person
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The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent, and a woman may be taken in preliminary marriage either in person or through an agent. A man may give away his adolescent daughter in preliminary marriage himself or through his agent. If a man say to a woman: Be married to me preliminarily by this date fruit, be preliminarily married by that one, she is preliminarily married if one of them was worth a peruṭah, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. By this and by that one, she is preliminarily married if together they are worth a peruṭah, but if she was eating immediately what she received, she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah.
HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.” But do all of them slaughter? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house.” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.” But do all of them slaughter? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house.” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.” But do all of them slaughter? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house.” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.” But do all of them slaughter? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house.” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.” But do all of them slaughter? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house.” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.” But do all of them slaughter? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house.” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.” But do all of them slaughter? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house.” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge.
The House of Shammai say, an agent may not testify as witness. But the House of Hillel say, an agent may testify as witness. How is that? If he sent two, in the opinion of the House of Shammai there is an agent and two witnesses. In the opinion of the House of Hillel, all three can be agents and all three can be witnesses. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, the matter is reasonable if the preliminary marriage was executed by document. But if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he became an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Yose said, since the Torah made him trustworthy, even if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he did not become an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Abba said, there came a case before Rav who admitted the agent as witness. A person deposited his amphoras in another’s corral; [the latter] reneged. The case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who admitted the agent as witness and made him swear [by the testimony of] the porter.
Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.
Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.
Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.
Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.
Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.
We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage, while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber, so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it to be for a loan when the lender said, buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover.
“Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma,” and she said, “throw it into the sea or the river,” she is not married. “Give it to a poor person,” she is married. In either case nothing came into her hand; in one case you say, she is married; in the other case you say, she is not married! Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She wants to be married and be seen as benefiting the poor. Rebbi Phineas said, this can be interpreted either following Rebbi Ze‘ira or Rebbi Ila.
Here also, in the opinion of Rebbi Ze‘ira the husband becomes the wife’s agent to benefit the poor. Rebbi Hila said, the poor person acquired it for the wife from her husband and afterwards acquired it for himself.
A person gave a pledge to another; the other reneged on it. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Hila, and Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa all three say it was a deal about flax seed and he had given partial payment. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said: Either he delivers the entire contract or one may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, either he delivers for the amount of the pledge or ome may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph agrees with Rebbi Joḥanan in a sale which is not usually split, such as of a cow or a stole. Is a woman usually acquired split? Rebbi Ḥaggai and Rebbi Yudan both said, a sale usually may be split, the acquisition of a wife cannot be split.
There, we have stated: “An animal that is found as from Jerusalem to Migdal-Eder in every direction.” The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, this was taught for their monetary value. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, does one say to a person, go and commit larceny with sacrifices? But in every case they followed the majority of cases: If most are male, they are elevation offerings, if most are female, well-being offerings. But do not well-being offerings come from males and females? What does he do? He redeems them as profane and then turns them into elevation offerings. This is difficult. Can a purification offering become an elevation offering? Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is a stipulation by the court that all redundant animals should be brought as elevation offerings. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Jacob bar Ḥama, is that not intentional [misuse]? He said to him, since it is a stipulation by the court, it is not intentional [misuse]. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, as you say there, it is a stipulation by the court that lost animals should be brought as elevation offerings.
HALAKHAH: “If a man performs preliminary marriage using ‘orlah, or kilaim of a vineyard,” etc. The first-born of a she-ass, Rebbi Eleazar said, may be used to preliminarily marry a woman; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it may not be used to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The first-born of a she-ass may be used to preliminarily marry a woman by an argument de minore ad majus. Since you say that a firstling, whose prohibition cannot be lifted during its lifetime, can be used to preliminarily marry a woman, this one, whose prohibition can be lifted during its lifetime, not so much more? What is the difference between them? If somebody transgressed and redeemed it without the knowledge of its owner. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is not redeemed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is redeemed. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar and disagrees with him. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: If somebody steals the first-born of another person’s she-ass, he has to pay double restitution. The end disagrees with him: For even though he has no interest in it now he will later. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Eleazar explained that, after breaking of [the foal’s] neck. For Rebbi Eleazar said, everybody agrees that after its neck was broken it cannot be redeemed.
“One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman, but Rebbi Simeon permits it.” That disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar in two respects. If during its lifetime, it disagrees following the rabbis; if after breaking the neck, it disagrees following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Explain it that it died. If he broke its neck, it is forbidden for usufruct, but Rebbi Simeon permits it. “Breaking the neck, breaking the neck.” Since “breaking the neck” mentioned there implies that one has to break its neck, bury it, and it is forbidden for usufruct, so “breaking of the neck” mentioned here implies that one has to break its neck, [bury it,] and it is forbidden for usufruct. Following Rebbi Eleazar it is understandable. He permits during its lifetime; he needs an argument to forbid it after the breaking of the neck. Following Rebbi Joḥanan it is difficult. If it is forbidden during its lifetime, not so much more after breaking of its neck? There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of the rabbis: It is needed following the rabbis, lest you say that since the Torah combined the breaking of its neck with its redemption, and its redemption makes it profane, so also the breaking of its neck should make it profane. Do we find anything whose lifting makes profane and which is forbidden for usufruct? They objected: There is ṭevel containing the tithe of the poor which becomes totally profane by its lifting; but Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rebbi: A person eating produce which is ṭevel for the tithe of the poor is guilty of a deadly sin. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: So the rabbis answer Rebbi Simeon: Do we find anything that needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct? He replied to them: There is the first-born human who needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said, a person gives his tithes for the benefit of goodwill. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina? (Num. 5:10) “Everybody shall be the owner of his holy things.” How does Rebbi Joḥanan explain this? He may give them to whomever he likes.
A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaninah: “A vow that no Cohanim or Levites should have any advantage from me: they should take against his will.” He explains it about a person who says, I cannot possibly give them any gifts. You should know that this is so, since we have stated: “These Cohanim and Levites should [not] have any advantage from me; let others take.” A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “One may say, here you have a tetradrachma and give this firstling to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.” He explains, if he already wanted to give it to two Cohanim and that daughter’s son was one of them; then one said, here you have a tetradrachma and give it whole to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to another: go and marry me preliminarily to woman X,” etc. He looks out for himself and is rewarded since his acquisition is valid, but he behaved treacherously. The same holds for monetary transactions. If somebody says to another: go and buy for me goods X, and [the agent] went and bought [the merchandise] for himself, he looks out for himself and is rewarded since his acquisition is valid, but he behaved treacherously. Rebbi Ze‘ira cursed those who saw another person trying to buy certain goods and outbid him. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Also about one who organizes a group against another, the rabbis quote: “A person who prevents a good thing coming to his neighbor abandons the fear of the Almighty.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to another: go and marry me preliminarily to woman X,” etc. He looks out for himself and is rewarded since his acquisition is valid, but he behaved treacherously. The same holds for monetary transactions. If somebody says to another: go and buy for me goods X, and [the agent] went and bought [the merchandise] for himself, he looks out for himself and is rewarded since his acquisition is valid, but he behaved treacherously. Rebbi Ze‘ira cursed those who saw another person trying to buy certain goods and outbid him. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Also about one who organizes a group against another, the rabbis quote: “A person who prevents a good thing coming to his neighbor abandons the fear of the Almighty.”
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “This animal shall be an elevation sacrifice after thirty days.” If he sold it within the thirty days, it is sold; its dedication sanctifies. If he bought it back within the thirty days, the dedication as elevation sacrifice applies to it. After thirty days, the dedication as elevation sacrifice no longer applies. But an elevation sacrifice cannot be compared to a woman! Could an elevation sacrifice be compared to a woman? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it that the second man died but he had a brother. Since she is a candidate for levirate, the preliminary marriage of the first cannot be valid. Could an elevation sacrifice be compared to a woman? Rebbi Mattania said, explain it that he dedicated an animal with a permanent defect. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: There you say, my promise to Heaven is like my delivery to a private person, and here, you say so? He answered him: there, immediately, but here if he says, after thirty days.
There, we have stated: “A person can impose a condition of his ‘eruv.” So is the Mishnah: “A person can impose a condition of his‘eruvin.” Rebbi Eleazar said, who is the Tanna of “if they came”, “if they did not come”? Rebbi Meïr! Which Rebbi Meïr? The colleagues say, Rebbi Meïr of Qiddušin. As it was stated: If somebody say to a woman: You are preliminarily married to me on condition that there will be rain. If rain fell, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Meïr says, she is preliminarily married whether or not rain fell unless he doubled his condition. Everybody agrees that if he said, after rainfall, if it rained she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Yose said, it follows Rebbi Meïr in Eruvin, as we have stated there: “If it be in doubt, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah say, he is a camel-donkey driver.” Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Meïr said this only as a restriction. Rebbi Mana said, that is correct. He cannot acquire his ‘eruv since he is not able to enjoy it. [Why not] like the people of his place? If he had decided to leave his place. And here, she is not preliminarily married to the first, since no rain came. She is not preliminarily married to the second, since [the first] did not double his condition. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is this “if” not a reaction? He answered, there is a difference since the land was in their hand and he wanted to take it away from them.
There, we have stated: “A person can impose a condition of his ‘eruv.” So is the Mishnah: “A person can impose a condition of his‘eruvin.” Rebbi Eleazar said, who is the Tanna of “if they came”, “if they did not come”? Rebbi Meïr! Which Rebbi Meïr? The colleagues say, Rebbi Meïr of Qiddušin. As it was stated: If somebody say to a woman: You are preliminarily married to me on condition that there will be rain. If rain fell, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Meïr says, she is preliminarily married whether or not rain fell unless he doubled his condition. Everybody agrees that if he said, after rainfall, if it rained she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Yose said, it follows Rebbi Meïr in Eruvin, as we have stated there: “If it be in doubt, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah say, he is a camel-donkey driver.” Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Meïr said this only as a restriction. Rebbi Mana said, that is correct. He cannot acquire his ‘eruv since he is not able to enjoy it. [Why not] like the people of his place? If he had decided to leave his place. And here, she is not preliminarily married to the first, since no rain came. She is not preliminarily married to the second, since [the first] did not double his condition. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is this “if” not a reaction? He answered, there is a difference since the land was in their hand and he wanted to take it away from them.
MISHNAH: If a person contracts a preliminary marriage with a woman and then says, I was of the opinion that she was a Cohenet but she is a Levite, a Levite but she is a Cohenet, poor but she is rich, rich but she is poor, she is preliminarily married since she did not trick him.
A person met another in the market place. He said to him, give me the linen which you hold for me. The other responded, give me the denar which you hold for me. The first said, give me the linen and deduct the denar. The case came before Rebbi Mana, who said to him, you admitted that you owe him a denar; he did not admit anything about the linen. Go and give him the denar! Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Immi will agree that this is not the law but that he obligated him lest the other deny his liability for the linen.
A person owed another one 100 denars on a document. He sent 50 with an agent and instructed him: If he does not surrender the document, do not give him anything. The case came before Rebbi Immi. He said, go and give it, for we know. Think of it, Rebbi Immi [might die]! One writes for him a proclamation of the court. If one accepts for another person, the rabbis here say, what he accepted, he accepted for the claimant.
