2440 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:30

Proselyte, as it was stated: If a proselyte converted while he had wines, and said, it is clear to me that no libations were made from it, if he made it by himself it is pure for him but impure for others, by others it is impure both for him and for others. Rebbi Aqiba said, if they are pure for him they should be pure for others; if impure for others they should be impure for him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, restrictive, impure for him and for others.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:30

Proselyte, as it was stated: If a proselyte converted while he had wines, and said, it is clear to me that no libations were made from it, if he made it by himself it is pure for him but impure for others, by others it is impure both for him and for others. Rebbi Aqiba said, if they are pure for him they should be pure for others; if impure for others they should be impure for him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, restrictive, impure for him and for others.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:30

Proselyte, as it was stated: If a proselyte converted while he had wines, and said, it is clear to me that no libations were made from it, if he made it by himself it is pure for him but impure for others, by others it is impure both for him and for others. Rebbi Aqiba said, if they are pure for him they should be pure for others; if impure for others they should be impure for him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, restrictive, impure for him and for others.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:31

Vulgar, as it was stated: If a vulgar person who was inducted as a fellow has food made in purity and he said, it is clear to me that it was prepared in purity, if he made it by himself it is pure for him but impure for others, by others it is impure both for him and for others. Rebbi Aqiba said, if they are pure for him they should be pure for others; if impure for others they should be impure for him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, restrictive, impure for him and for others.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:31

Vulgar, as it was stated: If a vulgar person who was inducted as a fellow has food made in purity and he said, it is clear to me that it was prepared in purity, if he made it by himself it is pure for him but impure for others, by others it is impure both for him and for others. Rebbi Aqiba said, if they are pure for him they should be pure for others; if impure for others they should be impure for him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, restrictive, impure for him and for others.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:31

Vulgar, as it was stated: If a vulgar person who was inducted as a fellow has food made in purity and he said, it is clear to me that it was prepared in purity, if he made it by himself it is pure for him but impure for others, by others it is impure both for him and for others. Rebbi Aqiba said, if they are pure for him they should be pure for others; if impure for others they should be impure for him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, restrictive, impure for him and for others.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:31

Vulgar, as it was stated: If a vulgar person who was inducted as a fellow has food made in purity and he said, it is clear to me that it was prepared in purity, if he made it by himself it is pure for him but impure for others, by others it is impure both for him and for others. Rebbi Aqiba said, if they are pure for him they should be pure for others; if impure for others they should be impure for him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, restrictive, impure for him and for others.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:31

Vulgar, as it was stated: If a vulgar person who was inducted as a fellow has food made in purity and he said, it is clear to me that it was prepared in purity, if he made it by himself it is pure for him but impure for others, by others it is impure both for him and for others. Rebbi Aqiba said, if they are pure for him they should be pure for others; if impure for others they should be impure for him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, restrictive, impure for him and for others.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:31

Vulgar, as it was stated: If a vulgar person who was inducted as a fellow has food made in purity and he said, it is clear to me that it was prepared in purity, if he made it by himself it is pure for him but impure for others, by others it is impure both for him and for others. Rebbi Aqiba said, if they are pure for him they should be pure for others; if impure for others they should be impure for him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, restrictive, impure for him and for others.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:26

A man lost his tefillin on the holiday. He came to Rebbi Ḥananel who sent him to Rebbi Abba bar Nathan. He said to him, give him your tefillin and go, write for yourself. Rav said to him, go and write for him. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “a person may write tefillin and mezuzot for himself,” therefore not for others. He explains it: writing for supply.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:27

“And spins on his hip the blue string for his ṣiṣit.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: he spins even using a spindle. Rav said, he spins using a spindle both for himself or for others. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “and spins on his hip the blue string for his ṣiṣit;” therefore not for others. He explains it: spinning for supply.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:27

“And spins on his hip the blue string for his ṣiṣit.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: he spins even using a spindle. Rav said, he spins using a spindle both for himself or for others. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “and spins on his hip the blue string for his ṣiṣit;” therefore not for others. He explains it: spinning for supply.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:32

Rebbi Eleazar instructed Simeon bar Abba: the holiday is counted in the count of thirty. Rebbi Yose said, we find that thirty precede seven: “The decree of seven is cancelled for him who buried his dead three days before the holiday.” He only said three, therefore not two. That is what you are saying, in private; but the public does not occupy themselves with him. It was stated this way: One who buried his dead three days during the holiday counts seven after the holiday. During the first three days the public occupies themselves with him; the last four days the public do not occupy themselves with him. His work is done by others and his slaves and animals work in privacy at other places. Does one visit him? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Did they not say that there is no mourning on the Sabbath? Why did they say that one visits him? Not to honor? So here to honor. Similarly, one day before the holiday cancels the decree of two.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:36

All the time that his deceased is lying before him, he eats at his neighbor’s. If he has no neighbor, he eats in another room. If he has no other room, he makes a wall of separation and eats. If he is unable to make a wall of separation, he turns his face towards the wall and eats. He does not eat reclining; he does neither eat nor drink his fill. He eats neither meat nor drinks wine. One does not allow him to participate in a group to say Grace. If he recited Grace, one does not answer “amen” after him. If others recited Grace, he does not answer “amen”. That is on weekdays. But on the Sabbath, he does eat reclining; he eats meat and drinks wine, eats and drinks his fill. One lets him participate in a group to say Grace. If he recited Grace, one does answer “amen” after him. If others recited Grace, he answers “amen”. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said: Because you allowed all of these, oblige him for all other obligations of the Torah. If you permitted him temporary life, so much more eternal life. Rebbi Judah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. If he was handed over to the public, he may eat meat and drink wine. If he was handed over to the carriers it is as if he was handed to the public.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:36

All the time that his deceased is lying before him, he eats at his neighbor’s. If he has no neighbor, he eats in another room. If he has no other room, he makes a wall of separation and eats. If he is unable to make a wall of separation, he turns his face towards the wall and eats. He does not eat reclining; he does neither eat nor drink his fill. He eats neither meat nor drinks wine. One does not allow him to participate in a group to say Grace. If he recited Grace, one does not answer “amen” after him. If others recited Grace, he does not answer “amen”. That is on weekdays. But on the Sabbath, he does eat reclining; he eats meat and drinks wine, eats and drinks his fill. One lets him participate in a group to say Grace. If he recited Grace, one does answer “amen” after him. If others recited Grace, he answers “amen”. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said: Because you allowed all of these, oblige him for all other obligations of the Torah. If you permitted him temporary life, so much more eternal life. Rebbi Judah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. If he was handed over to the public, he may eat meat and drink wine. If he was handed over to the carriers it is as if he was handed to the public.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:17

