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2400 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
“If there are males they enable to eat, females do not enable to eat.” If there are males, they enable to eat since there is one doubt, whether he is male or female. A doubt in biblical matters forces restriction. Females do not enable to eat since there are two doubts, whether he is male or female, (after she was betrothed or maybe before she was betrothed.) A doubt regarding their words forces leniency. However you take it, if he is male, everything is his. Female, she takes her part with them.
HALAKHAH: “Who is injured in his lower parts,” etc. “Injured,” I would have said in his eye. The verse says “discharge pipe”, he is injured in the neighborhood of the discharge pipe. If he is injured in the neighborhood of the discharge pipe it might be his eye in the neighborhood of his nose! The verse says, “the lowly”. What comes between his heels. Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Mana, a man’s lowest part when he sits down are his testicles. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is correct. You should know that this is so since in all other cases “generations” are written except in this case since he is infertile. And not only if [a testicle] is injured but also if it is gangrenous, or dried up, or missing. It was stated: Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa says: I heard in the vineyard at Jabne that nobody [born] with only one testicle can be fertile and he is a “sun eunuch”. Rebbi Yose said, I heard that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa but I do not remember from whom I heard it. Rebbi Immi said, certainly Rebbi Yose did not hear it from a minor personality. Samuel said, if a person with only one testicle will come before me, I shall declare him qualified. Rebbi Ḥuna said, because he thinks like Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Yudan ben Ḥanin said, but only the one of the right hand side. There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, yes, my daughter, you are permitted to him. But you should know that he is infertile. Rebbi Ze‘ira praised him for making the case clear.
There, we have stated: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” Rebbi Eleazar said, [Symmachos] and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be guilty because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees to the earlier [part of the Mishnah]. If was found stated, it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition.
Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is the child a bastard following Rebbi Jehudah? He said to him, “No one with a damaged testicle or with cut-off penis may marry” interrupts the argument. It interrupted the argument in the matter of the father’s wife. He retorted, the father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. (Let the father’s wife be selected to teach about bastardy for all incests prohibitions.) Similarly, let the rape victim be selected to teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims. He said to him, the father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Can you say that the rape victim was in a set of all rape victims, that it could teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims? Why cannot the father’s wife be selected to teach about the rape victims in her case? He said to him, is she is the father’s wife, she is not his rape victim; is she is the father’s rape victim, she is not his wife.
Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is the child a bastard following Rebbi Jehudah? He said to him, “No one with a damaged testicle or with cut-off penis may marry” interrupts the argument. It interrupted the argument in the matter of the father’s wife. He retorted, the father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. (Let the father’s wife be selected to teach about bastardy for all incests prohibitions.) Similarly, let the rape victim be selected to teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims. He said to him, the father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Can you say that the rape victim was in a set of all rape victims, that it could teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims? Why cannot the father’s wife be selected to teach about the rape victims in her case? He said to him, is she is the father’s wife, she is not his rape victim; is she is the father’s rape victim, she is not his wife.
MISHNAH: If the child of a priestly woman was mixed up with the child of her slave girl then both may eat heave; they together take one part from the threshing floor, they may not defile themselves by becoming impure for the dead, and they may not marry women enabled or disabled [for the priesthood].
“They together take one part from the threshing floor,” that is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One does not distribute to women and slaves on the threshing floor but one gives them the gifts of priesthood and/or those due to Levites from the barn.
MISHNAH: When the mixed-up children became adults and manumitted one another they may marry women appropriate for the priesthood, may not defile themselves for the dead, but if they became defiled they do not suffer forty lashes. They may not eat heave, but if they ate they do not have to pay its value and and additional fifth. They cannot attend distributions on the threshing floor; they have to sell their heave, but the money is theirs. They have no part in the Temple sacrifices, one does not give them sacrifices, but one cannot take theirs from them. They are exempt from the foreleg, the chin, and the first stomach. Their firstborn animal should graze until it develops a blemish. One charges them with the disabilities of an Israel and those of Cohanim.
MISHNAH: [A woman] did not wait three months after [the death of] her husband, married, and gave birth, and it is not known whether it is a nine months’ child of the first or a seven months’ child of the second. If she had sons from the first and the second, they perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he had brothers from the first or from the second not from the same mother, he may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate and they may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate. If one was an Israel and the other a priest, he may marry a woman appropriate for the priesthood, may not defile himself for the dead, but if he became defiled he does not suffer forty lashes. He may not eat heave but if he ate, he does not have to pay its value and additional fifth. He cannot attend distributions on the threshing floor. He has to sell his heave but the money is his. He has no part in the Temple sacrifices, one does not give him sacrifices but one cannot take his from him. He is exempt from the foreleg, the chin, and the first stomach. His firstborn animal should graze until it develops a blemish. One charges him with the disabilities of an Israel and those of Cohanim. If both were Cohanim, he has to mourn intensely for them and they for him. He may not defile himself for them, they may not defile themselves for him. He does not inherit from them but they inherit from him. He is not prosecutable if he injures or curses either one of them. He may serve on the watch of either one but does not participate in distributions. If both were of the same watch, he takes one part.
MISHNAH: [A woman] did not wait three months after [the death of] her husband, married, and gave birth, and it is not known whether it is a nine months’ child of the first or a seven months’ child of the second. If she had sons from the first and the second, they perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he had brothers from the first or from the second not from the same mother, he may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate and they may perform ḥalîṣah or levirate. If one was an Israel and the other a priest, he may marry a woman appropriate for the priesthood, may not defile himself for the dead, but if he became defiled he does not suffer forty lashes. He may not eat heave but if he ate, he does not have to pay its value and additional fifth. He cannot attend distributions on the threshing floor. He has to sell his heave but the money is his. He has no part in the Temple sacrifices, one does not give him sacrifices but one cannot take his from him. He is exempt from the foreleg, the chin, and the first stomach. His firstborn animal should graze until it develops a blemish. One charges him with the disabilities of an Israel and those of Cohanim. If both were Cohanim, he has to mourn intensely for them and they for him. He may not defile himself for them, they may not defile themselves for him. He does not inherit from them but they inherit from him. He is not prosecutable if he injures or curses either one of them. He may serve on the watch of either one but does not participate in distributions. If both were of the same watch, he takes one part.
It was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: If it had not been written, it would have been impossible to say: This teaches us that when Moses died, he was lying on the wings of the Shekhina about four miles, from the inheritance of the tribe of Reuben to the inheritance of the tribe of Gad, since he died in the inheritance of the tribe of Reuben and was buried in the inheritance of the tribe of Gad. From where that he died in the inheritance of the tribe of Reuben? Because it was said, “the tribe of Reuben built Ḥešbon, Elaleh, Qiryatayim, and Nebo.” And it is written: “Ascend this ‘Abarim mountain, the Mountain of Nebo, and die on the Mountain up which you will climb.” And from where that he was buried in the inheritance of the tribe of Gad? For it was said: “To Gad he said, praised be He Who enlarges Gad, etc. For there the part of the lawgiver is hidden.” The Holy One, praise to Him, added: “He came at the head of the people.” The angels of the service said, “he executed the justice of the Eternal”, and Israel were saying, “and His laws with Israel.” All together were saying: “ May he come in peace, may they rest on their couches, he goes in His pleasure.”