A person owed another one 100 denars on a document. He sent 50 with an agent and instructed him: If he does not surrender the document, do not give him anything. The case came before Rebbi Immi. He said, go and give it, for we know. Think of it, Rebbi Immi [might die]! One writes for him a proclamation of the court. If one accepts for another person, the rabbis here say, what he accepted, he accepted for the claimant.
Explanation: Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Yose ben Kipper descended to collect there for the colleagues when they were slandered. They asked but were not given anything. Then they came and wanted to take it back from them. They answered, we already acquired it. They said, we wish for you to accept it in good faith; they answered, we are unpaid trustees. They approached Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai who told them, there it is, all of it. They took Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, whipped him with ropes, and took it from him. When they returned here, he went to his father and told him, look what your son did to me! He asked him, what did he do to you? He answered, if he had taken my position, they could not have taken anything from us. He asked him, why did you act in such a way? He said, I saw that they were a unanimous court, their hats were a cubit wide, they were directing blows, my brother Yose was bound and the whip ascended and descended. I said, does my father have another Dositheos? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, you say that for somebody who cannot give a warranty in good faith. But if somebody gives a warranty in good faith, one takes from this one and gives to the other. If somebody forgave a bond to another person: Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mamal: one said it is forgiven; the other said it is not forgiven unless he handed over the bond.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody say to a woman,” etc. They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the difference between this and one who says, “this shall be heave for this standing produce after it has been cut”? He said to them, there, it is in his power to cut; but here, it is not in his power to be freed. Rebbi Ephes asked, think of it, if she was his slave girl? Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, “after you are freed”, she is made dependent on another person’s will.
The elder Rebbi Hoshaia and Rebbi Jehudah Neśia were sitting together. They said, let us say something on the subject of preliminary marriage. If somebody say to his wife, here you have a peruṭaḣ that you should be preliminarily married to me after I have divorced you, what is the rule? They laughed and got up. Rebbi Yose said, why did they laugh? Did not Rebbi Abba bar Mamal say, “after you are freed”, she is made dependent on another person’s will; and here “after you are divorced,” she is made dependent on another’s will. If you want to find a difficulty. ask the following: A person went to preliminarily marry a woman. Another person overtook him and said to her, you should know that the man who is coming to preliminarily marry you has a bad mind. In the future he will abandon you. But here you have this peruṭah that you should be preliminarily married to me after he will have divorced you. What is the rule?
The elder Rebbi Hoshaia and Rebbi Jehudah Neśia were sitting together. They said, let us say something on the subject of preliminary marriage. If somebody say to his wife, here you have a peruṭaḣ that you should be preliminarily married to me after I have divorced you, what is the rule? They laughed and got up. Rebbi Yose said, why did they laugh? Did not Rebbi Abba bar Mamal say, “after you are freed”, she is made dependent on another person’s will; and here “after you are divorced,” she is made dependent on another’s will. If you want to find a difficulty. ask the following: A person went to preliminarily marry a woman. Another person overtook him and said to her, you should know that the man who is coming to preliminarily marry you has a bad mind. In the future he will abandon you. But here you have this peruṭah that you should be preliminarily married to me after he will have divorced you. What is the rule?
The elder Rebbi Hoshaia and Rebbi Jehudah Neśia were sitting together. They said, let us say something on the subject of preliminary marriage. If somebody say to his wife, here you have a peruṭaḣ that you should be preliminarily married to me after I have divorced you, what is the rule? They laughed and got up. Rebbi Yose said, why did they laugh? Did not Rebbi Abba bar Mamal say, “after you are freed”, she is made dependent on another person’s will; and here “after you are divorced,” she is made dependent on another’s will. If you want to find a difficulty. ask the following: A person went to preliminarily marry a woman. Another person overtook him and said to her, you should know that the man who is coming to preliminarily marry you has a bad mind. In the future he will abandon you. But here you have this peruṭah that you should be preliminarily married to me after he will have divorced you. What is the rule?
Ḥizqiah said, if he redeemed them they revert to their sanctity. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he redeemed them they are redeemed. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “These have no redemption.” He explains thus: After they were cut they do not need redemption. Rebbi Yose said, what Ḥizqiah said refers to the case that he himself redeemed them. But if another person redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them. The argument of Rebbi Yose is switched: There, he says that if [another] redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them, but here, he says that if she was married to another man the qiddušin [of the first] were not removed! All that is questionable for him is if he gave her two peruṭot, one for the moment and one for after he divorced her; what is the situation?
MISHNAH: Rebbi Tarphon says, bastards can cleanse themselves. How is this? If the bastard married a slave girl, the child is a slave. When he is manumitted, the son is a free person. Rebbi Eliezer said, he is a slave and a bastard.
“Desecrated priest.” Following “from the sons of Cohanim, the family Ḥavaya, the family Haqqoṣ . . . they tried to find their genealogical documents; but they were not found and they were freed from priesthood. And the tiršata told them.” Why was he called hattiršata? Because they permitted him to drink of the wine. Hatiršata, “I was the king’s cup bearer.” “That they should not eat from what was dedicated as holy.” Therefore, from outside holy food they might eat? Rebbi Yose said, great is the permanence of the status quo ante Since they were used to eat there, they may also eat here. One understands there, as it is written: “Put up signposts for yourself.” What can one say here? Following him who said, they accepted tithes voluntarily. “Until a priest will be appointed for urim and tummim.” But were there any urim and tummim then, in the Second Temple? But [he is] like a person who says until the dead will be resurrected, until David’s son will come.
