says
11983 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: But about where there is no knowledge either at the start or at the end, the he-goats of the holidays and the he-goats of the Days of the New Moon atone, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, the he-goats of the holidays atone but not the he-goats of the Days of the New Moon. What do the he-goats of the Days of the New Moon atone for? For the pure person who ate impure. Rebbi Meїr says, the atoning of all he-goats is the same, about the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta. Rebbi Simeon used to say, the he-goats of the holidays atone for the pure person who ate impure; those of the holidays atone for where there is no knowledge either at the start or at the end, and those of the Day of Atonement where there is no knowledge at the start but there is knowledge at the end. They asked him, could they be brought one for the other? He told them, they may be brought. They asked him, since their atoning is not the same, how can they be brought one for the other? He told them, all of them serve to atone for the impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta.
The elevation offering atones for thoughts. What is the reason? What rises in your spirits will not be. Rebbi Levi said, the elevation offering atones for your spirits. And so in Job he says, maybe my children sinned and cursed God in their hearts. This implies that the elevation offering atones for thoughts.
Rebbi says, the Day of Atonement atones for all sins against the Torah except for him who tears away the yoke, or who breaks the Covenant, or who finds aspects in the Torah, where it atones if he repented but does not atone otherwise. Rebbi Zebida said: Rebbi Yasa asked: Does Rebbi think that the Day of Atonement atones without repentance? There came Rebbi Ashian, Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Day of Atonement atones without repentance, and death cleanses without repentance. We have stated thus: The day of death equals repentance. Who stated this? Rebbi! Then what we stated, “death and the Day of Atonement atone with repentance,” does not follow Rebbi.
Rebbi Matthew ben Ḥarash asked Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah in the Academy, did you hear the four types of Atonement which Rebbi Ismael explained? He answered him, there are three in addition to repentance. One verse says, return, naughty children, etc. But another verse says, for on that day, He shall pardon you, etc. And another verse says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, etc. And another verse says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. How is this? If somebody violates a positive commandment and repents, before he moves from there it will be forgiven to him. About this one it says, return, naughty children, etc. If one transgresses a prohibition and immediately repents, repentance suspends judgment, and the Day of Atonement pardons. About this one it says, for onthat day, He shall pardon you. If one intentionally transgressed [sins punishable by] extirpations or death penalties, repentance and the Day of Atonement atone half, and sufferings atone half. About this one it says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, and their iniquities with plagues. But by whom the Name of Heaven was desecrated, there is no power in repentance to suspend judgment, nor in the Day of Atonement to pardon, nor in sufferings to scour; but repentance and the Day of Atonement suspend, and death scours with sufferings. About this one it says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. From this we learn that death scours.
Rebbi Matthew ben Ḥarash asked Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah in the Academy, did you hear the four types of Atonement which Rebbi Ismael explained? He answered him, there are three in addition to repentance. One verse says, return, naughty children, etc. But another verse says, for on that day, He shall pardon you, etc. And another verse says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, etc. And another verse says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. How is this? If somebody violates a positive commandment and repents, before he moves from there it will be forgiven to him. About this one it says, return, naughty children, etc. If one transgresses a prohibition and immediately repents, repentance suspends judgment, and the Day of Atonement pardons. About this one it says, for onthat day, He shall pardon you. If one intentionally transgressed [sins punishable by] extirpations or death penalties, repentance and the Day of Atonement atone half, and sufferings atone half. About this one it says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, and their iniquities with plagues. But by whom the Name of Heaven was desecrated, there is no power in repentance to suspend judgment, nor in the Day of Atonement to pardon, nor in sufferings to scour; but repentance and the Day of Atonement suspend, and death scours with sufferings. About this one it says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. From this we learn that death scours.
