3209 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:70

Rebbi Berekhia, Rebbi Ḥelbo, Ulla from Bireh, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: In the future the Holy One, praise to Him, will lead a circular dance for the Just ones. What is the reason? Put your hearts to the walls, it is written “to its circular dance.” And the Just one will point with their finger and say, Truly, He is GOD, our Power, Forever; He will lead us beyond death! Almut, in strength; almut, in agility. Almut, like these girls. Akilas translated ’αθανασία, a world without death. And the Just one will point with their finger and say, Truly, He is GOD, our Power, Forever; He will lead us beyond death! He will lead us in this world, He will lead us in the future.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:7

May she eat heave? Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: It is reasonable that she should eat if she was eating during her husband’s lifetime; otherwise she may not eat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she eats even if she did not eat before. Rebbi Yose said, even if she was only able to eat. There is a baraita in support of either one. There is a baraita supporting Samuel: A hearing daughter of an Israel who married a deaf-mute Cohen does not eat heave. If he died and she came before the levir, if he is hearing, she eats, deaf-mute does not eat. There is a baraita supporting Rebbi Joḥanan: A hearing daughter of an Israel who became engaged to a hearing Cohen, who did not manage to bring her to the bridal chamber before he became deaf-mute or before she became deaf-mute, does not eat heave. If he died and she came before a levir she eats even if he is deaf-mute. In this He increased the power of the levir over that of the husband since the deaf-mute levir enables her to eat, but the deaf-mute husband does not enable her to eat.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:2

HALAKHAH: “A widow [married] to a High Ptiest,” etc. From where that a priest who married a wife or bought slaves enables them to eat heave? The verse says “and if a priest buys a person as his money’s acquisition,” etc. From where that if his wife bought slaves, and her slaves [bought] slaves, that they may eat heave? The verse says “and if a priest buys a person as his money’s acquisition,” etc. Also his acquisition which bought an acquisition enables him to eat. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The baraita speaks about a slave who acquired slaves within the power of his master. But if a slave acquired slaves on condition that his master have no power over them, they are his property. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. If a slave acquired slaves on condition that his master have no power over them and he died, the first person who comes can grab them. In that case, [that slave] is not his property’s property.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:2

HALAKHAH: “A widow [married] to a High Ptiest,” etc. From where that a priest who married a wife or bought slaves enables them to eat heave? The verse says “and if a priest buys a person as his money’s acquisition,” etc. From where that if his wife bought slaves, and her slaves [bought] slaves, that they may eat heave? The verse says “and if a priest buys a person as his money’s acquisition,” etc. Also his acquisition which bought an acquisition enables him to eat. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The baraita speaks about a slave who acquired slaves within the power of his master. But if a slave acquired slaves on condition that his master have no power over them, they are his property. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. If a slave acquired slaves on condition that his master have no power over them and he died, the first person who comes can grab them. In that case, [that slave] is not his property’s property.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:2

HALAKHAH: “A widow [married] to a High Ptiest,” etc. From where that a priest who married a wife or bought slaves enables them to eat heave? The verse says “and if a priest buys a person as his money’s acquisition,” etc. From where that if his wife bought slaves, and her slaves [bought] slaves, that they may eat heave? The verse says “and if a priest buys a person as his money’s acquisition,” etc. Also his acquisition which bought an acquisition enables him to eat. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The baraita speaks about a slave who acquired slaves within the power of his master. But if a slave acquired slaves on condition that his master have no power over them, they are his property. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. If a slave acquired slaves on condition that his master have no power over them and he died, the first person who comes can grab them. In that case, [that slave] is not his property’s property.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:4

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:4

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:20

MISHNAH: The rapist, the seducer, and the insane do neither disable nor enable to eat, but if they are unable to marry in Israel they disable. How is that? If an Israel came upon the daughter of a Cohen, she may eat heave, if she became pregnant she may not eat. If the fetus was cut into pieces in her body she may eat. If a Cohen came upon the daughter of an Israel, she may not eat heave, if she became pregnant she may not eat, if she gave birth she may eat. It turns out that the son’s power is greater than the father’s.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:8

A slave may be a permanent sojourner. A sojourner is like a Gentile in every respect. Rebbi Samuel bar Ḥiyya bar Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: One keeps the sojourner for twelve months. If he changes his mind, that is fine; otherwise he is like a Gentile in all respects. Rebbi Samuel bar Ḥiyya bar Jehudah, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi: The sojourner has to accept on condition that he may eat cadaver meat. Rebbi Hila said, one would then say, the words are [interpreted] as they are written. What does it mean, the words are [interpreted] as they are written? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, “You shall not eat any cadaver; to the sojourner in your midst you shall give it that he eat it.” Some Tannaim state: One does not receive a sojourner unless he accepts all commandments written in the Torah. Some Tannaim state: One does not receive a sojourner unless he renounces his idolatry. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi: One does not receive a sojourner unless he renounces his idolatry as a Gentile. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, from their consensus: unless he renounces his idolatry as a Gentile. For if it were not so, what would we say? Since he is forbidden idolatry he cannot render profane. But are Gentiles not also forbidden idolatry and they do render profane? Rebbi Yose said, that you should not say, since he is equal to an Israel in three respects, do not oppress, do not cheat, and he is exiled like an Israel, that he has no power to render profane. Therefore, it was necessary to spell out that he renders idols profane like a Gentile. Who is the Tanna who includes “do not oppress”? He is Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated: The sojourner is protected by the prohibition, the words of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:13

MISHNAH: Rebbi Yose says, her ketubah is from the property of her first husband. Rebbi Eleazar says, the first [husband] is entitled to what she finds and earns and may annul her vows. Rebbi Simeon says, copulation with her or ḥaliṣah with her by a brother of the first [husband] frees her co-wives and a child from him is not a bastard; if she was married without permission she is permitted to return to him. If she married by a decision of the court, she must leave but is free from the sacrifice; without a decision of the court, she must leave but must bring the sacrifice. The power of the court frees her from the sacrifice. If the court instructed her to marry but she misbehaved, she must bring a sacrifice since they permitted her only to marry.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 14:18

HALAKHAH: “Two hearing brothers,” etc. “Two brothers, one of them deaf-mute,” etc. May she eat heave? Let us hear from the following: “A hearing daughter of an Israel who became engaged to a hearing Cohen, who did not manage to bring her to the bridal chamber before he became deaf-mute or before she became deaf-mute, does not eat heave. If he died and she came before a levir she eats even if he is deaf-mute. In this He increased the power of the levir over that of the husband since the deaf-mute levir enables her to eat, but the deaf-mute husband does not enable her to eat.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 16:29

