pay
1181 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: Somebody who lent to another by a document collects from encumbered property, by witnesses collects from free property. If he presents a note in his own handwriting that he owes him, he collects from free property. From a guarantor who endorsed after the signature of the witnesses, one collects from free property. This case came before Rebbi Ismael who said, he collects from free property. Ben Nannas said to him, he collects neither from encumbered nor from free property. He asked, why? He answered, if one would strangle another in the market place and a third person would say, let him go, I shall pay you, he is not liable since the loan was not made on his faith. Who is the guarantor who is liable? If he told him, “lend to him and I shall pay you,” he is liable because the loan was extended on his faith. Rebbi Ismael said, anybody who wants to train to become wise should study the laws of money matters since nothing greater is there in the Torah; they are like a flowing source, and anybody wanting to study the laws of money matters should serve Simeon ben Nannas.
Samuel said, if two men acted as judges, their judgment stands, but they are called an insolent court. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both are instructing: Even if two men acted as judges, their judgment is no judgment. There, we have stated: “If he rendered judgment, acquitted the guilty and condemned the innocent, declared the pure impure or the impure pure, what he did is done but he has to pay from his own pocket.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: if they told him, we accept you as if you were two. What are we dealing with? If his error was that he judged them on his discretion, then what he did is done. If his error was that he judged them by Torah law, why should he pay from his own pocket? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: if they told him, we accept you as if you were three on condition that you judge us by Torah law. He erred and judged them on his discretion. What he did is done, but since he erred and judged them on his discretion, he has to pay from his own pocket because he was presumptuous to judge alone by Torah law, as we have stated: “Do not judge sitting alone, for only One judges sitting alone.”
Samuel said, if two men acted as judges, their judgment stands, but they are called an insolent court. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both are instructing: Even if two men acted as judges, their judgment is no judgment. There, we have stated: “If he rendered judgment, acquitted the guilty and condemned the innocent, declared the pure impure or the impure pure, what he did is done but he has to pay from his own pocket.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: if they told him, we accept you as if you were two. What are we dealing with? If his error was that he judged them on his discretion, then what he did is done. If his error was that he judged them by Torah law, why should he pay from his own pocket? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: if they told him, we accept you as if you were three on condition that you judge us by Torah law. He erred and judged them on his discretion. What he did is done, but since he erred and judged them on his discretion, he has to pay from his own pocket because he was presumptuous to judge alone by Torah law, as we have stated: “Do not judge sitting alone, for only One judges sitting alone.”
Samuel said, if two men acted as judges, their judgment stands, but they are called an insolent court. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both are instructing: Even if two men acted as judges, their judgment is no judgment. There, we have stated: “If he rendered judgment, acquitted the guilty and condemned the innocent, declared the pure impure or the impure pure, what he did is done but he has to pay from his own pocket.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: if they told him, we accept you as if you were two. What are we dealing with? If his error was that he judged them on his discretion, then what he did is done. If his error was that he judged them by Torah law, why should he pay from his own pocket? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: if they told him, we accept you as if you were three on condition that you judge us by Torah law. He erred and judged them on his discretion. What he did is done, but since he erred and judged them on his discretion, he has to pay from his own pocket because he was presumptuous to judge alone by Torah law, as we have stated: “Do not judge sitting alone, for only One judges sitting alone.”
Rebbi Abbahu asked: Following Rebbi Meïr, should an ox which is stoned have to pay damages by a court of three and be stoned by 23? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun told him, the rules of an ox which is stoned are all about money; it is a decision of the verse that it should be stoned.
“Capital crimes [are judged] by 23.” Rebbi Abbahu asked: Following Rebbi Meïr, should an ox which is stoned have to pay damages by a court of three and be stoned by 23? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun told him, the rules of an ox which is stoned are all about money; it is a decision of the verse that it should be stoned.
He was with David at Efes Dammim. Rebbi Joḥanan said, at the red field. But Rebbi Samuel said, from there the money stopped. The Philistines assembled, etc. Rebbi Jacob from Kefar Ḥanan said, they were lentils but a kernel was as good as a barley grain. Rebbi Levi said, this describes the Philistines who came straight as barley and went away low as lentils, as one verse says, there was a field full of barley, and one said, full of lentils. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, it was one year but concerning two fields, one of barley and one of lentils. It was obvious to him that he might destroy it and pay for the damage. Perhaps it was obvious to him that he might destroy it and not pay for the damage? Which one might he destroy and for which one would he have to pay? For the one of lentils or the one of barley? For the one of lentils grows human food, the one of barley animal feed. The one of lentils will not be obligated for ḥallah, barley will be obligated for ḥallah. The ˋomer comes from barley; ˋomer cannot be brought from lentils. But the rabbis said, it was one field and two years. Does one infer from last year, or does one not infer from one year to the next? They stood up in the property and saved it. One verse says, they saved it, and one says, he saved it. This shows that he returned it to its owner and it was dear to him as if it had been a field of saffron.
He was with David at Efes Dammim. Rebbi Joḥanan said, at the red field. But Rebbi Samuel said, from there the money stopped. The Philistines assembled, etc. Rebbi Jacob from Kefar Ḥanan said, they were lentils but a kernel was as good as a barley grain. Rebbi Levi said, this describes the Philistines who came straight as barley and went away low as lentils, as one verse says, there was a field full of barley, and one said, full of lentils. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, it was one year but concerning two fields, one of barley and one of lentils. It was obvious to him that he might destroy it and pay for the damage. Perhaps it was obvious to him that he might destroy it and not pay for the damage? Which one might he destroy and for which one would he have to pay? For the one of lentils or the one of barley? For the one of lentils grows human food, the one of barley animal feed. The one of lentils will not be obligated for ḥallah, barley will be obligated for ḥallah. The ˋomer comes from barley; ˋomer cannot be brought from lentils. But the rabbis said, it was one field and two years. Does one infer from last year, or does one not infer from one year to the next? They stood up in the property and saved it. One verse says, they saved it, and one says, he saved it. This shows that he returned it to its owner and it was dear to him as if it had been a field of saffron.
