30 occurrences across the corpus

Church Orders

Apostolic Constitutions, Book II 8:1

But if any one be maliciously prosecuted by the heathen, because he will not still go along with them to the same excess of riot, let him know that such a one is blessed of God, according as our Lord says in the Gospel: Blessed are you when men shall reproach you, or persecute you, or say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake. Rejoice and be exceeding glad, for your reward is great in heaven. If, therefore, any one be slandered and falsely accused, such a one is blessed; for the Scripture says, A man that is a reprobate is not tried by God. But if any one be convicted as having done a wicked action, such a one not only hurts himself, but occasions the whole body of the Church and its doctrine to be blasphemed; as if we Christians did not practice those things that we declare to be good and honest, and we ourselves shall be reproached by the Lord, that they say and do not. Wherefore the bishop must boldly reject such as these upon full conviction, unless they change their course of life.

The Works of Flavius Josephus

Antiquities of the Jews, Book VI 13:8

When David had said this, he dismissed the woman. But when she came home and found her husband feasting with a great company, and oppressed with wine, she said nothing to him then about what had happened; but on the next day, when he was sober, she told him all the particulars, and made his whole body to appear like that of a dead man by her words, and by that grief which arose from them; so Nabal survived ten days, and no more, and then died. And when David heard of his death, he said that God had justly avenged him of this man, for that Nabal had died by his own wickedness, and had suffered punishment on his account, while he had kept his own hands clean. At which time he understood that the wicked are prosecuted by God; that he does not overlook any man, but bestows on the good what is suitable to them, and inflicts a deserved punishment on the wicked. So he sent to Nabal's wife, and invited her to come to him, to live with him, and to be his wife. Whereupon she replied to those that came, that she was not worthy to touch his feet; however, she came, with all her servants, and became his wife, having received that honor on account of her wise and righteous course of life. She also obtained the same honor partly on account of her beauty. Now David had a wife before, whom he married from the city Abesar; for as to Michal, the daughter of king Saul, who had been David's wife, her father had given her in marriage to Phalti, the son of Laish, who was of the city of Gallim.

Antiquities of the Jews, Book XV 10:4

At which time Herod released to his subjects the third part of their taxes, under pretense indeed of relieving them, after the dearth they had had; but the main reason was, to recover their good-will, which he now wanted; for they were uneasy at him, because of the innovations he had introduced in their practices, of the dissolution of their religion, and of the disuse of their own customs; and the people every where talked against him, like those that were still more provoked and disturbed at his procedure; against which discontents he greatly guarded himself, and took away the opportunities they might have to disturb him, and enjoined them to be always at work; nor did he permit the citizens either to meet together, or to walk or eat together, but watched every thing they did, and when any were caught, they were severely punished; and many there were who were brought to the citadel Hyrcania, both openly and secretly, and were there put to death; and there were spies set every where, both in the city and in the roads, who watched those that met together; nay, it is reported that he did not himself neglect this part of caution, but that he would oftentimes himself take the habit of a private man, and mix among the multitude, in the night time, and make trial what opinion they had of his government: and as for those that could no way be reduced to acquiesce under his scheme of government, he prosecuted them all manner of ways; but for the rest of the multitude, he required that they should be obliged to take an oath of fidelity to him, and at the same time compelled them to swear that they would bear him good-will, and continue certainly so to do, in his management of the government; and indeed a great part of them, either to please him, or out of fear of him, yielded to what he required of them; but for such as were of a more open and generous disposition, and had indignation at the force he used to them, he by one means or other made away, with them. He endeavored also to persuade Pollio the Pharisee, and Satneas, and the greatest part of their scholars, to take the oath; but these would neither submit so to do, nor were they punished together with the rest, out of the reverence he bore to Pollio. The Essens also, as we call a sect of ours, were excused from this imposition. These men live the same kind of life as do those whom the Greeks call Pythagoreans, concerning whom I shall discourse more fully elsewhere. However, it is but fit to set down here the reasons wherefore Herod had these Essens in such honor, and thought higher of them than their mortal nature required; nor will this account be unsuitable to the nature of this history, as it will show the opinion men had of these Essens.

