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The Mishnah
One who lends money to his fellow may not dwell in his courtyard for free or rent it from him at a reduced rate, since that counts as usury. One may increase rent-charge [not paid in advance] but not purchase price [not paid in advance]. How so? If his fellow rented him his courtyard, and said to him, “If you pay me now the cost is 10 selas per year, but if you pay me on a monthly basis, the rent is one sela per month”, this is permitted. However, if he sold him his field, and said to him, “If you pay me now it is yours for 1,000 zuz, but if you pay me at the time of threshing it will be 1,200 zuz”, it is forbidden.
One who lends money to his fellow may not dwell in his courtyard for free or rent it from him at a reduced rate, since that counts as usury. One may increase rent-charge [not paid in advance] but not purchase price [not paid in advance]. How so? If his fellow rented him his courtyard, and said to him, “If you pay me now the cost is 10 selas per year, but if you pay me on a monthly basis, the rent is one sela per month”, this is permitted. However, if he sold him his field, and said to him, “If you pay me now it is yours for 1,000 zuz, but if you pay me at the time of threshing it will be 1,200 zuz”, it is forbidden.
If a man sold a field, and the buyer gave him part of the price and he said to the buyer, “Pay me the rest of the price whenever you wish and then take what is yours”, this is forbidden. If a man lent another money on the security of his field and said to him, “If you do not pay me within three years it will be mine”, then it becomes his. This is what Boethus the son of Zunin used to do with the consent of the Sages.
If a man sold a field, and the buyer gave him part of the price and he said to the buyer, “Pay me the rest of the price whenever you wish and then take what is yours”, this is forbidden. If a man lent another money on the security of his field and said to him, “If you do not pay me within three years it will be mine”, then it becomes his. This is what Boethus the son of Zunin used to do with the consent of the Sages.
If one leased a field from his fellow and he let it lie fallow, they assess how much it was likely to have yielded and he must pay the owner accordingly, since he wrote [in the leasing agreement]: “If I suffer the land to lie fallow and do not till it, I will pay thee at the rate of its highest yield.”
If one leased a field from his fellow and he let it lie fallow, they assess how much it was likely to have yielded and he must pay the owner accordingly, since he wrote [in the leasing agreement]: “If I suffer the land to lie fallow and do not till it, I will pay thee at the rate of its highest yield.”
If one leased a field from his fellow and he did not want to weed it, and he said to the owner, “What do you care, as long as I pay you the agreed rental?”, they do not listen to him, for the owner can say to him, “Tomorrow you will leave the field and it won’t bring forth anything but weeds.”
If one leased a field from his fellow in return for ten kors of wheat a year and it produced bad wheat, he may pay him out of this crop. If [it produced] good wheat he may not say, “I will buy other wheat from the market”, rather he must pay him from the crop of that field.
If one leased a field from his fellow in return for ten kors of wheat a year and it produced bad wheat, he may pay him out of this crop. If [it produced] good wheat he may not say, “I will buy other wheat from the market”, rather he must pay him from the crop of that field.
The laws “You must pay him his wages on the same day” (Deut. 24:15) and “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning” (Lev. 19:13) apply both to the hire of a man or of a beast or of utensils. When is this so? When the employee has laid claim to it, but if he had not laid claim to it the employer does not commit a transgression. If he gave him a draft on a shopkeeper or moneychanger [the employer] does not commit a transgression [even though the employee has not yet collected]. If an employee [claimed his wages] within the set time he may take an oath and take his wages. [But] if the set time had passed he may not take an oath and take his wages. If witnesses testified that he had claimed his wages at the set time [and was not paid], he may take an oath and receive his wages. The law “You must pay him his wages on the same day” applies also to the resident alien, but not the law, “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning”.
The laws “You must pay him his wages on the same day” (Deut. 24:15) and “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning” (Lev. 19:13) apply both to the hire of a man or of a beast or of utensils. When is this so? When the employee has laid claim to it, but if he had not laid claim to it the employer does not commit a transgression. If he gave him a draft on a shopkeeper or moneychanger [the employer] does not commit a transgression [even though the employee has not yet collected]. If an employee [claimed his wages] within the set time he may take an oath and take his wages. [But] if the set time had passed he may not take an oath and take his wages. If witnesses testified that he had claimed his wages at the set time [and was not paid], he may take an oath and receive his wages. The law “You must pay him his wages on the same day” applies also to the resident alien, but not the law, “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning”.
If a house (the bottom story) and an upper room belonging to two persons (each owning fell down, and the owner of the upper room told the owner of the house (the bottom story) to rebuild it, and he did not want to rebuild it, the owner of the upper room may rebuild the house below and live in it until the other repays him what he has spent. Rabbi Judah says: “He would then [after being reimbursed] have been dwelling on his fellow’s property and he should [therefore] pay him rent. Rather the owner of the upper room should rebuild both the house below and the upper room and put a roof on the upper room, and live in the house below until the other repays him what he has spent.”
One may not set up an oven inside a house unless there is a space of four cubits above it. If he sets it up in the upper room, the flooring beneath it must be three handbreadths deep, or for a stove one handbreadth. And if it causes damage [to the floor] he must pay for the damage caused. Rabbi Shimon says: “They only mentioned these measurements so that if the object caused damage he would be exempt.”
They may not write documents of betrothal or marriage except with the consent of both parties. And the bridegroom pays the (scribe’s) fee. They may not write documents of tenancy and sharecropping except with the consent of both parties. And the tenant pays the (scribe’s) fee. They may not write documents of arbitration or any document drawn up before a court except with the consent of both parties. And both parties pay the (scribe’s) fee. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “Two documents are written for the two parties, one copy for each.”
