prohibitions

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar disagree, for Rebbi Joḥanan said, one whips for prohibitions and Rebbi Eleazar said, one does not whip. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, so did Rebbi Joḥanan answer Rebbi Eleazar: According to you, who says one does not whip on prohibitions, did we not state: “If somebody has vowed not to have any usufruct from another and he goes to visit him,” let him not enter! Rebbi Jeremiah said, there is a difference there because of the ways of peace. Rebbi Yose asked: If it is because of the ways of peace, should he not also be permitted in case of an oath? But we have stated: “Vows are forbidden, oaths permitted.”

“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.

“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.

HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.

HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.

Who is the Tanna of “the gain should be given to the sacred fund”? Rebbi Meïr! For Rebbi Meïr said, one commits sacrilege with prohibitions. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands? Let us hear from the following: “If he said, this loaf shall be dedicated, if he or another person ate it, they committed sacrilege; therefore, it can be redeemed. But if he said, it is for me [as if dedicated], if he ate it he committed sacrilege on goodwill but others would not commit sacrilege.” He said only, if he ate it. Therefore, to warm his hands is permitted. The students of Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: That is if he said I shall not eat it nor taste it; if he forbade only eating to himself. But the question was, if somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands?

It was stated: “All substitute names for nazir vows are like nazir vows, and one whips because of them.” Even though Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions, he agrees in this case that he is whipped. Even though Rebbi Simeon said, he does not bring a sacrifice, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Even though Rebbi Jehudah said, a questionable nazir vow is permitted, he agrees in this case that he be whipped. Where do we hold? If he has the intention of becoming a nazir, even if he only said, I shall be a nazir if I mention bread, he is a nazir. Similarly, if he had no intention of becoming a nazir, even if he mentioned nazir, he is no nazir; for example if he was reading the Torah and mentioned nazir,naziq. But we hold about one who says, I declared my vow of nazir by any of these expressions. If one of them is a valid expression of a vow of nazir, it will fall on him, otherwise, will the vow of nazir not fall on him? One tells him: keep the discipline.

“I did not vow as a nazir,” he is permitted. “I already had been a nazir,” he is forbidden. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Avina, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If somebody says, I am like ‘orlah juice, he did not say anything. The colleagues say, that follows Rebbi Simeon in a disagreement. As we have stated there: “If somebody said, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling things, he is guilty. But Rebbi Simeon declares him free from prosecution.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if it is an inclusive statement. But if it is a detailed statement, everybody agrees that no oath can be applied to prohibitions. And here, we consider an inclusive statement. Rebbi Yudan said, one is about vows, the other about oaths. Vows can be applied to prohibitions but no oaths can be applied to prohibitions.

“I did not vow as a nazir,” he is permitted. “I already had been a nazir,” he is forbidden. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Avina, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If somebody says, I am like ‘orlah juice, he did not say anything. The colleagues say, that follows Rebbi Simeon in a disagreement. As we have stated there: “If somebody said, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling things, he is guilty. But Rebbi Simeon declares him free from prosecution.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if it is an inclusive statement. But if it is a detailed statement, everybody agrees that no oath can be applied to prohibitions. And here, we consider an inclusive statement. Rebbi Yudan said, one is about vows, the other about oaths. Vows can be applied to prohibitions but no oaths can be applied to prohibitions.

“I did not vow as a nazir,” he is permitted. “I already had been a nazir,” he is forbidden. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Avina, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If somebody says, I am like ‘orlah juice, he did not say anything. The colleagues say, that follows Rebbi Simeon in a disagreement. As we have stated there: “If somebody said, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling things, he is guilty. But Rebbi Simeon declares him free from prosecution.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if it is an inclusive statement. But if it is a detailed statement, everybody agrees that no oath can be applied to prohibitions. And here, we consider an inclusive statement. Rebbi Yudan said, one is about vows, the other about oaths. Vows can be applied to prohibitions but no oaths can be applied to prohibitions.

From here, “if his hair became heavy”: Rebbi. For Rebbi Jeremiah said in the name of Rebbi Immi: The words of Rebbi: A nazir in perpetuity shaves once in twelve months. The words of the Sages: A nazir in perpetuity sometimes shaves every thirty days, sometimes once in twelve months. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Assi: It says so: “I am a nazir like the hair on my head, like the dust of the earth, or like the sand of the sea. He is a nazir in perpetuity and shaves every thirty days. Rebbi says, this one does not shave every thirty days,” but once in twelve months. “Who is one who shaves every thirty days? If he says, I am obligated for nezirut like the hair on my head, like the dust of the earth, or like the sand of the sea.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they differ if it was not made explicit. Where do we hold? If he says, “the fullness of my hair”, everybody agrees that he shaves once every thirty days. If he says, “the number of the hairs on my head,” everybody agrees that he shaves after twelve months. But we must hold that he says “like hair”. Rebbi says, “the fullness of my hair”. But the rabbis say, he means “the number of the hairs on my head.” And here, why? Why did the man not make the vow? He only encourages himself to avoid prohibitions. In addition, from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah added: If he said, like that which is collected in the fig harvest, or like sheaves in a Sabbatical year, or like stars in the sky, he is a nazir in perpetuity and shaves every thirty days.” Could you say that Rebbi Jehudah follows the rabbis? He holds with Rebbi, as Rebbi Jehudah added: “Absalom was a nazir in perpetuity and shaved every twelve months.” What is the reason? Because of nezirut. But that would mean for the rabbis that he shaved every thirty days; that is what we have stated: “I am a nazir the house full, or a chest full. One checks him out.” It was stated on that: He shaves every thirty days. But here he said, he shaved every twelve months.

HALAKHAH: “A person who made a vow of nazir,” etc. It was stated: The House of Shammai say, from the moment he asked; but the House of Hillel say, from the moment he vowed. Where do we hold? If he scoffed at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he asked. If he did not scoff at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he vowed. But we have to deal with one who is going to ask. The House of Shammai say, since he decided to ask, he is now scoffing. But the House of Hillel say, if he were scoffing, he would not ask. If he made a vow of nazir and scoffed at his vow, one does not let him ask about it unless he kept its prohibitions for the number of days he did not keep the prohibitions, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yasa said, when has this been said? If he vowed a lengthy period. But if he vowed a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. What is the difference between a lengthy and a short period? But it must be: When has this been said? If he scoffed at his vow for a lengthy period. But if he scoffed at his vow for a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. Where are we holding? If he scoffed in impurity, everybody agrees that he invalidated everything. If he scoffed in shaving, everybody agrees that he invalidated only 30 days. But we must deal with the case that he scoffed with wine. That is, if he is still within his period of nazir. But after his period of nazir, he invalidated everything.

HALAKHAH: “A person who made a vow of nazir,” etc. It was stated: The House of Shammai say, from the moment he asked; but the House of Hillel say, from the moment he vowed. Where do we hold? If he scoffed at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he asked. If he did not scoff at his vow, everybody agrees from the moment he vowed. But we have to deal with one who is going to ask. The House of Shammai say, since he decided to ask, he is now scoffing. But the House of Hillel say, if he were scoffing, he would not ask. If he made a vow of nazir and scoffed at his vow, one does not let him ask about it unless he kept its prohibitions for the number of days he did not keep the prohibitions, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yasa said, when has this been said? If he vowed a lengthy period. But if he vowed a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. What is the difference between a lengthy and a short period? But it must be: When has this been said? If he scoffed at his vow for a lengthy period. But if he scoffed at his vow for a short period, thirty days are sufficient for him. Where are we holding? If he scoffed in impurity, everybody agrees that he invalidated everything. If he scoffed in shaving, everybody agrees that he invalidated only 30 days. But we must deal with the case that he scoffed with wine. That is, if he is still within his period of nazir. But after his period of nazir, he invalidated everything.

Rebbi Samuel bar Sosarti asked: Then one who eats a limb from a kosher living animal should be guilty on two counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh.” Does one argue from kosher abour non-kosher animals? But did not Rebbi Eleazar argue from kosher about non-kosher animals? Then one who eats a limb from a non-kosher living animal should be guilty on three counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh”; and because of “you shall not eat from their flesh.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If somebody ate five ants together, in one forgetting, he is guilty for each one separately because of “creature”. If he fragmented and ate them, he is guilty only once, if together they amount to the volume of an olive. If he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive, he is guilty; if he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive and an ant, he is guilty twice. If this is correct, then if he ate of the fragments less than the volume of an olive and an ant completed the volume of an olive, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, if the ate an ant the size of an olive, is he guilty twice? The same rule applies to combinations of a nazir. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive, he is guilty. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive and a grape berry, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, then if he ate a grape berry for the volume ofan olive, is he guilty twice? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All [food] prohibitions combine together to be whipped for the volume of an olive, but for an ant one is guilty twice. Then if he ate prohibited food and an ant completed the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice. Then if he ate an ant the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice.

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One estimates [food] prohibitions as if they concerned onions or leeks. This parallels what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If carcass meat disappeared among slaughtered meat, its [impurity by] touch has disappeared by biblical law.

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Rebbi Ila said before Rebbi Yose: For whipping one, for hindering two, to start again three. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: “If he cropped any, he is guilty.” Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, Rebbi Yasa explains it by a little bit from each one. A baraita disagrees with Samuel: A person may tear out two hairs and have violated four prohibitions: As a nazir, as a sufferer from sking disease, on a holiday, because of jaw stripping. We have enumerated the prohibitions; but with regard to whippings, one even whips for one.

Rebbi Ila said before Rebbi Yose: For whipping one, for hindering two, to start again three. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: “If he cropped any, he is guilty.” Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, Rebbi Yasa explains it by a little bit from each one. A baraita disagrees with Samuel: A person may tear out two hairs and have violated four prohibitions: As a nazir, as a sufferer from sking disease, on a holiday, because of jaw stripping. We have enumerated the prohibitions; but with regard to whippings, one even whips for one.

Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi in the name of Bar Pedaiah: All sources of flavor one in a hundred. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi in the name of Bar Pedaiah: All sources of flavor one in sixty. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said to Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Yasa disagrees with you and the Mishnah disagrees with both of you: “Anything which sours, flavors, or creates dema‘? If you say about 100 or 200, even if it does not sour, flavor, or create dema‘! Therefore, we hold even more. Rebbi Jeremiah said, explain it for meat in meat. Rebbi Yose said, meat in meat is the same as all other prohibitions since Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, one estimates as if they were onion or leeks.

HALAKHAH: “The High Priest and the nazir,” etc. It is written: “He shall not go close to a dead body.” Where do we hold? If to forbid non-relatives, is he not also under the rules of a simple priest? If it cannot refer to non-relatives, refer it to relatives. It is written: “Not to go close to a dead body,” and you say so? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Gamda said, from here repeated prohibitions in the Torah. But it is to permit the corpse of obligation. Some understand it from the following: “ The man shall not defile himself, in the midst of his people” he may not defile himself. But he defiles himself for a corpse of obligation. Some understand it from the following: “ To profane himself.” He may not defile himself to profane himself; he defiles himself for a corpse of obligation.

Rebbi Yose asked: What is the legal status of “touching” a male? What is the legal status of “touching” an animal? Were not all incest prohibitions inferred from the menstruating woman? The male is included; the animal is included. So far, for Israel. For Gentiles? Rebbi Mana said, not from this: “He shall cling to his wife”? Not in any way to somebody else’s wife, not in any way to a male or an animal.

“From today and after 30 days.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even preliminary marriages of a hundred men apply to her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it was necessary [to state], even if the second preliminarily married her absolutely. Rebbi Isaac bar Tebele asked before Rebbi Eleazar: As you take it; what the first acquired, he acquired; the remainder the second finished. He answered, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? How is that? To any woman who is not acquired by one man only, even preliminary marriages of a hundred men apply.

MISHNAH: A man may say to another, weed with me and I shall be weeding with you, hoe with me and I shall be hoeing with you, but he shall not tell him, weed with me and I shall be hoeing with you, hoe with me and I shall be weeding with you. All the dry season is one, all the wet season is not; one may not say to him, plough with me in the dry season and I shall be ploughing with you in the wet season. Rabban Gamliel says, there exists predated and postdated interest. How is this? If one indended to borrow from him and sent him [a gift] saying, so you should lend me; that is predated interest. If one had borrowed and returned the money when he sent him [a gift] saying, that is for your money which was not earning for you while it was with me; that is postdated interest. Rebbi Simeon says, there exists verbal interest. One should not say to him, you should know that X came from place Y. The following transgress prohibitions: The creditor, and the debtor, and the guarantor, and the witnesses; the Sages say, also the scribe. They transgress “do not give,” and “do not take from him,” and “do not be a creditor,” and “do not burden him with interest,” and “before a blind man do not put an obstacle; and fear your God, I am the Eternal.”

HALAKHAH: “The following transgress prohibitions,” etc. “Rebbi Yose said, come and see how blind are the eyes of people who lend on interest. If a person calls another one idolator, or adulterer, or murderer, the other will want to destroy him. But this one pays witnesses and a scribe and tells them, come and testify that I negated the roots [of Judaism]. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, they negate much more than the roots, for they declare the Torah false and Moses an idiot and say, if Moses had known how much we are earning, he would not have written it. Rebbi Aqiba says, interest is difficult since even a favor can be interest. If one told him to buy vegetables on the market for him, even though he gave him the money, this is interest. Rebbi Simeon said, interest is difficult since even greeting can be interest. If he never greeted him but because he took a loan from him he is quick to greet him, this is interest. In this sense, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar used to say, about a person who has money and does not lend it on interest the verse says: ‘his money he did not lend on interest,’ etc. Rebbi Samuel bar Immi said, we would not know what this tottering was if Salomon had not come and explained: ‘to save those taken to death.’”

Could one not judge him on Fridays, pass sentence on the Sabbath, and execute him after the Sabbath? If you say so, it turns out that his judgment is delayed. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked, could he not be judged on the Sabbath, have his sentence passed on the Sabbath, and be executed on the Sabbath? Temple service, which supersedes Sabbath prohibitions, is pushed aside by obligatory executions, since it is said, from My altar take him to be executed. Therefore the Sabbath, which is pushed aside by Temple service, logically should be pushed aside by obligatory executions. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This implies that courts may not sit on the Sabbath; what is the reason? It is said here, in all your dwellings, and it is said there, these shall be for you legal procedures for your generations in all your dwellings. Since there the verse refers to courts, so also here the verse refers to courts.

But Rebbi Joḥanan himself had a problem: from where does one prove it? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Two prohibitions and one extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. For example, it should not be used to be rubbed on anybody’s skin and in its proportions you shall not imitate it, and it is written, a person who would compound similarly, or who would put it on a stranger, will be extirpated from his people, that is two prohibitions and one extirpation. The prohibitions split the extirpation. Also from the following: Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze`ura, should not well-being sacrifices, being treated separately, split all sancta regarding impurity? He told him, it was necessary that they be treated separately, to eliminate sancta destined for the upkeep of the Temple [regarding larceny], lest one be liable for them because of mushiness, leftovers, and impurity. But is that not a Mishnah? “All sancta destined for the altar combine with one another with respect to liability for mushiness, leftovers, and impurity,” in contrast to sancta destined for the upkeep of the Temple. Since they do not combine, they do (not) split. Rebbi Ḥanina said, what he really questioned, should they not split but combine ?

But Rebbi Joḥanan himself had a problem: from where does one prove it? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Two prohibitions and one extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. For example, it should not be used to be rubbed on anybody’s skin and in its proportions you shall not imitate it, and it is written, a person who would compound similarly, or who would put it on a stranger, will be extirpated from his people, that is two prohibitions and one extirpation. The prohibitions split the extirpation. Also from the following: Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze`ura, should not well-being sacrifices, being treated separately, split all sancta regarding impurity? He told him, it was necessary that they be treated separately, to eliminate sancta destined for the upkeep of the Temple [regarding larceny], lest one be liable for them because of mushiness, leftovers, and impurity. But is that not a Mishnah? “All sancta destined for the altar combine with one another with respect to liability for mushiness, leftovers, and impurity,” in contrast to sancta destined for the upkeep of the Temple. Since they do not combine, they do (not) split. Rebbi Ḥanina said, what he really questioned, should they not split but combine ?

But Rebbi Joḥanan himself had a problem: from where does one prove it? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Two prohibitions and one extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. For example, it should not be used to be rubbed on anybody’s skin and in its proportions you shall not imitate it, and it is written, a person who would compound similarly, or who would put it on a stranger, will be extirpated from his people, that is two prohibitions and one extirpation. The prohibitions split the extirpation. Also from the following: Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze`ura, should not well-being sacrifices, being treated separately, split all sancta regarding impurity? He told him, it was necessary that they be treated separately, to eliminate sancta destined for the upkeep of the Temple [regarding larceny], lest one be liable for them because of mushiness, leftovers, and impurity. But is that not a Mishnah? “All sancta destined for the altar combine with one another with respect to liability for mushiness, leftovers, and impurity,” in contrast to sancta destined for the upkeep of the Temple. Since they do not combine, they do (not) split. Rebbi Ḥanina said, what he really questioned, should they not split but combine ?

But Rebbi Joḥanan himself had a problem: from where does one prove it? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Two prohibitions and one extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. For example, it should not be used to be rubbed on anybody’s skin and in its proportions you shall not imitate it, and it is written, a person who would compound similarly, or who would put it on a stranger, will be extirpated from his people, that is two prohibitions and one extirpation. The prohibitions split the extirpation. Also from the following: Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze`ura, should not well-being sacrifices, being treated separately, split all sancta regarding impurity? He told him, it was necessary that they be treated separately, to eliminate sancta destined for the upkeep of the Temple [regarding larceny], lest one be liable for them because of mushiness, leftovers, and impurity. But is that not a Mishnah? “All sancta destined for the altar combine with one another with respect to liability for mushiness, leftovers, and impurity,” in contrast to sancta destined for the upkeep of the Temple. Since they do not combine, they do (not) split. Rebbi Ḥanina said, what he really questioned, should they not split but combine ?

If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. The sower and the pruner were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since the sower and the pruner are particular in that they perform work on the ground or on a tree, I have only what is work on the ground or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion they do not divide. But he holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, they are not for making inferences. There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow your field, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. But is it not written that the Land shall rest as a repose for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it.

If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal, a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune, detail. The sower and the pruner were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since the sower and the pruner are particular in that they perform work on the ground or on a tree, I have only what is work on the ground or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion they do not divide. But he holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, they are not for making inferences. There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions. Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow your field, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard, not in the Sabbatical. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment. But is it not written that the Land shall rest as a repose for the Eternal? That is for the prohibition implied by it.

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked of Rebbi Zeˋira: For what reason did Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba disagree about a male and an animal but did not disagree about any incest prohibition? He told him, because for all incest prohibitions it is written blood relative, and about these it is not written blood relative. They objected: About the menstruating woman it is not written blood relative; did they disagree about her? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: For it is written approach, approach; it is as if all were here and there. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Aba in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: To the wife in the separation of her impurity you shall not come near to uncover her nakedness. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, “not to come near” is “not to uncover.”

Rebbi Eleazar said, Symmachos and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” There, we have stated: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be liable because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother, and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. It was found stated: it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and (her daughter) [her son’s daughter] and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall the under same prohibition.

Rebbi Eleazar said, Symmachos and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” There, we have stated: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be liable because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother, and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. It was found stated: it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and (her daughter) [her son’s daughter] and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall the under same prohibition.

If there are two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. What is the reason? On human flesh it may not be rubbed and in its proportions you should not make [a compound] like it, etc.. And it is written: A man who would compound like it, etc. This implies that for two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation.

If there are two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. What is the reason? On human flesh it may not be rubbed and in its proportions you should not make [a compound] like it, etc.. And it is written: A man who would compound like it, etc. This implies that for two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation.

If there are two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. What is the reason? On human flesh it may not be rubbed and in its proportions you should not make [a compound] like it, etc.. And it is written: A man who would compound like it, etc. This implies that for two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation.

If there are two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. What is the reason? On human flesh it may not be rubbed and in its proportions you should not make [a compound] like it, etc.. And it is written: A man who would compound like it, etc. This implies that for two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation.

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is the child a bastard following Rebbi Jehudah? He said to him, No one with a damaged testicle or with cut-off penis may marry into the Eternal’s congregation interrupts the argument. It interrupted the argument in the matter of the father’s wife. The father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Similarly, let the rape victim be selected to teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims. The father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Can you say here that the rape victim was in the set, that it could teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims? Why cannot the father’s wife be selected to teach about the rape victim in her case? He said to him, if she is his father’s wife, she is not his rape victim; if she is the father’s rape victim, she is not his wife.

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is the child a bastard following Rebbi Jehudah? He said to him, No one with a damaged testicle or with cut-off penis may marry into the Eternal’s congregation interrupts the argument. It interrupted the argument in the matter of the father’s wife. The father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Similarly, let the rape victim be selected to teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims. The father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Can you say here that the rape victim was in the set, that it could teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims? Why cannot the father’s wife be selected to teach about the rape victim in her case? He said to him, if she is his father’s wife, she is not his rape victim; if she is the father’s rape victim, she is not his wife.

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is the child a bastard following Rebbi Jehudah? He said to him, No one with a damaged testicle or with cut-off penis may marry into the Eternal’s congregation interrupts the argument. It interrupted the argument in the matter of the father’s wife. The father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Similarly, let the rape victim be selected to teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims. The father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Can you say here that the rape victim was in the set, that it could teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims? Why cannot the father’s wife be selected to teach about the rape victim in her case? He said to him, if she is his father’s wife, she is not his rape victim; if she is the father’s rape victim, she is not his wife.

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is the child a bastard following Rebbi Jehudah? He said to him, No one with a damaged testicle or with cut-off penis may marry into the Eternal’s congregation interrupts the argument. It interrupted the argument in the matter of the father’s wife. The father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Similarly, let the rape victim be selected to teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims. The father’s wife was part of the set of all incest prohibitions; it was selected from this set to teach about bastardy for all incest prohibitions. Can you say here that the rape victim was in the set, that it could teach a prohibition concerning all rape victims? Why cannot the father’s wife be selected to teach about the rape victim in her case? He said to him, if she is his father’s wife, she is not his rape victim; if she is the father’s rape victim, she is not his wife.

HALAKHAH: “Somebody who was found guilty of two death penalties,” etc. There it was stated that one states: “Rebbi Yose says, he shall be convicted for the first connection.” How is this? His mother-in-law who then became a married woman is [executed] by burning. As a married woman who later became his mother-in-law it is by strangulation, if he copulated with his mother-in-law. How with his mother-in-law and daughter-in-law? How can this be? A man married a woman, and her brother’s daughter, and the woman’s daughter. If he copulated with the old woman he is liable for her because of his mother-in-law, the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law. If his mother-in-law is simultaneously his daughter-in-law, how does Rebbi Yose treat this? The more severe and the lesser, how does Rebbi Yose treat this? Two simultaneous prohibitions, how does Rebbi Yose treat this?

They said, what was asked of Rebbi Yose also can be asked of Rebbi Ismael since it was stated in the name of Rebbi Ismael: If she became widowed, divorced, desecrated, and a whore in this order: when afterwards he copulated with her, he is liable only once. If she whored, was desecrated, and after that he copulated with her, he is liable for every single [transgression]. If she became widowed and divorced simultaneously, how does Rebbi Ismael treat this? The more severe and the lesser, how does Rebbi Ismael treat this? Two simultaneous prohibitions, how does Rebbi Ismael treat this?

MISHNAH: Intentional impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta is atoned by the he-goat whose blood is brought inside and the Day of Atonement. The remainder of the transgressions mentioned in the Torah, minor or serious ones, intentional and unintentional, known and unknown, positive commandments and prohibitions, extirpations and capital crimes, the scapegoat atones.

Are not minor sins [positive commandments and] prohibitions; are not serious ones extirpations and capital crimes? Rav Jehudah said, so is the Mishnah: “Minor or serious ones. Those minor ones, whether he committed them intentionally or committed them unintentionally. Those intentional ones, whether he obtained knowledge of them or did not obtain knowledge of them. The following are minor sins: positive commandments and prohibitions. Serious ones, extirpations and capital crimes. Just as the he-goat whose blood is brought inside atones for intentional infractions and suspends for the unintentional, the same holds for the scapegoat.”

Are not minor sins [positive commandments and] prohibitions; are not serious ones extirpations and capital crimes? Rav Jehudah said, so is the Mishnah: “Minor or serious ones. Those minor ones, whether he committed them intentionally or committed them unintentionally. Those intentional ones, whether he obtained knowledge of them or did not obtain knowledge of them. The following are minor sins: positive commandments and prohibitions. Serious ones, extirpations and capital crimes. Just as the he-goat whose blood is brought inside atones for intentional infractions and suspends for the unintentional, the same holds for the scapegoat.”

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall eat neither,” etc. “An oath that I shall not eat bread” and he wrapped it in reed leaves or grape leaves and ate, he is liable only once. “An oath that I shall not eat bread nor grape skin nor grape seeds, and he wrapped it in grape skins and grape seeds, he is liable for each one, and if he was a nazir he is liable for three. Rebbi Joḥanan said, in comprehensive form. But in detail, no oaths fall on prohibitions. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even in comprehensive form no oaths fall on prohibitions.

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall eat neither,” etc. “An oath that I shall not eat bread” and he wrapped it in reed leaves or grape leaves and ate, he is liable only once. “An oath that I shall not eat bread nor grape skin nor grape seeds, and he wrapped it in grape skins and grape seeds, he is liable for each one, and if he was a nazir he is liable for three. Rebbi Joḥanan said, in comprehensive form. But in detail, no oaths fall on prohibitions. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even in comprehensive form no oaths fall on prohibitions.

Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who said that comprehensive oaths fall on prohibitions, should we not state “an oath that I shall not eat; when he ate”? Rebbi Ze`ira said, in the whole lifetime of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal we did not find an answer; after he had died, we found an answer. Where do we stand? If one said, an oath that I shall not eat meat, including Passover; that I shall not eat during these ten days, including the Day of Atonement, then the oath falls on prohibitions. Rebbi Yose said, one may infer from here if in front of him were olive-sized pieces of slaughtered [meat] and one of carcass meat and he said, [an oath] that I shall eat these ten olive-sized pieces, since he is not liable for the carcass meat, he neither is liable for the remainder.

Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who said that comprehensive oaths fall on prohibitions, should we not state “an oath that I shall not eat; when he ate”? Rebbi Ze`ira said, in the whole lifetime of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal we did not find an answer; after he had died, we found an answer. Where do we stand? If one said, an oath that I shall not eat meat, including Passover; that I shall not eat during these ten days, including the Day of Atonement, then the oath falls on prohibitions. Rebbi Yose said, one may infer from here if in front of him were olive-sized pieces of slaughtered [meat] and one of carcass meat and he said, [an oath] that I shall eat these ten olive-sized pieces, since he is not liable for the carcass meat, he neither is liable for the remainder.

HALAKHAH: “If he swore not to observe a commandment,” etc. Rebbi Mani said, so is the Mishnah: “He is liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.” What Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said refers to prohibitions in general. “An oath that I shall eat carcass meat,” but he did not eat it. He is not liable. “An oath that I shall eat,” and he ate. If you would say that he is liable, they should have objected to him: No. You declare about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes” and “yes” equal to “no”, can you declare this about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”?

Abime the brother of Ḥefa said, I had studied Nedarim and Ševuot; Ḥefa wanted to examine him. He had before him five loaves and said, an oath that I would not eat this loaf. He returned and said, these two. He returned and said, these three. He returned and said, these four. He returned and said, these five. Then he ate the first. He said to him, he is liable for each single one. He answered, he is liable only once, for when he mentioned the first he made it like carcass meat; the following make an oath fall on something prohibited and oaths cannot fall on prohibitions.

“An oath that I shall not eat this loaf today; an oath that I shall not eat it today.” Then he ate it. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is twice liable. Is he only once liable in Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion? Even Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that he only emphasizes the prohibitions.

Rebbi Yudan from Cappadocia asked: What about “an oath that neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt I am holding for you”? Is it as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. “I am not holding for you wheat, or barley, or spelt, an oath,” is this as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. Is it so if this were a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall not eat; I shall not eat, an oath”? In the rabbis’ opinion he brings a sacrifice for each one. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion does he bring one for the entirety? Even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that he is only emphasizing the prohibitions. It only would be problematic if it were about the past. “An oath that I did not eat; I did not eat, an oath.” In the rabbis’ opinion he brings two sacrifices (for each one). In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one (for each).

Rebbi Yose asked in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: May prohibitions of usufruct become insignificant in (combination) [by being shredded]? But did we not state “the ox which was stoned”? Explain it in pieces. But did we not state “the birds of the sufferer from skin disease”? Explain it as a bird among birds. But did we not state “the nazir’s hair”? Can you say a bird among birds? When they came to study `Orlah did Rebbi Jacob object before Rebbi Yose, did we not state, “if somebody weaves the length of a sīt of firstling’s wool, the cloth must be burned. Of nazir’s hair or firstling donkey in sackcloth, the sackcloth must be burned.” He told him, (if the Tanna had said before us, you would have given) correctly.

MISHNAH: One might plough a single furrow and be liable because of it for eight prohibitions. If one ploughs with an ox and a donkey which had been sanctified for kilaim in a vineyard, in a Sabbatical year, on a holiday, he is a Cohen and a nazir at an impure place. Onias ben Ḥakhinai said, also if he wore kilaim. They told him, this is not of the same category. He told them, neither is the nazir of the same category.

MISHNAH: One estimates him only for floggings divisible by three. If they estimated that he could receive forty; after he was flogged some, they said that he could not withstand forty, he is not liable. If they had estimated him for eighteen; after he was flogged they said that he could withstand forty, he is not liable. If he committed a transgression which involved two prohibitions, if they estimated him in one estimation he is flogged and then is no longer liable; otherwise he is flogged, recovers, and is flogged a second time.

HALAKHAH: “They are only liable for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation,” etc. The commandments of the Eternal. I could think that this also includes those who eat abominations and crawling things. It says here from the eyes and it says there from the eyes. Just as from the eyes mentioned there means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so from the eyes mentioned here means something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Or since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here should mean something that can lead to the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the (married woman) [father’s wife] came out to tell you about the bastard. Rebbi said over which, over her. Since over her mentioned there refers to something which is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin, so over which mentioned here means something for which one is punished by extirpation in case of intentional sin and needs a purification sacrifice for an inadvertent sin. Why does Rebbi not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? [Rebbi Zeˋira said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then from the eyes mentioned there for the Anointed refers to action in error; also from the eyes mentioned here would have to refer to action in error. Therefore, Rebbi will not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes.] Rebbi Yose said: If Rebbi would infer from from the eyes, from the eyes, then since from the eyes mentioned there means something that can lead to the death penalty, so from the eyes mentioned here means something that can lead to the death penalty. Therefore, Rebbi does not infer from from the eyes, from the eyes. (Does Rebbi not have a book) [Will Rebbi not in the end have] to infer from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have the rules for the individual, the chief, and the Anointed? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have “unless they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part”? Not from from the eyes, from the eyes? For if it is not so, from where would we have [the difference between] a ruling of the High Court and a ruling of a lower court? Rebbi Ḥanania said before Rebbi Mana: Would not Rebbi in the end have to infer from from the eyes, from the eyes? He told him, what do you want from Rebbi? Rebbi follows his own opinion, since Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error. Intentional error is only written for the Court. It. It specifies about his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary. Does this follow Rebbi, as Rebbi said, the Anointed refers to action in error; if it would follow the rabbis, there must be an instance of forgetting. (Rav) [Rebbi] Huna said, it was needed for the rabbis. Lest you say, because there is extirpation its blood should be brought into the Sanctuary. Therefore, it was necessary to say it, it specifies his sacrifice that for the singular commandment its blood should not be brought into the Sanctuary.

There is one Baraita that agrees with the first statement, while another Baraita agrees with the second statement. The Baraita that agrees with the second statement reads: He who takes a meal on the eve of the ninth of Ab, may, if he expects to take another meal at a later hour, eat meat and drink wine, but if he does not expect to eat again, he is not allowed to do so. The Baraita that agrees with the first statement reads: On the eve of the ninth of Ab one should not eat of two courses, neither eat meat nor drink wine; Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, he should change his usual mode of living. Said R. Judah: How is this change to be made? If he was used to eat of two courses, he should eat of only one; if he was used to dine in the company of ten people, he should now dine with five; and if he was used to drink wine out of ten successive glasses, he should now drink the same quantity in five glasses; the foregoing prohibitions apply only to meals taken in the afternoon, but not to the forenoon.

A widow [who is] a divorcee [cohabiting with a high priest] is liable because of two prohibitions. A divorcee [who had also] received chalutzah [cohabiting with an ordinary priest] is only liable to one prohibition alone.

What is the reason of Rebbi Yishmael? The Torah says (Deuteronomy 28, 58), "If you do not guard yourself to perform all of these laws" and (Deuteronomy 28, 59) "And G-d make wondrous (הפלאה) your plagues" I do not know what this word "הפלאה" means. But when the Torah elsewhere says (Deuteronomy 25, 2) "And the judge should cast him down and hit him before his face", then I must say that this word "הפלאה" means malkus. And the Torah said over there (Deuteronomy 28, 58), "If you do not guard yourself to perform all etc.". [showing that all prohibitions are punishable with malkus.]

A prohibition remedied by an positive commandment should also [be liable to malkus, something which we know isn't true]? [All malkus prohibitions must] similar to the prohibition of muzzling (Deuteronomy 25,4). [The prohibition of muzzling did not have a positive commandment to remedy it.]

And why was kares repeated by [the prohibition of cohabiting with] his sister according to the Rabbis [Rebbi Yishmael and Rebbi Akiva]? To [teach us that sacrifices are] separated [with regards to bringing a sacrifice for an inadvertent offence], as Rebbi Yochanon said that if a person did all [of these kares prohibitions] in one lapse of unawareness he is liable [to bring a chatos sacrifice] for each and every one of them.

This should be obvious!? They are separate bodies and they are separate prohibitions, [why do the Rabbis need a verse to teach us this?] Rather to make one liable [separate offerings for cohabiting with] his sister who is his father's sister, and who is [also] his mother's sister. And how can we find such a case, with a sinner the son of a sinner [re'shia bar re'shia. cf. Rashi].

They responded, This [case] we have not heard, but we have not heard, but we have heard that one who cohabits with five woman who are niddahs in one lapse of unawareness is liable [a separate offering] for each and every one, and it would appear that these [two] cases form a kal v'chomer, and just if [by the case of five] niddah[s] which is one prohibition, one is liable for each and every one, then here [by re'shia bar re'shia] where there are three separate prohibitions is it not more so?

And why do the Rabbis need achoso d'seifa? To make one liable for his sister who is his father's daughter and his mother's daughter [his full sister], to teach that we can't derive punishment from a kal v'chomer [specifically that we don't derive it from the prohibitions on both half sisters].

And [where does Rebbi Yitzchak learn to separate the two]? He holds like what Rebbi Elezar said in the name of Rebbi Hoshiah. That Rebbi Elezar said in the name of Rebbi Hoshiah, any place that you find two prohibitions with one kares, they are separated with regards to [bringing] a sacrifice [for an inadvertent transgression].

But Rava had said that a non-Kohen that eats from an Ollah before the zerika outside of the wall would get five sets of malkus according to Rebbi Shimon? He means five prohibitions, [but no malkus].

Only to assign separte prohibitions for each one.

But let him also incur malkas according to the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer, that it was taught in a baraisa, Rebbi Eliezer says anything that is subject to being "entirely burnt" has an additional prohibition on its consumption. Yes this is so, but Rava was only talking about prohibitions derived from that one verse.

There is a case of where on plows a single row, and is liable on it due to eight separate prohibitions. One who [1]plows with an ox and a donkey, [2,3]which are sanctified, over [4]mixed seeds in a vineyard [5]on the sabbatical year, [6]on a holiday, and he is a [7]Kohen and a [8]Nazir in a house of tumah.

There is a single plowing... etc.: Rav Yanai said, In the group, they voted and decided that one who [merely] covers Kilayim [mixed seeds] incurs malkus. Rebbi Yochanon asked him, Wasn't that already stated in our Mishna? There is a case of where on plows a single row, and is liable on it due to eight separate prohibitions. One who plows with an ox and a donkey, which are sanctified, over mixed seeds in a vineyard" This plowing that one is liable on because of Kilayim, how would [such a case] be found? Would it not be where he covers them as he is plowing?

MISHNA: If one commits a sin involving two prohibitions and they evaluated him once, then he gets flogged and is exonerated. But if not, then he is flogged, allowed to recuperate, and flogged again.

GEMARA: But it was taught in a baraisa, we do not use a single evaluation for two prohibitions!?

Rebbi Simlai expounded, Six hundred and thirteen mitzvos were told to Moshe. Three hundred and sixty five prohibitions in accordance with the days of the sun. And two hundred and forty eight positive commandments in accordance with the limbs of a person. Rav Hamnunya said what is the meaning of the verse (Deuteronomy 33,4) "Moshe commanded us a law ("Torah"), an inheritance"? "Torah" has a numerical value of