say
12911 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case. What means, one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In qiddushin, the same holds. “ I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry the wife.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “ This one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says, I gave her qiddushin. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betroth her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says. I gave her qiddushin and one of them jumped the gun and married her. But if he said, I gave her qiddushin and married her, and another one comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way.
HALAKHAH: “A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow”, etc. “A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow cannot marry her.” I would say, that was his intention from the start. “If she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court”, because two will not usually sin for the benefit of a third. There, we have stated: “If somebody deposits fruit with another person, that one should not touch it even if it spoils. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, he shall sell it under the supervision of a court because one is obliged to return a find to its owners.” Rebbi Abba bar Jacob said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. What does one do with the money? Rav Jehudah said, the disagreement of Rebbi Aqiba and Rebbi Ṭarphon. It is a condition that the members of the court cannot buy. Rebbi Aqiba said, Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Rebbi Sabbatai asked: Here, you say, “if she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court,” and here, you say so? Rebbi Yose said, there, the buy could be in thirds, but here, two will not usually sin for the benefit of a third.
HALAKHAH: “A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow”, etc. “A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow cannot marry her.” I would say, that was his intention from the start. “If she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court”, because two will not usually sin for the benefit of a third. There, we have stated: “If somebody deposits fruit with another person, that one should not touch it even if it spoils. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, he shall sell it under the supervision of a court because one is obliged to return a find to its owners.” Rebbi Abba bar Jacob said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. What does one do with the money? Rav Jehudah said, the disagreement of Rebbi Aqiba and Rebbi Ṭarphon. It is a condition that the members of the court cannot buy. Rebbi Aqiba said, Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Rebbi Sabbatai asked: Here, you say, “if she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court,” and here, you say so? Rebbi Yose said, there, the buy could be in thirds, but here, two will not usually sin for the benefit of a third.
HALAKHAH: “A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow”, etc. “A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow cannot marry her.” I would say, that was his intention from the start. “If she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court”, because two will not usually sin for the benefit of a third. There, we have stated: “If somebody deposits fruit with another person, that one should not touch it even if it spoils. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, he shall sell it under the supervision of a court because one is obliged to return a find to its owners.” Rebbi Abba bar Jacob said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. What does one do with the money? Rav Jehudah said, the disagreement of Rebbi Aqiba and Rebbi Ṭarphon. It is a condition that the members of the court cannot buy. Rebbi Aqiba said, Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Rebbi Sabbatai asked: Here, you say, “if she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court,” and here, you say so? Rebbi Yose said, there, the buy could be in thirds, but here, two will not usually sin for the benefit of a third.
MISHNAH: There are four brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters. If those married to the sisters died, [the sisters] have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If [the remaining brothers] jumped the gun and married, they must divorce them. Rebbi Eliezer said, the House of Shammai say, they shall keep them, but the House of Hillel say, they have to divorce.
MISHNAH: There are four brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters. If those married to the sisters died, [the sisters] have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If [the remaining brothers] jumped the gun and married, they must divorce them. Rebbi Eliezer said, the House of Shammai say, they shall keep them, but the House of Hillel say, they have to divorce.
There, we have stated: “If a brother gave qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If [one of the] brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to send away his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.” It says only: If the sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him. But if his wife died, his sister-in-law is forbidden to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Sages hold that for anything induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition is removed. But for Rebbi Eliezer, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains.
Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Here, you say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him, and here you say so? He said to him, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law cannot be compared to the prohibition of sisters who are not sisters-in-law. Rebbi Jeremiah said, explain it that the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time. Rebbi Yose asked, did Rebbi Joḥanan say, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law if the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time? Only if they died one after the other. They wanted to say, what was the problem of Rebbi Joḥanan? If the second one died, why should the first one not be permitted to him? But if the first one died, the second should be forbidden to him. Rebbi Yudan said, both cases are the same problem for him. And candidacy counts for nothing since if there are three brothers,two of them paternal but not maternal halfbrothers, and two maternal but not paternal halfbrothers. If the paternal halfbrother died first and the second brother had no time to perform ḥalîṣah or levirate before he died, and she became eligible for his maternal halfbrother, may he not take her? This shows that candidacy is nothing, [otherwise] she should be forbidden as the maternal halfbrother’s wife.
Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Here, you say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him, and here you say so? He said to him, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law cannot be compared to the prohibition of sisters who are not sisters-in-law. Rebbi Jeremiah said, explain it that the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time. Rebbi Yose asked, did Rebbi Joḥanan say, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law if the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time? Only if they died one after the other. They wanted to say, what was the problem of Rebbi Joḥanan? If the second one died, why should the first one not be permitted to him? But if the first one died, the second should be forbidden to him. Rebbi Yudan said, both cases are the same problem for him. And candidacy counts for nothing since if there are three brothers,two of them paternal but not maternal halfbrothers, and two maternal but not paternal halfbrothers. If the paternal halfbrother died first and the second brother had no time to perform ḥalîṣah or levirate before he died, and she became eligible for his maternal halfbrother, may he not take her? This shows that candidacy is nothing, [otherwise] she should be forbidden as the maternal halfbrother’s wife.
Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Here, you say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him, and here you say so? He said to him, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law cannot be compared to the prohibition of sisters who are not sisters-in-law. Rebbi Jeremiah said, explain it that the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time. Rebbi Yose asked, did Rebbi Joḥanan say, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law if the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time? Only if they died one after the other. They wanted to say, what was the problem of Rebbi Joḥanan? If the second one died, why should the first one not be permitted to him? But if the first one died, the second should be forbidden to him. Rebbi Yudan said, both cases are the same problem for him. And candidacy counts for nothing since if there are three brothers,two of them paternal but not maternal halfbrothers, and two maternal but not paternal halfbrothers. If the paternal halfbrother died first and the second brother had no time to perform ḥalîṣah or levirate before he died, and she became eligible for his maternal halfbrother, may he not take her? This shows that candidacy is nothing, [otherwise] she should be forbidden as the maternal halfbrother’s wife.
Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Here, you say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him, and here you say so? He said to him, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law cannot be compared to the prohibition of sisters who are not sisters-in-law. Rebbi Jeremiah said, explain it that the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time. Rebbi Yose asked, did Rebbi Joḥanan say, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law if the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time? Only if they died one after the other. They wanted to say, what was the problem of Rebbi Joḥanan? If the second one died, why should the first one not be permitted to him? But if the first one died, the second should be forbidden to him. Rebbi Yudan said, both cases are the same problem for him. And candidacy counts for nothing since if there are three brothers,two of them paternal but not maternal halfbrothers, and two maternal but not paternal halfbrothers. If the paternal halfbrother died first and the second brother had no time to perform ḥalîṣah or levirate before he died, and she became eligible for his maternal halfbrother, may he not take her? This shows that candidacy is nothing, [otherwise] she should be forbidden as the maternal halfbrother’s wife.
What if there is a co-wife? Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Avina: It is an inference de minore ad majus. If the Sages gave a co-wife to the sister of a woman with whom one performed ḥalîṣah, which is rabbinic, here, where there is the prohibition of sisters, not so much more? It is obvious that the rule of co-wives applies to his daughter. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Avina: One has stated there, “if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed; if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives were not freed.” But as you say, if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, so it should be that even if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives should be freed. But it must follow Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri, since Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, come and let us institute that the co-wife perform ḥalîṣah without being admitted to levirate. Did they institute that? Was it not stated: They did not manage to institute this before the time became unsuitable. But it must follow the House of Shammai since the House of Shammai permit the co-wives to the brothers. Rebbi Phineas said to Rebbi Yose: If it follows the House of Shammai, even if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sistersshould not be freed! But we have stated: Rebbi Eliezer said, the House of Shammai say, they shall keep them, but the House of Hillel say, they have to divorce. There are two Tannaïm interpreting the House of Shammai, one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, the other one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were not freed.
What if there is a co-wife? Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Avina: It is an inference de minore ad majus. If the Sages gave a co-wife to the sister of a woman with whom one performed ḥalîṣah, which is rabbinic, here, where there is the prohibition of sisters, not so much more? It is obvious that the rule of co-wives applies to his daughter. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Avina: One has stated there, “if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed; if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives were not freed.” But as you say, if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, so it should be that even if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives should be freed. But it must follow Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri, since Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, come and let us institute that the co-wife perform ḥalîṣah without being admitted to levirate. Did they institute that? Was it not stated: They did not manage to institute this before the time became unsuitable. But it must follow the House of Shammai since the House of Shammai permit the co-wives to the brothers. Rebbi Phineas said to Rebbi Yose: If it follows the House of Shammai, even if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sistersshould not be freed! But we have stated: Rebbi Eliezer said, the House of Shammai say, they shall keep them, but the House of Hillel say, they have to divorce. There are two Tannaïm interpreting the House of Shammai, one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, the other one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were not freed.
What if there is a co-wife? Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Avina: It is an inference de minore ad majus. If the Sages gave a co-wife to the sister of a woman with whom one performed ḥalîṣah, which is rabbinic, here, where there is the prohibition of sisters, not so much more? It is obvious that the rule of co-wives applies to his daughter. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Avina: One has stated there, “if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed; if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives were not freed.” But as you say, if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, so it should be that even if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives should be freed. But it must follow Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri, since Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, come and let us institute that the co-wife perform ḥalîṣah without being admitted to levirate. Did they institute that? Was it not stated: They did not manage to institute this before the time became unsuitable. But it must follow the House of Shammai since the House of Shammai permit the co-wives to the brothers. Rebbi Phineas said to Rebbi Yose: If it follows the House of Shammai, even if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sistersshould not be freed! But we have stated: Rebbi Eliezer said, the House of Shammai say, they shall keep them, but the House of Hillel say, they have to divorce. There are two Tannaïm interpreting the House of Shammai, one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, the other one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were not freed.
If the first [sister] had a co-wife, one [of the brothers] performs ḥalîṣah, the co-wife is freed. If then he had intercourse with her, this is forbidden intercourse and the co-wife is not freed. If he performed ḥalîṣah and then had intercourse with her, as you look at it, either ḥalîṣah should free or intercourse should free! Rebbi Yudan said, I confirmed it following “If somebody married his sister-in-law and she turns out to be pregnant”, as you say there, the co-wife should not marry until she knows by which means she is permitted, whether through the fetus or through intercourse; so here also the co-wife should not marry until she knows by which means she is permitted, whether through ḥalîṣah or through intercourse.
If the first [sister] had a co-wife, he can marry the co-wife, keep his wife, but the second [sister] is forbidden to him. That is “the sister of the co-wife of one for whom he performed ḥalîah is permitted to a person.” Should the co-wife not be forbidden to him as co-wife of the sister of one for whom he performed ḥalîṣah? Rebbi Yudan said, if he wanted to have intercourse with the co-wife before he married, would he not have been permitted? At the start, he is permitted; at the end, he is prohibited? If you say so, you are making a co-wife after death and there can be no co-wife after death.
A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.
A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.
A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.
If the first [sister] had a co-wife, he can marry the co-wife, keep his wife, but the second [sister] is forbidden to him. That is “the sister of the co-wife of one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah is permitted to a person.” Should the co-wife not be forbidden to him as co-wife of a relative of one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah? Rebbi Yudan said, if he wanted to have intercourse with the co-wife before he married, would he not have been permitted? At the start, he is permitted; at the end, he is prohibited? If you say so, you are creating a co-wife after death and there can be no co-wife after death.
MISHNAH: Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters and the third is a bachelor. One of the sisters’ husbands died; the bachelor “bespoke” her; then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce, and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. That is what people say, he is unlucky with his wife and with his brother’s wife.
MISHNAH: Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters and the third is a bachelor. One of the sisters’ husbands died; the bachelor “bespoke” her; then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce, and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. That is what people say, he is unlucky with his wife and with his brother’s wife.
MISHNAH: Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters and the third is a bachelor. One of the sisters’ husbands died; the bachelor “bespoke” her; then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce, and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. That is what people say, he is unlucky with his wife and with his brother’s wife.
HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. Do the House of Shammai follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely? If they would follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, in case he had divorced the “bespoken” widow, she would not need ḥalîṣah! But Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the House of Shammai agree that if he divorced the “bespoken”, she needs ḥalîṣah! It must be they follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. If they would follow Rebbi Simeon, in any case, if “bespeaking” acquires, nothing follows it. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, why “his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? Maybe “bespeaking” for the House of Shammai is like candidacy for Rebbi Simeon in the interpretation of the rabbis there. As the rabbis there say, “bespeaking” acquires and leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, [candidacy] acquires and leaves a remainder. Rebbi Simeon says, no candidacy can come after a candidacy, so the House of Shammai say here, no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”.
HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. Do the House of Shammai follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely? If they would follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, in case he had divorced the “bespoken” widow, she would not need ḥalîṣah! But Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the House of Shammai agree that if he divorced the “bespoken”, she needs ḥalîṣah! It must be they follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. If they would follow Rebbi Simeon, in any case, if “bespeaking” acquires, nothing follows it. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, why “his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? Maybe “bespeaking” for the House of Shammai is like candidacy for Rebbi Simeon in the interpretation of the rabbis there. As the rabbis there say, “bespeaking” acquires and leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, [candidacy] acquires and leaves a remainder. Rebbi Simeon says, no candidacy can come after a candidacy, so the House of Shammai say here, no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”.
It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed, he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abun said, because it is invalid. So far, if the old man took the loan and [later] the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and [later] the son mortgaged, can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun said, and was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce. Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.
It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed, he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abun said, because it is invalid. So far, if the old man took the loan and [later] the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and [later] the son mortgaged, can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun said, and was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce. Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.
HALAKHAH: “Three brothers married to three women,” etc. Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. One understands that he has to perform ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” because the wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Why can the other one not be married in levirate? Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, of any one you cannot marry in levirate, you cannot marry the co-wife in levirate. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar formulated this, he formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “ A boy at least nine years and one day old who had intercourse with his sister-in-law and when he grew up he married another wife; if he never had intercourse with the first again after he became an adult, the second [wife] may perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis. Rebbi Abun bar Bisna in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, but only if first he married in levirate and then performed ḥalîṣah. But if he performed ḥalîṣah first, it is forbidden; perhaps “bespeaking” acquired and she was freed by her co-wife’s ḥalîṣah.
HALAKHAH: “Three brothers married to three women,” etc. Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. One understands that he has to perform ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” because the wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Why can the other one not be married in levirate? Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, of any one you cannot marry in levirate, you cannot marry the co-wife in levirate. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar formulated this, he formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “ A boy at least nine years and one day old who had intercourse with his sister-in-law and when he grew up he married another wife; if he never had intercourse with the first again after he became an adult, the second [wife] may perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis. Rebbi Abun bar Bisna in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, but only if first he married in levirate and then performed ḥalîṣah. But if he performed ḥalîṣah first, it is forbidden; perhaps “bespeaking” acquired and she was freed by her co-wife’s ḥalîṣah.
HALAKHAH: “Three brothers married to three women,” etc. Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. One understands that he has to perform ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” because the wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Why can the other one not be married in levirate? Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, of any one you cannot marry in levirate, you cannot marry the co-wife in levirate. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar formulated this, he formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “ A boy at least nine years and one day old who had intercourse with his sister-in-law and when he grew up he married another wife; if he never had intercourse with the first again after he became an adult, the second [wife] may perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis. Rebbi Abun bar Bisna in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, but only if first he married in levirate and then performed ḥalîṣah. But if he performed ḥalîṣah first, it is forbidden; perhaps “bespeaking” acquired and she was freed by her co-wife’s ḥalîṣah.
HALAKHAH: “Three brothers married to three women,” etc. Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. One understands that he has to perform ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” because the wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Why can the other one not be married in levirate? Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, of any one you cannot marry in levirate, you cannot marry the co-wife in levirate. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar formulated this, he formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “ A boy at least nine years and one day old who had intercourse with his sister-in-law and when he grew up he married another wife; if he never had intercourse with the first again after he became an adult, the second [wife] may perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis. Rebbi Abun bar Bisna in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, but only if first he married in levirate and then performed ḥalîṣah. But if he performed ḥalîṣah first, it is forbidden; perhaps “bespeaking” acquired and she was freed by her co-wife’s ḥalîṣah.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” etc. If he transgressed, but not from the start. That follows the Mishnah: “The widow should not perform ḥalîṣah or have levirate until after three months.” Why can she not have ḥalîṣah immediately? As you take it, if she has a live birth, ḥalîṣah did not affect her. If she has a still birth, she holds ḥalîṣah in her hand. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Hoshaiah stated: “My levir refuses.” To the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him one says: perform ḥalîṣah; but to the one to whom one cannot say: perform levirate, to him one cannot say: perform ḥalîṣah! What is the difference between them? If she had been acceptable and was desecrated, e. g., a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. According to him who says that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood; that one, who does not need a proclamation for the priesthood, should have ḥalîṣah. According to him who says that to the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him does one say: perform ḥalîṣah?
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” etc. If he transgressed, but not from the start. That follows the Mishnah: “The widow should not perform ḥalîṣah or have levirate until after three months.” Why can she not have ḥalîṣah immediately? As you take it, if she has a live birth, ḥalîṣah did not affect her. If she has a still birth, she holds ḥalîṣah in her hand. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Hoshaiah stated: “My levir refuses.” To the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him one says: perform ḥalîṣah; but to the one to whom one cannot say: perform levirate, to him one cannot say: perform ḥalîṣah! What is the difference between them? If she had been acceptable and was desecrated, e. g., a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. According to him who says that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood; that one, who does not need a proclamation for the priesthood, should have ḥalîṣah. According to him who says that to the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him does one say: perform ḥalîṣah?
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” etc. If he transgressed, but not from the start. That follows the Mishnah: “The widow should not perform ḥalîṣah or have levirate until after three months.” Why can she not have ḥalîṣah immediately? As you take it, if she has a live birth, ḥalîṣah did not affect her. If she has a still birth, she holds ḥalîṣah in her hand. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Hoshaiah stated: “My levir refuses.” To the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him one says: perform ḥalîṣah; but to the one to whom one cannot say: perform levirate, to him one cannot say: perform ḥalîṣah! What is the difference between them? If she had been acceptable and was desecrated, e. g., a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. According to him who says that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood; that one, who does not need a proclamation for the priesthood, should have ḥalîṣah. According to him who says that to the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him does one say: perform ḥalîṣah?
If there was ḥalîṣah during these three months, does she need another one after three months? Let us hear from the following: “A minor who performed ḥalîṣah should perform ḥalîṣah after she grows up; if she performed [only one] ḥalîṣah, the ḥalîṣah she performed is valid.” Rebbi Mana said it anonymously, Rebbi Isaac the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya brought it in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan; this is Rebbi Meïr‘s, since Rebbi Meïr says one does neither perform ḥalîṣah nor levirate with a minor: maybe she would turn out to be a she-ram. As you say there, even though she already performed ḥalîṣah, she again performs ḥalîṣah; so here also though she did perform ḥalîṣah, she performs ḥalîṣah.
Could I say, her co-wife may remarry? “ He who marries his sister-in-law and she turns out to be pregnant,” as you say, “her co-wife cannot marry until you know by which means she is permitted, whether by pregnancy or by intercourse” The same is valid for the one who performed ḥalîṣah. Ḥalîṣah frees and intercourse frees. As you said it for intercourse so it was said for ḥalîṣah.
Could I say, her co-wife may remarry? “ He who marries his sister-in-law and she turns out to be pregnant,” as you say, “her co-wife cannot marry until you know by which means she is permitted, whether by pregnancy or by intercourse” The same is valid for the one who performed ḥalîṣah. Ḥalîṣah frees and intercourse frees. As you said it for intercourse so it was said for ḥalîṣah.
Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”
Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”
Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!
How do we hold? If he came to her immediately after her husband’s death, and the fetus was recognized after two months, one should have stated: A nine-month child of either one of them or a seven-month of either one of them! But it may be that he came to her after two months and the fetus was recognized after three months, one should have stated: The sister-in-law should not perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate until after five months! But it must be that he came to her after 40 days and the fetus was recognized after 50 days. That would be complete months for [a child of] the first [brother] and incomplete ones for the second. This implies that a woman may give birth after full months. This implies that there are two creations. This implies that a woman may give birth after incomplete months. This implies that a woman may become pregnant repeatedly. This implies that a woman cannot become pregnant simultaneously from two men. And it disagrees with the sermonizing rabbis, since the sermonizing rabbis say “the middleman” “from the orders of the Philistines”, from 100 prepuces of Philistines, that 100 prepuces of Philistines touched her. Rebbi Mattaniah said, there is no disagreement. As long as the semen is not spoiled, a woman can become pregnant from several men simultaneously. After the semen is spoiled, a woman cannot become pregnant from several men simultaneously.
MISHNAH: If property came to a woman waiting for her levir, the House of Shammai agree with the House of Hillel that she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah and property that enters and leaves with her? The House of Shammai say, the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs. But the House of Hillel say that all property remains where it is; the ketubah in the hands of the husband’s heirs and property that enters and leaves with her in the hands of her father’s heirs.
MISHNAH: If property came to a woman waiting for her levir, the House of Shammai agree with the House of Hillel that she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah and property that enters and leaves with her? The House of Shammai say, the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs. But the House of Hillel say that all property remains where it is; the ketubah in the hands of the husband’s heirs and property that enters and leaves with her in the hands of her father’s heirs.
HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah?” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.
HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah?” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.
HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah?” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.
HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah?” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.
Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna said: A betrothed woman who died does not have a ketubah since she was not permitted to marry outside. That you should not say [the case] should be considered as if he divorced her and she should have a ketubah; therefore it was necessary to say that she does not have a ketubah.
Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna said: A betrothed woman who died does not have a ketubah since she was not permitted to marry outside. That you should not say [the case] should be considered as if he divorced her and she should have a ketubah; therefore it was necessary to say that she does not have a ketubah.
HALAKHAH: “He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance,” etc. That one should not say, ḥalîṣah is freeing, intercourse is freeing; just as you say, “he who marries his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property,” so he who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property. Therefore, it is necessary to say “he is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance”.
HALAKHAH: “He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance,” etc. That one should not say, ḥalîṣah is freeing, intercourse is freeing; just as you say, “he who marries his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property,” so he who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property. Therefore, it is necessary to say “he is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance”.
HALAKHAH: “He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance,” etc. That one should not say, ḥalîṣah is freeing, intercourse is freeing; just as you say, “he who marries his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property,” so he who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property. Therefore, it is necessary to say “he is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance”.
HALAKHAH: It says only: If the sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him. But if his wife died, his sister-in-law is forbidden to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Sages hold that for anything induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition is removed. But for Rebbi Eliezer, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains.
HALAKHAH: “No sister-in-law should be a party to ḥalîṣah,” etc. How long is it until a pregnancy is recognized? Symmachos said in the name of Rebbi Meїr: After three months. Even though it is no proof, there is a hint: “It was after about three months.” Rebbi Yudan said, even for a phantom pregnancy, “we were pregnant, we were sick, as if we gave birth to wind,” “get pregnant with dry grass, give birth to straw.” Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra said, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya: Even most of the first, most of the last, and the middle one complete. Rav Assi said, a full 90 days. Samuel said, they in their fulness. A case came before the rabbis there; we do not know if thirteen of the first and seventeen of the last or seventeen of the first and thirteen of the last, and five complete ones in the middle; they wanted to touch the child because of a doubt of bastardy. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob told them, such a case came before Abba bar Abba and he declared it acceptable. Does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Abba said, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth. A pregnancy is recognized after full months, a birth can happen after fractional months. There, we have stated: “How long can labor be? Rebbi Meїr said, even 40 to 50 days. Rebbi Jehudah said, her month is sufficient. Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon say, no labor is longer than two weeks”. “Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after fractional months. Since otherwise one should have stated “thirty days”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after full months. Since we have stated: “Her month is sufficient.”
Rebbi Mana said, I heard in the name of Samuel that there is no difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth, but I do not remember from whom I heard this. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen said before Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Jeremiah said this. Rebbi Ḥizqyah said to him, Rebbi Jeremiah did not say this; Rebbi Yose was offended by him. He said to him: Even Joshua who was bound to Moses would not have said so, but you said so! He checked himself and said, it is true that he said that but as a person who quotes something and questions it; does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Berekhiah in the name of Samuel: A woman gives birth only either after 271, 272, 273, or 274, days. Rebbi Mana said to him, from whom did the rabbi hear this? He said to him, from Rebbi Abba. The position of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There, he says, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth, and here, he says so? Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra in the name of Samuel: {If with ה Rabba, with א Rava.} Everything which is “many” is 208.
Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah is suspicious about a child. Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. Could you say that Rebbi Meїr is not suspicious about bills of divorce, as we have stated: “Those that had received qiddushin can be married.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Gedula: The one who repudiates does not have to wait three months; the one who leaves by a bill of divorce needs to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Me‘ir since Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Jeremiah: A woman who has been raped does not have to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Yose, since Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. It was stated: The proselyte, the captive, and the slave woman who were redeemed, or converted, or freed, have to wait three months, the words of Rebbi Judah. Rebbi Yose says, they do not have to wait. Their blood, Rebbi Jehudah says, makes impure 24 hours retroactively; Rebbi Yose says, from its moment onwards. Rebbi said, the words of Rebbi Judah are reasonable for the blood, and the words of Rebbi Yose for the child. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu said, my father had a case and he asked Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa, and Rebbi Immi, and they instructed him following Rebbi Yose for the child. For if it were not so, what could we say? Between Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Yose, practice does not follow Rebbi Yose? But because Rebbi said, “they are reasonable”. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, every time Rebbi taught “they are reasonable”, the disagreement is unresolved except in the case of the fig cake where each party to the controversy accepts the opposition’s argument. Rebbi Yose said, I stated a difficulty before Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu: Even if it is certain that they had sex? He said to him, is a normal Gentile not like one who had sex? Simeon bar Abba said, there came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan and he instructed following Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Eleazar was sorry about this; he said, one disregards the anonymous [Mishnah] and follows an isolated opinion! He found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He understood that following Rebbi Simeon, he found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He said, the old man certainly understands the chapters about bills of divorce.
Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah is suspicious about a child. Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. Could you say that Rebbi Meїr is not suspicious about bills of divorce, as we have stated: “Those that had received qiddushin can be married.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Gedula: The one who repudiates does not have to wait three months; the one who leaves by a bill of divorce needs to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Me‘ir since Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Jeremiah: A woman who has been raped does not have to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Yose, since Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. It was stated: The proselyte, the captive, and the slave woman who were redeemed, or converted, or freed, have to wait three months, the words of Rebbi Judah. Rebbi Yose says, they do not have to wait. Their blood, Rebbi Jehudah says, makes impure 24 hours retroactively; Rebbi Yose says, from its moment onwards. Rebbi said, the words of Rebbi Judah are reasonable for the blood, and the words of Rebbi Yose for the child. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu said, my father had a case and he asked Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa, and Rebbi Immi, and they instructed him following Rebbi Yose for the child. For if it were not so, what could we say? Between Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Yose, practice does not follow Rebbi Yose? But because Rebbi said, “they are reasonable”. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, every time Rebbi taught “they are reasonable”, the disagreement is unresolved except in the case of the fig cake where each party to the controversy accepts the opposition’s argument. Rebbi Yose said, I stated a difficulty before Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu: Even if it is certain that they had sex? He said to him, is a normal Gentile not like one who had sex? Simeon bar Abba said, there came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan and he instructed following Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Eleazar was sorry about this; he said, one disregards the anonymous [Mishnah] and follows an isolated opinion! He found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He understood that following Rebbi Simeon, he found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He said, the old man certainly understands the chapters about bills of divorce.
Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah is suspicious about a child. Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. Could you say that Rebbi Meїr is not suspicious about bills of divorce, as we have stated: “Those that had received qiddushin can be married.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Gedula: The one who repudiates does not have to wait three months; the one who leaves by a bill of divorce needs to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Me‘ir since Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Jeremiah: A woman who has been raped does not have to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Yose, since Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. It was stated: The proselyte, the captive, and the slave woman who were redeemed, or converted, or freed, have to wait three months, the words of Rebbi Judah. Rebbi Yose says, they do not have to wait. Their blood, Rebbi Jehudah says, makes impure 24 hours retroactively; Rebbi Yose says, from its moment onwards. Rebbi said, the words of Rebbi Judah are reasonable for the blood, and the words of Rebbi Yose for the child. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu said, my father had a case and he asked Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa, and Rebbi Immi, and they instructed him following Rebbi Yose for the child. For if it were not so, what could we say? Between Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Yose, practice does not follow Rebbi Yose? But because Rebbi said, “they are reasonable”. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, every time Rebbi taught “they are reasonable”, the disagreement is unresolved except in the case of the fig cake where each party to the controversy accepts the opposition’s argument. Rebbi Yose said, I stated a difficulty before Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu: Even if it is certain that they had sex? He said to him, is a normal Gentile not like one who had sex? Simeon bar Abba said, there came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan and he instructed following Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Eleazar was sorry about this; he said, one disregards the anonymous [Mishnah] and follows an isolated opinion! He found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He understood that following Rebbi Simeon, he found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He said, the old man certainly understands the chapters about bills of divorce.
Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: There Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu, said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Every place where Rebbi taught a disagreement and afterwards taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous Mishnah. And here, you say so? He said to him, if not Rebbi, maybe somebody else said it? Since when Rebbi taught a disagreement and afterwards taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous [text]. It must be that Rebbi did not find a disagreement in the Mishnah; but if others taught it in disagreement and Rebbi taught it anonymously, certainly practice follows the anonymous [text]. There come Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jacob bar Abba and Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Even if others taught a disagreement but Rebbi taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous [text]. Why does he agree here with a dissenting opinion? Rebbi Samuel ben Inaya in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. That means, if no diagreement is stated together with the anonymous [text], but if a disagreement is stated together with the anonymous [text], practice does not follow the anonymous [opinion]. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. That is, if individual disagrees with individual. But if an individual disagrees next to the [anonymous] Sages, practice does not follow the anonymous [text].
Rebbi Joḥanan said, everywhere one taught anonymous Mishnaiot, it follows the rabbis unless one’s teacher explains it [differently]. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, all anonymous Mishnaiot follow Rebbi Meїr unless one’s teacher explains it [differently]. Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Yasa, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees, only he saw that most anonymous Mishnaiot follow Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What kind of teacher? The teacher of the baraita or the teacher of study? Does not the story of Rebbi Eleazar imply, the teacher of the baraita? “Following Rebbi Simeon, he found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He said, the old man certainly understands his chapters.” We have to say that he received instruction from the teacher of the baraita when he understood that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr.
The woman who performs ḥalîṣah counts from the moment of death. The one who leaves by a bill of divorce counts from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Ḥanina said, from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the moment of writing. Rav and Samuel, Rav like Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel like Rebbi Joḥanan. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you, since you say from the moment of delivery, about what are you suspicious? Because in the meantime she was alone with him! Then one should worry about an old bill of divorce! Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan: According to you, since you say from the moment of writing, if there were two bills of divorce, one written now and one later, and both delivered on the same day. This one you prohibit and that one you permit! What Rav objected to Samuel, Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan. What Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel objected to Rav. Practice: She counts from the time of writing if he never was alone with her.
The woman who performs ḥalîṣah counts from the moment of death. The one who leaves by a bill of divorce counts from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Ḥanina said, from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the moment of writing. Rav and Samuel, Rav like Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel like Rebbi Joḥanan. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you, since you say from the moment of delivery, about what are you suspicious? Because in the meantime she was alone with him! Then one should worry about an old bill of divorce! Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan: According to you, since you say from the moment of writing, if there were two bills of divorce, one written now and one later, and both delivered on the same day. This one you prohibit and that one you permit! What Rav objected to Samuel, Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan. What Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel objected to Rav. Practice: She counts from the time of writing if he never was alone with her.
Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said, it is written: “His house should be called in Israel the house of the shoe-stripped.” A house which was permitted by one stripping. The same is true for intercourse. Stripping frees and intercourse frees. What you say about stripping you say about intercourse.
Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said, it is written: “His house should be called in Israel the house of the shoe-stripped.” A house which was permitted by one stripping. The same is true for intercourse. Stripping frees and intercourse frees. What you say about stripping you say about intercourse.
MISHNAH: He who takes back his divorcee, or marries the woman with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, or marries a relative of the woman with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, has to divorce her and any child is a bastard, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. But the Sages say, it is not a bastard. But they agree that the child of one who marries a relative of his divorcee is a bastard.
Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.
Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.
HALAKHAH: “If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him,” etc. That means, her mother is forbidden to him. Did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. But since we stated: “If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him,” therefore he stated “her sister.”
MISHNAH: Rabban Gamliel says, there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce, no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, no copulation after copulation, and no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah. But the Sages say, there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce and “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, but nothing after copulation or after ḥalîṣah.
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, does he say similarly that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Simeon says, there is nothing after copulation if it is primary. Therefore, if it is secondary, there is something afterwards. That must deal with copulation after a bill of divorce. For if it were copulation after “bespeaking”, what could you say? If “bespeaking” acquired, there is nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse will acquire and there is nothing after that. So we must speak about copulation after a bill of divorce. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially.
Since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, does he say similarly that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Simeon says, there is nothing after copulation if it is primary. Therefore, if it is secondary, there is something afterwards. That must deal with copulation after a bill of divorce. For if it were copulation after “bespeaking”, what could you say? If “bespeaking” acquired, there is nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse will acquire and there is nothing after that. So we must speak about copulation after a bill of divorce. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.
Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.
Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.
Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.
In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, can there be invalid intercourse after invalid intercourse, or the intercourse of a nine-years-old after the intercourse of [another] nine-years-old, or invalid intercourse after the intercourse of a nine-years-old, or intercourse of a nine-years-old after invalid intercourse? Do the Sages agree with Rabban Gamliel that there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” for one sister-in-law? How is that? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law, gave her a bill of divorce, and “bespoke” her again. If you say, there can be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she did not become free by that bill of divorce. If you say, there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she was freed by that bill of divorce.
In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, can there be invalid intercourse after invalid intercourse, or the intercourse of a nine-years-old after the intercourse of [another] nine-years-old, or invalid intercourse after the intercourse of a nine-years-old, or intercourse of a nine-years-old after invalid intercourse? Do the Sages agree with Rabban Gamliel that there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” for one sister-in-law? How is that? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law, gave her a bill of divorce, and “bespoke” her again. If you say, there can be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she did not become free by that bill of divorce. If you say, there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she was freed by that bill of divorce.
HALAKHAH: “How? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law,” etc. That means that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired. If you would say that a bill of divorce does not free more than “bespeaking” had acquired, the levir could say: My bill of divorce shall not free more than my “bespeaking” had acquired. But then the bill of divorce did not even free what my “bespeaking” had acquired! “Cutting off.” That is no cutting off!
HALAKHAH: “How? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law,” etc. That means that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired. If you would say that a bill of divorce does not free more than “bespeaking” had acquired, the levir could say: My bill of divorce shall not free more than my “bespeaking” had acquired. But then the bill of divorce did not even free what my “bespeaking” had acquired! “Cutting off.” That is no cutting off!
Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, this means that there is an obligation first to give qiddushin and only after that to cohabit. Since here, where qiddushin are not written, you say “that is as it is commanded”, for a wife, where it is written, not so much more!
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody comes to his sister-in-law,” etc. We have stated: “Even if he is in error and she acts criminally, or he does it criminally but she is in error.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Even if both act in error, even if both act criminally. They wanted to say, a hearing person who is competent acquires both if he has the intention and if he does not have the intention but the deaf-mute, who is not competent, should acquire only if he has the intention. It was found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Both the deaf-mute and the insane who copulated acquired [the widow] and freed the co-wives.
HALAKHAH: “Similarly, anybody who comes upon any of the incest-prohibited women,” etc. “He should not take a widow.” Even if under duress? The verse says, “he shall not desecrate his seed in his people.” Even if he touched? The verse does not say לא יחול but לא יחלל, even under duress; לא יחול but לא יחלל, even by touching. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: It says here “taking” and it says there “taking” referring to incest prohibitions. Since regarding “taking” referred to by incest prohibitions He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked, if regarding “taking” referred to by incest prohibitions He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and the child is a bastard, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and treat the child as a bastard. Rebbi Yosa said, for which purpose was “desecrated” written? Is not bastard worse than desecrated? Rebbi Abun bar Bisna came in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal. It says here “taking” and it says there “taking” referring to the woman waiting for the levir. Since regarding “taking” referring to the one waiting for the levir He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and the child is acceptable, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and treat the child as acceptable, since Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said: When he touched, he became guilty because of the desecrated one. When the gland entered, he became guilty for having intercourse. When he ejaculated, he became guilty because of desecrating.
HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.
HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.
HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.
A sister injured by a piece of wood, Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon say, he shall not defile himself for her, but the Sages say, he must defile himself for her. Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon follow well what they have stated, but the argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “a girl”, not an adult, “a virgin”, not one injured by a piece of wood; and here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. There, “and for his virgin sister”, that excludes the raped and the seduced one. Or maybe I should exclude the one injured by a piece of wood? The verse says, “who had not been a man’s.” Who became [deflowered] through the action of a man, not one who became it through something else. “The close one”, to include the betrothed one. “To him”, to include the adult. The argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “the close one”, to exclude the betrothed one, “to him”, to exclude the divorcee. And here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. “His sister” is always inside [the family] until she leaves; his betrothed is always outside until she enters.
A sister injured by a piece of wood, Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon say, he shall not defile himself for her, but the Sages say, he must defile himself for her. Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon follow well what they have stated, but the argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “a girl”, not an adult, “a virgin”, not one injured by a piece of wood; and here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. There, “and for his virgin sister”, that excludes the raped and the seduced one. Or maybe I should exclude the one injured by a piece of wood? The verse says, “who had not been a man’s.” Who became [deflowered] through the action of a man, not one who became it through something else. “The close one”, to include the betrothed one. “To him”, to include the adult. The argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “the close one”, to exclude the betrothed one, “to him”, to exclude the divorcee. And here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. “His sister” is always inside [the family] until she leaves; his betrothed is always outside until she enters.
A sister injured by a piece of wood, Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon say, he shall not defile himself for her, but the Sages say, he must defile himself for her. Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon follow well what they have stated, but the argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “a girl”, not an adult, “a virgin”, not one injured by a piece of wood; and here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. There, “and for his virgin sister”, that excludes the raped and the seduced one. Or maybe I should exclude the one injured by a piece of wood? The verse says, “who had not been a man’s.” Who became [deflowered] through the action of a man, not one who became it through something else. “The close one”, to include the betrothed one. “To him”, to include the adult. The argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “the close one”, to exclude the betrothed one, “to him”, to exclude the divorcee. And here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. “His sister” is always inside [the family] until she leaves; his betrothed is always outside until she enters.
A sister injured by a piece of wood, Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon say, he shall not defile himself for her, but the Sages say, he must defile himself for her. Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon follow well what they have stated, but the argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “a girl”, not an adult, “a virgin”, not one injured by a piece of wood; and here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. There, “and for his virgin sister”, that excludes the raped and the seduced one. Or maybe I should exclude the one injured by a piece of wood? The verse says, “who had not been a man’s.” Who became [deflowered] through the action of a man, not one who became it through something else. “The close one”, to include the betrothed one. “To him”, to include the adult. The argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “the close one”, to exclude the betrothed one, “to him”, to exclude the divorcee. And here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. “His sister” is always inside [the family] until she leaves; his betrothed is always outside until she enters.
A sister injured by a piece of wood, Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon say, he shall not defile himself for her, but the Sages say, he must defile himself for her. Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon follow well what they have stated, but the argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “a girl”, not an adult, “a virgin”, not one injured by a piece of wood; and here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. There, “and for his virgin sister”, that excludes the raped and the seduced one. Or maybe I should exclude the one injured by a piece of wood? The verse says, “who had not been a man’s.” Who became [deflowered] through the action of a man, not one who became it through something else. “The close one”, to include the betrothed one. “To him”, to include the adult. The argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “the close one”, to exclude the betrothed one, “to him”, to exclude the divorcee. And here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. “His sister” is always inside [the family] until she leaves; his betrothed is always outside until she enters.
A sister injured by a piece of wood, Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon say, he shall not defile himself for her, but the Sages say, he must defile himself for her. Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon follow well what they have stated, but the argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “a girl”, not an adult, “a virgin”, not one injured by a piece of wood; and here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. There, “and for his virgin sister”, that excludes the raped and the seduced one. Or maybe I should exclude the one injured by a piece of wood? The verse says, “who had not been a man’s.” Who became [deflowered] through the action of a man, not one who became it through something else. “The close one”, to include the betrothed one. “To him”, to include the adult. The argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “the close one”, to exclude the betrothed one, “to him”, to exclude the divorcee. And here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. “His sister” is always inside [the family] until she leaves; his betrothed is always outside until she enters.
“If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah?