property
1216 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: “If somebody dedicates his wife’s earnings,” etc. Rebbi Meïr says, it is sanctified as his property. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian says, it is profane as his property. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree about the excess over five tetradrachmas. He explains it in the case of one who supports his wife with food but does not give her an obolus for her needs, as we stated: “If he does not give her an obolus for her needs, what she earns is hers”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they disagree about the excess left after [the husband’s] death; for he explains it if he does not support her with food. But if he supports her with food, everybody agrees that it became dedicated. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, what one states there supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “When was this said? If he does not feed her. But if he feeds her, everybody agrees that it was sanctified.” But is not everything a wife has subject to the husband’s claim to its yield?
For whom is it needed? For Rebbi Meïr! Even though for Rebbi Meïr the hand of the slave is his master’s hand and if the wife acquired title the husband should have acquired it; he agrees that his rights over it are restricted to the use of the yield. There, we have stated: “The finds of his underage son and daughter or of his Canaanite slave or slave-girl as well as his wife’s find belong to him,” for he can direct them to do other work. Why do we say: “The finds of his adult son and daughter or of his Hebrew slave or slave-girl belong to them,” because he cannot direct them to do other work. But his wife he cannot direct to do other work and you say that her find belongs to him! Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is another reason for his wife. What is the other reason for his wife? Rebbi Ḥaggai says, because of quarrel. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but that she should not smuggle away any of her husband’s property and say, I found it. Think of it, if another person gave it to her as a gift! A gift is public knowledge, a find is not public knowledge. Think of it, if she found it in the presence of witnesses! This because of that. Rebbi Yoḥanan said, if they are not dependent on their father. But if they are dependent on their father, their finds belong to him.
MISHNAH: If an orphan girl was married off by her mother or her brothers and they wrote her 100 or 50 zuz, after she becomes an adult she can claim from them what is appropriate to be given to her. Rebbi Jehudah says, if he married off his first daughter, the second should be given in the way the first had been given. But the Sages say, sometimes it happens that a person was poor and became rich, or was rich and became poor. But one appraises the property and gives to her
If there were two daughters and one son; the first one took a tenth of the estate, but the son died before the second could take her tenth. Rebbi Ḥanina was of the opinion that the second takes a tenth of the estate and the rest they divide equally among themselves. Rebbi Joḥanan told him that in this case there was nothing else to provide for her, but here she may sell from the remainder and provide for herself! Rebbi Tebi in the name of Rebbi Joshia: The reason of Rebbi Ḥanina: If she can collect from encumbered real estate, from what lies before her not so much more? Rebbi Joḥanan sticks to his opinion, since Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rebbi Joḥanan does not collect. Who collects? Rebbi Ḥanina [and Rebbi Hila] collect. Rebbi Yasa was appointed custodian of orphans’ property. There were orphan [girls] who asked to be provided for. He brought the case before Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim. Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim said, is it not better to provide for them from their father’s estate rather than from charity? Rebbi Eleazar said to him: If such a case came before our teachers, our teachers would not touch it; would we act? Rebbi Yose said, I shall give to them, and if some orphans get up and complain, I would give it to them. Even so, they saw and did not complain. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yose: How do you decide in practical cases? He said to him, following Rebbi Ḥanina. And so an actual case was decided following Rebbi Ḥanina. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Hila: One considers the estate as if it were dry.
”If somebody says, give my sons one šeqel per week and they need a tetradrachma, one gives them a tetradrachma. Do not give them more than one šeqel per week, one gives them a šeqel. But for the support of the wife and the daughters, whether he says give or do not give, one gives them a šeqel. It was stated: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, Meïr used to say, if somebody says, give my sons one šeqel per week and they need a tetradrachma, one gives them a šeqel, and for the remainder they should be provided for by charity. But the Sages say, one takes continuously until the property is used up and after that they should be provided by charity.” Rebbi Yose said, that gives a simple example for Ḥilfai’s question. He said, I shall sit on the river bank and if I cannot extract the teachings of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya from the Mishnah, throw me into the river. What could he say? “The trustee should execute what he was entrusted with.”
”If they died, others should inherit.” Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person can transfer property rights in any language except with an expression of inheritance? One does not have here “they shall inherit” but “they shall take”. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Do they not differ here in matters of a gift? If somebody signed over all his property to two persons at the same time; to one he wrote in the language of gift but to the other in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Eleazar said, since the one acquired in the language of gift, the other one acquired in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it seems that one did acquire in the language of gift but the other did not acquire in the language of inheritance Rebbi Phineas said, there came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah: Practice follows Rebbi Eleazar since Rebbi Eleazar stated a docrine but Rebbi Joḥanan said only “it seems”. Rebbi Samuel said, but did not Rebbi Meïr say that and it does not seem reasonable; is that nothing? Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Assi: Carded firstling wool becomes insignificant in a plurality. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Sepphorean brought before Rebbi Ammi a pound in eight but the latter refused to rule since had not Rebbi Assi said, is that not a Mishnah? “If somebody weaves the length of a sîṭ of firstling’s wool in a cloth, the cloth must be burned, of hair of a nazir or firstling donkey in sackcloth, the sackcloth must be burned”? The following Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote any expression of gift either at the start, or in the middle, or at the end, his instructions are valid.” There, to one person in an expression of gift and to one an expression of inheritance. But here to each one both in the language of gift and the language of inheritance Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: But does he not prejudice the rights of others? He said to him, if there are no brothers. But does he not prejudice the rights of his paternal uncles? Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel: A person prefers the good of his house over his relatives.
