possession
847 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
One may not consecrate [a field of his possession] less than two years before the Jubilee, nor redeem it less than one year after the Jubilee. One does not reckon months to [the disadvantage of] the Sanctuary, but the Sanctuary does reckon months [to its own advantage]. If a man consecrated his field at a time when the law of the Jubilee is in force, he must pay fifty shekels for [every piece of field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. If the field contained ravines ten handbreadths deep or rocks ten handbreadths high, they are not included as part of the field. But if less than this, they are included. If he consecrated it two or three years before the Jubilee, he must pay one sela [shekel] and one pondion for each year. If he says: “I shall pay for each year as it comes,” they do not listen to him, rather he must pay for all the years together.
If a man consecrated [his field] and then redeemed it, it does not go out of his possession in the Jubilee. If his son redeemed it, it reverts to his father in the Jubilee. If another person, or a relative redeemed it, and he redeemed it from his hand, it goes out [to the priests]. If one of the priests redeemed it, and it was still in his possession, he cannot say: “Since it goes out to the priests in the Jubilee, and since it is now in my possession, therefore it belongs to me.” Rather, it goes out of his possession to all his fellow priests.
If a man consecrated [his field] and then redeemed it, it does not go out of his possession in the Jubilee. If his son redeemed it, it reverts to his father in the Jubilee. If another person, or a relative redeemed it, and he redeemed it from his hand, it goes out [to the priests]. If one of the priests redeemed it, and it was still in his possession, he cannot say: “Since it goes out to the priests in the Jubilee, and since it is now in my possession, therefore it belongs to me.” Rather, it goes out of his possession to all his fellow priests.
If a man consecrated [his field] and then redeemed it, it does not go out of his possession in the Jubilee. If his son redeemed it, it reverts to his father in the Jubilee. If another person, or a relative redeemed it, and he redeemed it from his hand, it goes out [to the priests]. If one of the priests redeemed it, and it was still in his possession, he cannot say: “Since it goes out to the priests in the Jubilee, and since it is now in my possession, therefore it belongs to me.” Rather, it goes out of his possession to all his fellow priests.
If a man consecrated [his field] and then redeemed it, it does not go out of his possession in the Jubilee. If his son redeemed it, it reverts to his father in the Jubilee. If another person, or a relative redeemed it, and he redeemed it from his hand, it goes out [to the priests]. If one of the priests redeemed it, and it was still in his possession, he cannot say: “Since it goes out to the priests in the Jubilee, and since it is now in my possession, therefore it belongs to me.” Rather, it goes out of his possession to all his fellow priests.
If the Jubilee arrived and it was not yet redeemed then the priests enter into possession of the land and they pay its value, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: they enter [into possession] but they do not pay [its value]. Rabbi Eliezer says: they neither enter [into possession] nor pay [its value]. But it is called an abandoned field until the second Jubilee. If the second jubilee has arrived and it was not yet redeemed, it is called a ‘twice abandoned field’ until the third Jubilee. The priests never enter into possession of the field until someone else had redeemed it.
If the Jubilee arrived and it was not yet redeemed then the priests enter into possession of the land and they pay its value, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: they enter [into possession] but they do not pay [its value]. Rabbi Eliezer says: they neither enter [into possession] nor pay [its value]. But it is called an abandoned field until the second Jubilee. If the second jubilee has arrived and it was not yet redeemed, it is called a ‘twice abandoned field’ until the third Jubilee. The priests never enter into possession of the field until someone else had redeemed it.
If the Jubilee arrived and it was not yet redeemed then the priests enter into possession of the land and they pay its value, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: they enter [into possession] but they do not pay [its value]. Rabbi Eliezer says: they neither enter [into possession] nor pay [its value]. But it is called an abandoned field until the second Jubilee. If the second jubilee has arrived and it was not yet redeemed, it is called a ‘twice abandoned field’ until the third Jubilee. The priests never enter into possession of the field until someone else had redeemed it.
If the Jubilee arrived and it was not yet redeemed then the priests enter into possession of the land and they pay its value, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: they enter [into possession] but they do not pay [its value]. Rabbi Eliezer says: they neither enter [into possession] nor pay [its value]. But it is called an abandoned field until the second Jubilee. If the second jubilee has arrived and it was not yet redeemed, it is called a ‘twice abandoned field’ until the third Jubilee. The priests never enter into possession of the field until someone else had redeemed it.
If one bought a field from his father, and his father died and afterwards he consecrated it, it is considered a field of possession. If he consecrated it and afterwards his father died, then it is considered a field acquired by purchase, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon say: it is considered a field of possession, as it is said: “And if a field which he has, which is not a field of his possession” (Leviticus 27:22) a field which is not capable of becoming a field of his possession, thus excluding a field which is capable of becoming a field of possession. A field acquired by purchase does not go out to the priests in the year of the Jubilee, for no man can consecrate an object not belonging to him. Priests and Levites may consecrate [their fields] at any time and redeem at any time, both before and after the jubilee.
If one bought a field from his father, and his father died and afterwards he consecrated it, it is considered a field of possession. If he consecrated it and afterwards his father died, then it is considered a field acquired by purchase, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon say: it is considered a field of possession, as it is said: “And if a field which he has, which is not a field of his possession” (Leviticus 27:22) a field which is not capable of becoming a field of his possession, thus excluding a field which is capable of becoming a field of possession. A field acquired by purchase does not go out to the priests in the year of the Jubilee, for no man can consecrate an object not belonging to him. Priests and Levites may consecrate [their fields] at any time and redeem at any time, both before and after the jubilee.
If one bought a field from his father, and his father died and afterwards he consecrated it, it is considered a field of possession. If he consecrated it and afterwards his father died, then it is considered a field acquired by purchase, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon say: it is considered a field of possession, as it is said: “And if a field which he has, which is not a field of his possession” (Leviticus 27:22) a field which is not capable of becoming a field of his possession, thus excluding a field which is capable of becoming a field of possession. A field acquired by purchase does not go out to the priests in the year of the Jubilee, for no man can consecrate an object not belonging to him. Priests and Levites may consecrate [their fields] at any time and redeem at any time, both before and after the jubilee.
