recipient
27 occurrences across the corpus
The Writings of Origen
Now, since this consideration has weight with some, that the leaders of that heresy (of which we have been speaking) think they have established a kind of division, according to which they have declared that justice is one thing and goodness another, and have applied this division even to divine things, maintaining that the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is indeed a good God, but not a just one, whereas the God of the law and the prophets is just, but not good; I think it necessary to return, with as much brevity as possible, an answer to these statements. These persons, then, consider goodness to be some such affection as would have benefits conferred on all, although the recipient of them be unworthy and undeserving of any kindness; but here, in my opinion, they have not rightly applied their definition, inasmuch as they think that no benefit is conferred on him who is visited with any suffering or calamity. Justice, on the other hand, they view as that quality which rewards every one according to his deserts. But here, again, they do not rightly interpret the meaning of their own definition. For they think that it is just to send evils upon the wicked and benefits upon the good; i.e. so that, according to their view, the just God does not appear to wish well to the bad, but to be animated by a kind of hatred against them. And they gather together instances of this, wherever they find a history in the Scriptures of the Old Testament, relating, e.g., the punishment of the deluge, or the fate of those who are described as perishing in it, or the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrha by a shower of fire and brimstone, or the falling of all the people in the wilderness on account of their sins, so that none of those who had left Egypt were found to have entered the promised land, with the exception of Joshua and Caleb. Whereas from the New Testament they gather together words of compassion and piety, through which the disciples are trained by the Saviour, and by which it seems to be declared that no one is good save God the Father only; and by this means they have ventured to style the Father of the Saviour Jesus Christ a good God, but to say that the God of the world is a different one, whom they are pleased to term just, but not also good.
The remark, indeed, was true which Celsus made, that any one, on hearing his words, would answer, seeing that his words are words of darkness, “You pour darkness before my eyes.” Celsus verily, and those like him, do desire to pour darkness before our eyes: we, however, by means of the light of the Word, disperse the darkness of their impious opinions. The Christian, indeed, could retort on Celsus, who says nothing that is distinct or true, “I see nothing that is distinct among all your statements.” It is not, therefore, “out of darkness” into “the brightness of light” that Celsus leads us forth: he wishes, on the contrary, to transport us from light into darkness, making the darkness light and the light darkness, and exposing himself to the woe well described by the prophet Isaiah in the following manner: “Woe unto them that put darkness for light, and light for darkness.” But we, the eyes of whose soul have been opened by the Word, and who see the difference between light and darkness, prefer by all means to take our stand “in the light,” and will have nothing to do with darkness at all. The true light, moreover, being endued with life, knows to whom his full splendours are to be manifested, and to whom his light; for he does not display his brilliancy on account of the still existing weakness in the eyes of the recipient. And if we must speak at all of “sight being affected and injured,” what other eyes shall we say are in this condition, than his who is involved in ignorance of God, and who is prevented by his passions from seeing the truth? Christians, however, by no means consider that they are blinded by the words of Celsus, or any other who is opposed to the worship of God. But let those who perceive that they are blinded by following multitudes who are in error, and tribes of those who keep festivals to demons, draw near to the Word, who can bestow the gift of sight, in order that, like those poor and blind who had thrown themselves down by the wayside, and who were healed by Jesus because they said to Him, “Son of David, have mercy upon me,” they too may receive mercy and recover their eyesight, fresh and beautiful, as the Word of God can create it.
The Mishnah
If one finds produce on the road and picks it up in order to eat it, and then decides to hide it, he may not hide it unless he has [first] tithed it. But if from the outset he picked it up only in order to guard it against being destroyed, he is exempt [from tithing it]. Any produce which one may not sell [in the condition of] demai, he may not send it [as a gift] to his friend [in the condition of] demai. Rabbi Yose permits [one to send as a gift produce] that is certainly untithed, on condition that he makes the matter known to the recipient.