He was with David at Efes Dammim. Rebbi Joḥanan said, at the red field. But Rebbi Samuel said, from there the money stopped. The Philistines assembled, etc. Rebbi Jacob from Kefar Ḥanan said, they were lentils but a kernel was as good as a barley grain. Rebbi Levi said, this describes the Philistines who came straight as barley and went away low as lentils, as one verse says, there was a field full of barley, and one said, full of lentils. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, it was one year but concerning two fields, one of barley and one of lentils. It was obvious to him that he might destroy it and pay for the damage. Perhaps it was obvious to him that he might destroy it and not pay for the damage? Which one might he destroy and for which one would he have to pay? For the one of lentils or the one of barley? For the one of lentils grows human food, the one of barley animal feed. The one of lentils will not be obligated for ḥallah, barley will be obligated for ḥallah. The ˋomer comes from barley; ˋomer cannot be brought from lentils. But the rabbis said, it was one field and two years. Does one infer from last year, or does one not infer from one year to the next? They stood up in the property and saved it. One verse says, they saved it, and one says, he saved it. This shows that he returned it to its owner and it was dear to him as if it had been a field of saffron.
Rebbi Jehudah said, I heard that if the judge wants to let both of them sit, he may tell them to sit down. Rebbi Ismael says, one says to him, either you dress as he is dressed or pay him to be dressed as you are.
“Qualified one but not disqualified one.” For it is said, if he does not tell, he has to bear his punishment. If he told, the other would have to pay money. This excludes one where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.
“Qualified one but not disqualified one.” For it is said, if he does not tell, he has to bear his punishment. If he told, the other would have to pay money. This excludes one where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.
“Outside of court.” If he does not tell, he has to bear his punishment. If he told, one would have to pay money. This excludes outside of court where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.
“Outside of court.” If he does not tell, he has to bear his punishment. If he told, one would have to pay money. This excludes outside of court where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.
It is written: At that moment Joshua dedicated them as hewers of wood and drawers of water for the congregation. One understands “for the congregation.” But “for the Eternal’s altar”? But Joshua kept them in limbo. He said, I shall [neither] exclude nor include them. But he who sometime in the future will build the Temple, if he wants to include he may include, if he wants to exclude he may exclude. David came and excluded them as it is said: But the Gibeonites are not part of the Children of Israel. Why did he exclude them? Because there was a famine in David’s time, three years year after year. David said, for three sins the rains are locked away: Foreign worship, incest and adultery, and murder. Foreign worship, as it is written: Beware, lest you be seduced and next to it, He locks the sky up. Incest and adultery, as it is written Rain-showers were withheld, there was no late rain, for you had the forehead of a whoring woman. Murder, as it is written: Because blood will distort the Land. Some say, also those who publicly promise money for welfare but do not pay, as it is written: Clouds and wind but no rain means the man who boasts with lying gifts. David checked on all his ways and did not find any of them. He turned to ask the Urim and Tummim. That is what is written: David asked before the Eternal. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is written: Ask the Eternal, all the meek of the Land, who execute His Law, etc. The Eternal said, because of Saul and the House of blood-guilt, for he had killed the Gibeonites. Because of Saul, whom you did not grant the last favor, and because of the House of blood-guilt, for he had killed the Gibeonites. David sent and called them. He asked them, what is between you and the House of Saul? They told him, because he killed seven of our men, two hewers of wood, two drawers of water, a scribe, a religious leader, and a beadle. He asked them, what do you want now? They said to him, May there be given to us seven men … and we shall hang them before the Eternal in Gibeon. He said to them, what use is it to you that they be killed? Take silver and gold for yourselves! But they answered, there is no silver or gold for us from Saul and his house. He said, maybe they are afraid one of the other; he dealt which each of them separately, trying to mollify him by himself, but nobody accepted it. That is what is written, there is no silver or gold for us, it is written for me. At this moment, David said that the Holy One gave three good gifts to Israel: They are decent, merciful, and charitable. Decent, for it is written: that His fear be on your faces. Merciful, for it is written: He gave you mercy, had mercy on you and increased you. Charitable, for it is written: The Eternal, your God, kept for you covenant and charity. But these, nothing of this is found in them; he excluded them: But the Gibeonites are not of the Children of Israel. And Ezra also excluded them, as it is said: And the dedicated ones dwelt in the Ophel; Ziha and Gishpa were of the dedicated ones. Also in the future, the Holy One, praise to Him, will exclude them as it is written: The city worker will cultivate it, from all tribes of Israel. He will eliminate them from all tribes of Israel.
HALAKHAH: “If he stole from his father,” etc. From where a first warning about stealing: you shall not steal. From where a second warning about stealing: you shall not steal. You shall not steal, in order to aggravate; you shall not steal, in order to pay double restitution, in order to pay quadruple or quintuple restitution. Ben Bagbag says, do not steal your own property from the thief, lest you be seen stealing.
HALAKHAH: “If he stole from his father,” etc. From where a first warning about stealing: you shall not steal. From where a second warning about stealing: you shall not steal. You shall not steal, in order to aggravate; you shall not steal, in order to pay double restitution, in order to pay quadruple or quintuple restitution. Ben Bagbag says, do not steal your own property from the thief, lest you be seen stealing.
The following is obvious: A murderer who broke vessels or otherwise caused damage is liable to pay. If he continued to break until he came to the town, Rebbi Zeˋira and Rebbi Hoshaia: One said, he pays, the other said, he does not pay. If the pursuer becomes the pursued, may one save the pursuer through the person of the pursued? An adult (who became) a minor, may one save the adult through the person of the minor? Rebbi Jeremiah objected, did we not state: “If his head and most of his body were born, one does not touch him, for one does not push aside one life for another.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav Ḥisda: It is different there since you do not know who is killing whom.