HALAKHAH: “He brought a bowl,” etc. It was stated: “A new one.” Our Mishnah follows Rebbi Eliezer, as we have stated there: “He brought a new earthenware bowl.” Who stated “a new one”? Rebbi Eliezer! Since he explains: “Into an earthenware vessel on fresh water.” Just as the water had no prior use, so the earthenware vessel should not have had any prior use. It is understandable there because he explains: “Into an earthenware vessel on fresh water;” but what may one say here? Rebbi Joḥanan said, because he agrees with Rebbi Ismael. It was stated: From the wash basin. Rebbi Ismael says, water from a fountain. But the Sages approve of all kinds of water. Therefore, Rebbi Eliezer holds with Rebbi Ismael about the water and Rebbi Ismael with Rebbi Eliezer about the earthenware vessel. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says, into a new earthenware vessel. Some Tannaїm state: Into an earthenware vessel but not into a maqqēdah. Some Tannaїm state: Even into a maqqēdah. They wanted to say, he who says, into an earthenware vessel but not into a maqqēdah, is Rebbi Eliezer but those who say, even into a maqqēdah, are the rabbis. It all is the rabbis’. He who says, into an earthenware vessel but not into a maqqēdah, if most of it was removed but a small part was left; he who says, even into a maqqēdah, if a small part was removed but most of it was left.
HALAKHAH: “He brought a bowl,” etc. It was stated: “A new one.” Our Mishnah follows Rebbi Eliezer, as we have stated there: “He brought a new earthenware bowl.” Who stated “a new one”? Rebbi Eliezer! Since he explains: “Into an earthenware vessel on fresh water.” Just as the water had no prior use, so the earthenware vessel should not have had any prior use. It is understandable there because he explains: “Into an earthenware vessel on fresh water;” but what may one say here? Rebbi Joḥanan said, because he agrees with Rebbi Ismael. It was stated: From the wash basin. Rebbi Ismael says, water from a fountain. But the Sages approve of all kinds of water. Therefore, Rebbi Eliezer holds with Rebbi Ismael about the water and Rebbi Ismael with Rebbi Eliezer about the earthenware vessel. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says, into a new earthenware vessel. Some Tannaїm state: Into an earthenware vessel but not into a maqqēdah. Some Tannaїm state: Even into a maqqēdah. They wanted to say, he who says, into an earthenware vessel but not into a maqqēdah, is Rebbi Eliezer but those who say, even into a maqqēdah, are the rabbis. It all is the rabbis’. He who says, into an earthenware vessel but not into a maqqēdah, if most of it was removed but a small part was left; he who says, even into a maqqēdah, if a small part was removed but most of it was left.
Three things have to be executed in the name [of the woman]. “He shall write for her.” “He shall execute for her.” “Or manumission was not given to her.” Three things have to be seen: The ashes of the cow, the dust of the suspected wife, and the spittle of the sister-in-law. Rebbi Ismael stated: Also the blood of the bird for the sufferer from skin disease. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the Sages estimated that the blood of a small bird becomes negligible in a quarter [log] and the blood of a large bird does not render a quarter [log of water] negligible. As it was stated: “In the blood”, should that be only blood? The verse says, “fresh water”. If fresh water, should that be all fresh water? The verse says, “in the blood”. How is this? Fresh water in which the bird’s blood is recognizable. The Sages estimated, a quarter [log]. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The water of a suspected wife becomes disqualified by staying overnight. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abina: Nothing of which the altar has no part becomes disqualified by staying overnight.
There, it was stated: “The following flour offerings have a handful taken and the remainders are eaten.” Rebbi Abba bar Mamal and Rebbi [Samuel] bar Rav Isaac were sitting together. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked from Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: From where [do we know that] the remainders of the ‘Omer offering are eaten? He said to him: Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “Offering of, offering of.” Since “offering of” mentioned there is from barley, so also “offering of” mentioned here is from barley. Since the remainders of the offering of the suspected wife are eaten, so the remainders of the ‘Omer offering are eaten. Rebbi (Aqiba) said: After they got up, Rebbi Abba bar Mamal was standing with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him: Look, how he made your question fly away! From where [do we know that] the remainders of the offering of the suspected wife are eaten? Rebbi Ze‘ira brought Rebbi Isaac Aṭoshiyya, who stated for him: “Any flour offering mixed with oil”. Where do we hold? If about mixed wheat flour, it already had been said. So if it does not refer to mixed wheat flour, apply it to mixed barley flour. Another [baraita] states: “Or dry”. Where do we hold? If about dry wheat flour, it already had been said. So if it does not refer to dry wheat flour, apply it to dry barley flour. Rebbi Yose said, we deal with mixed wheat flour and dry wheat flour, and it was said for a purpose. “[It] shall belong to all sons of Aaron, to each man as to his brother.” A man takes his part even if he is blemished. A minor does not take a part even if he is unblemished. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said: Because the Torah added a detail in one case, can you add that in every case? But “remembrance, remembrance”. “You shall bring,” to include the ‘Omer flour offering in presentations. “He shall present it,” to include the suspected wife’s flour offering in presentations. It is written after that: “What is left from the offering is most holy for Aaron and his sons.”
There, it was stated: “The following flour offerings have a handful taken and the remainders are eaten.” Rebbi Abba bar Mamal and Rebbi [Samuel] bar Rav Isaac were sitting together. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked from Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: From where [do we know that] the remainders of the ‘Omer offering are eaten? He said to him: Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “Offering of, offering of.” Since “offering of” mentioned there is from barley, so also “offering of” mentioned here is from barley. Since the remainders of the offering of the suspected wife are eaten, so the remainders of the ‘Omer offering are eaten. Rebbi (Aqiba) said: After they got up, Rebbi Abba bar Mamal was standing with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him: Look, how he made your question fly away! From where [do we know that] the remainders of the offering of the suspected wife are eaten? Rebbi Ze‘ira brought Rebbi Isaac Aṭoshiyya, who stated for him: “Any flour offering mixed with oil”. Where do we hold? If about mixed wheat flour, it already had been said. So if it does not refer to mixed wheat flour, apply it to mixed barley flour. Another [baraita] states: “Or dry”. Where do we hold? If about dry wheat flour, it already had been said. So if it does not refer to dry wheat flour, apply it to dry barley flour. Rebbi Yose said, we deal with mixed wheat flour and dry wheat flour, and it was said for a purpose. “[It] shall belong to all sons of Aaron, to each man as to his brother.” A man takes his part even if he is blemished. A minor does not take a part even if he is unblemished. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said: Because the Torah added a detail in one case, can you add that in every case? But “remembrance, remembrance”. “You shall bring,” to include the ‘Omer flour offering in presentations. “He shall present it,” to include the suspected wife’s flour offering in presentations. It is written after that: “What is left from the offering is most holy for Aaron and his sons.”
HALAKHAH: “He gives her to drink and after that he sacrifices her offering,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall come into her.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “After that he shall give to the woman to drink.” How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “they shall come into her”? All of them, not part only How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “after that he shall give the water to the woman to drink”? Against her will, without her agreement. Rebbi Simeon agrees with the rabbis that if he gave her to drink and after that presented her offering, it is valid. The rabbis agree with Rebbi Simeon that if he presented her offering and after that gave her to drink, it is valid. What is the difference between them? The commandment. The rabbis say that the flour offering checks her out but Rebbi Simeon says, the water is what checks her out. What is the reason of the Sages? “A flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “They shall come into her.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon’s reason, “they shall come into her”? This teaches that it shakes all her limbs. How does Rebbi Simeon explain the rabbis’ reason, “a flour offering of remembrance remembering iniquity”? This teaches that all iniquities she has committed are remembered at that time.
HALAKHAH: “She does not finish drinking”, etc. But did we not think to say “All of them, not part only”? It is as if somebody said, X did not finish drinking when he started shaking.
Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi accepted the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon and taught accordingly. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen asked before Rebbi Yose: Why Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon? Even following his father, Rebbi Simeon! He said to him, “eating” is on the altar, “burning” is not on the altar. Rebbi Ḥanina objected before Rebbi Mana: Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya disagree: “It cannot be burned completely because of the wife’s part; it cannot be eaten because of the husband’s part.” He said to him, Rebbi accepted the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon, the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya accepted the opinion of the latter’s father Rebbi Simeon.
Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi accepted the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon and taught accordingly. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen asked before Rebbi Yose: Why Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon? Even following his father, Rebbi Simeon! He said to him, “eating” is on the altar, “burning” is not on the altar. Rebbi Ḥanina objected before Rebbi Mana: Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya disagree: “It cannot be burned completely because of the wife’s part; it cannot be eaten because of the husband’s part.” He said to him, Rebbi accepted the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon, the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya accepted the opinion of the latter’s father Rebbi Simeon.
Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Here, she did not drink but in the case of breaking the calf’s neck they did break it. Rav said, she did drink. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would not drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the end say: “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rav say, she would drink? Rebbi Joḥanan said, she would not drink. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the first statement say: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rebbi Joḥanan say, she would not drink? They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel, the Mishnah talks about those whose testimony is invalid. They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel: The Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What does it mean, “the Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous”? He said to him, so says Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This entire chapter [deals with the case that] he had declared his jealousy and she went to a secluded place. She went to a secluded place by the testimony of two [witnesses]. If one of them said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion and about impurity. After the time of seclusion, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw that she did not become impure while in the secluded place, how do you treat this? As a testimony which, if part of the testimony is thrown out, the entire testimony is thrown out, or does one accept the remainder of the testimony? They said in the name of Rebbi Abba Mari: Even he who says, if part of it is thrown out, all is thrown out, here one accepts the remainder of the testimony, since the matter has feet to stand on.
Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Here, she did not drink but in the case of breaking the calf’s neck they did break it. Rav said, she did drink. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would not drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the end say: “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rav say, she would drink? Rebbi Joḥanan said, she would not drink. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the first statement say: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rebbi Joḥanan say, she would not drink? They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel, the Mishnah talks about those whose testimony is invalid. They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel: The Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What does it mean, “the Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous”? He said to him, so says Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This entire chapter [deals with the case that] he had declared his jealousy and she went to a secluded place. She went to a secluded place by the testimony of two [witnesses]. If one of them said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion and about impurity. After the time of seclusion, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw that she did not become impure while in the secluded place, how do you treat this? As a testimony which, if part of the testimony is thrown out, the entire testimony is thrown out, or does one accept the remainder of the testimony? They said in the name of Rebbi Abba Mari: Even he who says, if part of it is thrown out, all is thrown out, here one accepts the remainder of the testimony, since the matter has feet to stand on.
Cahana said, just as they divide here, so they divide at the beginning of the second book of the Pentateuch. Some Tannaïm state: Just as they divide here, so they divide in the standards. The sons of Leah on one side, the sons of Rachel one on one side, the other one on the other side, and the sons of the handmaidens in the middle. Rebbi Mattania said, the reason of this Tanna is: “Hear me, Jacob my servant, Israel my roofed in.” Just as on the roof the thick part of one [beam] is next to the slim part of the other [beam]. Some Tannaïm state: Just as they are split here, so they are split on the stones of the ephod. “In their fulnesses”, that there should be 25 on one side and 25 on the other side. But they are only 49! Rebbi Joḥanan said, “Benjamin” of “and their births” is plene. Rebbi Judah bar Zabida said, Jehoseph is plene, “He put it up as a testimony in Jehoseph.” But they are only 23 on one side and 27 on the other! Rebbi Joḥanan said, Benjamin was split, Ben on one side, Jamin on the other side. Rebbi Zabida said, this is fine. Does it say “their six names”? No, but, “of their names”, not their entire names! The first were written on the right hand side of the High Priest, to the left of the viewer. The last were written on the left hand side of the High Priest, to the right of the viewer. The first ones were not written in order, for Jehudah is king. The last ones were written in order.
Cahana said, just as they divide here, so they divide at the beginning of the second book of the Pentateuch. Some Tannaïm state: Just as they divide here, so they divide in the standards. The sons of Leah on one side, the sons of Rachel one on one side, the other one on the other side, and the sons of the handmaidens in the middle. Rebbi Mattania said, the reason of this Tanna is: “Hear me, Jacob my servant, Israel my roofed in.” Just as on the roof the thick part of one [beam] is next to the slim part of the other [beam]. Some Tannaïm state: Just as they are split here, so they are split on the stones of the ephod. “In their fulnesses”, that there should be 25 on one side and 25 on the other side. But they are only 49! Rebbi Joḥanan said, “Benjamin” of “and their births” is plene. Rebbi Judah bar Zabida said, Jehoseph is plene, “He put it up as a testimony in Jehoseph.” But they are only 23 on one side and 27 on the other! Rebbi Joḥanan said, Benjamin was split, Ben on one side, Jamin on the other side. Rebbi Zabida said, this is fine. Does it say “their six names”? No, but, “of their names”, not their entire names! The first were written on the right hand side of the High Priest, to the left of the viewer. The last were written on the left hand side of the High Priest, to the right of the viewer. The first ones were not written in order, for Jehudah is king. The last ones were written in order.
Would missing limbs disable it? That would not be even like sacrifices of the descendants of Noah! Did not Rebbi Yasa say that Rebbi Eleazar explained to the colleagues: “From all living, from all flesh,” that they should be complete in their limbs? There, some were for the altar, but here, the altar has no part. Rebbi Ḥuna in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Since you say, purgation is written there as for sacrifices, it is as if some of it were for the altar. Does ṭerefa disable it? Since you say, it is as if some of it were for the altar, in that it should be clear to you that ṭerefa disables it. If its foot was undeveloped, as a donkey’s foot, how do you treat that? If you treat it as if missing a limb, can it be enabled? If you treat it as a bodily defect, can it be disabled? Does its blood prepare? Since Rebbi Ḥiyya stated that its blood is impure, its blood prepares.
If somebody claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced witnesses that the [defendant] owes him 50 [zuz]. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya said, [the defendant] has to swear about the remainder. Rebbi Joḥanan says, he does not have to swear. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya learned it from two who are grabbing a toga, as we have stated there: “Two are grabbing a toga, one says, I found it, and the other says, I found it.” The one who grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that that half belongs to him. The other says, “it belongs to me entirely”, and the fact that he grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that this half belongs to him. The one who says, “it belongs to me entirely”, swears that not the entire [toga] is the other’s. But he did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan that this oath is a rabbinic institution, that a man should not see another in the market and tell him, the toga which you are wearing is mine, come and split your toga with me! Rebbi Abin in the name of Rav: My uncle agrees in the case of a document. How is that? He claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced a document that the [defendant] owed him 50 [zuz]. He has only fifty. And Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, we can understand it from the following: “‘The amount of … tetradrachmas’ and it was illegible, he owes no less than two. “If it is more, if the lender says five but the borrower says three, Ben Azzay says since he partially agreed to the claim, he has to swear, but the Sages say, what he agreed to is not of the kind which was claimed. Because it was not of the kind which was claimed! Therefore, if it were of the kind which was claimed, he would be obligated. And is it not here that the agreed sum was part of the claim? Everybody agrees that he owes her a mina. But she claimsanother mina from him, to which he does not agree. The burden of proof is on the claimant.
MISHNAH: In the following cases, one is trustworthy to testify as an adult about what one saw in one’s minority. A man is trustworthy to say, this is my father’s handwriting, my teacher’s handwriting, my brother’s handwriting; I remember that this person went out in hinuma and uncovered hair, or that this man left school to immerse himself to eat heave, or that he took his part with us on the threshing floor, or that this place is bet happeras, or this far we went on the Sabbath. But a person is not trustworthy to say that X had a right of way at this place, or that X had a space for eulogies at this place.
MISHNAH: If he did not write her “the male children you will have from me shall inherit the amount of your ketubah in addition to their part with their brothers”; he is obligated, for this is a stipulation enforced by the court.
HALAKHAH: ““The female children you will have by me,” etc. Rav Ḥisda said, if they became adults, they lost the support. If they married, they lost their dowries. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “If they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries.” Rebbi Abin in the name of Hila: They all agree on the following: If a widow sues the heirs, she says I did not receive my ketubah, but the heirs say you received your ketubah. Before she remarried, the burden of proof is on the heirs that she received her ketubah. After she remarried, the burden of proof is on her that she had not received her ketubah. But did we not state: “If an orphan was married off by her mother or her brother and they wrote her [a dowry of] 150 zuz, after she grows up she can extract from them.” The reason, because she was underage. Therefore, a grown up gave up her claim. Explain it that she had received partial payment. Did not Rebbi Avina say in the name of Rebbi Assi: If a firstborn took as a simple [brother], this is prima facie evidence that he gave up his claim. Still, if she had received part payment. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this one did not take anything from his primogeniture. There came a case before Rebbi Mana, who wanted to act following Rav Ḥisda. Rebbi Ḥananiah said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “if they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries”? He said to him: I quoted a tradition, you quoted a Baraita. Let the tradition be disregarded before the Baraita.
MISHNAH: What a woman finds or makes with her hands belongs to her husband. Of what she inherits he eats the yield during her lifetime. [Payments she receives for] settlements for shame and diminution of value belong to her; Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra says, in case it is covered, she receives two thirds and he one third; in case it is visible, he receives two thirds and she one third. His part shall be given immediately; her part shall be invested in real estate and he eats its yield.
MISHNAH: What a woman finds or makes with her hands belongs to her husband. Of what she inherits he eats the yield during her lifetime. [Payments she receives for] settlements for shame and diminution of value belong to her; Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra says, in case it is covered, she receives two thirds and he one third; in case it is visible, he receives two thirds and she one third. His part shall be given immediately; her part shall be invested in real estate and he eats its yield.
HALAKHAH: “If she decided to bring him money,” etc. “If she decided to bring him 500 denars by appraisal, he makes it 400. If he did not do that but made it 1’000; if she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, he deducts five denars for each tetradrachma, but he cannot touch the addition. If she decided to bring him 500 denars in coin, he makes it 750. If he did not do that but made them 1’000; if she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, he deducts six denars for each tetradrachma, but he cannot touch the addition. If she decided to bring him 1’000 zuz, he must turn them into fifteen minas. If he did not do that but wrote over to her a field worth 12 minas in place of the 1’000 zuz. If she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, one does not decrease for a virgin to less than 200 and for a widow to less than a mina.” Here, you say, he deducts. But there, you say, he does not deduct. Here, if she invalidated part of it, there if she did not invalidate part of it. Here, you say, he touches the addition but there, you say, he does not touch the addition. Here, he added but did not subtract; there, he subtracted but did not add. It was stated: Both for appraisal and for coin. Why for appraisal? Corresponding to what he subtracts, corresponding to what what he adds, corresponding to what she brings.
HALAKHAH: “If she decided to bring him money,” etc. “If she decided to bring him 500 denars by appraisal, he makes it 400. If he did not do that but made it 1’000; if she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, he deducts five denars for each tetradrachma, but he cannot touch the addition. If she decided to bring him 500 denars in coin, he makes it 750. If he did not do that but made them 1’000; if she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, he deducts six denars for each tetradrachma, but he cannot touch the addition. If she decided to bring him 1’000 zuz, he must turn them into fifteen minas. If he did not do that but wrote over to her a field worth 12 minas in place of the 1’000 zuz. If she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, one does not decrease for a virgin to less than 200 and for a widow to less than a mina.” Here, you say, he deducts. But there, you say, he does not deduct. Here, if she invalidated part of it, there if she did not invalidate part of it. Here, you say, he touches the addition but there, you say, he does not touch the addition. Here, he added but did not subtract; there, he subtracted but did not add. It was stated: Both for appraisal and for coin. Why for appraisal? Corresponding to what he subtracts, corresponding to what what he adds, corresponding to what she brings.
MISHNAH: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels, Admon says, since he admitted part of the claim he is made to swear, but the Sages say, what he admitted was not of the kind that was claimed. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement,
How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. Does Rebbi Ismael not agree with this? Everything derives from there. It follows from there that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths and it follows from there that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. How does Rebbi Ismael explain “any person who vows a vow of nazir”? From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir. Does Rebbi Aqiba not agree with this? He agrees and everything derives from there. He agrees that from there a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.
How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. Does Rebbi Ismael not agree with this? Everything derives from there. It follows from there that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths and it follows from there that if part of a vow is invalid, all of it is invalid. How does Rebbi Ismael explain “any person who vows a vow of nazir”? From there that a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir. Does Rebbi Aqiba not agree with this? He agrees and everything derives from there. He agrees that from there a person can obligate himself as nazir while he currently is a nazir.
It was found stated about both cases: It is more restrictive for oaths than for vows that an erroneous oath is forbidden but an erroneous vow is permitted. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi [ ], does Rebbi Aqiba add to the words of the House of Hillel? As we have stated there, “until Rebbi Aqiba came and taught that a vow of which any part was permitted is totally permitted.” He said to him, if you say that there, in the case of a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, you say that a vow of which any part was invalidated is totally invalidated, here, where it does not need investigation by a Sage, so much more! Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because of an erroneous vow; if I had known that my father and my brothers were there I would not have made the vow.
It was found stated about both cases: It is more restrictive for oaths than for vows that an erroneous oath is forbidden but an erroneous vow is permitted. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi [ ], does Rebbi Aqiba add to the words of the House of Hillel? As we have stated there, “until Rebbi Aqiba came and taught that a vow of which any part was permitted is totally permitted.” He said to him, if you say that there, in the case of a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, you say that a vow of which any part was invalidated is totally invalidated, here, where it does not need investigation by a Sage, so much more! Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because of an erroneous vow; if I had known that my father and my brothers were there I would not have made the vow.
MISHNAH: One who makes a vow away from the seafaring men is permitted the dwellers on dry land; from the dwellers on dry land he is forbidden the seafaring men because the seafaring men are part of the dwellers on dry land. [One speaks] not of those who go from Acco to Jaffa but those who frequently take to the sea.
HALAKHAH: “One who makes a vow away from the seafaring men,” etc. That you should not say, not from those who go from Acco to Jaffa but those who frequently take to the sea. “From the dwellers on dry land he is forbidden the seafaring men,” not only those who go from Acco to Jaffa but even those who frequently take to the sea. But did he not make a vow regarding the dwellers on dry land? This implies that the seafaring men are part of the dwellers on dry land. If he made a vow away from the seafaring men after thirty days but [a certain mariner] became a land dweller, there is a dispute between Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba. For Rebbi Ismael says, after the vow, and Rebbi Aqiba says, after the prohibition. And about children it is a problem.
HALAKHAH: “A qônām that I shall not enjoy from the descendants of Noah; he is permitted Jews and forbidden Gentiles. That I shall not enjoy from the descendants of Abraham; he is forbidden Jews and permitted Gentiles,” etc. Is Ismael not part of Abraham’s seed? “ For in Isaac will be called your seed.” And is not Esaw part of Isaac’s seed? Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said, “in Isaac,” in part of Isaac. Rebbi Huna said, “ב” are two, the son who will be inheriting two worlds, this world and the world to come. Rebbi Gershom in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, “ a star did step out from Jacob,” from whom did a star step out and will appear in the future? From Jacob! Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: In the future world, evil Esaw will put on his prayer shawl and sit with the Just in Paradise, but the Holy One, Praise to Him, draws him away. Why? “ If you climb as high as an eagle or if you would make your nest between stars, from there I would take you down, says the Lord.” But “stars” are only the Just. As you say, “those who justify the many are like stars, eternally.”
HALAKHAH: “A qônām that I shall not enjoy from the descendants of Noah; he is permitted Jews and forbidden Gentiles. That I shall not enjoy from the descendants of Abraham; he is forbidden Jews and permitted Gentiles,” etc. Is Ismael not part of Abraham’s seed? “ For in Isaac will be called your seed.” And is not Esaw part of Isaac’s seed? Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said, “in Isaac,” in part of Isaac. Rebbi Huna said, “ב” are two, the son who will be inheriting two worlds, this world and the world to come. Rebbi Gershom in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, “ a star did step out from Jacob,” from whom did a star step out and will appear in the future? From Jacob! Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: In the future world, evil Esaw will put on his prayer shawl and sit with the Just in Paradise, but the Holy One, Praise to Him, draws him away. Why? “ If you climb as high as an eagle or if you would make your nest between stars, from there I would take you down, says the Lord.” But “stars” are only the Just. As you say, “those who justify the many are like stars, eternally.”
HALAKHAH: “A qônām that I shall not enjoy from the descendants of Noah; he is permitted Jews and forbidden Gentiles. That I shall not enjoy from the descendants of Abraham; he is forbidden Jews and permitted Gentiles,” etc. Is Ismael not part of Abraham’s seed? “ For in Isaac will be called your seed.” And is not Esaw part of Isaac’s seed? Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said, “in Isaac,” in part of Isaac. Rebbi Huna said, “ב” are two, the son who will be inheriting two worlds, this world and the world to come. Rebbi Gershom in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, “ a star did step out from Jacob,” from whom did a star step out and will appear in the future? From Jacob! Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: In the future world, evil Esaw will put on his prayer shawl and sit with the Just in Paradise, but the Holy One, Praise to Him, draws him away. Why? “ If you climb as high as an eagle or if you would make your nest between stars, from there I would take you down, says the Lord.” But “stars” are only the Just. As you say, “those who justify the many are like stars, eternally.”
MISHNAH: Partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another are forbidden to enter the courtyard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, each one enters into what is his. Both are forbidden to put up there a grindstone or an oven, or to raise chickens there. If one of them made a vow not to have usufruct from the other, he cannot enter the courtyard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, one can say to the other, I enter into my property, I do not enter into yours. One forces the one who made the vow to sell his part.
HALAKHAH: “Partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another,” etc. The rabbis say, every single [square] hand-breadth is common property of the partners. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, each one enters into what is his. If the courtyard was divided by pebbles, even the rabbis agree. If one of them went and sold his part, even Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees. If they contracted between themselves to concede, it is still in the hands of the partners. It is only needed if they did not contract between themselves to concede; what is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he buys higher and sells lower”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he should not lend him nor ask him for anything,”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And what Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim said, that he should not stay long?
“I enter my property, I do not enter yours.” And you say, one forces him? It was not said on this, but on: “I enter your partner’s property, I do not enter yours.” In that case one forces the [maker of the vow] to sell his part. If he says, you shall not have any usufruct from me. But not if he says, I shall not have any usufruct from you.
HALAKHAH: “If anyone from outside was,” etc. And we did not state “one forces”! Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “If he was a frequent maker of vows, one forces him,” because the other [partner] can say to him, one came to me and you did such and such to him; a second person and you did such and such to him; the third time he tells him either you undo your vow or sell your part.
MISHNAH: What are the institutions of the returnees from Babylonia? For example, the Temple Mount, the courtyards, and the cistern in the middle of the road. What are the institutions of that town? For example, the town square, the bathhouse, the synagogue with the ark and the scrolls. And he writes his part to the Patriarch. Rebbi Jehudah says, one of them writes to the Patriarch and the other to a private person. What is the difference between him who writes to the Patriarch and him who writes to a private person? The one who writes to the Patriarch does not have to perform an act of delivery, the one who writes to a private person has to perform an act of delivery. But the Sages say, in either case one has to perform an act of delivery. Rebbi Jehudah says, the people of Galilee do not have to write since their forefathers already wrote for them.
“Rebbi Jehudah says, even if only one signs over his part to the Patriarch,” etc. So is the Mishnah: One of them has to sign over his part to the Patriarch.
“Rebbi Jehudah says, even if only one signs over his part to the Patriarch,” etc. So is the Mishnah: One of them has to sign over his part to the Patriarch.
“Rabbi Joḥanan said, it is obvious that this one was learned.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is what happened: Jonathan ben Uzziel’s father vowed not to let him have any usufruct from him and in his will gave his part to Shammai. What did Shammai do? He sold some, gave some to the sacred fund, gave him the remainder as a gift, and said: He who wants to attack this gift, let him first get back [the merchandise] from the buyers and from the sacred fund; after that he can get [the remainder] back from this one.
MISHNAH: One who vows not to use the house is permitted the upper floor, the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say that the upper floor is part of the house. One who vows not to use the upper floor is permitted the house.
“One does not have to mention if one of them confirmed it.” Come and see; if the father dissolved, it is not dissolved, and you say so? Not on that it was said, but on the following: If the father dissolved his part but the husband did not have time to dissolve before he died, the father dissolves the husband’s part. Rebbi Nathan said, those are the words of the House of Shammai. But the statement of the Sages is that he does not need to dissolve if [the husband] did not confirm it. But if [the husband] confirmed, [the father] cannot void.
“One does not have to mention if one of them confirmed it.” Come and see; if the father dissolved, it is not dissolved, and you say so? Not on that it was said, but on the following: If the father dissolved his part but the husband did not have time to dissolve before he died, the father dissolves the husband’s part. Rebbi Nathan said, those are the words of the House of Shammai. But the statement of the Sages is that he does not need to dissolve if [the husband] did not confirm it. But if [the husband] confirmed, [the father] cannot void.
You say that the father dissolves the husband’s part. If he wanted to confirm, he says, it is confirmed for you, without details, (it is confirmed for you, without details); the husband’s part is dissolved for you. The following is obvious: If the father did not dissolve his part and she violated her vow, she is whipped. If the father dissolved but the husband did not, would she be whipped? Or since if the husband died and his part became void in favor of the father, would she not be whipped? This follows him who said, death does not force [dissolution]. But following him who said, death does force dissolution, and here since he did not dissolve for her and she violated her vow, she is whipped. It was stated: If the father dissolved his part but the husband died before he could dissolve, the last husband dissolves the part of the first one. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says so: “Her father and her last husband dissolve her vows”.
You say that the father dissolves the husband’s part. If he wanted to confirm, he says, it is confirmed for you, without details, (it is confirmed for you, without details); the husband’s part is dissolved for you. The following is obvious: If the father did not dissolve his part and she violated her vow, she is whipped. If the father dissolved but the husband did not, would she be whipped? Or since if the husband died and his part became void in favor of the father, would she not be whipped? This follows him who said, death does not force [dissolution]. But following him who said, death does force dissolution, and here since he did not dissolve for her and she violated her vow, she is whipped. It was stated: If the father dissolved his part but the husband died before he could dissolve, the last husband dissolves the part of the first one. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says so: “Her father and her last husband dissolve her vows”.
You say that the father dissolves the husband’s part. If he wanted to confirm, he says, it is confirmed for you, without details, (it is confirmed for you, without details); the husband’s part is dissolved for you. The following is obvious: If the father did not dissolve his part and she violated her vow, she is whipped. If the father dissolved but the husband did not, would she be whipped? Or since if the husband died and his part became void in favor of the father, would she not be whipped? This follows him who said, death does not force [dissolution]. But following him who said, death does force dissolution, and here since he did not dissolve for her and she violated her vow, she is whipped. It was stated: If the father dissolved his part but the husband died before he could dissolve, the last husband dissolves the part of the first one. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says so: “Her father and her last husband dissolve her vows”.
You say that the father dissolves the husband’s part. If he wanted to confirm, he says, it is confirmed for you, without details, (it is confirmed for you, without details); the husband’s part is dissolved for you. The following is obvious: If the father did not dissolve his part and she violated her vow, she is whipped. If the father dissolved but the husband did not, would she be whipped? Or since if the husband died and his part became void in favor of the father, would she not be whipped? This follows him who said, death does not force [dissolution]. But following him who said, death does force dissolution, and here since he did not dissolve for her and she violated her vow, she is whipped. It was stated: If the father dissolved his part but the husband died before he could dissolve, the last husband dissolves the part of the first one. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says so: “Her father and her last husband dissolve her vows”.
You say that the father dissolves the husband’s part. If he wanted to confirm, he says, it is confirmed for you, without details, (it is confirmed for you, without details); the husband’s part is dissolved for you. The following is obvious: If the father did not dissolve his part and she violated her vow, she is whipped. If the father dissolved but the husband did not, would she be whipped? Or since if the husband died and his part became void in favor of the father, would she not be whipped? This follows him who said, death does not force [dissolution]. But following him who said, death does force dissolution, and here since he did not dissolve for her and she violated her vow, she is whipped. It was stated: If the father dissolved his part but the husband died before he could dissolve, the last husband dissolves the part of the first one. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says so: “Her father and her last husband dissolve her vows”.
You say that the father dissolves the husband’s part. If he wanted to confirm, he says, it is confirmed for you, without details, (it is confirmed for you, without details); the husband’s part is dissolved for you. The following is obvious: If the father did not dissolve his part and she violated her vow, she is whipped. If the father dissolved but the husband did not, would she be whipped? Or since if the husband died and his part became void in favor of the father, would she not be whipped? This follows him who said, death does not force [dissolution]. But following him who said, death does force dissolution, and here since he did not dissolve for her and she violated her vow, she is whipped. It was stated: If the father dissolved his part but the husband died before he could dissolve, the last husband dissolves the part of the first one. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says so: “Her father and her last husband dissolve her vows”.
HALAKHAH: “If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband,” etc. They wanted to say that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. Let us hear from the following: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’.” This implies that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.
HALAKHAH: “If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband,” etc. They wanted to say that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. Let us hear from the following: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’.” This implies that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.
If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the husband.” They wanted to say, after the husband had dissolved his part. But if the husband had not dissolved his part when he died, the power is not voided in favor of the father. Let us hear from the following: “If she made a vow while being preliminarily married. If she was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.” That means, even if the husband had not dissolved his part and died, his power is voided in favor of the father.
If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the husband.” They wanted to say, after the husband had dissolved his part. But if the husband had not dissolved his part when he died, the power is not voided in favor of the father. Let us hear from the following: “If she made a vow while being preliminarily married. If she was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.” That means, even if the husband had not dissolved his part and died, his power is voided in favor of the father.
If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the husband.” They wanted to say, after the husband had dissolved his part. But if the husband had not dissolved his part when he died, the power is not voided in favor of the father. Let us hear from the following: “If she made a vow while being preliminarily married. If she was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.” That means, even if the husband had not dissolved his part and died, his power is voided in favor of the father.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
“Rebbi Aqiba said, he has to dissolve.” Rebbi Abba said, if she forbids the yields of her work, [vowing] not to work, he can force her up to the weight of five tetradrachmas. More than that he cannot force, for he has to be afraid that she may work more and it turns out that she profits from what is forbidden. Therefore, Rebbi Aqiba says, he has to dissolve his part. Rebbi Hila said, it is impossible for her to make exactly the weight of five tetradrachmas. He could force her up to the weight of five tetradrachmas; more that that he cannot force. He has to be afraid that she might be over the limit by a minute amount; then he would profit from what is forbidden. Therefore ….
MISHNAH: Earlier they said, three categories of women have to be divorced and collect their ketubah: The one who says, I am impure for you, or Heaven is between you and me, or I am separated from the Jews. They changed to say that a woman should not be encouraged to want another man and cause trouble to her husband. If she says, I am impure for you, she should bring proof. Heaven is between you and me, they should try to mediate. I am separated from the Jews, he shall dissolve his part, she shall live with him and be separated from the Jews.
HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: ““I shall be a nazir if a son is born to me,” etc. It is obvious that the end of a day is counted as a full [day]. Is the start of a day counted as a full day? Is that not the Mishnah: “after 70 [days], he reduces to 70,” not even a part? This implies that the start of a day is counted as a full day.
There, we have stated: “Leftovers for nezirim are for nezirim; what is left over from a nazir is for donation.” Rav Ḥisda said, only if his purification offering was presented last. But if his well-being offering waspresented last, what is left over is for a well-being offering. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if his well-being offering was presented last, it is a general rule for a nazir that his leftover be for donation. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “The following are undesignated monies: any which contain money for purification offerings that should die. Even if he designated money for purification offerings that should die, it remains undesignated.” A baraita supports Rav Ḥisda: “This is for my purification offering and the rest for my nezirut. Then he died. One commits larceny with all of them but not with part of them.” It does not say, when he died it should be given for donation.
An animal is not subject to the rules of the non-designated at the beginning, but it is subject to the rules of the non-designated at the end. Money is subject to the rules of the non-designated at the beginning, but it is not subject to the rules of the non-designated at the end. Money is subject to the rules of the non-designated at the beginning, as we have stated: “If he had money not designated, it should be given as donation.” An animal is subject to the rules of the non-designated at the end, as we have stated: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if he brought three animals but did not explain.” They are subject to the rules of the non-designated at the beginning, as we have stated: “ ‘These are for my purification offering, the remainder is for the rest of my nezirut’, when he died. One commits larceny about all but one cannot commit larceny about a part.” It is not subject to the rules of the non-designated at the end, when he brought money and redeemed it for an animal. If he designated a donkey, it is as if he designated money. If he designated an ox, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Julianus, both speak in Shammai’s name. One says, he is like one who designates money; the other says, he is like one who designates an animal.
HALAKHAH: “One is guilty for wine separately, for grapes separately,” etc. It is written: “Also grapes, fresh or dried, he shall not eat.” One understands, since it said “grapes”, do we not know that they are fresh? Why does the verse say, “grapes, fresh or dried”? To declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Ḥizqiah stated: Since at a place where He did not treat the waste of fruits like fruits, He treated fresh and dried equally, here, where He treated the waste of fruits like fruits, would it not be logical that we treat fresh and dried equally? The verse said, “fresh or dried”, to declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Rebbi Hila said: “One may not impound the movable and the fixed part of a flour-mill. “One understands, since it said “the fixed part”, do we not know that the entire mill is understood? Why does the verse say, “the movable and the fixed part”? To declare guilty for either part separately.
HALAKHAH: “One is guilty for wine separately, for grapes separately,” etc. It is written: “Also grapes, fresh or dried, he shall not eat.” One understands, since it said “grapes”, do we not know that they are fresh? Why does the verse say, “grapes, fresh or dried”? To declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Ḥizqiah stated: Since at a place where He did not treat the waste of fruits like fruits, He treated fresh and dried equally, here, where He treated the waste of fruits like fruits, would it not be logical that we treat fresh and dried equally? The verse said, “fresh or dried”, to declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Rebbi Hila said: “One may not impound the movable and the fixed part of a flour-mill. “One understands, since it said “the fixed part”, do we not know that the entire mill is understood? Why does the verse say, “the movable and the fixed part”? To declare guilty for either part separately.
HALAKHAH: “One is guilty for wine separately, for grapes separately,” etc. It is written: “Also grapes, fresh or dried, he shall not eat.” One understands, since it said “grapes”, do we not know that they are fresh? Why does the verse say, “grapes, fresh or dried”? To declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Ḥizqiah stated: Since at a place where He did not treat the waste of fruits like fruits, He treated fresh and dried equally, here, where He treated the waste of fruits like fruits, would it not be logical that we treat fresh and dried equally? The verse said, “fresh or dried”, to declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Rebbi Hila said: “One may not impound the movable and the fixed part of a flour-mill. “One understands, since it said “the fixed part”, do we not know that the entire mill is understood? Why does the verse say, “the movable and the fixed part”? To declare guilty for either part separately.
HALAKHAH: “One is guilty for wine separately, for grapes separately,” etc. It is written: “Also grapes, fresh or dried, he shall not eat.” One understands, since it said “grapes”, do we not know that they are fresh? Why does the verse say, “grapes, fresh or dried”? To declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Ḥizqiah stated: Since at a place where He did not treat the waste of fruits like fruits, He treated fresh and dried equally, here, where He treated the waste of fruits like fruits, would it not be logical that we treat fresh and dried equally? The verse said, “fresh or dried”, to declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Rebbi Hila said: “One may not impound the movable and the fixed part of a flour-mill. “One understands, since it said “the fixed part”, do we not know that the entire mill is understood? Why does the verse say, “the movable and the fixed part”? To declare guilty for either part separately.
HALAKHAH: “An unspecified nezirut is thirty days,” etc. It is written: “A shaving knife shall not pass over his head;” therefore, if it did pass, he is guilty. “His head’s hair grows wildly;” how much means growing hair? 30 days. {That refers to an impure nazir. A pure nazir? “He has to shave his head on the day be becomes pure.” Why does the verse say: “On the seventh day he shall shave all his hair”? That shows that he shaves a second time.} “He shaves,” all, not in part. From here that if he left two hairs, he [did] nothing. “A shaving knife shall not pass over his head.” Not only a shaving knife, from where to treat a cropper and scissors like a shaving knife? The verse says, “shall not pass over his head.” That means not only a shaving knife; all methods of removal are understood. From here that he starts again only for a [shaving knife].
If his foot was cut off, from above the joint there is no “decay”, from below the joint there is “decay”. If it was buried together with him, from below the joint it becomes an attachment to him, from above the joint it does not become an attachment to him. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon: If he bound from below the joint as attachment? He said to them, if it were so, even if it was not cut I should consider it as if cut and it should be an attachment! Since it is connected to him, it forms one body. If there is something missing, can it have “decay”? Let us hear from the following: If it is imcomplete, there is no “decay”, it does not require the surrounding earth, and it is not part of a row of graves. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, how much must be missing that it have no “decay”? Might it follow what we have stated there: “That he will die if it was removed.” Is it the same here? Think of it, if the esophagus was perforated, nothing was missing but he could not survive. You have only the following: If his foot was cut off, from below the joint there is “decay”, from above the joint there is no “decay”. If it was buried together with him, from below the joint it becomes an attachment to him, from above the joint it does not become an attachment to him.
Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: If a man and his wife held on to a bill of divorce; she says, I acquired it, but he says, you did not acquire. Does this refer to the disagreement between Rebbi and Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel? Since they disagreed: If creditor and borrower both hold on to the bond; the creditor says it is mine; I had lost it. The borrower says, it is mine because I paid it off. The document should be verified by its signatories, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, they should split. Rebbi Eleazar said, everything depends on who actually holds the signatures of the witnesses. Where do they disagree? If it was written lengthwise and both hold part of the signatures of the witnesses. He said to him, it is everybody’s opinion that it is not a bill of divorce if all is in her hand but a thread is in his hand, for it is written: “He shall deliver it into her hand,” not unless all be in her hand.
Rebbi Eliezer objected to the rabbis: Just as you hold that one who brings a bill of divorce from one province to another overseas has to say, “it was written and signed before me,” so I hold that one who brings a bill of divorce from one province to another in the Land of Israel has to say, “it was written and signed before me.” Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi said, it happened that one brought a bill of divorce from the harbor of Caesarea. The case came before Rebbi Abbahu who said yes, he has to say that it was written and signed before him. But is the harbor of Caesarea not part of Caesarea? Rebbi Abin said, it was from a departing ship, and it was stated thus: One who brings a bill of divorce from a ship is like one who brings from outside the Land and has to say that it was written and signed before him.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate, but from his own he may separate.
HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.
“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
HALAKHAH: “This is your bill of divorce,” etc. For what? Rebbi Elazar said, for his house; Rebbi Joḥanan said, for places. The Mishnah supports him who said, for his house: “If he came to Acco, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it following him who said that Acco is part of the Land of Israel for bills of divorce. But even if you say that Acco is part of the Land of Israel for bills of divorce, does that mean also for conditions imposed on a bill of divorce?
HALAKHAH: “This is your bill of divorce,” etc. For what? Rebbi Elazar said, for his house; Rebbi Joḥanan said, for places. The Mishnah supports him who said, for his house: “If he came to Acco, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it following him who said that Acco is part of the Land of Israel for bills of divorce. But even if you say that Acco is part of the Land of Israel for bills of divorce, does that mean also for conditions imposed on a bill of divorce?
Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah speaks of a roof with a parapet when it descended lower than the parapet, or one without a parapet when it descended lower than within three handbreadths of the roof, since anything within three handbreadths of the roof is as if it were part of the roof. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna in the name of Rav Ada bar Aḥawa: This refers to the rules of the Sabbath, where anything within three handbreadths of a partition is considered part of the partition. Rebbi Yasa said, they are not comparable, for bills of divorce are about the top, the rules of the Sabbath about the below. For bills of divorce even if it never came to rest, for the Sabbath only if it rested. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only if it descended to within the partitions. Rebbi Immi asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does the Mishnah follow Rebbi, since Rebbi considers partitions as solidly filled up? He said to him, here in the matter of bills of divorce it is everybody’s opinion. Could one not object that Rebbi said, if it is roofed? And you say, it is not roofed? What is the difference between bills of divorce and the Sabbath? Rebbi Abba said, about the Sabbath it is written: “You shall not do any work;” it may make itself automatically. But here “he shall deliver into her hand,” into her domain.
Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah speaks of a roof with a parapet when it descended lower than the parapet, or one without a parapet when it descended lower than within three handbreadths of the roof, since anything within three handbreadths of the roof is as if it were part of the roof. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna in the name of Rav Ada bar Aḥawa: This refers to the rules of the Sabbath, where anything within three handbreadths of a partition is considered part of the partition. Rebbi Yasa said, they are not comparable, for bills of divorce are about the top, the rules of the Sabbath about the below. For bills of divorce even if it never came to rest, for the Sabbath only if it rested. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only if it descended to within the partitions. Rebbi Immi asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does the Mishnah follow Rebbi, since Rebbi considers partitions as solidly filled up? He said to him, here in the matter of bills of divorce it is everybody’s opinion. Could one not object that Rebbi said, if it is roofed? And you say, it is not roofed? What is the difference between bills of divorce and the Sabbath? Rebbi Abba said, about the Sabbath it is written: “You shall not do any work;” it may make itself automatically. But here “he shall deliver into her hand,” into her domain.
HALAKHAH: “Anybody can supplement a bald document,” etc. From where that a document can be knotted? Rebbi Immi said, it is written: “I took the document,” etc. “And [the sealed]”, that is the knotted [document]. “And the open,” that is the simple, part of the knotted. “And the orders and the rules”; orders and rules differ between these, for one is with two {witnesses], the other with three; one in it, the other on its back. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah, on a simple document, the witnesses sign parallel, on a knotted one the witnesses sign lengthwise. Rebbi Idi said, the witnesses sign between any two knots, but it must be on top. But should one not be afraid that maybe he falsifies? Rav Naḥman wanted to argue that witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that two times “I accept” makes it invalid. But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Does Rav Huna not consider that he might write another text, erase and change to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that an erasure makes invalid even if the correction is certified.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah applies if one witness is missing, but only if there are three or more. Two or three at the beginning is invalid, one below the three is valid. Rebbi Mana asked: That is, if they are continuous. If they are with interruptions? As one says, they are considered like testimony at a distance, they only serve to certify the testimony. And so it is here. If there were nine, can he untie two and have two sign? Or are two witnesses on a knotted document nothing? If there were five, it is obvious that he unties one and has it signed. It turns out that his untying permits it following Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel, for Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel says, the essential part is what validates, even if he ties and signs after that. That is, if he ties all knots and after that the first three [witnesses] did sign. But if he tied the first three and had them signed, even if he makes many ties and lets many sign it is valid. Practice is that a knotted document is first knotted and then signed. If he made the first knots and had them signed right away, it is obvious that the first two did not sign the knotted document.
A document which has an erasure or insertion in its main part is invalid; in the routine matter it is valid; but if it was mentioned later it is valid even in the main part. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, one has to mention it at least in the second line before the end of the text. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav: One has to mention the essence of the document with it. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: If one did not mention the essence of the document with it. The argument of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There, Rebbi Ba said in the name of Rav Jeremiah: Disqualified witnesses do not constitute remote testimony since they came only to support the document’s validity. And here, he says so? There, in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah, here in the name of Rav.
A document which has an erasure or insertion in its main part is invalid; in the routine matter it is valid; but if it was mentioned later it is valid even in the main part. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, one has to mention it at least in the second line before the end of the text. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav: One has to mention the essence of the document with it. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: If one did not mention the essence of the document with it. The argument of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There, Rebbi Ba said in the name of Rav Jeremiah: Disqualified witnesses do not constitute remote testimony since they came only to support the document’s validity. And here, he says so? There, in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah, here in the name of Rav.
It is written: “Six years he shall work.” How much does he work? I could think that he leaves at the end of six [years]. The verse says, “and in the seventh he shall leave.” I could think that he leave at the end of seven [years]. The verse says, “six years he shall work.” How is that? He works the entire six and leaves at the start of the seventh. “And in the seventh he shall leave.” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Do you say, the seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world? Since it says, “six years he shall work,” this spells out six years. How can I confirm “and in the seventh he shall leave?” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Say it is the opposite. Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Huna: It is written: “and in the seventh,” “and in the seventh”. Rebbi Ḥuna said, if you say, in the Seventh of the world, what would the Jubilee free? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, this follows him who said that the Jubilee does not become part of a Sabbatical period. But following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, sometimes it falls in the middle of a Sabbatical period. The rabbis of Caesarea say, even following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, we could deduce from here that the Sabbatical year frees the slaves and the Jubilee the pierced ones.
It is written: “Six years he shall work.” How much does he work? I could think that he leaves at the end of six [years]. The verse says, “and in the seventh he shall leave.” I could think that he leave at the end of seven [years]. The verse says, “six years he shall work.” How is that? He works the entire six and leaves at the start of the seventh. “And in the seventh he shall leave.” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Do you say, the seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world? Since it says, “six years he shall work,” this spells out six years. How can I confirm “and in the seventh he shall leave?” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Say it is the opposite. Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Huna: It is written: “and in the seventh,” “and in the seventh”. Rebbi Ḥuna said, if you say, in the Seventh of the world, what would the Jubilee free? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, this follows him who said that the Jubilee does not become part of a Sabbatical period. But following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, sometimes it falls in the middle of a Sabbatical period. The rabbis of Caesarea say, even following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, we could deduce from here that the Sabbatical year frees the slaves and the Jubilee the pierced ones.
It is written: “Six years he shall work.” How much does he work? I could think that he leaves at the end of six [years]. The verse says, “and in the seventh he shall leave.” I could think that he leave at the end of seven [years]. The verse says, “six years he shall work.” How is that? He works the entire six and leaves at the start of the seventh. “And in the seventh he shall leave.” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Do you say, the seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world? Since it says, “six years he shall work,” this spells out six years. How can I confirm “and in the seventh he shall leave?” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Say it is the opposite. Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Huna: It is written: “and in the seventh,” “and in the seventh”. Rebbi Ḥuna said, if you say, in the Seventh of the world, what would the Jubilee free? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, this follows him who said that the Jubilee does not become part of a Sabbatical period. But following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, sometimes it falls in the middle of a Sabbatical period. The rabbis of Caesarea say, even following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, we could deduce from here that the Sabbatical year frees the slaves and the Jubilee the pierced ones.
Rav Jehudah sent and asked Rebbi Eleazar: Brothers who split? He answered, they divide what they are wearing but not what their sons and daughters are wearing. Rebbi Immi said, if one makes an appraisal for his wife, this is counted for himself and becomes part of the common estate to be distributed. If one makes a necklace for his wife, this is not of the common estate to be distributed if it is to be used on weekdays. But if it is made to be used on holidays, it becomes part of the common estate to be distributed. Rebbi Mana said, holiday dresses are distributed. Sabbath dresses are problematic. It is obvious for Rebbi Abin that both holiday and Sabbath dresses become part of the common estate and are distributed. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What about spherules? He answered, you understand this since you own many spherules. He said to him, they become part of the common estate to be distributed.