Levi bar Sisi asked before Rebbi: Should we not state “sixteen women”? One’s mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother. He said to him, it is evident that this person has no brain in his head. And why? He said to him, because of Rebbi Jehudah, because Rebbi Jehudah forbids the one who was raped or seduced by his father. Does Rebbi Jehudah not agree that if [the halfbrother] gave her qiddushin, the preliminary marriage is legally recognized? But because we have stated: “Six incest prohibitions more severe than these; because they are married to others their co-wives are free.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thereupon: “If they may marry his brother without sin their co-wives are freed from ḥalîṣah and levirate.” And among all of them there is only his mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother. Why did we not state this? Because Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it, should we not state it? Certainly we should state it! But because we have stated: “Her sister who also is her sister-in-law either takes ḥalîṣah or accepts the levirate.” We find in all cases that her sister who also is her sister-in-law accepts the levirate except for his mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:41

MISHNAH: Six incest prohibitions are more stringent than these since they [concern women who] must be married to others, their co-wives are permitted: A man’s mother, his father’s wife, his father’s sister, his paternal sister, his paternal aunt, and his paternal brother’s wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:42

HALAKHAH: “Six incest prohibitions are more stringent than these since they [concern women who] must be married to others”, etc. In what are they more stringent? Here there is extirpation, there is extirpation. Here there is bastardy, there there is bastardy. What is more stringent? That they cannot be married to the brothers without transgression. And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: For all women who may be married to the brothers without transgression, their co-wives are free from ḥalîṣah and levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:43

Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “A co-wife is only from a brother”. Rebbi Yose said, our Mishnah says the same: “Since they must be married to others, their co-wives are permitted.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Why can there not be a co-wife from the market place? Rebbi Yose said, did Rebbi Jeremiah not hear what Rebbi Ḥiyya said, did he not hear our Mishnah, “since they must be married to others, their co-wives are permitted”? He turned around and said, certainly did he hear. But he is a person who hears something and questions it.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:43

Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “A co-wife is only from a brother”. Rebbi Yose said, our Mishnah says the same: “Since they must be married to others, their co-wives are permitted.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Why can there not be a co-wife from the market place? Rebbi Yose said, did Rebbi Jeremiah not hear what Rebbi Ḥiyya said, did he not hear our Mishnah, “since they must be married to others, their co-wives are permitted”? He turned around and said, certainly did he hear. But he is a person who hears something and questions it.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:44

“We killed him,” she should be married to others but not to him. “They said before Rebbi Jehudah, it happened that a robber was caught in Kappadokian Caesarea. When he went out to be executed, he said to them, go and tell the wife of Simeon ben Cahana that I killed him when he was coming into Lydda. The case came before the Sages and they confirmed his words. Rebbi Jehudah said to them: Is that a proof? He only said, we killed him.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:45

MISHNAH: A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow cannot marry her. If she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court. And all who had wives who [subsequently] died may marry them. And to all who were married to others and were divorced or widowed, they can be married. All are permitted to their sons or brothers.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:47

“ “And all who had wives who [subsequently] died may marry them.” It only says “who died”; therefore, not if they were divorced. “And to all who were married to others and were divorced or widowed, they can be married”, since usually nobody sins for an uncertain future. “All are permitted to their sons or brothers,” since usually nobody sins for the benefit of either his son ot his brother.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:40

Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: There Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu, said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Every place where Rebbi taught a disagreement and afterwards taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous Mishnah. And here, you say so? He said to him, if not Rebbi, maybe somebody else said it? Since when Rebbi taught a disagreement and afterwards taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous [text]. It must be that Rebbi did not find a disagreement in the Mishnah; but if others taught it in disagreement and Rebbi taught it anonymously, certainly practice follows the anonymous [text]. There come Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jacob bar Abba and Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Even if others taught a disagreement but Rebbi taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous [text]. Why does he agree here with a dissenting opinion? Rebbi Samuel ben Inaya in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. That means, if no diagreement is stated together with the anonymous [text], but if a disagreement is stated together with the anonymous [text], practice does not follow the anonymous [opinion]. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. That is, if individual disagrees with individual. But if an individual disagrees next to the [anonymous] Sages, practice does not follow the anonymous [text].

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:40

Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: There Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu, said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Every place where Rebbi taught a disagreement and afterwards taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous Mishnah. And here, you say so? He said to him, if not Rebbi, maybe somebody else said it? Since when Rebbi taught a disagreement and afterwards taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous [text]. It must be that Rebbi did not find a disagreement in the Mishnah; but if others taught it in disagreement and Rebbi taught it anonymously, certainly practice follows the anonymous [text]. There come Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jacob bar Abba and Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Even if others taught a disagreement but Rebbi taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous [text]. Why does he agree here with a dissenting opinion? Rebbi Samuel ben Inaya in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. That means, if no diagreement is stated together with the anonymous [text], but if a disagreement is stated together with the anonymous [text], practice does not follow the anonymous [opinion]. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. That is, if individual disagrees with individual. But if an individual disagrees next to the [anonymous] Sages, practice does not follow the anonymous [text].