Any person who converts because of love, i. e., a man because of a woman or a woman because of a man, or proselytes of the king’s table, or lion proselytes, or the proselytes of Mordechai and Esther, one does not accept. Rav said, they are proselytes; one does not reject them in the way one has to reject proselytes from the start. But one accepts them; they need to be received in a friendly way; perhaps they became proselytes for God.
[“The dedicated ones”]. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, because of: “At that moment Joshua dedicated them as hewers of wood and drawers of water for the congregation.” One understands “for the congregation.” But “for the Eternal’s altar”? But Joshua kept them in limbo. He said, I shall not include nor exclude them. But he who sometime in the future will build the Temple, if he wants to include them he may include, exclude them he may exclude. David came and excluded them as it is said: “But the Gibeonites are not part of the Children of Israel.” Why did he exclude them? Because “ there was a famine in David’s time, three years year after year.” David said, for four sins the rains are locked away. For the sins of foreign worship, incest and adultery, murder, and the sins of those who publicly promise money for welfare but do not pay. From where for the sin of foreign worship? “ Beware, lest you be seduced” etc. What is written afterwards? “The Eternal’s rage will be inflamed against you and he locks the sky, etc.” From where for the sins of the incestuous and adulterers? “ You distorted the Land by your immorality and your evil deeds.” What is the punishment? “Rainshowers were withheld, there was no late rain,” etc. From where because of the murderers? “ Because blood will distort the Land.” From where for the sins of those who publicly promise money for welfare but do not pay? “ Clouds and wind but no rain means the man who prides himself by lying gifts.” David checked his entire generation and did not find one of these. He turned to ask the urim and tummim. That is what is written: “ David asked before the Eternal” by urim and tummim. Rebbi Eleazar said, “Ask the Eternal, all the meek of the Land, who execute His Law.” What means “Whose Law is Work”? He enforces His Law and this is His Action. “ The Eternal said, because of Saul and the House of blood guilt.” “Because of Saul,” whom you did not grant the last favor, “and because of the House of blood guilt, for he had killed the Gibeonites.” David sent and called them, what is between you and the house of Saul? They told him, because he killed seven of our men, two hewers of wood, two drawers of water, a religious leader, a scribe, and a beadle. He asked them, what do you want now? They said to him: “ May there be given to us seven men of his sons and we shall hang them before the Eternal on the hill of Saul, the elected of the Eternal.” He said to them, what use is it for you that they be killed? Take silver and gold for yourselves! But they answered, “there is no money for us from Saul and his house.” He said, maybe they are afraid; he separated them and spoke to each one separately, trying to mollify him by himself, and asked him: What use is it for you that they be killed? Take gold and silver! But he said, “there is no money for us from Saul and his house.” It is written “for me”. At this moment, David said that the Holy One gave three good gifts to Israel: They are merciful, decent, and charitable. From where that they are merciful? “He gave you mercy.” From where that they are decent? “That His fear should be on your faces.” This is a sign, for a decent person does not sin. About anybody indecent it is clear that his ancestors did not stand on Mount Sinai. From where that they are charitable? “The Eternal, your God, kept for you covenant and charity.” But these, nothing of this in found in them. Immediately he went to exclude them as it is said: “But the Gibeonites are not of the Children of Israel.” And Ezra also excluded them, as it is said: “And the dedicated ones dwelt in the Ophel.” Also in the future the Holy One, praise to Him, will exclude them as it is written: “One crossing the city they cause to be lost.”
HALAKHAH: “One does not investigate from the altar and before,” etc. It is written: “You certainly shall put a king over you.” This refers not only to a king; from where to add public officials, administrators of welfare, clerks of the court, and those who whip with a lash; from where? The verse says, “from amidst your brothers you shall appoint a king over you,” anybody whom you appoint over you shall only be from the select among your brethren. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: “Their distinguished lineage in the army in war.” The merit of their lineage supports them in war. So far from tradition; from the words of the Torah? “No bastard shall come into the Eternal’s congregation.” “No person injured in his testicles shall come, etc.” What is written afterwards? “When you encamp against your enemies, etc.”
HALAKHAH: “Similarly, if a woman empowered her agent,” etc. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates agency by a declaration? He explains it by the stringency of the rules of adultery and incest. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun understood this from the latter part: “Similarly, if a woman empowered her agent to contract preliminary marriage for her and then went and contracted for herself.” Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates agency by a declaration? He explains it by the stringency of the rules of adultery and incest.
HALAKHAH: “Similarly, if a woman empowered her agent,” etc. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates agency by a declaration? He explains it by the stringency of the rules of adultery and incest. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun understood this from the latter part: “Similarly, if a woman empowered her agent to contract preliminary marriage for her and then went and contracted for herself.” Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates agency by a declaration? He explains it by the stringency of the rules of adultery and incest.
Rebbi Meïr says: A person can earn his livelihood from anywhere. Blessed is he who sees his parents in an esteemed trade; woe to him who sees his parents in a degrading trade.
New paragraph. “Rebbi Meïr says that a man should try to teach his son a clean trade,” etc. What should a man do? A person should try and teach his son an unassuming trade and pray for mercy to Him to Whom riches belong since there is no trade in which poor and rich people are not found, for everything depends on a person’s merit. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Meïr: Did you ever see a lion porter, a (lion) [deer] maker of fig cakes, a fox grocer, a wolf selling pots? And they sustain themselves without pain. Why were they created? Only to serve me, and I was created to serve my Maker. Is it not an argument de minore ad maius? Since they were created to serve me and sustain themselves so without pain, should it not be logical that I, who was created to serve my Maker, should be able to sustain myself without pain? What caused me to have to sustain myself with pain? One has to say, my sins. Because I worsened my deeds and destroyed my sustenance.
New paragraph. “Rebbi Meïr says that a man should try to teach his son a clean trade,” etc. What should a man do? A person should try and teach his son an unassuming trade and pray for mercy to Him to Whom riches belong since there is no trade in which poor and rich people are not found, for everything depends on a person’s merit. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Meïr: Did you ever see a lion porter, a (lion) [deer] maker of fig cakes, a fox grocer, a wolf selling pots? And they sustain themselves without pain. Why were they created? Only to serve me, and I was created to serve my Maker. Is it not an argument de minore ad maius? Since they were created to serve me and sustain themselves so without pain, should it not be logical that I, who was created to serve my Maker, should be able to sustain myself without pain? What caused me to have to sustain myself with pain? One has to say, my sins. Because I worsened my deeds and destroyed my sustenance.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Nehorai says: I am leaving aside all trades in the world and teach my son only Torah, for a man eats from its rewards in this world and the capital remains for the future world. But with other trades it is not so, for if a person is afflicted with sickness, or old age, or a measure of suffering, and cannot continue in his trade, he dies, abandoned, from hunger. But the Torah is different, it guards him from all evil in his youth and gives him a future and hope in his old age. What does it say about his youth? “Those who trust in the Eternal will renew strength, they rise on wings like an eagle, they run without effort, they walk without tiring.” What does it say about his old age? “They still bear fruit in old age, fat and invigorated they will be.” So it says about our father Abraham, peace on him: “Abraham was old, came into days, and the Eternal blessed Abraham with everything.” We find that our father Abraham kept the entire Torah before it was given, as it is said: “As a reward because Abraham listened to My voice and kept My watch, My commandments, My laws, and My teachings.”
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Nehorai says: I am leaving aside all trades in the world and teach my son only Torah.” For all trades support a person only in his youth as long as he is in possession of his powers. But if a person is afflicted with sickness or a measure of suffering, and cannot continue working, he dies from hunger. But the Torah is different, it honors him and guards him from all evil in his youth and gives him a future and hope in his old age. What does it say about his youth? “Those who trust in the Eternal will renew strength, they rise on wings like an eagle, they run without effort, they walk without tiring.” What does it say about his old age? “They still bear fruit in old age, fat and invigorated they will be.” So you find about the patriarch Abraham who kept the Torah before it came into the world, as it is said: “As a reward because Abraham listened to My voice and kept My watch, My commandments, My laws, and My teachings.” Also it made him great and blessed him in his youth and gave him a future and hope in his old age. What does it say about his youth? “Abraham was very wealthy with livestock, silver, and gold.” And about his old age, what does it say? “Abraham was old, came into days, and the Eternal blessed Abraham with everything.”
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Nehorai says: I am leaving aside all trades in the world and teach my son only Torah.” For all trades support a person only in his youth as long as he is in possession of his powers. But if a person is afflicted with sickness or a measure of suffering, and cannot continue working, he dies from hunger. But the Torah is different, it honors him and guards him from all evil in his youth and gives him a future and hope in his old age. What does it say about his youth? “Those who trust in the Eternal will renew strength, they rise on wings like an eagle, they run without effort, they walk without tiring.” What does it say about his old age? “They still bear fruit in old age, fat and invigorated they will be.” So you find about the patriarch Abraham who kept the Torah before it came into the world, as it is said: “As a reward because Abraham listened to My voice and kept My watch, My commandments, My laws, and My teachings.” Also it made him great and blessed him in his youth and gave him a future and hope in his old age. What does it say about his youth? “Abraham was very wealthy with livestock, silver, and gold.” And about his old age, what does it say? “Abraham was old, came into days, and the Eternal blessed Abraham with everything.”
Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Cohen in the name of Rav. It is forbidden to dwell in a city which has neither a medical man, nor a public bath, nor a court lashing and jailing. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, also it is forbidden to dwell in a city which has no vegetable garden. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Cohen in the name of Rav: Every person will have to justify himself for everything his eye saw and which he did not eat. Rebbi Eleazar took note of this statement and saved coins from which he ate every kind once a year.
MISHNAH: There are four main categories of damages: The bull, and the pit, and the devourer, and the setting on fire. The bull is not like the devourer, nor the devourer like the bull; neither of them who are alive is like the pit which is not alive, nor either of them which move in causing damage is like the fire which does not move in causing damage. The common theme of them is that they are usually causing damage and you are obligated to watch them, and if damage was caused the person causing the damage is obligated to pay the damages in best quality land.
HALAKHAH: “There are four main categories of damages,” etc. The bull means the horn, as is written: “If a man’s bull smite another person’s bull,” etc. So far a harmless animal. From where a notorious [dangerous] one? “Or it was known that it be a goring bull,” etc. The pit, “if a man open a pit,” etc.; “the pit’s owner has to pay,” etc. The devourer: “If a person causes a field or a vineyard to be despoiled by sending his animals;” this is the foot as it is written: “Those who send the foot of bull and donkey.” And it is written: “Remove its cover and it will be despoiled,” that is the tooth, “tear down its fence and it will be trampled,” that is the foot. And the setting on fire, as it is written: “If fire starts and finds thistles,” etc.
HALAKHAH: “There are four main categories of damages,” etc. The bull means the horn, as is written: “If a man’s bull smite another person’s bull,” etc. So far a harmless animal. From where a notorious [dangerous] one? “Or it was known that it be a goring bull,” etc. The pit, “if a man open a pit,” etc.; “the pit’s owner has to pay,” etc. The devourer: “If a person causes a field or a vineyard to be despoiled by sending his animals;” this is the foot as it is written: “Those who send the foot of bull and donkey.” And it is written: “Remove its cover and it will be despoiled,” that is the tooth, “tear down its fence and it will be trampled,” that is the foot. And the setting on fire, as it is written: “If fire starts and finds thistles,” etc.
Derivatives of the pit: The entire third Chapter of Mishnah Neziqin. Rebbi stated: Somebody put a glowing coal in the public domain, another person came and stumbled over it while a flask was in his hand. If as a consequence that person’s clothing was singed and the flask in his hand was broken, he is obligated for the flask because of ‘pit’, and for the garments because of ‘fire’.
Derivatives of the pit: The entire third Chapter of Mishnah Neziqin. Rebbi stated: Somebody put a glowing coal in the public domain, another person came and stumbled over it while a flask was in his hand. If as a consequence that person’s clothing was singed and the flask in his hand was broken, he is obligated for the flask because of ‘pit’, and for the garments because of ‘fire’.
Rebbi Yose said: This means that a person who injured another first has to pay even if he later becomes injured, as is written: “He who injures an animal has to pay for it,” he has to pay the diminution in value.
New Paragraph. “If damage was caused the person responsible is obligated to pay for the damages,” etc. Rebbi Ḥanina said, “he who injures an animal has to pay for it,” he has to pay the diminution in value. Bar Pedaiah said, “if it was torn, he shall bring it up to the place of the carcass, for which he does not have to pay.” Rebbi Nasa said, the quote of Rebbi Ḥanina is needed and the quote of Bar Pedaiah is needed. If only the quote of Rebbi Ḥanina was given but not that of Bar Pedaiah, I would have said that if he made the damage possible he should not have to pay anything but for bodily damage he has to pay the diminution in value. Therefore, Bar Pedaiah’s quote is necessary. But if only the quote of Bar Pedaiah was given but not that of Rebbi Ḥanina, I would have said that if he made the damage possible he has to pay the diminution in value, but for bodily damage he has to pay the whole. Therefore, the quote of Rebbi Ḥanina is needed and the quote of Bar Pedaiah is needed.
MISHNAH: Anything I am obligated to watch I did set up for damage claims. If I partially set up for damage claims I am liable for claims as if I had set up for any claims. Properties of people of the covenant and private property, except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage; but property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage falls under the rules of restitution.
MISHNAH: Anything I am obligated to watch I did set up for damage claims. If I partially set up for damage claims I am liable for claims as if I had set up for any claims. Properties of people of the covenant and private property, except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage; but property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage falls under the rules of restitution.
MISHNAH: Anything I am obligated to watch I did set up for damage claims. If I partially set up for damage claims I am liable for claims as if I had set up for any claims. Properties of people of the covenant and private property, except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage; but property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage falls under the rules of restitution.
“If I partially set up for damage claims” “as if I had set up for any claims.” This is the pit, as it was stated: If somebody dug a pit ten handbreadths deep and another came and deepened it another handbreadth, the latter is responsible. Rebbi says, one goes after the latter in case of death and after the former for damages. Rebbi Isaac says: So is the baraita: After the latter in case of death and after both of them for damages. If he dug [a pit] ten handbreadths deep and another person came, whitewashed and lined it, both of them are liable. Is he liable because he whitewashed and lined it? When he told him, whitewash this (house) [pit] and acquire it, for Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the prevention of damages follows the rules of guarding an acquisition. Rebbi Simon said, explain it when he was digging in the dunes. And it was stated: If each of them dug ten, or each one twenty, or each one a hundred, they are all liable. How deep does it have to be? To be deadly, ten handbreadths. To do damage, anything. Symmachos says, three in depth and four in width. Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower says, the length of the animal which falls in. What means the length of the animal which falls in? Whether chicken or camel.
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A condominium courtyard is obligated. Rebbi Yasa said: and I deduced that from what Rebbi Hoshaia stated: Four principles about damages Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar enunciated in Rebbi Meїr’s name: Any place which is permitted to both the person who sustained the damage and the person who caused it, such as a hostelry or a condominium courtyard and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing by a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from [real estate] of the best quality. [Permitted] to the person who sustained the damage but not the person who caused it, he pays everyting. [Permitted] to the person who caused the damage but not the person who sustained it, he is free from everything. And everybody agrees that if neither of them had access, as a valley or public property and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing from a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from his storage room.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A condominium courtyard is obligated. Rebbi Yasa said: and I deduced that from what Rebbi Hoshaia stated: Four principles about damages Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar enunciated in Rebbi Meїr’s name: Any place which is permitted to both the person who sustained the damage and the person who caused it, such as a hostelry or a condominium courtyard and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing by a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from [real estate] of the best quality. [Permitted] to the person who sustained the damage but not the person who caused it, he pays everyting. [Permitted] to the person who caused the damage but not the person who sustained it, he is free from everything. And everybody agrees that if neither of them had access, as a valley or public property and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing from a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from his storage room.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A condominium courtyard is obligated. Rebbi Yasa said: and I deduced that from what Rebbi Hoshaia stated: Four principles about damages Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar enunciated in Rebbi Meїr’s name: Any place which is permitted to both the person who sustained the damage and the person who caused it, such as a hostelry or a condominium courtyard and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing by a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from [real estate] of the best quality. [Permitted] to the person who sustained the damage but not the person who caused it, he pays everyting. [Permitted] to the person who caused the damage but not the person who sustained it, he is free from everything. And everybody agrees that if neither of them had access, as a valley or public property and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing from a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from his storage room.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A condominium courtyard is obligated. Rebbi Yasa said: and I deduced that from what Rebbi Hoshaia stated: Four principles about damages Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar enunciated in Rebbi Meїr’s name: Any place which is permitted to both the person who sustained the damage and the person who caused it, such as a hostelry or a condominium courtyard and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing by a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from [real estate] of the best quality. [Permitted] to the person who sustained the damage but not the person who caused it, he pays everyting. [Permitted] to the person who caused the damage but not the person who sustained it, he is free from everything. And everybody agrees that if neither of them had access, as a valley or public property and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing from a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from his storage room.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A condominium courtyard is obligated. Rebbi Yasa said: and I deduced that from what Rebbi Hoshaia stated: Four principles about damages Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar enunciated in Rebbi Meїr’s name: Any place which is permitted to both the person who sustained the damage and the person who caused it, such as a hostelry or a condominium courtyard and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing by a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from [real estate] of the best quality. [Permitted] to the person who sustained the damage but not the person who caused it, he pays everyting. [Permitted] to the person who caused the damage but not the person who sustained it, he is free from everything. And everybody agrees that if neither of them had access, as a valley or public property and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing from a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from his storage room.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A condominium courtyard is obligated. Rebbi Yasa said: and I deduced that from what Rebbi Hoshaia stated: Four principles about damages Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar enunciated in Rebbi Meїr’s name: Any place which is permitted to both the person who sustained the damage and the person who caused it, such as a hostelry or a condominium courtyard and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing by a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from [real estate] of the best quality. [Permitted] to the person who sustained the damage but not the person who caused it, he pays everyting. [Permitted] to the person who caused the damage but not the person who sustained it, he is free from everything. And everybody agrees that if neither of them had access, as a valley or public property and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing from a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from his storage room.
MISHNAH: Estimation and determination of money’s worth is by a court based on testimony of free persons of the Covenant. Women are under the rule of torts and sometimes both the person who causes and the one who suffers the damage pay.
HALAKHAH: “Estimation and determination of money’s worth,” etc. One does not say that a cow be compensated for by a stole, but one appraises all property in court. “Money’s worth,” this teaches that the court only appraises mortgageable property. But if the person suffering damage appropriated movables, one appraises those. “By a court”, this teaches that one only appraises in court. “Based on testimony”, for one only appraises by testimony. “Of free persons of the Covenant”, this excludes Gentiles, and slaves, and persons disqualified for testimony. “Women are under the rule of torts”; since the verse speaks only of men, it is necessary to include women: Rebbi Ismael stated, “these are the laws which you shall put before them” “And sometimes both the person who causes and the one who suffers the damage pay”; they pay half the damage. From here, that one splits the damage; each one loses half the value of the damage.
HALAKHAH: “Estimation and determination of money’s worth,” etc. One does not say that a cow be compensated for by a stole, but one appraises all property in court. “Money’s worth,” this teaches that the court only appraises mortgageable property. But if the person suffering damage appropriated movables, one appraises those. “By a court”, this teaches that one only appraises in court. “Based on testimony”, for one only appraises by testimony. “Of free persons of the Covenant”, this excludes Gentiles, and slaves, and persons disqualified for testimony. “Women are under the rule of torts”; since the verse speaks only of men, it is necessary to include women: Rebbi Ismael stated, “these are the laws which you shall put before them” “And sometimes both the person who causes and the one who suffers the damage pay”; they pay half the damage. From here, that one splits the damage; each one loses half the value of the damage.
MISHNAH: Five harmless and five notorious animals. An animal is not known to gore, nor to hit, nor to bite, nor to lie down, nor to kick. The tooth is known to eat what is appropriate for it. A notorious bull, a bull of the person who causes the damage on the property of the person who suffered the damage, and the human.
MISHNAH: Five harmless and five notorious animals. An animal is not known to gore, nor to hit, nor to bite, nor to lie down, nor to kick. The tooth is known to eat what is appropriate for it. A notorious bull, a bull of the person who causes the damage on the property of the person who suffered the damage, and the human.
HALAKHAH: “Five harmless and five notorious animals,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this follows Rebbi Ṭarphon: “In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages.”
MISHNAH: How is the tooth notorious to eat what is fitting for it? A domesticated animal is notorious for eating fruits and vegetables. If it ate a garment or vessels, he pays half damages. When has this been said? In the domain of the person sustaining the damage. But on public property he is free; but if it benefited, he pays what it benefited.
“A dog stole a hot pitta.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if he lit every single ear of grain. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another. Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If a kid goat was bound to it and a slave was close by and was burned, he is obligated. If the slave was bound and the kid goat close by, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then for the first ear he is guilty of a capital crime; for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. Rebbi Yose said, you also understand that from: “If his cattle set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is obligated. But if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then should he not become obligated since for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. A person did put out a hot water bottle outside. A donkey passed by and broke it. The case came before Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai, who said to him: He does not owe you anything. Not only that but if [the donkey] suffered damage, [you] would be obligated for its damages.
“A dog stole a hot pitta.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if he lit every single ear of grain. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another. Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If a kid goat was bound to it and a slave was close by and was burned, he is obligated. If the slave was bound and the kid goat close by, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then for the first ear he is guilty of a capital crime; for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. Rebbi Yose said, you also understand that from: “If his cattle set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is obligated. But if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then should he not become obligated since for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. A person did put out a hot water bottle outside. A donkey passed by and broke it. The case came before Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai, who said to him: He does not owe you anything. Not only that but if [the donkey] suffered damage, [you] would be obligated for its damages.
