he is exempt. “You have of mine a golden denar”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a silver denar, or a tresis, or a pundion, or a perutah”, he is liable, for all are one kind of coinage. “You have of mine a kor of grain”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a letek of beans”, he is exempt. “You have of mine a kor of produce”, [and he replies], “I have of yours only a letek of beans,” he is liable, for beans are included in produce. If he claimed from him wheat, and the other admitted barley, he is exempt. But Rabban Gamaliel makes him liable. If he claims from his neighbor jars of oil, and he admits [his claim to the empty] jars, Admon says, since he admits to him a portion of the same kind as the claim, he must swear. But the sages say, the admission is not of the same kind as the claim. Rabban Gamaliel said, “I approve the words of Admon. If he claims from him vessels and lands, and he admits the vessels, but denies the lands; or admits the lands, but denies the vessels, he is exempt. If he admits a portion of the lands, he is exempt; a portion of the vessels, he is liable because properties for which there is no security bind properties for which there is security to take an oath for them.
Rabbi Meir says: “There are things which are [attached] to land, but are not like land.” But the sages do not agree with him. How so? [If one says,] “Ten vines laden with fruit I delivered to you” and the other says, “There were only five”; Rabbi Meir makes him take an oath; But the Sages say: “All that is attached to land is like land.” An oath is imposed only for a thing [defined] by size, weight, or number. How so? [If one says,] “A store room full [of produce] I delivered to you,” or “A purse full [of money] I delivered to you” – and the other says, “I do not know; but what you left you may take,” he is exempt. If one says, “[I gave you produce reaching] up to the moulding [above the window],” and the other says, “Only up to the window,” he is liable.
Rabbi Meir says: “There are things which are [attached] to land, but are not like land.” But the sages do not agree with him. How so? [If one says,] “Ten vines laden with fruit I delivered to you” and the other says, “There were only five”; Rabbi Meir makes him take an oath; But the Sages say: “All that is attached to land is like land.” An oath is imposed only for a thing [defined] by size, weight, or number. How so? [If one says,] “A store room full [of produce] I delivered to you,” or “A purse full [of money] I delivered to you” – and the other says, “I do not know; but what you left you may take,” he is exempt. If one says, “[I gave you produce reaching] up to the moulding [above the window],” and the other says, “Only up to the window,” he is liable.
Rabbi Meir says: “There are things which are [attached] to land, but are not like land.” But the sages do not agree with him. How so? [If one says,] “Ten vines laden with fruit I delivered to you” and the other says, “There were only five”; Rabbi Meir makes him take an oath; But the Sages say: “All that is attached to land is like land.” An oath is imposed only for a thing [defined] by size, weight, or number. How so? [If one says,] “A store room full [of produce] I delivered to you,” or “A purse full [of money] I delivered to you” – and the other says, “I do not know; but what you left you may take,” he is exempt. If one says, “[I gave you produce reaching] up to the moulding [above the window],” and the other says, “Only up to the window,” he is liable.
If a man lends [money] to his neighbor on a pledge, and the pledge was lost, and he said to him: “I lent you a sela on it, and it [the pledge] was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”, he is exempt. “I lent you a sela” on it, and it was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth three denarii,” he is liable. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says, “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”,” he is exempt. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says: “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth five denarii,” he is liable. And who takes the oath? He who had the deposit, lest, if the other take the oath, this one may bring out the deposit.
If a man lends [money] to his neighbor on a pledge, and the pledge was lost, and he said to him: “I lent you a sela on it, and it [the pledge] was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”, he is exempt. “I lent you a sela” on it, and it was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth three denarii,” he is liable. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says, “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”,” he is exempt. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says: “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth five denarii,” he is liable. And who takes the oath? He who had the deposit, lest, if the other take the oath, this one may bring out the deposit.
If a man lends [money] to his neighbor on a pledge, and the pledge was lost, and he said to him: “I lent you a sela on it, and it [the pledge] was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”, he is exempt. “I lent you a sela” on it, and it was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth three denarii,” he is liable. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says, “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”,” he is exempt. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says: “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth five denarii,” he is liable. And who takes the oath? He who had the deposit, lest, if the other take the oath, this one may bring out the deposit.
