responsible

New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”

New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”

New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”

New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”

New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”

HALAKHAH: “How is the tooth notorious,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it refers to the first part. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it refers to all. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is responsible. And here, he says so? They said, there in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia; but here, in his own name. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, is it free [from payment]. Rebbi Joḥanan’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is obligated. Not only if the walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down or one which is lying down kicks the walking one. If a walking [animal] kicks a walking one? Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is free [from payment]. But in the case of one lying down against one walking or one who was walking against one walking, it is obligated. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: It always is free. What is Rebbi Hoshaia’s reason; is there no “horn” in the public domain? Rav said, if it stood still and ate from heaped produce, [it is obligated]. Since the leniency for “tooth” is in case it ate walking from the standing; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the one standing still. Ilfai said: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is obligated. Since the leniency for “tooth” is that it ate walking {from the standing} [from the walking]; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the walking one.

A person put down a stone in the public domain, the wind blew it onto a private domain, another person stumbled over it. Is [the first] responsible for damages?

A person put down a stone in the public domain, another person stumbled over it and made it roll into a private domain where a third person stumbled over it. Is [the first] responsible for damages?

HALAKHAH: “Two potters were walking one behind the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Does one give time to the first to get up? Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Joḥanan to give time to the first to stand up. But it is reasonable otherwise from the second one onwards, does one give time to the second to stand up? Let us hear from the following: “Potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. They are liable for damage to humans but not liable for damage to vessels. But if they (damaged) [warned] one another, none are liable. Donkey drivers were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. Donkeys were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell: even 100, all are liable.” Some Tannaïm state, none are liable. Rebbi La said, he who says ‘liable’, if their owner let them lie down. He who says ‘not liable’, if they fell, since animals are not responsible for accidents. “If the feet of a donkey were bad, one is not allowed to step over him. [ ]” What does it mean, ‘to step over him?’ They step on his body and pass by. “If one was free, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the free one. One unloaded, the other one loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were loaded or both unloaded, let them agree between themselves. Two carriages or two ships, one empty, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were unloaded or loaded, let them agree between themselves.” “The person entering the bath house gives precedence to the person leaving; the person leaving the toilet gives precedence to the person entering.”

Abba bar Rab Huna said: This implies that somebody who hit another person’s animal which as a consequence went and did damage is responsible for the damage caused.

HALAKHAH: “A bull belonging to a woman, a bull belonging to orphans,” etc. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? “It was testified to before its owners and they did not watch it;” those have no owners who could be responsible for damages. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: In matters of damages, Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable. What about weregilt? Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Everybody agrees that he is liable for weregilt. But some say, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Just as they disagree for damages so they disagree for weregilt. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: How does one actually act? He said to him, following Rebbi Hoshaia that in matters of damages, Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable; therefore, in matters of weregilt everybody agrees that he is liable.

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “If a shepherd handed his flock over to another shepherd, the first is liable, the second is not liable.” Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both said, since he handed it over to a responsible person, he is not liable.

HALAKHAH: “Somebody had robbed a field from another person,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, but did they not say that “real estate cannot be robbed”? Why did they say, “he has to give him a field”? It is a fine by which they fined him. If the discharged veterans took it from the robber because of the robbed, could he tell him, in any case give me what is mine and let any claimant come and deal with me? Rebbi Johua ben Levi said, nobody is held responsible for his neighbor and the latter has to repay him except annona and head-tax. Rav said, he can tell him, you redeemed your pledge with my money.

HALAKHAH: “One hands a cow or a donkey over for care,” etc. It was stated: “A person may receive from another an animal on condition to deliver to him one lamb and one shearing per year, a chicken for ten eggs a month. The woman receiving a chicken has to care for the chicks as long as those depend on their mother. One cares for small animals 30 days and for large animals 50 days. Rebbi Yose says, for (large) [small] animals three months because they need special care. After that, he gives the owner his part equally, everything according to local practice.” What means “he gives the owner his part equally”? A person gave to another 100 denars; they produced 20 denars. Each takes half of it; the half of the owner remains with him as capital. Do people do that? But they trade, and at the end they divide it up. “A person receiving an animal for care is responsible for it, for an unclean animal twelve months, for a human 24 months. At a place where work is compensated separately, one pays; for offspring of animals, one pays, everything following local custom.”

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: There you say that a paid trustee who would be responsible for accidents is forbidden. But here you say that a paid trustee who is responsible for accidents is permitted. Does it not happen that an unpaid trustee agrees to be like a borrower? Rebbi Jeremiah asked: There you say that mortmain belongs to the first, but here you say to the second. Rebbi Yose said, there since the essence belongs to the first, the offspring are counted for the first. But here the essence belongs to the second since the offspring belong to the second.

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: There you say that a paid trustee who would be responsible for accidents is forbidden. But here you say that a paid trustee who is responsible for accidents is permitted. Does it not happen that an unpaid trustee agrees to be like a borrower? Rebbi Jeremiah asked: There you say that mortmain belongs to the first, but here you say to the second. Rebbi Yose said, there since the essence belongs to the first, the offspring are counted for the first. But here the essence belongs to the second since the offspring belong to the second.

MISHNAH: If somebody sells grain to another and it did not sprout, or even flax seed, he is not responsible for it. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, for garden seeds which are not edible he is responsible. If somebody sells produce to another he has to accept a quarter [qab] of chaff per se’ah; for figs he has to accept ten worm-bitten ones per hundred; with a wine cellar he has to accept ten sour ones per hundred; with vessels in the Sharon he has to accept ten pitassaot per hundred. If somebody sells wine to another and it turned into vinegar, he is not responsible for it. But if it was known that his wine turns into vinegar, it is a buy in error. If he told him, I am selling you spice wine, it has to keep until Pentecost. “Old” is from the year before, “aged” from three years.

MISHNAH: If somebody sells grain to another and it did not sprout, or even flax seed, he is not responsible for it. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, for garden seeds which are not edible he is responsible. If somebody sells produce to another he has to accept a quarter [qab] of chaff per se’ah; for figs he has to accept ten worm-bitten ones per hundred; with a wine cellar he has to accept ten sour ones per hundred; with vessels in the Sharon he has to accept ten pitassaot per hundred. If somebody sells wine to another and it turned into vinegar, he is not responsible for it. But if it was known that his wine turns into vinegar, it is a buy in error. If he told him, I am selling you spice wine, it has to keep until Pentecost. “Old” is from the year before, “aged” from three years.

MISHNAH: If somebody sells grain to another and it did not sprout, or even flax seed, he is not responsible for it. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, for garden seeds which are not edible he is responsible. If somebody sells produce to another he has to accept a quarter [qab] of chaff per se’ah; for figs he has to accept ten worm-bitten ones per hundred; with a wine cellar he has to accept ten sour ones per hundred; with vessels in the Sharon he has to accept ten pitassaot per hundred. If somebody sells wine to another and it turned into vinegar, he is not responsible for it. But if it was known that his wine turns into vinegar, it is a buy in error. If he told him, I am selling you spice wine, it has to keep until Pentecost. “Old” is from the year before, “aged” from three years.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sells grain to another,” etc. It was stated: “If somebody sells grain to another and it did not sprout, even flax seed, he is not responsible for it. But if he made it conditional from the start as seeds, he is liable. What does he pay him? The value of the seeds. Some say, he gives him his expenses.”

HALAKHAH: “An oath about a deposit,” etc. It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation; in his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation? Rebbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person”, everything is here and everything is there. Rebbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and the Sages. He lied to his fellow man, if his confession was eliminated by the oath. It excludes one who lied to one of partners; it excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and warrantors for one another”, they are responsible and warrantors for one another; but one does not act on this. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him. Should he not be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable. If the deposit was worth one peruṭa, does this not result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? What here? If one would swear, and swear, and swear, would he not bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? There, each oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth.

HALAKHAH: “An oath about a deposit,” etc. It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation; in his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation? Rebbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person”, everything is here and everything is there. Rebbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and the Sages. He lied to his fellow man, if his confession was eliminated by the oath. It excludes one who lied to one of partners; it excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and warrantors for one another”, they are responsible and warrantors for one another; but one does not act on this. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him. Should he not be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable. If the deposit was worth one peruṭa, does this not result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? What here? If one would swear, and swear, and swear, would he not bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? There, each oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth.

MISHNAH: About the following one does not swear: slaves, and documents, and real estate, and gifts to the Temple. Not about double restitution, nor quadruple or quintuple; the unpaid trustee does not swear, the paid trustee does not pay. Rebbi Simeon says, one swears about things for which he is responsible if they be alienated, but does not swear if he is not responsible if they be alienated. Rebbi Meїr says, there are things which are like real estate and they are not like real estate but the Sages do not agree with him. How is this? “Ten bearing vines did I hand over to you,” but the other says, “they are only five.” Rebbi Meїr declares liable for an oath but the Sages say, anything connected to the ground is like ground.

MISHNAH: About the following one does not swear: slaves, and documents, and real estate, and gifts to the Temple. Not about double restitution, nor quadruple or quintuple; the unpaid trustee does not swear, the paid trustee does not pay. Rebbi Simeon says, one swears about things for which he is responsible if they be alienated, but does not swear if he is not responsible if they be alienated. Rebbi Meїr says, there are things which are like real estate and they are not like real estate but the Sages do not agree with him. How is this? “Ten bearing vines did I hand over to you,” but the other says, “they are only five.” Rebbi Meїr declares liable for an oath but the Sages say, anything connected to the ground is like ground.

“Rebbi Simeon says, both most holy and simple sancta; about any sancta for which he is responsible if alienated, I am reading against his neighbor and he lied; but about any sancta for which he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading against the Eternal and he lied.” Rav Huna said, both qualified and disqualified sancta, if he is responsible if alienated, even if they are for the Eternal, I am reading against his neighbor and he lied; but if he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading against the Eternal and he lied but not against his neighbor and he lied.

“Rebbi Simeon says, both most holy and simple sancta; about any sancta for which he is responsible if alienated, I am reading against his neighbor and he lied; but about any sancta for which he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading against the Eternal and he lied.” Rav Huna said, both qualified and disqualified sancta, if he is responsible if alienated, even if they are for the Eternal, I am reading against his neighbor and he lied; but if he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading against the Eternal and he lied but not against his neighbor and he lied.

“Rebbi Simeon says, both most holy and simple sancta; about any sancta for which he is responsible if alienated, I am reading against his neighbor and he lied; but about any sancta for which he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading against the Eternal and he lied.” Rav Huna said, both qualified and disqualified sancta, if he is responsible if alienated, even if they are for the Eternal, I am reading against his neighbor and he lied; but if he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading against the Eternal and he lied but not against his neighbor and he lied.

“Rebbi Simeon says, both most holy and simple sancta; about any sancta for which he is responsible if alienated, I am reading against his neighbor and he lied; but about any sancta for which he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading against the Eternal and he lied.” Rav Huna said, both qualified and disqualified sancta, if he is responsible if alienated, even if they are for the Eternal, I am reading against his neighbor and he lied; but if he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading against the Eternal and he lied but not against his neighbor and he lied.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sold his wine to a Non-Jew,” etc. Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: One who handles a wine-skin and it splits in his hand is not responsible for it. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it is necessary even if he takes it in the store when he has no other intention than that no other person should take it. Can he take possession at a minimal rate? Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, a Mishnah says that it cannot become his possession at a minimal rate, as we have stated there: “If somebody sells his wine to a Non-Jew, in case he fixed the price before that one measured, the proceeds are permitted; if that one measured before he fixed the price, the proceeds are forbidden.” If you say that it can come into his possession at a minimal price, even if he measured before he fixed the price should be as if he fixed the price before he measured and the proceeds would be permitted.

If a man was reciting the Tefillah and found excrement where he was standing, Rabbah said : Even if he himself was responsible for it, his Tefillah is valid. Raba retorted : But lo [it is written], "The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination" (Prov. xxi. 27)! Therefore, said Raba, since he is responsible [for the excrement], although he has uttered the prayer, his Tefillah is an abomination.

If a man was reciting the Tefillah and found excrement where he was standing, Rabbah said : Even if he himself was responsible for it, his Tefillah is valid. Raba retorted : But lo [it is written], "The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination" (Prov. xxi. 27)! Therefore, said Raba, since he is responsible [for the excrement], although he has uttered the prayer, his Tefillah is an abomination.

Mishnah: There is no difference between vowed offerings and freewill-offerings except that he is responsible for vowed offering but not responsible for freewill-offerings.

Mishnah: There is no difference between vowed offerings and freewill-offerings except that he is responsible for vowed offering but not responsible for freewill-offerings.

It was taught there: What constitutes a vow? When one says: “It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah.” And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: “Behold, this shall be an olah.” What is the [practical] difference between vows (neder) and freewill offerings (nedavah)? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement. Whence is this rule derived? —

It was taught there: What constitutes a vow? When one says: “It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah.” And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: “Behold, this shall be an olah.” What is the [practical] difference between vows (neder) and freewill offerings (nedavah)? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement. Whence is this rule derived? —

It was taught there: What constitutes a vow? When one says: “It is incumbent upon me to bring an olah.” And what constitutes a freewill-offering? When one says: “Behold, this shall be an olah.” What is the [practical] difference between vows (neder) and freewill offerings (nedavah)? In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; In the case of vows, if they die or are stolen, one is responsible for their replacement; But in the case of freewill offerings, if they die or are stolen, one is not responsible for their replacement. Whence is this rule derived? —

Rabbah b. Bar Hanah said in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi: His father was from Benjamin and his mother from Judah. The Rabbis, however, said: The tribes competed with one another [for him]. The tribe of Judah said: I am responsible for the birth of Mordecai, because David did not kill Shimei the son of Gera. And the tribe of Benjamin said: He is actually descended from me.

Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.

Except a deaf man, a fool, and a child etc. There is a Baraitha, A deaf man is like a fool and a child. As a fool and a child are not responsible for their actions, so a deaf man is not responsible for his actions. And we learn, as we are taught by a canonical Mishnah, A deaf man, as wise men have everywhere said, is one who does not hear and does not speak (Niddah, 13b, ii. 17). Lo, you will say then, He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. Yes, for there is a Baraitha for this. For our Rabbis have taught, He who speaks and does not hear is deaf, he who hears and does not speak is dumb. Both one and the other are to be treated as capable persons in all that relates to them. And whence do you infer that he who speaks and does not hear is deaf, and that he who hears and does not speak is dumb? Since it is written, "But I as a deaf man hear not; and I am as a dumb man, who openeth not his mouth" (Ps. xxxviii. 14). And, if you like, I will say, according to the proverbial saying, A man stumbling in his words. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is bound. But, lo, there is a Baraitha, viz., He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt. Rabena, or it may have been Rabba, said, There is a hiatus here. And there is a Baraitha to this effect, All are bound as regards the holocaust, and as regards the rejoicing, except a deaf man. He who speaks and does not hear, or he who hears and does not speak, is exempt from the holocaust. But although he is exempt from the holocaust, he is bound as regards the rejoicing; but as for him who does not hear and does not speak, and as for a fool and a child, he is exempt also from the rejoicing, inasmuch as these are exempt from all the commandments which are contained in the Law.