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:6

It was stated: If she brought them when they were small, she takes them when they are lads. If she brought him two vessels. If one of them was worth the value of her marriage contract, she takes it for her marriage contract. If one and a half was the value of her marriage contract, [disagreement of] Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman bar Jacob. One of them said, he pays for the second vessel and takes it; the other one says, she pays for the second vessel and takes it. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said before Rebbi Immi, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Even if one was worth one and a half times the value of her marriage contract, she pays for the second vessel and takes it, because it is unthinkable that others should use her vessels. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: A baraita says so: If she brought them for their monetary value, she takes them for their monetary value.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:2

HALAKHAH: “There exist women permitted to their husbands,” etc. Rebbi Niḥa bar Sava asked before Rebbi Jonah: Why “married”? Even “betrothed”! Why a widow? even a virgin! Are these all? She and her co-wife. I also have others: The co-wife of one suspected of adultery is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If his brother had slept with the sister of one who had performed ḥalîṣah with him, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:6

Are these all? There are others: If somebody takes back a woman he divorced after she had been married [to another man], she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. If he slept with the sister of a woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. If a man with injured testicles married a qualified woman, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:8

HALAKHAH: Are these all? There are others: A woman suspected of adultery is forbidden to both of them. The widow after ḥalîṣah is forbidden to both of them. If a man with injured testicles married a qualified woman and has a brother with injured testicles, she is forbidden to both of them. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:2

HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:2

HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:10

Rebbi Bisna in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: A promiscuous priestly woman may eat tithe. Is that not the Mishnah: “the daughter of a Cohen from heave,” this implies that she eats tithe. It may follow him who says that tithe is not given to Cohanim. Rebbi Nasa said, the words of the rabbis disagree, since Rebbi Hila, Simeon ben Yosina, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia said: If a Cohen came upon a divorcee, had a son from her, and died. [If the father died] within thirty days [of the son’s birth], the son must redeem himself. After thirty days, the presumption is that his father redeemed him. If he redeems for others, certainly for his son.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:14

HALAKHAH: “If she married by a decision of the court,” etc. Rebbi Abba: Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. What does Rebbi Yose say about the other matters? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose said, anything which disables for others disables for himself; anything which does not disable for others does not disable for himself.” And Rebbi Abba said, Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. This means that Rebbi Yose does not disagree about the other matters.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:14

HALAKHAH: “If she married by a decision of the court,” etc. Rebbi Abba: Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. What does Rebbi Yose say about the other matters? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose said, anything which disables for others disables for himself; anything which does not disable for others does not disable for himself.” And Rebbi Abba said, Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. This means that Rebbi Yose does not disagree about the other matters.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:20

A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:35

Rebbi Abba: Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. What does Rebbi Yose say about the other matters? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose said, anything which disables for others disables for himself; anything which does not disable for others does not disable for himself.” And Rebbi Abba said, Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:35

Rebbi Abba: Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. What does Rebbi Yose say about the other matters? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose said, anything which disables for others disables for himself; anything which does not disable for others does not disable for himself.” And Rebbi Abba said, Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:36

“Rebbi Yose says, anything which disables,” etc. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If his wife’s sister was married, since he disables her for others, he disables her for himself. But his wife’s unmarried sister which he does not disable for others, he does not disable for himself. As Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she needs a bill of divorce from him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:36

“Rebbi Yose says, anything which disables,” etc. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If his wife’s sister was married, since he disables her for others, he disables her for himself. But his wife’s unmarried sister which he does not disable for others, he does not disable for himself. As Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she needs a bill of divorce from him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:41

“If he allots her to his son;” he allots her to his son but he may not allot her to his grandson. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: In matters of inheritance you take the grandson like the son but here you do not take the grandson like the son? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if anybody explains this matter, I shall pour him spiced wine. Rebbi Tanḥum answered: In matters of inheritance where the brother can take the place of the son and all others can take the place of the son, the grandson takes the place of the son. The rabbis of Caesarea answered: In matters of impurity you consider the brother like the son and all [near] relatives like the son but not the grandson like the son. He said, there went the spiced wine.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:22

MISHNAH: If the children of five women were mixed up, and the mixed-up became adults, married wives, and died, then four perform ḥalîṣah and one marries in levirate. This one and three others perform ḥalîṣah for another one and another one marries in levirate. It turns out that there are four ḥaliṣot and one levirate marriage for every one.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 14:2

HALAKHAH: “A deaf-mute who married a hearing woman”, etc. How does he do it? He communicates in sign language and gives her the bill of divorce. In the same way he communicates with others, others communicate with him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 14:2

HALAKHAH: “A deaf-mute who married a hearing woman”, etc. How does he do it? He communicates in sign language and gives her the bill of divorce. In the same way he communicates with others, others communicate with him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:26

Rav said, if testimony was contradicted in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradicted in itself, the testimony is void in the opinion of everybody. If testimony was contradicted in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. These say, he counted into his bosom, the others say he counted into his money-belt; everybody agrees that is contradicting testimony after the main testimony, and the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? (Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.) A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:26

Rav said, if testimony was contradicted in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradicted in itself, the testimony is void in the opinion of everybody. If testimony was contradicted in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. These say, he counted into his bosom, the others say he counted into his money-belt; everybody agrees that is contradicting testimony after the main testimony, and the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? (Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.) A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:26

Rav said, if testimony was contradicted in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradicted in itself, the testimony is void in the opinion of everybody. If testimony was contradicted in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. These say, he counted into his bosom, the others say he counted into his money-belt; everybody agrees that is contradicting testimony after the main testimony, and the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? (Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.) A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 16:26

There, we have stated: “The seducer is a common person, the seduced is a common person.” Therefore, not a Sage? (Since he is seduced, he is not a Sage.) Since he seduces, he is not a Sage. Since he is seduced, he is not a Sage. What does one do to be sly about him? One hides two witnesses, people, in an inner room and puts him into the outer room, lights a candle near him so they can see him and hear his voice. That is what they did to Ben Satra in Lod, where they hid two Sages, brought him to court, and stoned him. And here, you say so? It is different because he said, “I am”. Here also, “I am”? That he should not flee, go away, and continue to seduce others with him.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:5

What is Rebbi Eliezer’s reason? “For he found in her a word of nakedness.. “Nakedness”, that is the rendez-vous. “Word”, that is the declaration of jealousy. “Word, word”; just as “word” mentioned there requires two witnesses, so “word” mentioned here requires two witnesses. “But he can take her to drink by the testimony of one witness or his own testimony,” “she was untrue to him in untruthfulness”, about the conditions spelled out to her through the mouth of others.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:10

If she was seen going to a secluded place by one witness in the morning and by one witness in the evening, it is to be treated like the following: “If she was together alone with him by the testimony of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him; if there was a single witness she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. With one witness in the morning and one witness in the evening, such a case happened and Rebbi Eleazar ben Thaddeus asked the Sages, who told him that this is not being together alone.” If he declared his jealousy before one witness in the morning and before one witness in the evening; since he is a man and she is a woman, his declaration is nothing. Or is it to be treated like the following: “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar [Rav] Isaac in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on her back and the other says, I saw one hair on her back, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia the son of Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. Two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement; Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:10

If she was seen going to a secluded place by one witness in the morning and by one witness in the evening, it is to be treated like the following: “If she was together alone with him by the testimony of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him; if there was a single witness she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. With one witness in the morning and one witness in the evening, such a case happened and Rebbi Eleazar ben Thaddeus asked the Sages, who told him that this is not being together alone.” If he declared his jealousy before one witness in the morning and before one witness in the evening; since he is a man and she is a woman, his declaration is nothing. Or is it to be treated like the following: “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar [Rav] Isaac in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on her back and the other says, I saw one hair on her back, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia the son of Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. Two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement; Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:4

May her husband dedicate for her without her knowledge? Since he is a partner in the flour offering, may he dedicate for her without her knowledge? May another person dedicate for her without her knowledge? It comes following what Rebbi Joḥanan said, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, for the four who need cleansing others may dedicate without their knowledge; these are the following: Man or woman [healed from] genital discharges, one [healed from] scale disease, and the woman after childbirth; since a father may dedicate for his small son who is lying in a crib. One understands man or woman [healed from] genital discharges or [healed from] scale disease, but a woman after childbirth? May a minor give birth? Did not Rebbi Redifa, Rebbi Jonah, say in the name of Rebbi Hila: If a woman became pregnant and gave birth before she grew two hairs, she and her son will die. After she grew two hairs, she and her son will live. If she became pregnant before she grew two hairs and gave birth after she grew two hairs, she will live but her son will die. How is the situation? Since a man may dedicate for his underage daughter. Since she grew [pubic hair] she already left his power. But it must be since a man may dedicate for his deaf-mute wife. Here, in the case of the suspected wife, the case of the minor does not apply since Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An underage girl who whored has no will to be forbidden to her husband. The case of the deaf-mute does not apply since it is written: “The woman shall say: Amen, amen.” Rebbi Abin said, since it is written: “You shall enjoy together with your house,” and he is the cause that he cannot enjoy with her, he may dedicate without her knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:5

Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ila: He may not dedicate for her the bird elevation offering, only the bird purification offering because the latter enables her to eat family sacrifices. It was stated: He may dedicate for her only something that enables her to eat family sacrifices. Rebbi Yose said, that is all. It was stated: Just as that disables her from eating family sacrifices, so she disables others from eating family sacrifices; since he is hindered from enjoying with her it is as if he disabled her from eating family sacrifices. It was stated: Even by the shearing of her head she hinders him from eating family sacrifices. Since she is ugly and he is hindered from enjoying with her it is as if he disabled her from eating family sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:31

Some Tannaїm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaїm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for curse and oath? Some Tannaїm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaїm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:31

Some Tannaїm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaїm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for curse and oath? Some Tannaїm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaїm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:31

Some Tannaїm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaїm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for curse and oath? Some Tannaїm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaїm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:31

Some Tannaїm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaїm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for curse and oath? Some Tannaїm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaїm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 3:21

“A sly wicked man.” Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rav Huna: That is one who chooses leniencies for himself and teaches restrictions to others. In this matter, it was stated: “About anybody who wants to take upon himself the stringencies both of the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel it was said: ‘The silly one walks in darkness’. The leniencies of both of them, he is called wicked. Only either following the words of the House of Shammai in their leniencies and stringencies, or following the words of the House of Hillel in their leniencies and stringencies.” That is, before there came the disembodied voice. But after the disembodied voice was heard, “practice follows the House of Hillel forever.” And any who transgresses the words of the House of Hillel is deserving of death. It was stated: There came the disembodied voice and said: “Both of them are the words of the Living God, but practice follows the House of Hillel forever.” Where was the disembodied voice heard? Rav Bebai in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The disembodied voice was heard at Yabneh.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 7:28

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah bar Ilai says: Abba Ḥalaphta, Rebbi Eleazar ben Mattia, and Ḥanina bar Ḥakhinai stood on those stones and estimated that each one on them was a load of 40 seah. From here you can estimate how big was the bunch of grapes. It is written: “Each one should lift a stone on his shoulder.” One cannot compare one who lifts from the ground to his shoulder to one who lifts first from the ground to his knee and then from his knee to his shoulder. One cannot compare one who lifts first from the ground to his knee and then from his knee to his shoulder to one onto whom others hang [the load]. One cannot compare one onto whom others hang [the load] to [a load] carried by two. It is written: “One man per tribe.” In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba who says these are expressions of additions, there were 24, sixteen for the grape bunch and eight for figs, pomegranates, and their belongings. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, who says there are double expressions, there were twelve, eight for the grape bunch and four for figs, pomegranates, and their belongings. In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael a beam; in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba a beam and beams of beams.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 7:28

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah bar Ilai says: Abba Ḥalaphta, Rebbi Eleazar ben Mattia, and Ḥanina bar Ḥakhinai stood on those stones and estimated that each one on them was a load of 40 seah. From here you can estimate how big was the bunch of grapes. It is written: “Each one should lift a stone on his shoulder.” One cannot compare one who lifts from the ground to his shoulder to one who lifts first from the ground to his knee and then from his knee to his shoulder. One cannot compare one who lifts first from the ground to his knee and then from his knee to his shoulder to one onto whom others hang [the load]. One cannot compare one onto whom others hang [the load] to [a load] carried by two. It is written: “One man per tribe.” In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba who says these are expressions of additions, there were 24, sixteen for the grape bunch and eight for figs, pomegranates, and their belongings. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, who says there are double expressions, there were twelve, eight for the grape bunch and four for figs, pomegranates, and their belongings. In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael a beam; in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba a beam and beams of beams.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 8:33

HALAKHAH: “If he built a house and inaugurated it,” but did not use it for twelve months. “If he planted a vineyard and redeemed it,” but did not use it for twelve months. And all are derived from the wife: Since the wife needs twelve months, also all of them need twelve months. It was stated: All those mentioned remain unoccupied in town, [do not pay city taxes], and do not provide food and water nor improve the roads, as it is said: “nor should anything be imposed on him,” but it may be imposed on others.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:48