If a man lends [money] to his neighbor on a pledge, and the pledge was lost, and he said to him: “I lent you a sela on it, and it [the pledge] was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”, he is exempt. “I lent you a sela” on it, and it was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth three denarii,” he is liable. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says, “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”,” he is exempt. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says: “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth five denarii,” he is liable. And who takes the oath? He who had the deposit, lest, if the other take the oath, this one may bring out the deposit.
If a man lends [money] to his neighbor on a pledge, and the pledge was lost, and he said to him: “I lent you a sela on it, and it [the pledge] was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”, he is exempt. “I lent you a sela” on it, and it was worth a shekel,” and the other says, “No! You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth three denarii,” he is liable. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says, “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth a sela”,” he is exempt. “You lent me a sela on it, and it was worth two,” and the other says: “No! I lent you a sela on it, and it was worth five denarii,” he is liable. And who takes the oath? He who had the deposit, lest, if the other take the oath, this one may bring out the deposit.
All whom the Torah obligates to take an oath, take an oath, and do not pay. But these take an oath, and receive [payment]: the hired laborer, he who has been robbed, he who has been wounded, and he whose opponent is suspected of taking a false oath, and the shopkeeper with his account book. “The hired laborer” How so? [If] he says to him [his employer], “Give me my wages which you owe me,” and he replies, “I have given,” and the other says, “I have not received it,” he [the laborer] takes an oath and collects his wages. Rabbi Judah says: “[There is no oath] unless there is partial admission: How so? If he says to him, “Give me my wages, fifty denarii, which you owe me,” and the other says, “You have received a gold denar (25 silver denar).”
All whom the Torah obligates to take an oath, take an oath, and do not pay. But these take an oath, and receive [payment]: the hired laborer, he who has been robbed, he who has been wounded, and he whose opponent is suspected of taking a false oath, and the shopkeeper with his account book. “The hired laborer” How so? [If] he says to him [his employer], “Give me my wages which you owe me,” and he replies, “I have given,” and the other says, “I have not received it,” he [the laborer] takes an oath and collects his wages. Rabbi Judah says: “[There is no oath] unless there is partial admission: How so? If he says to him, “Give me my wages, fifty denarii, which you owe me,” and the other says, “You have received a gold denar (25 silver denar).”
“He who has been robbed” How so? If they testified of a man that he entered into another’s house to take a pledge without permission, and the other says, “You have taken my vessels, and he says, “I have not taken them,” he takes an oath, and takes back his vessels. Rabbi Judah says: “[There is no oath] unless there is partial admission: How so? He said to him, “You have taken two vessels,” and the other says, “I have taken only one.”
“He who has been robbed” How so? If they testified of a man that he entered into another’s house to take a pledge without permission, and the other says, “You have taken my vessels, and he says, “I have not taken them,” he takes an oath, and takes back his vessels. Rabbi Judah says: “[There is no oath] unless there is partial admission: How so? He said to him, “You have taken two vessels,” and the other says, “I have taken only one.”
“He who has been wounded,” How so? If they testified about a person that another went onto his property whole, and came out wounded, and he said to him, “You have wounded me,” and the other said, “I have not wounded you,” he takes an oath, and receives [damages]. R. Judah says: “[There is no oath] unless there is partial admission: How so? He said to him, you have inflicted on me two wounds,” and the other said, “I inflicted on you only one wound.”
“He who has been wounded,” How so? If they testified about a person that another went onto his property whole, and came out wounded, and he said to him, “You have wounded me,” and the other said, “I have not wounded you,” he takes an oath, and receives [damages]. R. Judah says: “[There is no oath] unless there is partial admission: How so? He said to him, you have inflicted on me two wounds,” and the other said, “I inflicted on you only one wound.”
If he said to a shopkeeper, “Give me fruit for a denar,” and he gave him, and then the shopkeeper said to him, “Give me the denar”, and he replied to him, “I gave it to you, and you placed it in the till”, the customer takes an oath. If he gave him the denar, and said to him, “Give me the fruit,” and the shopkeeper says to him, “I have given it to you, and you took it to your house,” the shopkeeper takes an oath. Rabbi Judah says: “He who has the fruit in his possession, has the advantage.” If he said to a money-changer, “Give me change for a denar,” and he gave him; and said to him, “Give me the denar,” and the other said, “I have given it to you, and you placed it in the till,” the customer takes an oath. If he gave him the denar, and said to him, “Give me the small change,” and the other said to him, “I have given it to you, and you threw it in your purse,” the money -changer takes an oath. Rabbi Judah says: “It is not usual for a money-changer to give [even] an issar until he receives the denar.”
If he said to a shopkeeper, “Give me fruit for a denar,” and he gave him, and then the shopkeeper said to him, “Give me the denar”, and he replied to him, “I gave it to you, and you placed it in the till”, the customer takes an oath. If he gave him the denar, and said to him, “Give me the fruit,” and the shopkeeper says to him, “I have given it to you, and you took it to your house,” the shopkeeper takes an oath. Rabbi Judah says: “He who has the fruit in his possession, has the advantage.” If he said to a money-changer, “Give me change for a denar,” and he gave him; and said to him, “Give me the denar,” and the other said, “I have given it to you, and you placed it in the till,” the customer takes an oath. If he gave him the denar, and said to him, “Give me the small change,” and the other said to him, “I have given it to you, and you threw it in your purse,” the money -changer takes an oath. Rabbi Judah says: “It is not usual for a money-changer to give [even] an issar until he receives the denar.”
And these take an oath though there is no [definite] claim: partners, tenants, guardians, the wife who transacts the affairs in the house, and the son of the house. [If] he said to him, “What do you claim of me?”, [and the other replied,] “I want you to swear to me”, he must take an oath. If the partners or tenants had divided, he cannot impose an oath upon them. If an oath was imposed upon him in another case, they impose upon him the whole. And the seventh year cancels the oath.
A vessel of earthenware can protect everything [in it from contracting impurity], according to Beth Hillel. But Beth Shammai says: “It protects only food and liquids and [other] vessels of earthenware.” Beth Hillel said to them: “Why?” Beth Shammai said to them: “Because it is [itself] impure with respect to an ignoramus, and no impure vessel can screen [against impurity].” Beth Hillel said to them: “And did you not pronounce pure the food and liquids inside it?” Beth Shammai said to them: “When we pronounced pure the food and liquids inside it, we pronounced them pure for him [the ignoramus] only, but when you pronounced the vessel pure you pronounced it pure for yourself and for him.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.
Rabbi Yishmael declared three things before the Sages in the vineyard at Yavneh: Concerning an egg which was beaten together, and placed on vegetables of terumah that it acts as a connection; but if it was in the form of a helmet it does not act as a connection. And concerning an ear of corn in the harvesting, the top of which reached the standing corn that if it can be reaped together with the standing corn, it belongs to the owner; and if not, it belongs to the poor. And concerning a small garden which was surrounded by a row of vines that if it has space for the grape-gatherer and his basket on one side, and space for the grape-gatherer and his basket on the other side, it may be sown with seed; but if not, it may not be sown with seed.
Rabbi Akiba declared three things; about two they agreed with him, and about one they disagreed with him. About a lime-burner’s sandal, that it is liable to contract midras impurity; And about the remains of a [broken] oven, that they must be four handbreadths high [in order to retain impurity], whereas they used to say three and [when he said four] they agreed with him. And about one they disagreed with him About a stool, from which two of its covering-boards had been removed, the one beside the other, which Rabbi Akiba pronounces able to contract impurity, but the Sages declare unable to contract impurity.
Four cases of doubt Rabbi Joshua pronounces impure, and the Sages pronounce them pure. How is this so? If the impure person stands and the pure person passes by him; or if the pure person stands and the impure person passes by him; or if impurity is in the private domain and something pure is in the public domain; Or if something pure is in the private domain and something impure is in the public domain; If it is doubtful [in all of these case] whether one touched or did not touch the other, or if it is doubtful whether one formed a tent over the other or did not form a tent over the other, or if it is doubtful whether one moved or did not move the other Rabbi Joshua pronounces such a case impure, and the Sages pronounce it pure.
Four cases of doubt Rabbi Joshua pronounces impure, and the Sages pronounce them pure. How is this so? If the impure person stands and the pure person passes by him; or if the pure person stands and the impure person passes by him; or if impurity is in the private domain and something pure is in the public domain; Or if something pure is in the private domain and something impure is in the public domain; If it is doubtful [in all of these case] whether one touched or did not touch the other, or if it is doubtful whether one formed a tent over the other or did not form a tent over the other, or if it is doubtful whether one moved or did not move the other Rabbi Joshua pronounces such a case impure, and the Sages pronounce it pure.
Four cases of doubt Rabbi Joshua pronounces impure, and the Sages pronounce them pure. How is this so? If the impure person stands and the pure person passes by him; or if the pure person stands and the impure person passes by him; or if impurity is in the private domain and something pure is in the public domain; Or if something pure is in the private domain and something impure is in the public domain; If it is doubtful [in all of these case] whether one touched or did not touch the other, or if it is doubtful whether one formed a tent over the other or did not form a tent over the other, or if it is doubtful whether one moved or did not move the other Rabbi Joshua pronounces such a case impure, and the Sages pronounce it pure.
Four cases of doubt Rabbi Joshua pronounces impure, and the Sages pronounce them pure. How is this so? If the impure person stands and the pure person passes by him; or if the pure person stands and the impure person passes by him; or if impurity is in the private domain and something pure is in the public domain; Or if something pure is in the private domain and something impure is in the public domain; If it is doubtful [in all of these case] whether one touched or did not touch the other, or if it is doubtful whether one formed a tent over the other or did not form a tent over the other, or if it is doubtful whether one moved or did not move the other Rabbi Joshua pronounces such a case impure, and the Sages pronounce it pure.
A barrel of pickled olives: Beth Shammai says: one need not perforate it, And Beth Hillel say: one must perforate it. But they agree that if it was perforated and the dregs stopped it up, it is not liable to receive impurity. One who had anointed himself with clean oil and [then] became unclean, and he went down and immersed himself, Beth Shammai says: although he still drips [oil], it is clean. And Beth Hillel says: [only while there remains] enough for anointing a small limb. And if from the beginning it was unclean oil, Beth Shammai says: [it is unclean as long as there remains] enough for anointing a small limb, And Beth Hillel says: [even if there remains as much] as a moist liquid. Rabbi Judah says in the name of Beth Hillel: [provided it remains] moist [itself] and [can also] moisten [other things].
Beth Shammai permits the rival wives [of a deceased brother to be married] to the [surviving] brothers; But Beth Hillel forbids them. If they have performed halitzah, Beth Shammai pronounce them unfit to [marry into] the priesthood, But Beth Hillel pronounced them fit. If they have married their brother-in-law, Beth Shammai pronounce them fit [to marry into the priesthood], But Beth Hillel pronounced them unfit. And although these pronounce unfit and these pronounce fit, Beth Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from [the daughters of] Beth Hillel, nor did Beth Hillel refrain from marrying women from [the daughters of] Beth Shammai. And in the case of all matters of purity and impurity in respect to which these pronounce pure and these pronounce impure, they did not refrain from preparing foods requiring a condition of purity each by means of [the vessels of] the other.
[In the case of] three brothers, of whom two were married to two sisters and one was unmarried, if one of the husbands of the sisters died and the unmarried one betrothed her (maamar), and afterwards his other brother died, Beth Shammai says: his wife remains with him, and the other [widow] is released on the grounds of [the law forbidding] the wife’s sister. But Beth Hillel says: he should put away his wife with a get and halitzah, and the wife of his brother [he should put away] with halitzah. This is the case of which they said: woe to him because of his wife, and woe to him because of his brother’s wife!