If a man lent his fellow money by using a document, he may recover the debt from mortgaged property. But if he had lent only before witnesses (and not through a document), he may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If the [creditor] brought forth [a loan document] upon which appeared his (the debtor’s) signature as evidence that he was indebted to him, the creditor may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If a man signed as a guarantor after the signatures of witnesses, the creditor may recover the debt only from [the guarantor’s] unmortgaged property. Such a case came before Rabbi Yishmael and he said, “He may recover only from unmortgaged property”. Ben Nanos said to him: “He may recover the debt neither from mortgaged nor unmortgaged property.” He said to him: “Why?” He answered, “If a man seized a debtor by the throat in the street and his fellow found him and said ‘Leave him alone (and I will pay), he is not liable, since not through trust in him did the creditor lend the debtor money.” Rather which type of guarantor is liable? [If a man said], “Lend him money and I will pay thee”, he is liable, for he lent him the money through his trust in the guarantor. And Rabbi Yishmael said, “He who wants to be wise let him occupy himself with cases dealing with monetary matters, for there is no greater branch of Torah than this; for they are like a welling fountain; and he who wishes to occupy himself with laws concerning monetary matters, let him serve [as a pupil] of Shimon ben Nanos.
If a man lent his fellow money by using a document, he may recover the debt from mortgaged property. But if he had lent only before witnesses (and not through a document), he may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If the [creditor] brought forth [a loan document] upon which appeared his (the debtor’s) signature as evidence that he was indebted to him, the creditor may recover the debt only from unmortgaged property. If a man signed as a guarantor after the signatures of witnesses, the creditor may recover the debt only from [the guarantor’s] unmortgaged property. Such a case came before Rabbi Yishmael and he said, “He may recover only from unmortgaged property”. Ben Nanos said to him: “He may recover the debt neither from mortgaged nor unmortgaged property.” He said to him: “Why?” He answered, “If a man seized a debtor by the throat in the street and his fellow found him and said ‘Leave him alone (and I will pay), he is not liable, since not through trust in him did the creditor lend the debtor money.” Rather which type of guarantor is liable? [If a man said], “Lend him money and I will pay thee”, he is liable, for he lent him the money through his trust in the guarantor. And Rabbi Yishmael said, “He who wants to be wise let him occupy himself with cases dealing with monetary matters, for there is no greater branch of Torah than this; for they are like a welling fountain; and he who wishes to occupy himself with laws concerning monetary matters, let him serve [as a pupil] of Shimon ben Nanos.
He may send forth the people to a battle waged of free choice by the decision of the court of seventy one. He may break through [the private domain of any man] to make himself a road and none may protest him. The king’s road has no limit. Whatsoever the people take in plunder they must place before him, and he may take first. “And he shall not have many wives” (Deut. 17:17) eighteen only. Rabbi Judah says: “He may take many wives provided they don’t turn his heart away [from worshipping God]. Rabbi Shimon says: “Even one that might turn his heart away, he should not marry. Why then does it say, “He shall not have many wives”, even if they are like Avigayil. “He shall not keep many horses” (Deut. 17:16) enough for his chariot only. “Nor shall he amass silver and gold to excess” (Deut. 17:17) enough to pay his soldier’s wages. He must write a Torah scroll for himself; when he goes forth to battle he shall take it with him, and when he returns he shall bring it back with him; when he sits in judgement it shall be with him, and when he sits to eat it shall be with him, as it says, “Let it remain with him and let him read it all his life” (Deut. 17:19)
How did they admonish witnesses in capital cases? They brought them in and admonished them, [saying], “Perhaps you will say something that is only a supposition or hearsay or secondhand, or even from a trustworthy man. Or perhaps you do not know that we shall check you with examination and inquiry? Know, moreover, that capital cases are not like non-capital cases: in non-capital cases a man may pay money and so make atonement, but in capital cases the witness is answerable for the blood of him [that is wrongfully condemned] and the blood of his descendants [that should have been born to him] to the end of the world.” For so have we found it with Cain that murdered his brother, for it says, “The bloods of your brother cry out” (Gen. 4:10). It doesn’t say, “The blood of your brother”, but rather “The bloods of your brother” meaning his blood and the blood of his descendants. Another saying is, “The bloods of your brother” that his blood was cast over trees and stones. Therefore but a single person was created in the world, to teach that if any man has caused a single life to perish from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had caused a whole world to perish; and anyone who saves a single soul from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had saved a whole world. Again [but a single person was created] for the sake of peace among humankind, that one should not say to another, “My father was greater than your father”. Again, [but a single person was created] against the heretics so they should not say, “There are many ruling powers in heaven”. Again [but a single person was created] to proclaim the greatness of the Holy Blessed One; for humans stamp many coins with one seal and they are all like one another; but the King of kings, the Holy Blessed One, has stamped every human with the seal of the first man, yet not one of them are like another. Therefore everyone must say, “For my sake was the world created.” And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be involved with this trouble”, was it not said, “He, being a witness, whether he has seen or known, [if he does not speak it, then he shall bear his iniquity] (Lev. 5:1). And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be guilty of the blood of this man?,” was it not said, “When the wicked perish there is rejoicing” (Proverbs 11:10).]