”If they died, others should inherit.” Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person can transfer property rights in any language except with an expression of inheritance? One does not have here “they shall inherit” but “they shall take”. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Do they not differ here in matters of a gift? If somebody signed over all his property to two persons at the same time; to one he wrote in the language of gift but to the other in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Eleazar said, since the one acquired in the language of gift, the other one acquired in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it seems that one did acquire in the language of gift but the other did not acquire in the language of inheritance Rebbi Phineas said, there came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah: Practice follows Rebbi Eleazar since Rebbi Eleazar stated a docrine but Rebbi Joḥanan said only “it seems”. Rebbi Samuel said, but did not Rebbi Meïr say that and it does not seem reasonable; is that nothing? Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Assi: Carded firstling wool becomes insignificant in a plurality. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Sepphorean brought before Rebbi Ammi a pound in eight but the latter refused to rule since had not Rebbi Assi said, is that not a Mishnah? “If somebody weaves the length of a sîṭ of firstling’s wool in a cloth, the cloth must be burned, of hair of a nazir or firstling donkey in sackcloth, the sackcloth must be burned”? The following Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote any expression of gift either at the start, or in the middle, or at the end, his instructions are valid.” There, to one person in an expression of gift and to one an expression of inheritance. But here to each one both in the language of gift and the language of inheritance Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: But does he not prejudice the rights of others? He said to him, if there are no brothers. But does he not prejudice the rights of his paternal uncles? Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel: A person prefers the good of his house over his relatives.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody makes a vow that his wife should not have any usufruct from him,” etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody by a vow bars his wife from sexual intercourse,” and here you say so? There, he makes a vow to separate her from his body, but here he makes a vow to separate her from his property. But can anybody make a vow not to pay his debt? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, since in the future he will divorce her, pay her the ketubah, and stop her food supply, it is as if there was no debt. Why could she not sit there and wait; if he divorced her everything would be in order, otherwise let him provide her with food? It follows him who said that the wife’s food is not from words of the Torah, as it was stated: The court will not determine food for the wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s. Then should she not be considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah? This proves that she is not considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife,” etc. Can anybody cause somebody else’s vow during his lifetime? It must be that the wife made a vow, the husband heard it, and said to her: If you will eat from such and such, my property will be forbidden to you. If she ate from such and such, why should his property not be forbidden to her? Is that not the case from the beginning of the chapter? But if his wife made a vow, her husband was informed, and did not dissolve it, following him who says that he put his finger between her teeth, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ḥuna said, even he who said that she put his finger between her teeth, and should be divorced without ketubah, will agree in case he provoked her to make the vow.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife,” etc. Can anybody cause somebody else’s vow during his lifetime? It must be that the wife made a vow, the husband heard it, and said to her: If you will eat from such and such, my property will be forbidden to you. If she ate from such and such, why should his property not be forbidden to her? Is that not the case from the beginning of the chapter? But if his wife made a vow, her husband was informed, and did not dissolve it, following him who says that he put his finger between her teeth, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ḥuna said, even he who said that she put his finger between her teeth, and should be divorced without ketubah, will agree in case he provoked her to make the vow.
MISHNAH: If a woman inherited property before she became preliminarily married, the Houses of Shammai and Hillel agree that if she sells or gives it away it is valid. If she inherited after she became preliminarily married, the House of Shammai say she may sell, the House of Hillel say she should not sell, but both of them agree that if she sold or gave it away it is valid. Rebbi Jehudah said: They said before Rabban Gamliel: If he obtained the right to the woman, should he not also acquire the right to the property? He said to them, are we not ashamed about the new [properties] and you want to burden us with the old ones?
MISHNAH: If a woman inherited property before she became preliminarily married, the Houses of Shammai and Hillel agree that if she sells or gives it away it is valid. If she inherited after she became preliminarily married, the House of Shammai say she may sell, the House of Hillel say she should not sell, but both of them agree that if she sold or gave it away it is valid. Rebbi Jehudah said: They said before Rabban Gamliel: If he obtained the right to the woman, should he not also acquire the right to the property? He said to them, are we not ashamed about the new [properties] and you want to burden us with the old ones?
HALAKHAH: “If a woman inherited property,” etc. So is the Mishnah: Before she was preliminarily married. What is the difference between before she was preliminarily married and after she was preliminarily married? Before she was preliminarily married, it fell to her; after she was preliminarily married it fell to her and him.
Rebbi Phineas asked before Rebbi Yose, why did we not state it with the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel? He said to him, the Mishnaiot apply only to circumstances that are either stringent on both sides or lenient on both sides. But here it is a stringency on one side and a leniency on the other side. But did we not state: “The House of Shammai say, property abandoned to the poor [is abandoned]?” Is this not lenient for the poor and stringent for the householder, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the poor and not stringent for the householder, since he intentionally abandoned it. He said to him, did we not state: “If the sheaf that was near a closure, a stack, cattle, or vessels was forgotten,” is this not lenient for the householder and stringent for the poor, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the householder but not stringent for the poor, because they did not acquire it yet. You may also say here, it is lenient for the woman and not stringent for the husband since he did not yet acquire property rights to it. He said to him, since he became betrothed to her, the inheritance fell to both of them.
Rebbi Phineas asked before Rebbi Yose, why did we not state it with the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel? He said to him, the Mishnaiot apply only to circumstances that are either stringent on both sides or lenient on both sides. But here it is a stringency on one side and a leniency on the other side. But did we not state: “The House of Shammai say, property abandoned to the poor [is abandoned]?” Is this not lenient for the poor and stringent for the householder, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the poor and not stringent for the householder, since he intentionally abandoned it. He said to him, did we not state: “If the sheaf that was near a closure, a stack, cattle, or vessels was forgotten,” is this not lenient for the householder and stringent for the poor, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the householder but not stringent for the poor, because they did not acquire it yet. You may also say here, it is lenient for the woman and not stringent for the husband since he did not yet acquire property rights to it. He said to him, since he became betrothed to her, the inheritance fell to both of them.
MISHNAH: If she inherited property after she was definitively married, both agree that if she sold or gave away the husband retrieves from the hand of the buyers. [If she interited] before she was definitively married and [sold] after she was definitively married, Rabban Gamliel said if she sold or gave away it is valid. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, they said before Rabban Gamliel: If he obtained the right to the woman, did he not also acquire the right to the property? He said to them, are we not ashamed about the new [properties], and you want to burden us with the old ones?