Rebbi Matthew ben Ḥarash asked Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah in the Academy, did you hear the four types of Atonement which Rebbi Ismael explained? He answered him, there are three in addition to repentance. One verse says, return, naughty children, etc. But another verse says, for on that day, He shall pardon you, etc. And another verse says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, etc. And another verse says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. How is this? If somebody violates a positive commandment and repents, before he moves from there it will be forgiven to him. About this one it says, return, naughty children, etc. If one transgresses a prohibition and immediately repents, repentance suspends judgment, and the Day of Atonement pardons. About this one it says, for onthat day, He shall pardon you. If one intentionally transgressed [sins punishable by] extirpations or death penalties, repentance and the Day of Atonement atone half, and sufferings atone half. About this one it says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, and their iniquities with plagues. But by whom the Name of Heaven was desecrated, there is no power in repentance to suspend judgment, nor in the Day of Atonement to pardon, nor in sufferings to scour; but repentance and the Day of Atonement suspend, and death scours with sufferings. About this one it says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. From this we learn that death scours.
Rebbi Matthew ben Ḥarash asked Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah in the Academy, did you hear the four types of Atonement which Rebbi Ismael explained? He answered him, there are three in addition to repentance. One verse says, return, naughty children, etc. But another verse says, for on that day, He shall pardon you, etc. And another verse says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, etc. And another verse says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. How is this? If somebody violates a positive commandment and repents, before he moves from there it will be forgiven to him. About this one it says, return, naughty children, etc. If one transgresses a prohibition and immediately repents, repentance suspends judgment, and the Day of Atonement pardons. About this one it says, for onthat day, He shall pardon you. If one intentionally transgressed [sins punishable by] extirpations or death penalties, repentance and the Day of Atonement atone half, and sufferings atone half. About this one it says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, and their iniquities with plagues. But by whom the Name of Heaven was desecrated, there is no power in repentance to suspend judgment, nor in the Day of Atonement to pardon, nor in sufferings to scour; but repentance and the Day of Atonement suspend, and death scours with sufferings. About this one it says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. From this we learn that death scours.
Rebbi Matthew ben Ḥarash asked Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah in the Academy, did you hear the four types of Atonement which Rebbi Ismael explained? He answered him, there are three in addition to repentance. One verse says, return, naughty children, etc. But another verse says, for on that day, He shall pardon you, etc. And another verse says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, etc. And another verse says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. How is this? If somebody violates a positive commandment and repents, before he moves from there it will be forgiven to him. About this one it says, return, naughty children, etc. If one transgresses a prohibition and immediately repents, repentance suspends judgment, and the Day of Atonement pardons. About this one it says, for onthat day, He shall pardon you. If one intentionally transgressed [sins punishable by] extirpations or death penalties, repentance and the Day of Atonement atone half, and sufferings atone half. About this one it says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, and their iniquities with plagues. But by whom the Name of Heaven was desecrated, there is no power in repentance to suspend judgment, nor in the Day of Atonement to pardon, nor in sufferings to scour; but repentance and the Day of Atonement suspend, and death scours with sufferings. About this one it says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. From this we learn that death scours.
Rebbi Matthew ben Ḥarash asked Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah in the Academy, did you hear the four types of Atonement which Rebbi Ismael explained? He answered him, there are three in addition to repentance. One verse says, return, naughty children, etc. But another verse says, for on that day, He shall pardon you, etc. And another verse says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, etc. And another verse says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. How is this? If somebody violates a positive commandment and repents, before he moves from there it will be forgiven to him. About this one it says, return, naughty children, etc. If one transgresses a prohibition and immediately repents, repentance suspends judgment, and the Day of Atonement pardons. About this one it says, for onthat day, He shall pardon you. If one intentionally transgressed [sins punishable by] extirpations or death penalties, repentance and the Day of Atonement atone half, and sufferings atone half. About this one it says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, and their iniquities with plagues. But by whom the Name of Heaven was desecrated, there is no power in repentance to suspend judgment, nor in the Day of Atonement to pardon, nor in sufferings to scour; but repentance and the Day of Atonement suspend, and death scours with sufferings. About this one it says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. From this we learn that death scours.