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Aqiba said, when I left the country for Nahardea for the intercalation of the year, Nehemiah from Badala found me,” etc. If it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”; Rebbi Jeremiah said, one lets his wife remarry; Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, one does not let his wife remarry. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Jeremiah: “By the mouth of witnesses,” not on basis of their writings, not on the word of a translator, not on the testimony of a single witness.” Today, does one not let remarry on the testimony of a single witness? Therefore also one lets remarry on basis of their writings and on the word of a translator. A baraita supports Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: The power of witnesses is greater than the power of a document and the power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses. Since if witnesses say, “X died, X was killed”, one lets his wife remarry but if it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”, one does not let his wife remarry. The power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses, since if somebody gives a loan before witnesses, he can foreclose only from unincumbered property; by a document, he can foreclose from mortgaged property.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 16:29

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Aqiba said, when I left the country for Nahardea for the intercalation of the year, Nehemiah from Badala found me,” etc. If it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”; Rebbi Jeremiah said, one lets his wife remarry; Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, one does not let his wife remarry. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Jeremiah: “By the mouth of witnesses,” not on basis of their writings, not on the word of a translator, not on the testimony of a single witness.” Today, does one not let remarry on the testimony of a single witness? Therefore also one lets remarry on basis of their writings and on the word of a translator. A baraita supports Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: The power of witnesses is greater than the power of a document and the power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses. Since if witnesses say, “X died, X was killed”, one lets his wife remarry but if it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”, one does not let his wife remarry. The power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses, since if somebody gives a loan before witnesses, he can foreclose only from unincumbered property; by a document, he can foreclose from mortgaged property.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 16:29

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Aqiba said, when I left the country for Nahardea for the intercalation of the year, Nehemiah from Badala found me,” etc. If it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”; Rebbi Jeremiah said, one lets his wife remarry; Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, one does not let his wife remarry. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Jeremiah: “By the mouth of witnesses,” not on basis of their writings, not on the word of a translator, not on the testimony of a single witness.” Today, does one not let remarry on the testimony of a single witness? Therefore also one lets remarry on basis of their writings and on the word of a translator. A baraita supports Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: The power of witnesses is greater than the power of a document and the power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses. Since if witnesses say, “X died, X was killed”, one lets his wife remarry but if it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”, one does not let his wife remarry. The power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses, since if somebody gives a loan before witnesses, he can foreclose only from unincumbered property; by a document, he can foreclose from mortgaged property.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 16:29

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Aqiba said, when I left the country for Nahardea for the intercalation of the year, Nehemiah from Badala found me,” etc. If it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”; Rebbi Jeremiah said, one lets his wife remarry; Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, one does not let his wife remarry. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Jeremiah: “By the mouth of witnesses,” not on basis of their writings, not on the word of a translator, not on the testimony of a single witness.” Today, does one not let remarry on the testimony of a single witness? Therefore also one lets remarry on basis of their writings and on the word of a translator. A baraita supports Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: The power of witnesses is greater than the power of a document and the power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses. Since if witnesses say, “X died, X was killed”, one lets his wife remarry but if it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”, one does not let his wife remarry. The power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses, since if somebody gives a loan before witnesses, he can foreclose only from unincumbered property; by a document, he can foreclose from mortgaged property.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 16:29

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Aqiba said, when I left the country for Nahardea for the intercalation of the year, Nehemiah from Badala found me,” etc. If it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”; Rebbi Jeremiah said, one lets his wife remarry; Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, one does not let his wife remarry. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Jeremiah: “By the mouth of witnesses,” not on basis of their writings, not on the word of a translator, not on the testimony of a single witness.” Today, does one not let remarry on the testimony of a single witness? Therefore also one lets remarry on basis of their writings and on the word of a translator. A baraita supports Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: The power of witnesses is greater than the power of a document and the power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses. Since if witnesses say, “X died, X was killed”, one lets his wife remarry but if it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”, one does not let his wife remarry. The power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses, since if somebody gives a loan before witnesses, he can foreclose only from unincumbered property; by a document, he can foreclose from mortgaged property.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 16:29

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Aqiba said, when I left the country for Nahardea for the intercalation of the year, Nehemiah from Badala found me,” etc. If it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”; Rebbi Jeremiah said, one lets his wife remarry; Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, one does not let his wife remarry. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Jeremiah: “By the mouth of witnesses,” not on basis of their writings, not on the word of a translator, not on the testimony of a single witness.” Today, does one not let remarry on the testimony of a single witness? Therefore also one lets remarry on basis of their writings and on the word of a translator. A baraita supports Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: The power of witnesses is greater than the power of a document and the power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses. Since if witnesses say, “X died, X was killed”, one lets his wife remarry but if it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”, one does not let his wife remarry. The power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses, since if somebody gives a loan before witnesses, he can foreclose only from unincumbered property; by a document, he can foreclose from mortgaged property.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:53

It is written: “No man in Israel was beautiful like Absalom, to be very much praised.” I could think, in everything. The verse says, “from his foot sole to the top of his forehead”. It is written: “He had a son whose name was Saul, select and good, no one of the Children of Israel was better than he.” I could think, in everything. The verse says, “from his shoulder on he was higher than all the people.” But about Abner, what is written? “You should know that a leader and great man fell today in Israel.” Why was Abner killed? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, and the rabbis. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, because he made fun of the lives of his squires as it is said (2Sam. 2:14): “Let the squires get up and play before us.” R. Simeon ben Laqish said, because he prefaced his name before that of David; that is what is written (2Sam. 3:12) “Abner sent messengers to David the underling, saying: Whose is the land?” He wrote: From Abner to David. The rabbis say, because he did not let Shaul make peace with David. That is what is written (1Sam. 24:5): “My father, see, but see the corner of your coat in my hand!” He said to him, what do you want from the prattling of this one, it was torn off by thorns. But when they came to the circle, he said to him (1Sam. 26:14): “Can you answer, Abner?” About the corner, you said it was torn off by a thorn; were spear and pitcher cut off by a thorn? But some say, because he had it in his power to intervene for Nob, the city of priests, and he did not intervene.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 2:4

May her husband dedicate for her without her knowledge? Since he is a partner in the flour offering, may he dedicate for her without her knowledge? May another person dedicate for her without her knowledge? It comes following what Rebbi Joḥanan said, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, for the four who need cleansing others may dedicate without their knowledge; these are the following: Man or woman [healed from] genital discharges, one [healed from] scale disease, and the woman after childbirth; since a father may dedicate for his small son who is lying in a crib. One understands man or woman [healed from] genital discharges or [healed from] scale disease, but a woman after childbirth? May a minor give birth? Did not Rebbi Redifa, Rebbi Jonah, say in the name of Rebbi Hila: If a woman became pregnant and gave birth before she grew two hairs, she and her son will die. After she grew two hairs, she and her son will live. If she became pregnant before she grew two hairs and gave birth after she grew two hairs, she will live but her son will die. How is the situation? Since a man may dedicate for his underage daughter. Since she grew [pubic hair] she already left his power. But it must be since a man may dedicate for his deaf-mute wife. Here, in the case of the suspected wife, the case of the minor does not apply since Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An underage girl who whored has no will to be forbidden to her husband. The case of the deaf-mute does not apply since it is written: “The woman shall say: Amen, amen.” Rebbi Abin said, since it is written: “You shall enjoy together with your house,” and he is the cause that he cannot enjoy with her, he may dedicate without her knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 7:22

Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Tanḥum ben Rebbi Ḥiyya. If somebody studied and taught, kept and did, and it was in his power to strengthen, but he did not strengthen, that one is in the set of the cursed. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: If somebody did not study, did not teach, did not keep and did not do, and it was not in his hand to strengthen but he did strengthen, that one is in the set of the blessed. And Rebbi Ḥana, Rebbi Jeremiah, said in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: In the future [world], the Holy One, praise to Him, will make shadow of those who perform commandments in the shadow of those who study Torah. What is the reason? “For in the shadow of Torah, in the shadow of money”. And it is said, “it is a tree of life for those who support it.”

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 8:5

HALAKHAH: “As it was said further,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, anybody who is not in the position of those [men] who had the power to object, should not object. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: Just as it is a commandment to speak on things that will be done, so it is a commandment not to talk about things that would not be done. Rebbi Eleazar said, just as it is forbidden to declare the impure pure, so it is forbidden to declare the pure impure. Rebbi Abba bar Jacob in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a practical case comes before you and you do not know whether to burn or to suspend, always prefer burning to suspension since nothing is more beloved in the Torah than burned oxen and burned rams, and they are burned. Rebbi Yose asked: Does one infer something which is not commanded from something which is commanded?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:7

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was not cautioned should he not pay since when cautioned he would be flogged? A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If somebody eats heave in error, he pays principal and fifth,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as we have stated: “The following adolescent girls can claim a fine,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Rebbi Meïr learned from the calumniator. (Deut. 22:18) “They shall punish him,” flogging; (Deut. 22:19) “and they shall fine him”, money. But the rabbis say, [the law of] the calumniator is separate because of its novelty; one cannot learn from a novelty! Because nowhere else will a person become guilty by speech, but here he becomes guilty by speech; therefore, nothing can be inferred. Another explanation: one cannot transfer the rules of either payment or flogging. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he [eats] fat in error but is intentional about the sacrifice, if he was cautioned he will be flogged and has to bring a sacrifice? So here, he is flogged and he pays. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” If two possibilities are given to the court, one chooses one of them. This excludes matters in the power of Heaven.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:10

MISHNAH: If somebody gives his daughter in preliminary marriage and she was divorced, in preliminary marriage and she was widowed, the ketubah belongs to him. If he gave her in definitive marriage and she was divorced, in definitive marriage and she was widowed, the ketubah belongs to her. Rebbi Jehudah says, the first ketubah is his. They said to him, from the moment he gave her in definitive marriage, he no longer has any power over her.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:29

MISHNAH: She always remains in the father’s power until she enters the husband’s power for definitive marriage. If the father entrusted her to the husband’s emissaries she is in the husband’s power. If the father went with the husband’s emissaries, or the father’s emissaries went with the husband’s emissaries, she is in the father’s power. If the father’s emissaries entrusted her to the husband’s emissaries, she is in the husband’s power.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:29

MISHNAH: She always remains in the father’s power until she enters the husband’s power for definitive marriage. If the father entrusted her to the husband’s emissaries she is in the husband’s power. If the father went with the husband’s emissaries, or the father’s emissaries went with the husband’s emissaries, she is in the father’s power. If the father’s emissaries entrusted her to the husband’s emissaries, she is in the husband’s power.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:29

MISHNAH: She always remains in the father’s power until she enters the husband’s power for definitive marriage. If the father entrusted her to the husband’s emissaries she is in the husband’s power. If the father went with the husband’s emissaries, or the father’s emissaries went with the husband’s emissaries, she is in the father’s power. If the father’s emissaries entrusted her to the husband’s emissaries, she is in the husband’s power.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:29

MISHNAH: She always remains in the father’s power until she enters the husband’s power for definitive marriage. If the father entrusted her to the husband’s emissaries she is in the husband’s power. If the father went with the husband’s emissaries, or the father’s emissaries went with the husband’s emissaries, she is in the father’s power. If the father’s emissaries entrusted her to the husband’s emissaries, she is in the husband’s power.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:29

MISHNAH: She always remains in the father’s power until she enters the husband’s power for definitive marriage. If the father entrusted her to the husband’s emissaries she is in the husband’s power. If the father went with the husband’s emissaries, or the father’s emissaries went with the husband’s emissaries, she is in the father’s power. If the father’s emissaries entrusted her to the husband’s emissaries, she is in the husband’s power.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:30

HALAKHAH: “She always remains in the father’s power,” etc. Not only to the bridal chamber but to a house where the bridal chamber is. In which way? A banquet hall and a bedroom, the bridal chamber being the bedroom, and she entered the banquest hall. In which respect? Rebbi Eleazar said, to inherit from her. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, to dissolve her vows. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even though Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, to dissolve her vows, he agrees that he does not actually dissolve them until she enters the bridal chamber. Rebbi Huna said, a baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “To whore in her father’s house,” that excludes the case that the father’s emissaries entrusted her to the husband’s emissaries, after which she should not be stoned but strangled.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:24