HALAKHAH: There did not arise another grape bunch until Rebbi Aqiba rose. Were the other couples not also grape bunches? But these served in a position of leadership; the others did not serve in a position of leadership.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:3

Because no blessing is written for creatures? Could she have been married on the Sabbath if a blessing were written for creatures? But was it not stated: “A man should not first have sexual relations on the Sabbath, for he makes a wound.” It must follow “others”, for “others permit it.” But “others” permit only when he is already married, for before he was married he had no right to what she finds, what she earns, and to dissolve her vows. After he married her, he has the right to receive what she finds or earns, and to dissolve her vows. If you say so, he is like someone who acquires on the Sabbath. Rebbi Mana said, this means that those who marry a widow must take her in when it is still daytime on Friday, that he should not be like someone who acquires on the Sabbath.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:3

Because no blessing is written for creatures? Could she have been married on the Sabbath if a blessing were written for creatures? But was it not stated: “A man should not first have sexual relations on the Sabbath, for he makes a wound.” It must follow “others”, for “others permit it.” But “others” permit only when he is already married, for before he was married he had no right to what she finds, what she earns, and to dissolve her vows. After he married her, he has the right to receive what she finds or earns, and to dissolve her vows. If you say so, he is like someone who acquires on the Sabbath. Rebbi Mana said, this means that those who marry a widow must take her in when it is still daytime on Friday, that he should not be like someone who acquires on the Sabbath.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:3

Because no blessing is written for creatures? Could she have been married on the Sabbath if a blessing were written for creatures? But was it not stated: “A man should not first have sexual relations on the Sabbath, for he makes a wound.” It must follow “others”, for “others permit it.” But “others” permit only when he is already married, for before he was married he had no right to what she finds, what she earns, and to dissolve her vows. After he married her, he has the right to receive what she finds or earns, and to dissolve her vows. If you say so, he is like someone who acquires on the Sabbath. Rebbi Mana said, this means that those who marry a widow must take her in when it is still daytime on Friday, that he should not be like someone who acquires on the Sabbath.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:11

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:13

HALAKHAH: “If witnesses said, this is our signature,” etc. It was stated: And similarly, the witnesses who testified whether to declare impure or pure, or to remove or include, or to forbid or permit, or to obligate or absolve, if they say we did invent this before their testimony was investigated by the court, they can be believed; after their testimony was investigated by the court, they are not trustworthy.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been investigated by the court. If they say, these are our signatures, and others say, these are their signatures, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Their [testimony] does not add and does not detract. Rebbi Yose said, our Mishnah says so, “if there are witnesses to identify their signatures, or if their signatures are confirmed from another document, they are not trustworthy.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:14

They say, these are our signatures, but others say, not their signatures. Rebbi Mana said, that becomes a document which has been put under acloud. Issi said, only if it had been put under a cloud but was confirmed by the court. Rebbi Eleazar said, if it was not confirmed by a court. Rebbi Ila said, the reason of Rebbi Eleazar is, that after the witnesses were confirmed as the signatories of the document, it is as if their testimony had been investigated by the court.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:23

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who saysid it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who said it is valid? Maybe they were rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw two hairs on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid [testimony]. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of possession. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:26

Rebbi Yudan asked: “I had been married but I was divorced at place X”; if two [witnesses] come and say, no woman was divorced at place X, do they contradict her? Rebbi Yose asked, if she said, I had been married but I was divorced at place X at a certain date,” and two came and said, a woman was divorced at that place, but two [others] came and said, no woman was divorced at that place? That is a contradiction of the essence of the testimony; we live off her mouth.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:44

HALAKHAH: It was stated: Only these which they are used to. It was stated: Only if they are supported by others.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “The following adolescent girls,” etc. It is written: “She should be his wife,” one who can be his wife. Can the bastard girl be his wife? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “he should weigh silver appropriate for the bride-price of virgins”, that added many virgins. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if it had said “virgin’s brides-prices”; but it says only “appropriate for the bride-price of virgins”; the verse added them only for the bride-price. But where was this said? As Ḥizqiah stated: “If refusing her father should refuse,” not only if her father refuses; from where even if from Heaven they refuse? The verse says “refusing should refuse”, in any case. But then a man who has intercourse with a slave girl should pay the fine! This is impossible, as it was stated: I could think that one who has intercourse with a Gentile slave-girl should be obligated, the verse says, “by bride-money he should take her as a wife to himself.” Only one whom he can marry; this excludes the Gentile slave whom he cannot marry. But he cannot marry his sister and he pays the fine! There is a difference since she can be married to others. But his daughter can be married to others and he does not pay the fine! There is a difference since it is a capital crime and nobody who commits a capital crime pays money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “The following adolescent girls,” etc. It is written: “She should be his wife,” one who can be his wife. Can the bastard girl be his wife? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “he should weigh silver appropriate for the bride-price of virgins”, that added many virgins. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if it had said “virgin’s brides-prices”; but it says only “appropriate for the bride-price of virgins”; the verse added them only for the bride-price. But where was this said? As Ḥizqiah stated: “If refusing her father should refuse,” not only if her father refuses; from where even if from Heaven they refuse? The verse says “refusing should refuse”, in any case. But then a man who has intercourse with a slave girl should pay the fine! This is impossible, as it was stated: I could think that one who has intercourse with a Gentile slave-girl should be obligated, the verse says, “by bride-money he should take her as a wife to himself.” Only one whom he can marry; this excludes the Gentile slave whom he cannot marry. But he cannot marry his sister and he pays the fine! There is a difference since she can be married to others. But his daughter can be married to others and he does not pay the fine! There is a difference since it is a capital crime and nobody who commits a capital crime pays money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:35

As it was stated: “Living married to a husband,” that includes one who had received her husband in her father’s house while preliminarily married; the one who comes after him is strangled. Not only a regular intercourse but even perverse. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan; it is necessary to mention perverse intercourse for if it were regular, why mention her husband? As we have stated: If she was raped by two men, the first is stoned, the second strangled. The preliminarily married adolescent girl. If ten men came upon her perversely and then one regularly, they are all stoned. If they all come upon her regularly, the first is stoned and the remainder strangled. If ten men “touched” her and then one penetrated, they are all stoned. If they all penetrated, the first is stoned and the remainder strangled. A single girl. If ten men came upon her perversely and then one regularly, they all pay the fine. If they all come upon her regularly, the first is stoned and the remainder is free. If she chose one of them, the others were freed from the prohibition. If she said, he is impossible, she repeatedly chooses. If he was married to her sister, he already is freed. If she died, he is freed. If he died, one does not force the levir.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:4