Rebbi Matthew ben Ḥarash asked Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah in the Academy, did you hear the four types of Atonement which Rebbi Ismael explained? He answered him, there are three in addition to repentance. One verse says, return, naughty children, etc. But another verse says, for on that day, He shall pardon you, etc. And another verse says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, etc. And another verse says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. How is this? If somebody violates a positive commandment and repents, before he moves from there it will be forgiven to him. About this one it says, return, naughty children, etc. If one transgresses a prohibition and immediately repents, repentance suspends judgment, and the Day of Atonement pardons. About this one it says, for onthat day, He shall pardon you. If one intentionally transgressed [sins punishable by] extirpations or death penalties, repentance and the Day of Atonement atone half, and sufferings atone half. About this one it says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, and their iniquities with plagues. But by whom the Name of Heaven was desecrated, there is no power in repentance to suspend judgment, nor in the Day of Atonement to pardon, nor in sufferings to scour; but repentance and the Day of Atonement suspend, and death scours with sufferings. About this one it says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. From this we learn that death scours.
Rebbi Matthew ben Ḥarash asked Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah in the Academy, did you hear the four types of Atonement which Rebbi Ismael explained? He answered him, there are three in addition to repentance. One verse says, return, naughty children, etc. But another verse says, for on that day, He shall pardon you, etc. And another verse says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, etc. And another verse says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. How is this? If somebody violates a positive commandment and repents, before he moves from there it will be forgiven to him. About this one it says, return, naughty children, etc. If one transgresses a prohibition and immediately repents, repentance suspends judgment, and the Day of Atonement pardons. About this one it says, for onthat day, He shall pardon you. If one intentionally transgressed [sins punishable by] extirpations or death penalties, repentance and the Day of Atonement atone half, and sufferings atone half. About this one it says, I shall visit their crime with the rod, and their iniquities with plagues. But by whom the Name of Heaven was desecrated, there is no power in repentance to suspend judgment, nor in the Day of Atonement to pardon, nor in sufferings to scour; but repentance and the Day of Atonement suspend, and death scours with sufferings. About this one it says, the iniquity of this people shall not be atoned for until you die. From this we learn that death scours.
MISHNAH: Together Israel, Cohanim, and the Anointed Priest. What is the difference between Israel and a Cohen or the Anointed Priest? Only that the blood of the bull atones for Cohanim in matters of the Sanctuary and its sancta. Rebbi Simeon says, just as the blood of the he-goat which is brought inside atones for Israel, so the blood of the bull atones for the Cohanim. Just as the confession of the scapegoat atones for Israel, so the confession of the bull atones for Cohanim.
Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?
The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted. There he says, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of transgression. But here he says, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of transgression. There, his reparation offering determines it. Here what do you have?
The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted. There he says, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of transgression. But here he says, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of transgression. There, his reparation offering determines it. Here what do you have?
The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There, he said, if part of the sin was atoned, all of the sin was atoned. And here he says so? Rebbi Joḥanan said this only for the last realization which does not require any sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.
An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “If one became impure in the Temple courtyard,” etc. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: One verse says, he defiled the dwelling place of the Eternal, another verse says, he defiled the Sanctuary of the Eternal. Why is this? To state a difference between one who became inside and one who became outside. If he became impure (inside) not unless he bring his head and most of his body inside; if he became impure (outside) not unless he stay for prostrating. If he became impure inside and entered further inside? Let us hear from the following: “If he prostrated himself, or tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” If he tarried, is that not as if he brought his head and most of his body inside, but you are saying, “he tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” And here, not unless he tarried that he could have prostrated himself. How is that? About which of them does he become liable? About the first or the last? The colleagues say, about the first. Rebbi Yose told them, one says to him, leave, and you say about the first? But we must hold about the last.
HALAKHAH: “If one became impure in the Temple courtyard,” etc. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: One verse says, he defiled the dwelling place of the Eternal, another verse says, he defiled the Sanctuary of the Eternal. Why is this? To state a difference between one who became inside and one who became outside. If he became impure (inside) not unless he bring his head and most of his body inside; if he became impure (outside) not unless he stay for prostrating. If he became impure inside and entered further inside? Let us hear from the following: “If he prostrated himself, or tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” If he tarried, is that not as if he brought his head and most of his body inside, but you are saying, “he tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” And here, not unless he tarried that he could have prostrated himself. How is that? About which of them does he become liable? About the first or the last? The colleagues say, about the first. Rebbi Yose told them, one says to him, leave, and you say about the first? But we must hold about the last.
