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8470 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
It turns out that one disagreement is like an other other disagreement, as it was stated: On the Day of Atonement, one has to detail one’s deeds, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Aqiba says, one does not have to detail the sin. Some Tannïm state, one has to detail the vow; some Tannïm state, one does not have to detail the vow. A person made a vow not to earn money. He came before Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom. He asked him, what did you forswear to yourself? He said to him, not to earn money. Rebbi Yudan said to him, is there anyone doing that? He said to him, as a gambler. He said, praise to Him Who chose the Torah and the Sages who said, one has to detail the vow.
“Rabbi Joḥanan said, it is obvious that this one was learned.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is what happened: Jonathan ben Uzziel’s father vowed not to let him have any usufruct from him and in his will gave his part to Shammai. What did Shammai do? He sold some, gave some to the sacred fund, gave him the remainder as a gift, and said: He who wants to attack this gift, let him first get back [the merchandise] from the buyers and from the sacred fund; after that he can get [the remainder] back from this one.
Six things did Ezekiah, the king of Judea, do. With three they agreed, with three they did not agree. He dragged his father’s bones and they agreed. He smashed the bronze snake and they agreed. He hid the table of medicines and they agreed. With three they disagreed. He closed the upper Giḥon spring and they disagreed. He cut down the Temple doors and they disagreed. He intercalated Nisan in Nisan and they disagreed.
One does not intercalate for a year before New Year’s Day; if they did intercalate it would be invalid. But for an urgent need one may intercalate immediately after New Year’s Day. Nevertheless, only Adar is intercalated. Rebbi says, Nisan never was lengthened. But did we not state: “If the New Moon appeared in time”? If it would appear, it did not appear. Rav said, Tishre was never lengthened. But did we not state: “If the month was long”? If it would be, it never was.
One does not intercalate for a year before New Year’s Day; if they did intercalate it would be invalid. But for an urgent need one may intercalate immediately after New Year’s Day. Nevertheless, only Adar is intercalated. Rebbi says, Nisan never was lengthened. But did we not state: “If the New Moon appeared in time”? If it would appear, it did not appear. Rav said, Tishre was never lengthened. But did we not state: “If the month was long”? If it would be, it never was.
Jeremiah intercalated outside the Land. Ezechiel intercalated outside the Land. Baruch intercalated outside the Land. Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua intercalated outside the Land. Rebbi sent him three letters through Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Nathan. In one he wrote, to His holiness Ḥanania. And in one he wrote, the kid goats you left behind became rams. And in one he wrote, if you do not accept, go to the thistle desert, do slaughter and let Onias sprinkle. After the first [letter], he honored them. After the second, he honored them. After the third, he wanted to disgrace them. They said to him, you cannot do that since you already did honor us. Rebbi Isaac rose and quoted, it is written in the Torah: These are the holidays of Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. They said to him, “the holdays of the Eternal”. He said to them, that is with us. Rebbi Nathan rose and finished: “For from Babylonia will go Torah forth and the Eternal’s word from Nahar-Peqod.” They said to him, “for from Zion will Torah go forth and the Eternal’s word from Jerusalem”. He said to them, that is with us. He went to complain about them to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis. He said to him, follow them, follow them. He said to him, I do not know whom I left there. Who would tell me that they are wise to the computations as I am? If he had said, they are not wise, they should listen to him. Since they are wise to the computations as he is, he has to listen to them. He got up and rode on a horse. Where he reached, he reached. Where he did not reach, they continued following the corrupt [calendar].
Jeremiah intercalated outside the Land. Ezechiel intercalated outside the Land. Baruch intercalated outside the Land. Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua intercalated outside the Land. Rebbi sent him three letters through Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Nathan. In one he wrote, to His holiness Ḥanania. And in one he wrote, the kid goats you left behind became rams. And in one he wrote, if you do not accept, go to the thistle desert, do slaughter and let Onias sprinkle. After the first [letter], he honored them. After the second, he honored them. After the third, he wanted to disgrace them. They said to him, you cannot do that since you already did honor us. Rebbi Isaac rose and quoted, it is written in the Torah: These are the holidays of Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. They said to him, “the holdays of the Eternal”. He said to them, that is with us. Rebbi Nathan rose and finished: “For from Babylonia will go Torah forth and the Eternal’s word from Nahar-Peqod.” They said to him, “for from Zion will Torah go forth and the Eternal’s word from Jerusalem”. He said to them, that is with us. He went to complain about them to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis. He said to him, follow them, follow them. He said to him, I do not know whom I left there. Who would tell me that they are wise to the computations as I am? If he had said, they are not wise, they should listen to him. Since they are wise to the computations as he is, he has to listen to them. He got up and rode on a horse. Where he reached, he reached. Where he did not reach, they continued following the corrupt [calendar].
HALAKHAH: : What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? Is its father’s name called upon it? In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, if somebody makes a vow to abstain from wine, he is permitted spiced wine.
HALAKHAH: : What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? Is its father’s name called upon it? In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, if somebody makes a vow to abstain from wine, he is permitted spiced wine.
HALAKHAH: “One who makes a vow,” etc. What is Rebbi Meїr’s reason? What the rain produces from the earth. What is the reason of the rabbis? Flour is עבור.
MISHNAH: One who made a vow to abstain from garments is permitted sack-cloth, carpets, and goat’s hair cloth. If he said, a qônām that wool shall not come onto me, he is permitted to cover himself with shorn wool; that linen should not come upon me, he is permitted to cover himself with linen fibers. Rebbi Jehudah says, everything refers to the vow. If he was carrying and sweating and smelling badly, when he said, a qônām that no wool or flax should be on me, he is permitted to wear but forbidden to carry on his back.
HALAKHAH: “One who made a vow to abstain from garments,” etc. One who made a vow to abstain from clothing is permitted sack-cloth, carpet, and goat’s hair cloth, leather apron, and bandages. He is forbidden fascia and belt. One who vows to abstain from clothing is forbidden all kinds of clothing but permitted these. Rebbi Jeremiah said, Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: If one said, a qônām, that I shall not wear a garment, that I shall not cover myself with clothing? Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, if he said, a qônām for anything that is generally used to cover oneself and a derivative of it is generally used to cover oneself; generally he is permitted the derivative; if he made a vow to abstain from the derivative he is permitted the material itself. What is an example? For example, sheepskin. For anything that is generally used to cover oneself but no derivative of it is generally used to cover oneself; if he vowed about it, he is permitted the derivative; if he made a vow to abstain from the derivative he is forbidden the material itself. What is an example? For example, goatskin. And anything that is generally not used to cover oneself but a derivative of it is generally used to cover oneself; if he vowed about it, he intended only the derivative. What is an example? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, for example raw cotton.
MISHNAH: ‘That you provide me with usufruct until Passover if you would go to your father’s house until Tabernacles.’ If she went before Passover, she is forbidden to deliver usufruct to him until Passover, after Passover “he should not profane his word.”
MISHNAH: ‘That you provide me with usufruct from you until Tabernacles if you would go to your father’s house until Passover.’ If she went before Passover, she is forbidden to deliver usufruct to him until Tabernacles; but she is permitted to go after Passover.
MISHNAH: ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine today,’ he is forbidden only until nightfall. ‘This week’, he is forbidden the entire week; the Sabbath belongs to the past. ‘This month’, he is forbidden the entire month; the day of the New Moon belongs to the future. ‘This year’, he is forbidden the entire year; New Year’s Day belongs to the future. ‘This Sabbatical period’, he is forbidden the entire Sabbatical period; the Sabbatical year belongs to the past. But if he said, one day, one week, one month, one year, he is forbidden from day.
The words of Rebbi Joḥanan imply that one may fast for hours, for Rebbi Joḥanan said, I shall fast until I finish studying this chapter, until I finish studying this text. The words of Rebbi Jonah imply that one may fast for hours, for Rebbi Jonah was in Tyre when he heard that Rebbi Yose’s son had died. Even though he had eaten cheese and drunk water, he finished that day fasting. The words of Rav imply that one may fast for hours, for Rav said, one may borrow his fast day and pay back. Samuel said to him, is that a vow? If he had vowed to fast but forgot and ate the volume of an olive, he lost his fast day. Rebbi Abba in the name of the rabbis there: That is, if he said simply “a day”. But if he said “this day”, he has to continue fasting until the end. He spoke only of eating; that excludes tasting. Rebbi Abba Ḥasida in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Tasting does not create obligations of benediction, robbery, nor of demay, nor of the interruption of a fast day.
A private person who committed himself for a fast day, eats and drinks after nightfall. But if he said a public fast day, he eats and drinks only during daytime. If he made a vow to fast and it turned out to fall on Sabbath days or holidays, he is whipped but does not need permission from a Sage. If he made a vow to fast and it turned out to fall on days written in the Scroll of Fasts, Rebbi Ḥizqia and Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: One said, he fasts but does not finish, but the other one said, he is whipped but does not need permission from a Sage. That is, you say that before the scroll of fasts was abolished. But when the Scroll of Fasts was abolished, all this was abolished. Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Joḥanan both say that the Scroll of Fasts was abolished. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, the Scroll of Fasts was abolished. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and stating: “It happened that they decreed a fast day at Lod during Ḥanukka. Rebbi Eliezer went and had a haircut, Rebbi Joshua went and took a hot bath. Rebbi Joshua said to them, go and fast for what you fasted.” And you say, the Scroll of Fasts was abolished? Rebbi Abba said, even though you say that the Scroll of Fasts was abolished, Ḥanukka and Purim were not abolished. The acts of the rabbis imply that the Scroll of Fasts was abolished: Rebbi Jonathan fasted on the day before New Year’s Day. Rebbi Abin fasted on the day before Tabernacles. Rebbi Ze‘ira fasted 300 fast days, and some say 900 fast days and did not care about the Scroll of Fasts. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa told the scribes: If a woman comes to ask you, tell her that one may fast any day except Sabbaths, holidays, New Moons, the intermediary days of holidays, Ḥanukka, and Purim.
HALAKHAH: If one fixed the time for his son’s wedding and said, a qônām that I shall not taste wine until the wedding, is that as if the time was fixed? Or, since he could move the time to a later date, is it as if the time was not fixed?
MISHNAH: If they were importuning him to marry his sister’s daughter and he said, a qônām if she ever has any usufruct from me, and similarly, a man who was about to divorce his wife and said, a qônām if my wife ever has any usufruct from me, they may have usufruct from him since he intended only about matters of marriage.
HALAKHAH: “If they were importuning him to marry his sister’s daughter,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “everything refers to the vow.” “And similarly, a man who was about to divorce his wife.” Rebbi Yose said, this is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “everything refers to the vow.”
HALAKHAH: “If they were importuning him to marry his sister’s daughter,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “everything refers to the vow.” “And similarly, a man who was about to divorce his wife.” Rebbi Yose said, this is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “everything refers to the vow.”
HALAKHAH: “If they were importuning him to marry his sister’s daughter,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “everything refers to the vow.” “And similarly, a man who was about to divorce his wife.” Rebbi Yose said, this is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “everything refers to the vow.”
Rebbi Joḥanan provided an opening by having second thoughts: “If it were not for that, would he have come?” Are second thoughts not something new? Rebbi Hila said, second thoughts are a common occurrence. In this kind, Rebbi Simeon did not find an opening for his own vow until one of the Galilean Elders came; some say, that one was Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. He took him from here and put him there; he took him from here and put him there, until finally he put him into the sun and told him to check his garments for fleas. They said to him, if you had known that this old man would treat you in such a way, would you have made the vow? He said, No. He permitted him. They asked, from where do you have this? He said to them, I was Meïr’s servant both times when he fled, but some say, Rebbi Meïr’s walking stick was in my hand and it teaches me knowledge.
Rebbi Joḥanan provided an opening by having second thoughts: “If it were not for that, would he have come?” Are second thoughts not something new? Rebbi Hila said, second thoughts are a common occurrence. In this kind, Rebbi Simeon did not find an opening for his own vow until one of the Galilean Elders came; some say, that one was Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. He took him from here and put him there; he took him from here and put him there, until finally he put him into the sun and told him to check his garments for fleas. They said to him, if you had known that this old man would treat you in such a way, would you have made the vow? He said, No. He permitted him. They asked, from where do you have this? He said to them, I was Meïr’s servant both times when he fled, but some say, Rebbi Meïr’s walking stick was in my hand and it teaches me knowledge.
Rebbi Mana made a vow away from his father’s wine. His father came to him and said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that I am hurt by it? He said, no. He dissolved for him. Where do we hold? If he said, my benefit [is forbidden] to my father; is that not what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: One forces the son to support his father. But we must hold that he said, my father’s benefit [is forbidden] to me. Rebbi Mana made a vow and came to Rebbi Shammai, who said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that people do not want to deal with you since you are a vower? He said, no, and he dissolved for him.
Rebbi Mana made a vow away from his father’s wine. His father came to him and said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that I am hurt by it? He said, no. He dissolved for him. Where do we hold? If he said, my benefit [is forbidden] to my father; is that not what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: One forces the son to support his father. But we must hold that he said, my father’s benefit [is forbidden] to me. Rebbi Mana made a vow and came to Rebbi Shammai, who said to him, would you have made that vow if you had known that people do not want to deal with you since you are a vower? He said, no, and he dissolved for him.
MISHNAH: In addition, Rebbi Eliezer said, one finds an opening in changed circumstances, but the Sages forbid it. How is this? If he said, a qônām that I shall not benefit from Mr. X, who then becomes a public scribe or who marries off his son to one of [the vower’s] relatives, and he said, if I had known that he will become a public scribe or marry off his son to a relative, I would not have vowed; or if he said, a qônām that I shall not enter this house and it was turned into a synagogue and he said, if I had known that it would become a synagogue, I would not have vowed; Rebbi Eliezer permits but the Sages prohibit.
MISHNAH: One creates an opening for a man with his wife’s ketubah. It happened that one vowed usufruct from his wife whose ketubah was 400 denar. She came before Rebbi Aqiba who obliged him to give her her ketubah. He said, Rebbi, my father left 800 denar. My brother took 400 and I 400, would it not be enough if she take 200 and I 200? Rebbi Aqiba told him, even if you have to sell the hair on your head, you will pay her ketubah. He said to him, if I had known that, I would not have vowed. Rebbi Aqiba freed him.
HALAKHAH: “One creates an opening for a man with his wife’s ketubah” etc. Does one collect from movables? Rebbi Abba said, even if one could say, one collects from movables, one tells him to pay. Rebbi Manisha asked, could one tell the heirs to collect from pledged property? Rebbi Abba Mari said, the Mishnah says that one does not say so, as we have stated there: “It should be given to the heirs since everybody has to swear but the heirs do not have to swear.” What does one make her swear? There, they say, from straw I did not collect, from his person I did collect.
HALAKHAH: “One opens about festive days and Sabbaths,” etc. It was stated: “If one was permitted, all subsequent ones are permitted, all preceding ones are forbidden.” It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: “There exists a type of vow which may be partly voided and the rest confirmed. How is this? One made a vow [not to eat] from a fig basket which contained benot s̄eba’ figs. If he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have made the vow, he is permitted the benot s̄eba’ figs and not only these but all figs. But if he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have extended my vow to benot s̄eba’ figs, only benot s̄eba’ figs are permitted to him.”
HALAKHAH: “One opens about festive days and Sabbaths,” etc. It was stated: “If one was permitted, all subsequent ones are permitted, all preceding ones are forbidden.” It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: “There exists a type of vow which may be partly voided and the rest confirmed. How is this? One made a vow [not to eat] from a fig basket which contained benot s̄eba’ figs. If he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have made the vow, he is permitted the benot s̄eba’ figs and not only these but all figs. But if he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have extended my vow to benot s̄eba’ figs, only benot s̄eba’ figs are permitted to him.”
HALAKHAH: “One opens about festive days and Sabbaths,” etc. It was stated: “If one was permitted, all subsequent ones are permitted, all preceding ones are forbidden.” It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: “There exists a type of vow which may be partly voided and the rest confirmed. How is this? One made a vow [not to eat] from a fig basket which contained benot s̄eba’ figs. If he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have made the vow, he is permitted the benot s̄eba’ figs and not only these but all figs. But if he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have extended my vow to benot s̄eba’ figs, only benot s̄eba’ figs are permitted to him.”
HALAKHAH: “One opens about festive days and Sabbaths,” etc. It was stated: “If one was permitted, all subsequent ones are permitted, all preceding ones are forbidden.” It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: “There exists a type of vow which may be partly voided and the rest confirmed. How is this? One made a vow [not to eat] from a fig basket which contained benot s̄eba’ figs. If he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have made the vow, he is permitted the benot s̄eba’ figs and not only these but all figs. But if he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have extended my vow to benot s̄eba’ figs, only benot s̄eba’ figs are permitted to him.”
HALAKHAH: “One opens about festive days and Sabbaths,” etc. It was stated: “If one was permitted, all subsequent ones are permitted, all preceding ones are forbidden.” It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: “There exists a type of vow which may be partly voided and the rest confirmed. How is this? One made a vow [not to eat] from a fig basket which contained benot s̄eba’ figs. If he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have made the vow, he is permitted the benot s̄eba’ figs and not only these but all figs. But if he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have extended my vow to benot s̄eba’ figs, only benot s̄eba’ figs are permitted to him.”
HALAKHAH: “One opens about festive days and Sabbaths,” etc. It was stated: “If one was permitted, all subsequent ones are permitted, all preceding ones are forbidden.” It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: “There exists a type of vow which may be partly voided and the rest confirmed. How is this? One made a vow [not to eat] from a fig basket which contained benot s̄eba’ figs. If he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have made the vow, he is permitted the benot s̄eba’ figs and not only these but all figs. But if he said, if I had known that it contained benot s̄eba’ figs, I would not have extended my vow to benot s̄eba’ figs, only benot s̄eba’ figs are permitted to him.”
MISHNAH: ‘A qônām that I shall not marry the ugly Miss X, and she is beautiful, black and she is white, short and she is tall, he is permitted. Not because she was ugly and became beautiful, black and she became white, short and she became tall, but because the vow was erroneous. It happened that one made a vow renouncing benefit from his sister’s daughter. They brought her to Rebbi Ismael’s house and gave her a beauty treatment. Rebbi Ismael asked him, did you make your vow about this one? He said no, and Rebbi Ismael dissolved it. At that moment, Rebbi Ismael cried and said, the daughters of Israel are beautiful, but poverty disfigures them.
MISHNAH: ‘A qônām that I shall not marry the ugly Miss X, and she is beautiful, black and she is white, short and she is tall, he is permitted. Not because she was ugly and became beautiful, black and she became white, short and she became tall, but because the vow was erroneous. It happened that one made a vow renouncing benefit from his sister’s daughter. They brought her to Rebbi Ismael’s house and gave her a beauty treatment. Rebbi Ismael asked him, did you make your vow about this one? He said no, and Rebbi Ismael dissolved it. At that moment, Rebbi Ismael cried and said, the daughters of Israel are beautiful, but poverty disfigures them.
HALAKHAH: “An adolescent girl,” etc. It is written, “if she should be a man’s”. What are we speaking about? If a married one, it already is written “if she vowed in her husband’s house”. If about an unmarried one, it already is written “if she vows a vow to the Eternal”. Why does the verse say, ““if she should be a man’s with her vows on her”? That refers to the preliminarily married adolescent girl whose vows are dissolved by father and husband. So far for vows which she vowed after she was prelinimarily married. Vows which she vowed before she was prelinimarily married? “With her vows on her,” to include the vows which come with her from her father’s house.
HALAKHAH: “An adolescent girl,” etc. It is written, “if she should be a man’s”. What are we speaking about? If a married one, it already is written “if she vowed in her husband’s house”. If about an unmarried one, it already is written “if she vows a vow to the Eternal”. Why does the verse say, ““if she should be a man’s with her vows on her”? That refers to the preliminarily married adolescent girl whose vows are dissolved by father and husband. So far for vows which she vowed after she was prelinimarily married. Vows which she vowed before she was prelinimarily married? “With her vows on her,” to include the vows which come with her from her father’s house.
HALAKHAH: “An adolescent girl,” etc. It is written, “if she should be a man’s”. What are we speaking about? If a married one, it already is written “if she vowed in her husband’s house”. If about an unmarried one, it already is written “if she vows a vow to the Eternal”. Why does the verse say, ““if she should be a man’s with her vows on her”? That refers to the preliminarily married adolescent girl whose vows are dissolved by father and husband. So far for vows which she vowed after she was prelinimarily married. Vows which she vowed before she was prelinimarily married? “With her vows on her,” to include the vows which come with her from her father’s house.
HALAKHAH: “An adolescent girl,” etc. It is written, “if she should be a man’s”. What are we speaking about? If a married one, it already is written “if she vowed in her husband’s house”. If about an unmarried one, it already is written “if she vows a vow to the Eternal”. Why does the verse say, ““if she should be a man’s with her vows on her”? That refers to the preliminarily married adolescent girl whose vows are dissolved by father and husband. So far for vows which she vowed after she was prelinimarily married. Vows which she vowed before she was prelinimarily married? “With her vows on her,” to include the vows which come with her from her father’s house.
It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “If she should be a man’s”, the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died? The husband dissolves. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.” “Between a man and his wife.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.
It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “If she should be a man’s”, the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died? The husband dissolves. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.” “Between a man and his wife.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.
“One does not have to mention if one of them confirmed it.” Come and see; if the father dissolved, it is not dissolved, and you say so? Not on that it was said, but on the following: If the father dissolved his part but the husband did not have time to dissolve before he died, the father dissolves the husband’s part. Rebbi Nathan said, those are the words of the House of Shammai. But the statement of the Sages is that he does not need to dissolve if [the husband] did not confirm it. But if [the husband] confirmed, [the father] cannot void.
You say that the father dissolves the husband’s part. If he wanted to confirm, he says, it is confirmed for you, without details, (it is confirmed for you, without details); the husband’s part is dissolved for you. The following is obvious: If the father did not dissolve his part and she violated her vow, she is whipped. If the father dissolved but the husband did not, would she be whipped? Or since if the husband died and his part became void in favor of the father, would she not be whipped? This follows him who said, death does not force [dissolution]. But following him who said, death does force dissolution, and here since he did not dissolve for her and she violated her vow, she is whipped. It was stated: If the father dissolved his part but the husband died before he could dissolve, the last husband dissolves the part of the first one. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says so: “Her father and her last husband dissolve her vows”.
You say that the father dissolves the husband’s part. If he wanted to confirm, he says, it is confirmed for you, without details, (it is confirmed for you, without details); the husband’s part is dissolved for you. The following is obvious: If the father did not dissolve his part and she violated her vow, she is whipped. If the father dissolved but the husband did not, would she be whipped? Or since if the husband died and his part became void in favor of the father, would she not be whipped? This follows him who said, death does not force [dissolution]. But following him who said, death does force dissolution, and here since he did not dissolve for her and she violated her vow, she is whipped. It was stated: If the father dissolved his part but the husband died before he could dissolve, the last husband dissolves the part of the first one. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says so: “Her father and her last husband dissolve her vows”.
MISHNAH: If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father. In this, He strengthened the father’s power over the husband. In another matter, He strengthened the husband’s power over the father since the husband dissolves in adulthood but the father does not dissolve in adulthood.
MISHNAH: If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father. In this, He strengthened the father’s power over the husband. In another matter, He strengthened the husband’s power over the father since the husband dissolves in adulthood but the father does not dissolve in adulthood.
“Since the husband dissolves in adulthood.” The Mishnah follows Rebbi Eleazar, since it was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “If she should be a man’s”, the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl.
MISHNAH: If she made a vow while preliminarily married, was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even to a hundred men, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows. That is the principle: as long as she did not leave her father’s power for one moment, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.
HALAKHAH: “He answered to the words of Rebbi Eliezer: Let the miqweh prove it! It frees the impure from their impurities but it cannot save pure ones. Rebbi Eliezer argued another track: Since in a situation where he cannot dissolve his own vows before he made them, he dissolves his wife’s vows before she made them, in a situation where he can dissolve his own vows after he made them, would it not be logical that he could dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them? No! Why can he not dissolve his own vows before he made them? For if he wants to confirm them, he confirms them. Could he dissolve his wife’s vows after she made them, when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?” “But it says, ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them’. What can be confirmed can be dissolved,; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.”
HALAKHAH: “He answered to the words of Rebbi Eliezer: Let the miqweh prove it! It frees the impure from their impurities but it cannot save pure ones. Rebbi Eliezer argued another track: Since in a situation where he cannot dissolve his own vows before he made them, he dissolves his wife’s vows before she made them, in a situation where he can dissolve his own vows after he made them, would it not be logical that he could dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them? No! Why can he not dissolve his own vows before he made them? For if he wants to confirm them, he confirms them. Could he dissolve his wife’s vows after she made them, when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?” “But it says, ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them’. What can be confirmed can be dissolved,; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.”
HALAKHAH: “He answered to the words of Rebbi Eliezer: Let the miqweh prove it! It frees the impure from their impurities but it cannot save pure ones. Rebbi Eliezer argued another track: Since in a situation where he cannot dissolve his own vows before he made them, he dissolves his wife’s vows before she made them, in a situation where he can dissolve his own vows after he made them, would it not be logical that he could dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them? No! Why can he not dissolve his own vows before he made them? For if he wants to confirm them, he confirms them. Could he dissolve his wife’s vows after she made them, when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?” “But it says, ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them’. What can be confirmed can be dissolved,; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.”
HALAKHAH: “The dissolution of vows may take place the entire day,” etc. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon say, the dissolution of vows may take place from time to time.” What is the reason of the rabbis? “From day to day.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah? “On the day of his hearing.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s reason, “on the day of his hearing”? Explain it that she made the vow on the start of the night. How does Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah explain the rabbis’ reason, “from day to day”? Explain it that she made the vow at the start of Friday night, he became paralyzed, and then his power of speech returned. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one gives him 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he has only that day. If he became paralyzed, and later his power of speech returned, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one adds up to a total of 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he always can dissolve when his speech returns. But if it happened one hour before sundown, he can no longer dissolve.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, earlier generations were asking, may a man ask about his confirmation? How is that? If his wife made a vow, her husband heard it and did not dissolve for her. It is obvious that he cannot dissolve as a husband. May he dissolve as an Elder? What are we talking about? If it is about vows between him and her, these are vows of himself. But we must talk about vows between her and others. [Is that not a Mishnah? “Not his wife’s vows between her and others!”] Is that not Rebbi Jehudah’s? It was stated in the name of Rebbi Judah; Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of the Sages.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, earlier generations were asking, may a man ask about his confirmation? How is that? If his wife made a vow, her husband heard it and did not dissolve for her. It is obvious that he cannot dissolve as a husband. May he dissolve as an Elder? What are we talking about? If it is about vows between him and her, these are vows of himself. But we must talk about vows between her and others. [Is that not a Mishnah? “Not his wife’s vows between her and others!”] Is that not Rebbi Jehudah’s? It was stated in the name of Rebbi Judah; Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of the Sages.
May one permit vows in the night? Since vows under the husband’s jurisdiction, about which “on the day” is written, he may dissolve in the night, vows under the jurisdiction of the Elder, where “on the day” is not written, not so much more? Can one permit through an interpreter? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Abba bar Ẓutra was made an interpreter for Rebbi Joḥanan in the case of a woman who did not know Syriac.
Rebbi Hila explained the Mishnah: “These are the vows which he can dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], ‘if I wash, if I do not wash; if I wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.’ ” What means “Rebbi Yose said, these vows are not vows of mortification”? They are vows between him and her. “The following are vows of mortification” is everybody’s opinion.
“If I wash, if I do not wash.” It was stated: “If I wash, if I do not wash; if I wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels”, these are vows of mortification. Both according to Rebbi Ze‘ira or according to Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yose seems to contradict his own opinion, as it was stated: “A water source belonging to the townspeople, between them and outsiders, they have precedence over outsiders. Between outsiders and their animals, the outsiders have precedence over their animals. Their washing and the lives of outsiders, their washing has precedence over the lives of outsiders.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, who is the Tanna who said that washing is a necessity for survival? Rebbi Yose! As it was stated: “One may use it neither for steeping nor for washing. But Rebbi Yose permits it for washing.” The opinions of Rebbi Yose are contradictory. There he says, washing oneself is not a necessity of life. And here, he says washing one’s garments is a necessity of life! Rebbi Mana said, a person might put off washing himself but nobody puts off washing his clothes.
Jehudah from Ḥusa hid himself in a cave for three days because he wanted to find the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He came to Rabbi Yose bar Ḥalaphta and said, I was hiding in a cave for three days because I wanted to find the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He called his son Rebbi Abba and asked him about the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He said to him (Num. 35:15): “These [six] cities shall be”, each town shall be, and only afterwards their surroundings around them. He [R. Yose] said to him [Jehudah from Huṣa], what did cause you [this emharassment]? That you did not study with your companions!
Jehudah from Ḥusa hid himself in a cave for three days because he wanted to find the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He came to Rabbi Yose bar Ḥalaphta and said, I was hiding in a cave for three days because I wanted to find the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He called his son Rebbi Abba and asked him about the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He said to him (Num. 35:15): “These [six] cities shall be”, each town shall be, and only afterwards their surroundings around them. He [R. Yose] said to him [Jehudah from Huṣa], what did cause you [this emharassment]? That you did not study with your companions!
Jehudah from Ḥusa hid himself in a cave for three days because he wanted to find the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He came to Rabbi Yose bar Ḥalaphta and said, I was hiding in a cave for three days because I wanted to find the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He called his son Rebbi Abba and asked him about the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He said to him (Num. 35:15): “These [six] cities shall be”, each town shall be, and only afterwards their surroundings around them. He [R. Yose] said to him [Jehudah from Huṣa], what did cause you [this emharassment]? That you did not study with your companions!
A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaninah: “A vow that no Cohanim or Levites should have any advantage from me, they should take against his will.” He explains it about a person who says, I cannot possibly give them any gifts. You should know that this is so, since we have stated: “These Cohanim and Levites should [not] have any advantage from me, let others take.” A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “An Israel can say to another Israel, here you have a tetradrachma and give this firstling to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.” He explains, if he already wanted to give it to two [Cohanim] and that daughter’s son was one of them; then one said, here you have a tetradrachma and give it whole to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.
A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaninah: “A vow that no Cohanim or Levites should have any advantage from me, they should take against his will.” He explains it about a person who says, I cannot possibly give them any gifts. You should know that this is so, since we have stated: “These Cohanim and Levites should [not] have any advantage from me, let others take.” A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “An Israel can say to another Israel, here you have a tetradrachma and give this firstling to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.” He explains, if he already wanted to give it to two [Cohanim] and that daughter’s son was one of them; then one said, here you have a tetradrachma and give it whole to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.
A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaninah: “A vow that no Cohanim or Levites should have any advantage from me, they should take against his will.” He explains it about a person who says, I cannot possibly give them any gifts. You should know that this is so, since we have stated: “These Cohanim and Levites should [not] have any advantage from me, let others take.” A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “An Israel can say to another Israel, here you have a tetradrachma and give this firstling to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.” He explains, if he already wanted to give it to two [Cohanim] and that daughter’s son was one of them; then one said, here you have a tetradrachma and give it whole to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.
HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not work according to the wishes of my father,’ etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody dedicates his wife’s work, she works and eats. The excess? Rebbi Meїr says, it is dedicated; Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, it is profane.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree about the excess over five tetradrachmas. He explains it in the case of one who supports his wife with food but does not give her an obolus for her needs, as we stated: “If he does not give her an obolus for her needs, what she earns is hers”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they disagree about the excess left after [the husband’s] death; for he explains it if he does not support her with food. But if he supports her with food, everybody agrees that it became dedicated. And here, he cannot dissolve! Rebbi Meїr says. he does not have to dissolve. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, hers. Rebbi Aqiba said, hers. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, his.
HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not work according to the wishes of my father,’ etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody dedicates his wife’s work, she works and eats. The excess? Rebbi Meїr says, it is dedicated; Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, it is profane.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree about the excess over five tetradrachmas. He explains it in the case of one who supports his wife with food but does not give her an obolus for her needs, as we stated: “If he does not give her an obolus for her needs, what she earns is hers”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they disagree about the excess left after [the husband’s] death; for he explains it if he does not support her with food. But if he supports her with food, everybody agrees that it became dedicated. And here, he cannot dissolve! Rebbi Meїr says. he does not have to dissolve. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, hers. Rebbi Aqiba said, hers. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, his.
MISHNAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee, anything she forbids to herself shall be confirmed.” How is that? If she said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she married within these thirty days he cannot dissolve. If she made the vow under her husband’s authority and he dissolved it, if she had said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she should become a widow or a divorcee within the next 30 days, it remains dissolved. If she made a vow, was on the same day divorced, and taken back, he cannot dissolve. This is the principle: He cannot dissolve for any one who was on her own for one moment.
It was stated: “The House of Shammai say, both substitute names and substitutes of substitutes are forbidden. But the House of Hillel say, substitute names are forbidden, substitutes of substitutes are permitted.” What are substitutes of substitutes? Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said, menazaqa,menaziqna,mefaḥazna. Rebbi Yose said, these are not substitutes of substitutes, they are really substitute names, for is somebody who said menadarna not a nazir? But one who says menadarna is like one who said mefaḥazna. Following Rebbi Yose, these are substitutes of substitutes, as we have stated: “I have to bring birds’, Rebbi Meïr says, he is a nazir, but the Sages say, he is not a nazir. “Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of substitutes of substitutes: “Until his hair became mighty as an eagle’s and his fingernails like those of birds.”
“I shall be like this one”; Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, if he grabs [a nazir’s] hair and says, “I shall be like this one.” “I shall tend my hair, I shall groom my hair”. If he says, I shall be of those who have to tend or grow their hair. “I shall tend my hair and I shall groom my hair”, if he says I shall neither tend nor grow my hair for less than thirty [days], he means thirty. “It shall be my obligation neither to tend nor to grow my hair,” if he says, it shall be my obligation neither to tend nor to grow my hair more than thirty [days], he means thirty. “I shall be obligated to grow my hair”, means “I shall tend my hair, I shall groom my hair”. Or “It shall be my obligation neither to tend nor to groom my hair, but to let it grow wildly.”
“ ‘I have to bring birds’, Rebbi Meïr says, he is a nazir, but the Sages say, he is not a nazir.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of substitutes of substitutes: “Until his hair became mighty as an eagle’s and his fingernails like those of birds.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, because an impure nazir brings birds. Does he bring birds? He brings turtledoves or young pigeons. There are some Tannaïm who state that all pure birds are called צפור, and there are some Tannaïm who state that all birds, whether pure or impure, are called צפור. He who says that all pure birds are called צפור, “you may eat any pure bird.” He who says that all birds, whether pure or impure, are called צפור, “say to any winged bird. “What is the rabbi’s reason? He is like somebody offering birds for the upkeep of the Temple. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? He is like somebody offering a reparation sacrifice for the upkeep of the Temple. What is the difference between them? If somebody says, “I take upon myself to bring a reparation sacrifice.” In the opinion of Rebbi Meïr he is a nazir since one cannot bring a reparation sacrifice for the upkeep of the Temple. In the opinion of the rabbis he is a nazir since an impure nazir brings a reparation sacrifice.
“ ‘I have to bring birds’, Rebbi Meïr says, he is a nazir, but the Sages say, he is not a nazir.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of substitutes of substitutes: “Until his hair became mighty as an eagle’s and his fingernails like those of birds.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, because an impure nazir brings birds. Does he bring birds? He brings turtledoves or young pigeons. There are some Tannaïm who state that all pure birds are called צפור, and there are some Tannaïm who state that all birds, whether pure or impure, are called צפור. He who says that all pure birds are called צפור, “you may eat any pure bird.” He who says that all birds, whether pure or impure, are called צפור, “say to any winged bird. “What is the rabbi’s reason? He is like somebody offering birds for the upkeep of the Temple. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? He is like somebody offering a reparation sacrifice for the upkeep of the Temple. What is the difference between them? If somebody says, “I take upon myself to bring a reparation sacrifice.” In the opinion of Rebbi Meïr he is a nazir since one cannot bring a reparation sacrifice for the upkeep of the Temple. In the opinion of the rabbis he is a nazir since an impure nazir brings a reparation sacrifice.
“ ‘I have to bring birds’, Rebbi Meïr says, he is a nazir, but the Sages say, he is not a nazir.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of substitutes of substitutes: “Until his hair became mighty as an eagle’s and his fingernails like those of birds.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, because an impure nazir brings birds. Does he bring birds? He brings turtledoves or young pigeons. There are some Tannaïm who state that all pure birds are called צפור, and there are some Tannaïm who state that all birds, whether pure or impure, are called צפור. He who says that all pure birds are called צפור, “you may eat any pure bird.” He who says that all birds, whether pure or impure, are called צפור, “say to any winged bird. “What is the rabbi’s reason? He is like somebody offering birds for the upkeep of the Temple. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? He is like somebody offering a reparation sacrifice for the upkeep of the Temple. What is the difference between them? If somebody says, “I take upon myself to bring a reparation sacrifice.” In the opinion of Rebbi Meïr he is a nazir since one cannot bring a reparation sacrifice for the upkeep of the Temple. In the opinion of the rabbis he is a nazir since an impure nazir brings a reparation sacrifice.
MISHNAH: “I am off grape kernels,” or “off grape skin,” or “off hair shaving,” or “off impurity”; he is a nazir and all rules of nezirut apply to him. “I am like Samson ben Manoaḥ, like Dalilah’s husband, like the one who lifted the gates of Gaza, like the one blinded by the Philistines,” he is a Samson-nazir. What is the difference between a nazir in perpetuity and a Samson-nazir? If the hair of a nazir in perpetuity becomes heavy, he shaves it off with a knife and brings three animals; if he becomes impure, he brings a sacrifice of impurity. If the hair of a Samson-nazir becomes heavy, he does not shave; if he becomes impure, he does not bring a sacrifice of impurity.
“If he becomes impure, he does not bring a sacrifice of impurity.” He only said, “he does not bring a sacrifice of impurity.” But is he whipped? The Mishnah follows Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: A Samson-nazir makes himself impure for the dead, since Samson himself was making himself impure for the dead. Rebbi Simeon says, if somebody said, “as Samson”, he did not say anything, since the quality of nazir was not brought on by his mouth. What is the reason? “By the word of his nazir-vow”. Any whose quality of nazir was brought on by his mouth; this excludes Samson-nezirut which was not brought on by his mouth but by the Word. What is the reason? “For the lad will be God’s nazir from the womb.”
HALAKHAH: “An unspecified nezirut is for thirty days,” etc. Bar Qappara said “ιʼεʼιʼεʼ” is thirty. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: Corresponding to the 29 times that in the Chapter about the nazir in the Torah is written “vow, nazir, to vow as nazir”. Are they not 30? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one has to be removed for its definition. In the opinion of Bar Qappara, if he shaved on the 30th day, he did not fulfill his obligation. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he shaved on the 30th day, he fulfilled his obligation. Some want to understand it from here: “To let his head’s hair grow wildly.” How much is a hair growth? 30 days. Some want to understand it from here: “She shall cry for her father and her mother the days of a month.” Since “days” mentioned there are 30, so also “days” mentioned here. Some want to understand it from here: “The prior days shall fall, for his nezirut is impure.” The days which became permitted, which Moses and his court had permitted, and that is no less than 30 days. Some want to understand it from here: “Until the days are fulfilled”. How much are full days? 30 days. Then if he shaved on the 30th day, he did not fulfill his obligation! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, “days” are written defectively יָמִם, with a letter י missing.
The Mishnah follows Rebbi Jehudah since it was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, the ancient pious ones desired to bring a purification offering, but the Omnipresent did not let a sin happen to them; so they made a vow of nazir in order to be able to bring a purification offering. Rebbi Simeon says, they became sinners because they made a vow of nazir, for it was said: “He shall atone for himself for what he sinned about the person,” that one sinned against his own person because he barred himself from [drinking] wine. It turns out that the position of Simeon the Just parallels Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated: Simeon the Just said, I never ate the reparation offering of a nazir except once. Once a man came to me from the South, I saw that he was handsome, with beautiful eyes and good looks, and his hair in waves. I said to him, my son, what induced you to cut off that beautiful hair? He said to me: Rabbi, I was a shepherd in my village and I went to fill the water vessel with water when I saw my mirror image in the water and my instinct rushed over me and tried to remove me from the World. I said to it, wicked! You are rushing me to something which is not yours; it is upon me to sanctify you to Heaven! I embraced him, kissed him on his head and said, my son, there should be many more in Israel who fulfill the Omnipresent’s will like you. About you the verse says, “man or woman, if he clearly articulates vowing a vow of nazir, to be a nazir for the Eternal.” Rebbi Mana asked: Why following Simeon the Just, even following Rebbi Simeon? Did Simeon the Just never eat a purification offering for suet? Did Simeon the Just never eat a purification offering for blood? Simeon the Just holds that people make a vow while they are upset. Since they make the vow while they are upset, in the end, they wonder. But if he wonders, his sacrifices become similar to one of those who slaughtered profane animals in the Temple courtyard. But this one made a well thought-out dedication, when his mouth and his thoughts were in unison.
HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir [abstaining] from dried figs and fig cake,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the reason of the House of Shammai: because he mentioned the state of nazir. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, because of substitutes of substitutes. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, a verse supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “So says the Eternal, as cider is found in the grape bunch, etc.” The Torah called a grape bunch “cider”. And people call a dried fig cider, because of substitutes of substitutes. What is the difference between them? If he said, “I shall be a nazir[abstaining] from dried figs and fig cake.” In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is a nazir, in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion he is not a nazir. “I shall be a nazir[abstaining] from a loaf of bread,” in Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is a nazir, in Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is not a nazir. “From a loaf of bread,” he did not say anything. Rebbi Uqba asked before Rebbi Mana: The opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted, as we have stated there: “ ‘I take upon myself the obligation to bring a flour offering from barley.’ He shall bring from wheat.” And Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, because he mentioned “flour offering.” And here, he says so? He accepts one and he accepts the other. He accepts because he mentioned the state of nazir, and he accepts because of substitutes of substitutes. You should know that it is so since we have stated: “If he said, the cow said.” She did not say anything; it is because he mentioned the state of nazir, and here he mentioned the state of nazir.
HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir [abstaining] from dried figs and fig cake,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the reason of the House of Shammai: because he mentioned the state of nazir. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, because of substitutes of substitutes. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, a verse supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “So says the Eternal, as cider is found in the grape bunch, etc.” The Torah called a grape bunch “cider”. And people call a dried fig cider, because of substitutes of substitutes. What is the difference between them? If he said, “I shall be a nazir[abstaining] from dried figs and fig cake.” In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is a nazir, in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion he is not a nazir. “I shall be a nazir[abstaining] from a loaf of bread,” in Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is a nazir, in Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is not a nazir. “From a loaf of bread,” he did not say anything. Rebbi Uqba asked before Rebbi Mana: The opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted, as we have stated there: “ ‘I take upon myself the obligation to bring a flour offering from barley.’ He shall bring from wheat.” And Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, because he mentioned “flour offering.” And here, he says so? He accepts one and he accepts the other. He accepts because he mentioned the state of nazir, and he accepts because of substitutes of substitutes. You should know that it is so since we have stated: “If he said, the cow said.” She did not say anything; it is because he mentioned the state of nazir, and here he mentioned the state of nazir.
HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir [abstaining] from dried figs and fig cake,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the reason of the House of Shammai: because he mentioned the state of nazir. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, because of substitutes of substitutes. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, a verse supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “So says the Eternal, as cider is found in the grape bunch, etc.” The Torah called a grape bunch “cider”. And people call a dried fig cider, because of substitutes of substitutes. What is the difference between them? If he said, “I shall be a nazir[abstaining] from dried figs and fig cake.” In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is a nazir, in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion he is not a nazir. “I shall be a nazir[abstaining] from a loaf of bread,” in Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is a nazir, in Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is not a nazir. “From a loaf of bread,” he did not say anything. Rebbi Uqba asked before Rebbi Mana: The opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted, as we have stated there: “ ‘I take upon myself the obligation to bring a flour offering from barley.’ He shall bring from wheat.” And Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, because he mentioned “flour offering.” And here, he says so? He accepts one and he accepts the other. He accepts because he mentioned the state of nazir, and he accepts because of substitutes of substitutes. You should know that it is so since we have stated: “If he said, the cow said.” She did not say anything; it is because he mentioned the state of nazir, and here he mentioned the state of nazir.
HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir [abstaining] from dried figs and fig cake,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the reason of the House of Shammai: because he mentioned the state of nazir. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, because of substitutes of substitutes. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, a verse supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “So says the Eternal, as cider is found in the grape bunch, etc.” The Torah called a grape bunch “cider”. And people call a dried fig cider, because of substitutes of substitutes. What is the difference between them? If he said, “I shall be a nazir[abstaining] from dried figs and fig cake.” In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is a nazir, in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion he is not a nazir. “I shall be a nazir[abstaining] from a loaf of bread,” in Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is a nazir, in Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is not a nazir. “From a loaf of bread,” he did not say anything. Rebbi Uqba asked before Rebbi Mana: The opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted, as we have stated there: “ ‘I take upon myself the obligation to bring a flour offering from barley.’ He shall bring from wheat.” And Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, because he mentioned “flour offering.” And here, he says so? He accepts one and he accepts the other. He accepts because he mentioned the state of nazir, and he accepts because of substitutes of substitutes. You should know that it is so since we have stated: “If he said, the cow said.” She did not say anything; it is because he mentioned the state of nazir, and here he mentioned the state of nazir.
Any expressions can be used for nezirut except the expression qorban. Any expressions can be used for qorban except the expression nezirut. If he said about a bunch of grapes, “I am locked away from you, I am separated from you, I am prevented from you, I am nazir from you,” he is a nazir. “It is for me qorban,” he only forbade it for himself as qorban. If he said about a loaf of bread, “I am locked away from it, I am separated from it, I am prevented from it, it is qorban for me,” he only forbade it for himself as qorban. “I am nazir from it,” he is a nazir. “Prevented” implies both nezirut and qorban. If somebody said about a bunch of grapes, “I am prevented from it,” if he wanted to eat it, one tells him, is it not holy for its money’s worth? If he redeemed it, one tells him, are you not a nazir?
Any expressions can be used for redemption except the expression “exchange”. Any expressions can be used for exchange except the expression “redemption.” If he said about dedications to the altar: “this one is for that one, exchange for that one, barter for that one,” it is an exchange. “This is redeemed for that one,” it is no exchange. If he said about dedications for the upkeep of the Temple: “this one is for that one, barter for that one,” its money’s worth is engaged. “Exchange for that one,” he did not say anything. The other [expressions] serve for redemption and exchange. Dedications to the altar are subject both to redemption and to exchange. [Animals] dedicated for the upkeep of the Temple who were dedicated before developing a defect, “this one is for that one,” if he wants to sacrifice a perfect animal, one tells him that its sanctity is for its money’s worth. If he wants to eat it after it developed a blemish, one tells him that it is holy as exchange: “Itself and its exchange shall be holy.” Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar said, since he knows that anybody who exchanges is whipped, it never occured to him to exchange.
Any expressions can be used for redemption except the expression “exchange”. Any expressions can be used for exchange except the expression “redemption.” If he said about dedications to the altar: “this one is for that one, exchange for that one, barter for that one,” it is an exchange. “This is redeemed for that one,” it is no exchange. If he said about dedications for the upkeep of the Temple: “this one is for that one, barter for that one,” its money’s worth is engaged. “Exchange for that one,” he did not say anything. The other [expressions] serve for redemption and exchange. Dedications to the altar are subject both to redemption and to exchange. [Animals] dedicated for the upkeep of the Temple who were dedicated before developing a defect, “this one is for that one,” if he wants to sacrifice a perfect animal, one tells him that its sanctity is for its money’s worth. If he wants to eat it after it developed a blemish, one tells him that it is holy as exchange: “Itself and its exchange shall be holy.” Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar said, since he knows that anybody who exchanges is whipped, it never occured to him to exchange.
Any expressions can be used for valuation except the expression “money’s worth”. Any expressions can be used for money’s worth except the expression “valuation.” If he said about a human, “I shall pay his cost, I shall pay his settlement, I shall pay his estimate, I shall pay his valuation,” he has to pay his valuation. “I shall pay his money’s worth,” he has to pay his money’s worth. “Estimate” is used as an expression both for valuation and money’s worth. A human has both valuation and money’s worth. If he said about a human, “I shall pay his estimate,” if he was good looking, he pays his money’s worth; if he was ugly, he pays his valuation.
Any expressions can be used for valuation except the expression “money’s worth”. Any expressions can be used for money’s worth except the expression “valuation.” If he said about a human, “I shall pay his cost, I shall pay his settlement, I shall pay his estimate, I shall pay his valuation,” he has to pay his valuation. “I shall pay his money’s worth,” he has to pay his money’s worth. “Estimate” is used as an expression both for valuation and money’s worth. A human has both valuation and money’s worth. If he said about a human, “I shall pay his estimate,” if he was good looking, he pays his money’s worth; if he was ugly, he pays his valuation.
Any expressions can be used for valuation except the expression “money’s worth”. Any expressions can be used for money’s worth except the expression “valuation.” If he said about a human, “I shall pay his cost, I shall pay his settlement, I shall pay his estimate, I shall pay his valuation,” he has to pay his valuation. “I shall pay his money’s worth,” he has to pay his money’s worth. “Estimate” is used as an expression both for valuation and money’s worth. A human has both valuation and money’s worth. If he said about a human, “I shall pay his estimate,” if he was good looking, he pays his money’s worth; if he was ugly, he pays his valuation.
Any expressions can be used for valuation except the expression “money’s worth”. Any expressions can be used for money’s worth except the expression “valuation.” If he said about a human, “I shall pay his cost, I shall pay his settlement, I shall pay his estimate, I shall pay his valuation,” he has to pay his valuation. “I shall pay his money’s worth,” he has to pay his money’s worth. “Estimate” is used as an expression both for valuation and money’s worth. A human has both valuation and money’s worth. If he said about a human, “I shall pay his estimate,” if he was good looking, he pays his money’s worth; if he was ugly, he pays his valuation.
Any expressions can be used for valuation except the expression “money’s worth”. Any expressions can be used for money’s worth except the expression “valuation.” If he said about a human, “I shall pay his cost, I shall pay his settlement, I shall pay his estimate, I shall pay his valuation,” he has to pay his valuation. “I shall pay his money’s worth,” he has to pay his money’s worth. “Estimate” is used as an expression both for valuation and money’s worth. A human has both valuation and money’s worth. If he said about a human, “I shall pay his estimate,” if he was good looking, he pays his money’s worth; if he was ugly, he pays his valuation.
Any expressions can be used for valuation except the expression “money’s worth”. Any expressions can be used for money’s worth except the expression “valuation.” If he said about a human, “I shall pay his cost, I shall pay his settlement, I shall pay his estimate, I shall pay his valuation,” he has to pay his valuation. “I shall pay his money’s worth,” he has to pay his money’s worth. “Estimate” is used as an expression both for valuation and money’s worth. A human has both valuation and money’s worth. If he said about a human, “I shall pay his estimate,” if he was good looking, he pays his money’s worth; if he was ugly, he pays his valuation.
Any expressions can be used for valuation except the expression “money’s worth”. Any expressions can be used for money’s worth except the expression “valuation.” If he said about a human, “I shall pay his cost, I shall pay his settlement, I shall pay his estimate, I shall pay his valuation,” he has to pay his valuation. “I shall pay his money’s worth,” he has to pay his money’s worth. “Estimate” is used as an expression both for valuation and money’s worth. A human has both valuation and money’s worth. If he said about a human, “I shall pay his estimate,” if he was good looking, he pays his money’s worth; if he was ugly, he pays his valuation.
HALAKHAH: The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr says, one has to double one’s stipulation. It follows everybody’s opinion; one tells him: Watch and keep discipline. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr or Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema, as it was stated: “This is your bill of divorce, on condition that you not fly in the air, that you not cross the Sea on your feet, that is a bill of divorce. On condition that you fly in the air, that you cross the Sea on your feet, that is no bill of divorce; Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema said, it is a bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you should realize that he seeks a subterfuge for the bill of divorce, since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied. What is Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema’s reason? Since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied, it is as if the condition attached to the bill of divorce were satisfied.
HALAKHAH: The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr says, one has to double one’s stipulation. It follows everybody’s opinion; one tells him: Watch and keep discipline. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr or Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema, as it was stated: “This is your bill of divorce, on condition that you not fly in the air, that you not cross the Sea on your feet, that is a bill of divorce. On condition that you fly in the air, that you cross the Sea on your feet, that is no bill of divorce; Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema said, it is a bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you should realize that he seeks a subterfuge for the bill of divorce, since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied. What is Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema’s reason? Since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied, it is as if the condition attached to the bill of divorce were satisfied.
HALAKHAH: The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr says, one has to double one’s stipulation. It follows everybody’s opinion; one tells him: Watch and keep discipline. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr or Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema, as it was stated: “This is your bill of divorce, on condition that you not fly in the air, that you not cross the Sea on your feet, that is a bill of divorce. On condition that you fly in the air, that you cross the Sea on your feet, that is no bill of divorce; Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema said, it is a bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you should realize that he seeks a subterfuge for the bill of divorce, since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied. What is Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema’s reason? Since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied, it is as if the condition attached to the bill of divorce were satisfied.
HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “If his wife had a miscarriage,” etc. Should one not be afraid that he might have been viable? Rebbi Joḥanan said, [the Mishnah] is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, any doubt of nezirut is permitted. It was said to him that Rebbi Jehudah said so only for the end; but for the start even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. What is beginning and what is end? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbu Abun said: Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac disagreed: Everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Where do they disagree? If it was once or twice. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba considered it the end, Rebbi Samuel considered it the beginning. Rebbi Mana: The problem for Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac about one or two times is whether it is the beginning or the end.
HALAKHAH: “ “I am a nazir and a nazir when a son is born to me,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: If he said, “I am a nazir for these 30 days and those 30 days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: Is that not the Mishnah? “He interrupts his own, counts for his son, and then finishes for himself.” Not even if his wife is in the process of giving birth? He said to him, his nezirut is not comparable to his son’s nezirut, but to the case that he said, “I am already a nazir and a nazir after twenty days.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina both say: If he finished his nezirut, his son’s nezirut cannot start for him before he was shaving with a sacrifice. About a nazir who became impure, the opinions of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seem contradictory. There, he says, if a person impure by the impurity of the dead made a vow of nazir, his seventh day is counted. If a nazir becomes impure, his seventh day is not counted. In our case, is he not like a person impure by the impurity of the dead, who made a vow of nazir? And is not the seventh day counted for a person impure by the impurity of the dead, who made a vow of nazir? Would this obligate him to bring a sacrifice for his impurity? But if a nazir who becomes impure, his seventh day is not counted; does it not obligate him to bring a sacrifice for his impurity? And here, because he is obligated to bring a sacrifice (of impurity), the seventh day is [not] counted for him.