So far payments that are consequences of sexual relations. If somebody injured her, blinded one of her eyes, cut off one of her hands, broke one of her legs? To whom does he pay, to her or to her father? Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays to her father; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he pays to her. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is of the opinion that her earnings belong to her even before she becomes an adult. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only after she comes of age. Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: They disagree before she comes of age, but after she is an adult everybody agrees that all belongs to her. A baraita supports either one of them. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody injures somebody else’s daughter or son, the payments for the son must be given immediately; those for the daughter shall be held as property value. Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Judah the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said that some state it so that beginning and end support Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If somebody injures his own underage daughter, diminution of value belong to her and he is free from paying for shame and diminution of value. If others injure her, diminution of values belong to her, the rest shall be transformed into property value, but payments for shame and diminution of value belong to her father.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:34

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Ḥananiah: They voted in Usha that if one writes all his property over to his sons, he and his wife are supported by them. What is the situation of underage children? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, but some say it in the name of Rebbi Judah ben Ḥanina: He, his wife and his underage children are supported by them. What about his widow? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this was asked but not resolved. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, it was asked and resolved, Rebbi Abba said, it seems reasonable that if she ate during her husband’s lifetime then she eats; otherwise, she does not eat. It says only “if one writes”; that excludes the seller. If he wrote to his sons and sold to others, what is here reasonable? Rebbi Ḥanina said, I would not give him anything. Rebbi Mana: Is it not reasonable that they hire him a servant and marry a wife to him so she should serve him?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:35

HALAKHAH: “For how long does one reduce? Up to the amount of her ketubah”, etc. Here you say seven, and there you say three? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said, since she is obligated for seven, he deducts seven; he, since he is obligated for three, has to add three. Think of it, if she brought him slaves, she is not obligated for anything! Think of it, if he stipulated [that he is not obligated for] either šĕ‘ēr, or dress, or ‘onāh, he is not obligated for anything! What is it? Following Rebbi Joḥanan, that the suffering of the male is greater than that of the female. That is what is written: “It was when she had nagged him day after day and pressured him.” What means “and pressured him”? Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar said, that she slipped away from under him. “He felt badly, to die”. He felt badly, ready to die, but she did not feel badly, to die. But some say that she fulfilled her needs with others. So much more she should have wanted, since Rebbi Naḥman said in the name of Rebbi Naḥman: This human limb, if you starved it you satisfied it, if you satisfied it you starved it.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:24

”If they died, others should inherit.” Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person can transfer property rights in any language except with an expression of inheritance? One does not have here “they shall inherit” but “they shall take”. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Do they not differ here in matters of a gift? If somebody signed over all his property to two persons at the same time; to one he wrote in the language of gift but to the other in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Eleazar said, since the one acquired in the language of gift, the other one acquired in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it seems that one did acquire in the language of gift but the other did not acquire in the language of inheritance Rebbi Phineas said, there came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah: Practice follows Rebbi Eleazar since Rebbi Eleazar stated a docrine but Rebbi Joḥanan said only “it seems”. Rebbi Samuel said, but did not Rebbi Meïr say that and it does not seem reasonable; is that nothing? Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Assi: Carded firstling wool becomes insignificant in a plurality. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Sepphorean brought before Rebbi Ammi a pound in eight but the latter refused to rule since had not Rebbi Assi said, is that not a Mishnah? “If somebody weaves the length of a sîṭ of firstling’s wool in a cloth, the cloth must be burned, of hair of a nazir or firstling donkey in sackcloth, the sackcloth must be burned”? The following Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote any expression of gift either at the start, or in the middle, or at the end, his instructions are valid.” There, to one person in an expression of gift and to one an expression of inheritance. But here to each one both in the language of gift and the language of inheritance Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: But does he not prejudice the rights of others? He said to him, if there are no brothers. But does he not prejudice the rights of his paternal uncles? Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel: A person prefers the good of his house over his relatives.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:24

”If they died, others should inherit.” Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person can transfer property rights in any language except with an expression of inheritance? One does not have here “they shall inherit” but “they shall take”. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Do they not differ here in matters of a gift? If somebody signed over all his property to two persons at the same time; to one he wrote in the language of gift but to the other in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Eleazar said, since the one acquired in the language of gift, the other one acquired in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it seems that one did acquire in the language of gift but the other did not acquire in the language of inheritance Rebbi Phineas said, there came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah: Practice follows Rebbi Eleazar since Rebbi Eleazar stated a docrine but Rebbi Joḥanan said only “it seems”. Rebbi Samuel said, but did not Rebbi Meïr say that and it does not seem reasonable; is that nothing? Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Assi: Carded firstling wool becomes insignificant in a plurality. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Sepphorean brought before Rebbi Ammi a pound in eight but the latter refused to rule since had not Rebbi Assi said, is that not a Mishnah? “If somebody weaves the length of a sîṭ of firstling’s wool in a cloth, the cloth must be burned, of hair of a nazir or firstling donkey in sackcloth, the sackcloth must be burned”? The following Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote any expression of gift either at the start, or in the middle, or at the end, his instructions are valid.” There, to one person in an expression of gift and to one an expression of inheritance. But here to each one both in the language of gift and the language of inheritance Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: But does he not prejudice the rights of others? He said to him, if there are no brothers. But does he not prejudice the rights of his paternal uncles? Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel: A person prefers the good of his house over his relatives.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:14

MISHNAH: If somebody died and left his wife, a creditor, and heirs, and he was owed a deposit or a debt by a third party, Rebbi Ṭarphon says, these should be given to the weakest among them. Rebbi Aqiba says, one does not show mercy in law! But these should be given to the heirs for all others have to swear, only the heirs do not have to swear.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:17

MISHNAH: If he left produce taken from the ground, the one who takes them first acquires them. If the widow acquired more than her ketubah sum, or the creditor more than his claim, the remainder, Rebbi Ṭarphon says, should be given to the weakest among them. Rebbi Aqiba says, one does not show mercy in law! But it should be given to the heirs since all others have to swear, only the heirs do not have to swear.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:35