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not say “his” but [ ]. In which respect? In case the heir took it, one removes it from his hand. Does one have the same rule for the creditor? Was it not stated: If either the heir or the creditor took it, one takes it from their hands? Rebbi Aḥa bar Ulla said, let us hear from the following: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas, [the creditor] adds another denar and redeems these properties.” Not necessarily a denar, but anything, that a dedication should not be seen to be profanated without redemption. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One would be guilty of complete larceny. That is difficult. If one would be guilty of complete larceny, should if not be redeemed for its full value? If it can be redeemed for less than its full value, one should not be guilty of complete larceny! What are we talking about? If it is connected to the ground, can there be larceny about real estate? But we talk about standing grain. Since if the administrator misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand; the administrator and the heir follow the same rule. Also if the heir misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The same rule holds for an ox. Can you say that an ox is real estate? Rebbi Tanḥum bar Mari in the name of Rebbi Yose: They made the rules for an ox parallel those of dedications that lost their value. Here, you say one takes it from his hand, but there you say, one does not take it from his hand. Since you diminished the woman’s power in that her ketubah is a lien only on the properties of her first husband, you strengthened her power in this matter that if the heir came and took it, one removes it from his hand. It was stated thus: Trees and cutting, old or young, one removes from their hands.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:24

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not say “his” but [ ]. In which respect? In case the heir took it, one removes it from his hand. Does one have the same rule for the creditor? Was it not stated: If either the heir or the creditor took it, one takes it from their hands? Rebbi Aḥa bar Ulla said, let us hear from the following: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas, [the creditor] adds another denar and redeems these properties.” Not necessarily a denar, but anything, that a dedication should not be seen to be profanated without redemption. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One would be guilty of complete larceny. That is difficult. If one would be guilty of complete larceny, should if not be redeemed for its full value? If it can be redeemed for less than its full value, one should not be guilty of complete larceny! What are we talking about? If it is connected to the ground, can there be larceny about real estate? But we talk about standing grain. Since if the administrator misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand; the administrator and the heir follow the same rule. Also if the heir misbehaved and took it, one does not take it from his hand. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The same rule holds for an ox. Can you say that an ox is real estate? Rebbi Tanḥum bar Mari in the name of Rebbi Yose: They made the rules for an ox parallel those of dedications that lost their value. Here, you say one takes it from his hand, but there you say, one does not take it from his hand. Since you diminished the woman’s power in that her ketubah is a lien only on the properties of her first husband, you strengthened her power in this matter that if the heir came and took it, one removes it from his hand. It was stated thus: Trees and cutting, old or young, one removes from their hands.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:32

It was stated: If an heir’s father held a compromised promissory note, the son collects without swearing. In that the son’s power is greater than the father’s, since the son collects without swearing while the father can collect only by swearing. Rebbi Eleazar said, nevertheless he has to execute an heir’s oath, “that our father did not charge us, that our father did not tell us, that we did not find a document among our father’s documents that this note was paid.” Rebbi Hoshaia asked, does the baraita follow the House of Shammai? For the House of Shammai say, “she collects her ketubah and does not drink.” Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the House of Shammai is: Bring my husband and I shall drink! But here, it would be in order that even his father would not have to swear. They instituted a rule that he has to swear. They instituted that for him, but not for his son. When he died, you put his son on the biblical rule.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:19

MISHNAH: If the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much, their sale is invalid. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, their sale is valid; otherwise, what is the court’s power worth? But if they offered public tender, even if they sold either the worth of a mina for 200 or the worth of 200 for a mina, their sale is valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:20

HALAKHAH: “If the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much,” etc. As you say for a private person, in real estate up to one third, in movables up to one sixth. And similarly, for Temple property, in real estate up to one sixth, in movables up to [one in] twelve. There, we have stated: “The estimation for orphans is thirty days, the estimation for Temple property sixty days, and one publicly announces mornings and evenings.” And why thirty? In order to empower the orphans. Why should they not announce longer? Up to thirty days you empower the orphans, more than that you diminish their power. Why do you not say that for Temple property? Temple property is different because each offer made is firm. Then they should announce forever! If suffices for the Temple that it should be twice that of a private person. Rebbi Yudan said, since you say that Temple property is different because each offer made is firm, this implies that if they find their estimation they do not continue but close the deal.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:2

HALAKHAH: “Two robbery judges were in Jerusalem,” etc. Did not Rebbi Phineas say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: 469 synagogues were in Jerusalem and each one of them had a Book house and a study house; the Book house for Scripture and the study house for Mishnah? But these two were appointed for robberies; to teach you that if anybody has the power to intervene, if he does not exercise his power the misconduct is attributed to him. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: Naḥum the Mede also was with them. In Rebbi Nathan’s opinion, three robbery judges were in Jerusalem.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:2

HALAKHAH: “Two robbery judges were in Jerusalem,” etc. Did not Rebbi Phineas say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: 469 synagogues were in Jerusalem and each one of them had a Book house and a study house; the Book house for Scripture and the study house for Mishnah? But these two were appointed for robberies; to teach you that if anybody has the power to intervene, if he does not exercise his power the misconduct is attributed to him. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: Naḥum the Mede also was with them. In Rebbi Nathan’s opinion, three robbery judges were in Jerusalem.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:23

Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free. And why did we state: “Rabban Gamliel obligates him”? This comes to tell you the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he obligates people. Rebbi Abbahu [supported] that of Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, the Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is obligated. Rav followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went with another to court before Rav. He started claiming from him barley, wheat and spelt. Rav told him, charge him with anything you have to charge, and in the end he will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free, did we not state “if he sued him for vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? If he is obligated for vessels about vessels, not so much more vessels for real estate? What does he do with it? He explains it, to transfer an oath to him. But did we not state: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for oil and he admitted vessels, everybody agrees that what he admitted does not refer to the claim, for Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna said in the name of Rav: The Mishnah deals with the case that he sued for vessels full of oil; the ones are full, the others empty. One understands vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abun formulates it as oil bucket. Can one not ask him in the end? If he lost his speech.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:3

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “If she should be a man’s”, the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died? The husband dissolves. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.” “Between a man and his wife.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:3

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “If she should be a man’s”, the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died? The husband dissolves. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.” “Between a man and his wife.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:3

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “If she should be a man’s”, the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died? The husband dissolves. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.” “Between a man and his wife.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:6

MISHNAH: If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father. In this, He strengthened the father’s power over the husband. In another matter, He strengthened the husband’s power over the father since the husband dissolves in adulthood but the father does not dissolve in adulthood.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:6

MISHNAH: If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father. In this, He strengthened the father’s power over the husband. In another matter, He strengthened the husband’s power over the father since the husband dissolves in adulthood but the father does not dissolve in adulthood.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:6