[In the case of] three brothers, of whom two were married to two sisters and one was unmarried, if one of the husbands of the sisters died and the unmarried one betrothed her (maamar), and afterwards his other brother died, Beth Shammai says: his wife remains with him, and the other [widow] is released on the grounds of [the law forbidding] the wife’s sister. But Beth Hillel says: he should put away his wife with a get and halitzah, and the wife of his brother [he should put away] with halitzah. This is the case of which they said: woe to him because of his wife, and woe to him because of his brother’s wife!
Rabbi Joshua said: I have received a tradition from Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, who heard it from his teacher, and his teacher [heard it] from his teacher, as a halakhah [given] to Moses from Sinai, that Elijah will not come to pronounce unclean or to pronounce clean, to put away or to bring near, but to put away those brought near by force and to bring near those put away by force. The family of Beth Tzriphah was on the other side of the Jordan and Ben Zion put it away by force; and yet another family was there, and Ben Zion brought it near by force. It is such as these that Elijah will come to pronounce unclean or to pronounce clean, to put away or to bring near. Rabbi Judah says: to bring near, but not to put away. Rabbi Shimon says: to conciliate disputes. And the Sages say: neither to put away nor to bring near, but to make peace in the world, for it is said, “Behold I send to you Elijah the prophet”, etc., “and he shall turn the heart of the fathers to the children and the heart of the children to their fathers” (Malachi 3:23-2.
When an idolatrous [festival] takes place within a city it is permitted [to conduct business with non-Jews] outside it. If the idolatrous [festival] takes place outside it, [business] is permitted within it. Is it permitted to go there? If the road leads solely to that place, it is forbidden; But if one can go by it to any other place, it is permitted. A city in which an idolatrous festival is taking place, some of its shops being decorated and some not decorated this was the case with Beth-Shean, and the Sages said: in the decorated stores it is forbidden [to buy] but in the undecorated ones it is permitted.
The following things are forbidden to be sold to idolaters: iztroblin, bnoth-shuah with their stems, frankincense, and a white rooster. Rabbi Judah says: it is permitted to sell a white rooster to an idolater among other roosters; but if it be by itself, one should clip its spur and then sell it to him, because a defective [animal] is not sacrificed to an idol. As for other things, if they are not specified their sale is permitted, but if specified it is forbidden. Rabbi Meir says: also a “good-palm”, hazab and niklivas are forbidden to be sold to idolaters.
The following things are forbidden to be sold to idolaters: iztroblin, bnoth-shuah with their stems, frankincense, and a white rooster. Rabbi Judah says: it is permitted to sell a white rooster to an idolater among other roosters; but if it be by itself, one should clip its spur and then sell it to him, because a defective [animal] is not sacrificed to an idol. As for other things, if they are not specified their sale is permitted, but if specified it is forbidden. Rabbi Meir says: also a “good-palm”, hazab and niklivas are forbidden to be sold to idolaters.
If one took pieces of wood from it [the asherah tree], they are forbidden to be used. If he heated an oven with them if it was new it must be broken to pieces; if it was old, it must be allowed to cool. If he baked bread [in an oven heated with wood from an asherah], it is forbidden to be used, and if [the loaf] became mixed with other loaves, they are all prohibited. Rabbi Eliezer says: let him cast the advantage [he derives] into the Dead Sea. They said to him: there is no process of redemption for an idol. If one took [a piece of wood] from it [to use as] a shuttle, it is forbidden to be used. If he wove a garment with it, it is forbidden to be used. If [the garment) became mixed with others, and these with others, they are all forbidden to be used. Rabbi Eliezer says: let him cast the advantage [he derives] into the Dead Sea. They said to him: there is no process of redemption for an idol.
If a non-Jew was transporting jars of wine together with a Jew from place to place, and it was presumed that [the wine] was under guard, it is permitted. But if [the Jew] informed him that he was going away [and he was absent a length of time] sufficient for the other to bore a hole [in a jar], stop it up and [the sealing clay] to become dry, [the wine is prohibited]. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: [a length of time] sufficient for him to open a cask, put a new stopper on and [the new stopper] to become dry.