When he is about ten cubits away from the place of stoning, they say to him, ‘confess’, for such is the practice of all who are executed, that they [first] confess, for he who confesses has a portion in the world to come. For so we find in the case of Achan, that Joshua said to him, “My son, pay honor to the Lord, the God of Israel, and make confession to him. [Tell me what you have done, do not hold anything back from me.]” And Achan answered Joshua and said, “It is true, I have sinned against the Lord the God of Israel, and this is what I have done” (Josh. 7:19-20). And how do we know that his confessions made atonement for him? As it says, “And Joshua said, “What calamity have you brought upon us! The Lord will bring calamity upon you this day” (Josh. 7:35), [meaning] this day you are a calamity, but you are not to be a calamity in the next world. And if he does not know how to confess, they say to him, “Say, may my death be an expiation for all my sins.” Rabbi Judah said: “If he knows that he is a victim of false evidence, he can say: may my death be an expiation for all my sins but this.” They [the sages] said to him: “If so, everyone will speak likewise in order to clear himself.”
[The thief] who burrows his way in [to someone’s home] is judged on account of his outcome. If he burrowed his way in and broke a jug, should there be blood-guiltiness for him, he must pay [for the jug], but if there is no blood-guiltiness for him, he is not liable.
How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers? [If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years.
How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers? [If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years.
How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers? [If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years.
How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers? [If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years.
A manslayer who went to his city of his refuge and the men of that city wished to do him honor, should [refuse] by saying to them, “I am a manslayer!”. If they say to him, “Nevertheless” he should accept from them [the proffered honor], as it is said: “and this is the word of the manslayer.” They used to pay rent to the Levites, according to the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir says: “They did not pay them rent.” And [on his return home] he returns to the office he formerly held, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: “He does not return to the office he formerly held.”
A manslayer who went to his city of his refuge and the men of that city wished to do him honor, should [refuse] by saying to them, “I am a manslayer!”. If they say to him, “Nevertheless” he should accept from them [the proffered honor], as it is said: “and this is the word of the manslayer.” They used to pay rent to the Levites, according to the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir says: “They did not pay them rent.” And [on his return home] he returns to the office he formerly held, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: “He does not return to the office he formerly held.”
“You raped or seduced my daughter” and the other says, “I did not rape, nor seduce,” “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. Rabbi Shimon exempts him, for he does not pay a fine on his own admission. They said to him: “Even though he does not pay a fine on his own admission, he still pays for the shame and blemish [to the girl], based on his own admission.
“You raped or seduced my daughter” and the other says, “I did not rape, nor seduce,” “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. Rabbi Shimon exempts him, for he does not pay a fine on his own admission. They said to him: “Even though he does not pay a fine on his own admission, he still pays for the shame and blemish [to the girl], based on his own admission.
“You stole my ox,” and he says, “I have not stolen it” “I adjure You,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. “I have stolen it, but I have not killed it or sold it”, “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is exempt. “Your ox killed my ox,” and he says, “It did not kill [your ox]”, “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” and he says, “It did not kill [your slave]”, “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is exempt. He said to him, “You injured me, or bruised me,” and the other says, “I have not injured you or bruised you,” “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is liable. His slave said to him, “You knocked out my tooth, or blinded my eye,” and he said, “I did not knock out [your tooth], or blind [your eye],’ “I adjure you,” and he responds, “Amen!” he is exempt. This is the principle: whenever he pays on his own admission, he is liable; and when he does not pay on his own admission, he is exempt.
And these are the things for which no oath is imposed: slaves, bonds, lands, and dedicated objects. [The law of] paying double, or four or five times the value, does not apply to them. An unpaid guardian does not take an oath, and a paid guardian does not pay. Rabbi Shimon says: “For dedicated objects for which he is responsible an oath is imposed and for [dedicated objects] for which he is not responsible an oath is not imposed.
All whom the Torah obligates to take an oath, take an oath, and do not pay. But these take an oath, and receive [payment]: the hired laborer, he who has been robbed, he who has been wounded, and he whose opponent is suspected of taking a false oath, and the shopkeeper with his account book. “The hired laborer” How so? [If] he says to him [his employer], “Give me my wages which you owe me,” and he replies, “I have given,” and the other says, “I have not received it,” he [the laborer] takes an oath and collects his wages. Rabbi Judah says: “[There is no oath] unless there is partial admission: How so? If he says to him, “Give me my wages, fifty denarii, which you owe me,” and the other says, “You have received a gold denar (25 silver denar).”
One who takes a vow not to have intercourse with his wife: Beth Shammai says: [after] two weeks [he must divorce her and pay her kethubah], And Beth Hillel say: after one week. A woman has a miscarriage on the eve of the eighty first [day]: Beth Shammai exempt her from bringing the offering, And Beth Hillel do not exempt her. [With regards to the rules of] tzitzit (fringes) on linen sheet: Beth Shammai exempts, And Beth Hillel does not exempt. A basket of [fruit set aside for] the Sabbath: Beth Shammai exempts it [from tithes]. And Beth Hillel does not exempt it.
Rabbi Elazar said: Be diligent in the study of the Torah; And know how to answer an epicuros, And know before whom you toil, and that your employer is faithful, for He will pay you the reward of your labor.
He [Rabbi Tarfon] used to say: It is not your duty to finish the work, but neither are you at liberty to neglect it; If you have studied much Torah, you shall be given much reward. Faithful is your employer to pay you the reward of your labor; And know that the grant of reward unto the righteous is in the age to come.
Do not seek greatness for yourself, and do not covet honor. Practice more than you learn. Do not yearn for the table of kings, for your table is greater than their table, and your crown is greater than their crown, and faithful is your employer to pay you the reward of your labor.
