responsible

And when the day came on which the king was to let the taxes of the cities to farm, and those that were the principal men of dignity in their several countries were to bid for them, the sum of the taxes together, of Celesyria, and Phoenicia, and Judea, with Samaria, [as they were bidden for,] came to eight thousand talents. Hereupon Joseph accused the bidders, as having agreed together to estimate the value of the taxes at too low a rate; and he promised that he would himself give twice as much for them: but for those who did not pay, he would send the king home their whole substance; for this privilege was sold together with the taxes themselves. The king was pleased to hear that offer; and because it augmented his revenues, he said he would confirm the sale of the taxes to him. But when he asked him this question, Whether he had any sureties that would be bound for the payment of the money? he answered very pleasantly, "I will give such security, and those of persons good and responsible, and which you shall have no reason to distrust." And when he bid him name them who they were, he replied, "I give thee no other persons, O king, for my sureties, than thyself, and this thy wife; and you shall be security for both parties." So Ptolemy laughed at the proposal, and granted him the farming of the taxes without any sureties. This procedure was a sore grief to those that came from the cities into Egypt, who were utterly disappointed; and they returned every one to their own country with shame.

One who gives [produce] to an innkeeper [to prepare it for food], he must tithe what he gives to her and what he takes back from her, because she is suspected of exchanging it [with her own produce]. Rabbi Yose said: we are not responsible for deceivers. Rather, he must tithe only that which he takes from her.

One who causes his vine to overhang his fellow’s grain, behold he has caused the grain to be prohibited and he is responsible for it. Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Shimon say: a person does not prohibit [as kilayim] that which is not his own.

From where do we know that one is responsible [for his bikkurim] until he brings them to the temple Mount? Because it says: “The first of the first-fruits of your land you shall bring into the house of the Lord your God” (Exodus 23:19) this teaches that he is responsible until he brings them to the Temple Mount. If he brought [bikkurim] of one kind and made the recital and then brought of another kind, he does not make a [second] recital.

From where do we know that one is responsible [for his bikkurim] until he brings them to the temple Mount? Because it says: “The first of the first-fruits of your land you shall bring into the house of the Lord your God” (Exodus 23:19) this teaches that he is responsible until he brings them to the Temple Mount. If he brought [bikkurim] of one kind and made the recital and then brought of another kind, he does not make a [second] recital.

And there are [laws] which apply to bikkurim which do not [apply] to terumah or maaser sheni: For bikkurim can become acquired while still attached [to the soil]. And a man may make his entire field bikkurim; He is responsible for them; And they require a sacrifice, a song, waving and spending the night in Jerusalem.

A company lost their pesah and they said to one [who was registered with them], “Go and seek it, and slaughter it on our behalf”; and he went, found, and slaughtered it, and they [also] took an animal and slaughtered [it]: If his was slaughtered first, he eats of his and they eat with him. And if theirs was first slaughtered, they eat of theirs, while he eats of his. And if it is unknown which of them was first slaughtered, or if they slaughtered both of them at the same time, he eats of his, but they may not eat with him; while theirs goes forth to the place of burning, and they are exempt from keeping the second Pesah. He said to them, “If I delay, go forth and slaughter on my behalf,’, [and] then he went and found it and slaughtered [it], while they took [another] and slaughtered [it]: If theirs was slaughtered first, they eat of theirs while he eats with them; And if his was slaughtered first, he eats of his and they eat of theirs. And if it is unknown which of them was slaughtered first, or if they slaughtered both of them at the same time, they eat of theirs, but he may not eat with them, while his goes forth to the place of burning, and he is exempt from keeping the second Pesah. He said to them, and they said to him: they all eat of the first [to be slaughtered], and if it is unknown which of them was slaughtered first, both go forth to the place of burning. If he did not say to them and they did not say to him, they are not responsible for each other.

There is no difference between one who is prohibited by vow from benefiting from his fellow and one who is prohibited by vow from [benefiting from] his food, except in the matter of setting foot [on his property] and of vessels which are not used for [preparing] food. There is no difference between vowed offerings and freewill-offerings except that he is responsible for vowed offering but not responsible for freewill-offerings.

There is no difference between one who is prohibited by vow from benefiting from his fellow and one who is prohibited by vow from [benefiting from] his food, except in the matter of setting foot [on his property] and of vessels which are not used for [preparing] food. There is no difference between vowed offerings and freewill-offerings except that he is responsible for vowed offering but not responsible for freewill-offerings.

If a widow [who married] a high priest, or if a divorced woman or a halutzah [who married] an ordinary priest brought in to her husband melog slaves and tzon barzel slaves, the melog slaves may not eat terumah but the tzon barzel slaves may eat of it. The following are melog slaves: those who, if they die, are the wife’s loss and, if their value increases, are her profit. Even though it is the husband's duty to maintain them, they may not eat terumah. The following are tzon barzel slaves: if they die, they are the loss of the husband and, if their value increases, they are a profit to him. Since he is responsible for them, they are permitted to eat terumah.

[In the case of] a girl who has reached majority age who waited twelve months, or a widow [who waited] thirty days, Rabbi Eliezer says: since her [betrothed] husband is responsible for her maintenance, he may annul [her vows]. But the Sages say: the husband cannot annul [her vows] until she enters into his domain.

There are four primary causes of injury: the ox and the pit and the crop-destroying beast and fire. [The distinctive feature of] the ox is not like [that of] the crop-destroying beast, nor is [the distinctive feature of] either of these, which are alive, like [that of] fire, which is not alive; nor is [the distinctive feature of] any of these, whose way it is to go forth and do injury, like [that of] the pit, whose way it is not to go forth and do injury. What they have in common is that it is their way to do injury and that you are responsible for caring over them; and if one of them did injury whoever [is responsible] for the injury must make restitution [to the damaged party] with the best of his land.

There are four primary causes of injury: the ox and the pit and the crop-destroying beast and fire. [The distinctive feature of] the ox is not like [that of] the crop-destroying beast, nor is [the distinctive feature of] either of these, which are alive, like [that of] fire, which is not alive; nor is [the distinctive feature of] any of these, whose way it is to go forth and do injury, like [that of] the pit, whose way it is not to go forth and do injury. What they have in common is that it is their way to do injury and that you are responsible for caring over them; and if one of them did injury whoever [is responsible] for the injury must make restitution [to the damaged party] with the best of his land.

Anything that I am responsible to guard, I have rendered it possible to do injury [for which I will become obligated]. If I have partially rendered it possible to do injury, I must make restitution for that injury as if I totally rendered it possible to do injury. When one damages [property that fits all of the following categories]: property that does not have “sacrilege” [i.e. sacrificial animals or property that belongs to the Temple in Jerusalem], property that belongs to other members of the covenant [Jews], property that is owned, and the injury is done in any place other than the private domain of the injurer and the common domain of the injured and injurer, in these cases the injurer must make restitution for the injury with the best of his land.

If a man stole a lamb from the flock and restored it, but it died or was stolen again, he is responsible for it. If the owner knew neither of its theft nor of its return and counted the flock and found it complete, the thief is exempt.

If he (the claimant) named what was lost but could not describe its distinctive marks, he should not give it back to him. And it should not be give to a [known] deceiver, even if he describes its distinctive marks, as it is said [in the verse, Deut. 22:2]: “Until your fellow claims it”, [which is to say] until you inquire about your fellow, if he is a deceiver or not. Whatsoever works and eats, let it work and eat [while in the finder’s care]. But whatsoever does not work and eat should be sold, as it is said [in the verse, Deut. 22:2]: “And you shall return it to him”, See how you can return it to him. What shall be with the money [from the sale]? Rabbi Tarfon says: “He may use it, therefore if it is lost he is responsible for it.” Rabbi Akiva says: “He may not use it, therefore if it is lost he is not responsible for it.”

If he (the claimant) named what was lost but could not describe its distinctive marks, he should not give it back to him. And it should not be give to a [known] deceiver, even if he describes its distinctive marks, as it is said [in the verse, Deut. 22:2]: “Until your fellow claims it”, [which is to say] until you inquire about your fellow, if he is a deceiver or not. Whatsoever works and eats, let it work and eat [while in the finder’s care]. But whatsoever does not work and eat should be sold, as it is said [in the verse, Deut. 22:2]: “And you shall return it to him”, See how you can return it to him. What shall be with the money [from the sale]? Rabbi Tarfon says: “He may use it, therefore if it is lost he is responsible for it.” Rabbi Akiva says: “He may not use it, therefore if it is lost he is not responsible for it.”

If he found an [animal] in a stable, he is not responsible for it [even though the stable door was loose and unguarded. But if he found it in the public domain he is responsible for it. If it was in a cemetery he need not contract uncleanness because of it. If his father said to him, “Contract uncleanness”, or if he said to him, “Do not return it”, he may not listen to him. If he unloaded [the ass fallen under its load] and reloaded it and again unloaded it and reloaded it, even four or five times he is still obligated, for it is written, “You must surely raise it with him”. If the owner went and sat down and said, “Since the commandment is upon you, if you wish to unload, unload”, he is not obligated, for it is written “with him”. But if the owner was aged or sick, he is obligated. It is a commandment from the Torah to unload but not to reload. Rabbi Shimon says, “To reload as well.” Rabbi Yose the Galilean says, “If the beast was carrying more than its proper load he is not obligated [to help unload it], for it is written, “under its load”, [which is to say] a load which it is able to endure.

If he found an [animal] in a stable, he is not responsible for it [even though the stable door was loose and unguarded. But if he found it in the public domain he is responsible for it. If it was in a cemetery he need not contract uncleanness because of it. If his father said to him, “Contract uncleanness”, or if he said to him, “Do not return it”, he may not listen to him. If he unloaded [the ass fallen under its load] and reloaded it and again unloaded it and reloaded it, even four or five times he is still obligated, for it is written, “You must surely raise it with him”. If the owner went and sat down and said, “Since the commandment is upon you, if you wish to unload, unload”, he is not obligated, for it is written “with him”. But if the owner was aged or sick, he is obligated. It is a commandment from the Torah to unload but not to reload. Rabbi Shimon says, “To reload as well.” Rabbi Yose the Galilean says, “If the beast was carrying more than its proper load he is not obligated [to help unload it], for it is written, “under its load”, [which is to say] a load which it is able to endure.

If a man left coins with a money-changer: If they were tied up [in a bag], he may not use them. Therefore, if they were lost, he is not responsible. If they were loose, he may use they were. Therefore, they were was lost, he is responsible. [If a man left coins] with a householder, Whether they were loose or tied up, he may not use them. Therefore, if they were lost he his not responsible. A shopkeeper is like a householder, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says a shopkeeper is like a money-changer.

If a man left coins with a money-changer: If they were tied up [in a bag], he may not use them. Therefore, if they were lost, he is not responsible. If they were loose, he may use they were. Therefore, they were was lost, he is responsible. [If a man left coins] with a householder, Whether they were loose or tied up, he may not use them. Therefore, if they were lost he his not responsible. A shopkeeper is like a householder, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says a shopkeeper is like a money-changer.

If a man left coins with a money-changer: If they were tied up [in a bag], he may not use them. Therefore, if they were lost, he is not responsible. If they were loose, he may use they were. Therefore, they were was lost, he is responsible. [If a man left coins] with a householder, Whether they were loose or tied up, he may not use them. Therefore, if they were lost he his not responsible. A shopkeeper is like a householder, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says a shopkeeper is like a money-changer.

These are the things to which the laws of fraud through overcharging do not apply: The sale of slaves, debt documents, land and what belongs to the Temple. They are not subject to twofold restitution, nor fourfold or fivefold restitution. An unpaid guardian does not take an oath [on their account, that he did not damage them] nor does a paid guardian make compensation [if they are lost on his watch]. Rabbi Shimon says: “Holy Things for which he is responsible, are subject to the laws of fraud through overcharging, and Holy Things for which he is not responsible are not subject to the laws of fraud through overcharging.” Rabbi Judah says: “Also one who sells a Torah scroll, and an animal or a pearl they are not subject to the laws of fraud through overcharging.” They (the Sages) said to him: “They only said these.”

These are the things to which the laws of fraud through overcharging do not apply: The sale of slaves, debt documents, land and what belongs to the Temple. They are not subject to twofold restitution, nor fourfold or fivefold restitution. An unpaid guardian does not take an oath [on their account, that he did not damage them] nor does a paid guardian make compensation [if they are lost on his watch]. Rabbi Shimon says: “Holy Things for which he is responsible, are subject to the laws of fraud through overcharging, and Holy Things for which he is not responsible are not subject to the laws of fraud through overcharging.” Rabbi Judah says: “Also one who sells a Torah scroll, and an animal or a pearl they are not subject to the laws of fraud through overcharging.” They (the Sages) said to him: “They only said these.”

If a man sold wine to his fellow and it turned sour he is not responsible. But if it was known [to the seller] that his wine would [soon] turn sour, this is a mistaken purchase. If he had said to him, “I am selling you spiced wine”, he is responsible for its remaining [good] until Shavuoth. [If he said] it is old wine, it must be from last year’s. [If he said] it is vintage old wine, it must be from the year before last.

If a man sold wine to his fellow and it turned sour he is not responsible. But if it was known [to the seller] that his wine would [soon] turn sour, this is a mistaken purchase. If he had said to him, “I am selling you spiced wine”, he is responsible for its remaining [good] until Shavuoth. [If he said] it is old wine, it must be from last year’s. [If he said] it is vintage old wine, it must be from the year before last.

And these are the things for which no oath is imposed: slaves, bonds, lands, and dedicated objects. [The law of] paying double, or four or five times the value, does not apply to them. An unpaid guardian does not take an oath, and a paid guardian does not pay. Rabbi Shimon says: “For dedicated objects for which he is responsible an oath is imposed and for [dedicated objects] for which he is not responsible an oath is not imposed.

And these are the things for which no oath is imposed: slaves, bonds, lands, and dedicated objects. [The law of] paying double, or four or five times the value, does not apply to them. An unpaid guardian does not take an oath, and a paid guardian does not pay. Rabbi Shimon says: “For dedicated objects for which he is responsible an oath is imposed and for [dedicated objects] for which he is not responsible an oath is not imposed.

If one sets aside [a lamb] for the redemption of the first-birth of a donkey and it died: Rabbi Eliezer says: he is responsible as is the case with the five selas for the redemption of the first-born. But the sages say: he is not responsible, as is the case with the redemption of the second tithe. Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Zadok testified concerning the redemption of the first-born of a donkey which died that the priest receives nothing [in such circumstances]. If the first-born of a donkey died [after the lamb for redemption had been set aside]: Rabbi Eliezer says: it shall be buried, but the lamb may be used. But the sages say: it does not need to be buried and the lamb belongs to the priest.

If one sets aside [a lamb] for the redemption of the first-birth of a donkey and it died: Rabbi Eliezer says: he is responsible as is the case with the five selas for the redemption of the first-born. But the sages say: he is not responsible, as is the case with the redemption of the second tithe. Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Zadok testified concerning the redemption of the first-born of a donkey which died that the priest receives nothing [in such circumstances]. If the first-born of a donkey died [after the lamb for redemption had been set aside]: Rabbi Eliezer says: it shall be buried, but the lamb may be used. But the sages say: it does not need to be buried and the lamb belongs to the priest.

We must not redeem [a first-born] with slaves, nor with notes of indebtedness, nor with immovable properties, nor with objects of hekdesh. If one gives a written acknowledgment to a priest that he owes him five selas he is bound to give them to him, although his son is not considered as redeemed. Therefore, if the priest wishes to give him [the note of indebtedness] as a gift he is permitted to do so. If one set aside the redemption money of his son and it became lost, he is responsible for it, because it says: “Shall be for you [but] you shall surely redeem” (Numbers 18:15).

There are [laws relating] to the sacrifices of an individual which do not apply to congregational sacrifices and [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals. For sacrifices of an individual can make a substitute whereas congregational sacrifices cannot make a substitute; Sacrifices of an individual can be either males or females, whereas congregational sacrifices can be only males. For sacrifices of an individual the owner is responsible for them and their libations, whereas for congregational sacrifices they are not liable for them or for their libations, although they are liable for their libations once the sacrifice has been offered. There are [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals: For congregational sacrifices override Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity, whereas sacrifices of individuals do not override the Shabbat or [the laws] of ritual impurity. Rabbi Meir said: but do not the griddle cakes of a high priest and the bull for Yom Hakippurim which are sacrifices of individuals and yet override the Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity? The matter therefore depends on [whether] the time [for the offering up] is fixed.

A bird hatat is performed below [the red line], but a beast hatat is performed above [the red line]. A bird olah is performed above, but a beast olah below. If he changed this procedure with either, then the offering is disqualified. The seder [ordered ritual] in the case of kinnim is as follows: In the case of obligatory offerings, one [bird] is a hatat and one an olah. In the case of vows and freewill offerings, however, all are olot. What constitutes a vow? When one says: "It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah." And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: "Behold, this shall be an olah." What is the [practical] difference between vows and freewill offerings? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement.

A bird hatat is performed below [the red line], but a beast hatat is performed above [the red line]. A bird olah is performed above, but a beast olah below. If he changed this procedure with either, then the offering is disqualified. The seder [ordered ritual] in the case of kinnim is as follows: In the case of obligatory offerings, one [bird] is a hatat and one an olah. In the case of vows and freewill offerings, however, all are olot. What constitutes a vow? When one says: "It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah." And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: "Behold, this shall be an olah." What is the [practical] difference between vows and freewill offerings? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement.

There are seven ways in which a zav is examined as long as he had not become subject to zivah: With regard to food, drink, as [to what] he had carried, whether he had jumped, whether he had been ill, what he had seen, or what he had thought. [It doesn't matter] whether he had thoughts before seeing [a woman], or whether he had seen [a woman] before his thoughts. Rabbi Judah says: even if he had watched beasts, wild animals or birds having intercourse with each other, and even when he had seen a woman's dyed garments. Rabbi Akiva says: even if he had eaten any kind of food, be it good or bad, or had drunk any kind of liquid. They said to him: Then there will be no zavim in the world!’ He replied to them: you are not held responsible for the existence of zavim!’ Once he had become subject to zivah, no further examination takes place. [Zov] resulting from an accident, or that was at all doubtful, or an issue of semen, these are unclean, since there are grounds for the assumption [that it is zivah]. If he had at a first [issue] they examine him; On the second [issue] they examine him, but on the third [issue] they don't examine him. Rabbi Eliezer says: even on the third [issue] they examine him because of the sacrifice.

The Sadducees say: we complain against you, Pharisees, that you declare an uninterrupted flow of a liquid to be clean. The Pharisees say: we complain against you, Sadducees, that you declare a stream of water which flows from a burial-ground to be clean? The Sadducees say: we complain against you, Pharisees, that you say, my ox or donkey which has done injury is liable, yet my male or female slave who has done injury is not liable. Now if in the case of my ox or my donkey for which I am not responsible if they do not fulfill religious duties, yet I am responsible for their damages, in the case of my male or female slave for whom I am responsible to see that they fulfill mitzvot, how much more so that I should be responsible for their damages? They said to them: No, if you argue about my ox or my donkey which have no understanding, can you deduce from there anything concerning a male or female slave who do have understanding? So that if I were to anger either of them and they would go and burn another person's stack, should I be liable to make restitution?

The Sadducees say: we complain against you, Pharisees, that you declare an uninterrupted flow of a liquid to be clean. The Pharisees say: we complain against you, Sadducees, that you declare a stream of water which flows from a burial-ground to be clean? The Sadducees say: we complain against you, Pharisees, that you say, my ox or donkey which has done injury is liable, yet my male or female slave who has done injury is not liable. Now if in the case of my ox or my donkey for which I am not responsible if they do not fulfill religious duties, yet I am responsible for their damages, in the case of my male or female slave for whom I am responsible to see that they fulfill mitzvot, how much more so that I should be responsible for their damages? They said to them: No, if you argue about my ox or my donkey which have no understanding, can you deduce from there anything concerning a male or female slave who do have understanding? So that if I were to anger either of them and they would go and burn another person's stack, should I be liable to make restitution?

The Sadducees say: we complain against you, Pharisees, that you declare an uninterrupted flow of a liquid to be clean. The Pharisees say: we complain against you, Sadducees, that you declare a stream of water which flows from a burial-ground to be clean? The Sadducees say: we complain against you, Pharisees, that you say, my ox or donkey which has done injury is liable, yet my male or female slave who has done injury is not liable. Now if in the case of my ox or my donkey for which I am not responsible if they do not fulfill religious duties, yet I am responsible for their damages, in the case of my male or female slave for whom I am responsible to see that they fulfill mitzvot, how much more so that I should be responsible for their damages? They said to them: No, if you argue about my ox or my donkey which have no understanding, can you deduce from there anything concerning a male or female slave who do have understanding? So that if I were to anger either of them and they would go and burn another person's stack, should I be liable to make restitution?

The Sadducees say: we complain against you, Pharisees, that you declare an uninterrupted flow of a liquid to be clean. The Pharisees say: we complain against you, Sadducees, that you declare a stream of water which flows from a burial-ground to be clean? The Sadducees say: we complain against you, Pharisees, that you say, my ox or donkey which has done injury is liable, yet my male or female slave who has done injury is not liable. Now if in the case of my ox or my donkey for which I am not responsible if they do not fulfill religious duties, yet I am responsible for their damages, in the case of my male or female slave for whom I am responsible to see that they fulfill mitzvot, how much more so that I should be responsible for their damages? They said to them: No, if you argue about my ox or my donkey which have no understanding, can you deduce from there anything concerning a male or female slave who do have understanding? So that if I were to anger either of them and they would go and burn another person's stack, should I be liable to make restitution?

There, we have stated: “He who turns over cow dung in the public domain and a third party was hurt, is liable for damages.” It was also stated: “It is forbidden because of robbery.” Cahana said, only if he turned it over in order to acquire it. But if he did not turn it over in order to acquire it, about that one does not speak. But as regards damages, there is no difference whether he turned it over in order to acquire it or he did not turn it over in order to acquire it; if a third party was hurt, he is liable for damages. And here, you say so? Rebbi Abun said, there it is written (Ex. 21:34): “The one responsible for the pit shall pay,” the one responsible for the damage shall pay. But here (Deut. 14:22): “You shall give tithes,” you give tithes from your property but not from other people’s property.

There, we have stated: “He who turns over cow dung in the public domain and a third party was hurt, is liable for damages.” It was also stated: “It is forbidden because of robbery.” Cahana said, only if he turned it over in order to acquire it. But if he did not turn it over in order to acquire it, about that one does not speak. But as regards damages, there is no difference whether he turned it over in order to acquire it or he did not turn it over in order to acquire it; if a third party was hurt, he is liable for damages. And here, you say so? Rebbi Abun said, there it is written (Ex. 21:34): “The one responsible for the pit shall pay,” the one responsible for the damage shall pay. But here (Deut. 14:22): “You shall give tithes,” you give tithes from your property but not from other people’s property.

MISHNAH: He who gives to the innkeeper’s wife, tithes what he gives her and what he takes from her because she is suspected to switch. Rebbi Yose said, we are not responsible for the dishonest; he tithes only what he receives from her.

HALAKHAH: Both Rebbi Yose and Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said the same thing. Just as Rebbi Yose said, we are not responsible for the dishonest, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, we are not responsible for the dishonest. It is reasonable that Rebbi Yose will agree with Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, but Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel will not agree with Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Yose will agree with Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel that we are not responsible for the dishonest. But Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel will not agree with Rebbi Yose, because it is not fitting for a ḥaver that anything not in order should leave his house.

HALAKHAH: Both Rebbi Yose and Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said the same thing. Just as Rebbi Yose said, we are not responsible for the dishonest, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, we are not responsible for the dishonest. It is reasonable that Rebbi Yose will agree with Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, but Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel will not agree with Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Yose will agree with Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel that we are not responsible for the dishonest. But Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel will not agree with Rebbi Yose, because it is not fitting for a ḥaver that anything not in order should leave his house.

HALAKHAH: Both Rebbi Yose and Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said the same thing. Just as Rebbi Yose said, we are not responsible for the dishonest, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, we are not responsible for the dishonest. It is reasonable that Rebbi Yose will agree with Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, but Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel will not agree with Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Yose will agree with Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel that we are not responsible for the dishonest. But Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel will not agree with Rebbi Yose, because it is not fitting for a ḥaver that anything not in order should leave his house.

MISHNAH: If somebody draws his vine over somebody else’s grain it sanctifies and he is responsible for its alienation. Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon say, nobody can sanctify anything that is not his. Rebbi Yose said, it happened that someone sowed in his vineyard in the Sabbatical year. When this came before Rebbi Aqiba, he said nobody can sanctify anything that is not his.

Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina, he who leads kilaim by voice will be whipped. We have stated so: “If he led it, if he made it draw, if he called it and it came, he is responsible to pay like a borrower.” But did not Samuel state: “If it was standing outside the Sabbath domain, he called it and it came after him, he is free.” There it comes of its own volition, here it is forced to walk But did we not state: “If he clapped before his [a slave’s] eye and blinded it, before his [a slave’s] ear and made it deaf, he [the slave] does not attain freedom.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose, there is a difference because he [the slave] could have fled. Know that it is so because we have stated: “If he grabbed him he is guilty.”

Rebbi Joḥanan follows Rebbi, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, even if Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish would hold with Rebbi, but only for something he is obligated to give to a Cohen; but for something he is not obligated to give to a Cohen, even Rebbi will agree since that is a Mishnah: “If he separated the redemption of a first-born donkey and then it died, Rebbi Eliezer says one is responsible for alienation as for the five tetradrachmas of the [human] first-born; but the Sages say, he is not responsible for alienation, as for Second Tithe.” Rebbi Eliezer will agree about first-born donkeys he inherited from the estate of his maternal grandfather, a Cohen, that he sanctified it when he separated it.

Rebbi Joḥanan follows Rebbi, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, even if Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish would hold with Rebbi, but only for something he is obligated to give to a Cohen; but for something he is not obligated to give to a Cohen, even Rebbi will agree since that is a Mishnah: “If he separated the redemption of a first-born donkey and then it died, Rebbi Eliezer says one is responsible for alienation as for the five tetradrachmas of the [human] first-born; but the Sages say, he is not responsible for alienation, as for Second Tithe.” Rebbi Eliezer will agree about first-born donkeys he inherited from the estate of his maternal grandfather, a Cohen, that he sanctified it when he separated it.

Did we not state: “Rebbi Eliezer holds him responsible for principal and fifth, but Rebbi Joshua frees.” They wanted to say, they disagree about the fifth, but for the principal even Rebbi Joshua agrees. They disagree for the past, but for the future even Rebbi Joshua agrees.

HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: A person should not sell his field. Rebbi Simeon permits since he may say to him, I sold mine, go and demand what is yours. If he transgressed and sold, he tithes what he eats but he does not have to tithe for what he sold since we are not responsible for the dishonest.

Both Rebbi Yose and Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said the same thing. Just as Rebbi Yose said, we are not responsible for the dishonest, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, we are not responsible for the dishonest. It is reasonable that Rebbi Yose will agree with Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel will not agree with Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Yose will agree with Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel that we are not responsible for the dishonest. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel will not agree with Rebbi Yose, because it is not fitting for a ḥaver that anything not in order should leave his house.

Both Rebbi Yose and Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said the same thing. Just as Rebbi Yose said, we are not responsible for the dishonest, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, we are not responsible for the dishonest. It is reasonable that Rebbi Yose will agree with Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel will not agree with Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Yose will agree with Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel that we are not responsible for the dishonest. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel will not agree with Rebbi Yose, because it is not fitting for a ḥaver that anything not in order should leave his house.

Both Rebbi Yose and Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said the same thing. Just as Rebbi Yose said, we are not responsible for the dishonest, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, we are not responsible for the dishonest. It is reasonable that Rebbi Yose will agree with Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel will not agree with Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Yose will agree with Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel that we are not responsible for the dishonest. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel will not agree with Rebbi Yose, because it is not fitting for a ḥaver that anything not in order should leave his house.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel parallels him who says “in the evening”, as we have stated: “Rebbi Dosa says, ‘everything the poor will collect between the sheaves shall be abandoned’, it is abandoned. Rebbi Jehudah says, in the evening. But the Sages say, a declaration of abandonment under duress is not an abandonment, for we are not responsible for tricksters.” But he is not parallel to him who says “in the morning”. Can one abandon anything if it is standing on the ground? Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is even parallel to him who says “in the morning”. Is it not Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel’s? In addition, he holds that taking Second Tithe is its redemption. Rebbi Yose said, is that (Lev. 27:19): “It shall be his”? If somebody saw a loaf floating in a river and said, that loaf shall be dedicated, did he say anything? Rebbi Jeremiah said, before you ask all these questions regarding “in the morning”, ask them regarding “in the evening!” He answered him, he who holds “in the evening” does not have all these questions.

MISHNAH: If he dedicated his First Fruits and then sold his field he brings but does not make the declaration. The other person cannot bring from the same kind, but from another kind he brings and makes the declaration. Rebbi Jehudah says, he may bring and make the declaration from the same kind. If he dedicated his First Fruits and then they rotted, were robbed, stolen, lost, or became impure, he brings others in their stead. One is not liable for a fifth for the replacements. If they became impure in the Temple court, he scatters them and cannot make the declaration. From where that he is responsible for them until he delivers them to the Temple Mount? Because it is said (Deut. 26:3): “The beginning of the First Fruits of your land you shall bring to the Temple of the Eternal, your God, etc.” This teaches that he is responsible for them until be delivers them to the Temple Mount. If he brought from one kind and made the declaration, when he comes back and brings from another kind he cannot make the declaration.

MISHNAH: If he dedicated his First Fruits and then sold his field he brings but does not make the declaration. The other person cannot bring from the same kind, but from another kind he brings and makes the declaration. Rebbi Jehudah says, he may bring and make the declaration from the same kind. If he dedicated his First Fruits and then they rotted, were robbed, stolen, lost, or became impure, he brings others in their stead. One is not liable for a fifth for the replacements. If they became impure in the Temple court, he scatters them and cannot make the declaration. From where that he is responsible for them until he delivers them to the Temple Mount? Because it is said (Deut. 26:3): “The beginning of the First Fruits of your land you shall bring to the Temple of the Eternal, your God, etc.” This teaches that he is responsible for them until be delivers them to the Temple Mount. If he brought from one kind and made the declaration, when he comes back and brings from another kind he cannot make the declaration.

MISHNAH: Some rules apply to heave and tithe but not to First Fruits since heave and tithe forbid on the threshing floor, they have a fixed measure, apply to all produce, are due whether the Temple exists or not, and apply to sharecroppers, tenant farmers, sicarii, and robbers. They apply to heave and tithe but not to First Fruits. Some rules apply to First Fruits but not to heave and tithe. For First Fruits acquire [hallowed status] when connected to the ground, a person may dedicate his entire field as First Fruits, he is responsible for them, and they need a sacrifice, song, weaving, and staying overnight. Heave of the tithe is similar to First Fruits in two ways and to heave in two ways. It may be taken from pure for impure and from produce not earmarked, like First Fruits. It forbids the threshing floor and it has a measure like heave.

“One is responsible for them,” for it is written (Ex. 23:19): “The beginning of the First Fruits of your land.”

“One may not tie camels one to the other and draw.” Rebbi Abba said, because of the suspicion, that they should not say this man goes out to do his job on the Sabbath. Assi said, it was necessary for kilaim. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel (said, from his hand it is forbidden but from the neck of the animal it is permitted, for if it is not for the animal) wound around the animal’s neck it is forbidden, hanging from the animal’s neck it is permitted. Rav Huna and Rav Jehudah, both in the name of Samuel. One said, from his hand is forbidden but from the animal’s neck it is permitted. The other one inverts. He who says from his hand is forbidden, because of a load on the Sabbath. But from the animal’s neck it is permitted, because for the animal it is not a load on the Sabbath. And he who says from his hand is permitted, because it is impossible, but from the animal’s neck it is forbidden, because he is responsible for the rest of his animal as for his own, as it is said, that your ox and your donkey rest” “like you”.

MISHNAH: If a Gentile comes to extinguish one tells him neither to extinguish nor not to extinguish since you are not responsible for him resting. But if a minor comes to extinguish one may not listen to him since you are responsible for him resting.

MISHNAH: If a Gentile comes to extinguish one tells him neither to extinguish nor not to extinguish since you are not responsible for him resting. But if a minor comes to extinguish one may not listen to him since you are responsible for him resting.

It should not be seen in your possession. There are Tannaim who state, it should not be seen in your possession, yours you may not see, [but] you may see Heaven’s. There are Tannaim who state, not even Heaven’s. He who said, yours you may not see, you may see Heaven’s, if its dedication precedes its elimination. He who said, not even Heaven’s, if its dedication is after its elimination. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Zeˋira: Explain it about sancta for which he is responsible in case of alienation following Rebbi Simeon.

MISHNAH: A group whose Pesaḥ was lost and they said to one of them go, and search for it, and slaughter for us. He went, found, and slaughtered, and they bought and slaughtered. If his was slaughtered first, he eats of his, and they eat with him; but if theirs was slaughtered first, they eat of theirs, and he eats of his. If it is not known which one was slaughtered first, or they slaughtered simultaneously, they eat of theirs, but he does not eat with them. His is brought to be burned, and he is not liable for a Second Pesaḥ. If he told them, if I would tarry, slaughter for me; he went, found, and slaughtered, and they bought and slaughtered. If theirs was slaughtered first, they eat of theirs, and he eats with them; but if his was slaughtered first, he eats of his and they eat of theirs. If it is not known which one was slaughtered first, or they slaughtered simultaneously, he eats of his, but they he may not eat with him; and theirs is brought to be burned, but they are not liable for a Second Pesaḥ. If he told them, if I would tarry, go and slaughter for me; he went, found, and slaughtered, and they bought and slaughtered. If theirs was slaughtered first, they eat of theirs, and he eats with them; but if his was slaughtered first, he eats of his and they eat of theirs. If it is not known which one was slaughtered first, or they slaughtered simultaneously, they eat of theirs, and he may not eat with them; and his is brought to be burned, but he is not liable for a Second Pesaḥ. If he said to them and they said to him, all of them eat of the first. If he did not talk to them nor did they talk to him, they are not responsible for one another. Two groups whose Pesaḥim were commingled, each of them draws one for them. One of each group joins the other and they declare: If this Pesaḥ is ours, your hand is removed from yours and you are subscribing to ours, and if this Pesaḥ is yours, our hand is removed from ours and we are subscribing to yours. The same holds for five groups of five members each, or ten of ten, one exchanges members of each group and so they declare.

“If the people of a city sent their sheqalim and these were stolen or lost.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Simeon’s, since Rebbi Simeon said, sancta for whose alienation he is responsible are like his own property. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion, because of an instituted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion is understandable; “they have to swear to the city dwellers who have to replace them by new sheqalim.” Is that Rebbi Simeon’s? Even though the city dwellers agreed to pay, Temple property cannot be released without an oath.

Somebody put aside his sheqel and it was lost. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is responsible for its alienation until he delivers to the Temple trustee. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, Temple property is Heaven’s at any place where it may be. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “they have to swear to the city dwellers who have to replace them by new sheqalim..” Still this is because of a regulation oath.

“When Israel returned from the Babylonian exile they gave as Temple tax darics,” denars, “they continued to give sela`im,” as their meaning, “they continued to give minted coins,” half tetradrachmas, they wanted to give denars,” quarters, but these were not accepted by the following: and we accepted for us as commandment to give a sheqel three times in the year for the service in our God’s House. Rebbi Ḥilkiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: From here that a person has to give his sheqel three times a year; <from here that a person is responsible for the alienation of his sheqel three times a year;> from here that one does not importune people more than three times a year. Rebbi Abbin said, from here the three se`ah, from here the three boxes, from here the three collection times.

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Jacob the Southerner asked, does the Mishnah contradict Rebbi Dosa? For “Rebbi Dosa said, in the morning a person has to say, everything which the poor will collect today between the sheaves is ownerless property. Rebbi Jehudah says, in the evening. But the Sages say, a declaration of abandonment under duress is not an abandonment, because we are not responsible for cheaters.” There you are saying, a declaration of abandonment under duress is not an abandonment, but here you are saying, a declaration of abandonment under duress is abandonment. Rebbi Eleazar said, there he declares ownerless by his own will, here he declares ownerless against his own will. Rebbi Ḥananiah the son of Rebbi Hillel said, this is correct. You have to know that this is so since already his replacement is in his hand.

MISHNAH: The only difference between one who is under a vow {not to have} usufruct from another and one who is under a vow about use of food is passing through his real estate and vessels that cannot be used to prepare food. The only difference between vows and voluntary gifts is that for vows one is responsible if they died or were lost, and for voluntary gifts one is not responsible if they died or were lost.

MISHNAH: The only difference between one who is under a vow {not to have} usufruct from another and one who is under a vow about use of food is passing through his real estate and vessels that cannot be used to prepare food. The only difference between vows and voluntary gifts is that for vows one is responsible if they died or were lost, and for voluntary gifts one is not responsible if they died or were lost.

MISHNAH: If a widow [married] to a High Priest, or a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah [married] to a simple priest, brought him slaves as paraphernalia or as mortmain: The slaves of separate property may not eat heave, the slaves of mortmain may eat heave. These are slaves of paraphernalia: If they died, they died as her property, if they increased, they increased as her property. Even though he is responsible for their upkeep, they may not eat heave. These are slaves of mortmain: If they died, they died as his property, if they increased, they increased as his property. Since he guarantees them, they may eat heave.

“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody engages his wife as grocer,” etc. Is Rebbi Eliezer not correct? What is the rabbis’ reason? If you say so, there never would be peace in his house. If she broke vessels, is she responsible as an unpaid or a paid trustee? It would be reasonable to consider her a paid trustee. They said, she is not even an unpaid trustee, for if you say so, there never would be peace in his house.

Rebbi Joshua ben Levi says, nobody is held responsible for his neighbor except for annona and head-tax. Rav said, anything for which one is held responsible for one’s neighbor has to be repaid. The strength of Rav is from the following: “He who appropriated a field and oppressors took it.” He did not hear that Rebbi Joḥanan said, they exacted a fine from a robber. Rebbi Abin asked, what is greater? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, and Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Julianus both said in the name of Samuel; one said, it is like annona and head-tax; the other said, it is not like annona and head-tax.

Rebbi Joshua ben Levi says, nobody is held responsible for his neighbor except for annona and head-tax. Rav said, anything for which one is held responsible for one’s neighbor has to be repaid. The strength of Rav is from the following: “He who appropriated a field and oppressors took it.” He did not hear that Rebbi Joḥanan said, they exacted a fine from a robber. Rebbi Abin asked, what is greater? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, and Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Julianus both said in the name of Samuel; one said, it is like annona and head-tax; the other said, it is not like annona and head-tax.

Rebbi Joshua ben Levi says, nobody is held responsible for his neighbor except for annona and head-tax. Rav said, anything for which one is held responsible for one’s neighbor has to be repaid. The strength of Rav is from the following: “He who appropriated a field and oppressors took it.” He did not hear that Rebbi Joḥanan said, they exacted a fine from a robber. Rebbi Abin asked, (who was the father of) Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, and Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Julianus both said in the name of Samuel; one said, it is like annona and head-tax; the other one said, it is not like annona and head-tax.

Rebbi Joshua ben Levi says, nobody is held responsible for his neighbor except for annona and head-tax. Rav said, anything for which one is held responsible for one’s neighbor has to be repaid. The strength of Rav is from the following: “He who appropriated a field and oppressors took it.” He did not hear that Rebbi Joḥanan said, they exacted a fine from a robber. Rebbi Abin asked, (who was the father of) Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, and Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Julianus both said in the name of Samuel; one said, it is like annona and head-tax; the other one said, it is not like annona and head-tax.

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Partners can acquire one from the other and are responsible for damages inflicted by one on the other. Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, if he said, collect and acquire. But if they were collected he does not acquire unless he moves.

MISHNAH: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’. Similarly, the husband tells her before she enters his domain: ‘Any vows which you had vowed before you enter my domain are dissolved,’ for after she enters his domain he cannot dissolve. An adult girl and one who had waited twelve months and a widow 30 days, Rebbi Eliezer says, since her husband is responsible for her upkeep he may dissolve but the Sages say that the husband dissolves only after she enters his domain.

There, we have stated: “The Non-Jew, Rebbi Meїr says, is evaluated but does not evaluate; Rebbi Jehudah says, he evaluates but is not evaluated. Both agree that they make vows and are objects of vows.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: For him who says there that he evaluates, here can he declare a nazir? For him who says there that he is evaluated, here can he be declared a nazir? How would it be possible for him to [be declared a nazir]? A Israelite can declare a Gentile to be a nazir. Would he listen to him? But the Israelite said, “I am a nazir,” the Gentile heard it and said, “I am responsible for what this one said.” It is only as if he paid a debt. How would it be possible for him to [declare a nazir]? A Gentile can declare an Israelite to be nazir. Since an Israelite cannot declare [another] Israelite to be a nazir, a Gentile cannot declare an Israelite to be a nazir. But it must be that the Gentile said, “I am a nazir”, the Israelite heard it and said, “I am taking upon me what this one said.” What did you exclude from him? An Israelite is subject to “not to desecrate”, a Gentile is not subject to “not to desecrate”. Rebbi Jonah said, Israelites can be relieved by a Sage, Gentiles cannot be relieved by a Sage. Rebbi Yose said, Israelites need a Sage to be relieved, Gentiles do not need a Sage to be relieved. It follows that Rebbi (Jonah) [Yose] follows Rebbi Abbahu. A Gentile woman came before Rebbi Abbahu, who said to Abime bar Tobi: Go and find her an opening by unforeseen circumstances. And Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Aḥa, who said that Laban was Kushan-Riš‘ataim. Why was he called “Kushan the doubly bad”? Because he committed two evils. One that he desecrated his oath, the other that he subjugated Israel for eight years.

“If somebody says, give this mina to X because I owe it to him, bring this mina to X for the pledge which he has from me, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so but he himself is responsible until X receives his due.” Rebbi Ila said, a gift is like a debt. “Give this mina to X, bring this mina to X, give this gift document to X, if he wants to change his mind he can(not) do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should return it to the sender, and if that one had died he should give it to the latter’s heirs.” “Acquire this mina for X, accept this mina for X, acquire this gift document for X, accept this gift document for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should deliver it to his heirs. But if he acquired after [X’s] death he should return it to the sender since nobody can acquire documents after his death.” “If somebody says, this mina is for X, take this mina for X, this mina shall be in your hand for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so” because if somebody acquires for another person it cannot be changed.

This does not disagree with what Rebbi Joḥanan said, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if an agent handed over to another agent, the first one is responsible. Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya: Because of a condition of the divorce. What is the difference between them? If the husband came earlier and took it. If you say, because of a condition of the divorce, that is understandable. If you say, because I do not want to see my valuables in somebody else’s hand, his valuables are not in somebody else’s hand. Is it the same for preliminary marriages? What is the difference between divorces and preliminary marriages? One can divorce through the agency of anybody. One cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.

“The best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay,” i. e., the party responsible for the damage, the words of Rebbi Ismael. Rebbi Aqiba says, “the best of his field and the best of his vineyard”, of the person suffering the damage. It is difficult for Rebbi Aqiba, he suffered damage, and you say so? But the court see what the field was worth before it was damaged and estimates accordingly. As it was stated, it is possible if the grazing was on best quality land, one estimates from best quality, from lowest quality one estimates from lowest quality. How is this? The best of the lowest quality is quite good. If you say so you provide a windfall for the person suffering the damage. One looks at the field as if it was full of first quality [produce] and estimates for him from the best quality land; least quality one estimates from least quality land. It turns out that he pays with best quality for best quality and from least quality for least quality. From where has Rebbi Aqiba that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land”? It is not from the Torah, it is a decree. “Why did they say, ‘for tort victims one estimates with best quality land’? Because of the robbers. That a man should say, why should I have robbed [land] in my hand, or land subject to a suit for damages on my hand? Tomorrow, the court will see my good field, take it from me, and support it by the verse, ‘the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay.’ ” So far his real estate. His pledge was inferred from his real estate. Since his real estate [is taken] from the best quality, also his pledge [is taken] from the best.

It is obvious that a slave may accept a gift by one third party to another, by a third party to his master, [but] not from his master to himself. From a third party to himself is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the Sages. If one said: Here [I am giving] you this money on condition that your master have no power over it, the slave acquired it and with him his master, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, the slave acquired it [but not] his master. What is the problem? From his master to a third party. Since the slave may receive from a third party for his master, may he receive from his master for a third party? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his slave, his son, or his agent.” Does this not mean that the slave is able to transfer rights from his master to a third party? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it for a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you have to explain if for a Canaanite slave; explain it that he said, open [the gate] for her and she will come by herself, as we have stated: “If he led her, drew her to himself, called her and she followed him, he is responsible as a borrower.” Rebbi Zeïra understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his underage son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!

Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: One who handles a wine-skin and it splits in his hand is not responsible for it. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, it is necessary even if he takes it in the store when he had no other intention than that no other person should take it. Can he take possession at a minimal rate? Rebbi Ḥaggai said in the name of Rebbi Yose: A Mishnah says that it cannot become his possession at a minimal rate, as we have stated there: “If somebody sells his wine to a Non-Jew. If he fixed the price before he measured, the proceeds are permitted; if he measured before he fixed the price, the proceeds are forbidden.” If you say that it can come into his possession at a minimal rate, even if he measured before he fixed the price, it should be as if he fixed the price before he measured and the proceeds would be permitted.

Samuel said, if somebody take a small gold vessel and it be snatched, who is responsible for it? Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is at Tyre or a similar place, at Caesarea or a similar place. But here, so far it usually would be recovered.

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: If “the bull” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit. Since for the pit, which is not usually moving, one has to pay full damages, not so much more for the bull which usually is moving? Either since for the pit one pays full damages, also the bull pays full damages, or since the bull pays half damages, also for the pit one should have to pay half damages. If “the bull” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit; if “the pit” had not been written, I would have inferred the bull from the pit. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things. Similarly, the seat is not like the bed and the bed is not like the seat. One understands that the seat is not like the bed. The seat a square ṭephaḥ large can become impure; the bed four ṭephaḥim large can become impure. Because He declared a bed four ṭephaḥim large as impure, would a seat a square ṭephaḥ large become impure? If the seat had not been written, I would have inferred seat from bed. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things to be stated. Similarly, the paragraph on lighting the candles is not like the paragraph about exiling the impure and the paragraph on exiling the impure is not like the paragraph about lighting the candles. If the paragraph about exiling the impure had not been written, I would have inferred the rules of the paragraph on exiling the impure from the paragraph on lighting the candles. Why was it stated here? Because there are many things to be stated. So what is equal about them is that they are “command” here and in future generations, so everything by “command” is for here and for future generations. Rebbi La said, it is necessary that all be written; and the bull teaches that the owners have to deal with the cadaver. But it is written, “and the cadaver shall be his”, and it is written for the pit, “and the cadaver shall be his”! Rebbi Ismael said, this excludes real estate which cannot be moved; it excludes a human because there can be no usufruct from him in death. But the fire teaches for all of them that one is responsible for accidents.

New Paragraph. “If damage was caused the person responsible is obligated to pay for the damages,” etc. Rebbi Ḥanina said, “he who injures an animal has to pay for it,” he has to pay the diminution in value. Bar Pedaiah said, “if it was torn, he shall bring it up to the place of the carcass, for which he does not have to pay.” Rebbi Nasa said, the quote of Rebbi Ḥanina is needed and the quote of Bar Pedaiah is needed. If only the quote of Rebbi Ḥanina was given but not that of Bar Pedaiah, I would have said that if he made the damage possible he should not have to pay anything but for bodily damage he has to pay the diminution in value. Therefore, Bar Pedaiah’s quote is necessary. But if only the quote of Bar Pedaiah was given but not that of Rebbi Ḥanina, I would have said that if he made the damage possible he has to pay the diminution in value, but for bodily damage he has to pay the whole. Therefore, the quote of Rebbi Ḥanina is needed and the quote of Bar Pedaiah is needed.

MISHNAH: Anything I am obligated to watch I did set up for damage claims. If I partially set up for damage claims I am liable for claims as if I had set up for any claims. Properties of people of the covenant and private property, except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage; but property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage falls under the rules of restitution.

MISHNAH: Anything I am obligated to watch I did set up for damage claims. If I partially set up for damage claims I am liable for claims as if I had set up for any claims. Properties of people of the covenant and private property, except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage; but property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage falls under the rules of restitution.

“If I partially set up for damage claims” “as if I had set up for any claims.” This is the pit, as it was stated: If somebody dug a pit ten handbreadths deep and another came and deepened it another handbreadth, the latter is responsible. Rebbi says, one goes after the latter in case of death and after the former for damages. Rebbi Isaac says: So is the baraita: After the latter in case of death and after both of them for damages. If he dug [a pit] ten handbreadths deep and another person came, whitewashed and lined it, both of them are liable. Is he liable because he whitewashed and lined it? When he told him, whitewash this (house) [pit] and acquire it, for Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the prevention of damages follows the rules of guarding an acquisition. Rebbi Simon said, explain it when he was digging in the dunes. And it was stated: If each of them dug ten, or each one twenty, or each one a hundred, they are all liable. How deep does it have to be? To be deadly, ten handbreadths. To do damage, anything. Symmachos says, three in depth and four in width. Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower says, the length of the animal which falls in. What means the length of the animal which falls in? Whether chicken or camel.

New paragraph. “Properties not subject to the laws of misappropriation of sancta.” As it was stated: “These properties are acquired together with properties subject to the laws of misappropriation of sancta.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: This follows Rebbi Yose the Galilean, as it was stated: “ ‘He commits larceny before the Eternal,’ Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, this includes simple sancta. Ben Azzai says, this includes well-being sacrifices. Abba Yose ben Dosai says, Ben Azzai said this only for the firstling.” What is between them? He who says well-being sacrifices certainly include tithes. But he who says tithes excludes the firstling. “Rebbi Simeon says, both most holy and simple sancta; about any sancta for which he is responsible if alienated, I am reading ‘against his neighbor and he lied’; but about any sancta for which he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading ‘against the Eternal and he lied’ ”. Rav Huna said, both qualified and disqualified sancta, if he is responsible if alienated, even if they are for the Eternal, I am reading “against his fellow and he denied”, but if he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading “against the Eternal and he lied” but not “against his fellow and he lied”.

New paragraph. “Properties not subject to the laws of misappropriation of sancta.” As it was stated: “These properties are acquired together with properties subject to the laws of misappropriation of sancta.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: This follows Rebbi Yose the Galilean, as it was stated: “ ‘He commits larceny before the Eternal,’ Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, this includes simple sancta. Ben Azzai says, this includes well-being sacrifices. Abba Yose ben Dosai says, Ben Azzai said this only for the firstling.” What is between them? He who says well-being sacrifices certainly include tithes. But he who says tithes excludes the firstling. “Rebbi Simeon says, both most holy and simple sancta; about any sancta for which he is responsible if alienated, I am reading ‘against his neighbor and he lied’; but about any sancta for which he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading ‘against the Eternal and he lied’ ”. Rav Huna said, both qualified and disqualified sancta, if he is responsible if alienated, even if they are for the Eternal, I am reading “against his fellow and he denied”, but if he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading “against the Eternal and he lied” but not “against his fellow and he lied”.

New paragraph. “Properties not subject to the laws of misappropriation of sancta.” As it was stated: “These properties are acquired together with properties subject to the laws of misappropriation of sancta.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: This follows Rebbi Yose the Galilean, as it was stated: “ ‘He commits larceny before the Eternal,’ Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, this includes simple sancta. Ben Azzai says, this includes well-being sacrifices. Abba Yose ben Dosai says, Ben Azzai said this only for the firstling.” What is between them? He who says well-being sacrifices certainly include tithes. But he who says tithes excludes the firstling. “Rebbi Simeon says, both most holy and simple sancta; about any sancta for which he is responsible if alienated, I am reading ‘against his neighbor and he lied’; but about any sancta for which he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading ‘against the Eternal and he lied’ ”. Rav Huna said, both qualified and disqualified sancta, if he is responsible if alienated, even if they are for the Eternal, I am reading “against his fellow and he denied”, but if he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading “against the Eternal and he lied” but not “against his fellow and he lied”.

New paragraph. “Properties not subject to the laws of misappropriation of sancta.” As it was stated: “These properties are acquired together with properties subject to the laws of misappropriation of sancta.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: This follows Rebbi Yose the Galilean, as it was stated: “ ‘He commits larceny before the Eternal,’ Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, this includes simple sancta. Ben Azzai says, this includes well-being sacrifices. Abba Yose ben Dosai says, Ben Azzai said this only for the firstling.” What is between them? He who says well-being sacrifices certainly include tithes. But he who says tithes excludes the firstling. “Rebbi Simeon says, both most holy and simple sancta; about any sancta for which he is responsible if alienated, I am reading ‘against his neighbor and he lied’; but about any sancta for which he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading ‘against the Eternal and he lied’ ”. Rav Huna said, both qualified and disqualified sancta, if he is responsible if alienated, even if they are for the Eternal, I am reading “against his fellow and he denied”, but if he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading “against the Eternal and he lied” but not “against his fellow and he lied”.

New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”

New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”