If one bought a field from his father, and his father died and afterwards he consecrated it, it is considered a field of possession. If he consecrated it and afterwards his father died, then it is considered a field acquired by purchase, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon say: it is considered a field of possession, as it is said: “And if a field which he has, which is not a field of his possession” (Leviticus 27:22) a field which is not capable of becoming a field of his possession, thus excluding a field which is capable of becoming a field of possession. A field acquired by purchase does not go out to the priests in the year of the Jubilee, for no man can consecrate an object not belonging to him. Priests and Levites may consecrate [their fields] at any time and redeem at any time, both before and after the jubilee.
If one bought a field from his father, and his father died and afterwards he consecrated it, it is considered a field of possession. If he consecrated it and afterwards his father died, then it is considered a field acquired by purchase, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon say: it is considered a field of possession, as it is said: “And if a field which he has, which is not a field of his possession” (Leviticus 27:22) a field which is not capable of becoming a field of his possession, thus excluding a field which is capable of becoming a field of possession. A field acquired by purchase does not go out to the priests in the year of the Jubilee, for no man can consecrate an object not belonging to him. Priests and Levites may consecrate [their fields] at any time and redeem at any time, both before and after the jubilee.
A man may proscribe [part] of his flock or of his herd, of his Canaanite slaves or female slaves or of his field of possession. But if he proscribed all of them, they are not considered [validly] proscribed, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah said: just as when it comes to the Highest One, one is not permitted to proscribe all of his possessions, how much more so should one be careful with his property.
If one proscribes his son or his daughter, or his Hebrew slave or female slave, or the field which he acquired by purchase, they are not considered [validly] proscribed, for one can proscribe something that does not belong to him. Priests and Levites cannot proscribe [their belongings], the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: the priests cannot proscribe, because things proscribed belong to them. But Levites can proscribe, because things proscribed do not belong to them. Rabbi says: the words of Rabbi Judah seem acceptable in cases of immovable property as it is said: “For that is their perpetual possession,” (Leviticus 25:34) and the words of Rabbi Shimon seem acceptable in cases of movable property, since things proscribed do not fall to them.
Things proscribed for [the use of] the priests cannot be redeemed but are to be given to the priests. Rabbi Judah ben Batera says: things proscribed without specification fall to [the fund for] Temple repairs, as it was said: “Every proscribed thing is most holy to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:25). But the sages say: things proscribed without specification go to the priests, as it is said: “As a field proscribed: its possession belongs to the priest” (Leviticus 27:21). If so, why is it said: “Every proscribed thing is most holy to the Lord”? This teaches that it applies to most holy and less holy things.
If one sold his field [of possession] at the time when the Jubilee was in force, he may not redeem it for two years, as it says: “According to the number of the years of the crops he shall sell to you” (Leviticus 25:15). If there was a year of blight or mildew, or a seventh year, it is not included in the count. If he only broke the ground [without planting] or left it fallow [for a year], that year is included in the count. Rabbi Elazar says: if he sold it to him before Rosh Hashanah year, and it was still full of fruit, he enjoys three crops in two years.
If he sold it to the first for one hundred [denars] and the first sold it to the second for two hundred, then he need reckon only with the first, as it says, “With the man to whom he sold” (Leviticus 25:27). If he sold it to the first for two hundred, and the first sold it to the second for one hundred, then he need reckon only with the second, as it says: “With the man” (ibid) the man in possession of the field. One may not sell a distant field in order to redeem a near one, or a poor field in order to redeem a good one. One may not borrow [money] in order to redeem, nor redeem it in halves. But in the case of objects consecrated all these things are permitted. In this respect the laws concerning a person’s [property] are more stringent than those concerning sacred things.
If the [last] day of the twelve months has arrived and it was not redeemed, it becomes his permanent [possession]. This applies whether he bought it or received it as a gift, as it is said: “beyond reclaim” (Leviticus 25:30). In earlier times, he [the buyer] would hide on the last day of the twelve months, so that [the house] might become his permanent [possession]. Hillel enacted that he [the seller] could deposit his money in the chamber and break down the door and enter, and that the other [the buyer], whenever he wanted, might come and take his money.
If the [last] day of the twelve months has arrived and it was not redeemed, it becomes his permanent [possession]. This applies whether he bought it or received it as a gift, as it is said: “beyond reclaim” (Leviticus 25:30). In earlier times, he [the buyer] would hide on the last day of the twelve months, so that [the house] might become his permanent [possession]. Hillel enacted that he [the seller] could deposit his money in the chamber and break down the door and enter, and that the other [the buyer], whenever he wanted, might come and take his money.
One who has sent a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor: If they carried out their agency the employer is guilty, If they did not carry out their appointed errand, the shopkeeper is guilty. If one sent one of sound senses and remembers [that the money belongs to Temple property] before it has come into the possession of the shopkeeper, the shopkeeper will be guilty when he spends it. What should he do? He should take a perutah or a vessel and say “The perutah that is Temple property, wherever it may be, is redeemed with this;” for consecrated things can be redeemed both with money and with money's worth.
One who deposited vessels with an am haaretz they are unclean with corpse uncleanness and with midras uncleanness. If he knew that he eats terumah, they are free from corpse uncleanness but are unclean with midras uncleanness. Rabbi Yose says: if he deposited with him a chest full of clothes, they are deemed to be unclean with midras when they are tightly packed, but if they are not tightly packed they are only unclean with madaf uncleanness, even though the key is in the possession of the owner.
The Jerusalem Talmud
It was stated: Rebbi and Rebbi Jehudah the Prince did not disagree about produce bought on the field from a Gentile that it is subject to tithes because the Jew takes his place, nor about harvested produce bought from the Gentile that it is free from tithes. What did they disagree about? About him who buys harvested produce from his fellow in a year of tithes for the poor. Rebbi Judah the Prince said, one takes it from him whether he be poor or rich. But Rebbi said, one takes it from the rich, one does not take it from the poor. What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah the Prince? Just as nobody has any rights on the single stalks, the forgotten sheaves, and the peah of his own field, so he should have no right to his tithe for the poor. What is the reason of Rebbi? Single stalks, the forgotten sheaves, and peah do not cause tebel, but the tithe for the poor creates ṭebel. It became ṭebel already in the possession of the first owner! What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah the Prince? Because of a fine! What is the reason of Rebbi? Only the rich person has the power to buy ; it is not in the power of the poor to buy. As Rebbi Jehudah the Prince says, he may take a loan; but Rebbi says that he will not be able to borrow.
If the treasurer cut half of the half but did not finish to harvest the rest before somebody redeemed everything, he gives from the harvest for what was harvested but all that was harvested in the possession of the Temple is already exempted.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Aqiba says: Any real estate is subject to peah and first fruits, to write a prozbol based on it, and to acquire simultaneously non-guaranteed property with money or contract or possession. If someone signs over his properties when bedridden and reserved for himself any real estate, his gift is permanent; if he did not reserve any real estate for himself, his gift is not permanent. If he signs over his properties to his sons and signs over some real estate for his wife, she lost her ketubah. Rebbi Yose says, if she accepted it, even if it was not in a written document, she lost her ketubah.
From where that non-guaranteed property may be acquired with guaranteed property, by money, document, or possession? Rebbi Yose in the name of Ḥizqiah; Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Ḥanina Tortaya in the name of Ḥizqiah, it is written (2Chr. 21:3): “Their father gave them many gifts, silver and gold and delicacies, with fortified cities in Jehudah.” So far real estate and movables were at the same place. If real estate was at one place and movables elsewhere? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eliezer said to them, it happened that a man from Madon was in Jerusalem, rich in movables. He wanted to distribute them, to give them as gifts. They said to him, you cannot do that except if you acquire real estate. What did he do? He went and bought a rock near Jerusalem and said: The Northern part I give to X with a hundred amphoras of wine, the Southern part I give to Y with a hundred amphoras of oil. The matter came before the Sages and they upheld his words. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: But was he not bedridden? For in general a person might give property rights only in writing, and here even orally. In general, a person might give only if real estate and movables are at the same place, but here the real estate even was at one place and the movables elsewhere. He said to him: But is there a difference for Rebbi Eliezer? The sick person for Rebbi Eliezer is like the healthy person for the rabbis.
Our Mishnah is from Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba said that you go after the first third. And they differed: A field that was one-third ripened in the possession of a Gentile, and a Jew bought it after that time, Rebbi Aqiba said it is free, but the Sages say he is obligated for the additional growth. How is that? Explain it for Rebbi Aqiba (after smoothing) [in a disagreement], or according to everybody if he harvested immediately.
MISHNAH: : A single ear on the field to be harvested and its head reaches to the grain that is still standing, if it can be cut together with standing grain, it belongs to the owner, otherwise it is for the poor. An ear of gleanings that was mixed up in a stack of grain, he gives tithes for one ear and gives it to him. Rebbi Eliezer said, how can the poor man exchange something that never was in his possession? But he has to give the poor rights to the entire stack; then he gives tithes for one ear and gives it to him.
Rebbi Zeïra stated: Rebbi Abbahu in the name of R. Joḥanan: The reasoning of Rebbi Eliezer is inverted! There he makes him acquire, and here he says thus? He answered “according to your reasoning,” in your reasoning that you say it is by exchange. “How can the poor man exchange something that never was in his possession? But he has to give the poor man rights to the entire stack; then he gives tithes for one ear and gives to him.”
MISHNAH: If a proselyte and a Gentile inherited from their Gentile father, the proselyte may say, take the idols and I shall take money, take the wine for libations and I shall take produce. After they came into the proselyte’s possession, this is forbidden. He who sells produce in Syria and says: ‘They are from the Land of Israel,’ must tithe them. ‘They are tithed,’ one believes him because the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits. ‘They are from my field,’ he must tithe them. ‘They are tithed,’ one believes him because the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permits. If it is known that he has a field in Syria, he must tithe.
HALAKHAH: a Jew and a Gentile bought a Gentile’s house and found there idols, libation wine, and coins, he should not tell him, take the idols and libation wine, and I shall take the coins.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, not only idols, libation wine, and coins, but even if there were two idols, one shaped as a tripod and one not shaped as a tripod, he should not tell him, take the one that is not shaped as a tripod and I shall take the one shaped like a tripod. Rebbi Zeïra said, that is correct, since even in the case of a ḥaver and an am haäreẓ who inherited from their am haäreẓ father and found there produce which might become impure and produce which might not, may he say to him, you take the produce which might become impure and I shall take that which might not? But our Mishnah disagrees: “Take the idols and I shall take money, take the wine for libations and I shall take produce.” But the end shows that there is no disagreement: “After they came into the possession of the proselyte, this is forbidden;” here, from the moment he acquired it it is as if it entered into his possession.
HALAKHAH: a Jew and a Gentile bought a Gentile’s house and found there idols, libation wine, and coins, he should not tell him, take the idols and libation wine, and I shall take the coins.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, not only idols, libation wine, and coins, but even if there were two idols, one shaped as a tripod and one not shaped as a tripod, he should not tell him, take the one that is not shaped as a tripod and I shall take the one shaped like a tripod. Rebbi Zeïra said, that is correct, since even in the case of a ḥaver and an am haäreẓ who inherited from their am haäreẓ father and found there produce which might become impure and produce which might not, may he say to him, you take the produce which might become impure and I shall take that which might not? But our Mishnah disagrees: “Take the idols and I shall take money, take the wine for libations and I shall take produce.” But the end shows that there is no disagreement: “After they came into the possession of the proselyte, this is forbidden;” here, from the moment he acquired it it is as if it entered into his possession.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Joḥanan said: The Mishnah deals with demay. Hence, not with certain produce? A Mishnah says, even for certain produce, as we have stated there: “If he had ṭevel figs in his house and he was in the House of Study or on the field.” If you want to say that we deal with demay, you cannot do so, since it is stated: “If it was demay.” What Rebbi Joḥanan said was that it deals with demay. He did not say, not with certain produce, but that this Mishnah deals with demay. What is the difference between demay and certain produce? For demay, a person may make a proviso for something that is not in his possession; for certain produce, he may only make a proviso for something that is in his possession.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Joḥanan said: The Mishnah deals with demay. Hence, not with certain produce? A Mishnah says, even for certain produce, as we have stated there: “If he had ṭevel figs in his house and he was in the House of Study or on the field.” If you want to say that we deal with demay, you cannot do so, since it is stated: “If it was demay.” What Rebbi Joḥanan said was that it deals with demay. He did not say, not with certain produce, but that this Mishnah deals with demay. What is the difference between demay and certain produce? For demay, a person may make a proviso for something that is not in his possession; for certain produce, he may only make a proviso for something that is in his possession.
It was stated: “Rebbi Jehudah forbids.” What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? Can a person make a proviso about something not in his possession? “But Rebbi Jehudah agrees that he may go, buy from the place from which his host bought, and tithe.” Can a person give for something that is not his? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: they considered him as one who sold ṭevel produce to another person, as was stated: “He who sells ṭevel produce to another person has to run after him and put the produce in order. If he does not find him, if it is known that the produce still exists, he has to tithe for him; if not, he does not have to tithe for him. If it is doubtful whether the produce exists or not, he tithes for it and gives a name to the tithes.”
It was stated: “And all those which remained from the sixth year into the Sabbatical belong to the sixth except for nasturtium which is like a vegetable.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no [rule that] “from the sixth year into the Sabbatical they belong to the sixth” but [they belong] to the Sabbatical. But did we not state: “Calamint, hyssop, and thyme he brought to the courtyard, (but) if it was from the second year into the third they belong to the third; from the sixth year into the Sabbatical they belong to the sixth?” Here, you count the past [year], there the coming! Rebbi Yose said, in the third and sixth years, even though there is no second tithe, there are tithes; in the Sabbatical there is no tithe whatsoever. But did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no “from the sixth year into the Sabbatical they belong to the sixth” but they belong to the Sabbatical? There it is in the possession of the landowners, here it is in the possession of the poor. He prefers one which is certain to two which are possible.
It was stated: “And all those which remained from the sixth year into the Sabbatical belong to the sixth except for nasturtium which is like a vegetable.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no [rule that] “from the sixth year into the Sabbatical they belong to the sixth” but [they belong] to the Sabbatical. But did we not state: “Calamint, hyssop, and thyme he brought to the courtyard, (but) if it was from the second year into the third they belong to the third; from the sixth year into the Sabbatical they belong to the sixth?” Here, you count the past [year], there the coming! Rebbi Yose said, in the third and sixth years, even though there is no second tithe, there are tithes; in the Sabbatical there is no tithe whatsoever. But did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no “from the sixth year into the Sabbatical they belong to the sixth” but they belong to the Sabbatical? There it is in the possession of the landowners, here it is in the possession of the poor. He prefers one which is certain to two which are possible.
“ ‘You’ excludes one who gives heave from what is not his.” What is the interpretation, one who gives heave from what is not his own, or one who gives heave from what is somebody else’s? Let us hear the following: If he declared his heap as ownerless and then smoothed it and took possession again, if you refer to one who gives heave from what is not his own, his heave is not heave, if you refer to one who gives heave from what is somebody else’s, his heave is heave. Let us hear from the following: “If he stole Temple heave and ate it, he pays two fifths and the principal because there is no double payment for Temple property.” Who gave the heave if not the administrator? Is he not giving heave from what is not his? And you say his heave is heave! The reason must be that he does not give heave from another person’s property. Or should we say, who gave the heave if not a Levite who dedicated his heave? But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state that there is no difference between him who dedicated his ṭevel and him who dedicated his heave? Rebbi Idi said, the administrator is like the owner. This does not follow Rebbi Yose, since Rebbi Yose said the administrator is like any other person.
Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The hot, the bitter, and the sweet are not under the rules for being uncovered. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The hot, the bitter, and the sweet are not under the rules for being uncovered or under those of libation wine. Rebbi Simeon explains: The hot, spice wine. And the bitter, vermouth wine. And the sweet, cooked wine. Rebbi Joshua ben Zeidal had cooked wine which was left unsupervised in the possession of a Gentile. He asked Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael who said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The sweet is not under the rules for being uncovered or under those of libation wine. Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael fell ill. Rebbi Zeïra, Rebbi Hoshaiah, Rebbi Abun bar Cahana, and Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis went to visit him. They saw that Rebbi Joshua ben Zeidal was sitting [there]. They said, there is the master of the decision and the person of the happening; they went and asked him. Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael said to them, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the sweet is not under the rules for being uncovered or under those of libation wine. Rebbi Zeïra said to him, maybe that statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is for argument’s sake? He told him no, it is for action and you can rely on me. When they came back, there was Rebbi Hila standing with Rebbi Abun bar Cahana. He told him, if you did not prefer decisions, is it not a baraita? Since Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “Why is cooked wine of Gentiles forbidden? Because it started out as wine. Why is vinegar of Gentiles forbidden? Because it started out as wine.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “wine and vinegar of Gentiles which originally was wine.”
Rav Ḥisda said, if somebody declared his standing grain ownerless, came back and retook possession, and illegally gave heave, that is heave. What is the difference between standing grain and ears of grain? Standing grain, if he illegally gave heave before he declared it ownerless, that is not heave. Ears, if he illegally gave heave before he declared them ownerless, that is heave. Rav Ḥinena in the name of Rav Ḥisda, the same applies to a dedicated crop. The words of the rabbis disagree, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: (Deut. 14:29) “The Levite shall come, because he has neither part nor inheritance with you.” You are obliged to give him from what you have but he has not. This excludes gleanings for which your and his hands are equal. Gleanings, forgotten sheaves, peah, and abandoned property are all equal. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the company did ask: But dedications, where your and his hands are not equal, are treated as if your and his hands were equal. Said Rebbi Ila, what are we talking about? If the heap was made when it was ownerless or dedicated, the Torah said (Deut. 18:4) “the first of your grain”, not the ownerless, “the first of your grain”, not Temple property. But we must be talking about ears that he declared ownerless and of which he retook possession. If they were ownerless, he would be free, if dedicated, he would be obligated. If they were ownerless, he would be free, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: (Deut. 14:29) “The Levite shall come, because he has neither part nor inheritance with you.” You are obligated to give him from what you have but he has not. This excludes gleanings for which your and his hands are equal. If dedicated, he would be obligated, from the following: “If somebody dedicated standing produce and redeemed it standing, it is obligated.” What is the difference between ownerless and dedicated? Ownerless [property] is outside the power of everybody, dedicated [property] is not outside the power of the Temple treasurer. Rebbi Abin said, it did not even go outside the power of its owners since he must say to him you redeem first.
Rav Ḥisda said, if somebody declared his standing grain ownerless, came back and retook possession, and illegally gave heave, that is heave. What is the difference between standing grain and ears of grain? Standing grain, if he illegally gave heave before he declared it ownerless, that is not heave. Ears, if he illegally gave heave before he declared them ownerless, that is heave. Rav Ḥinena in the name of Rav Ḥisda, the same applies to a dedicated crop. The words of the rabbis disagree, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: (Deut. 14:29) “The Levite shall come, because he has neither part nor inheritance with you.” You are obliged to give him from what you have but he has not. This excludes gleanings for which your and his hands are equal. Gleanings, forgotten sheaves, peah, and abandoned property are all equal. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the company did ask: But dedications, where your and his hands are not equal, are treated as if your and his hands were equal. Said Rebbi Ila, what are we talking about? If the heap was made when it was ownerless or dedicated, the Torah said (Deut. 18:4) “the first of your grain”, not the ownerless, “the first of your grain”, not Temple property. But we must be talking about ears that he declared ownerless and of which he retook possession. If they were ownerless, he would be free, if dedicated, he would be obligated. If they were ownerless, he would be free, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: (Deut. 14:29) “The Levite shall come, because he has neither part nor inheritance with you.” You are obligated to give him from what you have but he has not. This excludes gleanings for which your and his hands are equal. If dedicated, he would be obligated, from the following: “If somebody dedicated standing produce and redeemed it standing, it is obligated.” What is the difference between ownerless and dedicated? Ownerless [property] is outside the power of everybody, dedicated [property] is not outside the power of the Temple treasurer. Rebbi Abin said, it did not even go outside the power of its owners since he must say to him you redeem first.
It was stated: If a field became one-third ripe in the possession of a Gentile and a Jew bought it from him, Rebbi Aqiba says the addition is free. But the Sages say, the addition is obligated. Rebbi Abina, Ulla ben Rebbi Israel in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Also the Sages did obligate only for the past; if it was second it remains second, for the poor it remains for the poor. It was stated: Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose says, from where that grain one-third ripe before New Year’s day may be brought in during the Sabbatical? The verse says (Lev. 25:3): “You shall gather its yield,” [even] in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Abina, Ulla ben Rebbi Israel in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said, you follow the first third, so Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose said, you follow the first third. Rebbi Zeїra said to Rebbi Abina, you say two things which contradict one another. Here you teach that the Sages also did obligate only for the past; if it was second it remains second, for the poor it remains for the poor. There, you teach that Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. If Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba then just as Rebbi Aqiba says the prohibition of aftergrowth is from the Torah, so Rebbi Jonathan ben Rebbi Yose must say, the prohibition of aftergrowth is from the Torah. If it grew less than one-third ripe before the Sabbatical, in the Sabbatical it is forbidden as aftergrowth but the sanctity of the Sabbatical did not fall on it since it was grass on which the sanctity of the Sabbatical cannot fall. If it grew less than one-third ripe before the eighth year, in the eighth year it is permitted as aftergrowth but the sanctity of the Sabbatical falls on it. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both teach that the Sages agree with Rebbi Aqiba in the order of years; if it was second it remains second, for the poor it remains for the poor.
MISHNAH: One does not sell Second Tithe, one does not take it as a pledge, one does not barter it, and one does not weigh corresponding to it. One should not say to his neighbor in Jerusalem, here you have wine, give me its value in oil, but they may give free gifts to one another. One may not sell animal tithe unblemished alive, or blemished alive or slaughtered, and one may not use it for preliminarily marrying a woman. One may sell a firstling unblemished alive, blemished alive or slaughtered, and one may use it for preliminarily marrying a woman. One does not exchange Second Tithe by a blank, or by a coin not in circulation, or on money not in his possession.
I could think that if someone had money on King’s Mountain or in a castle he might exchange based on it. The verse says (Deut. 14:25): “take the silver in your hand;” what means “in your hand”? In your possession! Rebbi Jonah asked, if his wallet with 1’000’000 [denars] fell into a cistern and he could spend 500’000 to get them out, is that as if 500’000 were in his possession?
I could think that if someone had money on King’s Mountain or in a castle he might exchange based on it. The verse says (Deut. 14:25): “take the silver in your hand;” what means “in your hand”? In your possession! Rebbi Jonah asked, if his wallet with 1’000’000 [denars] fell into a cistern and he could spend 500’000 to get them out, is that as if 500’000 were in his possession?
Our Mishnah is from Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba said that you go after the first third. And they differed: A field that was one-third ripened in the possession of a Gentile, and a Jew bought it after that time, Rebbi Aqiba said the additional growth is free, but the Sages say he is obligated for the additional growth. How is that? Explain it either for Rebbi Aqiba in a disagreement, or according to everybody if he harvested immediately.
HALAKHAH: What is the difference between this and a dough of annona? Is the latter not obligated for ḥallah? There it is in the possession of the Jew until the Gentile decides to take it. But here it depends on the latter’s opinion.
Some Tannaïm state: The Jordan is part of the Land of Israel. Some state, the Jordan is outside the Land. Some state, the Jordan is a boundary by itself. He who says the Jordan is part of the Land of Israel: (Deut. 3:17) “The prairie, the Jordan, and the border.” He who says the Jordan is outside the Land: (Jos. 18:20): “The Jordan shall form its border Eastward.” He who says the Jordan is a boundary by itself, if it is in one place. “If the Jordan took from one place and gave to another, what it took, it took, and what it gave, it gave.” What are we dealing with? If it was from the Land of Israel and became Syria, it already is under the presumptive obligation of tithes and Sabbatical! Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, for claims of possession, removals, and animal tithe. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Only if it removed earth.
If he planted as a fence for three years, afterwards thought to use it for food, and it grew more? Rebbi Jeremiah said the addition is exempt, Rebbi Abba said the addition is obligated. Rebbi Yose said, the opinion of Rebbi Jeremiah seems to be difficult but it is only reasonable, as we have stated: “If a field became one-third ripe in the possession of a Gentile and a Jew bought it, Rebbi Aqiba says the addition is exempt. But the Sages say, the addition is obligated.” In our case the stem is exempt and its addition should be obligated?
MISHNAH: The eight kinds of vermin mentioned in the Torah: one who catches or injures them is liable. Other abominations and vermin: one who injures them is not liable; if he catches them for some need he is liable, otherwise he is not liable. Wild animals and fowl in his possession: if he catches them he is not liable but if he injures them he is liable.
“Wild animals and fowl in his possession: if he catches them he is not liable but if he injures them he is liable.” They said this only if it is under the control of a human. Therefore if it is not under the control of a human he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, this means that one who on the Sabbath catches an escaped bull is liable. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rav Avidan: One is permitted to write a mezuzah on bird’s skin.
HALAKHAH: “If a window between two courtyards,” etc. Lattice work diminishes it for the laws of Sabbath, but it does not diminish for the laws of presumed possession. Straw and provender do not diminish in it; pebbles and provender do diminish in it. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, if grasses grew in it, they do not diminish it.
MISHNAH: A Non-Jew’s leavened matter which existed during Passover is permitted for usufruct but a Jew’s is forbidden for usufruct since it is said, it should not be seen in your possession. If a Non-Jew gave a loan to a Jew secured by leavened matter, after Passover it is permitted for usufruct but if a Jew gave a loan to a Non-Jew secured by leavened matter, after Passover it is forbidden for usufruct. Leavened matter on which debris fell is as if eliminated; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only one which cannot be dug out by a dog.
Who is the Tanna of it should not be seen in your possession? Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated: He who eats leavened matter after the sixth hour, as well as leavened matter which was in existence during Passover violates a biblical prohibition but there is no extirpation, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, anything for which there is no extirpation there is no biblical prohibition. Rebbi Simeon agrees about the prohibition that it is prohibited. What is its prohibition? Rebbi Jeremiah said, its prohibition is a word of the Torah. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, its prohibition is from their words. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? No leavened matter may be eaten, today. Where do we hold? If during the holiday, it already is written, you may not eat leavened matter with it. But if it does not refer to the time during the holiday, transfer it to the time after the holiday. How does Rebbi Simeon explain Rebbi Jehudah’s reason, no leavened matter may be eaten, today? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, he will explain if following Rebbi Yose the Galilean, as it was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, I am saying that in Egypt the Passover was only one day as it was said, no leavened matter may be eaten, today.
It should not be seen in your possession. There are Tannaim who state, it should not be seen in your possession, yours you may not see, [but] you may see Heaven’s. There are Tannaim who state, not even Heaven’s. He who said, yours you may not see, you may see Heaven’s, if its dedication precedes its elimination. He who said, not even Heaven’s, if its dedication is after its elimination. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Zeˋira: Explain it about sancta for which he is responsible in case of alienation following Rebbi Simeon.
It should not be seen in your possession. There are Tannaim who state, it should not be seen in your possession, yours you may not see, [but] you may see Heaven’s. There are Tannaim who state, not even Heaven’s. He who said, yours you may not see, you may see Heaven’s, if its dedication precedes its elimination. He who said, not even Heaven’s, if its dedication is after its elimination. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Zeˋira: Explain it about sancta for which he is responsible in case of alienation following Rebbi Simeon.
It should not be seen in your possession. There are Tannaim who state, it should not be seen in your possession, yours you may not see; you may see it in the street; there are Tannaim who state, not even if in the street;. He who says, yours you may not see, you may see it in the street, if his renunciation of ownership precedes its elimination; he who said, not even in the street, if his renunciation of ownership follows its elimination. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, explain it for sancta, etc.
It should not be seen in your possession. There are Tannaim who state, it should not be seen in your possession, yours you may not see; you may see it in the street; there are Tannaim who state, not even if in the street;. He who says, yours you may not see, you may see it in the street, if his renunciation of ownership precedes its elimination; he who said, not even in the street, if his renunciation of ownership follows its elimination. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, explain it for sancta, etc.
MISHNAH: Once every thirty days one sets the prices for the office. Anyone who accepts to supply fine flour at a rate of four, if the going rate goes up to three he has to supply at the rate of four; if at the rate of three and the going rate went down to four he has to supply at four since the hand of the sanctuary is privileged. If the flour turned out worm-infected, it was infected in his possession; and if the wine turned into vinegar it was vinegar in his possession. He is not paid until the altar did atone.
MISHNAH: Once every thirty days one sets the prices for the office. Anyone who accepts to supply fine flour at a rate of four, if the going rate goes up to three he has to supply at the rate of four; if at the rate of three and the going rate went down to four he has to supply at four since the hand of the sanctuary is privileged. If the flour turned out worm-infected, it was infected in his possession; and if the wine turned into vinegar it was vinegar in his possession. He is not paid until the altar did atone.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.