MISHNAH: If she inherited property after she was definitively married, both agree that if she sold or gave away the husband retrieves from the hand of the buyers. [If she interited] before she was definitively married and [sold] after she was definitively married, Rabban Gamliel said if she sold or gave away it is valid. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, they said before Rabban Gamliel: If he obtained the right to the woman, did he not also acquire the right to the property? He said to them, are we not ashamed about the new [properties], and you want to burden us with the old ones?
HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.
MISHNAH: If she inherited money; real estate should be bought with it and he eats its yield. For produce cut from the ground, real estate should be bought and he eats its yield; with produce connected to the ground, Rebbi Meïr says one has to estimate how much the property is worth with produce and how much without, for the difference real estate should be bought and he eats its yield. But the Sages say, standing produce is his, cut it is hers; real estate should be bought from it and he eats its yield.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Simeon says, in the circumstances where he was empowered,” etc. You say, at her entrance they are his: If she sold them they are not sold, if she gave them to a sharecropper he has the reward from it, if she dedicated them as First Fruits they are not dedicated You say, at her exit they are hers, if he sold them they are not sold, if he gave them to a sharecropper she has the reward from it, if he dedicated them as First Fruits, this is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, since they disagreed: (Deut. 26:11): ‘You shall enjoy all the good things that the Eternal, your God, gave to you and your house.’ This teaches that a person brings First Fruits from his wife’s property.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after her death but not during her lifetime. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no difference, during her lifetime and after her death. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows his own opinion since he said, a person does not inherit from his wife as a biblical rule. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it never was dedicated. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan it is dedicated and the holiness is removed.
MISHNAH: If a woman waiting for her levir inherited property, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel agree that if she sells or gives away it is valid. If she died, what shall be done with her ketubah and the properties which enter and leave with her? The House of Shammai say, the husband’s and the father’s heirs shall split it. But the House of Hillel say, the properties are in the hands of the holders; the ketubah in the hands of the husband’s heirs and the properties which enter and leave with her in the hands of the father’s heirs.
HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid.” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.
MISHNAH: If his brother left money, real estate should be bought with it and he eats its yield. For produce cut from the ground, real estate should be bought and he eats its yield; connected to the ground, Rebbi Meïr says one has to estimate how much it is worth with produce and how much without, for the difference real estate should be bought and he eats its yield. But the Sages say, standing produce is his, cut it is up for grabs. If he took possession first, it is his; if she took possession first, real estate should be bought for the proceeds and he eats its yield. If he married her, she is his wife in every respect except that her ketubah is a lien on the property of her first husband.
HALAKHAH: “He should not say to her ‘here is your ketubah’”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” In the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.
HALAKHAH: “He should not say to her ‘here is your ketubah’”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” In the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.
HALAKHAH: “He should not say to her ‘here is your ketubah’”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” In the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.
HALAKHAH: “He should not say to her ‘here is your ketubah’”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” In the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.
Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, but not in the matter of words. Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel for he said, if she dies he inherits from her, but in matters of words, “since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid,” in personal matters. But in money matters, one’s stipulations are valid and that is a money matter! Why did we say that the condition is invalid? Because in the end he acquired it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The law should have been that if she sold or gave it away it should be valid, for [the buyer] acquired it. Why did they say it is invalid? That a wife should not sell her husband’s property and say, it is mine.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the brothers divided [the inheritance], the widow is supported by them. For you should not say, they should be considered as if they had sold the properties and the widow would not be supported by these, since it is obvious that if they sold, they sold their own property.
Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.
Rebbi Yose said: Those who write “if she should die childless, her property should return to her father’s family” write a monetary condition which is a valid condition.
That widow took a slave girl. The case came before Rebbi Isaac who said, what she took, she took. Rebbi Immi took her away, for she thought that she was hers but she was not hers. A similar case: The father of the sons of Shammai died and bequeathed a goat to them. The creditor came and took it. The case came before Rebbi Abbahu who said, he took his own property. Did we not state that if either an heir or a creditor came and took, one does [not] remove from his hand; for they thought they were theirs but they were not theirs. Rebbi Jacob bar Zabdi said, Rebbi Abbahu agrees that if they sold it, or gave it as a pledge, or moved it to another place, if then the creditor came and took it one removes it from his possession.
There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
HALAKHAH: ““I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, only if she was made a steward during her husband’s lifetime. But if she was appointed as a steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can(not) make her swear. That is the Mishnah: if she was not appointed a steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If she was appointed a steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past. What is “about the past”? From the time of death to the time of burial. And Rebbi Yose said, even if he appointed her as steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can make her swear. But did we not state: “If he did not appoint her as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If he appointed her as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future but cannot make her swear for the past.” He explains it about the first case. But if it is about the first case, Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about property over which she had control during her husband’s lifetime but even about property over which she acquired control after her husband’s death the heirs cannot make her swear. Explain it, from the time of death to the time of burial. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The heirs cannot make her swear from the time of death to the time of burial. Bar Qappara stated: That she should not abandon him and leave for her family.
HALAKHAH: ““I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, only if she was made a steward during her husband’s lifetime. But if she was appointed as a steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can(not) make her swear. That is the Mishnah: if she was not appointed a steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If she was appointed a steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past. What is “about the past”? From the time of death to the time of burial. And Rebbi Yose said, even if he appointed her as steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can make her swear. But did we not state: “If he did not appoint her as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If he appointed her as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future but cannot make her swear for the past.” He explains it about the first case. But if it is about the first case, Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about property over which she had control during her husband’s lifetime but even about property over which she acquired control after her husband’s death the heirs cannot make her swear. Explain it, from the time of death to the time of burial. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The heirs cannot make her swear from the time of death to the time of burial. Bar Qappara stated: That she should not abandon him and leave for her family.
MISHNAH: If she had compromised her ketubah, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. If one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From orphans’ property, or from encumbered property, in his absence she shall not be able to collect without an oath.
MISHNAH: If she had compromised her ketubah, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. If one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From orphans’ property, or from encumbered property, in his absence she shall not be able to collect without an oath.
“If she had compromised her ketubah, she shall not be able to collect without an oath,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due, and some say, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should jump to marry her. Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, here about an adult orphan, there about an underage orphan.
“If she had compromised her ketubah, she shall not be able to collect without an oath,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due, and some say, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should jump to marry her. Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, here about an adult orphan, there about an underage orphan.
“If she had compromised her ketubah, she shall not be able to collect without an oath,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due, and some say, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should jump to marry her. Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, here about an adult orphan, there about an underage orphan.
MISHNAH: If she had compromised her ketubah, how is that? If her ketubah was 1‘000 zuz and he said to her, you received your ketubah, but she says, I received only one mina, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. If one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, how is that? If her ketubah was 1‘000 zuz and he said to her, you received your ketubah, but she says, I received nothing, and one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From encumbered property, how is that? If he sold his real estate to others and she collects from the buyers, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From orphans’ property, how is that? If he died and left his estate to the orphans, if she is paid out by the orphans she shall not be able to collect without an oath. Not in his presence, how is that? If he went overseas and she collects in his absence, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. Rebbi Simeon says, any time she asks for her ketubah, the heirs can require an oath from her. If she does not ask for her ketubah, the heirs cannot require an oath from her.
MISHNAH: If she had compromised her ketubah, how is that? If her ketubah was 1‘000 zuz and he said to her, you received your ketubah, but she says, I received only one mina, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. If one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, how is that? If her ketubah was 1‘000 zuz and he said to her, you received your ketubah, but she says, I received nothing, and one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From encumbered property, how is that? If he sold his real estate to others and she collects from the buyers, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From orphans’ property, how is that? If he died and left his estate to the orphans, if she is paid out by the orphans she shall not be able to collect without an oath. Not in his presence, how is that? If he went overseas and she collects in his absence, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. Rebbi Simeon says, any time she asks for her ketubah, the heirs can require an oath from her. If she does not ask for her ketubah, the heirs cannot require an oath from her.
HALAKHAH: “From encumbered property, how is that?” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody disputes a court document, he is not trustworthy. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him: Is that not the Mishnah? “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah”! Rebbi Joḥanan said to him: Babylonian, after I removed the clay from the pearl, you say to me: Is that not the Mishnah? Rav said, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she produces she collects. He changed his mind and said, she collects even at a place where one writes a ketubah; let anyone powerful object to this! Rebbi Yose objected: Was it not stated: She might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, and collect a second time? If those died. Are there not witnesses? Bring them! They went overseas. Is there not an agreement? Is there no registrar of agreements? There is a registrar of agreements; as you say, if a document is lost, one writes a replacement. This is what one says, if the ketubah was lost, one writes a new one. Rebbi Abba objected: Was it not stated, she might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, wait until he dies, and collect a second time? Rebbi Yose bar Abun said to him: Would she not have to prove that she lived with him until he died?
HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two women,” etc. The Mishnah refers to ketubah, but for sustenance both are equal. Between ketubah and burial, what has precedence? Between ketubah and a loan attested to by witnesses, what has precedence? Between ketubah and daughters’ dowry, what has precedence? For him who says, one collects for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry has precedence. But for him who says, one does not collect for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry does not have precedence.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two women,” etc. The Mishnah refers to ketubah, but for sustenance both are equal. Between ketubah and burial, what has precedence? Between ketubah and a loan attested to by witnesses, what has precedence? Between ketubah and daughters’ dowry, what has precedence? For him who says, one collects for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry has precedence. But for him who says, one does not collect for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry does not have precedence.
Debts diminish and, equally, debts add. How is this? If there was a field which in the future would return in the jubilee year, you consider it virtual [property].
MISHNAH: If the estate contained expected property, it does not have the status of property in actual possession. Rebbi Simeon says, even if there was no mortgageable property, it does not count unless there is mortgageable property in the value of at least a denar more than the two ketubot.
MISHNAH: If the estate contained expected property, it does not have the status of property in actual possession. Rebbi Simeon says, even if there was no mortgageable property, it does not count unless there is mortgageable property in the value of at least a denar more than the two ketubot.
MISHNAH: If the estate contained expected property, it does not have the status of property in actual possession. Rebbi Simeon says, even if there was no mortgageable property, it does not count unless there is mortgageable property in the value of at least a denar more than the two ketubot.
MISHNAH: If the estate contained expected property, it does not have the status of property in actual possession. Rebbi Simeon says, even if there was no mortgageable property, it does not count unless there is mortgageable property in the value of at least a denar more than the two ketubot.
HALAKHAH: “If the estate contained expected property,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree about the basic claim of the two ketubot. Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. But for the excess denar everybody agrees that it is movable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everybody agrees about the basic claim of the two ketubot that it must be real estate. Where do they disagree? About the excess denar, where Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rav: But in Syria they routinely collect from bronze and bedspreads. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only from bedspreads of that night. Rav Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The people in Arabia routinely collect from camels and spices. Similarly, only from spices of that night? Rebbi Ḥuna’s widow collected from movables following her place’s custom.
MISHNAH: If a widow is supported by the orphans’ property, she has to work for them but they are not obligated to bury her. Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.
HALAKHAH: “If a widow is supported by the orphans’ property,” etc. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: What she finds belongs to herself. If she had sustenance left over? Since her finds belong to her husband, the married woman’s leftover sustenance belongs to her husband. Since a widow’s finds belong to herself, her leftover sustenance belongs to herself. Her worn-out clothing belongs to her. Since even a married woman, whose leftover sustenance belongs to her husband, keeps her worn-out clothing to herself, the widow, whose leftover food belongs to herself, her worn-out clothing so much more! There, she needs them for the time of her period. Here also, she needs them for the time of her period.
Rav said, if a dying person said, do not bury me, he is buried as a charge on public charity. Rebbi Immi asked, how could one think that others are provided for by his property and he is buried as a charge on public charity? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.” Explain it, if they inherited real estate. As it was stated: “If he left male and female slaves, mortgages, and movables, anybody who takes them first acquires them and he shall be buried by public charity.” Because he took it first. Therefore, if he did not take it first one removes from his hand. Explain it, if he said, bury me. As Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: If a dead person was buried who had not said “bury me”, even though others came and took [of his property] one removes from their hands. If they took real estate. In fact, what you say, one removes from their hands, if they took real estate. But if they took movables, one does not remove from their hands, if it was a loan by witnesses. But for a documented loan, whether they took real estate or movables one does not remove from their hands. For Rebbi Abba, the son of Rav Huna, said: They made the words of a bedridden person equal to those of a healthy person who wrote and delivered. But only if he died from that illness, not if he recovered. And if he was explicit and said, give field X to Y. If he said, give field X to Y? Is it as if he was explicit or only if he said, the Northern half, the Southern half? Rebbi Yudan asked: If he said, burn me by pagan rites and give half of field X to Y. Since they do not burn, do they give? Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: A sick person who said, my daughters shall be supported. Would the daughters not be supported anyway? No, it is necessary, for otherwise would they be supported from pledged real estate or would they be supported from movables? Rebbi Yudan [ ] there came a case before Rebbi Yose about a bedridden person who had said, my documents shall be given to X. He said to him, the bedridden can only transfer property which is acquired either by a document or by taking hold. But these are acquired by a document and by taking hold. As it was stated: “A ship is acquired by taking hold in the opinion of everybody. Rebbi Nathan says a ship and documents are acquired by a document and by taking hold. If he wrote and did not take hold, or took hold without writing [a transfer document] he did not do anything unless he both writes and takes hold.”
Rav said, if a dying person said, do not bury me, he is buried as a charge on public charity. Rebbi Immi asked, how could one think that others are provided for by his property and he is buried as a charge on public charity? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.” Explain it, if they inherited real estate. As it was stated: “If he left male and female slaves, mortgages, and movables, anybody who takes them first acquires them and he shall be buried by public charity.” Because he took it first. Therefore, if he did not take it first one removes from his hand. Explain it, if he said, bury me. As Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: If a dead person was buried who had not said “bury me”, even though others came and took [of his property] one removes from their hands. If they took real estate. In fact, what you say, one removes from their hands, if they took real estate. But if they took movables, one does not remove from their hands, if it was a loan by witnesses. But for a documented loan, whether they took real estate or movables one does not remove from their hands. For Rebbi Abba, the son of Rav Huna, said: They made the words of a bedridden person equal to those of a healthy person who wrote and delivered. But only if he died from that illness, not if he recovered. And if he was explicit and said, give field X to Y. If he said, give field X to Y? Is it as if he was explicit or only if he said, the Northern half, the Southern half? Rebbi Yudan asked: If he said, burn me by pagan rites and give half of field X to Y. Since they do not burn, do they give? Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: A sick person who said, my daughters shall be supported. Would the daughters not be supported anyway? No, it is necessary, for otherwise would they be supported from pledged real estate or would they be supported from movables? Rebbi Yudan [ ] there came a case before Rebbi Yose about a bedridden person who had said, my documents shall be given to X. He said to him, the bedridden can only transfer property which is acquired either by a document or by taking hold. But these are acquired by a document and by taking hold. As it was stated: “A ship is acquired by taking hold in the opinion of everybody. Rebbi Nathan says a ship and documents are acquired by a document and by taking hold. If he wrote and did not take hold, or took hold without writing [a transfer document] he did not do anything unless he both writes and takes hold.”
Rav said, if a dying person said, do not bury me, he is buried as a charge on public charity. Rebbi Immi asked, how could one think that others are provided for by his property and he is buried as a charge on public charity? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Her heirs, the heirs of her ketubah, are obligated to bury her.” Explain it, if they inherited real estate. As it was stated: “If he left male and female slaves, mortgages, and movables, anybody who takes them first acquires them and he shall be buried by public charity.” Because he took it first. Therefore, if he did not take it first one removes from his hand. Explain it, if he said, bury me. As Rebbi Yose said in the name of the rabbis: If a dead person was buried who had not said “bury me”, even though others came and took [of his property] one removes from their hands. If they took real estate. In fact, what you say, one removes from their hands, if they took real estate. But if they took movables, one does not remove from their hands, if it was a loan by witnesses. But for a documented loan, whether they took real estate or movables one does not remove from their hands. For Rebbi Abba, the son of Rav Huna, said: They made the words of a bedridden person equal to those of a healthy person who wrote and delivered. But only if he died from that illness, not if he recovered. And if he was explicit and said, give field X to Y. If he said, give field X to Y? Is it as if he was explicit or only if he said, the Northern half, the Southern half? Rebbi Yudan asked: If he said, burn me by pagan rites and give half of field X to Y. Since they do not burn, do they give? Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: A sick person who said, my daughters shall be supported. Would the daughters not be supported anyway? No, it is necessary, for otherwise would they be supported from pledged real estate or would they be supported from movables? Rebbi Yudan [ ] there came a case before Rebbi Yose about a bedridden person who had said, my documents shall be given to X. He said to him, the bedridden can only transfer property which is acquired either by a document or by taking hold. But these are acquired by a document and by taking hold. As it was stated: “A ship is acquired by taking hold in the opinion of everybody. Rebbi Nathan says a ship and documents are acquired by a document and by taking hold. If he wrote and did not take hold, or took hold without writing [a transfer document] he did not do anything unless he both writes and takes hold.”
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Just as a man is concerned about his widow’s honor so he has to be concerned about his divorcee’s honor, as Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, “do not hide yourself from your flesh”, that refers to one’s divorcee. Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s wife did mistreat him badly. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah went to him and told him, rabbi, send her away, for she does not treat you with the honor due to you. He said to him, her ketubah is too large for me. He said to him, I shall give you the ketubah and send her away. He gave him the ketubah and he divorced her. She went and married the city treasurer. That one lost his property and became blind. She took him around the town and led him. Once they went around the entire town and nobody gave him anything. He said to her, is there not another neighborhood? She said to him, there is the neighborhood of my divorcer; it is beyond my powers to bring you there. He started hitting her. Rebbi Yose the Galilean passed by and heard them demeaning one another in public. He took them, brought them to one of his houses, and provided them with food all the days of their lives, because “do not hide yourself from your flesh”, that refers to one’s divorcee. Nevertheless they quarelled loudly in the night and her voice was heard saying, the pain she suffered outside her body was easier to bear than that inside her body.
HALAKHAH: “If a widow’s ketubah was 200,” etc. We understand worth a mina for 200 or worth 200 for a mina. In any case, she made the orphans lose a mina. [If it was worth] a mina [and she sold it] for 200, would the sale not be invalidated as erroneous buy? Explain it that the property increased in value. Rebbi Abin said, this supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, real estate buys are never under the laws of overcharging. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if the transaction was excessive, it comes under the law of overcharging. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “The following do not fall under the laws of overcharging: Slaves, securities, real estate, and redemptions.” He explains it, unless it was excessive. If he redeemed what was worth a mina by 200, Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is not redeemed, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is redeemed. A baralta disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: If he said, this toga instead of this donkey, the latter becomes profane. And its end disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is necessary to compute the value. Rebbi Yose said, the baraita itself implies that it is necessary to compute the value. Where do they disagree? To bring [a sacrifice to atone for] larceny. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he has to bring a sacrifice for larceny; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he does not have to bring a sacrifice for larceny.
HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.
HALAKHAH: “If the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much,” etc. As you say for a private person, in real estate up to one third, in movables up to one sixth. And similarly, for Temple property, in real estate up to one sixth, in movables up to [one in] twelve. There, we have stated: “The estimation for orphans is thirty days, the estimation for Temple property sixty days, and one publicly announces mornings and evenings.” And why thirty? In order to empower the orphans. Why should they not announce longer? Up to thirty days you empower the orphans, more than that you diminish their power. Why do you not say that for Temple property? Temple property is different because each offer made is firm. Then they should announce forever! If suffices for the Temple that it should be twice that of a private person. Rebbi Yudan said, since you say that Temple property is different because each offer made is firm, this implies that if they find their estimation they do not continue but close the deal.
HALAKHAH: “If the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much,” etc. As you say for a private person, in real estate up to one third, in movables up to one sixth. And similarly, for Temple property, in real estate up to one sixth, in movables up to [one in] twelve. There, we have stated: “The estimation for orphans is thirty days, the estimation for Temple property sixty days, and one publicly announces mornings and evenings.” And why thirty? In order to empower the orphans. Why should they not announce longer? Up to thirty days you empower the orphans, more than that you diminish their power. Why do you not say that for Temple property? Temple property is different because each offer made is firm. Then they should announce forever! If suffices for the Temple that it should be twice that of a private person. Rebbi Yudan said, since you say that Temple property is different because each offer made is firm, this implies that if they find their estimation they do not continue but close the deal.
HALAKHAH: “If the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much,” etc. As you say for a private person, in real estate up to one third, in movables up to one sixth. And similarly, for Temple property, in real estate up to one sixth, in movables up to [one in] twelve. There, we have stated: “The estimation for orphans is thirty days, the estimation for Temple property sixty days, and one publicly announces mornings and evenings.” And why thirty? In order to empower the orphans. Why should they not announce longer? Up to thirty days you empower the orphans, more than that you diminish their power. Why do you not say that for Temple property? Temple property is different because each offer made is firm. Then they should announce forever! If suffices for the Temple that it should be twice that of a private person. Rebbi Yudan said, since you say that Temple property is different because each offer made is firm, this implies that if they find their estimation they do not continue but close the deal.
HALAKHAH: “If the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much,” etc. As you say for a private person, in real estate up to one third, in movables up to one sixth. And similarly, for Temple property, in real estate up to one sixth, in movables up to [one in] twelve. There, we have stated: “The estimation for orphans is thirty days, the estimation for Temple property sixty days, and one publicly announces mornings and evenings.” And why thirty? In order to empower the orphans. Why should they not announce longer? Up to thirty days you empower the orphans, more than that you diminish their power. Why do you not say that for Temple property? Temple property is different because each offer made is firm. Then they should announce forever! If suffices for the Temple that it should be twice that of a private person. Rebbi Yudan said, since you say that Temple property is different because each offer made is firm, this implies that if they find their estimation they do not continue but close the deal.
HALAKHAH: “If the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much,” etc. As you say for a private person, in real estate up to one third, in movables up to one sixth. And similarly, for Temple property, in real estate up to one sixth, in movables up to [one in] twelve. There, we have stated: “The estimation for orphans is thirty days, the estimation for Temple property sixty days, and one publicly announces mornings and evenings.” And why thirty? In order to empower the orphans. Why should they not announce longer? Up to thirty days you empower the orphans, more than that you diminish their power. Why do you not say that for Temple property? Temple property is different because each offer made is firm. Then they should announce forever! If suffices for the Temple that it should be twice that of a private person. Rebbi Yudan said, since you say that Temple property is different because each offer made is firm, this implies that if they find their estimation they do not continue but close the deal.
“No usufruct.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, that he has from her only the usufruct. Rebbi Yose the Sidonian stated before Rebbi Jeremiah, in disgreement with Rebbi Jeremiah: “He has the right to what she finds and earns, and to dissolve her vows.” What means “no usufruct”? That she cannot reclaim from him the usufruct he had [from her property].
MISHNAH: If the daughter married, the husband has to sustain her and they pay the cost of her sustenance. If they died, their daughters are supported from unincumbered property but she is supported from mortgaged property since her status is that of a creditor. The intelligent ones did write: On condition that I support your daughter for five years the entire time you are with me.
MISHNAH: If the daughter married, the husband has to sustain her and they pay the cost of her sustenance. If they died, their daughters are supported from unincumbered property but she is supported from mortgaged property since her status is that of a creditor. The intelligent ones did write: On condition that I support your daughter for five years the entire time you are with me.
HALAKHAH: “If the daughter married, the husband has to sustain her,” etc. What is the status of the ketubah stipulations if he wrote them in the document? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he wrote them for emphasis; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he wrote them to collect from encumbered property. Rebbi Jeremiah switched the traditions. Rebbi Yudan said, a Mishnah supports him who said, he wrote them for emphasis, since we stated there: “One does not foreclose from mortgaged property to indemnify for produce or investment, or sustenance of widow and daughters, in order not to impede the economy.” Are [the first categories] not based on a document? Here also based on the document. Rebbi Ḥanania said, “since her status is that of a creditor”! Is that not based on a document? Here also based on the document.
HALAKHAH: “If the daughter married, the husband has to sustain her,” etc. What is the status of the ketubah stipulations if he wrote them in the document? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he wrote them for emphasis; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he wrote them to collect from encumbered property. Rebbi Jeremiah switched the traditions. Rebbi Yudan said, a Mishnah supports him who said, he wrote them for emphasis, since we stated there: “One does not foreclose from mortgaged property to indemnify for produce or investment, or sustenance of widow and daughters, in order not to impede the economy.” Are [the first categories] not based on a document? Here also based on the document. Rebbi Ḥanania said, “since her status is that of a creditor”! Is that not based on a document? Here also based on the document.
Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One stated this only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects forever. Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she can collect only up to 25 years. This disagreement parallels the following disagreement, as was stated there: “Torts are estimated from choice land, creditor’s claims from average, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable.” Rebbi Jeremiah said to him, this was stated only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz], but a ketubah of 1’000 denar is evaluated in terms of average quality land. But Rebbi Yose said, even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects only from the least valuable land. It turns out that Rebbi Yose follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Jeremiah Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. As we have stated there: “If somebody signs over his property to his sons and signs over some real estate to his wife, she lost her claim to ketubah.” Rav said, if he lets them acquire through her. Samuel says, if he distributes in her presence. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they stated here a relaxation of the laws of ketubah. Rebbi Abba said, the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina is that it applies not only to a ketubah of a mina or two hundred, but even regarding a ketubah of one thousand denar they proclaimed a relaxation of the laws of ketubah.
There, we have stated: “He heals him in the sense of personal healing but not in the sense of financial healing.” Rebbi Judan and Rebbi Yose. One of them said, here if the vow refers to his body, there if the vow refers to his property. But the other said, here if he has somebody else who can heal him, there if there is nobody else who can heal him. If he has somebody else who can heal him, he should not be able to heal him personally! Not by everybody is a person successfully healed.
Is not the property of the finder forbidden to the owner of the cow? Ulla bar Ismael in the name of Rebbi Isaac: If each man’s property was forbidden to the other.
Is not the property of the finder forbidden to the owner of the cow? Ulla bar Ismael in the name of Rebbi Isaac: If each man’s property was forbidden to the other.
When does one appraise for them? Rebbi Mana said, one appraises at the end. Rebbi Ḥanina said to him, the words of the rabbis imply that one does not listen to you, for Nathan bar Hoshaia asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, if there was sustenance for twelve months but the estate diminished in value? He answered him, since the heirs started to eat with permission, they continue to eat until the last coin is gone! Therefore, one appraises at the start. Rav Ḥisda asked: If there was sustenance for twelve months and then the property increased in value? Let us hear from the following, for Rebbi Ḥanina, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the heirs sold, they sold from their own property. So here, if it increased in value, their property value increased. If the estate was not sufficient for twelve months’ sustenance, may the sons say to the daughters, take what is yours and leave! Rebbi Abba said, is that a question? The Mishnah says that they cannot say so to them, as we have stated there: “If the orphans say, we accept the properties of our father for the value of an extra denar in order to take their mother’s ketubah; one does not listen to them but one appraises the properties in court.”
When does one appraise for them? Rebbi Mana said, one appraises at the end. Rebbi Ḥanina said to him, the words of the rabbis imply that one does not listen to you, for Nathan bar Hoshaia asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, if there was sustenance for twelve months but the estate diminished in value? He answered him, since the heirs started to eat with permission, they continue to eat until the last coin is gone! Therefore, one appraises at the start. Rav Ḥisda asked: If there was sustenance for twelve months and then the property increased in value? Let us hear from the following, for Rebbi Ḥanina, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the heirs sold, they sold from their own property. So here, if it increased in value, their property value increased. If the estate was not sufficient for twelve months’ sustenance, may the sons say to the daughters, take what is yours and leave! Rebbi Abba said, is that a question? The Mishnah says that they cannot say so to them, as we have stated there: “If the orphans say, we accept the properties of our father for the value of an extra denar in order to take their mother’s ketubah; one does not listen to them but one appraises the properties in court.”
When does one appraise for them? Rebbi Mana said, one appraises at the end. Rebbi Ḥanina said to him, the words of the rabbis imply that one does not listen to you, for Nathan bar Hoshaia asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, if there was sustenance for twelve months but the estate diminished in value? He answered him, since the heirs started to eat with permission, they continue to eat until the last coin is gone! Therefore, one appraises at the start. Rav Ḥisda asked: If there was sustenance for twelve months and then the property increased in value? Let us hear from the following, for Rebbi Ḥanina, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the heirs sold, they sold from their own property. So here, if it increased in value, their property value increased. If the estate was not sufficient for twelve months’ sustenance, may the sons say to the daughters, take what is yours and leave! Rebbi Abba said, is that a question? The Mishnah says that they cannot say so to them, as we have stated there: “If the orphans say, we accept the properties of our father for the value of an extra denar in order to take their mother’s ketubah; one does not listen to them but one appraises the properties in court.”