HALAKHAH: “If one became impure in the Temple courtyard,” etc. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: One verse says, he defiled the dwelling place of the Eternal, another verse says, he defiled the Sanctuary of the Eternal. Why is this? To state a difference between one who became inside and one who became outside. If he became impure (inside) not unless he bring his head and most of his body inside; if he became impure (outside) not unless he stay for prostrating. If he became impure inside and entered further inside? Let us hear from the following: “If he prostrated himself, or tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” If he tarried, is that not as if he brought his head and most of his body inside, but you are saying, “he tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” And here, not unless he tarried that he could have prostrated himself. How is that? About which of them does he become liable? About the first or the last? The colleagues say, about the first. Rebbi Yose told them, one says to him, leave, and you say about the first? But we must hold about the last.
There, we have stated: “They removed the cup and the censer for him”. About which of them does he become liable? About the first or the last? The colleagues say, about the last. Rebbi Yose told them, one says to him, enter, and you say about the last? But we must hold about the first.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Eliezer says, the crawling animal and he became oblivious, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Aqiba says, and he became oblivious while he was impure, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Ismael says, and he became oblivious, and he became oblivious, two times to make him liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Eliezer says, the crawling animal and he became oblivious, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Aqiba says, and he became oblivious while he was impure, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Ismael says, and he became oblivious, and he became oblivious, two times to make him liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Eliezer says, the crawling animal and he became oblivious, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Aqiba says, and he became oblivious while he was impure, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Ismael says, and he became oblivious, and he became oblivious, two times to make him liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.
HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
Does not the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where do we find that somebody talks and brings a sacrifice that this one talks and brings a sacrifice? Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inverted? There he said, for Rebbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaïm following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.
HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not drink,” etc. In this case, Rebbi Simeon declares not liable. Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion, as we have stated there: “How much does he have to eat from ṭevel to be liable? Rebbi Simeon says, anything; but the Sages say, the volume of an olive. Rebbi Simeon told them, do you not agree that one who eats an ant is liable? They told him, because it is a creature. He answered them, also a grain of wheat is a creature.” In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, why does Rebbi Simeon declare not liable? Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: You shall deprive yourselves, of what is permitted to you, not of what is forbidden to you.
HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.
HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.
It was stated: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, there is nothing square from the six Days of Creation. Rebbi Berekhiah objected: Did we not state: “The body of baheret is like a square Cilician grit. The place for a grit is nine lentils. The space for a lentil is four hairwidths; in all 36 hairwidths.” Rebbi (Yosna) said, that in itself says that there is no square. Why was it stated “squared”? That he should square it. And כגעה? It is full of knots. But there is the bunch of pila! It is round below. Some wanted to say, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said this only about creatures, There is square in foods, there is no square in creatures.
It was stated: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, there is nothing square from the six Days of Creation. Rebbi Berekhiah objected: Did we not state: “The body of baheret is like a square Cilician grit. The place for a grit is nine lentils. The space for a lentil is four hairwidths; in all 36 hairwidths.” Rebbi (Yosna) said, that in itself says that there is no square. Why was it stated “squared”? That he should square it. And כגעה? It is full of knots. But there is the bunch of pila! It is round below. Some wanted to say, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said this only about creatures, There is square in foods, there is no square in creatures.
“An oath that I shall eat this loaf;” etc. Vain and untruth both were said together, which is impossible for the ear to hear and the mouth to say. Its desecrator shall be put to death and on the Sabbath day two sheep were said together. Do not wear ša`aṭnez, fringes you shall make for yourselves, both were said together. The nakedness of your brother’s wife and her brother-in-law shall come to her were said together. You shall not move property; any daughter inheriting real estate both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. And so it says, God spoke once, two I heard from this. And it says, is not My word like fire, says the Eternal.
“An oath that I shall eat this loaf;” etc. Vain and untruth both were said together, which is impossible for the ear to hear and the mouth to say. Its desecrator shall be put to death and on the Sabbath day two sheep were said together. Do not wear ša`aṭnez, fringes you shall make for yourselves, both were said together. The nakedness of your brother’s wife and her brother-in-law shall come to her were said together. You shall not move property; any daughter inheriting real estate both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. And so it says, God spoke once, two I heard from this. And it says, is not My word like fire, says the Eternal.
“An oath that I shall eat this loaf;” etc. Vain and untruth both were said together, which is impossible for the ear to hear and the mouth to say. Its desecrator shall be put to death and on the Sabbath day two sheep were said together. Do not wear ša`aṭnez, fringes you shall make for yourselves, both were said together. The nakedness of your brother’s wife and her brother-in-law shall come to her were said together. You shall not move property; any daughter inheriting real estate both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. And so it says, God spoke once, two I heard from this. And it says, is not My word like fire, says the Eternal.
HALAKHAH: “A blurted oath,” etc. “ ‘An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it’, he is liable only once”. Something which would be forbidden for vows and is permitted for oaths. Not on this was it said but on the following: “Whether matters of himself, or matters of others,” as Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: ‘An oath that X gave a mina to Y.’ If it turns out that he had not given, since it is not in his hand for the future it is not in his hand for the past. It was found stated on both cases: This is more stringent for the past than for the future: If he says “I shall not eat, I shall not eat,” he is liable only once. “I did not eat, I did not eat,” he is liable for each single time.
Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Yose. It is said here two and it is said there by the mouth of two witnesses. Since there it must be by the testimony of two witnesses, also here by the testimony of two witnesses. Then why does the verse say two? Lest one of them be standing while the other be sitting; one says everything he has to say, but to the other one says, make your statement short. With one he puts up, to the other he is unfriendly.
Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Yose. It is said here two and it is said there by the mouth of two witnesses. Since there it must be by the testimony of two witnesses, also here by the testimony of two witnesses. Then why does the verse say two? Lest one of them be standing while the other be sitting; one says everything he has to say, but to the other one says, make your statement short. With one he puts up, to the other he is unfriendly.
Rebbi Jehudah said, I heard that if the judge wants to let both of them sit, he may tell them to sit down. What is forbidden is that not one be standing and the other sitting; one says everything he has to say, but to the other one says, make your statement short. Rebbi Ismael says, one says to him, either you dress as he is dressed or pay him to be dressed as you are.
Rebbi Jehudah said, I heard that if the judge wants to let both of them sit, he may tell them to sit down. What is forbidden is that not one be standing and the other sitting; one says everything he has to say, but to the other one says, make your statement short. Rebbi Ismael says, one says to him, either you dress as he is dressed or pay him to be dressed as you are.
Rebbi Jehudah said, I heard that if the judge wants to let both of them sit, he may tell them to sit down. What is forbidden is that not one be standing and the other sitting; one says everything he has to say, but to the other one says, make your statement short. Rebbi Ismael says, one says to him, either you dress as he is dressed or pay him to be dressed as you are.
Rebbi Jehudah said, I heard that if the judge wants to let both of them sit, he may tell them to sit down. What is forbidden is that not one be standing and the other sitting; one says everything he has to say, but to the other one says, make your statement short. Rebbi Ismael says, one says to him, either you dress as he is dressed or pay him to be dressed as you are.
So far only fathers and sons; from where the other relatives? Rebbi Ze`ira says, and sons includes the remaining relatives.
“Before the court.” To exclude a single witness. If they told him that they would accept his word as if there were two witnesses, from where? The verse says, if he was a witness, had seen or known; if he does not tell he shall bear his punishment. One who is qualified to testify according to biblical standards; this excludes a single witness who is not qualified to testify.
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times in his own words and let him swear five times by the mouth of others, what? Since Rebbi Meїr considered “in his own words” as if in court, would they determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request? It should come like the following: “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. Should they be liable? The verse says, and he heard the voice of an imprecation. Only one who hears an imprecation. This excludes those who did not hear a voice.” Would he be liable from his own mouth for real estate? From his own mouth would he be liable for fines? From his own mouth would he be liable for a variable value sacrifice?
If they were ten. There are Tannaïm who state, the first one is liable and all the rest are not liable. There are Tannaïm who state, the last one is not liable and all the rest are liable. The one who said, the first one is liable and all the rest are not liable, holds with him who said, the testimony can be verified by the remaining [witnesses]. The one who said, the last one is not liable and all the rest are liable, holds with him who said, testimony that was partially invalidated is totally invalidated. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “if there were two groups of witnesses.” He only said “two”. Therefore if there had been one, testimony that was partially invalidated it is totally invalidated.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meïr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive. “May He not punish you if you come and testify for me.” Therefore, if you do not come and testify for me He shall punish you. There is not only an imprecation accompanied by an oath. From where one not accompanied by an oath be like one which is accompanied by an oath? The verse says, and heard an imprecation, and heard a voice, to make one without imprecation like one with an imprecation. Therefore not an imprecation without an oath. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no difference; an imprecation without oath is the same as an oath without an imprecation.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meïr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive. “May He not punish you if you come and testify for me.” Therefore, if you do not come and testify for me He shall punish you. There is not only an imprecation accompanied by an oath. From where one not accompanied by an oath be like one which is accompanied by an oath? The verse says, and heard an imprecation, and heard a voice, to make one without imprecation like one with an imprecation. Therefore not an imprecation without an oath. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There is no difference; an imprecation without oath is the same as an oath without an imprecation.
Rebbi La: Both Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both are saying, there is no ”witnesses “here. Why? Because they might die. But might not a document be lost? Therefore, the reason can only be that they might forget their testimony. There, we have stated: “Where is my ox? He told him, it is lost. I want you to swear, he said, Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed himself, he has to pay the value, and the fifth, and the reparation sacrifice.” The Mishnah [applies] if he does not know that there are witnesses. He comes to tell you, even if he knows that there are witnesses. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “If there were two groups of witnesses, if the first group reneged and after this the second, both are liable.” One understands that the first group becomes liable. Why the second? Not because they might forget their testimony? [Here also, because they (are commanded) to forget their testimony.]
He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”
MISHNAH: If five people were claiming from him and said to him, give us the deposit which you are holding for us. “An oath that I am not holding anything of yours’ ”; he is liable only once. “An oath that I am not holding anything of you, and of you, and of you;” he is liable for each one separately. Rebbi Eliezer says, on condition that he repeat “an oath” at the end. Rebbi Simeon says, not unless he repeat “an oath” for each single one.
MISHNAH: If five people were claiming from him and said to him, give us the deposit which you are holding for us. “An oath that I am not holding anything of yours’ ”; he is liable only once. “An oath that I am not holding anything of you, and of you, and of you;” he is liable for each one separately. Rebbi Eliezer says, on condition that he repeat “an oath” at the end. Rebbi Simeon says, not unless he repeat “an oath” for each single one.
MISHNAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan, the robbery, and the lost object which you are holding for me.” “An oath that I am not holding anything of yours;” he is liable only once. “An oath that I am holding for you neither a deposit, nor a loan, nor a robbery, nor a lost object;” he is liable for each separate item. “Give me the wheat, and the barley, and the spelt, which you are holding for me.” “An oath that I am not holding anything for you,” he is liable only for one. “An oath that I am not holding wheat, and barley, and spelt, for you,” he is liable for each single one. Rebbi Meїr says, even if he says, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,” he is liable for each single one.
MISHNAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan, the robbery, and the lost object which you are holding for me.” “An oath that I am not holding anything of yours;” he is liable only once. “An oath that I am holding for you neither a deposit, nor a loan, nor a robbery, nor a lost object;” he is liable for each separate item. “Give me the wheat, and the barley, and the spelt, which you are holding for me.” “An oath that I am not holding anything for you,” he is liable only for one. “An oath that I am not holding wheat, and barley, and spelt, for you,” he is liable for each single one. Rebbi Meїr says, even if he says, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,” he is liable for each single one.
HALAKHAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi (Yasa) will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a baraita supports what the colleagues said. “A woman made a vow as a nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I’; the first woman’s husband heard it and dissolved [the vow] for her; the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. If she said, ‘my intention was only to be like her,’ both are permitted.” Because she said, “to be like her, in her state”. Therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state”, the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where the essence is not an oath, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? What Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest, if he connects: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.
Samuel said. the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah; the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meïr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meïr, as Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything; “I am greeting X,” he only signed for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed everything? Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated: “Rebbi Meїr says, even if he says, ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt,’ he is liable for each single one;” and nobody says “even” unless he agrees to an earlier statement. Rebbi Ḥinena said, in Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, whether he said, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,” or “wheat, barley, spelt,” it is a general statement and details. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, if he said, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,” it is a general statement and details. If he said “wheat, barley, spelt,” it is a general statement without details.
Samuel said. the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah; the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meïr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meïr, as Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything; “I am greeting X,” he only signed for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed everything? Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated: “Rebbi Meїr says, even if he says, ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt,’ he is liable for each single one;” and nobody says “even” unless he agrees to an earlier statement. Rebbi Ḥinena said, in Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, whether he said, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,” or “wheat, barley, spelt,” it is a general statement and details. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, if he said, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,” it is a general statement and details. If he said “wheat, barley, spelt,” it is a general statement without details.
Samuel said. the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah; the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meïr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meïr, as Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything; “I am greeting X,” he only signed for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed everything? Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated: “Rebbi Meїr says, even if he says, ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt,’ he is liable for each single one;” and nobody says “even” unless he agrees to an earlier statement. Rebbi Ḥinena said, in Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, whether he said, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,” or “wheat, barley, spelt,” it is a general statement and details. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, if he said, “wheat, and barley, and spelt,” it is a general statement and details. If he said “wheat, barley, spelt,” it is a general statement without details.
MISHNAH: “You raped or seduced my daughter,” and he says “I did not rape, I did not seduce.” “I am asking you to swear,” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. Rebbi Simeon frees him from liability since he would not pay the fine by his own admission. They told him, even though he does not pay the fine by his own admission, he pays for shame and diminution by his own admission.
MISHNAH: “You raped or seduced my daughter,” and he says “I did not rape, I did not seduce.” “I am asking you to swear,” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. Rebbi Simeon frees him from liability since he would not pay the fine by his own admission. They told him, even though he does not pay the fine by his own admission, he pays for shame and diminution by his own admission.
HALAKHAH: “You raped or seduced my daughter,” etc. Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The words of Rebbi Simeon [imply that] the main claim is for the fine, which is not so for the words of the Sages. Rebbi Illa said, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he claims the fine, shame and diminution; the words of the Sages if he claims shame, diminution, and fine. The rabbis say, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he advances three claims; the words of the Sages if he advances one claim. Rebbi Ze`ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, did you hear explicitly from Rebbi Joḥanan, or from his word? Rebbi Yasa said, for he is of the rabbis’ opinion. Rebbi Mana said, even if he is of Rebbi Illa’s opinion, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he advances one claim; the words of the Sages if he advances three claims. “Not only matters for which he has to pay the capital, from where double payment, quadruple and quintuple payment, the rapist, and the seducer, and the calumniator? The verse says, everything about which one would swear falsely.” Is the calumniator’s not a fine? Rebbi Jeremiah says, this is Rebbi Simeon’s who said, all depends on the collection.
HALAKHAH: “You raped or seduced my daughter,” etc. Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The words of Rebbi Simeon [imply that] the main claim is for the fine, which is not so for the words of the Sages. Rebbi Illa said, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he claims the fine, shame and diminution; the words of the Sages if he claims shame, diminution, and fine. The rabbis say, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he advances three claims; the words of the Sages if he advances one claim. Rebbi Ze`ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, did you hear explicitly from Rebbi Joḥanan, or from his word? Rebbi Yasa said, for he is of the rabbis’ opinion. Rebbi Mana said, even if he is of Rebbi Illa’s opinion, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he advances one claim; the words of the Sages if he advances three claims. “Not only matters for which he has to pay the capital, from where double payment, quadruple and quintuple payment, the rapist, and the seducer, and the calumniator? The verse says, everything about which one would swear falsely.” Is the calumniator’s not a fine? Rebbi Jeremiah says, this is Rebbi Simeon’s who said, all depends on the collection.
MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.
MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.
MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.
MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.
MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.
MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.
MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.
MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.
MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.
MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.
MISHNAH: “You stole my ox,” but he says “I did not steal;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. “I stole but I did not slaughter or sell it;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. “Your ox killed my ox,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. “Your ox killed my slave,” but he says “he did not kill;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. He said to him, “you hurt me and injured me,” but he says “I did not hurt you and I did not injure you;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is liable. His slave said to him, “you knocked out my tooth and blinded my eye,” but he says “I did not knock out your tooth or blind your eye;” “I am asking you to swear” and he says “Amen”, he is not liable. This is the principle, anybody who has to pay on his own admission is liable; but anybody who does not have to pay on his own admission is not liable.
HALAKHAH: “ “You stole my ox,” etc. to the end of the Chapter. Rebbi Isaac asked, should one have to pay the value of the slave by his admission? But what is his problem? Are the entire thirty a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, all the thirty are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “ ‘Your ox killed my slave’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is not liable.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he killed a slave covered with boils. He said to him, but it says afterwards, “ ‘Your ox killed my son’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is liable.” You could explain it if he was covered with boils, then he would not be liable! You cannot do this, as we have stated: “If he killed a human, he has to pay his worth.” Rebbi Ezra said before Rebbi Mana Explain it following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured. He said to him, if following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured, all is a fine
HALAKHAH: “ “You stole my ox,” etc. to the end of the Chapter. Rebbi Isaac asked, should one have to pay the value of the slave by his admission? But what is his problem? Are the entire thirty a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, all the thirty are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “ ‘Your ox killed my slave’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is not liable.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he killed a slave covered with boils. He said to him, but it says afterwards, “ ‘Your ox killed my son’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is liable.” You could explain it if he was covered with boils, then he would not be liable! You cannot do this, as we have stated: “If he killed a human, he has to pay his worth.” Rebbi Ezra said before Rebbi Mana Explain it following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured. He said to him, if following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured, all is a fine
HALAKHAH: “ “You stole my ox,” etc. to the end of the Chapter. Rebbi Isaac asked, should one have to pay the value of the slave by his admission? But what is his problem? Are the entire thirty a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, all the thirty are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “ ‘Your ox killed my slave’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is not liable.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he killed a slave covered with boils. He said to him, but it says afterwards, “ ‘Your ox killed my son’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is liable.” You could explain it if he was covered with boils, then he would not be liable! You cannot do this, as we have stated: “If he killed a human, he has to pay his worth.” Rebbi Ezra said before Rebbi Mana Explain it following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured. He said to him, if following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured, all is a fine
HALAKHAH: “ “You stole my ox,” etc. to the end of the Chapter. Rebbi Isaac asked, should one have to pay the value of the slave by his admission? But what is his problem? Are the entire thirty a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, all the thirty are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “ ‘Your ox killed my slave’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is not liable.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he killed a slave covered with boils. He said to him, but it says afterwards, “ ‘Your ox killed my son’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is liable.” You could explain it if he was covered with boils, then he would not be liable! You cannot do this, as we have stated: “If he killed a human, he has to pay his worth.” Rebbi Ezra said before Rebbi Mana Explain it following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured. He said to him, if following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured, all is a fine
HALAKHAH: “ “You stole my ox,” etc. to the end of the Chapter. Rebbi Isaac asked, should one have to pay the value of the slave by his admission? But what is his problem? Are the entire thirty a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, all the thirty are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “ ‘Your ox killed my slave’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is not liable.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he killed a slave covered with boils. He said to him, but it says afterwards, “ ‘Your ox killed my son’, but he says ‘he did not kill;’ ‘I am asking you to swear’ and he says ‘Amen’, he is liable.” You could explain it if he was covered with boils, then he would not be liable! You cannot do this, as we have stated: “If he killed a human, he has to pay his worth.” Rebbi Ezra said before Rebbi Mana Explain it following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured. He said to him, if following him who said, he shall pay redemption of his person; of the injured, all is a fine
Does one tell him, be in the clear with Heaven? Let us hear from the following: “It happened that Rabban Gamliel knocked out a tooth of his slave Tabi. He came to Rebbi Joshua and said to him, I found a reason to manumit my slave Tabi. He told him, you have nothing in your hand; fines only are imposed through witnesses and in court.” This implies that one does not tell him, be in the clear with Heaven. Rebbi Gamliel ben Rebbi Illai asked before Rebbi Mana, does Rabban Gamliel hold with him who says, one is permitted to manumit? He told him, in itself it says that it is forbidden to manumit, for otherwise he should have manumitted him immediately.