Antiquities of the Jews, Book XVI 5:4

Now some there are who stand amazed at the diversity of Herod's nature and purposes; for when we have respect to his magnificence, and the benefits which he bestowed on all mankind, there is no possibility for even those that had the least respect for him to deny, or not openly to confess, that he had a nature vastly beneficent; but when any one looks upon the punishments he inflicted, and the injuries he did, not only to his subjects, but to his nearest relations, and takes notice of his severe and unrelenting disposition there, he will be forced to allow that he was brutish, and a stranger to all humanity; insomuch that these men suppose his nature to be different, and sometimes at contradiction with itself; but I am myself of another opinion, and imagine that the occasion of both these sort of actions was one and the same; for being a man ambitious of honor, and quite overcome by that passion, he was induced to be magnificent, wherever there appeared any hopes of a future memorial, or of reputation at present; and as his expenses were beyond his abilities, he was necessitated to be harsh to his subjects; for the persons on whom he expended his money were so many, that they made him a very bad procurer of it; and because he was conscious that he was hated by those under him, for the injuries he did them, he thought it not an easy thing to amend his offenses, for that it was inconvenient for his revenue; he therefore strove on the other side to make their ill-will an occasion of his gains. As to his own court, therefore, if any one was not very obsequious to him in his language, and would not confess himself to be his slave, or but seemed to think of any innovation in his government, he was not able to contain himself, but prosecuted his very kindred and friends, and punished them as if they were enemies and this wickedness he undertook out of a desire that he might be himself alone honored. Now for this, my assertion about that passion of his, we have the greatest evidence, by what he did to honor Cæsar and Agrippa, and his other friends; for with what honors he paid his respects to them who were his superiors, the same did he desire to be paid to himself; and what he thought the most excellent present he could make another, he discovered an inclination to have the like presented to himself. But now the Jewish nation is by their law a stranger to all such things, and accustomed to prefer righteousness to glory; for which reason that nation was not agreeable to him, because it was out of their power to flatter the king's ambition with statues or temples, or any other such performances; And this seems to me to have been at once the occasion of Herod's crimes as to his own courtiers and counselors, and of his benefactions as to foreigners and those that had no relation to him.

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Orlah 2:44

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. Rebbi Zeïra said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted are not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Zeïra: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from seeds to grape skins he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? That means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; is it not logical that for all prohibitions of the Torah, whose prohibition is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition cannot be lifted, that we treat taste like the thing itself? From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Zeïra who says everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here he says, “even if he did not taste.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:39

“If he injured one and then injured the other, or cursed one and then cursed the other, he cannot be prosecuted.” Rebbi Ḥanania asked, does that not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan? Since they disagree about the second day of holidays in the diaspora. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one accepts forwarning in a case of doubt, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one does not accept forwarning in a case of doubt. Rebbi Ḥanina said in the name of Rebbi, there is no disagreement. There, it would have been possible to make a determination, here it is impossible to make the determination.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:17

“And they spread out the cloth.” That is all simile. Rebbi Ismael stated: That is one of three verses in the Torah which have been written as simile. “If he gets up and walks outside on his support, the one who hit him is not prosecuted.” Could anybody think that one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But what is “on his support”, in his health. “If the sun shone on him, he has blood.” Does the sun shine only on him? But just as the sun is particular that it brings peace to the entire world, so also this one, if one knows that [the other] is at peace with him and he kills him, he is guilty.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:12

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:31

MISHNAH: If somebody injured another person who was judged dying and then this person’s state improved but later he died, he is guilty. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, he cannot be prosecuted since it is not unsubstantiated.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:32

HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:11

“A man.” Why does the verse say, “any man”? To include that Gentiles who committed adultery or incest by Gentile rules should be judged by Gentile law, but if they committed adultery with a Jewishwoman, one judges them by Jewish law. Rebbi Eleazar said, of all of them there is only the Jewish betrothed, for if he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty, with a betrothed Gentile woman he cannot be prosecuted. If he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty. How is he found to be guilty? By their rules or by Jewish rules? If you say by Jewish rules, by two witnesses, 23 judges, after warning, and by stoning. If you say by their rules, by one witness, one judge, without warning, and by the sword.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:13

If you say, by Jewish rules, he is guilty if he converted. If you say, by their rules, he cannot be prosecuted if he converted, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, a descendant of Noah who blasphemed and then converted cannot be prosecuted since the law changed for him. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The descendants of Noah are warned about nakedness as Jews are; the verse says, “he shall cling to his wife”, not to somebody else’s wife. “He shall cling to his wife”, not to a male, nor to an animal. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: A descendant of Noah who had perverse intercourse with his wife is killed. What is the reason? “He shall cling to his wife so they become one flesh,” at the place where they together create one flesh.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:13

If you say, by Jewish rules, he is guilty if he converted. If you say, by their rules, he cannot be prosecuted if he converted, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, a descendant of Noah who blasphemed and then converted cannot be prosecuted since the law changed for him. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The descendants of Noah are warned about nakedness as Jews are; the verse says, “he shall cling to his wife”, not to somebody else’s wife. “He shall cling to his wife”, not to a male, nor to an animal. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: A descendant of Noah who had perverse intercourse with his wife is killed. What is the reason? “He shall cling to his wife so they become one flesh,” at the place where they together create one flesh.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 7:14

There is a rule about the slaughterer which does not apply to the seller and to the seller which does not apply to the slaughterer, for he who slaughters on the Sabbath is criminally liable but he who sells on the Sabbath cannot be prosecuted. Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael said, we find a case of sale for which one is criminally liable on the Sabbath. Think of it, if somebody said to another: tear something off from this ground to acquire, did he not acquire? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the tearing makes him liable, not the sale.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:8

“If they warned him and he remained silent, they warned him and he nodded his head, even if he said, I know, he cannot be prosecuted unless he say: for that purpose I am doing it.” “If they saw him spilling blood; they told him, know that he is a son of the Covenant and the Torah said, he who spills a man’s blood, by man his blood shall be spilled, even if he said, I know, he cannot be prosecuted unless he say: for that purpose I am doing it.” “If they saw him desecrating the Sabbath; they told him, know that today is Sabbath and the Torah said, its desecrators shall be put to death, even if he said, I know, he cannot be prosecuted unless he say: for that purpose I am doing it.”

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:8

“If they warned him and he remained silent, they warned him and he nodded his head, even if he said, I know, he cannot be prosecuted unless he say: for that purpose I am doing it.” “If they saw him spilling blood; they told him, know that he is a son of the Covenant and the Torah said, he who spills a man’s blood, by man his blood shall be spilled, even if he said, I know, he cannot be prosecuted unless he say: for that purpose I am doing it.” “If they saw him desecrating the Sabbath; they told him, know that today is Sabbath and the Torah said, its desecrators shall be put to death, even if he said, I know, he cannot be prosecuted unless he say: for that purpose I am doing it.”

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 5:8

“If they warned him and he remained silent, they warned him and he nodded his head, even if he said, I know, he cannot be prosecuted unless he say: for that purpose I am doing it.” “If they saw him spilling blood; they told him, know that he is a son of the Covenant and the Torah said, he who spills a man’s blood, by man his blood shall be spilled, even if he said, I know, he cannot be prosecuted unless he say: for that purpose I am doing it.” “If they saw him desecrating the Sabbath; they told him, know that today is Sabbath and the Torah said, its desecrators shall be put to death, even if he said, I know, he cannot be prosecuted unless he say: for that purpose I am doing it.”

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:73

MISHNAH: The sorcerer is one who does a deed but not one who creates an illusion. Rebbi Aqiba says in the name of Rebbi Joshua: Two are collecting green melons; one who collected cannot be prosecuted, the other one is guilty. The who does a deed is guilty; he who creates an illusion cannot be prosecuted.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:73

MISHNAH: The sorcerer is one who does a deed but not one who creates an illusion. Rebbi Aqiba says in the name of Rebbi Joshua: Two are collecting green melons; one who collected cannot be prosecuted, the other one is guilty. The who does a deed is guilty; he who creates an illusion cannot be prosecuted.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:79

Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥanania said: Rebbi Eliezer used to explain 300 chapters in the matter of the sorceress, but from all of them I understood only two things: “Two are collecting green melons; one who collected cannot be prosecuted, the other one is guilty. He who does a deed is guilty; he who creates an illusion cannot be prosecuted.” Rebbi Darosa said, there were 900 chapters. 300 where one is guilty, 300 where one is free, and 300 where one is guilty but cannot be prosecuted.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:79

Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥanania said: Rebbi Eliezer used to explain 300 chapters in the matter of the sorceress, but from all of them I understood only two things: “Two are collecting green melons; one who collected cannot be prosecuted, the other one is guilty. He who does a deed is guilty; he who creates an illusion cannot be prosecuted.” Rebbi Darosa said, there were 900 chapters. 300 where one is guilty, 300 where one is free, and 300 where one is guilty but cannot be prosecuted.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 7:79

Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥanania said: Rebbi Eliezer used to explain 300 chapters in the matter of the sorceress, but from all of them I understood only two things: “Two are collecting green melons; one who collected cannot be prosecuted, the other one is guilty. He who does a deed is guilty; he who creates an illusion cannot be prosecuted.” Rebbi Darosa said, there were 900 chapters. 300 where one is guilty, 300 where one is free, and 300 where one is guilty but cannot be prosecuted.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:21

HALAKHAH: “If somebody injures another person,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not [criminally] liable but the Sages declare him [criminally] liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other one is executed because of him? But even if he dies according to the first estimation, he cannot be prosecuted. What is the rabbi’s reason? If he does not die but is bedridden. Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they did not estimate that he would die. If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is [criminally] liable. But if they estimated that he would die? If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: But he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? “But he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” For him who said, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, does he have to pay? For him who said, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay, one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would live but he died, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. This implies that the estimate was wrong. If you would say, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay, he should pay from the first moment. A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would die but he lived, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.” That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:24

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:24

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:24

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 9:24

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 11:1

MISHNAH: But the following are strangled: One who hits his father or his mother, and one who kidnaps a person from Israel, and the Elder who rebels against the Court, and the false prophet, and one who prophesies in the name of foreign worship, and one who copulates with a married woman, and the perjured witness of a Cohen’s daughter and her paramour. One who hits his father or his mother is not punishable unless he inflict a wound on them. The following is more aggravating about one who curses than one who hits, in that one who curses is punishable even after death, but one who hits after death cannot be prosecuted.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 11:9

MISHNAH: The Elder who rebels against the Court, as it is said: If a law case is too difficult for you, whether blood and blood, or case and case, etc. Three courts were there, one at the entrance of the Temple Mount, one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard, and one in the ashlar hall. They come to the one at the entrance to the Temple Mount and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleague taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise they come to the one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleagues taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise these and those come to the Supreme Court in the ashlar hall, for from there instruction goes out to all of Israel as it is said, from that place which the Eternal will choose. If he returned to his town, repeated and taught as was his custom, he cannot be prosecuted. If he instructed to act, he is punishable, as it is said, but the man who would act criminally etc. He is not punishable unless he instruct to act. A student who instructed to act cannot be prosecuted; it turns out that his severity is his leniency.

Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin 11:9

MISHNAH: The Elder who rebels against the Court, as it is said: If a law case is too difficult for you, whether blood and blood, or case and case, etc. Three courts were there, one at the entrance of the Temple Mount, one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard, and one in the ashlar hall. They come to the one at the entrance to the Temple Mount and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleague taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise they come to the one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleagues taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise these and those come to the Supreme Court in the ashlar hall, for from there instruction goes out to all of Israel as it is said, from that place which the Eternal will choose. If he returned to his town, repeated and taught as was his custom, he cannot be prosecuted. If he instructed to act, he is punishable, as it is said, but the man who would act criminally etc. He is not punishable unless he instruct to act. A student who instructed to act cannot be prosecuted; it turns out that his severity is his leniency.