purpose
813 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
For its purpose and not for its purpose on the other days of the year? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Samuel bar Abba: Since it is left without a name it is as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and is qualified. They said to him. if it is so, even if he slaughtered for its purpose to pour the blood not for its purpose it should be treated as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and be qualified. Rebbi Abba Mari said, who says that in silence it is qualified? Or may we say, in silence it is disqualified?
For its purpose and not for its purpose on the other days of the year? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Samuel bar Abba: Since it is left without a name it is as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and is qualified. They said to him. if it is so, even if he slaughtered for its purpose to pour the blood not for its purpose it should be treated as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and be qualified. Rebbi Abba Mari said, who says that in silence it is qualified? Or may we say, in silence it is disqualified?
Rebbi Simlai came to Rebbi Jonathan. He said to him, teach me homiletics. He answered him, I have a tradition from my forefathers not to teach homiletics either to a Babylonian or to a Southerner, since they are gross in spirit and have little learning. And you are from Nahardea and live in the South. He said to him, tell me this one thing, what is the difference between “for its purpose and not for its purpose” and “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”? He answered him, “for its purpose and not for its purpose”, the disqualification is intrinsic. “For those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”, the disqualification is of others. “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, you cannot pick out the disqualified from the qualified. [“For those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”, you can pick out the disqualified from the qualified.] “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, applies to all sacrifices; “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it” applies only to the Pesaḥ.
Rebbi Simlai came to Rebbi Jonathan. He said to him, teach me homiletics. He answered him, I have a tradition from my forefathers not to teach homiletics either to a Babylonian or to a Southerner, since they are gross in spirit and have little learning. And you are from Nahardea and live in the South. He said to him, tell me this one thing, what is the difference between “for its purpose and not for its purpose” and “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”? He answered him, “for its purpose and not for its purpose”, the disqualification is intrinsic. “For those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”, the disqualification is of others. “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, you cannot pick out the disqualified from the qualified. [“For those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”, you can pick out the disqualified from the qualified.] “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, applies to all sacrifices; “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it” applies only to the Pesaḥ.
Rebbi Simlai came to Rebbi Jonathan. He said to him, teach me homiletics. He answered him, I have a tradition from my forefathers not to teach homiletics either to a Babylonian or to a Southerner, since they are gross in spirit and have little learning. And you are from Nahardea and live in the South. He said to him, tell me this one thing, what is the difference between “for its purpose and not for its purpose” and “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”? He answered him, “for its purpose and not for its purpose”, the disqualification is intrinsic. “For those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”, the disqualification is of others. “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, you cannot pick out the disqualified from the qualified. [“For those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”, you can pick out the disqualified from the qualified.] “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, applies to all sacrifices; “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it” applies only to the Pesaḥ.
Rebbi Simlai came to Rebbi Jonathan. He said to him, teach me homiletics. He answered him, I have a tradition from my forefathers not to teach homiletics either to a Babylonian or to a Southerner, since they are gross in spirit and have little learning. And you are from Nahardea and live in the South. He said to him, tell me this one thing, what is the difference between “for its purpose and not for its purpose” and “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”? He answered him, “for its purpose and not for its purpose”, the disqualification is intrinsic. “For those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”, the disqualification is of others. “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, you cannot pick out the disqualified from the qualified. [“For those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”, you can pick out the disqualified from the qualified.] “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, applies to all sacrifices; “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it” applies only to the Pesaḥ.
Rebbi Simlai came to Rebbi Jonathan. He said to him, teach me homiletics. He answered him, I have a tradition from my forefathers not to teach homiletics either to a Babylonian or to a Southerner, since they are gross in spirit and have little learning. And you are from Nahardea and live in the South. He said to him, tell me this one thing, what is the difference between “for its purpose and not for its purpose” and “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”? He answered him, “for its purpose and not for its purpose”, the disqualification is intrinsic. “For those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”, the disqualification is of others. “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, you cannot pick out the disqualified from the qualified. [“For those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”, you can pick out the disqualified from the qualified.] “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, applies to all sacrifices; “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it” applies only to the Pesaḥ.
Rebbi Simlai came to Rebbi Jonathan. He said to him, teach me homiletics. He answered him, I have a tradition from my forefathers not to teach homiletics either to a Babylonian or to a Southerner, since they are gross in spirit and have little learning. And you are from Nahardea and live in the South. He said to him, tell me this one thing, what is the difference between “for its purpose and not for its purpose” and “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”? He answered him, “for its purpose and not for its purpose”, the disqualification is intrinsic. “For those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”, the disqualification is of others. “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, you cannot pick out the disqualified from the qualified. [“For those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”, you can pick out the disqualified from the qualified.] “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, applies to all sacrifices; “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it” applies only to the Pesaḥ.
Rebbi Simlai came to Rebbi Jonathan. He said to him, teach me homiletics. He answered him, I have a tradition from my forefathers not to teach homiletics either to a Babylonian or to a Southerner, since they are gross in spirit and have little learning. And you are from Nahardea and live in the South. He said to him, tell me this one thing, what is the difference between “for its purpose and not for its purpose” and “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”? He answered him, “for its purpose and not for its purpose”, the disqualification is intrinsic. “For those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”, the disqualification is of others. “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, you cannot pick out the disqualified from the qualified. [“For those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”, you can pick out the disqualified from the qualified.] “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, applies to all sacrifices; “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it” applies only to the Pesaḥ.
Rebbi Simlai came to Rebbi Jonathan. He said to him, teach me homiletics. He answered him, I have a tradition from my forefathers not to teach homiletics either to a Babylonian or to a Southerner, since they are gross in spirit and have little learning. And you are from Nahardea and live in the South. He said to him, tell me this one thing, what is the difference between “for its purpose and not for its purpose” and “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”? He answered him, “for its purpose and not for its purpose”, the disqualification is intrinsic. “For those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”, the disqualification is of others. “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, you cannot pick out the disqualified from the qualified. [“For those who eat it and those who cannot eat it”, you can pick out the disqualified from the qualified.] “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, applies to all sacrifices; “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it” applies only to the Pesaḥ.
Rebbi Yose said, from that of Rebbi Eleazar one may deduce two [conclusions]. Since Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah if he slaughtered it for those who eat it, but it was covered by those who eat it and those who cannot eat it. But it is disqualified if from the start he slaughtered for those who eat it and it was covered by those who eat it and those who cannot eat it. Then its disqualification is of others and you can pick out the disqualified from the qualified, and you are saying so? But it must be the following, “for its purpose and not for its purpose”, applies to all sacrifices; “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it” applies only to the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Abin said, there are others. “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, applies to all services; “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it” applies only to slaughtering.
Rebbi Yose said, from that of Rebbi Eleazar one may deduce two [conclusions]. Since Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah if he slaughtered it for those who eat it, but it was covered by those who eat it and those who cannot eat it. But it is disqualified if from the start he slaughtered for those who eat it and it was covered by those who eat it and those who cannot eat it. Then its disqualification is of others and you can pick out the disqualified from the qualified, and you are saying so? But it must be the following, “for its purpose and not for its purpose”, applies to all sacrifices; “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it” applies only to the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Abin said, there are others. “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, applies to all services; “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it” applies only to slaughtering.
Rebbi Yose said, from that of Rebbi Eleazar one may deduce two [conclusions]. Since Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah if he slaughtered it for those who eat it, but it was covered by those who eat it and those who cannot eat it. But it is disqualified if from the start he slaughtered for those who eat it and it was covered by those who eat it and those who cannot eat it. Then its disqualification is of others and you can pick out the disqualified from the qualified, and you are saying so? But it must be the following, “for its purpose and not for its purpose”, applies to all sacrifices; “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it” applies only to the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Abin said, there are others. “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, applies to all services; “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it” applies only to slaughtering.
Rebbi Yose said, from that of Rebbi Eleazar one may deduce two [conclusions]. Since Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah if he slaughtered it for those who eat it, but it was covered by those who eat it and those who cannot eat it. But it is disqualified if from the start he slaughtered for those who eat it and it was covered by those who eat it and those who cannot eat it. Then its disqualification is of others and you can pick out the disqualified from the qualified, and you are saying so? But it must be the following, “for its purpose and not for its purpose”, applies to all sacrifices; “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it” applies only to the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Abin said, there are others. “For its purpose and not for its purpose”, applies to all services; “for those who eat it and those who cannot eat it” applies only to slaughtering.
MISHNAH: One who slaughters the Pesaḥ on leavened matter transgresses a prohibition; Rebbi Jehudah says, also the daily sacrifice. Rebbi Simeon says, the Pesaḥ on the Fourteenth, if for its purpose, he is liable, not for its purpose he is not liable. All other sacrifices, whether for their purposes or not for their purposes, he is not liable. On the holiday, for its purpose he is not liable, not for its purpose he is liable; for all other sacrifices, whether for their purposes or not for their purposes, he is liable except for the purification offering which he slaughtered not for its purpose.
MISHNAH: One who slaughters the Pesaḥ on leavened matter transgresses a prohibition; Rebbi Jehudah says, also the daily sacrifice. Rebbi Simeon says, the Pesaḥ on the Fourteenth, if for its purpose, he is liable, not for its purpose he is not liable. All other sacrifices, whether for their purposes or not for their purposes, he is not liable. On the holiday, for its purpose he is not liable, not for its purpose he is liable; for all other sacrifices, whether for their purposes or not for their purposes, he is liable except for the purification offering which he slaughtered not for its purpose.