“A dog stole a hot pitta.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if he lit every single ear of grain. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another. Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If a kid goat was bound to it and a slave was close by and was burned, he is obligated. If the slave was bound and the kid goat close by, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then for the first ear he is guilty of a capital crime; for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. Rebbi Yose said, you also understand that from: “If his cattle set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is obligated. But if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then should he not become obligated since for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. A person did put out a hot water bottle outside. A donkey passed by and broke it. The case came before Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai, who said to him: He does not owe you anything. Not only that but if [the donkey] suffered damage, [you] would be obligated for its damages.
“A dog stole a hot pitta.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if he lit every single ear of grain. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another. Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If a kid goat was bound to it and a slave was close by and was burned, he is obligated. If the slave was bound and the kid goat close by, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then for the first ear he is guilty of a capital crime; for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. Rebbi Yose said, you also understand that from: “If his cattle set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is obligated. But if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then should he not become obligated since for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. A person did put out a hot water bottle outside. A donkey passed by and broke it. The case came before Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai, who said to him: He does not owe you anything. Not only that but if [the donkey] suffered damage, [you] would be obligated for its damages.
MISHNAH: How does one treat the bull of the person causing the damage in the domain of the person sustaining the damage? If it gored, hit, bit, wallowed, or kicked, in the public domain he pays half of the damages. In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages. Rebbi Tarphon said to them: Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, where one is free, He was restrictive for them in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, when full damages must be paid, and He was restrictive regarding damage by the horn in the public domain, where one has to pay half damages; is it not logical that we should be restrictive in this case in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, that full damages must be paid? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages. He said to them, I do not argue horn from horn, I argue horn from foot! Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, He was restrictive for damage by the horn, when He was restrictive with [damage by] tooth or foot in the domain of the person sustaining the damage; is it not logical that we should be restrictive [in case of damage] by the horn? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages.
MISHNAH: How does one treat the bull of the person causing the damage in the domain of the person sustaining the damage? If it gored, hit, bit, wallowed, or kicked, in the public domain he pays half of the damages. In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages. Rebbi Tarphon said to them: Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, where one is free, He was restrictive for them in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, when full damages must be paid, and He was restrictive regarding damage by the horn in the public domain, where one has to pay half damages; is it not logical that we should be restrictive in this case in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, that full damages must be paid? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages. He said to them, I do not argue horn from horn, I argue horn from foot! Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, He was restrictive for damage by the horn, when He was restrictive with [damage by] tooth or foot in the domain of the person sustaining the damage; is it not logical that we should be restrictive [in case of damage] by the horn? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages.
MISHNAH: How does one treat the bull of the person causing the damage in the domain of the person sustaining the damage? If it gored, hit, bit, wallowed, or kicked, in the public domain he pays half of the damages. In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages. Rebbi Tarphon said to them: Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, where one is free, He was restrictive for them in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, when full damages must be paid, and He was restrictive regarding damage by the horn in the public domain, where one has to pay half damages; is it not logical that we should be restrictive in this case in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, that full damages must be paid? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages. He said to them, I do not argue horn from horn, I argue horn from foot! Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, He was restrictive for damage by the horn, when He was restrictive with [damage by] tooth or foot in the domain of the person sustaining the damage; is it not logical that we should be restrictive [in case of damage] by the horn? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages.
MISHNAH: How does one treat the bull of the person causing the damage in the domain of the person sustaining the damage? If it gored, hit, bit, wallowed, or kicked, in the public domain he pays half of the damages. In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages. Rebbi Tarphon said to them: Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, where one is free, He was restrictive for them in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, when full damages must be paid, and He was restrictive regarding damage by the horn in the public domain, where one has to pay half damages; is it not logical that we should be restrictive in this case in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, that full damages must be paid? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages. He said to them, I do not argue horn from horn, I argue horn from foot! Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, He was restrictive for damage by the horn, when He was restrictive with [damage by] tooth or foot in the domain of the person sustaining the damage; is it not logical that we should be restrictive [in case of damage] by the horn? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages.
MISHNAH: How does one treat the bull of the person causing the damage in the domain of the person sustaining the damage? If it gored, hit, bit, wallowed, or kicked, in the public domain he pays half of the damages. In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages. Rebbi Tarphon said to them: Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, where one is free, He was restrictive for them in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, when full damages must be paid, and He was restrictive regarding damage by the horn in the public domain, where one has to pay half damages; is it not logical that we should be restrictive in this case in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, that full damages must be paid? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages. He said to them, I do not argue horn from horn, I argue horn from foot! Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, He was restrictive for damage by the horn, when He was restrictive with [damage by] tooth or foot in the domain of the person sustaining the damage; is it not logical that we should be restrictive [in case of damage] by the horn? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages.
MISHNAH: How does one treat the bull of the person causing the damage in the domain of the person sustaining the damage? If it gored, hit, bit, wallowed, or kicked, in the public domain he pays half of the damages. In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages. Rebbi Tarphon said to them: Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, where one is free, He was restrictive for them in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, when full damages must be paid, and He was restrictive regarding damage by the horn in the public domain, where one has to pay half damages; is it not logical that we should be restrictive in this case in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, that full damages must be paid? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages. He said to them, I do not argue horn from horn, I argue horn from foot! Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, He was restrictive for damage by the horn, when He was restrictive with [damage by] tooth or foot in the domain of the person sustaining the damage; is it not logical that we should be restrictive [in case of damage] by the horn? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages.