4960 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 8:35

HALAKHAH: It is written: “The policemen shall add.” This expression “shall add” only means an addition. Like a man who says, I am adding to the words of my teacher. It was stated: The latter [words] are additions. Rebbi Yose said, there are two Tannaïm. He who said, “I am adding to the words of my teacher,” both the first and the later declarations both he and his teacher said. He who said, the later ones are additions, the first [declarations] both he and his teacher said, but the later ones he said but not his teacher. Rebbi Mana said, there is only one Tanna. The first [declarations] both he and his teacher said, but the later ones he said but not his teacher. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: He hears a sentence from the Cohen and tells it to the people in all languages. But its end disagrees with Rebbi Mana: He adds a final word of his own. If you say so, it does not disagree at all with Rebbi Yose, as it was stated: The first [declarations] both he and his teacher said, but the later ones he said but not his teacher.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:47

HALAKHAH: “If she was pregnant,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, everybody agrees that the child is of unknown paternity. It was stated thus: “Where was this said, for the testimony of the woman in her own behalf. But everybody agrees that the child is of unknown paternity.” Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, simply of unknown paternity! We find that a child of unknown paternity can be High Priest. How is this possible? A group of Cohanim was passing by, one of them came and had sexual relations; it turns out that the child of unknown paternity can be High Priest.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:17

MISHNAH: If one says, this is my signature and that is my colleague’s signature, and the other says, this is my signature and that is my colleague’s signature, they are trustworthy. If each of them says, that ismy signature, each of them needs another with him, the words of Rebbi, but the Sages say, everybody is trustworthy to confirm his own signature.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:21

Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market place cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. How is that? If one identified his own signature and that of his colleague, but that second witness’s signature was not known to anybody except his colleague, may that colleague together with somebody from the market place testify on that signature? That is what Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, said in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. Another case where there are no two persons: The signature of one is known by everybody, but that second witness’s signature is not known to anybody except his colleague. Can that colleague testify on his signature as if he were someone from the market place? If you say so, the entire testimony is confirmed by one witness. Rebbi Yudan said, that is correct. If two people come from a town that is mostly Gentile, like Hippos. One is known by everybody as a Jew, but the other is not known by anybody except his companion. Can the latter be considered one from the market place to testify about him? If you say so, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness! And in the prior case, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:37

MISHNAH: A woman who was jailed by Gentiles, if because of money matters, she is permitted to her husband; if because of criminal matters, she is prohibited to her husband. If a city was conquered after a siege, all wives of priests in it are disqualified; but if they have witnesses, even a slave, even a slave girl, those are trustworthy; but nobody is trustworthy about himself. Rebbi Zachariah, the son of the butcher, said, by the Temple! Her hand did not leave my hand from the moment the Gentiles entered Jerusalem until they left! They said to him, nobody testifies on his own behalf.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:12

Rebbi Ḥinena said before Rebbi Mana: Even if Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish thought the entire Mishnaiot were Rebbi Meïr’s, does the verse agree with Rebbi Meïr? Is it not written (Lev. 22:14): “If a person ate consecrated food in error”? But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish must hold that the fifth is a sacrifice. But even if he holds that the fifth is a sacrifice, can the principal be a sacrifice? Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said, the Mishnah declares that the principal is a fine, as we have stated: “He does not pay in heave but in totally profane food which is turned into heave.” If he had to pay from what he ate, it would be fine. And it was stated: “If he ate impure heave, he has to pay in pure profane food, but if he paid in impure profane, he discharged his obligation.” Does he not owe him the price of wood? That shows that the principal is a fine and since the principal is a fine, the fifth also is a fine. But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows his own opinion. Just as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there, everybody was under the obligation of (Ex. 20:16) “Do not become a false witness against your neighbor”, but this one was treated separately, (Deut. 19:19) “do to him what he intended to do to his brother”, to pay money; also here, everybody was under the obligation of (Lev. 22:10) “no outsider shall eat holy [food],” but this one was treated separately, (Lev. 22:14) “if somebody should eat holy [food] in error,” to pay money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:44

MISHNAH: One who says, I seduced X’s daughter, pays for shame and diminution of value on his own testimony but he does not pay the fine. One who says, I stole and I slaughtered or sold, pays the value on his own testimony but neither double restitution nor four or five times. My ox killed X or X’s ox, he pays on his own testimony. My ox killed X’s slave, he does not pay on his own testimony. This is the principle: Anybody who has to pay more than the damage he caused does not pay on his own testimony.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:44

MISHNAH: One who says, I seduced X’s daughter, pays for shame and diminution of value on his own testimony but he does not pay the fine. One who says, I stole and I slaughtered or sold, pays the value on his own testimony but neither double restitution nor four or five times. My ox killed X or X’s ox, he pays on his own testimony. My ox killed X’s slave, he does not pay on his own testimony. This is the principle: Anybody who has to pay more than the damage he caused does not pay on his own testimony.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:44

MISHNAH: One who says, I seduced X’s daughter, pays for shame and diminution of value on his own testimony but he does not pay the fine. One who says, I stole and I slaughtered or sold, pays the value on his own testimony but neither double restitution nor four or five times. My ox killed X or X’s ox, he pays on his own testimony. My ox killed X’s slave, he does not pay on his own testimony. This is the principle: Anybody who has to pay more than the damage he caused does not pay on his own testimony.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:44

MISHNAH: One who says, I seduced X’s daughter, pays for shame and diminution of value on his own testimony but he does not pay the fine. One who says, I stole and I slaughtered or sold, pays the value on his own testimony but neither double restitution nor four or five times. My ox killed X or X’s ox, he pays on his own testimony. My ox killed X’s slave, he does not pay on his own testimony. This is the principle: Anybody who has to pay more than the damage he caused does not pay on his own testimony.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:44

MISHNAH: One who says, I seduced X’s daughter, pays for shame and diminution of value on his own testimony but he does not pay the fine. One who says, I stole and I slaughtered or sold, pays the value on his own testimony but neither double restitution nor four or five times. My ox killed X or X’s ox, he pays on his own testimony. My ox killed X’s slave, he does not pay on his own testimony. This is the principle: Anybody who has to pay more than the damage he caused does not pay on his own testimony.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:45

HALAKHAH: “One who says, I seduced X’s daughter,” etc. Rebbi Isaac asked: Would he have to pay the slave’s value on his own testimony? What is his problem? Are the entire 30 [šeqel] a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, the entire 30 [šeqel] are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “‘Your ox killed my slave’! The other said, ‘he did not kill’. ‘I want you to swear’ and he said ‘Amen’, he is free.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it if he killed a slave afflicted with boils. He said to him, what does it say afterwards? “‘Your ox killed my son’! The other said, ‘he did not kill’. ‘I want you to swear’ and he said ‘Amen’, he is obligated.” Why do you not explain it that he was afflicted with boils, then he would be free. Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it following him who says “he shall pay the redemption of his person”, the one’s who caused the damage. He said to him, if following him who says “he shall pay the redemption of his person”, the one’s who caused the damage, everything is a fine. Can one say to him, be also in the clear with Heaven? Let us hear from the following: It happened that Rabban Gamliel knocked out his slave Tebi’s tooth. He came to Rebbi Joshua and said to him, I found a reason to free my slave Tebi. He said to him, what do you have in your hand? Fines can be imposed only by witnesses! Could they not say to him, do your duty before Heaven? That means one does not tell him, do your duty before Heaven! Rebbi Gamliel ben Avina asked before Rebbi Mana: Does Rabban Gamliel follow him who said, it is permitted to manumit? He said to him, the story in itself implies that it is forbidden to manumit since, otherwise, he could have freed him immediately!