If one is forbidden by vow to benefit from his neighbor and has nothing to eat, he may give it [the food] to a third party, and he is permitted to use it. It happened to one in Beth Horon that his father was forbidden to benefit from him. Now he [the son] was giving his son in marriage and he said to his neighbor, “The courtyard and the banquet are give to you as a gift, but they are yours only that my father may come and feast with us at the banquet.” He said to him, “If they are mine, let them be dedicated to heaven!” [The son] responded, “But I did not give you my property to dedicate it to heaven.” [The other] responded, “You gave me yours so that you and your father might eat and drink together and become reconciled to one another, while the sin [of a broken vow] should devolve upon his (i.e. head.” When the matter came before the Sages, they ruled: every gift which is not [so given] that if he [the recipient] dedicates it, it is dedicated, is no gift [at all].
The Jerusalem Talmud
It was stated: “He who is trustworthy for purity is trustworthy for tithes.” Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismaël stated it and explained his reason: That means, if one is a guest of his, but for the public he is not trustworthy until he accepts it publicly. Rebbi Ammi in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Even I am not trustworthy until we accept it in public. Rebbi Zeïra, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even a ḥaver who sent to another ḥaver, the recipient must tithe. Rebbi Zeïra asked before Rebbi Yasa, for example, I to Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac, and Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac to me? He answered him, what do you want from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac, because all he eats, he eats from the market.
It was stated: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if he exchanged the coin he has to tithe.” Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody gives coins to another person to exchange them, when they are lost the recipient is answerable for their alienation.
If he gave much, even if he said, take and eat, it is as if he said, take and store. If he gave him anything that usually is not eaten raw, even if he said, take and eat, it is as if he said, take and store. If [the recipient] was an important personality who does not usually eat in public, if he said, take and eat, it is as if he said, take and store. If there were two people; to one he said, take and eat; to the other he said, take and store. The one to whom he said, take and eat, is free; the one to whom he said, take and store, is obligated. Rebbi Yose said, is that not a Mishnah (2:2): “They eat and are free but the owners of the gate or the store are obligated?” Rebbi Jonah said, it is everybody’s opinion; here for demay, there for certain.
He shall write, not engrave. And he shall write, not dropping points. He shall write, not pouring. He shall write, not engrave; some Tannaïm state, he even may engrave. Rab Ḥisda said, he who says not to engrave, if the writing stands out as on a denar. He who says even to engrave, as on a writing tablet. And he shall write, not dropping points; Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Shalom and Rebbi Mattaniah: One said, if he did not connect the points; the other said, even if he connected the points. And he shall write, not pouring. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, those Orientals are very sophisticated. If one of them wants to write a secret letter to another, he writes with juice of gall-nuts. The recipient pours ink without gall over it, which is absorbed at the place of writing. If one did that on the Sabbath, what? Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both said, only if he wrote ink on ink and vermilion on vermilion. But if he wrote ink on vermilion or vermilion on ink, he is liable. Rebbi Isaac bar Mesharshia in the name of the rabbis there: He is liable twice, for erasing and for writing.
“A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they counted lambs against rams and rams against lambs, but if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, it was his part from the first hour. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they counted lambs against lambs and rams against rams, they are like buyers, as we have stated there: “The buyer or recipient of a gift is not liable for animal tithe. Rebbi Ḥizkiah said that Rebbi Jeremiah asked: And why are we not saying that sometimes they are liable for both and sometimes they are not liable for either. How is this done? If they distributed the properties and afterwards distributed the animals they are liable for both. If they distributed the animals and afterwards distributed the properties they are not liable for either. Rebbi Mana said, this holds only if the animals were not a majority, but if the animals were a majority they form the main property. Rebbi Abun said that Rebbi Shammai asked: Because you made them like one person for animal tithe, you made them not liable for agios? He said to him, no. There is a difference because he is giving a complete tetradrachma. Then even if they distributed and then formed a partnership, they should be liable for animal tithe and not liable for the agio. But we have stated, “they are liable for the agio, not liable for animal tithe.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Abba bar Rav Huna it is the same for two brothers inheriting from their father or two brothers-in-law inheriting from their father-in-law.
HALAKHAH: “If two people mutually produced promissory notes of one on the other,” etc. If one borrowed a mina from the other, but the other borrowed from him 200 [zuz]. Rav Huna said, Rav Naḥman bar Jacob and Rab Sheshet disagree. One says, one counts one mina against the other mina, but the other says, each one collects the amount of his note. He who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, learns it from tame oxen who injured one another, where half of the excess damage is paid. He who says, each one collects the amount of his note, learns it from the Sages and Admon. Can the Sages and Admon not agree that one counts one mina against the other mina? Because we have stated: Admon says: “If I owed you, how come you borrowed from me?” Therefore it was necessary to say, each one collects the amount of his note. If the holder of the note of 200 forgave a mina, but the holder of the note of a mina did not forgive. For him who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, already one mina against the other mina was counted. But for him who says, each one collects the amount of his note, then what he forgave he cannot collect but what was not forgiven he can collect. If the note for 200 was written in a document but the loan for a mina was not written. For him who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, already one mina against the other mina was counted. But for him who says, each one collects the amount of his note, the holder of the written note can collect but the recipient of the oral promise cannot collect.
MISHNAH: If a person who by a vow was forbidden usufruct from another has nothing to eat, the other donates [food] as a gift to a third party and the person is permitted it. It happened in Bet Ḥoron with a person whose father was by a vow forbidden usufruct from him; when he married off his son he said to a friend, here the courtyard and the meal are given to you as a gift and they shall be yours until my father has come and eaten with us at the [wedding] meal. He said to him, if they are mine, they are dedicated to Heaven. He said, I did not give you my property that you should dedicate it to Heaven. He said to him, you gave me your property only that you and your father should eat, drink, and be friendly with one another and let the sin hang on my head. When the case came before the Sages they said, any gift with the proviso that if [the recipient] dedicated, it was not sanctified, is no gift.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Does this mean that nobody can give a gift to a friend on condition that he not dedicate it to Heaven? So is the Mishnah: Any gift similar to that of Beth Ḥoron, which was dishonest in that if [the recipient] dedicated, it was not sanctified, is no gift.
There, we have stated: “The public sale of orphans’ property goes on for 30 days, the public sale of Temple property goes on for 30 days, and they are publicly announed mornings and evenings.” Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Eliezer is afraid of trickery, Rebbi Joshua is not afraid of trickery. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai and Rebbi Joshua the House of Hillel. Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, a person may ask about his dedication; could he say that he does not have to vow usufruct? Rebbi Joshua follows the House of Hillel, since the House of Hillel say, a person may not ask about his dedication; could he say that he has to vow usufruct? In any case, could not a man ask about his vow of usufruct? Rebbi Joshua agrees that a guarantor must execute a vow of usufruct. What does Rebbi Joshua say about a gift? Since he gives voluntarily, he does not have to vow usufruct, or since [the recipient’s] power is small and [the donor] may change his mind, does he have to vow usufruct? Let us hear from the following: The husband of a relative of Rebbi Ḥaggai owed on a document. The creditor came and foreclosed. The case came before Rebbi Aḥa, who said, he owes a vow of usufruct. Rebbi Yose said, he does not have to vow usufruct. The colleagues said before Rebbi Aḥa [and] Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Aḥa say it correctly? Since if he takes her back, does not the creditor come and foreclose? Rebbi Yose said to them, she turns it into jewelry or keeps it as additions to her dowry. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, by Moses! Rebbi Yose says it correctly. It was executed following Rebbi Aḥa.
HALAKHAH: “One writes with anything,” etc. “He shall write”, not engrave. “He shall write”, not dropping points. “He shall write”, not pouring. “He shall write”, not engrave; some Tannaïm state, he even may engrave. Rav Ḥisda said, he who says not to engrave, if the writing stands out as on a denar. He who says even to engrave, as on a writing tablet. “He shall write”, not dropping points; Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom and Rebbi Mattaniah: One said, if he did not connect the points; the other said, even if he connected the points. “He shall write”, not pouring. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, those Orientals are very sophisticated. If one of them wants to write a secret letter to another, he writes with juice of gall-nuts. The recipient pours ink without gall over it, which is absorbed at the place of the writing. If one did that on the Sabbath, what? There, we have stated: “Writing on top of writing is not prosecutable.” Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both said, only if he wrote ink on ink or vermilion on vermilion. But if he wrote ink on vermilion or vermilion on ink, he is guilty. Rebbi Isaac bar Mesharshia in the name of the rabbis from there: He is doubly guilty, once for erasing and once for writing.
HALAKHAH: “If anything is given instead of money,” etc. There, we have stated: “This is the principle: All movables acquire one another.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: Even heaps among heaps. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, we have stated only: “If anything is given instead of money,” anything that needs estimation. It turns out that Rebbi Abba follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar his own opinion, as we have stated there: “Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe, but if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they exchanged kid goats against rams and rams against kid goats. But if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, that was [the recipient’s] part from the first moment. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, they are buyers. But we have stated there: “The buyer and the recipient of a gift are free from animal tithe. Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe.” When they split and then joined again. “But if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” If they never split.
HALAKHAH: “If anything is given instead of money,” etc. There, we have stated: “This is the principle: All movables acquire one another.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Ḥuna in the name of Rav: Even heaps among heaps. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, we have stated only: “If anything is given instead of money,” anything that needs estimation. It turns out that Rebbi Abba follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Eleazar his own opinion, as we have stated there: “Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe, but if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” Rebbi Eleazar said, only if they exchanged kid goats against rams and rams against kid goats. But if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, that was [the recipient’s] part from the first moment. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if they exchanged kid goats against kid goats and rams against rams, they are buyers. But we have stated there: “The buyer and the recipient of a gift are free from animal tithe. Brothers having common property who are obligated for agio are free from animal tithe.” When they split and then joined again. “But if they are obligated for animal tithe they are free from agio.” If they never split.
Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A ring does not have the status of a pledge. Nobody dealing in words onlymay one deliver to “Him Who exacted retribution”. Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one promised a gift to another and wanted to renege on it, he may renege. [Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi asked before Rebbi Abbahu: Is that “true no, true yes”?] He said, at the moment when he said it, he had to speak with full deliberation. After that, if he changes his mind, he cannot change it, that is, if [the recipient] is poor. But for a rich person, is that a vow? Rav commanded his servant: If I tell you to give a gift to a person, if he is poor, give it to him immediately. But if he is rich, take counsel with me a second time.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “Guarding” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “guarding” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “guarding” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not similar to “guarding” mentioned for the recipient of a fee. “Guarding” mentioned for the unpaid keeper; if he guarded it sufficiently he is not liable. For a paid keeper one estimates it only relative to his body. Therefore one judges him; if the guarding was appropriate he is not liable, otherwise he is liable. One does not say, if another had been there, he could have saved. If he saved, he is not liable; if he did not save, he is liable.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.
“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.
MISHNAH: He said to the borrower, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “It broke,” but it died, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “ ”It was abducted,” but it died, or broke, or was stolen, or lost. “It was stolen,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or lost. “It was lost,” but it died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is not liable. “Where is my ox?” He told him, “I do not know.” “What are you telling?” But if had died, or broke, or was abducted, or stolen, or lost. “I want you to swear;” he answered “Amen”. He is liable. He said to the recipient of a fee or to a renter, “where is my ox?” He told him, “it died,” but it broke or was abducted; “it broke,” but it died or was abducted; “it was abducted,” but it died or broke; “it was stolen,” but it was lost; “it was lost,” but it was stolen. “I want you to swear;” if he said “Amen”, he is not liable. “It died, or it broke, or it was abducted,” when it was stolen or lost. “I want you to swear;” if he said “Amen”, he is liable. “It was lost, or stolen,” when it died, or broke, or was abducted; he is not liable. This is the principle: Anybody who swears to his benefit is liable, to his detriment is not liable.
HALAKHAH: It was stated: If it was neither to his benefit nor to his detriment, he is liable. Rebbi said, a baraita says so: “If he said to the borrower, the unpaid trustee, the recipient of a fee, or the renter, ‘where is my ox?’ This one said, ‘it died.’” May he tell him, “come and swear to me that you never thought of rustling it”? In any case he would not pay; what could he say? “Even if you would pay me a lot, I want from you what is mine.”