“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.
“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.
“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.
“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.
“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Ḥaggai said that Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Can one witness testifying orally and one by a document be taken together? Is a single witness on a written document worth anything? Therefore, his question was, if there are two. They managed to confirm the first signature but not the second. Rebbi Mana asked, is one witness on a written document enough to force anybody to swear? Is a single witness on a written document worth anything? Therefore, his question was, if there are two. They managed to confirm the first signature but not the second. Parallel to it: One does not accept testimony from witnesses unless they had seen together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw one after the other. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac, in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa for witnesses about primogeniture and rights of possession.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who saysid it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who said it is valid? Maybe they were rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw two hairs on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid [testimony]. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of possession. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.
HALAKHAH: “About an orphan girl who had been preliminarily married and was divorced,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it turns out that Rebbi Eleazar follows the opinion of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said that she can collect the fine and it belongs to her, so Rebbi Eleazar said that she can collect the fine and it belongs to her. Then also for a seduced one? Rebbi Jeremiah said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that she remitted it to him. Can anybody remit anthing that does not belong to him? Explain it for an orphan; as it was stated in the House of Rebbi thus: The orphan, Rebbi Eleazar said that the rapist has to pay her but the seducer does not. Can anybody remit something which is not in his possession? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ura: The fine is not due from the first moment on. As we have stated there: “If she came to court before her father died, [the payments due] belong to her father and if the father died they belong to the brothers.” If you say that the fine is due from the first moment, it would belong to the brothers from the first moment! Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda: The Mishnah deals with shame and diminution of value. As Rebbi Mana said, how is it? The rapist is obligated for everything and the seducer is free from everything. Rebbi Abin said, [Rebbi] Shammai asked: What does it mean that the rapist has to pay but the seducer does not? The rapist has to pay everything but the seducer is free [from paying] for shame and diminution of value but is obligated for the fine. That is Rebbi Aqiba’s. Or, the rapist is free [from paying] for shame and diminution of value but is obligated for the fine but the seducer is free from everything? That is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s.
“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.
“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.
MISHNAH: If his brother left money, real estate should be bought with it and he eats its yield. For produce cut from the ground, real estate should be bought and he eats its yield; connected to the ground, Rebbi Meïr says one has to estimate how much it is worth with produce and how much without, for the difference real estate should be bought and he eats its yield. But the Sages say, standing produce is his, cut it is up for grabs. If he took possession first, it is his; if she took possession first, real estate should be bought for the proceeds and he eats its yield. If he married her, she is his wife in every respect except that her ketubah is a lien on the property of her first husband.
MISHNAH: If his brother left money, real estate should be bought with it and he eats its yield. For produce cut from the ground, real estate should be bought and he eats its yield; connected to the ground, Rebbi Meïr says one has to estimate how much it is worth with produce and how much without, for the difference real estate should be bought and he eats its yield. But the Sages say, standing produce is his, cut it is up for grabs. If he took possession first, it is his; if she took possession first, real estate should be bought for the proceeds and he eats its yield. If he married her, she is his wife in every respect except that her ketubah is a lien on the property of her first husband.
That widow took a slave girl. The case came before Rebbi Isaac who said, what she took, she took. Rebbi Immi took her away, for she thought that she was hers but she was not hers. A similar case: The father of the sons of Shammai died and bequeathed a goat to them. The creditor came and took it. The case came before Rebbi Abbahu who said, he took his own property. Did we not state that if either an heir or a creditor came and took, one does [not] remove from his hand; for they thought they were theirs but they were not theirs. Rebbi Jacob bar Zabdi said, Rebbi Abbahu agrees that if they sold it, or gave it as a pledge, or moved it to another place, if then the creditor came and took it one removes it from his possession.
MISHNAH: If the estate contained expected property, it does not have the status of property in actual possession. Rebbi Simeon says, even if there was no mortgageable property, it does not count unless there is mortgageable property in the value of at least a denar more than the two ketubot.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to three women,” etc. Samuel said, sharpness of the judges. As in the case of two mortgages written on one field, to whom the court wants to hand it over in possession they hand it over. The Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If the estate is only 100, they divide equally.” Was this said for the sharpness of the judges? And did we not state: If the heirs inherited an instrument of indebtedness, the male firstborn takes a double portion; and if an instrument of indebtedness was presented to them, the male firstborn pays a double portion. Was this said for the sharpness of the judges? Rebbi Abin in the name of Samuel: There is no difference, whether two mortgages were written on one field or one mortgage was written on two fields, on whom the court decide they hand it over in possession.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to three women,” etc. Samuel said, sharpness of the judges. As in the case of two mortgages written on one field, to whom the court wants to hand it over in possession they hand it over. The Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If the estate is only 100, they divide equally.” Was this said for the sharpness of the judges? And did we not state: If the heirs inherited an instrument of indebtedness, the male firstborn takes a double portion; and if an instrument of indebtedness was presented to them, the male firstborn pays a double portion. Was this said for the sharpness of the judges? Rebbi Abin in the name of Samuel: There is no difference, whether two mortgages were written on one field or one mortgage was written on two fields, on whom the court decide they hand it over in possession.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to four women when he died,” etc. Rebbi Abuna in the name of Rebbi Samuel: Following Ben Nanas, if one document was produced against (the wife) buyers, they all divide evenly. Rebbi Aqiba said before Rebbi Mana: Does this not disagree with Rebbi Samuel, since Samuel said, sharpness of the judges? As in the case of two mortgages written on one field, to whom they want to hand it over in possession they hand it over. And here, he says so? Not with two mortgages, what about one? He did not hear what Rebbi Abin said in the name of Samuel: There is no difference, whether two mortgages were written on two fields or two mortgages were written on one field, to whom the court decide they hand it over in possession. Rebbi instituted that one follows Ben Nanas in matters of annona, head taxes, and real estate taxes.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to four women when he died,” etc. Rebbi Abuna in the name of Rebbi Samuel: Following Ben Nanas, if one document was produced against (the wife) buyers, they all divide evenly. Rebbi Aqiba said before Rebbi Mana: Does this not disagree with Rebbi Samuel, since Samuel said, sharpness of the judges? As in the case of two mortgages written on one field, to whom they want to hand it over in possession they hand it over. And here, he says so? Not with two mortgages, what about one? He did not hear what Rebbi Abin said in the name of Samuel: There is no difference, whether two mortgages were written on two fields or two mortgages were written on one field, to whom the court decide they hand it over in possession. Rebbi instituted that one follows Ben Nanas in matters of annona, head taxes, and real estate taxes.
Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: At the start one sells for sustenance of twelve months but one gives her sustenance for 30 days. Why should they sell for the sustenance of 12 months? Not to disadvantage the woman. Why do they give her sustenance for 30 days? If you said otherwise, you would act in detriment of the orphans, as it was stated: If a widow took possession even of 1’000 zuz for her sustenance, one does not take it away from her. What could one say to her? “Show what is in your hands!” The students of Rebbi Mana said to her, “show what is in your hands.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to them, since in the end she will have to swear about anything in her hands, one says to her, let it be so.
HALAKHAH: It was stated: Rebbi Meïr says that as soon as a person abandons anything from his property, it is no longer in his possession. Rebbi Yose says, nothing may leave the hands of its owners except if it is taken up by another person. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya, both say, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: The words of Rebbi Yose [deal with the case] that a person gave a gift to ten people and this one was one of them. If somebody abandoned his field, some Tannaïm say, he can retract, but some Tannaïm say, he cannot retract. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The one who says that he can retract follows Rebbi Yose. But the one who says that he cannot retract follows Rebbi Meïr. Does this mean that abandoned property in the sense of Rebbi Yose is subject to tithes? What did he say? Abandoned property, not gift! Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa came in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Abandoned property in the sense of Rebbi Yose is subject to tithes. There, they say that abandoned property in the sense of Rebbi Yose is not subject to tithes, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “The Levite shall come,” etc. You are obliged to give him from what you have but he has not. This excludes abandoned property for which your and his hands are equal. Gleanings, forgotten sheaves, peah, and abandoned property are all equal.
Rebbi Yose asked: If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said, “it was written before me” and another, “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”, it is valid. Rav Ḥisda asked: half of an institution and half as biblical decree? If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband for an hour,” it is valid.
Rebbi Yose asked: If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said, “it was written before me” and another, “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”, it is valid. Rav Ḥisda asked: half of an institution and half as biblical decree? If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband for an hour,” it is valid.
Rebbi Yose asked: If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said, “it was written before me” and another, “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”, it is valid. Rav Ḥisda asked: half of an institution and half as biblical decree? If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband for an hour,” it is valid.
Rebbi Yose asked: If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said, “it was written before me” and another, “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”, it is valid. Rav Ḥisda asked: half of an institution and half as biblical decree? If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband for an hour,” it is valid.
MISHNAH: If somebody sent a bill of divorce to his wife and caught up with the agent, or he sent another agent after him and said: the bill of divorce I gave you is annulled, it is annulled. If he met his wife or he sent an agent to her and said: the bill of divorce I sent to you is annulled, it is annulled. After the bill of divorce came into her possession, he no longer can annul it.
“His field,” except movables. “His vineyard,” except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession. “ ‘His field,’ except movables.” About those who did not claim movables from the start. Is this different from what we stated: There is not only real estate; from where if he wanted to pay money? The verse says: “Money he shall return to its owner.” What did you mean to say that real estate is primary? Or should we say that money is primary? Then it should be irrevocably given to [the claimant] from the start! Do we not see rabbis who irrevocably give him real estate! “ ‘His vineyard,’ except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Nisa: If his father dug a cistern which caused injury during his father’s lifetime. Property fell to him after his father’s death. I might say that this property should be encumbered for that damage; therefore, it was necessary to say “his vineyard” to except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.
“His field,” except movables. “His vineyard,” except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession. “ ‘His field,’ except movables.” About those who did not claim movables from the start. Is this different from what we stated: There is not only real estate; from where if he wanted to pay money? The verse says: “Money he shall return to its owner.” What did you mean to say that real estate is primary? Or should we say that money is primary? Then it should be irrevocably given to [the claimant] from the start! Do we not see rabbis who irrevocably give him real estate! “ ‘His vineyard,’ except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Nisa: If his father dug a cistern which caused injury during his father’s lifetime. Property fell to him after his father’s death. I might say that this property should be encumbered for that damage; therefore, it was necessary to say “his vineyard” to except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.
“His field,” except movables. “His vineyard,” except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession. “ ‘His field,’ except movables.” About those who did not claim movables from the start. Is this different from what we stated: There is not only real estate; from where if he wanted to pay money? The verse says: “Money he shall return to its owner.” What did you mean to say that real estate is primary? Or should we say that money is primary? Then it should be irrevocably given to [the claimant] from the start! Do we not see rabbis who irrevocably give him real estate! “ ‘His vineyard,’ except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Nisa: If his father dug a cistern which caused injury during his father’s lifetime. Property fell to him after his father’s death. I might say that this property should be encumbered for that damage; therefore, it was necessary to say “his vineyard” to except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.
(The deaf-mute communicates by sign language.) They say, we had the means to buy; the buyer says, no. Rebbi Yose says, the field is always in the possession of the current owner since the burden of proof is on the claimant.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody throws a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. “He shall write,” “he shall deliver into her hand.” Not only into her hand; from where also into her garden or into her courtyard? The verse says “he shall deliver, he shall deliver.” Is this following Rebbi Ismael? It is following Rebbi Aqiba. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Ismael, “he took all his land from his hand, up to the Arnon.” Did he take it out of his hand? What means “from his hand”? From his possession.
Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.
Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.