Temed: Before it has fermented it may not be bought with second tithe money and it renders a mikveh invalid; After it has fermented it may be bought with second tithe money and it does not render a mikveh invalid. Brothers who are partners [in their inheritance]: When they are liable to pay the kalbon, they are exempt from the cattle tithe, And when they are liable to the cattle tithe, they are exempt from the kalbon. Whenever there is [the power] to sell, there is no fine, and whenever there is a fine there is no power to sell. Whenever there is the right of refusal there can be no halizah, and whenever there can be halizah there is no longer the right of refusal. When the shofar is blown there is no havdalah, and when there is havdalah the shofar is not blown. [Thus], if a festival falls on the day before Shabbat the shofar is blown but there is no havdalah; If it falls on the day following Shabbat there is havdalah but the shofar is not blown. How do they recite havdalah [on a festival that follows Shabbat]? “Who distinguishes between holy and holy.” Rabbi Dosa says: “Who distinguishes between the more holy and less holy day.”
If one slaughtered a first born and it became known that he had not shown it [to an expert]: That which [the purchasers] have eaten, they ate, and he must return the money to them. That which they have not yet eaten, the flesh must be buried and he must return the money to them. And likewise if one slaughtered a cow and sold it and it became known that it was terefah: That which [the purchasers] have eaten, they ate, and he must return the money to them. That which they have not eaten, they return the flesh to him and he must return the money to them. If [the purchasers], sold it to non-Jews or cast it to dogs, they must pay him the price of a terefah.
An animal bought or given as a present is exempt from the law of cattle tithe. If brothers became partners, though they are still bound to pay the kalbon [surcharge], they are exempt from the tithe of cattle. And when they become liable to tithe of cattle, they are exempt from paying the kalbon. If they acquired from the estate, they are bound [to tithe them]. But if not, they are exempt from tithing. If they first divided up the estate and then again became partners, they are bound to pay the kalbon and are exempt from tithe of cattle.
An animal bought or given as a present is exempt from the law of cattle tithe. If brothers became partners, though they are still bound to pay the kalbon [surcharge], they are exempt from the tithe of cattle. And when they become liable to tithe of cattle, they are exempt from paying the kalbon. If they acquired from the estate, they are bound [to tithe them]. But if not, they are exempt from tithing. If they first divided up the estate and then again became partners, they are bound to pay the kalbon and are exempt from tithe of cattle.
There is no evaluation less than one sela, nor more than fifty selas. How so? If one paid a sela and became rich, he need not give any [more]. But if he gave less than a sela and became rich, he must pay fifty selas. If he had five selas in his possession: Rabbi Meir says: he need not give more than one; The sages say he must give them all. There is no evaluation less than one sela, nor more than fifty selas. If a woman makes a mistake in her reckoning there is no re-opening for her [of the niddah count] earlier than seven, nor later than after seventeen days. No signs of leprosy are shut up for less than one week and none more than three weeks.
The law of evaluation is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict. The law of the field of possession is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict. The law concerning a warned ox that has killed a slave is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict. The law of the rapist and the seducer and the defamer is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict. The law of evaluation is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict. How so? Whether one has evaluated the fairest in Israel, or the ugliest in Israel, he must pay fifty selas. But if he said: “Behold, his monetary worth is upon me,” he pays only as much as he is worth.
“The law of the field of possession is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”How so? Whether one dedicates a field in the sandy plain of Mahoz or in the orchards of Savaste, [if he would redeem it] he must pay fifty shekels of silver for [every part of the field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. But if it was a field which he bought, he must pay what it is worth. Rabbi Eliezer says: it is all the same whether it is a field of possession or one that he bought. What is the difference between the field of possession and one that he bought? A field of possession he must pay the [added] fifth, whereas for a field that he has bought he need not pay the added fifth.
“The law of the field of possession is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”How so? Whether one dedicates a field in the sandy plain of Mahoz or in the orchards of Savaste, [if he would redeem it] he must pay fifty shekels of silver for [every part of the field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. But if it was a field which he bought, he must pay what it is worth. Rabbi Eliezer says: it is all the same whether it is a field of possession or one that he bought. What is the difference between the field of possession and one that he bought? A field of possession he must pay the [added] fifth, whereas for a field that he has bought he need not pay the added fifth.
“The law of the field of possession is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”How so? Whether one dedicates a field in the sandy plain of Mahoz or in the orchards of Savaste, [if he would redeem it] he must pay fifty shekels of silver for [every part of the field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. But if it was a field which he bought, he must pay what it is worth. Rabbi Eliezer says: it is all the same whether it is a field of possession or one that he bought. What is the difference between the field of possession and one that he bought? A field of possession he must pay the [added] fifth, whereas for a field that he has bought he need not pay the added fifth.
“The law of the field of possession is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”How so? Whether one dedicates a field in the sandy plain of Mahoz or in the orchards of Savaste, [if he would redeem it] he must pay fifty shekels of silver for [every part of the field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. But if it was a field which he bought, he must pay what it is worth. Rabbi Eliezer says: it is all the same whether it is a field of possession or one that he bought. What is the difference between the field of possession and one that he bought? A field of possession he must pay the [added] fifth, whereas for a field that he has bought he need not pay the added fifth.
“The law concerning a warned ox that has killed a slave is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”How so? Whether it killed the fine looking slave or an ugly slave, he must pay thirty selas. If it killed a free man he must pay what he is worth. If it wounded, whether this one or the other, he must pay the full damage.
“The law concerning a warned ox that has killed a slave is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”How so? Whether it killed the fine looking slave or an ugly slave, he must pay thirty selas. If it killed a free man he must pay what he is worth. If it wounded, whether this one or the other, he must pay the full damage.
“The law concerning a warned ox that has killed a slave is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”How so? Whether it killed the fine looking slave or an ugly slave, he must pay thirty selas. If it killed a free man he must pay what he is worth. If it wounded, whether this one or the other, he must pay the full damage.
“The law of the rapist and seducer is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”How so? Whether he raped or seduced a girl from among the best of the priestly stock or the humblest in Israel, he must pay fifty selas. But compensation for shaming and for blemish is in accord with the [circumstances] of him who shames and of the one who suffers the shame.
The law of the defamer is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict. How so? Whether he defamed a girl from among the best of the priestly stock or the humblest in Israel, he must pay one hundred selas. Thus it turns out that he who speaks with his mouth suffers more than he that commits an act. For thus we have also found that the judgment against our fathers in the wilderness was sealed only because of their evil tongue, as it is written: “Yet you have tested me these ten times, and you have not listened to My voice” (Numbers 14:22).
The sufficiency of means is according to the ability of the vower. And the age is according to the subject of the vow. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation. The sufficiency of means is according to the ability of the vower. How so? If a poor man evaluated a rich man, he pays only the valuation of a poor man. But if a rich man evaluated a poor man, he must pay the valuation of a rich man.
But it is not so with sacrifices. If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man.
But it is not so with sacrifices. If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man.
But it is not so with sacrifices. If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man.
But it is not so with sacrifices. If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man.
“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.
“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.
“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.
“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.
“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.
One who said: “I vow my weight,” he must pay his weight, in silver [if he had said in] silver, or in gold [if he had said in] gold. It happened with the mother of Yirmatia, who said, “I vow my daughter's weight.” She went up to Jerusalem and weighed her and then paid her weight in gold. [If a man said: “I vow] the weight of my hand,” Rabbi Judah says: let him fill a barrel with water and put it [his hand] in up to the elbow. Then let him weigh the flesh, bones and sinews of a donkey and put it into the barrel until it is filled up again. Rabbi Yose said: “But how is it possible to account exactly one kind of flesh against another kind of flesh, and one kind of bones against another kind of bones? Rather: one estimates what the hand is likely to weigh.
[If one said] “The worth of my hand is upon me,” they estimate his worth with his hand and [what it would be] without his hand. In this respect vows of worth are more stringent than vows of value. There is an aspect of vows of value that is more stringent than vows of worth. How so? If one said: “My value is upon me” and then he dies, his heirs must pay it. [But if he said:] “My worth is upon me,” and then he dies, his heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth. [If he said,] “The value of my hand or foot is upon me,” he has said nothing, [But if he said,] “The value of my head is upon me,” he must pay his whole value. This is the general rule: Anything upon which his life depends, he must pay his full value.
[If one said] “The worth of my hand is upon me,” they estimate his worth with his hand and [what it would be] without his hand. In this respect vows of worth are more stringent than vows of value. There is an aspect of vows of value that is more stringent than vows of worth. How so? If one said: “My value is upon me” and then he dies, his heirs must pay it. [But if he said:] “My worth is upon me,” and then he dies, his heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth. [If he said,] “The value of my hand or foot is upon me,” he has said nothing, [But if he said,] “The value of my head is upon me,” he must pay his whole value. This is the general rule: Anything upon which his life depends, he must pay his full value.
[If one said] “The worth of my hand is upon me,” they estimate his worth with his hand and [what it would be] without his hand. In this respect vows of worth are more stringent than vows of value. There is an aspect of vows of value that is more stringent than vows of worth. How so? If one said: “My value is upon me” and then he dies, his heirs must pay it. [But if he said:] “My worth is upon me,” and then he dies, his heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth. [If he said,] “The value of my hand or foot is upon me,” he has said nothing, [But if he said,] “The value of my head is upon me,” he must pay his whole value. This is the general rule: Anything upon which his life depends, he must pay his full value.
[If one said] “The worth of my hand is upon me,” they estimate his worth with his hand and [what it would be] without his hand. In this respect vows of worth are more stringent than vows of value. There is an aspect of vows of value that is more stringent than vows of worth. How so? If one said: “My value is upon me” and then he dies, his heirs must pay it. [But if he said:] “My worth is upon me,” and then he dies, his heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth. [If he said,] “The value of my hand or foot is upon me,” he has said nothing, [But if he said,] “The value of my head is upon me,” he must pay his whole value. This is the general rule: Anything upon which his life depends, he must pay his full value.
[If one said:] “Half my value is upon me,” he must pay half his evaluation. [But if he said,] “The value of one half of me he is upon me,” he must pay his full value. [If he said] “Half of my worth is upon me,” he must pay half his worth. [If he said,] “The worth of half of me is upon me,” he must pay his whole worth. This is the general rule: Anything on which his life depends, he must pay his whole worth.
[If one said:] “Half my value is upon me,” he must pay half his evaluation. [But if he said,] “The value of one half of me he is upon me,” he must pay his full value. [If he said] “Half of my worth is upon me,” he must pay half his worth. [If he said,] “The worth of half of me is upon me,” he must pay his whole worth. This is the general rule: Anything on which his life depends, he must pay his whole worth.
[If one said:] “Half my value is upon me,” he must pay half his evaluation. [But if he said,] “The value of one half of me he is upon me,” he must pay his full value. [If he said] “Half of my worth is upon me,” he must pay half his worth. [If he said,] “The worth of half of me is upon me,” he must pay his whole worth. This is the general rule: Anything on which his life depends, he must pay his whole worth.
[If one said:] “Half my value is upon me,” he must pay half his evaluation. [But if he said,] “The value of one half of me he is upon me,” he must pay his full value. [If he said] “Half of my worth is upon me,” he must pay half his worth. [If he said,] “The worth of half of me is upon me,” he must pay his whole worth. This is the general rule: Anything on which his life depends, he must pay his whole worth.
[If one said:] “Half my value is upon me,” he must pay half his evaluation. [But if he said,] “The value of one half of me he is upon me,” he must pay his full value. [If he said] “Half of my worth is upon me,” he must pay half his worth. [If he said,] “The worth of half of me is upon me,” he must pay his whole worth. This is the general rule: Anything on which his life depends, he must pay his whole worth.
If he said: “The value of so-and-so is upon me,” if both the vower and the subject of the vow died, then the heirs must pay it. [If he said,] “The worth of so-and-so is upon me,” and the vower died, the heirs must pay it. But if the subject of the vow died, the heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth.
If he said: “The value of so-and-so is upon me,” if both the vower and the subject of the vow died, then the heirs must pay it. [If he said,] “The worth of so-and-so is upon me,” and the vower died, the heirs must pay it. But if the subject of the vow died, the heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth.
If he said: “The value of so-and-so is upon me,” if both the vower and the subject of the vow died, then the heirs must pay it. [If he said,] “The worth of so-and-so is upon me,” and the vower died, the heirs must pay it. But if the subject of the vow died, the heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth.
[If someone said:] “This ox shall be an olah [a whole burnt offering],” or “This house shall be an olah,” and the ox died or the house fell down, he is not obligated to pay. [But if he said:] “This ox is upon me as an olah” or “this house is upon me as an olah” and the ox died, or the house fell down, he is obligated to pay [their worth].
[If someone said:] “This ox shall be an olah [a whole burnt offering],” or “This house shall be an olah,” and the ox died or the house fell down, he is not obligated to pay. [But if he said:] “This ox is upon me as an olah” or “this house is upon me as an olah” and the ox died, or the house fell down, he is obligated to pay [their worth].
With regard to those who made a vow of value: they take a pledge from them. With regard to those obligated to bring a hatat or asham: they do not take a pledge. With regard to those obligated to bring an olah or a shelamim: they do take a pledge. And even though he is not atoned for unless he is willing [to pay his obligation], as it is said: “willingly” (Leviticus 1:3), they coerce him until he says: I agree. The same is true in the case of divorce documents: they coerce him until he says: I agree.
One may not consecrate [a field of his possession] less than two years before the Jubilee, nor redeem it less than one year after the Jubilee. One does not reckon months to [the disadvantage of] the Sanctuary, but the Sanctuary does reckon months [to its own advantage]. If a man consecrated his field at a time when the law of the Jubilee is in force, he must pay fifty shekels for [every piece of field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. If the field contained ravines ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high, they are not included as part of the field. But if less than this, they are included. If he consecrated it two or three years before the Jubilee, he must pay one sela [shekel] and one pondion for each year. If he says: “I shall pay for each year as it comes,” they do not listen to him, rather he must pay for all the years together.
One may not consecrate [a field of his possession] less than two years before the Jubilee, nor redeem it less than one year after the Jubilee. One does not reckon months to [the disadvantage of] the Sanctuary, but the Sanctuary does reckon months [to its own advantage]. If a man consecrated his field at a time when the law of the Jubilee is in force, he must pay fifty shekels for [every piece of field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. If the field contained ravines ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high, they are not included as part of the field. But if less than this, they are included. If he consecrated it two or three years before the Jubilee, he must pay one sela [shekel] and one pondion for each year. If he says: “I shall pay for each year as it comes,” they do not listen to him, rather he must pay for all the years together.
One may not consecrate [a field of his possession] less than two years before the Jubilee, nor redeem it less than one year after the Jubilee. One does not reckon months to [the disadvantage of] the Sanctuary, but the Sanctuary does reckon months [to its own advantage]. If a man consecrated his field at a time when the law of the Jubilee is in force, he must pay fifty shekels for [every piece of field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. If the field contained ravines ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high, they are not included as part of the field. But if less than this, they are included. If he consecrated it two or three years before the Jubilee, he must pay one sela [shekel] and one pondion for each year. If he says: “I shall pay for each year as it comes,” they do not listen to him, rather he must pay for all the years together.
One may not consecrate [a field of his possession] less than two years before the Jubilee, nor redeem it less than one year after the Jubilee. One does not reckon months to [the disadvantage of] the Sanctuary, but the Sanctuary does reckon months [to its own advantage]. If a man consecrated his field at a time when the law of the Jubilee is in force, he must pay fifty shekels for [every piece of field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. If the field contained ravines ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high, they are not included as part of the field. But if less than this, they are included. If he consecrated it two or three years before the Jubilee, he must pay one sela [shekel] and one pondion for each year. If he says: “I shall pay for each year as it comes,” they do not listen to him, rather he must pay for all the years together.
If the Jubilee arrived and it was not yet redeemed then the priests enter into possession of the land and they pay its value, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: they enter [into possession] but they do not pay [its value]. Rabbi Eliezer says: they neither enter [into possession] nor pay [its value]. But it is called an abandoned field until the second Jubilee. If the second jubilee has arrived and it was not yet redeemed, it is called a ‘twice abandoned field’ until the third Jubilee. The priests never enter into possession of the field until someone else had redeemed it.
If the Jubilee arrived and it was not yet redeemed then the priests enter into possession of the land and they pay its value, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: they enter [into possession] but they do not pay [its value]. Rabbi Eliezer says: they neither enter [into possession] nor pay [its value]. But it is called an abandoned field until the second Jubilee. If the second jubilee has arrived and it was not yet redeemed, it is called a ‘twice abandoned field’ until the third Jubilee. The priests never enter into possession of the field until someone else had redeemed it.
If the Jubilee arrived and it was not yet redeemed then the priests enter into possession of the land and they pay its value, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: they enter [into possession] but they do not pay [its value]. Rabbi Eliezer says: they neither enter [into possession] nor pay [its value]. But it is called an abandoned field until the second Jubilee. If the second jubilee has arrived and it was not yet redeemed, it is called a ‘twice abandoned field’ until the third Jubilee. The priests never enter into possession of the field until someone else had redeemed it.
If one consecrated his field at a time when the [law of the] Jubilee was no longer observed, they say to him: “You open [the bidding]!” because the owner must pay an added fifth, whereas others do not pay an additional fifth. It happened that one consecrated his field because it was bad. They said to him: “You open the bidding.” He said: “I will acquire it for an issar.” Rabbi Yose said: he did say that, but rather “for an egg,” because consecrated objects may be redeemed by either money or money's equivalent. He [the Temple treasurer] said to him: It’s yours. It turns out he lost an issar and the field was his again.
If one consecrated his field at a time when the [law of the] Jubilee was no longer observed, they say to him: “You open [the bidding]!” because the owner must pay an added fifth, whereas others do not pay an additional fifth. It happened that one consecrated his field because it was bad. They said to him: “You open the bidding.” He said: “I will acquire it for an issar.” Rabbi Yose said: he did say that, but rather “for an egg,” because consecrated objects may be redeemed by either money or money's equivalent. He [the Temple treasurer] said to him: It’s yours. It turns out he lost an issar and the field was his again.
If one said I will acquire it for twenty-one selas, then the owners must pay twenty-six. [If one said] Twenty-two, the owners must pay twenty-seven. Twenty-three, the owners must pay twenty-eight. Twenty-four, the owners must pay twenty-nine. Twenty-five, the owners must pay thirty, For they need not add one fifth to what the other bids more. If one said: I will acquire it for twenty-six, if the owners want to pay thirty-one and an extra denar, the owner comes first. And if not, we say to the other: It has become yours.
If one said I will acquire it for twenty-one selas, then the owners must pay twenty-six. [If one said] Twenty-two, the owners must pay twenty-seven. Twenty-three, the owners must pay twenty-eight. Twenty-four, the owners must pay twenty-nine. Twenty-five, the owners must pay thirty, For they need not add one fifth to what the other bids more. If one said: I will acquire it for twenty-six, if the owners want to pay thirty-one and an extra denar, the owner comes first. And if not, we say to the other: It has become yours.
If one said I will acquire it for twenty-one selas, then the owners must pay twenty-six. [If one said] Twenty-two, the owners must pay twenty-seven. Twenty-three, the owners must pay twenty-eight. Twenty-four, the owners must pay twenty-nine. Twenty-five, the owners must pay thirty, For they need not add one fifth to what the other bids more. If one said: I will acquire it for twenty-six, if the owners want to pay thirty-one and an extra denar, the owner comes first. And if not, we say to the other: It has become yours.
If one said I will acquire it for twenty-one selas, then the owners must pay twenty-six. [If one said] Twenty-two, the owners must pay twenty-seven. Twenty-three, the owners must pay twenty-eight. Twenty-four, the owners must pay twenty-nine. Twenty-five, the owners must pay thirty, For they need not add one fifth to what the other bids more. If one said: I will acquire it for twenty-six, if the owners want to pay thirty-one and an extra denar, the owner comes first. And if not, we say to the other: It has become yours.
If one said I will acquire it for twenty-one selas, then the owners must pay twenty-six. [If one said] Twenty-two, the owners must pay twenty-seven. Twenty-three, the owners must pay twenty-eight. Twenty-four, the owners must pay twenty-nine. Twenty-five, the owners must pay thirty, For they need not add one fifth to what the other bids more. If one said: I will acquire it for twenty-six, if the owners want to pay thirty-one and an extra denar, the owner comes first. And if not, we say to the other: It has become yours.
If one said I will acquire it for twenty-one selas, then the owners must pay twenty-six. [If one said] Twenty-two, the owners must pay twenty-seven. Twenty-three, the owners must pay twenty-eight. Twenty-four, the owners must pay twenty-nine. Twenty-five, the owners must pay thirty, For they need not add one fifth to what the other bids more. If one said: I will acquire it for twenty-six, if the owners want to pay thirty-one and an extra denar, the owner comes first. And if not, we say to the other: It has become yours.
A man may proscribe his holy things, whether they are most holy things or less holy things. If [they had been] consecrated as a vow, he must give their value, if as a freewill-offering, he must give what it is worth to him. [If he said:] “Let this ox be an olah,” one estimates how much a man would pay for the ox to offer it as an olah, which he was not obliged [to offer]. A first-born, whether unblemished or blemished, may be proscribed. How can it be redeemed? They estimate what a man would give for this first-born in order to give it to the son of his daughter or to the son of his sister. Rabbi Ishmael says: one verse says, [All first-born males] you shall sanctify,” (Deuteronomy 15:19) and another verse says: [“The first-borns among beasts] no man shall sanctify it” (Leviticus 27:26). It is impossible to say: “You shall sanctify,” since it was said already: “No man shall sanctify,” and it is impossible to say: “No man shall sanctify,” since it is also said: “You shall sanctify”? Therefore resolve [thus]: you may sanctify it by consecrating its value [to the owner], but you may not sanctify it by consecrating it to the altar.
The Jerusalem Talmud
The behavior of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi disagrees since Rebbi Joshua ben Levi read psalms afterwards. But have we not stated: One does not say words after Emet Weyaẓiv? He explains that as relating to Emet Weyaẓiv of the morning prayers, since Rebbi Zeïra said in the name of Rav Abba bar Jeremiah: There are three immediacies: immediately after leaning comes slaughtering, immediately after hand-washing comes benediction, immediately after redemption comes prayer. Immediately after leaning comes slaughtering: “He shall lean … he shall slaughter” (Lev. 1:4–5). Immediately after hand-washing comes benediction, (Ps. 134:2) “Lift your hands in holiness and bless the Lord.” Immediately after redemption comes prayer, (Ps. 19:15) “May the words of my mouth be for goodwill” and it is written after that (Ps. 20:2) “May the Lord answer you on the day of worry.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said: For anyone who immediately slaughters after leaning, no disqualification will appear regarding his sacrifice. For anyone who immediately pronounces the benediction after washing his hands, Satan will not find anything to accuse about at that meal. For anyone who immediately prays after mentioning redemption, Satan will not find anything to accuse him of the entire day. Rebbi Zeïra said, I am used to immediately pray after mentioning redemption and I was conscripted to forced labor, to bring myrrh to the Palace. They said to him: our teacher, that is an honor. There are people who pay money to see the inside of the Palace. Rebbi Immi said: Anyone who does not immediately pray after mentioning redemption, whom is he to be likened to? To an acquaintance of the king who comes from afar to the king’s door. When the king comes to see what he wants, he finds that the person left. Hence, the king also leaves.
Rebbi Eleazar went to pay a sick-bed visit to Rebbi Simeon bar Abba. He said to him: Since I am weak, when I am reciting Shema‘ I tend to slumber; do I fulfill my obligation? He said to him: yes. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Zeïra: Did Rebbi Eleazar give this ruling since he knew that Rebbi Simeon bar Abba is very scrupulous in the execution of his religious duties, or because he was so weak? He answered him: They disagree explicitly; Rebbi Eleazar said he fulfilled his obligation, Rebbi Yoḥanan said he did not fulfill his obligation. They disagree for the recitation of Shema‘ since that is composed of separate chapters, but for the recitation of Hallel and the Esther scroll, Rebbi Eleazar will agree.
Rebbi Jonathan and Rebbi Yannai were sitting together. There came a man and kissed Rebbi Jonathan’s foot. Rebbi Yannai said to him: What kindness did he pay you back for from former days? He said to him: He once came and complained to me about his son that he should support him and I told him, go, assemble a congregation and humiliate him. He said to him, why did you not force him? He said to him, does one force him? He said to him, you still have questions about that? Rebbi Jonathan changed his opinion and fixed it as a tradition in his own name. The result is: Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan, one forces the son to feed his father. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if only all traditions were so clear to me as this one: One forces the son to feed his father.
Correspondingly, there are four things that a person has to pay for in this world and the principal remains for him in the future world: Idolatry, incest and adultery, and murder. But slander is equivalent to all of these. Idolatry from where? (Num. 15:31) “This soul shall certainly be cut off, its sin is inside it.” Why does the verse say “its sin is inside it?” This teaches that the soul is destroyed and its sin is still inside it. And it is written (Ex.32:21): “Please, this people has committed a grave sin, they made for themselves golden gods.” Incest and adultery from where? (Gen. 39:9) “How can I commit that grave evil and sin before God.” Murder from where? (Gen. 4:13) “Cain said to the Eternal, my sin is grave, it cannot be removed.” When he comes to calumny, it does not say in the singular “grave” or “the grave” but in the plural “grave” (Ps. 12:4): “May the Eternal cut off all slippery lips, all tongues peaking grave words.”
Now Rebbi Meïr says, one does not use the water wheel, and one estimates the loss to the owner. Now the rabbis say, one uses the water wheel and estimates the loss to the poor. To whom does he pay? Rebbi Jonah said, to the poor of his place, because otherwise, what could we say? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, it is needed for the measure of justice.
HALAKHAH: Everybody agrees that he who sells ten bunches to somebody else may not touch them. Everybody agrees in a partnership that just as he thins out his, so he thins out that of his partner. Rebbi Jehudah considers him to be a partner, Rebbi Meïr considers him to be a seller. Rebbi Immi said to him: Think about it, if a wild animal ate it, if you consider him a partner he is required to pay him!
Rebbi Jonah said, it is not written, “hail to him who gives to the needy,” but (Ps. 41:2): “Hail to him who is considerate to the needy;” this refers to him who fulfills this commandment intelligently. How did Rebbi Jonah do it? When he saw a son of a prominent family who had lost his property, he used to say to him: My son, since I heard that an inheritance fell to you at another place, take and you will pay back. When he had taken it, he said to him, it is a gift.
Rebbi Mana said, this means that he who gives in his home may not give from Sabbatical value because he would pay his debt with Sabbatical value. As it was stated: “Neither Sabbatical produce nor Second Tithe may be used to satisfy a loan or a debt. One does not use them for best men’s meals. One does not pay with them obligatory payments. One does not use them to pledge for charity in the synagogue. But one may use them for goodwill; then one has to notify.”