MISHNAH: One who slaughters the Pesaḥ on leavened matter transgresses a prohibition; Rebbi Jehudah says, also the daily sacrifice. Rebbi Simeon says, the Pesaḥ on the Fourteenth, if for its purpose, he is liable, not for its purpose he is not liable. All other sacrifices, whether for their purposes or not for their purposes, he is not liable. On the holiday, for its purpose he is not liable, not for its purpose he is liable; for all other sacrifices, whether for their purposes or not for their purposes, he is liable except for the purification offering which he slaughtered not for its purpose.
MISHNAH: One who slaughters the Pesaḥ on leavened matter transgresses a prohibition; Rebbi Jehudah says, also the daily sacrifice. Rebbi Simeon says, the Pesaḥ on the Fourteenth, if for its purpose, he is liable, not for its purpose he is not liable. All other sacrifices, whether for their purposes or not for their purposes, he is not liable. On the holiday, for its purpose he is not liable, not for its purpose he is liable; for all other sacrifices, whether for their purposes or not for their purposes, he is liable except for the purification offering which he slaughtered not for its purpose.
MISHNAH: One who slaughters the Pesaḥ on leavened matter transgresses a prohibition; Rebbi Jehudah says, also the daily sacrifice. Rebbi Simeon says, the Pesaḥ on the Fourteenth, if for its purpose, he is liable, not for its purpose he is not liable. All other sacrifices, whether for their purposes or not for their purposes, he is not liable. On the holiday, for its purpose he is not liable, not for its purpose he is liable; for all other sacrifices, whether for their purposes or not for their purposes, he is liable except for the purification offering which he slaughtered not for its purpose.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the company was asking, where are we holding? If it was lost and found before propitiation, whether it was for its purpose or not for its purpose it is qualified and sent to grazing. If it was lost and found after propitiation, whether for its purpose or not for its purpose, it is disqualified as well-being offering. But we confirmed it when the owner became impure or acted criminally and already pushed to the Second Pesaḥ. For its purpose, he is not liable and it is disqualified. Not for its purpose, he is liable and it is qualified. There they are saying in the name of Rav Ḥisda: If its year was completed between First and Second. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan : When the time for its propitiation was passed. “If a Pesaḥ whose time had passed was slaughtered for its purpose at its time, or that he slaughtered another one for its purpose at its time, Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies and Rebbi Joshua qualifies. Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies since he is like one who slaughters a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice. Rebbi Joshua qualifies since he is like one who slaughters a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ.” Since its time is passed, there is no difference whether he slaughtered a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice or he slaughtered a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ. In the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, if its year was completed between First and Second. In the opinion of Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan , when the time for its propitiation was passed.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the company was asking, where are we holding? If it was lost and found before propitiation, whether it was for its purpose or not for its purpose it is qualified and sent to grazing. If it was lost and found after propitiation, whether for its purpose or not for its purpose, it is disqualified as well-being offering. But we confirmed it when the owner became impure or acted criminally and already pushed to the Second Pesaḥ. For its purpose, he is not liable and it is disqualified. Not for its purpose, he is liable and it is qualified. There they are saying in the name of Rav Ḥisda: If its year was completed between First and Second. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan : When the time for its propitiation was passed. “If a Pesaḥ whose time had passed was slaughtered for its purpose at its time, or that he slaughtered another one for its purpose at its time, Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies and Rebbi Joshua qualifies. Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies since he is like one who slaughters a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice. Rebbi Joshua qualifies since he is like one who slaughters a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ.” Since its time is passed, there is no difference whether he slaughtered a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice or he slaughtered a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ. In the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, if its year was completed between First and Second. In the opinion of Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan , when the time for its propitiation was passed.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the company was asking, where are we holding? If it was lost and found before propitiation, whether it was for its purpose or not for its purpose it is qualified and sent to grazing. If it was lost and found after propitiation, whether for its purpose or not for its purpose, it is disqualified as well-being offering. But we confirmed it when the owner became impure or acted criminally and already pushed to the Second Pesaḥ. For its purpose, he is not liable and it is disqualified. Not for its purpose, he is liable and it is qualified. There they are saying in the name of Rav Ḥisda: If its year was completed between First and Second. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan : When the time for its propitiation was passed. “If a Pesaḥ whose time had passed was slaughtered for its purpose at its time, or that he slaughtered another one for its purpose at its time, Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies and Rebbi Joshua qualifies. Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies since he is like one who slaughters a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice. Rebbi Joshua qualifies since he is like one who slaughters a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ.” Since its time is passed, there is no difference whether he slaughtered a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice or he slaughtered a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ. In the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, if its year was completed between First and Second. In the opinion of Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan , when the time for its propitiation was passed.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the company was asking, where are we holding? If it was lost and found before propitiation, whether it was for its purpose or not for its purpose it is qualified and sent to grazing. If it was lost and found after propitiation, whether for its purpose or not for its purpose, it is disqualified as well-being offering. But we confirmed it when the owner became impure or acted criminally and already pushed to the Second Pesaḥ. For its purpose, he is not liable and it is disqualified. Not for its purpose, he is liable and it is qualified. There they are saying in the name of Rav Ḥisda: If its year was completed between First and Second. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan : When the time for its propitiation was passed. “If a Pesaḥ whose time had passed was slaughtered for its purpose at its time, or that he slaughtered another one for its purpose at its time, Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies and Rebbi Joshua qualifies. Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies since he is like one who slaughters a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice. Rebbi Joshua qualifies since he is like one who slaughters a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ.” Since its time is passed, there is no difference whether he slaughtered a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice or he slaughtered a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ. In the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, if its year was completed between First and Second. In the opinion of Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan , when the time for its propitiation was passed.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the company was asking, where are we holding? If it was lost and found before propitiation, whether it was for its purpose or not for its purpose it is qualified and sent to grazing. If it was lost and found after propitiation, whether for its purpose or not for its purpose, it is disqualified as well-being offering. But we confirmed it when the owner became impure or acted criminally and already pushed to the Second Pesaḥ. For its purpose, he is not liable and it is disqualified. Not for its purpose, he is liable and it is qualified. There they are saying in the name of Rav Ḥisda: If its year was completed between First and Second. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan : When the time for its propitiation was passed. “If a Pesaḥ whose time had passed was slaughtered for its purpose at its time, or that he slaughtered another one for its purpose at its time, Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies and Rebbi Joshua qualifies. Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies since he is like one who slaughters a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice. Rebbi Joshua qualifies since he is like one who slaughters a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ.” Since its time is passed, there is no difference whether he slaughtered a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice or he slaughtered a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ. In the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, if its year was completed between First and Second. In the opinion of Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan , when the time for its propitiation was passed.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the company was asking, where are we holding? If it was lost and found before propitiation, whether it was for its purpose or not for its purpose it is qualified and sent to grazing. If it was lost and found after propitiation, whether for its purpose or not for its purpose, it is disqualified as well-being offering. But we confirmed it when the owner became impure or acted criminally and already pushed to the Second Pesaḥ. For its purpose, he is not liable and it is disqualified. Not for its purpose, he is liable and it is qualified. There they are saying in the name of Rav Ḥisda: If its year was completed between First and Second. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan : When the time for its propitiation was passed. “If a Pesaḥ whose time had passed was slaughtered for its purpose at its time, or that he slaughtered another one for its purpose at its time, Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies and Rebbi Joshua qualifies. Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies since he is like one who slaughters a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice. Rebbi Joshua qualifies since he is like one who slaughters a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ.” Since its time is passed, there is no difference whether he slaughtered a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice or he slaughtered a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ. In the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, if its year was completed between First and Second. In the opinion of Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan , when the time for its propitiation was passed.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the company was asking, where are we holding? If it was lost and found before propitiation, whether it was for its purpose or not for its purpose it is qualified and sent to grazing. If it was lost and found after propitiation, whether for its purpose or not for its purpose, it is disqualified as well-being offering. But we confirmed it when the owner became impure or acted criminally and already pushed to the Second Pesaḥ. For its purpose, he is not liable and it is disqualified. Not for its purpose, he is liable and it is qualified. There they are saying in the name of Rav Ḥisda: If its year was completed between First and Second. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan : When the time for its propitiation was passed. “If a Pesaḥ whose time had passed was slaughtered for its purpose at its time, or that he slaughtered another one for its purpose at its time, Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies and Rebbi Joshua qualifies. Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies since he is like one who slaughters a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice. Rebbi Joshua qualifies since he is like one who slaughters a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ.” Since its time is passed, there is no difference whether he slaughtered a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice or he slaughtered a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ. In the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, if its year was completed between First and Second. In the opinion of Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan , when the time for its propitiation was passed.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the company was asking, where are we holding? If it was lost and found before propitiation, whether it was for its purpose or not for its purpose it is qualified and sent to grazing. If it was lost and found after propitiation, whether for its purpose or not for its purpose, it is disqualified as well-being offering. But we confirmed it when the owner became impure or acted criminally and already pushed to the Second Pesaḥ. For its purpose, he is not liable and it is disqualified. Not for its purpose, he is liable and it is qualified. There they are saying in the name of Rav Ḥisda: If its year was completed between First and Second. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan : When the time for its propitiation was passed. “If a Pesaḥ whose time had passed was slaughtered for its purpose at its time, or that he slaughtered another one for its purpose at its time, Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies and Rebbi Joshua qualifies. Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies since he is like one who slaughters a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice. Rebbi Joshua qualifies since he is like one who slaughters a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ.” Since its time is passed, there is no difference whether he slaughtered a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice or he slaughtered a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ. In the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, if its year was completed between First and Second. In the opinion of Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan , when the time for its propitiation was passed.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the company was asking, where are we holding? If it was lost and found before propitiation, whether it was for its purpose or not for its purpose it is qualified and sent to grazing. If it was lost and found after propitiation, whether for its purpose or not for its purpose, it is disqualified as well-being offering. But we confirmed it when the owner became impure or acted criminally and already pushed to the Second Pesaḥ. For its purpose, he is not liable and it is disqualified. Not for its purpose, he is liable and it is qualified. There they are saying in the name of Rav Ḥisda: If its year was completed between First and Second. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan : When the time for its propitiation was passed. “If a Pesaḥ whose time had passed was slaughtered for its purpose at its time, or that he slaughtered another one for its purpose at its time, Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies and Rebbi Joshua qualifies. Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies since he is like one who slaughters a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice. Rebbi Joshua qualifies since he is like one who slaughters a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ.” Since its time is passed, there is no difference whether he slaughtered a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice or he slaughtered a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ. In the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, if its year was completed between First and Second. In the opinion of Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan , when the time for its propitiation was passed.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the company was asking, where are we holding? If it was lost and found before propitiation, whether it was for its purpose or not for its purpose it is qualified and sent to grazing. If it was lost and found after propitiation, whether for its purpose or not for its purpose, it is disqualified as well-being offering. But we confirmed it when the owner became impure or acted criminally and already pushed to the Second Pesaḥ. For its purpose, he is not liable and it is disqualified. Not for its purpose, he is liable and it is qualified. There they are saying in the name of Rav Ḥisda: If its year was completed between First and Second. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan : When the time for its propitiation was passed. “If a Pesaḥ whose time had passed was slaughtered for its purpose at its time, or that he slaughtered another one for its purpose at its time, Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies and Rebbi Joshua qualifies. Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies since he is like one who slaughters a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice. Rebbi Joshua qualifies since he is like one who slaughters a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ.” Since its time is passed, there is no difference whether he slaughtered a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice or he slaughtered a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ. In the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, if its year was completed between First and Second. In the opinion of Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan , when the time for its propitiation was passed.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the company was asking, where are we holding? If it was lost and found before propitiation, whether it was for its purpose or not for its purpose it is qualified and sent to grazing. If it was lost and found after propitiation, whether for its purpose or not for its purpose, it is disqualified as well-being offering. But we confirmed it when the owner became impure or acted criminally and already pushed to the Second Pesaḥ. For its purpose, he is not liable and it is disqualified. Not for its purpose, he is liable and it is qualified. There they are saying in the name of Rav Ḥisda: If its year was completed between First and Second. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan : When the time for its propitiation was passed. “If a Pesaḥ whose time had passed was slaughtered for its purpose at its time, or that he slaughtered another one for its purpose at its time, Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies and Rebbi Joshua qualifies. Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies since he is like one who slaughters a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice. Rebbi Joshua qualifies since he is like one who slaughters a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ.” Since its time is passed, there is no difference whether he slaughtered a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice or he slaughtered a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ. In the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, if its year was completed between First and Second. In the opinion of Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan , when the time for its propitiation was passed.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, the company was asking, where are we holding? If it was lost and found before propitiation, whether it was for its purpose or not for its purpose it is qualified and sent to grazing. If it was lost and found after propitiation, whether for its purpose or not for its purpose, it is disqualified as well-being offering. But we confirmed it when the owner became impure or acted criminally and already pushed to the Second Pesaḥ. For its purpose, he is not liable and it is disqualified. Not for its purpose, he is liable and it is qualified. There they are saying in the name of Rav Ḥisda: If its year was completed between First and Second. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan : When the time for its propitiation was passed. “If a Pesaḥ whose time had passed was slaughtered for its purpose at its time, or that he slaughtered another one for its purpose at its time, Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies and Rebbi Joshua qualifies. Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies since he is like one who slaughters a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice. Rebbi Joshua qualifies since he is like one who slaughters a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ.” Since its time is passed, there is no difference whether he slaughtered a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice or he slaughtered a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ. In the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, if its year was completed between First and Second. In the opinion of Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan , when the time for its propitiation was passed.
MISHNAH: He who slaughters the Pesaḥ not for its purpose on the Sabbath is for this liable for a purification sacrifice. For any other sacrifice which he slaughtered for the purpose of Pesaḥ, if they are not suitable he is liable, if suitable, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares not liable. Rebbi Eliezer said to him, since for Pesaḥ, which is permitted for its purpose, he is liable if he changed its purpose, sacrifices which are forbidden for their purpose, it should be logical that he be liable if he changed their purpose. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about Pesaḥ, which he changed to something forbidden, what can you infer about sacrifices which he changed to something permitted? Rebbi Eliezer said to him, public parts should prove it, which are permitted for their purpose and he who slaughters for their purpose is liable. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about public parts which are fixed in number, what can you infer about Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? Rebbi Meïr says, also he who slaughters for the purpose of public parts is not liable.
MISHNAH: He who slaughters the Pesaḥ not for its purpose on the Sabbath is for this liable for a purification sacrifice. For any other sacrifice which he slaughtered for the purpose of Pesaḥ, if they are not suitable he is liable, if suitable, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares not liable. Rebbi Eliezer said to him, since for Pesaḥ, which is permitted for its purpose, he is liable if he changed its purpose, sacrifices which are forbidden for their purpose, it should be logical that he be liable if he changed their purpose. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about Pesaḥ, which he changed to something forbidden, what can you infer about sacrifices which he changed to something permitted? Rebbi Eliezer said to him, public parts should prove it, which are permitted for their purpose and he who slaughters for their purpose is liable. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about public parts which are fixed in number, what can you infer about Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? Rebbi Meïr says, also he who slaughters for the purpose of public parts is not liable.
MISHNAH: He who slaughters the Pesaḥ not for its purpose on the Sabbath is for this liable for a purification sacrifice. For any other sacrifice which he slaughtered for the purpose of Pesaḥ, if they are not suitable he is liable, if suitable, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares not liable. Rebbi Eliezer said to him, since for Pesaḥ, which is permitted for its purpose, he is liable if he changed its purpose, sacrifices which are forbidden for their purpose, it should be logical that he be liable if he changed their purpose. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about Pesaḥ, which he changed to something forbidden, what can you infer about sacrifices which he changed to something permitted? Rebbi Eliezer said to him, public parts should prove it, which are permitted for their purpose and he who slaughters for their purpose is liable. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about public parts which are fixed in number, what can you infer about Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? Rebbi Meïr says, also he who slaughters for the purpose of public parts is not liable.
MISHNAH: He who slaughters the Pesaḥ not for its purpose on the Sabbath is for this liable for a purification sacrifice. For any other sacrifice which he slaughtered for the purpose of Pesaḥ, if they are not suitable he is liable, if suitable, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares not liable. Rebbi Eliezer said to him, since for Pesaḥ, which is permitted for its purpose, he is liable if he changed its purpose, sacrifices which are forbidden for their purpose, it should be logical that he be liable if he changed their purpose. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about Pesaḥ, which he changed to something forbidden, what can you infer about sacrifices which he changed to something permitted? Rebbi Eliezer said to him, public parts should prove it, which are permitted for their purpose and he who slaughters for their purpose is liable. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about public parts which are fixed in number, what can you infer about Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? Rebbi Meïr says, also he who slaughters for the purpose of public parts is not liable.
MISHNAH: He who slaughters the Pesaḥ not for its purpose on the Sabbath is for this liable for a purification sacrifice. For any other sacrifice which he slaughtered for the purpose of Pesaḥ, if they are not suitable he is liable, if suitable, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares not liable. Rebbi Eliezer said to him, since for Pesaḥ, which is permitted for its purpose, he is liable if he changed its purpose, sacrifices which are forbidden for their purpose, it should be logical that he be liable if he changed their purpose. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about Pesaḥ, which he changed to something forbidden, what can you infer about sacrifices which he changed to something permitted? Rebbi Eliezer said to him, public parts should prove it, which are permitted for their purpose and he who slaughters for their purpose is liable. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about public parts which are fixed in number, what can you infer about Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? Rebbi Meïr says, also he who slaughters for the purpose of public parts is not liable.
MISHNAH: He who slaughters the Pesaḥ not for its purpose on the Sabbath is for this liable for a purification sacrifice. For any other sacrifice which he slaughtered for the purpose of Pesaḥ, if they are not suitable he is liable, if suitable, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares not liable. Rebbi Eliezer said to him, since for Pesaḥ, which is permitted for its purpose, he is liable if he changed its purpose, sacrifices which are forbidden for their purpose, it should be logical that he be liable if he changed their purpose. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about Pesaḥ, which he changed to something forbidden, what can you infer about sacrifices which he changed to something permitted? Rebbi Eliezer said to him, public parts should prove it, which are permitted for their purpose and he who slaughters for their purpose is liable. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about public parts which are fixed in number, what can you infer about Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? Rebbi Meïr says, also he who slaughters for the purpose of public parts is not liable.
MISHNAH: He who slaughters the Pesaḥ not for its purpose on the Sabbath is for this liable for a purification sacrifice. For any other sacrifice which he slaughtered for the purpose of Pesaḥ, if they are not suitable he is liable, if suitable, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares not liable. Rebbi Eliezer said to him, since for Pesaḥ, which is permitted for its purpose, he is liable if he changed its purpose, sacrifices which are forbidden for their purpose, it should be logical that he be liable if he changed their purpose. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about Pesaḥ, which he changed to something forbidden, what can you infer about sacrifices which he changed to something permitted? Rebbi Eliezer said to him, public parts should prove it, which are permitted for their purpose and he who slaughters for their purpose is liable. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about public parts which are fixed in number, what can you infer about Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? Rebbi Meïr says, also he who slaughters for the purpose of public parts is not liable.