The following is obvious: A murderer who broke vessels or otherwise caused damage is liable to pay. If he continued to break until he came to the town, Rebbi Zeˋira and Rebbi Hoshaia: One said, he pays, the other said, he does not pay. If the pursuer becomes the pursued, may one save the pursuer through the person of the pursued? An adult (who became) a minor, may one save the adult through the person of the minor? Rebbi Jeremiah objected, did we not state: “If his head and most of his body were born, one does not touch him, for one does not push aside one life for another.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav Ḥisda: It is different there since you do not know who is killing whom.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody injures another person,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not [criminally] liable but the Sages declare him [criminally] liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other one is executed because of him? But even if he dies according to the first estimation, he cannot be prosecuted. What is the rabbi’s reason? If he does not die but is bedridden. Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they did not estimate that he would die. If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is [criminally] liable. But if they estimated that he would die? If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: But he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? “But he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” For him who said, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, does he have to pay? For him who said, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay, one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would live but he died, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. This implies that the estimate was wrong. If you would say, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay, he should pay from the first moment. A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would die but he lived, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.” That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody injures another person,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not [criminally] liable but the Sages declare him [criminally] liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other one is executed because of him? But even if he dies according to the first estimation, he cannot be prosecuted. What is the rabbi’s reason? If he does not die but is bedridden. Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they did not estimate that he would die. If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is [criminally] liable. But if they estimated that he would die? If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: But he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? “But he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” For him who said, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, does he have to pay? For him who said, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay, one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would live but he died, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. This implies that the estimate was wrong. If you would say, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay, he should pay from the first moment. A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would die but he lived, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.” That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody injures another person,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not [criminally] liable but the Sages declare him [criminally] liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other one is executed because of him? But even if he dies according to the first estimation, he cannot be prosecuted. What is the rabbi’s reason? If he does not die but is bedridden. Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they did not estimate that he would die. If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is [criminally] liable. But if they estimated that he would die? If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: But he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? “But he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” For him who said, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, does he have to pay? For him who said, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay, one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would live but he died, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. This implies that the estimate was wrong. If you would say, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay, he should pay from the first moment. A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would die but he lived, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.” That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody injures another person,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not [criminally] liable but the Sages declare him [criminally] liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other one is executed because of him? But even if he dies according to the first estimation, he cannot be prosecuted. What is the rabbi’s reason? If he does not die but is bedridden. Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they did not estimate that he would die. If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is [criminally] liable. But if they estimated that he would die? If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: But he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? “But he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” For him who said, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, does he have to pay? For him who said, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay, one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would live but he died, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. This implies that the estimate was wrong. If you would say, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay, he should pay from the first moment. A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would die but he lived, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.” That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody injures another person,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not [criminally] liable but the Sages declare him [criminally] liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other one is executed because of him? But even if he dies according to the first estimation, he cannot be prosecuted. What is the rabbi’s reason? If he does not die but is bedridden. Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they did not estimate that he would die. If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is [criminally] liable. But if they estimated that he would die? If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: But he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? “But he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” For him who said, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, does he have to pay? For him who said, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay, one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would live but he died, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. This implies that the estimate was wrong. If you would say, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay, he should pay from the first moment. A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would die but he lived, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.” That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody injures another person,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not [criminally] liable but the Sages declare him [criminally] liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other one is executed because of him? But even if he dies according to the first estimation, he cannot be prosecuted. What is the rabbi’s reason? If he does not die but is bedridden. Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they did not estimate that he would die. If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is [criminally] liable. But if they estimated that he would die? If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: But he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? “But he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” For him who said, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, does he have to pay? For him who said, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay, one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would live but he died, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. This implies that the estimate was wrong. If you would say, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay, he should pay from the first moment. A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would die but he lived, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.” That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody injures another person,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not [criminally] liable but the Sages declare him [criminally] liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other one is executed because of him? But even if he dies according to the first estimation, he cannot be prosecuted. What is the rabbi’s reason? If he does not die but is bedridden. Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they did not estimate that he would die. If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is [criminally] liable. But if they estimated that he would die? If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: But he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? “But he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” For him who said, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, does he have to pay? For him who said, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay, one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would live but he died, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. This implies that the estimate was wrong. If you would say, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay, he should pay from the first moment. A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would die but he lived, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.” That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody injures another person,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not [criminally] liable but the Sages declare him [criminally] liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other one is executed because of him? But even if he dies according to the first estimation, he cannot be prosecuted. What is the rabbi’s reason? If he does not die but is bedridden. Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they did not estimate that he would die. If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is [criminally] liable. But if they estimated that he would die? If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: But he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? “But he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” For him who said, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, does he have to pay? For him who said, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay, one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would live but he died, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. This implies that the estimate was wrong. If you would say, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay, he should pay from the first moment. A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would die but he lived, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.” That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody injures another person,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not [criminally] liable but the Sages declare him [criminally] liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other one is executed because of him? But even if he dies according to the first estimation, he cannot be prosecuted. What is the rabbi’s reason? If he does not die but is bedridden. Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they did not estimate that he would die. If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is [criminally] liable. But if they estimated that he would die? If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: But he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? “But he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” For him who said, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, does he have to pay? For him who said, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay, one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would live but he died, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. This implies that the estimate was wrong. If you would say, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay, he should pay from the first moment. A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would die but he lived, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.” That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody injures another person,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not [criminally] liable but the Sages declare him [criminally] liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other one is executed because of him? But even if he dies according to the first estimation, he cannot be prosecuted. What is the rabbi’s reason? If he does not die but is bedridden. Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they did not estimate that he would die. If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is [criminally] liable. But if they estimated that he would die? If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: But he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? “But he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” For him who said, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, does he have to pay? For him who said, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay, one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would live but he died, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. This implies that the estimate was wrong. If you would say, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay, he should pay from the first moment. A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would die but he lived, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.” That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody injures another person,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not [criminally] liable but the Sages declare him [criminally] liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other one is executed because of him? But even if he dies according to the first estimation, he cannot be prosecuted. What is the rabbi’s reason? If he does not die but is bedridden. Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they did not estimate that he would die. If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is [criminally] liable. But if they estimated that he would die? If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: But he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? “But he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” For him who said, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, does he have to pay? For him who said, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay, one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would live but he died, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. This implies that the estimate was wrong. If you would say, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay, he should pay from the first moment. A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would die but he lived, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.” That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.
If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if his hand is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the hand? Let us hear from the following: If people quarrel, if people brawl. Is not brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, if people quarrel, if people brawl? To apply the rules of the intended to the unintended and of the unintended to the intended. One understands from the intended to the unintended. Of the unintended to the intended? It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if his hand is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the hand? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand.
If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if his hand is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the hand? Let us hear from the following: If people quarrel, if people brawl. Is not brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, if people quarrel, if people brawl? To apply the rules of the intended to the unintended and of the unintended to the intended. One understands from the intended to the unintended. Of the unintended to the intended? It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if his hand is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the hand? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand.
If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if his hand is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the hand? Let us hear from the following: If people quarrel, if people brawl. Is not brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, if people quarrel, if people brawl? To apply the rules of the intended to the unintended and of the unintended to the intended. One understands from the intended to the unintended. Of the unintended to the intended? It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if his hand is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the hand? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand.
If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if his hand is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the hand? Let us hear from the following: If people quarrel, if people brawl. Is not brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, if people quarrel, if people brawl? To apply the rules of the intended to the unintended and of the unintended to the intended. One understands from the intended to the unintended. Of the unintended to the intended? It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if his hand is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the hand? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand.
“If one intended to kill an animal,” etc. Rebbi Isaac asked: If they estimated that he would survive but he died; is it not common for the living to die? Since it is written but he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs, he is liable to pay for disability and medical costs. Rebbi Isaac asked: If they estimated that he would die but he survived; is it not common for the dying to live. Since it is written but he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs, he is liable to pay for disability and medical costs.
“If one intended to kill an animal,” etc. Rebbi Isaac asked: If they estimated that he would survive but he died; is it not common for the living to die? Since it is written but he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs, he is liable to pay for disability and medical costs. Rebbi Isaac asked: If they estimated that he would die but he survived; is it not common for the dying to live. Since it is written but he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs, he is liable to pay for disability and medical costs.
“If one intended to kill an animal,” etc. Rebbi Isaac asked: If they estimated that he would survive but he died; is it not common for the living to die? Since it is written but he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs, he is liable to pay for disability and medical costs. Rebbi Isaac asked: If they estimated that he would die but he survived; is it not common for the dying to live. Since it is written but he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs, he is liable to pay for disability and medical costs.
“If one intended to kill an animal,” etc. Rebbi Isaac asked: If they estimated that he would survive but he died; is it not common for the living to die? Since it is written but he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs, he is liable to pay for disability and medical costs. Rebbi Isaac asked: If they estimated that he would die but he survived; is it not common for the dying to live. Since it is written but he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs, he is liable to pay for disability and medical costs.
A majority of merits and a minority of transgressions: they let him pay for the minority of transgressions in this world in order to give him his complete recompense in the Future World. A majority of transgressions and a minority of merits: they give him the reward for his merits in this world in order to make him pay completely in the Future World.
A majority of merits and a minority of transgressions: they let him pay for the minority of transgressions in this world in order to give him his complete recompense in the Future World. A majority of transgressions and a minority of merits: they give him the reward for his merits in this world in order to make him pay completely in the Future World.
It is written: In his days did Ḥiel from Bet-El build Jericho; with his first-born Aviram he set the foundation and with his youngest son Seguv he put in the doors. Ḥiel is from the descendants of Josaphat, Jericho is in the territory of Benjamin. Only that good deeds are put in the hands of the worthy and bad deeds in the hands of the unworthy; therefore, it is said, with his first-born Aviram he set the foundation and with his youngest son Seguv he put in the doors. If it was not appropriate for him to learn from his firstborn Aviram, should he not have learned from the wicked Seguv? Because they wanted to make more money, the curse ruled over them and they were continuously weakened to confirm what was said, following the word of the Eternal, the God of Israel, which He had spoken through Joshua ben Nun. It is written: Elijah the Tisbite, from the inhabitants of Gilead, said to Aḥab: By the Living Eternal, the God of Israel, before Whom I stood, there will not be dew or rain in the coming years except by my word. What is the connection between these? The Holy One, praise to Him, had said to Elijah: this Ḥiel is an important personality, go and pay a visit of condolence. He answered, I do not want to go. He asked, why? He said, for if I go and they say things that enrage You, I shall not be able to bear it. He told him, If they say anything that would enrage Me, anything that you decide I shall fulfill. He went and found them discussing the verse: At that time, Joshua imprecated as follows: Cursed be the man before the Eternal who would build this town, Jericho; with his first-born he shall put in the foundation and with his youngest set the doors. He said, praised be the God of the just, Who fulfills the words of the just. Aḥab also was there. Aḥab said to them, who is greater, Moses or Joshua? They told him, Moses. He said to them, in Moses’s Torah it is written: Watch yourselves, lest your hearts be seduced, you deviate, and worship other powers and bow down before them. What is written next? The rage of the Eternal will burn against you, He will lock up the sky and there will be no rain. But I did not leave any strange worship that I would not have worshipped, and all good and comforting things came in my generation. He did not uphold the words of Moses; would He uphold Joshua’s words? Elijah told him, it is as you say, by the Living Eternal, the God of Israel, before Whom I stood, there will not be dew or rain in the coming years except by my word. When he heard this, he started crying. That is what is written: When Aḥab heard these words, he tore his garments, put sackcloth on his flesh, fasted, slept in sackcloth and went at. How long did he fast? He fasted for three hours. If he was used to eat at 6 o’clock, he ate at noontime. If he was used to eat at noontime, he ate at three p.m. He went at. What is at? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, he went barefoot. It is written: The word of the Eternal went to Elijah the Tisbite as follows: Did you see that Aḥab surrendered before me? The Holy One, praise to Him, said to Elijah: See the good part which I put in My world. A person may sin greatly before Me, but if he repents I am accepting him. That is what is written, did you see that Aḥab surrendered before Me? You saw that Aḥab repented. Because Aḥab surrendered before me, I shall not bring the evil in his days; in his son’s days I shall bring the evil over his dynasty.
Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: at the time when they voted and said that three kings and four private persons had no part in the Future World, there came a disembodied voice and said, does it pay for you that you oppose, that you choose, not I, and what can you say? They wanted to include Solomon with them. David came and bowed down before them, but some say that fire came out of the Holiest of Holies and flared around them. Hadar IIla was used to be answered when he prayed. From the time he voted with them he prayed but was not answered. The interpreters of hints say, all of them have part in the Future World. What is the reason? Mine is Gilead, mine is Manasse, Ephraim my main fortress, Jehudah is my scepter, Moab my washing trough, at Edom I shall throw my shoe. Mine is Gilead, that is Ahab, king of Israel, who fell at Ramot Gilead. Mine is Manasse, its plain meaning. Ephraim my main fortress, that is Jeroboam ben Nevat the Ephraimite. Jehudah is my scepter, that is Aḥitophel. Moab my washing trough, that is Geḥazi. At Edom I shall throw my shoe, that is Doëg the Edomite. Israel said before the Holy One, praise to Him: Master of all Worlds, what can we do if David, King of Israel, cursed them? Men of blood and deceit shall not live to half of their days! He told them, it is up to Me to make them friends one to the other. For me Peleshet is friendly; to me Peleshet makes friends; it is up to Me to lead them to good deeds and to make them friends one to the other.