MISHNAH: If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father. In this, He strengthened the father’s power over the husband. In another matter, He strengthened the husband’s power over the father since the husband dissolves in adulthood but the father does not dissolve in adulthood.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:6

MISHNAH: If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father. In this, He strengthened the father’s power over the husband. In another matter, He strengthened the husband’s power over the father since the husband dissolves in adulthood but the father does not dissolve in adulthood.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:7

HALAKHAH: “If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband,” etc. They wanted to say that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. Let us hear from the following: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’.” This implies that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:7

HALAKHAH: “If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband,” etc. They wanted to say that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. Let us hear from the following: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’.” This implies that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:7

HALAKHAH: “If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband,” etc. They wanted to say that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. Let us hear from the following: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’.” This implies that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:8

If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the husband.” They wanted to say, after the husband had dissolved his part. But if the husband had not dissolved his part when he died, the power is not voided in favor of the father. Let us hear from the following: “If she made a vow while being preliminarily married. If she was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.” That means, even if the husband had not dissolved his part and died, his power is voided in favor of the father.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:8

If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the husband.” They wanted to say, after the husband had dissolved his part. But if the husband had not dissolved his part when he died, the power is not voided in favor of the father. Let us hear from the following: “If she made a vow while being preliminarily married. If she was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.” That means, even if the husband had not dissolved his part and died, his power is voided in favor of the father.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:8

If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the husband.” They wanted to say, after the husband had dissolved his part. But if the husband had not dissolved his part when he died, the power is not voided in favor of the father. Let us hear from the following: “If she made a vow while being preliminarily married. If she was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.” That means, even if the husband had not dissolved his part and died, his power is voided in favor of the father.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:9

“If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.” Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose. So far for vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married; if the father died, was his power not voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? Why do you have to say, if the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband? That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married, if the father died, was his power voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? You say, “if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father”! That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married, if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father!

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:9

“If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.” Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose. So far for vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married; if the father died, was his power not voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? Why do you have to say, if the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband? That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married, if the father died, was his power voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? You say, “if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father”! That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married, if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father!

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:9

“If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.” Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose. So far for vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married; if the father died, was his power not voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? Why do you have to say, if the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband? That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married, if the father died, was his power voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? You say, “if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father”! That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married, if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father!

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:9

“If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.” Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose. So far for vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married; if the father died, was his power not voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? Why do you have to say, if the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband? That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married, if the father died, was his power voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? You say, “if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father”! That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married, if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father!

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:9

“If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.” Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose. So far for vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married; if the father died, was his power not voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? Why do you have to say, if the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband? That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married, if the father died, was his power voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? You say, “if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father”! That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married, if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father!

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:9

“If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.” Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose. So far for vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married; if the father died, was his power not voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? Why do you have to say, if the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband? That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married, if the father died, was his power voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? You say, “if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father”! That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married, if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father!

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:11

MISHNAH: If she made a vow while preliminarily married, was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even to a hundred men, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows. That is the principle: as long as she did not leave her father’s power for one moment, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:22

HALAKHAH: “The dissolution of vows may take place the entire day,” etc. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon say, the dissolution of vows may take place from time to time.” What is the reason of the rabbis? “From day to day.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah? “On the day of his hearing.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s reason, “on the day of his hearing”? Explain it that she made the vow on the start of the night. How does Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah explain the rabbis’ reason, “from day to day”? Explain it that she made the vow at the start of Friday night, he became paralyzed, and then his power of speech returned. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one gives him 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he has only that day. If he became paralyzed, and later his power of speech returned, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one adds up to a total of 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he always can dissolve when his speech returns. But if it happened one hour before sundown, he can no longer dissolve.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:22

HALAKHAH: “The dissolution of vows may take place the entire day,” etc. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon say, the dissolution of vows may take place from time to time.” What is the reason of the rabbis? “From day to day.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah? “On the day of his hearing.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s reason, “on the day of his hearing”? Explain it that she made the vow on the start of the night. How does Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah explain the rabbis’ reason, “from day to day”? Explain it that she made the vow at the start of Friday night, he became paralyzed, and then his power of speech returned. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one gives him 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he has only that day. If he became paralyzed, and later his power of speech returned, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one adds up to a total of 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he always can dissolve when his speech returns. But if it happened one hour before sundown, he can no longer dissolve.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:17

HALAKHAH: “A woman who had made a vow of nazir,” etc. Does this mean it became holy by dedication? But if a third person gave her a gift and said, on condition that your husband have no right of disposition over it, then it is hers. Rebbi Mattaniah said, if he gave her power over his properties. If he comes to protest, it did not become holy; otherwise, it became holy.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 5:9

There, we have stated: “The public sale of orphans’ property goes on for 30 days, the public sale of Temple property goes on for 30 days, and they are publicly announed mornings and evenings.” Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Eliezer is afraid of trickery, Rebbi Joshua is not afraid of trickery. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai and Rebbi Joshua the House of Hillel. Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, a person may ask about his dedication; could he say that he does not have to vow usufruct? Rebbi Joshua follows the House of Hillel, since the House of Hillel say, a person may not ask about his dedication; could he say that he has to vow usufruct? In any case, could not a man ask about his vow of usufruct? Rebbi Joshua agrees that a guarantor must execute a vow of usufruct. What does Rebbi Joshua say about a gift? Since he gives voluntarily, he does not have to vow usufruct, or since [the recipient’s] power is small and [the donor] may change his mind, does he have to vow usufruct? Let us hear from the following: The husband of a relative of Rebbi Ḥaggai owed on a document. The creditor came and foreclosed. The case came before Rebbi Aḥa, who said, he owes a vow of usufruct. Rebbi Yose said, he does not have to vow usufruct. The colleagues said before Rebbi Aḥa [and] Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Aḥa say it correctly? Since if he takes her back, does not the creditor come and foreclose? Rebbi Yose said to them, she turns it into jewelry or keeps it as additions to her dowry. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, by Moses! Rebbi Yose says it correctly. It was executed following Rebbi Aḥa.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:3

Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:1

MISHNAH: Gentiles cannot take a vow as nazir. Women and slaves can take a vow as nazir. A man’s power is restricted for his wives more than for his slaves since he can force his slave but he cannot force his wife. His power is restricted for his slaves more than for his wives since he can dissolve his wife’s vows but not his slave’s vows. If he dissolved his wife’s, they are eternally dissolved. If he dissolved his slave’s, once the slave gains his freedom he has to fulfill his nezirut. If [the slave] is not in the presence of his master, Rebbi Meïr says, he cannot drink, but Rebbi Yose says, he may drink.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:1