MISHNAH: He who slaughters the Pesaḥ not for its purpose on the Sabbath is for this liable for a purification sacrifice. For any other sacrifice which he slaughtered for the purpose of Pesaḥ, if they are not suitable he is liable, if suitable, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares not liable. Rebbi Eliezer said to him, since for Pesaḥ, which is permitted for its purpose, he is liable if he changed its purpose, sacrifices which are forbidden for their purpose, it should be logical that he be liable if he changed their purpose. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about Pesaḥ, which he changed to something forbidden, what can you infer about sacrifices which he changed to something permitted? Rebbi Eliezer said to him, public parts should prove it, which are permitted for their purpose and he who slaughters for their purpose is liable. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about public parts which are fixed in number, what can you infer about Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? Rebbi Meïr says, also he who slaughters for the purpose of public parts is not liable.
MISHNAH: He who slaughters the Pesaḥ not for its purpose on the Sabbath is for this liable for a purification sacrifice. For any other sacrifice which he slaughtered for the purpose of Pesaḥ, if they are not suitable he is liable, if suitable, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares not liable. Rebbi Eliezer said to him, since for Pesaḥ, which is permitted for its purpose, he is liable if he changed its purpose, sacrifices which are forbidden for their purpose, it should be logical that he be liable if he changed their purpose. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about Pesaḥ, which he changed to something forbidden, what can you infer about sacrifices which he changed to something permitted? Rebbi Eliezer said to him, public parts should prove it, which are permitted for their purpose and he who slaughters for their purpose is liable. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about public parts which are fixed in number, what can you infer about Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? Rebbi Meïr says, also he who slaughters for the purpose of public parts is not liable.
HALAKHAH: The Mishnah if he realized that it was Pesaḥ but he slaughtered it for the purpose of well-being offerings. If he knew that it was a well-being offering but he slaughtered it for the purpose of an elevation offering. Rebbi Mana said, there is fulfilling of a commandment in his action. Rebbi Yose said, there is no fulfilling of a commandment in his action. Rams of the public which he thought were sheep and he slaughtered them for the purpose of rams, are they perhaps not counted as rams for the public? It was stated thus: Rams of the public which he thought were sheep and he slaughtered them for the purpose of rams, already are counted for the public as fulfillment of their obligation. The Mishnah applies if he thought it was Pesaḥ and he slaughtered it for the purpose of Pesaḥ. If he knew that it was a well-being sacrifice but thought to say that it is permitted to change well-being sacrifice into Pesaḥ, Rebbi Mana said, there is no fulfilling of a commandment in his action; Rebbi Yose said, there is fulfilling of a commandment in his action. It is reasonable following Rebbi Mana in the first case, following Rebbi Yose in the last.
HALAKHAH: The Mishnah if he realized that it was Pesaḥ but he slaughtered it for the purpose of well-being offerings. If he knew that it was a well-being offering but he slaughtered it for the purpose of an elevation offering. Rebbi Mana said, there is fulfilling of a commandment in his action. Rebbi Yose said, there is no fulfilling of a commandment in his action. Rams of the public which he thought were sheep and he slaughtered them for the purpose of rams, are they perhaps not counted as rams for the public? It was stated thus: Rams of the public which he thought were sheep and he slaughtered them for the purpose of rams, already are counted for the public as fulfillment of their obligation. The Mishnah applies if he thought it was Pesaḥ and he slaughtered it for the purpose of Pesaḥ. If he knew that it was a well-being sacrifice but thought to say that it is permitted to change well-being sacrifice into Pesaḥ, Rebbi Mana said, there is no fulfilling of a commandment in his action; Rebbi Yose said, there is fulfilling of a commandment in his action. It is reasonable following Rebbi Mana in the first case, following Rebbi Yose in the last.
HALAKHAH: The Mishnah if he realized that it was Pesaḥ but he slaughtered it for the purpose of well-being offerings. If he knew that it was a well-being offering but he slaughtered it for the purpose of an elevation offering. Rebbi Mana said, there is fulfilling of a commandment in his action. Rebbi Yose said, there is no fulfilling of a commandment in his action. Rams of the public which he thought were sheep and he slaughtered them for the purpose of rams, are they perhaps not counted as rams for the public? It was stated thus: Rams of the public which he thought were sheep and he slaughtered them for the purpose of rams, already are counted for the public as fulfillment of their obligation. The Mishnah applies if he thought it was Pesaḥ and he slaughtered it for the purpose of Pesaḥ. If he knew that it was a well-being sacrifice but thought to say that it is permitted to change well-being sacrifice into Pesaḥ, Rebbi Mana said, there is no fulfilling of a commandment in his action; Rebbi Yose said, there is fulfilling of a commandment in his action. It is reasonable following Rebbi Mana in the first case, following Rebbi Yose in the last.
HALAKHAH: The Mishnah if he realized that it was Pesaḥ but he slaughtered it for the purpose of well-being offerings. If he knew that it was a well-being offering but he slaughtered it for the purpose of an elevation offering. Rebbi Mana said, there is fulfilling of a commandment in his action. Rebbi Yose said, there is no fulfilling of a commandment in his action. Rams of the public which he thought were sheep and he slaughtered them for the purpose of rams, are they perhaps not counted as rams for the public? It was stated thus: Rams of the public which he thought were sheep and he slaughtered them for the purpose of rams, already are counted for the public as fulfillment of their obligation. The Mishnah applies if he thought it was Pesaḥ and he slaughtered it for the purpose of Pesaḥ. If he knew that it was a well-being sacrifice but thought to say that it is permitted to change well-being sacrifice into Pesaḥ, Rebbi Mana said, there is no fulfilling of a commandment in his action; Rebbi Yose said, there is fulfilling of a commandment in his action. It is reasonable following Rebbi Mana in the first case, following Rebbi Yose in the last.
HALAKHAH: The Mishnah if he realized that it was Pesaḥ but he slaughtered it for the purpose of well-being offerings. If he knew that it was a well-being offering but he slaughtered it for the purpose of an elevation offering. Rebbi Mana said, there is fulfilling of a commandment in his action. Rebbi Yose said, there is no fulfilling of a commandment in his action. Rams of the public which he thought were sheep and he slaughtered them for the purpose of rams, are they perhaps not counted as rams for the public? It was stated thus: Rams of the public which he thought were sheep and he slaughtered them for the purpose of rams, already are counted for the public as fulfillment of their obligation. The Mishnah applies if he thought it was Pesaḥ and he slaughtered it for the purpose of Pesaḥ. If he knew that it was a well-being sacrifice but thought to say that it is permitted to change well-being sacrifice into Pesaḥ, Rebbi Mana said, there is no fulfilling of a commandment in his action; Rebbi Yose said, there is fulfilling of a commandment in his action. It is reasonable following Rebbi Mana in the first case, following Rebbi Yose in the last.
“Rebbi Meïr says, also he who slaughters for the purpose of public parts is not liable.” Rebbi Eleazar said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: even a calf. You understand from here two things. You understand something which has no fixed number, or that is apt to being changed, only if the act is meritorious. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if the act is meritorious, for example his sister-in-law which is menstruating and he slept with her. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if the act is [not] meritorious, for example two spits, one with slaughtered meat, the other with carcass meat, and he intended to eat from one but ate from the other. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he forgot and circumcised the one for Sunday on the Sabbath, Rebbi Eliezer makes him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares him not liable.” In this case the act is not meritorious and Rebbi Joshua declares not liable. Samuel from Cappadocia said, the next day it is meritorious.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: It is a stipulation of the Court that one dedicate his Pesaḥ and the other his money. He lets him subscribe to his [part] and the money automatically becomes profane. How? It becomes profane and then dedicated again? Or for this purpose it was dedicated from the start? What is the difference between them? If he dedicated 100 mina for his Pesaḥ and used 50 to subscribe. If you are saying that it becomes profane and is dedicated again, the remainder of the monies are profane. If you are saying that for this purpose he dedicated it from the start, the rest of the monies are (profane) [dedicated]. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Samuel bar Abba asked: Think of it if he lets him subscribe gratis. Where do you have “becomes profane and is dedicated again”? The words of the rabbis imply that it does not become profane and then dedicated again. We have stated there: “If he gave her monies, they are permitted; wines, oils, and fine flour, or anything of whose kind one offers on the altar, are forbidden.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he lets him subscribe to his Pesaḥ and to his festival offering. This implies that it does not become profane and then dedicated again. If you would say that it becomes profane and then dedicated again, it would be forbidden as harlot’s wages. Explain it if nothing was given into his hand; you should know as it was stated there, “he can bring for him nests for male or female sufferers from genital discharges, nests for childbirth;” not if nothing came into his hands? Here also if nothing came into his hands.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: It is a stipulation of the Court that one dedicate his Pesaḥ and the other his money. He lets him subscribe to his [part] and the money automatically becomes profane. How? It becomes profane and then dedicated again? Or for this purpose it was dedicated from the start? What is the difference between them? If he dedicated 100 mina for his Pesaḥ and used 50 to subscribe. If you are saying that it becomes profane and is dedicated again, the remainder of the monies are profane. If you are saying that for this purpose he dedicated it from the start, the rest of the monies are (profane) [dedicated]. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Samuel bar Abba asked: Think of it if he lets him subscribe gratis. Where do you have “becomes profane and is dedicated again”? The words of the rabbis imply that it does not become profane and then dedicated again. We have stated there: “If he gave her monies, they are permitted; wines, oils, and fine flour, or anything of whose kind one offers on the altar, are forbidden.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he lets him subscribe to his Pesaḥ and to his festival offering. This implies that it does not become profane and then dedicated again. If you would say that it becomes profane and then dedicated again, it would be forbidden as harlot’s wages. Explain it if nothing was given into his hand; you should know as it was stated there, “he can bring for him nests for male or female sufferers from genital discharges, nests for childbirth;” not if nothing came into his hands? Here also if nothing came into his hands.
As in the following: The city council and the military district had to bring a gift. The case came before Rebbi who said, the city council is not included in the military district. For which purpose did he say “city council and military district”? But that each party give one half. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi follows his opinion, as Rebbi said, for Aaron and his sons, half for Aaron and half for his sons.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, we do not find that slaughter be qualified by a non-Cohen. Rav commanded his students, everywhere state “he slaughters”, but for the Cow state “sprinkles”; and Rebbi Joḥanan said, we do not find that slaughter be (qualified) [disqualified] by a non-Cohen. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba objected. Is it not written, he slaughters, he sprinkles? Since sprinkling is not qualified by a woman as by a man, also slaughter is not qualified by a woman as by a man. He said to him, but sprinkling always was qualified by a Non-Cohen and disqualified by a woman. He answered him, there “Cohen” is not written. For which purpose is written a man? To qualify a non-Cohen. There is no difference between man and woman. If you are saying that it is qualified by a non-Cohen, it has to be qualified by a woman.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, about this Abba bar Abba enlightened me, for they are saying, from where that Pesaḥ is changed into the denomination of well-being sacrifices? The verse says, and if his sacrifice be from small cattle as meal well-being offering; anything from small cattle comes as well-being offering. They objected, is there not an elevation offering from small cattle? Anything which only comes from small cattle; this eliminates the elevation offering which even may come from large cattle. They objected, is there not reparation offering? Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, “from small cattle”. this eliminates the reparation offering, which only comes from rams. Everywhere you are saying that מִן (is to include) [is to exclude], but here you are saying that (מִן is to exclude) [is to include]. Rebbi Mana said, (it excludes it,) [here also מִן is to exclude: It excludes in that it may not be brought two years old; it excludes that it cannot be brought female; and for a reparation offering also it excludes] since it only comes from rams. They objected, is there not written, and if his sacrifice be from small cattle, from sheep or goats, as elevation offering; then excess Pesaḥ should become elevation offering? Rebbi Abun said, one changes something to be eaten into something to be eaten, but one does not change something to be eaten into something not to be eaten. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one changes simple sancta into simple sancta, but one does not change simple sancta into most holy sacrifices. Rebbi Joḥanan said, about what Rebbi Ḥanina enlightened, that they are saying, Pesaḥ is changed into a well-being offering only if he slaughtered it for the purpose of well-being offering; but I am saying, even for the purpose of an elevation offering. Rebbi Illa said, the reason of Rebbi Joḥanan: And if his sacrifice be from small cattle as meal well-being offering; anything to be consumed as sanctum is a well-being offering. Does it change with respect to disqualifying thoughts? How is this? If he slaughtered it for the purpose of an elevation offering in order to pour its blood the next day. In any case, it is disqualified. If you are saying that it changes with respect to disqualifying thoughts, it is piggul. If you are saying that it does not change with respect to disqualifying thoughts, it is disqualified.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, about this Abba bar Abba enlightened me, for they are saying, from where that Pesaḥ is changed into the denomination of well-being sacrifices? The verse says, and if his sacrifice be from small cattle as meal well-being offering; anything from small cattle comes as well-being offering. They objected, is there not an elevation offering from small cattle? Anything which only comes from small cattle; this eliminates the elevation offering which even may come from large cattle. They objected, is there not reparation offering? Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, “from small cattle”. this eliminates the reparation offering, which only comes from rams. Everywhere you are saying that מִן (is to include) [is to exclude], but here you are saying that (מִן is to exclude) [is to include]. Rebbi Mana said, (it excludes it,) [here also מִן is to exclude: It excludes in that it may not be brought two years old; it excludes that it cannot be brought female; and for a reparation offering also it excludes] since it only comes from rams. They objected, is there not written, and if his sacrifice be from small cattle, from sheep or goats, as elevation offering; then excess Pesaḥ should become elevation offering? Rebbi Abun said, one changes something to be eaten into something to be eaten, but one does not change something to be eaten into something not to be eaten. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one changes simple sancta into simple sancta, but one does not change simple sancta into most holy sacrifices. Rebbi Joḥanan said, about what Rebbi Ḥanina enlightened, that they are saying, Pesaḥ is changed into a well-being offering only if he slaughtered it for the purpose of well-being offering; but I am saying, even for the purpose of an elevation offering. Rebbi Illa said, the reason of Rebbi Joḥanan: And if his sacrifice be from small cattle as meal well-being offering; anything to be consumed as sanctum is a well-being offering. Does it change with respect to disqualifying thoughts? How is this? If he slaughtered it for the purpose of an elevation offering in order to pour its blood the next day. In any case, it is disqualified. If you are saying that it changes with respect to disqualifying thoughts, it is piggul. If you are saying that it does not change with respect to disqualifying thoughts, it is disqualified.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, about this Abba bar Abba enlightened me, for they are saying, from where that Pesaḥ is changed into the denomination of well-being sacrifices? The verse says, and if his sacrifice be from small cattle as meal well-being offering; anything from small cattle comes as well-being offering. They objected, is there not an elevation offering from small cattle? Anything which only comes from small cattle; this eliminates the elevation offering which even may come from large cattle. They objected, is there not reparation offering? Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, “from small cattle”. this eliminates the reparation offering, which only comes from rams. Everywhere you are saying that מִן (is to include) [is to exclude], but here you are saying that (מִן is to exclude) [is to include]. Rebbi Mana said, (it excludes it,) [here also מִן is to exclude: It excludes in that it may not be brought two years old; it excludes that it cannot be brought female; and for a reparation offering also it excludes] since it only comes from rams. They objected, is there not written, and if his sacrifice be from small cattle, from sheep or goats, as elevation offering; then excess Pesaḥ should become elevation offering? Rebbi Abun said, one changes something to be eaten into something to be eaten, but one does not change something to be eaten into something not to be eaten. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one changes simple sancta into simple sancta, but one does not change simple sancta into most holy sacrifices. Rebbi Joḥanan said, about what Rebbi Ḥanina enlightened, that they are saying, Pesaḥ is changed into a well-being offering only if he slaughtered it for the purpose of well-being offering; but I am saying, even for the purpose of an elevation offering. Rebbi Illa said, the reason of Rebbi Joḥanan: And if his sacrifice be from small cattle as meal well-being offering; anything to be consumed as sanctum is a well-being offering. Does it change with respect to disqualifying thoughts? How is this? If he slaughtered it for the purpose of an elevation offering in order to pour its blood the next day. In any case, it is disqualified. If you are saying that it changes with respect to disqualifying thoughts, it is piggul. If you are saying that it does not change with respect to disqualifying thoughts, it is disqualified.
For its purpose and not for its purpose on the other days of the year? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Samuel bar Abba: Since it is left without a name it is as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and is qualified. They said to him. if it is so, even if he slaughtered for its purpose to pour the blood not for its purpose it should be treated as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and be qualified. Rebbi Abba Mari said, who says that in silence it is qualified? Or may we say, in silence it is disqualified?
For its purpose and not for its purpose on the other days of the year? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Samuel bar Abba: Since it is left without a name it is as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and is qualified. They said to him. if it is so, even if he slaughtered for its purpose to pour the blood not for its purpose it should be treated as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and be qualified. Rebbi Abba Mari said, who says that in silence it is qualified? Or may we say, in silence it is disqualified?
For its purpose and not for its purpose on the other days of the year? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Samuel bar Abba: Since it is left without a name it is as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and is qualified. They said to him. if it is so, even if he slaughtered for its purpose to pour the blood not for its purpose it should be treated as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and be qualified. Rebbi Abba Mari said, who says that in silence it is qualified? Or may we say, in silence it is disqualified?
For its purpose and not for its purpose on the other days of the year? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Samuel bar Abba: Since it is left without a name it is as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and is qualified. They said to him. if it is so, even if he slaughtered for its purpose to pour the blood not for its purpose it should be treated as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and be qualified. Rebbi Abba Mari said, who says that in silence it is qualified? Or may we say, in silence it is disqualified?
For its purpose and not for its purpose on the other days of the year? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Samuel bar Abba: Since it is left without a name it is as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and is qualified. They said to him. if it is so, even if he slaughtered for its purpose to pour the blood not for its purpose it should be treated as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and be qualified. Rebbi Abba Mari said, who says that in silence it is qualified? Or may we say, in silence it is disqualified?
For its purpose and not for its purpose on the other days of the year? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Samuel bar Abba: Since it is left without a name it is as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and is qualified. They said to him. if it is so, even if he slaughtered for its purpose to pour the blood not for its purpose it should be treated as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and be qualified. Rebbi Abba Mari said, who says that in silence it is qualified? Or may we say, in silence it is disqualified?
For its purpose and not for its purpose on the other days of the year? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Samuel bar Abba: Since it is left without a name it is as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and is qualified. They said to him. if it is so, even if he slaughtered for its purpose to pour the blood not for its purpose it should be treated as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and be qualified. Rebbi Abba Mari said, who says that in silence it is qualified? Or may we say, in silence it is disqualified?
For its purpose and not for its purpose on the other days of the year? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Samuel bar Abba: Since it is left without a name it is as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and is qualified. They said to him. if it is so, even if he slaughtered for its purpose to pour the blood not for its purpose it should be treated as if from the start he slaughtered for its purpose and not for its purpose in silence and be qualified. Rebbi Abba Mari said, who says that in silence it is qualified? Or may we say, in silence it is disqualified?
It is forbidden to carry under the four-gated bowers in vineyards since they form the end of the roof and the end of a roof cannot save as a symbolic fence. Rebbi Phineas said, a case came before Rebbi Jeremiah of four pillars and on them four beams; he permitted to carry under them because of a symbolic fence. Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Abun asked before Rebbi Ze`ira, does a symbolic fence save in a sukkah? He said to them, a symbolic fence saves in a sukkah. Does the end of the roofing save in a sukkah? He said to them, the end of the roofing does not save in a sukkah. What is the difference between them? One is made for the purpose, the other one is not made for the purpose. Rebbi Abbahu said, all these things are for discussion’s sake, but as far as teaching, it is forbidden to teach it. If this is forbidden for the minor commandment of sukkah, so much more for the strict commandment of Sabbath! Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze`ira: Is not the Tanna, according to whom a symbolic fence saves, Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri? He said to him, that is the Tanna.
It is forbidden to carry under the four-gated bowers in vineyards since they form the end of the roof and the end of a roof cannot save as a symbolic fence. Rebbi Phineas said, a case came before Rebbi Jeremiah of four pillars and on them four beams; he permitted to carry under them because of a symbolic fence. Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Abun asked before Rebbi Ze`ira, does a symbolic fence save in a sukkah? He said to them, a symbolic fence saves in a sukkah. Does the end of the roofing save in a sukkah? He said to them, the end of the roofing does not save in a sukkah. What is the difference between them? One is made for the purpose, the other one is not made for the purpose. Rebbi Abbahu said, all these things are for discussion’s sake, but as far as teaching, it is forbidden to teach it. If this is forbidden for the minor commandment of sukkah, so much more for the strict commandment of Sabbath! Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze`ira: Is not the Tanna, according to whom a symbolic fence saves, Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri? He said to him, that is the Tanna.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Only if he drew them (on the spot) [for this purpose]. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: He needs to move it. Rebbi Yose said, both of them are for leniency. If he drew them (on the spot) [for this purpose] even if he did not move it; if he moved it even if he did not draw them (on the spot) [for this purpose].
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Only if he drew them (on the spot) [for this purpose]. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: He needs to move it. Rebbi Yose said, both of them are for leniency. If he drew them (on the spot) [for this purpose] even if he did not move it; if he moved it even if he did not draw them (on the spot) [for this purpose].
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Only if he drew them (on the spot) [for this purpose]. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: He needs to move it. Rebbi Yose said, both of them are for leniency. If he drew them (on the spot) [for this purpose] even if he did not move it; if he moved it even if he did not draw them (on the spot) [for this purpose].
HALAKHAH: Jehudah the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya went out. They asked him, what are the rules for a ladder to the upper floor? He told them, it is permitted. When he returned to his father, he asked him, what case came to your hands? He said, I permitted them the ladder to the upper floor. He appointed his Tanna before him, who stated, “when was this said, about a ladder for a dovecote. But a ladder for the upper floor is forbidden.” What is the difference between a ladder for a dovecote and a ladder for the upper floor? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a ladder for a dovecote if he had used it the day before for work it would be weak; a ladder for the upper floor may be used for work the day before. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, on the ladder for a dovecote he may stand and use it for his purpose; on the ladder for the upper floor he may not stand and use it for his purpose. A ladder for a dovecote even if it is used to climb to the upper floor; a ladder for the upper floor even if it used to climb to the dovecote.
HALAKHAH: Jehudah the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya went out. They asked him, what are the rules for a ladder to the upper floor? He told them, it is permitted. When he returned to his father, he asked him, what case came to your hands? He said, I permitted them the ladder to the upper floor. He appointed his Tanna before him, who stated, “when was this said, about a ladder for a dovecote. But a ladder for the upper floor is forbidden.” What is the difference between a ladder for a dovecote and a ladder for the upper floor? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a ladder for a dovecote if he had used it the day before for work it would be weak; a ladder for the upper floor may be used for work the day before. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, on the ladder for a dovecote he may stand and use it for his purpose; on the ladder for the upper floor he may not stand and use it for his purpose. A ladder for a dovecote even if it is used to climb to the upper floor; a ladder for the upper floor even if it used to climb to the dovecote.
HALAKHAH: Therefore not an adult? Rebbi Samuel, the son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, even an adult is permitted. For what purpose was stated “a small child”? It comes to inform you of the strength of the House of Shammai, how far they are restrictive. Samuel was carried from bed to bed. Rebbi Ze`ira said before Rebbi Yasa, let us say that he was asthenic. He told him, he was healthier than I and you. It was stated, Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi <yose> says, the stones on which we sat on in our youth make war against us in our old age. Rebbi Jonah ordered the colleagues, do not sit on the [outside] stone benches of the assembly of Bar Ulla because they are cold. Rav commanded his students, do not sit on the outside table of the assembly of Issy because it is cold. Rebbi Abba went down to bathe in the public baths of Tiberias, leaning on two Goths. They fell down and he lifted them up, they fell down and he lifted them up. One asked him, what is this? He said to them, I preserved my strength for my old age. Rav Huna did not come to the house of assembly. Rav Qatina asked, was it not stated that one carries the asthenics?
It and its young fell into a cistern. Rebbi Eliezer said, he should lift the first one for the purpose of slaughtering it and slaughter it. The second one has to be provided for at its place so it should not die. Rebbi Joshua says, he should lift the first one for the purpose of slaughtering it and not slaughter it, and be cunning and lift the second one. Even though he had no intention of slaughtering either of them, he is permitted. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Is the argument of Rebbi Eliezer not inverted? Here he says, one is prohibited from cunning but there he says, one is permitted to be cunning. There it is because “not to be seen nor found”; here, what do you have? Is the argument of Rebbi Joshua not inverted? Here he says, one is permitted to be cunning, but there he says, one is prohibited from cunning. Rebbi Idi said, here it is a rabbinic Sabbath prohibition, but there liability for a purification offering. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, here it is to protect Jews’ money; there what do you have? Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Joshia, one like one of them, the other like the other.
It and its young fell into a cistern. Rebbi Eliezer said, he should lift the first one for the purpose of slaughtering it and slaughter it. The second one has to be provided for at its place so it should not die. Rebbi Joshua says, he should lift the first one for the purpose of slaughtering it and not slaughter it, and be cunning and lift the second one. Even though he had no intention of slaughtering either of them, he is permitted. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Is the argument of Rebbi Eliezer not inverted? Here he says, one is prohibited from cunning but there he says, one is permitted to be cunning. There it is because “not to be seen nor found”; here, what do you have? Is the argument of Rebbi Joshua not inverted? Here he says, one is permitted to be cunning, but there he says, one is prohibited from cunning. Rebbi Idi said, here it is a rabbinic Sabbath prohibition, but there liability for a purification offering. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, here it is to protect Jews’ money; there what do you have? Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Joshia, one like one of them, the other like the other.
Rebbi Levi said: The upper waters are male and the lower ones female. What is the reason? The earth shall open, they shall bear fruit of help. The earth shall open, like a female who opens before a male; they should bear fruit of help, that is being fruitful and multiplying; and justice shall sprout, that is rainfall; I, the Eternal, did create it, for this purpose I created it, for the wellb̮eing of the world. Rebbi Aḥa stated it in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Gamliel: Why is it called “fertilizing”? Because it impregnates the earth.
“They said to him, just as you prayed for them to come, so pray to remove them. He told them, go and check whether the losers’ stone was wiped away.” What was the purpose of the losers’ stone. Only that anybody who lost something was taking it from there and anybody who found something was bringing it there. He told them that just as it is impossible for this stone to be wiped off from the world, so it is impossible to pray that the rains should stop. But go and bring me a bull as thanksgiving offering. They went and brought him a bull as thanksgiving offering. He leaned on it with both of his hands and said, my Master! You brought evil on Your children and they could not stand it; You brought benefit on Your children and they could not stand it, but may it be Your pleasure to bring relief. Immediately the wind blew, the clouds dissolved, the sun shone, and the earth dried. They went out and found the desert full of truffles.
If he was sacrificing the flour offering of the omer and it became impure in his hand, he says it and one brings him another one; otherwise one tells him, be intelligent and shut up, be intelligent and shut up, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, always one tells him, be intelligent and shut up, since no omer which was not cut for its purpose is qualified. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simon is of the opinion that the omer cannot come from storage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, that of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simon parallels the system of Rebbi Aqiba, his father’s teacher, as we have stated there: “Any work which is possible to be performed on Friday does not push the Sabbath away; but any which is impossible to be performed on Friday pushes the Sabbath away.” But did we not state, “It happened that more than 40 couples passed by and Rebbi Aqiba held them back in Lydda.” Because they are 40 couples. But if it had been a single couple he would not have held them back.