HALAKHAH: From where a first warning about stealing: you shall not steal. From where a second warning about stealing: you shall not steal. You shall not steal, in order to aggravate; you shall not steal, in order to pay double restitution, in order to pay quadruple or quintuple restitution. Ben Bagbag says, do not steal your own property back from the thief, lest you be seen stealing.
HALAKHAH: From where a first warning about stealing: you shall not steal. From where a second warning about stealing: you shall not steal. You shall not steal, in order to aggravate; you shall not steal, in order to pay double restitution, in order to pay quadruple or quintuple restitution. Ben Bagbag says, do not steal your own property back from the thief, lest you be seen stealing.
Rebbi Jehudah said, I heard that if the judge wants to let both of them sit, he may tell them to sit down. What is forbidden is that not one be standing and the other sitting; one says everything he has to say, but to the other one says, make your statement short. Rebbi Ismael says, one says to him, either you dress as he is dressed or pay him to be dressed as you are.
“To qualified but not to disqualified ones.” For it is said, if he does not tell, he has to bear his punishment. If he told, the other would have to pay money. This excludes one where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.
“To qualified but not to disqualified ones.” For it is said, if he does not tell, he has to bear his punishment. If he told, the other would have to pay money. This excludes one where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.
“Outside of court.” If he does not tell, he has to bear his punishment. If he told, one would have to pay money. This excludes outside of court where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.
“Outside of court.” If he does not tell, he has to bear his punishment. If he told, one would have to pay money. This excludes outside of court where the other would not have to pay money even if he told.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.
Rebbi La: Both Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both are saying, there is no ”witnesses “here. Why? Because they might die. But might not a document be lost? Therefore, the reason can only be that they might forget their testimony. There, we have stated: “Where is my ox? He told him, it is lost. I want you to swear, he said, Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed himself, he has to pay the value, and the fifth, and the reparation sacrifice.” The Mishnah [applies] if he does not know that there are witnesses. He comes to tell you, even if he knows that there are witnesses. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “If there were two groups of witnesses, if the first group reneged and after this the second, both are liable.” One understands that the first group becomes liable. Why the second? Not because they might forget their testimony? [Here also, because they (are commanded) to forget their testimony.]
Rebbi La: Both Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both are saying, there is no ”witnesses “here. Why? Because they might die. But might not a document be lost? Therefore, the reason can only be that they might forget their testimony. There, we have stated: “Where is my ox? He told him, it is lost. I want you to swear, he said, Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed himself, he has to pay the value, and the fifth, and the reparation sacrifice.” The Mishnah [applies] if he does not know that there are witnesses. He comes to tell you, even if he knows that there are witnesses. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “If there were two groups of witnesses, if the first group reneged and after this the second, both are liable.” One understands that the first group becomes liable. Why the second? Not because they might forget their testimony? [Here also, because they (are commanded) to forget their testimony.]
MISHNAH: “You raped or seduced my daughter,” and he says “I did not rape, I did not seduce.” “I am asking you to swear,” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. Rebbi Simeon frees him from liability since he would not pay the fine by his own admission. They told him, even though he does not pay the fine by his own admission, he pays for shame and diminution by his own admission.
MISHNAH: “You raped or seduced my daughter,” and he says “I did not rape, I did not seduce.” “I am asking you to swear,” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. Rebbi Simeon frees him from liability since he would not pay the fine by his own admission. They told him, even though he does not pay the fine by his own admission, he pays for shame and diminution by his own admission.
HALAKHAH: “You raped or seduced my daughter,” etc. Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The words of Rebbi Simeon [imply that] the main claim is for the fine, which is not so for the words of the Sages. Rebbi Illa said, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he claims the fine, shame and diminution; the words of the Sages if he claims shame, diminution, and fine. The rabbis say, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he advances three claims; the words of the Sages if he advances one claim. Rebbi Ze`ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, did you hear explicitly from Rebbi Joḥanan, or from his word? Rebbi Yasa said, for he is of the rabbis’ opinion. Rebbi Mana said, even if he is of Rebbi Illa’s opinion, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he advances one claim; the words of the Sages if he advances three claims. “Not only matters for which he has to pay the capital, from where double payment, quadruple and quintuple payment, the rapist, and the seducer, and the calumniator? The verse says, everything about which one would swear falsely.” Is the calumniator’s not a fine? Rebbi Jeremiah says, this is Rebbi Simeon’s who said, all depends on the collection.
MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.
MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.
HALAKHAH: “ “You stole my ox,” etc. to the end of the Chapter. Rebbi Isaac asked, should one have to pay the value of the slave by his admission? But what is his problem? Are the entire thirty a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, all the thirty are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “ ‘Your ox killed my slave’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is not liable.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he killed a slave covered with boils. He said to him, but it says afterwards, “ ‘Your ox killed my son’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is liable.” You could explain it if he was covered with boils, then he would not be liable! You cannot do this, as we have stated: “If he killed a human, he has to pay his worth.” Rebbi Ezra said before Rebbi Mana Explain it following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured. He said to him, if following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured, all is a fine
HALAKHAH: “ “You stole my ox,” etc. to the end of the Chapter. Rebbi Isaac asked, should one have to pay the value of the slave by his admission? But what is his problem? Are the entire thirty a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, all the thirty are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “ ‘Your ox killed my slave’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is not liable.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he killed a slave covered with boils. He said to him, but it says afterwards, “ ‘Your ox killed my son’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is liable.” You could explain it if he was covered with boils, then he would not be liable! You cannot do this, as we have stated: “If he killed a human, he has to pay his worth.” Rebbi Ezra said before Rebbi Mana Explain it following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured. He said to him, if following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured, all is a fine
HALAKHAH: “ “You stole my ox,” etc. to the end of the Chapter. Rebbi Isaac asked, should one have to pay the value of the slave by his admission? But what is his problem? Are the entire thirty a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, all the thirty are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “ ‘Your ox killed my slave’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is not liable.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he killed a slave covered with boils. He said to him, but it says afterwards, “ ‘Your ox killed my son’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is liable.” You could explain it if he was covered with boils, then he would not be liable! You cannot do this, as we have stated: “If he killed a human, he has to pay his worth.” Rebbi Ezra said before Rebbi Mana Explain it following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured. He said to him, if following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured, all is a fine
HALAKHAH: “ “You stole my ox,” etc. to the end of the Chapter. Rebbi Isaac asked, should one have to pay the value of the slave by his admission? But what is his problem? Are the entire thirty a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, all the thirty are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “ ‘Your ox killed my slave’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is not liable.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he killed a slave covered with boils. He said to him, but it says afterwards, “ ‘Your ox killed my son’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is liable.” You could explain it if he was covered with boils, then he would not be liable! You cannot do this, as we have stated: “If he killed a human, he has to pay his worth.” Rebbi Ezra said before Rebbi Mana Explain it following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured. He said to him, if following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured, all is a fine
HALAKHAH: “ “You stole my ox,” etc. to the end of the Chapter. Rebbi Isaac asked, should one have to pay the value of the slave by his admission? But what is his problem? Are the entire thirty a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, all the thirty are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “ ‘Your ox killed my slave’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is not liable.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he killed a slave covered with boils. He said to him, but it says afterwards, “ ‘Your ox killed my son’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is liable.” You could explain it if he was covered with boils, then he would not be liable! You cannot do this, as we have stated: “If he killed a human, he has to pay his worth.” Rebbi Ezra said before Rebbi Mana Explain it following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured. He said to him, if following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured, all is a fine
HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: In any case where two [witnesses] make him liable to pay money, a single witness sets him up for an oath. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for real estate? It is a difference since one does not swear about real estate. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a fine? There is a difference since one does not swear about a fine. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a peruṭah? Is it so? Have we not stated: “A judicial oath is about a claim of two silver coins and the acknowledgment of one peruṭah.” Our Mishnah, when he swears by his own formulation. What (Rebbi) Samuel said, when he swears by the formulation of others. Rav Ḥisda and his group disagree. “A judicial oath”, any judicial oath. There is no difference whether he swears by his own formulation or he swears by the formulation of others, he cannot be liable except for a claim.
“And the acknowledgment of one peruṭah.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody claims that another had stolen, the latter is not liable unless he partially admit. But all his colleagues differ from him. How do the colleagues uphold for this is it? If he claims money from him. If he claims money from him, is that double he shall pay to his neighbor? But this is a mixture of paragraphs.
MISHNAH: About the following one does not swear: slaves, and documents, and real estate, and gifts to the Temple. Not about double restitution, nor quadruple or quintuple; the unpaid trustee does not swear, the paid trustee does not pay. Rebbi Simeon says, one swears about things for which he is responsible if they be alienated, but does not swear if he is not responsible if they be alienated. Rebbi Meїr says, there are things which are like real estate and they are not like real estate but the Sages do not agree with him. How is this? “Ten bearing vines did I hand over to you,” but the other says, “they are only five.” Rebbi Meїr declares liable for an oath but the Sages say, anything connected to the ground is like ground.
MISHNAH: All who must swear by Torah standards do swear not to pay. The following do swear and collect: The journeyman, a person robbed or injured, and one whose opponent is suspected of perjury, and the grocer on his account book. How does the journeyman do it? He tells him, “give me my wages which you are holding;” he says, “I gave.” He swears and collects. Rebbi Jehudah says, only if there is partial admission. How is this? He tells him, “give me my wages of fifty denarii which you are holding;” but he says, “you received from these a gold denar.”
HALAKHAH: “All who must swear by Torah standards,” etc. One understands from what is said, an oath before the Eternal shall be between them, would we not know that if he does not swear, he has to pay? Why does the verse say, its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay? But from the moment the owner accepted his oath, he does not have to pay. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is this only following Rebbi Meїr or even following the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Assi say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meїr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive? Its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay, therefore if he does not swear, he has to pay. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The unpaid and the paid trustees may stipulate to be like a borrower. Rebbi Ḥanina said, everybody agrees that in the language of the Torah out of a negative one understands a positive; where do they disagree? In everyday speech.
HALAKHAH: “All who must swear by Torah standards,” etc. One understands from what is said, an oath before the Eternal shall be between them, would we not know that if he does not swear, he has to pay? Why does the verse say, its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay? But from the moment the owner accepted his oath, he does not have to pay. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is this only following Rebbi Meїr or even following the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Assi say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meїr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive? Its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay, therefore if he does not swear, he has to pay. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The unpaid and the paid trustees may stipulate to be like a borrower. Rebbi Ḥanina said, everybody agrees that in the language of the Torah out of a negative one understands a positive; where do they disagree? In everyday speech.
HALAKHAH: “All who must swear by Torah standards,” etc. One understands from what is said, an oath before the Eternal shall be between them, would we not know that if he does not swear, he has to pay? Why does the verse say, its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay? But from the moment the owner accepted his oath, he does not have to pay. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is this only following Rebbi Meїr or even following the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Assi say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meїr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive? Its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay, therefore if he does not swear, he has to pay. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The unpaid and the paid trustees may stipulate to be like a borrower. Rebbi Ḥanina said, everybody agrees that in the language of the Torah out of a negative one understands a positive; where do they disagree? In everyday speech.
HALAKHAH: “All who must swear by Torah standards,” etc. One understands from what is said, an oath before the Eternal shall be between them, would we not know that if he does not swear, he has to pay? Why does the verse say, its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay? But from the moment the owner accepted his oath, he does not have to pay. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is this only following Rebbi Meїr or even following the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Assi say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meїr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive? Its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay, therefore if he does not swear, he has to pay. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The unpaid and the paid trustees may stipulate to be like a borrower. Rebbi Ḥanina said, everybody agrees that in the language of the Torah out of a negative one understands a positive; where do they disagree? In everyday speech.
HALAKHAH: “All who must swear by Torah standards,” etc. One understands from what is said, an oath before the Eternal shall be between them, would we not know that if he does not swear, he has to pay? Why does the verse say, its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay? But from the moment the owner accepted his oath, he does not have to pay. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is this only following Rebbi Meїr or even following the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Assi say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meїr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive? Its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay, therefore if he does not swear, he has to pay. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The unpaid and the paid trustees may stipulate to be like a borrower. Rebbi Ḥanina said, everybody agrees that in the language of the Torah out of a negative one understands a positive; where do they disagree? In everyday speech.
Rav Huna said, if after he swore he brought witnesses that it was standing at the feeding trough, the oath already had robbed it. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav Huna: “ ‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, it was lost. ‘I am putting an oath on you,’ and he said Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed on his own, he pays the value, an additional fifth, and a reparation offering”. The Mishnah if he ate it and only later swore to him. What Rav Huna said, it he swore to him and only later ate it.
May one roll over a biblical oath on a biblical oath? Let us hear from the following: One rolls over a biblical oath on a biblical oath, an instituted oath on an instituted oath, a biblical oath on an instituted oath. An instituted oath on a biblical oath? There, one swears and pays, but here in one case he swears and collects, in the other he swears and does not pay.
Rav Hoshaia said before Rebbi Immi in the name of the rabbis there: the oath returned to Sinai. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: the oath returned to the parties. He who said, the oath returned to Sinai, it is as if there was no testimony; the burden of proof is on the claimant. He who said, the oath returned to the parties, since that man is suspect and cannot swear for me, get up and pay me.
“Similarly, the orphans can collect only by an oath;” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only if interest is due; Rebbi Nathan says, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Mana said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattania said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, all depends on the female. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should jump to marry her. Rebbi Nathan said, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from minor orphans’ property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from minor orphans’ property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated, the son shall stand in the father’s place; one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it as everybody’s opinion about testamentary dispositions.
MISHNAH: There are four kinds of keepers: The unpaid trustee and the borrower, the paid keeper, and the renter. The unpaid trustee swears about everything; the borrower pays for everything; the paid keeper and the renter swear about breakage, abduction, and death, but pay for the lost and the stolen.
It was stated, if it was stolen from the man’s house; not from the borrower’s house. If it was stolen from the man’s house; not from the house of the paid keeper or the renter? Since he is obligated to watch it, it is as if it referred to him; for you may say that there are three paragraphs. The last one about the borrower, the middle one about the paid keeper and the renter, the first one about the unpaid keeper. The borrower who profits from all pays everything. The paid keeper or the renter, because he profits partially and gives partial profit, swears about part and pays part. The unpaid keeper who does not profit at all swears and leaves. What does he swear? I did not commit anything. What is the situation if others know that he did not commit anything? Let us hear from the following: If the thief was found but has nothing with which to pay, may he say to him, swear to me that you were not thinking to take it? Let us hear from the following: If the thief was not found. Therefore, it he was found he is not liable.
For the borrower only the broken is written. From where loss and theft? It is logical. Since the paid keeper and the renter who do not pay for the broken or the dead have to pay for theft and loss, the borrower who pays for the broken or the dead certainly has to pay for theft and loss. It was stated about this: This is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged. From where the abducted? It is said here, it was broken or died; and it is said there, it dies or was broken. Since there the abducted was included, here also the abducted was included. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael follows Rebbi Nathan. Rebbi Nathan says, or, to include the abducted. Or following Rebbi Meïr who said, an equal cut at the place it comes from. Since there one swears for duress, also here one swears for duress. Still following Rebbi Nathan, for Rebbi Nathan said, or it died, to include the abducted one.
For the borrower only the broken is written. From where loss and theft? It is logical. Since the paid keeper and the renter who do not pay for the broken or the dead have to pay for theft and loss, the borrower who pays for the broken or the dead certainly has to pay for theft and loss. It was stated about this: This is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged. From where the abducted? It is said here, it was broken or died; and it is said there, it dies or was broken. Since there the abducted was included, here also the abducted was included. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael follows Rebbi Nathan. Rebbi Nathan says, or, to include the abducted. Or following Rebbi Meïr who said, an equal cut at the place it comes from. Since there one swears for duress, also here one swears for duress. Still following Rebbi Nathan, for Rebbi Nathan said, or it died, to include the abducted one.
For the borrower only the broken is written. From where loss and theft? It is logical. Since the paid keeper and the renter who do not pay for the broken or the dead have to pay for theft and loss, the borrower who pays for the broken or the dead certainly has to pay for theft and loss. It was stated about this: This is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged. From where the abducted? It is said here, it was broken or died; and it is said there, it dies or was broken. Since there the abducted was included, here also the abducted was included. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael follows Rebbi Nathan. Rebbi Nathan says, or, to include the abducted. Or following Rebbi Meïr who said, an equal cut at the place it comes from. Since there one swears for duress, also here one swears for duress. Still following Rebbi Nathan, for Rebbi Nathan said, or it died, to include the abducted one.
Rebbi Yudan asked: If he claimed the claim of a thief and duress? He told him, an armed robber came and took it; does he have to pay double restitution of duress? Rebbi Yose said, if it were so one should state “the paid keeper and the renter;” but we have stated: We do not find that the paid keeper and the renter pay double restitution of duress. On this we have stated, “this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable”. Rebbi Ḥanina said, if you say so, should you say, this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable, for he can tell him, let us say that the borrower pays double restitution. On this it was stated, this is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged.
Rebbi Yudan asked: If he claimed the claim of a thief and duress? He told him, an armed robber came and took it; does he have to pay double restitution of duress? Rebbi Yose said, if it were so one should state “the paid keeper and the renter;” but we have stated: We do not find that the paid keeper and the renter pay double restitution of duress. On this we have stated, “this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable”. Rebbi Ḥanina said, if you say so, should you say, this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable, for he can tell him, let us say that the borrower pays double restitution. On this it was stated, this is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged.
It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to pay. Does he have to swear? Rebbi Ze`ira said, he swears. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not that a fortiori the borrower be not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rebbi Ze`ira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; the paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rebbi Ze`ira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him; if the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner be with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner be with him? Rebbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rebbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we shall treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.
It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to pay. Does he have to swear? Rebbi Ze`ira said, he swears. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not that a fortiori the borrower be not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rebbi Ze`ira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; the paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rebbi Ze`ira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him; if the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner be with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner be with him? Rebbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rebbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we shall treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.
It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to pay. Does he have to swear? Rebbi Ze`ira said, he swears. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not that a fortiori the borrower be not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rebbi Ze`ira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; the paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rebbi Ze`ira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him; if the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner be with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner be with him? Rebbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rebbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we shall treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.
MISHNAH: “Where is my ox?” He told him, “I do not know.” “What are you telling?” But if had died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is not liable. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “it was lost.” “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. Witnesses testify that he ate it: he has to pay its value. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “it was stolen.” “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice. He said to a person on the market, “where is my ox which you stole?” This one says, “I did not steal,” but witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he slaughtered or sold it, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. If he saw that witnesses appeared and said, “I stole but did neither slaughter nor sell,” he only pays its value.
MISHNAH: “Where is my ox?” He told him, “I do not know.” “What are you telling?” But if had died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is not liable. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “it was lost.” “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. Witnesses testify that he ate it: he has to pay its value. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “it was stolen.” “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice. He said to a person on the market, “where is my ox which you stole?” This one says, “I did not steal,” but witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he slaughtered or sold it, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. If he saw that witnesses appeared and said, “I stole but did neither slaughter nor sell,” he only pays its value.
MISHNAH: “Where is my ox?” He told him, “I do not know.” “What are you telling?” But if had died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is not liable. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “it was lost.” “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. Witnesses testify that he ate it: he has to pay its value. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “it was stolen.” “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice. He said to a person on the market, “where is my ox which you stole?” This one says, “I did not steal,” but witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he slaughtered or sold it, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. If he saw that witnesses appeared and said, “I stole but did neither slaughter nor sell,” he only pays its value.
Another explanation: He shall pay the whole worth and add its fifths to it. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it was stated thus: “He claimed a claim of loss, swore, and dedicated a sacrifice. Since if he confessed after witnesses came it would be sanctified, it is sanctified here. He claimed a claim of thief, swore, and dedicated a sacrifice. Since if he confessed after witnesses came it would not be sanctified, it is not sanctified here, but following Rebbi Jacob it would be sanctified.”
Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody claims against another a claim of thief he pays double restitution. If he slaughtered or sold, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. There, they say, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: There we state and it supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was lost.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he ate it; he has to pay its value. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” Is there eating without slaughtering? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, explain it if another slaughtered. And the following said so: He said to one in the market place, “where is my ox which you stole?” He says, “I did not steal.” “I want you to swear,” and he says “Amen.” He is (not) liable. Because he is one in the market place. But if he said it to one of the keepers, that one would be liable. The baraita when he ate it and then swore. What Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he swore and after that ate it.
“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.
HALAKHAH: It was stated: If it was neither to his benefit nor to his detriment, he is liable. Rebbi said, a baraita says so: “If he said to the borrower, the unpaid trustee, the recipient of a fee, or the renter, ‘where is my ox?’ This one said, ‘it died.’” May he tell him, “come and swear to me that you never thought of rustling it”? In any case he would not pay; what could he say? “Even if you would pay me a lot, I want from you what is mine.”
HALAKHAH: It was stated: If it was neither to his benefit nor to his detriment, he is liable. Rebbi said, a baraita says so: “If he said to the borrower, the unpaid trustee, the recipient of a fee, or the renter, ‘where is my ox?’ This one said, ‘it died.’” May he tell him, “come and swear to me that you never thought of rustling it”? In any case he would not pay; what could he say? “Even if you would pay me a lot, I want from you what is mine.”
MISHNAH: Within three days before Gentile holidays one is forbidden to trade with them, to lend them and to borrow from them, to give them loans and to ask them for loans, to pay debts to them and to accept payment from them. Rebbi Jehudah says, one may accept payment from them because this hurts him. They told him, even though it hurts him now he will enjoy it later. Rebbi Ismael says, three days before and three days afterwards are forbidden but the Sages say, before their holidays it is forbidden, after their holidays it is permitted.
One understands “to lend;” “to borrow” from them? Because he increases his reputation. One understands “to give them loans;” “to ask them for loans”? Because he increases his reputation. One understands “to pay debts to them;” “to accept payment from them”? That he should not say, his pagan worship had helped him. Rebbi Abba bar Tevelai in the name of Rav: If it was a loan in danger of being lost it is permitted. It was stated thus: A loan in danger of being lost, by witnesses. A loan not in danger of being lost, by document. Even a loan by document is in danger of being lost, for not at all times does a person succeed in liquidating his debt. How is this? A loan not in danger of being lost, by pledge. A loan in danger of being lost, not by pledge. It was found following the former [opinion]: A loan in danger of being lost, by witnesses. A loan not in danger of being lost, by document.
If he transgressed and sold one fines him. Just as one fines for practice so one fines for custom. From where that one fines for custom? A person sold his camel to an Aramean. The case came before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who fined him double to make him take back the camel. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they fined the broker and called him son who brokers to Arameans. Does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow Rebbi Jehudah? As it was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehuda: “If somebody buys an animal from a Gentile and it gave birth to a firstling, he buys it up to its worth and gives half of its worth to a Cohen. If it was given to him as contractor, he has to pay for up to ten times its worth and gives all of its worth to the Cohen. But the Sages say, since the finger of the Gentile in involved it is no longer liable as firstling.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is more than Rebbi Jehudah. What Rebbi Jehudah said because of the practice of firstlings; but what Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said because of practice regarding a large animal.
If he worked for him half a day in prohibition and half a day in permission. If he was selling profane [food] and Second Tithe together, [the buyer] has the choice of treating as profane what he chooses and as Second Tithe what he chooses. Is this the same here? Let us hear from the following. If somebody hires a worker to bring wine to a sick person; if he delivered [the employer] has to pay him, otherwise he does not have to pay him. But if he told him, wine for a sick person from place X, an apple for a sick person from place X, whether or not he delivered he has to pay him, for he pays the wages of his feet. And here, does he not pay the wages of his feet?