As you say, after deduction for her ketubah, after deduction of burial costs, after deduction of loans by witnesses or by contract. After deduction for daughters’ dowries? For him who says, one forecloses from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are privileged. For him who says, one does not foreclose from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are not privileged. Let us hear from the following: The widow and the sons are of equal rank. The widow and the daughters are of equal rank. The widow does not push the sons aside and the widow does not push the daughters aside. How is that? If there was enough for 12 months sustenance and a widow to sustain. That explains that sometimes the widow pushes out the sons by means of the daughters. Just as she pushes out the sons by means of the daughters, should she not push them out by means of the sons? She might claim her ketubah and lose her right to sustenance.
As you say, after deduction for her ketubah, after deduction of burial costs, after deduction of loans by witnesses or by contract. After deduction for daughters’ dowries? For him who says, one forecloses from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are privileged. For him who says, one does not foreclose from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are not privileged. Let us hear from the following: The widow and the sons are of equal rank. The widow and the daughters are of equal rank. The widow does not push the sons aside and the widow does not push the daughters aside. How is that? If there was enough for 12 months sustenance and a widow to sustain. That explains that sometimes the widow pushes out the sons by means of the daughters. Just as she pushes out the sons by means of the daughters, should she not push them out by means of the sons? She might claim her ketubah and lose her right to sustenance.
“I am excommunicated from you, Rabbi Aqiba was stringent in that because of a doubt.” To forbid all his possessions. As you say, “all his property should be banned and he should be separated from the community of the diaspora.” What do the rabbis do with this? An excommunication by the court is weightier.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.
HALAKHAH: “The following vows are permitted,” etc. “To the Eternal”, nobody can forbid anything on himself unless it could be given to the Eternal. What is stated in the House of Rav disagrees: “From where that one may not make and dissolve vows which are dissolved for you from Heaven but people consider them as binding? The verse says, ‘he shall not profanate his word.’ He should not make his words profane.” They wanted to say, for example using “qorbān” or “oath”; but in all other respects it would be permitted. It comes to tell you, also all other respects. “To prohibit a prohibition on himself”. There are Tannaїm who state: on himself, not on others. There are Tannaїm who state: even on others. They wanted to say that he who says on himself, not on others, to forbid others’ property, but he who says even on others, to forbid his own property for others, but not the property of others for himself.
HALAKHAH: “The following vows are permitted,” etc. “To the Eternal”, nobody can forbid anything on himself unless it could be given to the Eternal. What is stated in the House of Rav disagrees: “From where that one may not make and dissolve vows which are dissolved for you from Heaven but people consider them as binding? The verse says, ‘he shall not profanate his word.’ He should not make his words profane.” They wanted to say, for example using “qorbān” or “oath”; but in all other respects it would be permitted. It comes to tell you, also all other respects. “To prohibit a prohibition on himself”. There are Tannaїm who state: on himself, not on others. There are Tannaїm who state: even on others. They wanted to say that he who says on himself, not on others, to forbid others’ property, but he who says even on others, to forbid his own property for others, but not the property of others for himself.
HALAKHAH: “The following vows are permitted,” etc. “To the Eternal”, nobody can forbid anything on himself unless it could be given to the Eternal. What is stated in the House of Rav disagrees: “From where that one may not make and dissolve vows which are dissolved for you from Heaven but people consider them as binding? The verse says, ‘he shall not profanate his word.’ He should not make his words profane.” They wanted to say, for example using “qorbān” or “oath”; but in all other respects it would be permitted. It comes to tell you, also all other respects. “To prohibit a prohibition on himself”. There are Tannaїm who state: on himself, not on others. There are Tannaїm who state: even on others. They wanted to say that he who says on himself, not on others, to forbid others’ property, but he who says even on others, to forbid his own property for others, but not the property of others for himself.
“Vain” and “untruth” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “Remember” and “keep” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “Its desecrator shall be put to death” and “two unblemished one year old sheep” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “The nakedness of your brother’s wife you shall not uncover”, “her brother-in-law shall come to her”, both were said together. “You shall not move real property from one tribe to another,” “any daughter inheriting real property,” both together. “Fringes you shall make for yourself,” “do not wear sha‘ṭnez”, both were said together. And so it says, “God spoke once, two I heard from this.” And it is written: “Is not my word like fire, says the Eternal, and like a hammer which shatters a rock.”
“Vain” and “untruth” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “Remember” and “keep” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “Its desecrator shall be put to death” and “two unblemished one year old sheep” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “The nakedness of your brother’s wife you shall not uncover”, “her brother-in-law shall come to her”, both were said together. “You shall not move real property from one tribe to another,” “any daughter inheriting real property,” both together. “Fringes you shall make for yourself,” “do not wear sha‘ṭnez”, both were said together. And so it says, “God spoke once, two I heard from this.” And it is written: “Is not my word like fire, says the Eternal, and like a hammer which shatters a rock.”
It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. Rebbi Abba said, you may even say in either case if they insist or if they do not insist; here about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property then his property is forbidden [to him]. But concerning the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped.
It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. Rebbi Abba said, you may even say in either case if they insist or if they do not insist; here about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property then his property is forbidden [to him]. But concerning the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped.
It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. Rebbi Abba said, you may even say in either case if they insist or if they do not insist; here about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property then his property is forbidden [to him]. But concerning the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped.
It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. Rebbi Abba said, you may even say in either case if they insist or if they do not insist; here about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property then his property is forbidden [to him]. But concerning the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped.
It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. Rebbi Abba said, you may even say in either case if they insist or if they do not insist; here about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property then his property is forbidden [to him]. But concerning the matter of whipping, he cannot be whipped.
MISHNAH: One makes a vow to tax assessors and to people who condemn property and to toll collectors that it is heave even though it is not heave, that it is king’s family’s property even though it is not theirs. The House of Shammai say, one vows anything except an oath, but the House of Hillel say, even an oath. The House of Shammai say, one may not offer a vow, but the House of Hillel say, one may offer. The House of Shammai say, only what he prescribes as vow, but the House of Hillel say, even what he does not prescribe. How is this? They said to him, say: a qônām that my wife cannot have any use from me, and he said: a qônām that my wife and my children cannot have any use from me; the House of Shammai say, his wife is permitted but his children are forbidden; but the House of Hillel say, both are permitted.