HALAKHAH: Since we had stated, “one does not spread out the Shema` with less than ten attendants”, for which purpose did we state, “one does not stand before the Ark with less than ten attendants”? It is necessary for what was stated, “one does not spread out the Shema` with less than ten attendants; if they started with ten and some left, he finishes. One does not stand before the Ark with less than ten attendants; if they started with ten and some left, he finishes. One does not lift his hands with less than ten attendants; if they started with ten and some left, he finishes. One does not read in the Torah with less than ten attendants; if they started with ten and some left, he finishes. One does not close with Prophets with less than ten attendants; if they started with ten and some left, he finishes. About all these He says, those who abandon the Eternal will disappear.”
It was stated: “There is about the sacrifice of appearance what does not apply to the festival sacrifice, and about the festival sacrifice what does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance. For the sacrifice of appearance is totally for the High; this does not apply to the festival sacrifice. The festival sacrifice was in use before the Word and after the Word; this does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance.” Was the festival sacrifice in use before the Word? The language of festival sacrifice was in use before the Word: send My people that they present Me with festival sacrifices in the desert.“ And joy applies to matters which are his property and matters which are others’ property; whether matters usually used for the purpose or matters not usually used for the purpose. But those apply only to his own property and matters usually used for the purpose.” Rebbi Yose said, and why do we not say, anybody liable for a sacrifice of appearance is liable for joy but there are those liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance: “Women are liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance”? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, and you shall enjoy, even from a butcher shop. Rebbi Eleazar said, joy is mentioned here and joy in mentioned there. Since the joy mentioned there refers to well-being sacrifices so also joy mentioned here refers to well-being sacrifices. Rav Ḥuna ate (deflated things) [simply] all seven days.
It was stated: “There is about the sacrifice of appearance what does not apply to the festival sacrifice, and about the festival sacrifice what does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance. For the sacrifice of appearance is totally for the High; this does not apply to the festival sacrifice. The festival sacrifice was in use before the Word and after the Word; this does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance.” Was the festival sacrifice in use before the Word? The language of festival sacrifice was in use before the Word: send My people that they present Me with festival sacrifices in the desert.“ And joy applies to matters which are his property and matters which are others’ property; whether matters usually used for the purpose or matters not usually used for the purpose. But those apply only to his own property and matters usually used for the purpose.” Rebbi Yose said, and why do we not say, anybody liable for a sacrifice of appearance is liable for joy but there are those liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance: “Women are liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance”? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, and you shall enjoy, even from a butcher shop. Rebbi Eleazar said, joy is mentioned here and joy in mentioned there. Since the joy mentioned there refers to well-being sacrifices so also joy mentioned here refers to well-being sacrifices. Rav Ḥuna ate (deflated things) [simply] all seven days.
It was stated: “There is about the sacrifice of appearance what does not apply to the festival sacrifice, and about the festival sacrifice what does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance. For the sacrifice of appearance is totally for the High; this does not apply to the festival sacrifice. The festival sacrifice was in use before the Word and after the Word; this does not apply to the sacrifice of appearance.” Was the festival sacrifice in use before the Word? The language of festival sacrifice was in use before the Word: send My people that they present Me with festival sacrifices in the desert.“ And joy applies to matters which are his property and matters which are others’ property; whether matters usually used for the purpose or matters not usually used for the purpose. But those apply only to his own property and matters usually used for the purpose.” Rebbi Yose said, and why do we not say, anybody liable for a sacrifice of appearance is liable for joy but there are those liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance: “Women are liable for joy but not liable for a sacrifice of appearance”? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, and you shall enjoy, even from a butcher shop. Rebbi Eleazar said, joy is mentioned here and joy in mentioned there. Since the joy mentioned there refers to well-being sacrifices so also joy mentioned here refers to well-being sacrifices. Rav Ḥuna ate (deflated things) [simply] all seven days.
Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: may a fistful be offered from two vessels? Rebbi Ḥanin objected, did we not state, “the vessel combines”? If you would say that a fistful can be offered from two vessels, for which purpose did we state “the vessel combines”? Rebbi Eleazar the Southerner said, did not Rebbi Yose bar Zamina say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, why did they say, leftovers of flour-offerings do combine together? Because they need their vessel. Here also because they have to be in their vessel. Rebbi Mattaniah said, are not fine flour, and incense, and frankincense, and coals offered in many vessels? Nevertheless you are saying, “the vessel combines”; and here “the vessel combines”. Cahana asked the rabbis there, a flour-offering split in the mixing bowl, if one became impure did the other become impure? They said to him, if one became impure the other became impure. Did impurity jump? They said to him, impurity did jump. Even if another {vessel} was in between? They said to him, even if another {vessel} was in between. Taking a fistful from one on the other? They said to him, we did not hear any tradition, we studied a Mishnah, as what we did state there, “if two flour offerings from which no fistfuls were taken were combined together, if he is able to take a fistful from one separately and from the other separately they are qualified, otherwise disqualified.” Do not the remainders of one interrupt between one and the other? There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a fistful was taken from one for the other, if one became impure he other became impure. Anything in-between did not become impure. Was it not stated, “one cup? Which makes its contents one.” Rebbi Ḥinena said, a vessel combines only what is tied to it.
Rebbi Shiloh from Kefar-Tamarta in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Eliezer: And you shall cover it with pure gold, etc. The Torah called it real estate. So far the golden altar. From where the altar of the elevation sacrifices? It is a logical argument. Since the golden altar which is one cubit square is called real estate, the altar of elevation sacrifices which is five cubits square not so much more? Some want to say, square, square. Since here it is real estate, also there it is real estate. Rebbi Hila said, the reason of the rabbis, the altar is of wood, three cubits its height, etc. The Torah called it movable. So far the altar of the elevation sacrifices. From where the golden altar? It is a logical argument. Since the the altar of the elevation sacrifices which is five cubit square is called soil, the golden altar which is one cubit square not so much more? Some want to say, square, square. Since here it is movable, also there it is movable. “But the Sages say, because they are covered.” But is it not cover which stands because of it? Did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Its thickness was that of a Gordian denar Rebbi La said, for its purpose it does not stand because of it. This parallels what Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, you shall make an altar for incense smoke is not written here but burning incense; the altar was burning the incense. But is it not like a table made to be moved and deposited? Does not Rebbi Immi say in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: why is the table impure? Not because one was removing it and showing it to the pilgrims? But this one remains in its place. It also served as a vessel in the Sanctuary. Then it should be pure, why is it impure? Rebbi Mana said, as what we have stated there, “there are three baskets”. Rebbi Ze`ira said, because one uses it for its bales; so also here one uses it for its bales.
That means that invalid intercourse does not free. Come and see, invalid ḥalîṣah frees but invalid intercourse does not free! Since the purpose of ḥalîṣah is invalidation, it frees. Intercourse, whose purpose is not invalidation, does not free. It should not free for leniency but might free for restriction. In which respect? If somebody came and gave qiddushin to the co-wife, these should lay hold on her. Rebbi Yudan said, I explained it. Any sister-in-law who is not totally outside remains inside until she leaves for the outside.
That means that invalid intercourse does not free. Come and see, invalid ḥalîṣah frees but invalid intercourse does not free! Since the purpose of ḥalîṣah is invalidation, it frees. Intercourse, whose purpose is not invalidation, does not free. It should not free for leniency but might free for restriction. In which respect? If somebody came and gave qiddushin to the co-wife, these should lay hold on her. Rebbi Yudan said, I explained it. Any sister-in-law who is not totally outside remains inside until she leaves for the outside.
HALAKHAH: “Similarly, anybody who comes upon any of the incest-prohibited women,” etc. “He should not take a widow.” Even if under duress? The verse says, “he shall not desecrate his seed in his people.” Even if he touched? The verse does not say לא יחול but לא יחלל, even under duress; לא יחול but לא יחלל, even by touching. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: It says here “taking” and it says there “taking” referring to incest prohibitions. Since regarding “taking” referred to by incest prohibitions He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked, if regarding “taking” referred to by incest prohibitions He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and the child is a bastard, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and treat the child as a bastard. Rebbi Yosa said, for which purpose was “desecrated” written? Is not bastard worse than desecrated? Rebbi Abun bar Bisna came in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal. It says here “taking” and it says there “taking” referring to the woman waiting for the levir. Since regarding “taking” referring to the one waiting for the levir He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and the child is acceptable, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and treat the child as acceptable, since Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said: When he touched, he became guilty because of the desecrated one. When the gland entered, he became guilty for having intercourse. When he ejaculated, he became guilty because of desecrating.
This supports what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of the deaf-and-dumb or the insane immerses herself from her husband’s bosom and eats, against Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, also if an unmarried man had intercourse with an unmarried woman not for the purpose of marriage it is copulation of harlotry.
There, it was stated: “The following flour offerings have a handful taken and the remainders are eaten.” Rebbi Abba bar Mamal and Rebbi [Samuel] bar Rav Isaac were sitting together. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked from Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: From where [do we know that] the remainders of the ‘Omer offering are eaten? He said to him: Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “Offering of, offering of.” Since “offering of” mentioned there is from barley, so also “offering of” mentioned here is from barley. Since the remainders of the offering of the suspected wife are eaten, so the remainders of the ‘Omer offering are eaten. Rebbi (Aqiba) said: After they got up, Rebbi Abba bar Mamal was standing with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him: Look, how he made your question fly away! From where [do we know that] the remainders of the offering of the suspected wife are eaten? Rebbi Ze‘ira brought Rebbi Isaac Aṭoshiyya, who stated for him: “Any flour offering mixed with oil”. Where do we hold? If about mixed wheat flour, it already had been said. So if it does not refer to mixed wheat flour, apply it to mixed barley flour. Another [baraita] states: “Or dry”. Where do we hold? If about dry wheat flour, it already had been said. So if it does not refer to dry wheat flour, apply it to dry barley flour. Rebbi Yose said, we deal with mixed wheat flour and dry wheat flour, and it was said for a purpose. “[It] shall belong to all sons of Aaron, to each man as to his brother.” A man takes his part even if he is blemished. A minor does not take a part even if he is unblemished. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said: Because the Torah added a detail in one case, can you add that in every case? But “remembrance, remembrance”. “You shall bring,” to include the ‘Omer flour offering in presentations. “He shall present it,” to include the suspected wife’s flour offering in presentations. It is written after that: “What is left from the offering is most holy for Aaron and his sons.”
“An offering of remembrance,” a general statement; “referring to sin”, a detailed statement. If a general statement is followed by a specific one, the general does not mean more than the specific. If you say so, do you not find the argument disadvantaged? If punishment, which is given out sparingly, can refer, then reward, which is given out in abundance, should do so much more! But, “an offering of remembrance,” if she has merit, “referring to sin”, if she has no merit. It was stated: Rebbi Tarphon said, all statements of “remembrance” in the Torah have a good meaning except this one which is for punishment. Rebbi Aqiba said to him: If it only said, “referring to sin”, and then was silent, I would agree with your statement. But since it says “an offering of remembrance,” this must be for a good [purpose].
Ulla bar Ismael said, he never thought to have a right to her wool basket. Think of it, if her wool basket was of gold? Certainly he never thought to have a right to her wool basket. Rebbi Joḥanan said, only if it is being used. Rebbi Yose said, only if she is using it at that moment. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if it is tied to her; Rebbi Yose said, if she lifts it for her purpose. Rebbi Hoshaiah stated in support of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even if he threw it into her maloš she is divorced.
If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.
Rebbi Eleazar said, sisters are not preliminarily married but in the case of purification sacrifices it atoned. How is that? If one slaughtered two purification offerings for one transgression, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. If one slaughtered two reparation offerings for one damage, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the first one was slaughtered not for its purpose but the second for its purpose, it did atone since the first, which was not for its purpose, becomes acceptable only through the purpose stated later. But if the first was slaughtered for its purpose but the second not for its purpose: if the first atoned for what may the second atone? For impurity which occured between the first and the second. But for Passover sacrifices it did not atone since the Passover sacrifice is only for the meat to be eaten. This does not follow Rebbi Nathan since Rebbi Nathan said, one fulfills one’s duty by sprinkling [the blood] without eating.
Rebbi Eleazar said, sisters are not preliminarily married but in the case of purification sacrifices it atoned. How is that? If one slaughtered two purification offerings for one transgression, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. If one slaughtered two reparation offerings for one damage, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the first one was slaughtered not for its purpose but the second for its purpose, it did atone since the first, which was not for its purpose, becomes acceptable only through the purpose stated later. But if the first was slaughtered for its purpose but the second not for its purpose: if the first atoned for what may the second atone? For impurity which occured between the first and the second. But for Passover sacrifices it did not atone since the Passover sacrifice is only for the meat to be eaten. This does not follow Rebbi Nathan since Rebbi Nathan said, one fulfills one’s duty by sprinkling [the blood] without eating.
Rebbi Eleazar said, sisters are not preliminarily married but in the case of purification sacrifices it atoned. How is that? If one slaughtered two purification offerings for one transgression, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. If one slaughtered two reparation offerings for one damage, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the first one was slaughtered not for its purpose but the second for its purpose, it did atone since the first, which was not for its purpose, becomes acceptable only through the purpose stated later. But if the first was slaughtered for its purpose but the second not for its purpose: if the first atoned for what may the second atone? For impurity which occured between the first and the second. But for Passover sacrifices it did not atone since the Passover sacrifice is only for the meat to be eaten. This does not follow Rebbi Nathan since Rebbi Nathan said, one fulfills one’s duty by sprinkling [the blood] without eating.
Rebbi Eleazar said, sisters are not preliminarily married but in the case of purification sacrifices it atoned. How is that? If one slaughtered two purification offerings for one transgression, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. If one slaughtered two reparation offerings for one damage, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the first one was slaughtered not for its purpose but the second for its purpose, it did atone since the first, which was not for its purpose, becomes acceptable only through the purpose stated later. But if the first was slaughtered for its purpose but the second not for its purpose: if the first atoned for what may the second atone? For impurity which occured between the first and the second. But for Passover sacrifices it did not atone since the Passover sacrifice is only for the meat to be eaten. This does not follow Rebbi Nathan since Rebbi Nathan said, one fulfills one’s duty by sprinkling [the blood] without eating.
Rebbi Eleazar said, sisters are not preliminarily married but in the case of purification sacrifices it atoned. How is that? If one slaughtered two purification offerings for one transgression, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. If one slaughtered two reparation offerings for one damage, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the first one was slaughtered not for its purpose but the second for its purpose, it did atone since the first, which was not for its purpose, becomes acceptable only through the purpose stated later. But if the first was slaughtered for its purpose but the second not for its purpose: if the first atoned for what may the second atone? For impurity which occured between the first and the second. But for Passover sacrifices it did not atone since the Passover sacrifice is only for the meat to be eaten. This does not follow Rebbi Nathan since Rebbi Nathan said, one fulfills one’s duty by sprinkling [the blood] without eating.
Rebbi Eleazar said, sisters are not preliminarily married but in the case of purification sacrifices it atoned. How is that? If one slaughtered two purification offerings for one transgression, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. If one slaughtered two reparation offerings for one damage, the altar selects that which is appropriate; both are forbidden to be eaten. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the first one was slaughtered not for its purpose but the second for its purpose, it did atone since the first, which was not for its purpose, becomes acceptable only through the purpose stated later. But if the first was slaughtered for its purpose but the second not for its purpose: if the first atoned for what may the second atone? For impurity which occured between the first and the second. But for Passover sacrifices it did not atone since the Passover sacrifice is only for the meat to be eaten. This does not follow Rebbi Nathan since Rebbi Nathan said, one fulfills one’s duty by sprinkling [the blood] without eating.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “This animal shall be an elevation sacrifice after thirty days;” if he sold it during the thirty days, it is not sold; its dedication does not sanctify. For which purpose did he say: “after thirty”? To reserve for himself shearing and work. “Pick from this field that it should be acquired by you after thirty days;” if he sold it within thirty days it is not sold, if he dedicated it it is not sanctified. Why did he say, after thirty days? To reserve usufruct for himself. “Here you have this tetradrachma that your field should be mine after thirty days,” if he sold it within thirty days it is not sold, if he dedicated it it is not sanctified. What is the difference between this and a woman? But if he sold it, it is sold.
HALAKHAH: “One who found documents of indebtedness,” etc. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Meïr: Both based on a document containing an alienation clause or a document containing no alienation clause, he collects from unincumbered property. Following this opinion of Rebbi Meïr, to what purpose does he return it? To cover the mouth of his pitcher. Rav said, an heir is like the holder of encumbered property. Just as a loan executed before witnesses cannot be collected from encumbered property, so it cannot be collected from heirs. Samuel said, what was received cannot be foreclosed on mortgaged property, but on free property it can be foreclosed. Here you say, it can be collected, but there you say, it cannot be collected. There is no comparison between one who agreed to a small lien and one who never agreed to a lien.
“If somebody gives money to another to buy produce with it for half the gain and one of them wants to age it, the other may hinder him. But if it was the eve of a Sabbatical year, the other may not hinder him because it was understood that it was bought for that purpose.”
“If they warned him and he remained silent, they warned him and he nodded his head, even if he said, I know, he cannot be prosecuted unless he say: for that purpose I am doing it.” “If they saw him spilling blood; they told him, know that he is a son of the Covenant and the Torah said, he who spills a man’s blood, by man his blood shall be spilled, even if he said, I know, he cannot be prosecuted unless he say: for that purpose I am doing it.” “If they saw him desecrating the Sabbath; they told him, know that today is Sabbath and the Torah said, its desecrators shall be put to death, even if he said, I know, he cannot be prosecuted unless he say: for that purpose I am doing it.”
“If they warned him and he remained silent, they warned him and he nodded his head, even if he said, I know, he cannot be prosecuted unless he say: for that purpose I am doing it.” “If they saw him spilling blood; they told him, know that he is a son of the Covenant and the Torah said, he who spills a man’s blood, by man his blood shall be spilled, even if he said, I know, he cannot be prosecuted unless he say: for that purpose I am doing it.” “If they saw him desecrating the Sabbath; they told him, know that today is Sabbath and the Torah said, its desecrators shall be put to death, even if he said, I know, he cannot be prosecuted unless he say: for that purpose I am doing it.”
“If they warned him and he remained silent, they warned him and he nodded his head, even if he said, I know, he cannot be prosecuted unless he say: for that purpose I am doing it.” “If they saw him spilling blood; they told him, know that he is a son of the Covenant and the Torah said, he who spills a man’s blood, by man his blood shall be spilled, even if he said, I know, he cannot be prosecuted unless he say: for that purpose I am doing it.” “If they saw him desecrating the Sabbath; they told him, know that today is Sabbath and the Torah said, its desecrators shall be put to death, even if he said, I know, he cannot be prosecuted unless he say: for that purpose I am doing it.”