MISHNAH: If she had compromised her ketubah, how is that? If her ketubah was 1‘000 zuz and he said to her, you received your ketubah, but she says, I received only one mina, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. If one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, how is that? If her ketubah was 1‘000 zuz and he said to her, you received your ketubah, but she says, I received nothing, and one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From encumbered property, how is that? If he sold his real estate to others and she collects from the buyers, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From orphans’ property, how is that? If he died and left his estate to the orphans, if she is paid out by the orphans she shall not be able to collect without an oath. Not in his presence, how is that? If he went overseas and she collects in his absence, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. Rebbi Simeon says, any time she asks for her ketubah, the heirs can require an oath from her. If she does not ask for her ketubah, the heirs cannot require an oath from her.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:5

Rav said, if a dying person said, do not bury me, he is buried as a charge on public charity. Rebbi Immi asked, how could one think that others are provided for by his property and he is buried as a charge on public charity? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.” Explain it, if they inherited real estate. As it was stated: “If he left male and female slaves, mortgages, and movables, anybody who takes them first acquires them and he shall be buried by public charity.” Because he took it first. Therefore, if he did not take it first one removes from his hand. Explain it, if he said, bury me. As Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: If a dead person was buried who had not said “bury me”, even though others came and took [of his property] one removes from their hands. If they took real estate. In fact, what you say, one removes from their hands, if they took real estate. But if they took movables, one does not remove from their hands, if it was a loan by witnesses. But for a documented loan, whether they took real estate or movables one does not remove from their hands. For Rebbi Abba, the son of Rav Huna, said: They made the words of a bedridden person equal to those of a healthy person who wrote and delivered. But only if he died from that illness, not if he recovered. And if he was explicit and said, give field X to Y. If he said, give field X to Y? Is it as if he was explicit or only if he said, the Northern half, the Southern half? Rebbi Yudan asked: If he said, burn me by pagan rites and give half of field X to Y. Since they do not burn, do they give? Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: A sick person who said, my daughters shall be supported. Would the daughters not be supported anyway? No, it is necessary, for otherwise would they be supported from pledged real estate or would they be supported from movables? Rebbi Yudan [ ] there came a case before Rebbi Yose about a bedridden person who had said, my documents shall be given to X. He said to him, the bedridden can only transfer property which is acquired either by a document or by taking hold. But these are acquired by a document and by taking hold. As it was stated: “A ship is acquired by taking hold in the opinion of everybody. Rebbi Nathan says a ship and documents are acquired by a document and by taking hold. If he wrote and did not take hold, or took hold without writing [a transfer document] he did not do anything unless he both writes and takes hold.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:5

Rav said, if a dying person said, do not bury me, he is buried as a charge on public charity. Rebbi Immi asked, how could one think that others are provided for by his property and he is buried as a charge on public charity? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.” Explain it, if they inherited real estate. As it was stated: “If he left male and female slaves, mortgages, and movables, anybody who takes them first acquires them and he shall be buried by public charity.” Because he took it first. Therefore, if he did not take it first one removes from his hand. Explain it, if he said, bury me. As Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: If a dead person was buried who had not said “bury me”, even though others came and took [of his property] one removes from their hands. If they took real estate. In fact, what you say, one removes from their hands, if they took real estate. But if they took movables, one does not remove from their hands, if it was a loan by witnesses. But for a documented loan, whether they took real estate or movables one does not remove from their hands. For Rebbi Abba, the son of Rav Huna, said: They made the words of a bedridden person equal to those of a healthy person who wrote and delivered. But only if he died from that illness, not if he recovered. And if he was explicit and said, give field X to Y. If he said, give field X to Y? Is it as if he was explicit or only if he said, the Northern half, the Southern half? Rebbi Yudan asked: If he said, burn me by pagan rites and give half of field X to Y. Since they do not burn, do they give? Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: A sick person who said, my daughters shall be supported. Would the daughters not be supported anyway? No, it is necessary, for otherwise would they be supported from pledged real estate or would they be supported from movables? Rebbi Yudan [ ] there came a case before Rebbi Yose about a bedridden person who had said, my documents shall be given to X. He said to him, the bedridden can only transfer property which is acquired either by a document or by taking hold. But these are acquired by a document and by taking hold. As it was stated: “A ship is acquired by taking hold in the opinion of everybody. Rebbi Nathan says a ship and documents are acquired by a document and by taking hold. If he wrote and did not take hold, or took hold without writing [a transfer document] he did not do anything unless he both writes and takes hold.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:17

MISHNAH: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid unless there would have been left a field [for sowing] nine qab, and in a garden half a qab, or following the words of Rebbi Aqiba, a fourth. If her ketubah was 400 zuz and she sold to one person worth 100, to a second 100, to a third 100, and to the last the value of a mina and a denar for a mina, the last transaction is invalid but all others are valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:13

Who is the Tanna of “the gain should be given to the sacred fund”? Rebbi Meïr! For Rebbi Meïr said, one commits sacrilege with prohibitions. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands? Let us hear from the following: “If he said, this loaf shall be dedicated, if he or another person ate it, they committed sacrilege; therefore, it can be redeemed. But if he said, it is for me [as if dedicated], if he ate it he committed sacrilege on goodwill but others would not commit sacrilege.” He said only, if he ate it. Therefore, to warm his hands is permitted. The students of Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: That is if he said I shall not eat it nor taste it; if he forbade only eating to himself. But the question was, if somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:23

Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free. And why did we state: “Rabban Gamliel obligates him”? This comes to tell you the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he obligates people. Rebbi Abbahu [supported] that of Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, the Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is obligated. Rav followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went with another to court before Rav. He started claiming from him barley, wheat and spelt. Rav told him, charge him with anything you have to charge, and in the end he will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free, did we not state “if he sued him for vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? If he is obligated for vessels about vessels, not so much more vessels for real estate? What does he do with it? He explains it, to transfer an oath to him. But did we not state: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for oil and he admitted vessels, everybody agrees that what he admitted does not refer to the claim, for Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna said in the name of Rav: The Mishnah deals with the case that he sued for vessels full of oil; the ones are full, the others empty. One understands vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abun formulates it as oil bucket. Can one not ask him in the end? If he lost his speech.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The following vows are permitted,” etc. “To the Eternal”, nobody can forbid anything on himself unless it could be given to the Eternal. What is stated in the House of Rav disagrees: “From where that one may not make and dissolve vows which are dissolved for you from Heaven but people consider them as binding? The verse says, ‘he shall not profanate his word.’ He should not make his words profane.” They wanted to say, for example using “qorbān” or “oath”; but in all other respects it would be permitted. It comes to tell you, also all other respects. “To prohibit a prohibition on himself”. There are Tannaїm who state: on himself, not on others. There are Tannaїm who state: even on others. They wanted to say that he who says on himself, not on others, to forbid others’ property, but he who says even on others, to forbid his own property for others, but not the property of others for himself.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The following vows are permitted,” etc. “To the Eternal”, nobody can forbid anything on himself unless it could be given to the Eternal. What is stated in the House of Rav disagrees: “From where that one may not make and dissolve vows which are dissolved for you from Heaven but people consider them as binding? The verse says, ‘he shall not profanate his word.’ He should not make his words profane.” They wanted to say, for example using “qorbān” or “oath”; but in all other respects it would be permitted. It comes to tell you, also all other respects. “To prohibit a prohibition on himself”. There are Tannaїm who state: on himself, not on others. There are Tannaїm who state: even on others. They wanted to say that he who says on himself, not on others, to forbid others’ property, but he who says even on others, to forbid his own property for others, but not the property of others for himself.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The following vows are permitted,” etc. “To the Eternal”, nobody can forbid anything on himself unless it could be given to the Eternal. What is stated in the House of Rav disagrees: “From where that one may not make and dissolve vows which are dissolved for you from Heaven but people consider them as binding? The verse says, ‘he shall not profanate his word.’ He should not make his words profane.” They wanted to say, for example using “qorbān” or “oath”; but in all other respects it would be permitted. It comes to tell you, also all other respects. “To prohibit a prohibition on himself”. There are Tannaїm who state: on himself, not on others. There are Tannaїm who state: even on others. They wanted to say that he who says on himself, not on others, to forbid others’ property, but he who says even on others, to forbid his own property for others, but not the property of others for himself.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The following vows are permitted,” etc. “To the Eternal”, nobody can forbid anything on himself unless it could be given to the Eternal. What is stated in the House of Rav disagrees: “From where that one may not make and dissolve vows which are dissolved for you from Heaven but people consider them as binding? The verse says, ‘he shall not profanate his word.’ He should not make his words profane.” They wanted to say, for example using “qorbān” or “oath”; but in all other respects it would be permitted. It comes to tell you, also all other respects. “To prohibit a prohibition on himself”. There are Tannaїm who state: on himself, not on others. There are Tannaїm who state: even on others. They wanted to say that he who says on himself, not on others, to forbid others’ property, but he who says even on others, to forbid his own property for others, but not the property of others for himself.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The following vows are permitted,” etc. “To the Eternal”, nobody can forbid anything on himself unless it could be given to the Eternal. What is stated in the House of Rav disagrees: “From where that one may not make and dissolve vows which are dissolved for you from Heaven but people consider them as binding? The verse says, ‘he shall not profanate his word.’ He should not make his words profane.” They wanted to say, for example using “qorbān” or “oath”; but in all other respects it would be permitted. It comes to tell you, also all other respects. “To prohibit a prohibition on himself”. There are Tannaїm who state: on himself, not on others. There are Tannaїm who state: even on others. They wanted to say that he who says on himself, not on others, to forbid others’ property, but he who says even on others, to forbid his own property for others, but not the property of others for himself.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The following vows are permitted,” etc. “To the Eternal”, nobody can forbid anything on himself unless it could be given to the Eternal. What is stated in the House of Rav disagrees: “From where that one may not make and dissolve vows which are dissolved for you from Heaven but people consider them as binding? The verse says, ‘he shall not profanate his word.’ He should not make his words profane.” They wanted to say, for example using “qorbān” or “oath”; but in all other respects it would be permitted. It comes to tell you, also all other respects. “To prohibit a prohibition on himself”. There are Tannaїm who state: on himself, not on others. There are Tannaїm who state: even on others. They wanted to say that he who says on himself, not on others, to forbid others’ property, but he who says even on others, to forbid his own property for others, but not the property of others for himself.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The following vows are permitted,” etc. “To the Eternal”, nobody can forbid anything on himself unless it could be given to the Eternal. What is stated in the House of Rav disagrees: “From where that one may not make and dissolve vows which are dissolved for you from Heaven but people consider them as binding? The verse says, ‘he shall not profanate his word.’ He should not make his words profane.” They wanted to say, for example using “qorbān” or “oath”; but in all other respects it would be permitted. It comes to tell you, also all other respects. “To prohibit a prohibition on himself”. There are Tannaїm who state: on himself, not on others. There are Tannaїm who state: even on others. They wanted to say that he who says on himself, not on others, to forbid others’ property, but he who says even on others, to forbid his own property for others, but not the property of others for himself.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:2

HALAKHAH: “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve,” etc. Do not the Sages permit all kinds of vows? It is written: “Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes.” He referred the paragraph to the heads of the tribes that they should dissolve the people’s vows. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: “He shall not profane his word.” He cannot profane his word; this implies that others can profane his words. Who is that? That is the Sage who dissolves the vow. Ḥananiah the nephew of Rebbi Joshua said, “I swore and I shall keep it.” Sometimes I keep it. Rebbi Joshua said, “What I swore in my rage:” In my rage I swore; I change my mind.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:6

MISHNAH: Exaggeration vows: If he said, if I did not see on this road [crowds] like those who left Egypt; if I did not see a snake [as thick] as the beam of the olive press. Vows in error how? If he said, if I ate or drank, and he remembers that he had eaten or drunk, that I shall not eat or shall not drink, and he forgot and ate or drank. If he said, a qônām that my wife cannot enjoy anything from me because she stole my wallet or hit my son, and it turns out that she did not hit him or became known that she did not steal. If he saw people eating [his] figs and said to them, these are for you as qorbān, but the persons turned out to be his father or brothers with others. The House of Shammai say, these are permitted, those with them forbidden. But the House of Hillel say, these and those are permitted.