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:4

So far payments that are consequences of sexual relations. If somebody injured her, blinded one of her eyes, cut off one of her hands, broke one of her legs? To whom does he pay, to her or to her father? Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays to her father; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he pays to her. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is of the opinion that her earnings belong to her even before she becomes an adult. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only after she comes of age. Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: They disagree before she comes of age, but after she is an adult everybody agrees that all belongs to her. A baraita supports either one of them. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody injures somebody else’s daughter or son, the payments for the son must be given immediately; those for the daughter shall be held as property value. Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Judah the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said that some state it so that beginning and end support Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If somebody injures his own underage daughter, diminution of value belong to her and he is free from paying for shame and diminution of value. If others injure her, diminution of values belong to her, the rest shall be transformed into property value, but payments for shame and diminution of value belong to her father.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:18

It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, the words should be said as they are written. What means “the words should be said as they are written”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he is not guilty unless he marries her definitively, has intercourse, and accuses her not to be a virgin. “They spread the cloth”. Not that “they spread the cloth” but until the things become clear like a cloth. Assi said, “they spread the cloth”, the witnesses are not stoned, nor is the husband flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas, until they say: you were with us at a certain place, and the husband hired them to testify falsely. If they said, you were with us at a certain place, but they did not say, the husband hired them to testify falsely? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is said here “putting”, it is said there “putting”. Since “putting” there means money, also “putting” here must mean money. But did we not state: He did not say to the witnesses, come and testify in my case, but they came on their own, he is not flogged nor does he pay 100 tetradrachmas but either she or the false witnesses would be stoned’? Because he did not say. But if he said, even if he did not hire them it is as if he hired them. If the father brought two groups of witnesses. One side say, you were with us at a certain place. The other side say, the husband hired them to testify falsely. It is obvious that those who said, you were with us at a certain place, are stoned, and those who said, the husband hired them to testify falsely, are flogged and pay 100 tetradrachmas. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, neither by these not by those are they flogged and pay 100 tetradrachmas, but they are flogged because of “you shall not testify as a false witness against your fellow man.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:2

HALAKHAH: “Even though they said that a virgin collects 200,” etc. How does he become indebted to her? Do not Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, if somebody writes a debenture for another person under the assumption that he owes him and it turns out that he does not owe, [he does not have] to give to him! He wants to give much to be called X’s son-in-law. That is, if he decided this at the time of the preliminary marriage. What if he decided this at the time of the definitive marriage? He wants to give much for sexual relations with her, which are sweet. That is if he slept with her. If he did not sleep with her? He wants to give much for the acquisition he made. If he had decided at the preliminary marriage, at the definitive marriage, he already is called X’s son-in-law, sexual relations are nothing new, there is no new acquisition; from thereon he wants to give much that she should not change her mind. But can she? Was it not stated that “a man divorces only by his own will”? Rebbi Abin said, she makes his life miserable and he frees her.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:44

HALAKHAH: “One gives her a silver obolus for her needs and she eats with him every Friday night,” etc. The matters are formulated in clean language. Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Really eating. In the opinion of Rav, she eats at his expense; in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she eats at her own expense.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:12

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Simeon says, in the circumstances where he was empowered,” etc. You say, at her entrance they are his: If she sold them they are not sold, if she gave them to a sharecropper he has the reward from it, if she dedicated them as First Fruits they are not dedicated You say, at her exit they are hers, if he sold them they are not sold, if he gave them to a sharecropper she has the reward from it, if he dedicated them as First Fruits, this is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, since they disagreed: (Deut. 26:11): ‘You shall enjoy all the good things that the Eternal, your God, gave to you and your house.’ This teaches that a person brings First Fruits from his wife’s property.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after her death but not during her lifetime. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no difference, during her lifetime and after her death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows his own opinion since he said, a person does not inherit from his wife as a biblical rule. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it never was dedicated. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan it is dedicated and the holiness is removed.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:10

Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the brothers divided [the inheritance], the widow is supported by them. For you should not say, they should be considered as if they had sold the properties and the widow would not be supported by these, since it is obvious that if they sold, they sold their own property.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:15

HALAKHAH: “If somebody died and left a wife,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, the weakest in his claim. For example, one lent before witnesses, the other lent on a mortgage document; it should be given to the one who lent before witnesses. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the weakest in his body. Think about it, if he is rich, like those of the family Andreas. Rebbi Aḥa said, the weakest in his body and poor. As the following: They gave to a relative of Rebbi Samuel bar Abba as the weakest. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish brought slaves of Rebbi Jehuda the Prince and took it away from her. Rebbi Joḥanan was leaning on Rebbi Simeon bar Abba and said, what was done with that poor woman? He said to him, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish brought slaves of Rebbi Jehuda the Prince and took it away from her. Was he justified in doing this? Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should we say that Rebbi Joḥanan follows his doctrine and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish his own? Since they disagree: Everybody agrees that if they err in arguments, one does not reverse. In the words of the Torah, one reverses. Where do they disagree? If one errs in a Mishnah, for Rebbi Joḥanan says, an error in Mishnah is like an error in arguments, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, an error in Mishnah is like an error in words of the Torah. What is said of the Mishnah is also said of words of the Elders.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:19

That widow took a slave girl. The case came before Rebbi Isaac who said, what she took, she took. Rebbi Immi took her away, for she thought that she was hers but she was not hers. A similar case: The father of the sons of Shammai died and bequeathed a goat to them. The creditor came and took it. The case came before Rebbi Abbahu who said, he took his own property. Did we not state that if either an heir or a creditor came and took, one does [not] remove from his hand; for they thought they were theirs but they were not theirs. Rebbi Jacob bar Zabdi said, Rebbi Abbahu agrees that if they sold it, or gave it as a pledge, or moved it to another place, if then the creditor came and took it one removes it from his possession.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:17

When does one appraise for them? Rebbi Mana said, one appraises at the end. Rebbi Ḥanina said to him, the words of the rabbis imply that one does not listen to you, for Nathan bar Hoshaia asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, if there was sustenance for twelve months but the estate diminished in value? He answered him, since the heirs started to eat with permission, they continue to eat until the last coin is gone! Therefore, one appraises at the start. Rav Ḥisda asked: If there was sustenance for twelve months and then the property increased in value? Let us hear from the following, for Rebbi Ḥanina, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the heirs sold, they sold from their own property. So here, if it increased in value, their property value increased. If the estate was not sufficient for twelve months’ sustenance, may the sons say to the daughters, take what is yours and leave! Rebbi Abba said, is that a question? The Mishnah says that they cannot say so to them, as we have stated there: “If the orphans say, we accept the properties of our father for the value of an extra denar in order to take their mother’s ketubah; one does not listen to them but one appraises the properties in court.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:14

“Like vows of the good ones, he did not say anything.” Does this mean that good people make vows? Since that one made a vow, he is not a good one. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Jehudah since it was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, the ancient pious ones desired to bring a purification offering, but the Omnipresent did not let a sin happen to them; so they made a vow of nazir in order to be able to bring a purification offering. Rebbi Simeon says, they became sinners because they made a vow of nazir, for it was said: “He shall atone for him for what he sinned about the person,” that one sinned against his own person because he barred himself from [drinking] wine. It turns out that that of Simeon the Just parallels Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated: Simeon the Just said, I never ate the reparation offering of a nazir except once. Once a man came to me from the South, I saw that he was reddish, with beautiful eyes and good looks, and his hair in nice rows of waves. I said to him, my son, what induced you to cut off that beautiful hair? He said to me: Great man, I was a shephard in my village and I went to fill the water vessel with water when I saw my mirror image in the water and my instinct rushed over me and tried to lose me from the World. I said to it, wicked! You are rushing me to something which is not yours; it is upon me to sanctify you to Heaven! I bent my head to him and said, my son, there should be many more in Israel who fulfill the Omnipresent’s will like you. About you the verse says, “man or woman, if he clearly articulates vowing a vow of nazir, to be a nazir for the Eternal.” Rebbi Mana asked: Why following Simeon the Just, even following Rebbi Simeon? Did Simeon the Just never eat a purification offering for suet? Did Simeon the Just never eat a purification offering for blood? Simeon the Just holds that people make a vow while they are upset. Since they make the vow while they are upset, in the end, they wonder. But if he wonders, his sacrifices become similar to one of those who slaughtered profane animals in the Temple courtyard. But this one made a well thought-out dedication, when his mouth and his thoughts were in unison.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The following vows are permitted,” etc. “To the Eternal”, nobody can forbid anything on himself unless it could be given to the Eternal. What is stated in the House of Rav disagrees: “From where that one may not make and dissolve vows which are dissolved for you from Heaven but people consider them as binding? The verse says, ‘he shall not profanate his word.’ He should not make his words profane.” They wanted to say, for example using “qorbān” or “oath”; but in all other respects it would be permitted. It comes to tell you, also all other respects. “To prohibit a prohibition on himself”. There are Tannaїm who state: on himself, not on others. There are Tannaїm who state: even on others. They wanted to say that he who says on himself, not on others, to forbid others’ property, but he who says even on others, to forbid his own property for others, but not the property of others for himself.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:34

Because Moses was lazy for circumcision, the angel tried to kill kim. That is what is written: “The Eternal met him and wanted to kill him.” Rebbi Yose said, far be the thought that Moses was lazy for circumcision but he argued on his own: To perform circumcision and leave would be dangerous. To wait, the Holy One, praise to Him, told him: “Go, return to Egypt.” But because he was lazy in preparing for the overnight stay before circumcision; that is what is written: “It was on the way, at the overnight stay.” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, far be the thought that the angel wanted to kill Moses; it was the baby. Come and see, who is called ḥātān? Moses or the baby? There are Tannaïm who state that Moses is called ḥātān. There are Tannaïm who state that the baby is called ḥātān. He who said that Moses is called ḥātān: Ḥātān, blood is required from you. And he said that the baby is called ḥātān: Ḥātān, in blood you are preserved for me. “Ṣippora took a flintstone and cut her son’s prepuce and touched his feet.” Rebbi Jehudah, Rebbi Neḥemiah, and the rabbis. One said, Moses’s feet. Another said, the angel’s feet. Another said, the baby’s feet. He who said Moses’s feet: Here I cut your obligation for you. He who said, the angel’s feet: Here your mission was accomplished. He who said the baby’s feet, she touched the baby’s body. “He left off from him; then she said, a blood ḥātān for circumcisions.” From here that there are two circumcisions; one for baring the gland and one for the fibers.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:11

MISHNAH: “I am ḥerein for you”, the addressee is forbidden. “You are for me ḥerem,” the vower is forbidden. “I am for you and you are for me,” both are forbidden. Both are permitted the institutions of the returnees from Babylonia and forbidden the institutions of their own town.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:13

“A person who makes a vow ‘to forbid himself the people of the town,’ if another person came and dwelled there for thirty days, [the vower] is permitted to deal with him. ‘From the inhabitants of the town,’ if another person came and dwelled there for thirty days, [the vower] is prohibited from dealing with him.” ‘A qônām that the people of my town cannot have any usufruct from me,’ he cannot ask the local rabbi. ‘The usufruct of the people of my town [is forbidden] to me’, he can ask the local rabbi. Some Tannaïm state, even in the first case he can ask, for it does not mean that [the rabbi] would dissolve his own vow. A vow of the community cannot be dissolved. A vow made in public cannot be dissolved. “If somebody made a vow that another should not have usufruct from him, if the vow was made in the other’s presence, he can request the vow to be dissolved only in the other’s presence; if the vow was not made in the other’s presence, he can request the dissolution either in the other’s presence or in his absence.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of the shame; Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, because of the suspicion.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:17

“This is the rule Rebbi Simeon declared in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For everything that may become permitted through some action, such as ṭevel, Second Tithe, donations to the Temple, and “new grain”, the Sages did not fix any limits, but a kind with its own is forbidden in the minutest amount, a kind with a different kind if it can be tasted. But for everything that cannot become permitted through any action, such as heave, ḥallah, orlah, and kilaim in a vineyard, the Sages did fix as limit both a kind with itself or with a different kind if it can be tasted.” How do you treat vows? As referring to something that can become permitted or to something that cannot become permitted? It seems reasonable that we treat them as referring to things that can become permitted, as we have stated there “for the Elder uproots the vow from the start.” They said, he only uproots for the future. Certainly a Mishnah treats it as referring to something that cannot become permitted, as we have stated there: “The growth from heave is heave; the growth from their growth is profane. But the growths from ṭevel, First Tithe, aftergrowth of the Sabbatical, heaves from outside the Land, dema‘, and First Fruits are profane as are growths from their growths. Growths from dedicated [seeds] and Second Tithe become profane; one redeems them corresponding to the time of sowing.” We have stated on this: When has this been said? Anything whose seeds disappear. But in produce whose seeds do not disappear, the growth from their growth is forbidden. There is a restriction on growth, as Rebbi Zeïra said in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: An onion of kilaim in a vineyard, taken out of the ground and replanted, stays forbidden even if it grows enormously because growth of something forbidden cannot neutralize the prohibition. But another Mishnah treats it as something that can become permitted, as we have stated there: “For if somebody vowed not to have a certain thing and it became mixed with something else, if it can be tasted it is forbidden.” This explains that it was mixed with another kind, following the rules of something that can become permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:4

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Since you say, one opens for him by the honor of his father and mother; in things between him and the Omnipresent, one does not open for him by the honor of the Omnipresent. But since in matters between him and his father and mother one opens for him by the honor of his father and mother; similarly, in things between him and the Omnipresent should one not open for him by the honor of the Omnipresent? What is the honor of the Omnipresent? For example, that I shall not make a tabernacle, that I shall not take a lulab, that I shall not put on phylacteries. One understands that he does it for his own benefit. As in the following: “If you are just, what are you giving Him?” “If you sinned, what would you do to Him?” Rebbi Yannai said, one who listens to his urges is as if he worshipped idols. What is the reason? “In yourself there shall be no alien force; do not bow down to a foreign god.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:6

Rebbi Joḥanan provided an opening by having second thoughts: “If it were not for that, would he have come?” Are second thoughts not something new? Rebbi Hila said, second thoughts are a common occurrence. In this kind, Rebbi Simeon did not find an opening for his own vow until one of the Galilean Elders came; some say, that one was Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. He took him from here and put him there; he took him from here and put him there, until finally he put him into the sun and told him to check his garments for fleas. They said to him, if you had known that this old man would treat you in such a way, would you have made the vow? He said, No. He permitted him. They asked, from where do you have this? He said to them, I was Meïr’s servant both times when he fled, but some say, Rebbi Meïr’s walking stick was in my hand and it teaches me knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:23

MISHNAH: One finds an opening for a man with his own honor and that of his children. One tells him, if you had known that tomorrow one will say of you, it is the habit of this man to divorce his wife, and about your daughters one will say, they are daughters of a divorcee, what did the mother of these do to get herself divorced? If he said, if I had known that it is so I would not have made the vow, then it is dissolved.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:24

HALAKHAH: “One finds an opening for a man about his own honor,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, one finds an opening for a man exclusively about his own honor. As the following? A woman vowed [not to have benefit] from her daughter. She came to Rebbi Joḥanan who said to her, if you had known that your daughter gets a bad reputation, would you have made the vow? She said, no, and he permitted her. Is that not the Mishnah: “One finds an opening for a man about his own honor and that of his children”? That you should not think one follows Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:24

HALAKHAH: “One finds an opening for a man about his own honor,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, one finds an opening for a man exclusively about his own honor. As the following? A woman vowed [not to have benefit] from her daughter. She came to Rebbi Joḥanan who said to her, if you had known that your daughter gets a bad reputation, would you have made the vow? She said, no, and he permitted her. Is that not the Mishnah: “One finds an opening for a man about his own honor and that of his children”? That you should not think one follows Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:24

HALAKHAH: “One finds an opening for a man about his own honor,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, one finds an opening for a man exclusively about his own honor. As the following? A woman vowed [not to have benefit] from her daughter. She came to Rebbi Joḥanan who said to her, if you had known that your daughter gets a bad reputation, would you have made the vow? She said, no, and he permitted her. Is that not the Mishnah: “One finds an opening for a man about his own honor and that of his children”? That you should not think one follows Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:20

HALAKHAH: “He answered to the words of Rebbi Eliezer: Let the miqweh prove it! It frees the impure from their impurities but it cannot save pure ones. Rebbi Eliezer argued another track: Since in a situation where he cannot dissolve his own vows before he made them, he dissolves his wife’s vows before she made them, in a situation where he can dissolve his own vows after he made them, would it not be logical that he could dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them? No! Why can he not dissolve his own vows before he made them? For if he wants to confirm them, he confirms them. Could he dissolve his wife’s vows after she made them, when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?” “But it says, ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them’. What can be confirmed can be dissolved,; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:20

HALAKHAH: “He answered to the words of Rebbi Eliezer: Let the miqweh prove it! It frees the impure from their impurities but it cannot save pure ones. Rebbi Eliezer argued another track: Since in a situation where he cannot dissolve his own vows before he made them, he dissolves his wife’s vows before she made them, in a situation where he can dissolve his own vows after he made them, would it not be logical that he could dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them? No! Why can he not dissolve his own vows before he made them? For if he wants to confirm them, he confirms them. Could he dissolve his wife’s vows after she made them, when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?” “But it says, ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them’. What can be confirmed can be dissolved,; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:20

HALAKHAH: “He answered to the words of Rebbi Eliezer: Let the miqweh prove it! It frees the impure from their impurities but it cannot save pure ones. Rebbi Eliezer argued another track: Since in a situation where he cannot dissolve his own vows before he made them, he dissolves his wife’s vows before she made them, in a situation where he can dissolve his own vows after he made them, would it not be logical that he could dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them? No! Why can he not dissolve his own vows before he made them? For if he wants to confirm them, he confirms them. Could he dissolve his wife’s vows after she made them, when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?” “But it says, ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them’. What can be confirmed can be dissolved,; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:25

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The husband who said “there is no vow, there is no oath,” did not say anything. Also the Elder who said “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” did not say anything. But everybody has to follow his own rules. The husband says “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” and the Elder says, “there is no vow, there is no oath”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:6

“If I wash, if I do not wash.” It was stated: “If I wash, if I do not wash; if I wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels”, these are vows of mortification. Both according to Rebbi Ze‘ira or according to Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yose seems to contradict his own opinion, as it was stated: “A water source belonging to the townspeople, between them and outsiders, they have precedence over outsiders. Between outsiders and their animals, the outsiders have precedence over their animals. Their washing and the lives of outsiders, their washing has precedence over the lives of outsiders.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, who is the Tanna who said that washing is a necessity for survival? Rebbi Yose! As it was stated: “One may use it neither for steeping nor for washing. But Rebbi Yose permits it for washing.” The opinions of Rebbi Yose are contradictory. There he says, washing oneself is not a necessity of life. And here, he says washing one’s garments is a necessity of life! Rebbi Mana said, a person might put off washing himself but nobody puts off washing his clothes.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:30

MISHNAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee, anything she forbids to herself shall be confirmed.” How is that? If she said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she married within these thirty days he cannot dissolve. If she made the vow under her husband’s authority and he dissolved it, if she had said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she should become a widow or a divorcee within the next 30 days, it remains dissolved. If she made a vow, was on the same day divorced, and taken back, he cannot dissolve. This is the principle: He cannot dissolve for any one who was on her own for one moment.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 1:30

The Mishnah follows Rebbi Jehudah since it was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, the ancient pious ones desired to bring a purification offering, but the Omnipresent did not let a sin happen to them; so they made a vow of nazir in order to be able to bring a purification offering. Rebbi Simeon says, they became sinners because they made a vow of nazir, for it was said: “He shall atone for himself for what he sinned about the person,” that one sinned against his own person because he barred himself from [drinking] wine. It turns out that the position of Simeon the Just parallels Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated: Simeon the Just said, I never ate the reparation offering of a nazir except once. Once a man came to me from the South, I saw that he was handsome, with beautiful eyes and good looks, and his hair in waves. I said to him, my son, what induced you to cut off that beautiful hair? He said to me: Rabbi, I was a shepherd in my village and I went to fill the water vessel with water when I saw my mirror image in the water and my instinct rushed over me and tried to remove me from the World. I said to it, wicked! You are rushing me to something which is not yours; it is upon me to sanctify you to Heaven! I embraced him, kissed him on his head and said, my son, there should be many more in Israel who fulfill the Omnipresent’s will like you. About you the verse says, “man or woman, if he clearly articulates vowing a vow of nazir, to be a nazir for the Eternal.” Rebbi Mana asked: Why following Simeon the Just, even following Rebbi Simeon? Did Simeon the Just never eat a purification offering for suet? Did Simeon the Just never eat a purification offering for blood? Simeon the Just holds that people make a vow while they are upset. Since they make the vow while they are upset, in the end, they wonder. But if he wonders, his sacrifices become similar to one of those who slaughtered profane animals in the Temple courtyard. But this one made a well thought-out dedication, when his mouth and his thoughts were in unison.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:26

MISHNAH: “I am a nazir and a nazir when a son is born to me.” If he started counting for himself when a son was born to him, he finishes his own and then counts for his son. “I am a nazir when a son is born to me, and a nazir.” If he had started counting for himself when a son was born to him he interrupts his own, counts for his son, and then finishes for himself.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:26

MISHNAH: “I am a nazir and a nazir when a son is born to me.” If he started counting for himself when a son was born to him, he finishes his own and then counts for his son. “I am a nazir when a son is born to me, and a nazir.” If he had started counting for himself when a son was born to him he interrupts his own, counts for his son, and then finishes for himself.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:27

HALAKHAH: “ “I am a nazir and a nazir when a son is born to me,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: If he said, “I am a nazir for these 30 days and those 30 days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: Is that not the Mishnah? “He interrupts his own, counts for his son, and then finishes for himself.” Not even if his wife is in the process of giving birth? He said to him, his nezirut is not comparable to his son’s nezirut, but to the case that he said, “I am already a nazir and a nazir after twenty days.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina both say: If he finished his nezirut, his son’s nezirut cannot start for him before he was shaving with a sacrifice. About a nazir who became impure, the opinions of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seem contradictory. There, he says, if a person impure by the impurity of the dead made a vow of nazir, his seventh day is counted. If a nazir becomes impure, his seventh day is not counted. In our case, is he not like a person impure by the impurity of the dead, who made a vow of nazir? And is not the seventh day counted for a person impure by the impurity of the dead, who made a vow of nazir? Would this obligate him to bring a sacrifice for his impurity? But if a nazir who becomes impure, his seventh day is not counted; does it not obligate him to bring a sacrifice for his impurity? And here, because he is obligated to bring a sacrifice (of impurity), the seventh day is [not] counted for him.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:28

Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he polluted himself during his son’s nezirut but was warned because of his own nezirut, he is whipped. If he dedicated his sacrifices, they are sanctified. One does not consider what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “His sacrifice to the Eternal for his nezirut,” i. e., his vow of nazir should precede his sacrifice, rather than that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:9

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The husband who said “there is no vow, there is no oath,” did not say anything. Also the Elder who said “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” did not say anything. But everybody has to follow his own rules. The husband says “it is dissolved for you, it is voided for you,” and the Elder says, “there is no vow, there is no oath”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:15

The following is obvious: If her husband did not dissolve for the first [woman] and she transgressed her vow, she is whipped. Can the second be whipped? Rebbi Yose said, since one is whipped, the other also is whipped. Rebbi La said, this follows Rebbi Simeon. Can the second not be considered like one who said, I am a nezirah after twenty days? Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion; for Rebbi Simeon declares him free, because his offering was not according to the custom of offerers.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:31

May his own vow of nazir and that of his father fall on him together? It happened that Rebbi Ḥanina ben Ḥanina’s father made him a nazir and Rebbi Simeon ben Gamliel checked him whether he had grown two pubic hairs. He said to him, why are you checking me? If my father’s nezirut is on me, I am a nazir; otherwise, I declare being a nazir. Rabban Gamliel stood up and kissed him on his head and said, I am sure that you will not die from old age before you taught instruction in Israel. Rebbi Eleazar bar Ṣadoq said, I saw him sitting and explaining in Jabneh.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 5:20

It has been stated: 300 nezirim came in the days of Rebbi Simeon ben Shetaḥ. For 150 of them he found an opening, for 150 of them he did not find an opening. He came to king Yannai and said to him: There are here 300 nezirim who need 900 sacrifices. You should give half of them from your side, I shall give half from my side. The king sent him 450 animals. An informer went around and said that the other one had not given anything from his own money. King Yannai heard about it and got angry. Simeon ben Shetaḥ heard and fled. After some time, important people from the Persian empire came to king Yannai. They said to him: We remember that there was an old man who gave us a rabbinic discourse. They said to him, send and bring him! He sent and gave him his word; he came and sat between king and queen. He said to him, why did you trick me? He said, I did not trick you; you with your money and I with my learning, as it is written (Eccl. 7:12) “In the shadow of wisdom, in the shadow of money.” He said to him, why did you disappear? He said to him, I heard that my lord was angry with me and I wanted to fulfill the verse (Is. 26:20) “Hide a little bit until the rage passes;” he used about himself (Eccl. 7:12): “Knowledge is an advantage, wisdom lets its possessor live.” He said to him, why did you sit between king and queen? He said to him, it is written in the book of Ben Sirach: “Esteem it and it will raise you and seat you among princes.” He said, bring him a cup that he may recite Grace. They brought him a cup and he said: “Let us give praise for the food that Yannai and his company ate.” He said to him, what should I say, “for the food that we did not eat?” He said, bring him something that he may eat. They brought, he ate and recited: “For the food that we ate.” Rebbi Yoḥanan said, his colleagues disagree with Simeon ben Shetaḥ. Rebbi Jeremiah said, about the first action; Rebbi Abba said, about the second action. Rebbi Jeremiah seems to contradict himself! There he wondered about it and here it is obvious for him! He wondered following the Sages; it is obvious to him following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. We have stated about this: If one came, was lying on a couch, and dipped with them, even if he did not eat grain the volume of an olive one ‘invites’ with him, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: One never ‘invites’ anyone unless he has eaten grain the volume of an olive. But did we not formulate, “two [eating] bread and one [eating] vegetable, then one ‘invites’?” This baraita follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:26

MISHNAH: Even women who cannot be believed if they say that [a woman’s] husband died are trustworthy to bring her bill of divorce: Her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her co-wife, her sister-in-law, and her husband’s daughter. What is the difference between divorce and death? The writing is the proof. A woman may herself bring her own bill of divorce, but she still is required to say that it was written and signed before her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:26

HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate, but from his own he may separate.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:14

MISHNAH: If a slave was kidnapped and ransomed, if it was as a slave he shall serve, if as a free person he shall not serve; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in any case he shall serve. A slave whom his master gave as mortgage to others and then freed in strict law does not owe anything, but for the public good one forces the master to formally manumit him and he writes a bond for his own value. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the one who manumits writes.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:22

HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:22

HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:21

Rav wrote to Rebbi, who transferred it to the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Ḥiyya wrote between the lines. If the orphans sold against the rules, one collects for dowry but one does not collect for sustenance. If they accepted a lien. I do not know what this lien is. Levi stated: Both for a lien made by the father and for a lien made by the son, one collects for dowry but one does not collect for sustenance. Rebbi Abba said, there is no mention of a lien made by the father, only a lien made by the son. If one cannot collect during the father’s lifetime, not so much less after the father’s death? Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If the daughters are married, the widow is sustained by them. Rebbi Abba follows his own [opinion] and Rebbi Jehudah follows his own [opinion]. For the sister of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaggai: Even if they died, the widow is sustained by them.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:21

Rav wrote to Rebbi, who transferred it to the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Ḥiyya wrote between the lines. If the orphans sold against the rules, one collects for dowry but one does not collect for sustenance. If they accepted a lien. I do not know what this lien is. Levi stated: Both for a lien made by the father and for a lien made by the son, one collects for dowry but one does not collect for sustenance. Rebbi Abba said, there is no mention of a lien made by the father, only a lien made by the son. If one cannot collect during the father’s lifetime, not so much less after the father’s death? Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If the daughters are married, the widow is sustained by them. Rebbi Abba follows his own [opinion] and Rebbi Jehudah follows his own [opinion]. For the sister of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaggai: Even if they died, the widow is sustained by them.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:3

Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said: If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he went and said to him, your wife said, accept the bill of divorce for me, even after the bill came into her hand it is not a valid bill of divorce, since he thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. Rebbi Huna bar Ḥiyya objected: But did we not state that if a woman said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand? Then even if the bill came into her hand it should not be a valid bill! For she thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that practice is that “accept” and “obtain” mean “bring”. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” Then it should not be a valid bill even if the bill of divorce reaches her hand. For she thinks that maybe she is divorced by the acceptance of the agent, but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that a minor cannot appoint an agent.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:3

Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said: If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he went and said to him, your wife said, accept the bill of divorce for me, even after the bill came into her hand it is not a valid bill of divorce, since he thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. Rebbi Huna bar Ḥiyya objected: But did we not state that if a woman said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand? Then even if the bill came into her hand it should not be a valid bill! For she thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that practice is that “accept” and “obtain” mean “bring”. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” Then it should not be a valid bill even if the bill of divorce reaches her hand. For she thinks that maybe she is divorced by the acceptance of the agent, but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that a minor cannot appoint an agent.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:3

Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said: If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he went and said to him, your wife said, accept the bill of divorce for me, even after the bill came into her hand it is not a valid bill of divorce, since he thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. Rebbi Huna bar Ḥiyya objected: But did we not state that if a woman said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand? Then even if the bill came into her hand it should not be a valid bill! For she thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that practice is that “accept” and “obtain” mean “bring”. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” Then it should not be a valid bill even if the bill of divorce reaches her hand. For she thinks that maybe she is divorced by the acceptance of the agent, but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that a minor cannot appoint an agent.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:4

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even while he is suffering an attack of seizures, one writes the bill of divorce and delivers it to his wife. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he regains his sanity. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted, since they disagreed: If he became deaf-mute, or insane, or became an apostate, or the Court ruled that fat may be eaten, Rebbi Joḥanan said, his sacrifice of purification is pushed aside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his sacrifice of purification is not pushed aside. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi (Joḥanan) [Aḥa] switches traditions, to avoid that a word of Rebbi Joḥanan contradict his own word. For Rebbi Samuel bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One sprinkles the blood of a purification sacrifice or a reparation sacrifice for a person terminally ill. The rabbis of Caesarea said, Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Yasa, one follows the one, the other follows the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:1

MISHNAH: If somebody throws a bill of divorce to his wife while she is in her own house or her own courtyard, she is divorced. If he threw it to her inside his house or his courtyard, even if he was together with her in a bed, she is not divorced. Into her bosom or her wool basket, she is divorced.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:1

MISHNAH: If somebody throws a bill of divorce to his wife while she is in her own house or her own courtyard, she is divorced. If he threw it to her inside his house or his courtyard, even if he was together with her in a bed, she is not divorced. Into her bosom or her wool basket, she is divorced.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:3

But are her garden and her courtyard not subject to her husband’s having the usufruct? Rebbi Joshua in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he writes to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqulah in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah: Even if he did not write to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” It turns out that Rebbi Yannai follows the rabbis and Rebbi Hoshaiah follows Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Yannai follows the rabbis, for the rabbis say, even though the slave’s hand is his master’s hand, he can acquire his document of manumission from [his master’s] hand. But her garden and her courtyard are subject to her husband’s having the usufruct unless he writes to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” It is difficult for the rabbis: since the slave’s hand is his master’s hand, how can he acquire his document of manumission from [his master’s] hand? Rebbi Hoshaiah follows Rebbi Meїr, for Rebbi Meїr said since the wife’s hand is not her husband’s hand, she can acquire her bill of divorce from her husband. Her garden and her courtyard will not be subject to her husband, even if he has the usufruct, even if he did not write to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” If he inherited properties together with her, even if he wrote it is as if he did not write; [for example] if he had married his brother’s daughter, even if he wrote it is as if he did not write. If another person gave her a gift and told her, on condition that your husband have no rights to it, but it is for you to trade on your own account, then even if he did not write it is as if he wrote.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:8

MISHNAH: “You are permitted to any man except to my father and your father, to my brother and your brother, to a slave, a Gentile,” or anybody she is unable to contract a preliminary marriage with, it is valid. “You are permitted to any man except as a widow to the High Priest, a divorcee or one having received ḥalȋṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite girl to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a a bastard or a Gibeonite,” or anybody she could contract a preliminary marriage with even if it is sinful, it is invalid. The essence of the bill of divorce: You are herewith permitted to any man. Rebbi Jehudah says: This shall be for you from me a divorce scroll and a letter of abandonment, to enable you to marry any man you desire. The essence of the bill of manumission: You are a free person, you are on your own.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:10

Rebbi Mana said: He has to be careful not to say “וְדִין”. Rebbi Mana asked: “You are on your own”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one must say: “You are a free person, you are on your own.” The Mishnah said so: “You are a free person, you are on your own.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:10

Rebbi Mana said: He has to be careful not to say “וְדִין”. Rebbi Mana asked: “You are on your own”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one must say: “You are a free person, you are on your own.” The Mishnah said so: “You are a free person, you are on your own.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:10

Rebbi Mana said: He has to be careful not to say “וְדִין”. Rebbi Mana asked: “You are on your own”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one must say: “You are a free person, you are on your own.” The Mishnah said so: “You are a free person, you are on your own.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:11

MISHNAH: Three kinds of bills of divorce are invalid, but if she married, the child is legitimate: If he wrote in his own handwriting but it was not signed by witnesses; it was signed by witnesses but is not dated; it is dated but only one witness signed it. These are three invalid kinds of bills of divorce, but if she married, the child is legitimate.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:15

“Three kinds of bills of divorce are invalid,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: All in handwriting. Rebbi Eleazar asked: There are witnesses; why do I need handwriting? Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: All in handwriting except if its witnesses are with it. Rav Hamnuna said, they testified to their own sin since they agreed to lie by signing on an undated bill of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:21

“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:31

Rebbi Isaac asked: Why do we not say: “either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife?” He turned around and said: Did we state “by her own ḥalîṣah”? Not “by her own ḥalîṣah”! But here either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife. But did we not state, “by intercourse”? Can you say, either by her own intercourse or the intercourse of her cowife? The Mishnah speaks of one sister-in-law; the problem arises for two sisters-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:31

Rebbi Isaac asked: Why do we not say: “either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife?” He turned around and said: Did we state “by her own ḥalîṣah”? Not “by her own ḥalîṣah”! But here either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife. But did we not state, “by intercourse”? Can you say, either by her own intercourse or the intercourse of her cowife? The Mishnah speaks of one sister-in-law; the problem arises for two sisters-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:31

Rebbi Isaac asked: Why do we not say: “either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife?” He turned around and said: Did we state “by her own ḥalîṣah”? Not “by her own ḥalîṣah”! But here either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife. But did we not state, “by intercourse”? Can you say, either by her own intercourse or the intercourse of her cowife? The Mishnah speaks of one sister-in-law; the problem arises for two sisters-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:31

Rebbi Isaac asked: Why do we not say: “either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife?” He turned around and said: Did we state “by her own ḥalîṣah”? Not “by her own ḥalîṣah”! But here either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife. But did we not state, “by intercourse”? Can you say, either by her own intercourse or the intercourse of her cowife? The Mishnah speaks of one sister-in-law; the problem arises for two sisters-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:31

Rebbi Isaac asked: Why do we not say: “either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife?” He turned around and said: Did we state “by her own ḥalîṣah”? Not “by her own ḥalîṣah”! But here either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife. But did we not state, “by intercourse”? Can you say, either by her own intercourse or the intercourse of her cowife? The Mishnah speaks of one sister-in-law; the problem arises for two sisters-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:43

“If he be not redeemed by these.” Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, by these to freedom, by all others to servitude. Rebbi Aqiba says, by these to servitude, by all others to freedom. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both interpret the same verse: “Unless he be redeemed by these.” Rebbi Yose the Galilean interprets: “Unless he be redeemed by these” but by others he is made to serve before he leaves. Rebbi Aqiba interprets: “Unless he be redeemed by these”, by these he completes before he leaves. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In both cases to freedom. It was stated thus: “If his hand achieves,” his own hand. “Or he found for his redemption.” Since his own hand achieves for himself, what others achieve also is for himself.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:43

“If he be not redeemed by these.” Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, by these to freedom, by all others to servitude. Rebbi Aqiba says, by these to servitude, by all others to freedom. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both interpret the same verse: “Unless he be redeemed by these.” Rebbi Yose the Galilean interprets: “Unless he be redeemed by these” but by others he is made to serve before he leaves. Rebbi Aqiba interprets: “Unless he be redeemed by these”, by these he completes before he leaves. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In both cases to freedom. It was stated thus: “If his hand achieves,” his own hand. “Or he found for his redemption.” Since his own hand achieves for himself, what others achieve also is for himself.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:75

If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:75

If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:75

If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:75

If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:90

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:92

Rav Jehudah sent and asked Rebbi Eleazar: Brothers who split? He answered, they divide what they are wearing but not what their sons and daughters are wearing. Rebbi Immi said, if one makes an appraisal for his wife, this is counted for himself and becomes part of the common estate to be distributed. If one makes a necklace for his wife, this is not of the common estate to be distributed if it is to be used on weekdays. But if it is made to be used on holidays, it becomes part of the common estate to be distributed. Rebbi Mana said, holiday dresses are distributed. Sabbath dresses are problematic. It is obvious for Rebbi Abin that both holiday and Sabbath dresses become part of the common estate and are distributed. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What about spherules? He answered, you understand this since you own many spherules. He said to him, they become part of the common estate to be distributed.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:110

HALAKHAH: “If anything is given instead of money,” etc. There, we have stated: “This is the principle: All movables acquire one another.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: Even heaps among heaps. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, we have stated only: “If anything is given instead of money,” anything that needs estimation. It turns out that Rebbi Abba follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar his own opinion, as we have stated there: “Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe, but if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they exchanged kid goats against rams and rams against kid goats. But if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, that was [the recipient’s] part from the first moment. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, they are buyers. But we have stated there: “The buyer and the recipient of a gift are free from animal tithe. Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe.” When they split and then joined again. “But if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” If they never split.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:119

Commandments which the son is obligated to fulfill towards his father. What is fear? He may not sit in his place and may not speak in his stead nor contradict his words. What is honor? He feeds and gives him to drink, clothes him, covers him, and puts on his shoes, leads him out and in. From whose money? Huna bar Ḥiyya said, from the old man’s. Some want to say, from his own. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: From where do we know that even if his father tells him to throw the wallet into the sea that he should obey him? That is, if he has another one and if it helps to quiet his father’s spirit. Both men and women. Only the man has the power in his hand, but the woman does not have the power in her own hand because others have disposition over her. If she is widowed or divorced, the power is in her own hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:119

Commandments which the son is obligated to fulfill towards his father. What is fear? He may not sit in his place and may not speak in his stead nor contradict his words. What is honor? He feeds and gives him to drink, clothes him, covers him, and puts on his shoes, leads him out and in. From whose money? Huna bar Ḥiyya said, from the old man’s. Some want to say, from his own. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: From where do we know that even if his father tells him to throw the wallet into the sea that he should obey him? That is, if he has another one and if it helps to quiet his father’s spirit. Both men and women. Only the man has the power in his hand, but the woman does not have the power in her own hand because others have disposition over her. If she is widowed or divorced, the power is in her own hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:119

Commandments which the son is obligated to fulfill towards his father. What is fear? He may not sit in his place and may not speak in his stead nor contradict his words. What is honor? He feeds and gives him to drink, clothes him, covers him, and puts on his shoes, leads him out and in. From whose money? Huna bar Ḥiyya said, from the old man’s. Some want to say, from his own. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: From where do we know that even if his father tells him to throw the wallet into the sea that he should obey him? That is, if he has another one and if it helps to quiet his father’s spirit. Both men and women. Only the man has the power in his hand, but the woman does not have the power in her own hand because others have disposition over her. If she is widowed or divorced, the power is in her own hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:127

The words of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba disagree, for Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rebbi Yudan, son of Rebbi Simeon bar Ioḥai’s daughter, stated that Rebbi Simeon bar Ioḥai stated: Honoring father and mother is great because the Holy One, praise to Him, preferred it over His own honor. It is said (Ex. 20:12): “Honor your father and your mother,” and it is said (Prov. 3:9): “Honor the Eternal with your property.” How do you honor Him? From your property! One gives gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and peah, one gives terumah, the First and Second Tithes and the tithe for the poor, ḥallah, one makes a sukkah, and lulav,shofar, and tefillin, and ẓiẓit, one feeds the hungry and gives to drink to the thirsty. If you have the wherewhithal, you are obliged for all of these; if you have nothing, you are not obliged even for one of them. But when it comes to honoring father and mother, whether you own property or you do not, you must honor father and mother, even if you are a beggar at people’s doors.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:127

The words of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba disagree, for Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rebbi Yudan, son of Rebbi Simeon bar Ioḥai’s daughter, stated that Rebbi Simeon bar Ioḥai stated: Honoring father and mother is great because the Holy One, praise to Him, preferred it over His own honor. It is said (Ex. 20:12): “Honor your father and your mother,” and it is said (Prov. 3:9): “Honor the Eternal with your property.” How do you honor Him? From your property! One gives gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and peah, one gives terumah, the First and Second Tithes and the tithe for the poor, ḥallah, one makes a sukkah, and lulav,shofar, and tefillin, and ẓiẓit, one feeds the hungry and gives to drink to the thirsty. If you have the wherewhithal, you are obliged for all of these; if you have nothing, you are not obliged even for one of them. But when it comes to honoring father and mother, whether you own property or you do not, you must honor father and mother, even if you are a beggar at people’s doors.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:129

Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Jonathan were sitting together. There came a man and kissed Rebbi Jonathan’s foot. Rebbi Yannai said to him: What kindness did he pay you back for from former days? He said to him: He once came and complained to me about his son that he should support him and I told him, go, assemble a congregation and humiliate him. He said to him, why did you not force him? He said to him, does one force him? He said to him, you still have questions about that? One said, Rebbi Jonathan changed his opinion and fixed it as a tradition in his own name. The result is: Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan, one forces the son to feed his father. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if only all my traditions were so clear to me as this one: One forces the son to feed his father.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:34

MISHNAH: If somebody preliminarily marries a woman and her daughter or two sisters simultaneously, they are not preliminarily married. It happened to five women, among them two sisters, that a man collected a bag of figs from their own property in the Sabbatical year and said: All of you are preliminarily married to me by this bag, and one of them accepted for all of them. Then the Sages said, the sisters are not preliminarily married.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:35

HALAKHAH: “If somebody preliminarily marries a woman and her daughter,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, one understands from this five rules: One understands that five women can be preliminarily married simultaneously. That a woman may receive her own wedding gift and that of her companion. And one may use the spoils of robbery for a preliminary marriage. And one may preliminarily marry using produce acquired by a prohibited act. And preliminary marriage is impossible in incest situations.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:39

Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Alive, but not slaughtered. And Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, Rebbi Meïr learns all sacrifices from animal tithe. Just as one may not become betrothed to a woman with animal tithe, so no sacrifices may be used to become betrothed to a woman. Rebbi Jehudah learns all dedicated things from the firstling. Just as one may become betrothed to a woman with a firstling, so all sacrifices may be used to become betrothed to a woman. The opinion of Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi is inverted. There, he says, alive or slaughtered. But here, he says alive, but not slaughtered. There in his own name, here in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. Even if you say there and here in his own name; if he becomes betrothed while it is still alive and with what is scheduled to fall to him. After slaughter, what is the reason of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi? (Num. 18:18): “Their meat shall be for you, like the breast of weaving.” And what is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi? “Shall be for you”, even after slaughtering. How does Rebbi Joshua ben Levi uphold “shall be for you”? He added another being that it should be eaten during two days and one night.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:39

Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Alive, but not slaughtered. And Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, Rebbi Meïr learns all sacrifices from animal tithe. Just as one may not become betrothed to a woman with animal tithe, so no sacrifices may be used to become betrothed to a woman. Rebbi Jehudah learns all dedicated things from the firstling. Just as one may become betrothed to a woman with a firstling, so all sacrifices may be used to become betrothed to a woman. The opinion of Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi is inverted. There, he says, alive or slaughtered. But here, he says alive, but not slaughtered. There in his own name, here in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. Even if you say there and here in his own name; if he becomes betrothed while it is still alive and with what is scheduled to fall to him. After slaughter, what is the reason of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi? (Num. 18:18): “Their meat shall be for you, like the breast of weaving.” And what is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi? “Shall be for you”, even after slaughtering. How does Rebbi Joshua ben Levi uphold “shall be for you”? He added another being that it should be eaten during two days and one night.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:50

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai: “If your brother, your mother’s son, or your son, or your daughter incites you”. “Your mother in secret,” “your daughter in secret.” A man can be alone with his mother and live with her, with his daughter and live with her, with his sister and does not live with her, and sleep with them with their skins touching. Rebbi Ḥalaphta ben Shaul stated: The daughter with her father up to the age of three years and one day; the son with his mother up to the age of nine years and one day. If they get older, each one sleeps in his own clothing. It was stated: If two people sleep in the same bed, each one covers himself with his own garment and recites {the Šema‘}; if his son or daughter were small it is permitted. There, they say: A man with his wife is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: A man with his wife is problematic.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:50

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai: “If your brother, your mother’s son, or your son, or your daughter incites you”. “Your mother in secret,” “your daughter in secret.” A man can be alone with his mother and live with her, with his daughter and live with her, with his sister and does not live with her, and sleep with them with their skins touching. Rebbi Ḥalaphta ben Shaul stated: The daughter with her father up to the age of three years and one day; the son with his mother up to the age of nine years and one day. If they get older, each one sleeps in his own clothing. It was stated: If two people sleep in the same bed, each one covers himself with his own garment and recites {the Šema‘}; if his son or daughter were small it is permitted. There, they say: A man with his wife is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: A man with his wife is problematic.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 2:10

HALAKHAH: “How is the tooth notorious,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it refers to the first part. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it refers to all. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is responsible. And here, he says so? They said, there in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia; but here, in his own name. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, is it free [from payment]. Rebbi Joḥanan’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is obligated. Not only if the walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down or one which is lying down kicks the walking one. If a walking [animal] kicks a walking one? Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is free [from payment]. But in the case of one lying down against one walking or one who was walking against one walking, it is obligated. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: It always is free. What is Rebbi Hoshaia’s reason; is there no “horn” in the public domain? Rav said, if it stood still and ate from heaped produce, [it is obligated]. Since the leniency for “tooth” is in case it ate walking from the standing; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the one standing still. Ilfai said: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is obligated. Since the leniency for “tooth” is that it ate walking {from the standing} [from the walking]; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the walking one.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:3

If it was filling the entire public domain, if he took it from here and put it down there he would create a “pit”. But could he take a stick and break it or step over it and if it broke, it broke? Let us hear from the following: If a bull mounted another and the [latter’s] owner came to draw away his own, or [the bull] slipped away, and [the attacker] fell down and died, he is free from payment. If he pushed [the attacker] which then fell down and died, he must pay. Could he not tell him, if you had not interferred, I would have paid your damages? But he could have answered, If I had not interferred, you would have paid me half the damage! Think of it, if it was notorious? It is not in your power to drag me through the courts.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:4

Somebody put down an amphora in the public domain and then another person came and put another one close to the first. If the first person comes to take his own and would move [the second] and put it down at another place, he would create a “pit”. But could he take a stick and break it or step over it and if it broke, it broke? Let us hear from the following: If a bull came to mount another and the [latter’s] owner came to draw away his own, if he drew him away before it could mount, and [the attacker] fell down and died, he is free from payment. If he pushed [the attacker] which then fell down and died, he must pay. Rebbi Yose said, we can hear from this that if one saw a flood threatening in his irrigation canal, before the flood reached his field he is permitted to divert the water to another place; after the flood reached his field he is not permitted to divert it to another place. If the chrysargyros was imposed, before [the collector of] chrysargyros arrived, one is permitted to say, X is following my profession, Y is following my professon. Once the [the collector of] chrysarguros arrived, it is forbidden. It is permitted to bribe the quartermaster before the Roman [soldiers] arrive; after the Roman [soldiers] arrive it is forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:4

Somebody put down an amphora in the public domain and then another person came and put another one close to the first. If the first person comes to take his own and would move [the second] and put it down at another place, he would create a “pit”. But could he take a stick and break it or step over it and if it broke, it broke? Let us hear from the following: If a bull came to mount another and the [latter’s] owner came to draw away his own, if he drew him away before it could mount, and [the attacker] fell down and died, he is free from payment. If he pushed [the attacker] which then fell down and died, he must pay. Rebbi Yose said, we can hear from this that if one saw a flood threatening in his irrigation canal, before the flood reached his field he is permitted to divert the water to another place; after the flood reached his field he is not permitted to divert it to another place. If the chrysargyros was imposed, before [the collector of] chrysargyros arrived, one is permitted to say, X is following my profession, Y is following my professon. Once the [the collector of] chrysarguros arrived, it is forbidden. It is permitted to bribe the quartermaster before the Roman [soldiers] arrive; after the Roman [soldiers] arrive it is forbidden.