MISHNAH: Gentiles cannot take a vow as nazir. Women and slaves can take a vow as nazir. A man’s power is restricted for his wives more than for his slaves since he can force his slave but he cannot force his wife. His power is restricted for his slaves more than for his wives since he can dissolve his wife’s vows but not his slave’s vows. If he dissolved his wife’s, they are eternally dissolved. If he dissolved his slave’s, once the slave gains his freedom he has to fulfill his nezirut. If [the slave] is not in the presence of his master, Rebbi Meïr says, he cannot drink, but Rebbi Yose says, he may drink.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:5

The following is obvious: If he became impure and then was manumitted, he brings a sacrifice of impurity. When is that, if his master forced him or if his master did not force him? If you say that he forced him, how can be bring a sacrifice of impurity? If you say he did not force him, should he not count for his master as long as he still is in the latter’s power? Rebbi Yose said, we are dealing with the case that his master forced him. You should not say that because he was manumitted, the nezirut in impurity was lifted from him. Therefore, it was necessary to say that he counts nezirut in impurity.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sent a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. This disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates the agent appointed by him by a declaration. He explains it by the stringency of the rules of incest. If he appointed an agent to deliver the bill of divorce, the latter has to deliver it in the presence of two [witnesses]; the agent is not counted as one of the two. If another agent went to invalidate the bill of divorce, he has to invalidate it in the presence of two [witnesses] and the agent is counted as one of the two. If he met him on the road and asked him, what about the bill of divorce I gave you? He answered, I delivered it to her. While they were talking there, he dropped it. He said, did you not tell me that you delivered it to her? He explained, I delivered it to her and she said, keep it for me. What? Can he be believed since it is in his power to divorce, or can he not be believed because it is in his hand? If the agent fell sick, how do you treat this? By the rules of divorces or the rules of preliminary marriages? By the rules of divorces one can divorce through the agency of anybody. By the rules of preliminary marriages one cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:6

If he transgressed and annulled? Let us hear from the following: “If he annulled it is annulled, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he can neither annul it nor add to his condition.” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says it correctly. What is the reason of Rebbi? It is the word of the Torah that he has the power to annul but they said, he shall not annul. Can their word uproot the words of the Torah? But is it not from the Torah that one may [give as heave] olives for oil and grapes for wine, but because of robbing the tribe they said not only that one may not give heave [in this way] but if he transgressed and gave, his heave is not heave. Rebbi Oshaia bar Abba said to Rebbi Yudan the Prince: Who could tell exactly what your ancestor meant?

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:6

Rebbi Joḥanan said, the practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said it never is a bill of divorce unless he declares at the moment of delivery: “This is your bill of divorce.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yannai: There is not even a hint of invalidity on her. Cahana said, this implies that they did not worry. If they did worry, might he not have said “you are permitted to any man” when it was still in her hand? Rebbi Aḥa said, this implies that they did worry. If they did not worry, could he not divorce by any power he has to divorce?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:40

From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:40

From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:46

“She leaves gratis,” these are the days of adulthood; “without money,” these are the indicators [of adolescence.] Could He not have mentioned only one of them? If only one of them were mentioned, would I not have said that if she leaves with indicators [of adolescence], then certainly in the days of adulthood? But in that case I would have said that they are identical with the days of adulthood. Would this not be logical? She is emancipated from the power of the father and she is emancipated from the power of the master; since she is emancipated from the power of the father by some indicators [of adulthood], she is emancipated from the power of the master by the same indicators. Therefore, it was necessary to say, “she leaves gratis,” these are the days of adulthood, “without money,” these are the indicators [of adolescence.] Or maybe the other way around? Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: “Without money.” At a place where there is money for the father, there is no money for the master.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:46

“She leaves gratis,” these are the days of adulthood; “without money,” these are the indicators [of adolescence.] Could He not have mentioned only one of them? If only one of them were mentioned, would I not have said that if she leaves with indicators [of adolescence], then certainly in the days of adulthood? But in that case I would have said that they are identical with the days of adulthood. Would this not be logical? She is emancipated from the power of the father and she is emancipated from the power of the master; since she is emancipated from the power of the father by some indicators [of adulthood], she is emancipated from the power of the master by the same indicators. Therefore, it was necessary to say, “she leaves gratis,” these are the days of adulthood, “without money,” these are the indicators [of adolescence.] Or maybe the other way around? Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: “Without money.” At a place where there is money for the father, there is no money for the master.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:46

“She leaves gratis,” these are the days of adulthood; “without money,” these are the indicators [of adolescence.] Could He not have mentioned only one of them? If only one of them were mentioned, would I not have said that if she leaves with indicators [of adolescence], then certainly in the days of adulthood? But in that case I would have said that they are identical with the days of adulthood. Would this not be logical? She is emancipated from the power of the father and she is emancipated from the power of the master; since she is emancipated from the power of the father by some indicators [of adulthood], she is emancipated from the power of the master by the same indicators. Therefore, it was necessary to say, “she leaves gratis,” these are the days of adulthood, “without money,” these are the indicators [of adolescence.] Or maybe the other way around? Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: “Without money.” At a place where there is money for the father, there is no money for the master.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:46

“She leaves gratis,” these are the days of adulthood; “without money,” these are the indicators [of adolescence.] Could He not have mentioned only one of them? If only one of them were mentioned, would I not have said that if she leaves with indicators [of adolescence], then certainly in the days of adulthood? But in that case I would have said that they are identical with the days of adulthood. Would this not be logical? She is emancipated from the power of the father and she is emancipated from the power of the master; since she is emancipated from the power of the father by some indicators [of adulthood], she is emancipated from the power of the master by the same indicators. Therefore, it was necessary to say, “she leaves gratis,” these are the days of adulthood, “without money,” these are the indicators [of adolescence.] Or maybe the other way around? Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: “Without money.” At a place where there is money for the father, there is no money for the master.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:48

Rebbi Hoshaia stated: How does he allot her? He tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “You are allotted to me.” In Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he gives her money for the allotment at the end. In the rabbis’ opinion, the money for allotment was given at the first hour. What is the difference between them? Her earning power. For him who says, he gives her money for the allotment at the end, her earning power belongs to her husband. For him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her father. Even for him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her husband. It is as if he said: “You are preliminarily married to me on condition that your earning power belong to me.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:48

Rebbi Hoshaia stated: How does he allot her? He tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “You are allotted to me.” In Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he gives her money for the allotment at the end. In the rabbis’ opinion, the money for allotment was given at the first hour. What is the difference between them? Her earning power. For him who says, he gives her money for the allotment at the end, her earning power belongs to her husband. For him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her father. Even for him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her husband. It is as if he said: “You are preliminarily married to me on condition that your earning power belong to me.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:48

Rebbi Hoshaia stated: How does he allot her? He tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “You are allotted to me.” In Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he gives her money for the allotment at the end. In the rabbis’ opinion, the money for allotment was given at the first hour. What is the difference between them? Her earning power. For him who says, he gives her money for the allotment at the end, her earning power belongs to her husband. For him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her father. Even for him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her husband. It is as if he said: “You are preliminarily married to me on condition that your earning power belong to me.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:48

Rebbi Hoshaia stated: How does he allot her? He tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “You are allotted to me.” In Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he gives her money for the allotment at the end. In the rabbis’ opinion, the money for allotment was given at the first hour. What is the difference between them? Her earning power. For him who says, he gives her money for the allotment at the end, her earning power belongs to her husband. For him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her father. Even for him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her husband. It is as if he said: “You are preliminarily married to me on condition that your earning power belong to me.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:48

Rebbi Hoshaia stated: How does he allot her? He tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “You are allotted to me.” In Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he gives her money for the allotment at the end. In the rabbis’ opinion, the money for allotment was given at the first hour. What is the difference between them? Her earning power. For him who says, he gives her money for the allotment at the end, her earning power belongs to her husband. For him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her father. Even for him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, her earning power belongs to her husband. It is as if he said: “You are preliminarily married to me on condition that your earning power belong to me.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:59

Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai stated: Just as he cannot sell her into servitude after marriage, so not into servitude after servitude. What is Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai’s reason? “By his being unfaithful to her.” Once he can be unfaithful to her, he cannot be unfaithful to her a second time. How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai’s reason? “She being in his garment;” from the moment that [her master] spread his garment on her, her father no longer has any power over her.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:60

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:60

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:60

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:60

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:77

It is obvious that a slave may accept a gift by one third party to another, by a third party to his master, [but] not from his master to himself. From a third party to himself is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the Sages. If one said: Here [I am giving] you this money on condition that your master have no power over it, the slave acquired it and with him his master, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, the slave acquired it [but not] his master. What is the problem? From his master to a third party. Since the slave may receive from a third party for his master, may he receive from his master for a third party? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his slave, his son, or his agent.” Does this not mean that the slave is able to transfer rights from his master to a third party? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it for a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you have to explain if for a Canaanite slave; explain it that he said, open [the gate] for her and she will come by herself, as we have stated: “If he led her, drew her to himself, called her and she followed him, he is responsible as a borrower.” Rebbi Zeïra understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his underage son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:79

“For my slave girl X I want a document that she should not be enslaved.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan. He said, he has no power to enslave. What are her children? Slaves. What did he retain for her? Her earnings. Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Yose both said, this follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. If he wrote all his possessions jointly to two of his slaves, both are free and both have to free one another. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Abba: Does this not imply that one slave accepts from his master for another one? He answered, what do you think? Since they acquired the properties they went free? No, simultaneously slaves and properties went free.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:119

Commandments which the son is obligated to fulfill towards his father. What is fear? He may not sit in his place and may not speak in his stead nor contradict his words. What is honor? He feeds and gives him to drink, clothes him, covers him, and puts on his shoes, leads him out and in. From whose money? Huna bar Ḥiyya said, from the old man’s. Some want to say, from his own. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: From where do we know that even if his father tells him to throw the wallet into the sea that he should obey him? That is, if he has another one and if it helps to quiet his father’s spirit. Both men and women. Only the man has the power in his hand, but the woman does not have the power in her own hand because others have disposition over her. If she is widowed or divorced, the power is in her own hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:119

Commandments which the son is obligated to fulfill towards his father. What is fear? He may not sit in his place and may not speak in his stead nor contradict his words. What is honor? He feeds and gives him to drink, clothes him, covers him, and puts on his shoes, leads him out and in. From whose money? Huna bar Ḥiyya said, from the old man’s. Some want to say, from his own. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: From where do we know that even if his father tells him to throw the wallet into the sea that he should obey him? That is, if he has another one and if it helps to quiet his father’s spirit. Both men and women. Only the man has the power in his hand, but the woman does not have the power in her own hand because others have disposition over her. If she is widowed or divorced, the power is in her own hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:119

Commandments which the son is obligated to fulfill towards his father. What is fear? He may not sit in his place and may not speak in his stead nor contradict his words. What is honor? He feeds and gives him to drink, clothes him, covers him, and puts on his shoes, leads him out and in. From whose money? Huna bar Ḥiyya said, from the old man’s. Some want to say, from his own. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: From where do we know that even if his father tells him to throw the wallet into the sea that he should obey him? That is, if he has another one and if it helps to quiet his father’s spirit. Both men and women. Only the man has the power in his hand, but the woman does not have the power in her own hand because others have disposition over her. If she is widowed or divorced, the power is in her own hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:33

HALAKHAH: “If somebody say to a woman,” etc. They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the difference between this and one who says, “this shall be heave for this standing produce after it has been cut”? He said to them, there, it is in his power to cut; but here, it is not in his power to be freed. Rebbi Ephes asked, think of it, if she was his slave girl? Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, “after you are freed”, she is made dependent on another person’s will.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:33

HALAKHAH: “If somebody say to a woman,” etc. They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the difference between this and one who says, “this shall be heave for this standing produce after it has been cut”? He said to them, there, it is in his power to cut; but here, it is not in his power to be freed. Rebbi Ephes asked, think of it, if she was his slave girl? Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, “after you are freed”, she is made dependent on another person’s will.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:8

It is written: “The King said, I shall give.” “The King took the two sons of Riṣpah bat Ayah whom she had born to Saul, Admoni and Mephiboshet,” etc. “Michal, Saul’s daughter, did not have a child until the day of her death,” and you say so? Say now that they were sons of Merab but Michal raised them, so they were named after her. “He gave them into the hand of the Gibeonites who hanged them on the mountain before the Eternal; all seven fell together.” Defective without י. That refers to Mephiboshet ben Jonathan ben Saul, who was great in the Torah and David intended to save him from their hand. David said, I let them pass by the altar and anyone received by the altar will be mine. He let each pass by the altar, prayed for him, and the altar moved and received him. This is what is written: “I shall call to the Most High God, to the Power Who has the ultimate decision about me!” For the Holy One, praise to Him, agreed with David. “ They were killed on the first days of harvest;” it is written “the barley harvest.” “Riṣpah bat Ayah took a sack and laid it out on the rock.” What means: “On the rock”? Rebbi Hoshaia said, she was reciting: “The rock, perfect is His action.” Rebbi Abba bar Zamina in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Sanctification of the Name is greater than desecration of the Name. Referring to desecration of the Name it is written: “Do not leave his corpse on the gallows overnight.” But referring to sanctification of the Name it is written: “From the start of harvest until water was poured on them.” This teaches that they were hanging from the sixteenth of Nisan to the seventeenth of Marḥeshwan. The passers-by were saying: How did these people sin that the rules of justice were changed for them? They were answered: Because these had attacked attached proselytes. They would say that even for those who did not convert for the sake of Heaven, the Eternal avenged their blood; if one would convert for the sake of Heaven not so much more? There is no Power like your God and no people like your people. Many converts were converted at that time; that is what is written: “Solomon counted all proselytes and appointed from them 70’000 carriers and 80’000 hewers of stone in the mountains.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 4:8

It is written: “The King said, I shall give.” “The King took the two sons of Riṣpah bat Ayah whom she had born to Saul, Admoni and Mephiboshet,” etc. “Michal, Saul’s daughter, did not have a child until the day of her death,” and you say so? Say now that they were sons of Merab but Michal raised them, so they were named after her. “He gave them into the hand of the Gibeonites who hanged them on the mountain before the Eternal; all seven fell together.” Defective without י. That refers to Mephiboshet ben Jonathan ben Saul, who was great in the Torah and David intended to save him from their hand. David said, I let them pass by the altar and anyone received by the altar will be mine. He let each pass by the altar, prayed for him, and the altar moved and received him. This is what is written: “I shall call to the Most High God, to the Power Who has the ultimate decision about me!” For the Holy One, praise to Him, agreed with David. “ They were killed on the first days of harvest;” it is written “the barley harvest.” “Riṣpah bat Ayah took a sack and laid it out on the rock.” What means: “On the rock”? Rebbi Hoshaia said, she was reciting: “The rock, perfect is His action.” Rebbi Abba bar Zamina in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Sanctification of the Name is greater than desecration of the Name. Referring to desecration of the Name it is written: “Do not leave his corpse on the gallows overnight.” But referring to sanctification of the Name it is written: “From the start of harvest until water was poured on them.” This teaches that they were hanging from the sixteenth of Nisan to the seventeenth of Marḥeshwan. The passers-by were saying: How did these people sin that the rules of justice were changed for them? They were answered: Because these had attacked attached proselytes. They would say that even for those who did not convert for the sake of Heaven, the Eternal avenged their blood; if one would convert for the sake of Heaven not so much more? There is no Power like your God and no people like your people. Many converts were converted at that time; that is what is written: “Solomon counted all proselytes and appointed from them 70’000 carriers and 80’000 hewers of stone in the mountains.”

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 1:3

We have stated: “Four main categories of damages.” But Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thirteen: Damages, suffering, medical costs, loss of earning power, shame; the unpaid trustee, and the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Say now, what we stated [refers to] responsibility for damages. What Rebbi Ḥiyya stated [refers to] both responsibility for damages and bodily injury. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: How can we state “four main categories”? If everything was said about one bull; let us state “three,” if it was said about three bulls, let us state “five”! But as it is presented in the verse, thus it is presented in the Mishnah.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 1:14

HALAKHAH: “Anything I am obligated to watch I did set up for damage claims,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: This refers to cattle and pit. But he did not state “fire”. Rebbi Jeremiah said, the fire set up for damage claims? Rebbi Yose said, if the fire were [more than] damage claims, should he not accept warning according to this opinion and be whipped? How is this? The fire in setting up for damage claims he accepts [responsibility] for damages, suffering, medical costs, loss of earning power, shame.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 3:3

If it was filling the entire public domain, if he took it from here and put it down there he would create a “pit”. But could he take a stick and break it or step over it and if it broke, it broke? Let us hear from the following: If a bull mounted another and the [latter’s] owner came to draw away his own, or [the bull] slipped away, and [the attacker] fell down and died, he is free from payment. If he pushed [the attacker] which then fell down and died, he must pay. Could he not tell him, if you had not interferred, I would have paid your damages? But he could have answered, If I had not interferred, you would have paid me half the damage! Think of it, if it was notorious? It is not in your power to drag me through the courts.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 7:6

HALAKHAH: Did not Rabbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he is intentional about fat but in error about a sacrifice, he can be warned, is whipped, and brings a sacrifice. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” If two alternatives are presented to the court, one chooses one of them. This excludes matters in the power of Heaven.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 1:23

If a person took a documented loan and paid it back, he cannot use the document to take a second loan because it diminishes the power of the buyers. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even on the same day. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: Here you say, even on the same day. But there, you say, if its date was that very day, he should return it! He answered, a person is apt to take a loan and repay it the same day, but a person is not apt to repay a loan and take it the same day. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yasa: It is the same day, the same witnesses, and the same amount. What is the meaning of “it diminishes the power of the buyers”? He answered, if the property had not been mortgaged. But some say, if the witnesses did not sign for this loan.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Metzia 1:23

If a person took a documented loan and paid it back, he cannot use the document to take a second loan because it diminishes the power of the buyers. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even on the same day. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: Here you say, even on the same day. But there, you say, if its date was that very day, he should return it! He answered, a person is apt to take a loan and repay it the same day, but a person is not apt to repay a loan and take it the same day. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yasa: It is the same day, the same witnesses, and the same amount. What is the meaning of “it diminishes the power of the buyers”? He answered, if the property had not been mortgaged. But some say, if the witnesses did not sign for this loan.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Batra 2:9

A person sold his entire house; he reserved for himself one stone bench where he went and sat. The case came before Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose. They said, it is not in your power to go and sit there and observe who comes and goes in his house. A person sold half his house; he reserved a bake shop for himself. The case came before Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose. They said, you are coming to him; he is not coming to you, as it is stated: “If the barn or the store preceded the storage room, he cannot object.”