3738 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:53

It supports him because he says it is all praise, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, Joḥanan the High Priest sent and checked in all localities of Israel and found that they separated only Great Heave. But First and Second Tithes some were separating and some did not. He said, since [omitting] First Tithe is a deadly sin and [omitting] Second Tithe [implies] the sin of ṭevel, a person should give a name to heave and heave of the tithe and give them to the Cohen; Second Tithe he exchanges for coins. About the remaining tithe of the poor, he who has a claim on another person must bring proof.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:53

It supports him because he says it is all praise, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, Joḥanan the High Priest sent and checked in all localities of Israel and found that they separated only Great Heave. But First and Second Tithes some were separating and some did not. He said, since [omitting] First Tithe is a deadly sin and [omitting] Second Tithe [implies] the sin of ṭevel, a person should give a name to heave and heave of the tithe and give them to the Cohen; Second Tithe he exchanges for coins. About the remaining tithe of the poor, he who has a claim on another person must bring proof.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:68

It happened that Elders came together in the house Gadia in Jericho, when a disembodied voice came and said to them: There is among you one man who would be worthy that the Holy Spirit should rest on him, only the generation is not worthy. They all looked at Hillel the Elder. When he died, they said about him, o meek, pious student of Ezra. Again it happened that Elders came together in a second floor at Jabne, when a disembodied voice came and said to them: There is among you one man who would be worthy that the Holy Spirit should rest on him, only the generation is not worthy. They all looked at Samuel Minor. Why was he called Minor? Because he effaced himself. Some say, because he was slightly below Samuel from Ramah. When he died, they said about him o meek, pious student of Hillel the Elder. When he was dying he said: Simeon and Ismael to the sword, the rest of the people to plunder, immense troubles will be. He said that in Aramaic and they did not understand what he was saying. For Rebbi Jehudah ben Baba they intended to say o meek, pious, but the time was torn.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:70

“And flowing bee’s honey”. Rebbi Eleazar said, honey that comes with floaters. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said, farina which floats on the sieve kneaded with honey and butter. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second quality fruit we ate in our youth tasted better that the peaches we ate in our old age, because during his lifetime the world changed. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, one seah of Arbel grain did yield one seah of fine flour, one seah of white flour, one seah of dark flour, one seah of bran, one seah of coarse bran. But today, we do not even get one for one.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:85

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that Elders came together in the upper floor of the house Gadia in Jericho, when a disembodied voice came and said to them: There are among you two who would be worthy that the Holy Spirit should rest on them, and one of them is Hillel the Elder. They all looked at Samuel Minor. Again it happened that Elders came together in a second floor at Jabne, when a disembodied voice came and said to them: There are among you two who would be worthy that the Holy Spirit should rest on them, and one of them is Samuel Minor. They all looked at Rebbi Eliezer ben Hyrkanos and were happy that their opinion coincided with that of the Omnipresent.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:8

MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua agrees that if somebody says to another: “This field did belong to your father but I bought it from him,” that he is trustworthy since the mouth which forbade is the mouth which permits. But if there are witnesses that it did belong to [the second man’s] father and [the first] said, I bought it, he is not trustworthy.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:10

“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:10

“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:21

Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market place cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. How is that? If one identified his own signature and that of his colleague, but that second witness’s signature was not known to anybody except his colleague, may that colleague together with somebody from the market place testify on that signature? That is what Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, said in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. Another case where there are no two persons: The signature of one is known by everybody, but that second witness’s signature is not known to anybody except his colleague. Can that colleague testify on his signature as if he were someone from the market place? If you say so, the entire testimony is confirmed by one witness. Rebbi Yudan said, that is correct. If two people come from a town that is mostly Gentile, like Hippos. One is known by everybody as a Jew, but the other is not known by anybody except his companion. Can the latter be considered one from the market place to testify about him? If you say so, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness! And in the prior case, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:21

Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market place cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. How is that? If one identified his own signature and that of his colleague, but that second witness’s signature was not known to anybody except his colleague, may that colleague together with somebody from the market place testify on that signature? That is what Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, said in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. Another case where there are no two persons: The signature of one is known by everybody, but that second witness’s signature is not known to anybody except his colleague. Can that colleague testify on his signature as if he were someone from the market place? If you say so, the entire testimony is confirmed by one witness. Rebbi Yudan said, that is correct. If two people come from a town that is mostly Gentile, like Hippos. One is known by everybody as a Jew, but the other is not known by anybody except his companion. Can the latter be considered one from the market place to testify about him? If you say so, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness! And in the prior case, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:21

Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market place cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. How is that? If one identified his own signature and that of his colleague, but that second witness’s signature was not known to anybody except his colleague, may that colleague together with somebody from the market place testify on that signature? That is what Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, said in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. Another case where there are no two persons: The signature of one is known by everybody, but that second witness’s signature is not known to anybody except his colleague. Can that colleague testify on his signature as if he were someone from the market place? If you say so, the entire testimony is confirmed by one witness. Rebbi Yudan said, that is correct. If two people come from a town that is mostly Gentile, like Hippos. One is known by everybody as a Jew, but the other is not known by anybody except his companion. Can the latter be considered one from the market place to testify about him? If you say so, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness! And in the prior case, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:21

Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market place cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. How is that? If one identified his own signature and that of his colleague, but that second witness’s signature was not known to anybody except his colleague, may that colleague together with somebody from the market place testify on that signature? That is what Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, said in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. Another case where there are no two persons: The signature of one is known by everybody, but that second witness’s signature is not known to anybody except his colleague. Can that colleague testify on his signature as if he were someone from the market place? If you say so, the entire testimony is confirmed by one witness. Rebbi Yudan said, that is correct. If two people come from a town that is mostly Gentile, like Hippos. One is known by everybody as a Jew, but the other is not known by anybody except his companion. Can the latter be considered one from the market place to testify about him? If you say so, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness! And in the prior case, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:22

Rebbi Ḥaggai said that Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Can one witness testifying orally and one by a document be taken together? Is a single witness on a written document worth anything? Therefore, his question was, if there are two. They managed to confirm the first signature but not the second. Rebbi Mana asked, is one witness on a written document enough to force anybody to swear? Is a single witness on a written document worth anything? Therefore, his question was, if there are two. They managed to confirm the first signature but not the second. Parallel to it: One does not accept testimony from witnesses unless they had seen together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw one after the other. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac, in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa for witnesses about primogeniture and rights of possession.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:22

Rebbi Ḥaggai said that Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Can one witness testifying orally and one by a document be taken together? Is a single witness on a written document worth anything? Therefore, his question was, if there are two. They managed to confirm the first signature but not the second. Rebbi Mana asked, is one witness on a written document enough to force anybody to swear? Is a single witness on a written document worth anything? Therefore, his question was, if there are two. They managed to confirm the first signature but not the second. Parallel to it: One does not accept testimony from witnesses unless they had seen together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw one after the other. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac, in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa for witnesses about primogeniture and rights of possession.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:23

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who saysid it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who said it is valid? Maybe they were rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw two hairs on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid [testimony]. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of possession. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:30

Women were kidnapped and brought there. The case came before Abba bar Abba, and Samuel. They ordered and gave them over to chaperones who were to return them to the Land of Israel. He said to him: What did we do for the earlier times when they were alone with them? Abba bar Abba said to him, would you say so if they were your daughters? Samuel’s daughters were kidnapped, “like an error which comes from the ruler”. When they were brought here, their kidnappers came with them. They came before Rebbi Ḥanina and left their kidnappers outside. They said to him, we were kidnapped but we are pure. He permitted them. After they left, their kidnappers sent after them. He said, it is obvious that these are the daughters of a Sage. When they came to know who they were, they said to Simeon bar Abba, take care of your relatives. He married the first one, but she died. The second one and she died. Why? Because they lied? God forbid, they did not lie. But because of the sin of Ḥanania, Rebbi Joshua’s nephew, who intercalated the year outside the Land.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:35

MISHNAH: Rebbi Jehudah says, one does not elevate to the priesthood by the testimony of one witness. Rebbi Eleazar said, when is this? If there are protesters; but if there are no protesters, one elevates to the priesthood by the testimony of one witness. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says in the name of Rebbi Simeon, the son of the second in command, that one elevates to the priesthood by the testimony of one witness.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:35

As it was stated: “Living married to a husband,” that includes one who had received her husband in her father’s house while preliminarily married; the one who comes after him is strangled. Not only a regular intercourse but even perverse. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan; it is necessary to mention perverse intercourse for if it were regular, why mention her husband? As we have stated: If she was raped by two men, the first is stoned, the second strangled. The preliminarily married adolescent girl. If ten men came upon her perversely and then one regularly, they are all stoned. If they all come upon her regularly, the first is stoned and the remainder strangled. If ten men “touched” her and then one penetrated, they are all stoned. If they all penetrated, the first is stoned and the remainder strangled. A single girl. If ten men came upon her perversely and then one regularly, they all pay the fine. If they all come upon her regularly, the first is stoned and the remainder is free. If she chose one of them, the others were freed from the prohibition. If she said, he is impossible, she repeatedly chooses. If he was married to her sister, he already is freed. If she died, he is freed. If he died, one does not force the levir.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:42

There, we have stated: “He who comes to a preliminarily married adolescent is guilty only if she was an adolescent, virgin, preliminarily married, in her father’s house. If two came upon her, the first is stoned and the second strangled.” Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: That is Rebbi Meïr’s. But following the rabbis even if she is a minor. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? “A lad” is written in the paragraph. How do the rabbis explain “a lad”? Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Once in the paragraph it is written “a young woman”; this teaches that in the entire paragraph she is an adult. Rebbi Meïr objected to the rabbis: In the matter of the calumniator, “a lad” is written and she is an adult since a minor is not stoned! What do the rabbis with this? Rebbi Abin said, explain it if he came to her as to a male.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:11

HALAKHAH: “One gives a virgin twelve months.” It was stated: Adulthood in its time is twelve months. Rebbi Hila said, state: One gives an adult twelve months and one gives her a preliminary wedding, and thirty days to a widow. We have stated: “One gives a virgin twelve months,” and you say so? Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: After she was an adult for twelve months one gives her the preliminary marriage and afterwards thirty days. If she spent twelve months for the first and then the second one came. If he says to her, did you not wait already? She can say to him, I love you better than the young one. He is a widower, she is a virgin, and he wants to definitively marry. She can say, I love you better than a bachelor. If he is a bachelor and she a widow, and she wants to be definitively married. He can say, I love you better than a virgin. If she is underage and wants to grow up one listens to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:17

MISHNAH: If an orphan girl was married off by her mother or her brothers and they wrote her 100 or 50 zuz, after she becomes an adult she can claim from them what is appropriate to be given to her. Rebbi Jehudah says, if he married off his first daughter, the second should be given in the way the first had been given. But the Sages say, sometimes it happens that a person was poor and became rich, or was rich and became poor. But one appraises the property and gives to her

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:19

Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rav Naḥman bar Jacob and Rav Ammi bar Pappai, who is the Tanna of “a tenth of the estate”? Rebbi Ze‘ura said to him in the name of Rav Jeremiah: A tenth of the estate following Rebbi. They asked before Rebbi: If there were ten daughters. Then if the first one took a tenth of the estate, the second took a tenth of the estate, the third, the fourth, the fifth, and so on up to the tenth, there is nothing left for the son! He said to them: The first one takes a tenth of the estate and leaves; the second takes a tenth of the remainder, the third from what then is left, the fourth of what then is left, up to the tenth from what then is left. It turns out that the daughters take two thirds less a little, and the son takes one third plus a little.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:19

Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rav Naḥman bar Jacob and Rav Ammi bar Pappai, who is the Tanna of “a tenth of the estate”? Rebbi Ze‘ura said to him in the name of Rav Jeremiah: A tenth of the estate following Rebbi. They asked before Rebbi: If there were ten daughters. Then if the first one took a tenth of the estate, the second took a tenth of the estate, the third, the fourth, the fifth, and so on up to the tenth, there is nothing left for the son! He said to them: The first one takes a tenth of the estate and leaves; the second takes a tenth of the remainder, the third from what then is left, the fourth of what then is left, up to the tenth from what then is left. It turns out that the daughters take two thirds less a little, and the son takes one third plus a little.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:20

If there were two daughters and one son; the first one took a tenth of the estate, but the son died before the second could take her tenth. Rebbi Ḥanina was of the opinion that the second takes a tenth of the estate and the rest they divide equally among themselves. Rebbi Joḥanan told him that in this case there was nothing else to provide for her, but here she may sell from the remainder and provide for herself! Rebbi Tebi in the name of Rebbi Joshia: The reason of Rebbi Ḥanina: If she can collect from encumbered real estate, from what lies before her not so much more? Rebbi Joḥanan sticks to his opinion, since Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rebbi Joḥanan does not collect. Who collects? Rebbi Ḥanina [and Rebbi Hila] collect. Rebbi Yasa was appointed custodian of orphans’ property. There were orphan [girls] who asked to be provided for. He brought the case before Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim. Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim said, is it not better to provide for them from their father’s estate rather than from charity? Rebbi Eleazar said to him: If such a case came before our teachers, our teachers would not touch it; would we act? Rebbi Yose said, I shall give to them, and if some orphans get up and complain, I would give it to them. Even so, they saw and did not complain. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yose: How do you decide in practical cases? He said to him, following Rebbi Ḥanina. And so an actual case was decided following Rebbi Ḥanina. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Hila: One considers the estate as if it were dry.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:20

If there were two daughters and one son; the first one took a tenth of the estate, but the son died before the second could take her tenth. Rebbi Ḥanina was of the opinion that the second takes a tenth of the estate and the rest they divide equally among themselves. Rebbi Joḥanan told him that in this case there was nothing else to provide for her, but here she may sell from the remainder and provide for herself! Rebbi Tebi in the name of Rebbi Joshia: The reason of Rebbi Ḥanina: If she can collect from encumbered real estate, from what lies before her not so much more? Rebbi Joḥanan sticks to his opinion, since Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rebbi Joḥanan does not collect. Who collects? Rebbi Ḥanina [and Rebbi Hila] collect. Rebbi Yasa was appointed custodian of orphans’ property. There were orphan [girls] who asked to be provided for. He brought the case before Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim. Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim said, is it not better to provide for them from their father’s estate rather than from charity? Rebbi Eleazar said to him: If such a case came before our teachers, our teachers would not touch it; would we act? Rebbi Yose said, I shall give to them, and if some orphans get up and complain, I would give it to them. Even so, they saw and did not complain. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yose: How do you decide in practical cases? He said to him, following Rebbi Ḥanina. And so an actual case was decided following Rebbi Ḥanina. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Hila: One considers the estate as if it were dry.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:5

Rebbi Yose said, they differ about wives of Cohanim. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the third. And a disagreement was stated, at the end of three [months], the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana said to him, where no disagreement was stated, you introduce a disagreement. But they disagree if he is an Israel. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of three [months]. It was stated thus: At the end of three by everybody’s opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:5

Rebbi Yose said, they differ about wives of Cohanim. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the third. And a disagreement was stated, at the end of three [months], the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana said to him, where no disagreement was stated, you introduce a disagreement. But they disagree if he is an Israel. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of three [months]. It was stated thus: At the end of three by everybody’s opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:5

Rebbi Yose said, they differ about wives of Cohanim. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the third. And a disagreement was stated, at the end of three [months], the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana said to him, where no disagreement was stated, you introduce a disagreement. But they disagree if he is an Israel. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of three [months]. It was stated thus: At the end of three by everybody’s opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:5

Rebbi Yose said, they differ about wives of Cohanim. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the third. And a disagreement was stated, at the end of three [months], the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana said to him, where no disagreement was stated, you introduce a disagreement. But they disagree if he is an Israel. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of three [months]. It was stated thus: At the end of three by everybody’s opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:4

Rebbi Jehudah said, they argued before Rabban Gamliel: Because preliminarily married she is his wife and definitively married she is his wife; just as the sale by the latter is void, the sale by the former also should be void. He said to them, we are ashamed of the new ones, now you want to roll the new on over the old ones! The new ones, after the definitive marriage; the old ones before the definitive marriage, when she was married in the second ceremony.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he did not take her in. But if he took her in, nobody can lose his rights by these expressions. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is the word of Rebbi Ḥiyya: He who says that “my hands are removed from this field, my feet are removed from this field,” did not say anything. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a Mishnah imply that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions? Did we not state there: “If somebody was married to two wives when he sold a field and the first one wrote for the buyer: I have no claims on you, the second one can take it away from the buyer’s hands,” this implies, not the first one. He said to him, that text itself implies that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions, but here the second wife cannot take anything away from the first, and why can the first one not take it away from the buyer’s hands? For she writes to him: For any complaint I shall have regarding this field, I shall have nothing against you.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he did not take her in. But if he took her in, nobody can lose his rights by these expressions. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is the word of Rebbi Ḥiyya: He who says that “my hands are removed from this field, my feet are removed from this field,” did not say anything. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a Mishnah imply that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions? Did we not state there: “If somebody was married to two wives when he sold a field and the first one wrote for the buyer: I have no claims on you, the second one can take it away from the buyer’s hands,” this implies, not the first one. He said to him, that text itself implies that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions, but here the second wife cannot take anything away from the first, and why can the first one not take it away from the buyer’s hands? For she writes to him: For any complaint I shall have regarding this field, I shall have nothing against you.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:12

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:12

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:12

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:12

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:12

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:12

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:41

HALAKHAH: “From encumbered property, how is that?” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody disputes a court document, he is not trustworthy. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him: Is that not the Mishnah? “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah”! Rebbi Joḥanan said to him: Babylonian, after I removed the clay from the pearl, you say to me: Is that not the Mishnah? Rav said, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she produces she collects. He changed his mind and said, she collects even at a place where one writes a ketubah; let anyone powerful object to this! Rebbi Yose objected: Was it not stated: She might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, and collect a second time? If those died. Are there not witnesses? Bring them! They went overseas. Is there not an agreement? Is there no registrar of agreements? There is a registrar of agreements; as you say, if a document is lost, one writes a replacement. This is what one says, if the ketubah was lost, one writes a new one. Rebbi Abba objected: Was it not stated, she might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, wait until he dies, and collect a second time? Rebbi Yose bar Abun said to him: Would she not have to prove that she lived with him until he died?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:41

HALAKHAH: “From encumbered property, how is that?” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody disputes a court document, he is not trustworthy. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him: Is that not the Mishnah? “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah”! Rebbi Joḥanan said to him: Babylonian, after I removed the clay from the pearl, you say to me: Is that not the Mishnah? Rav said, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she produces she collects. He changed his mind and said, she collects even at a place where one writes a ketubah; let anyone powerful object to this! Rebbi Yose objected: Was it not stated: She might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, and collect a second time? If those died. Are there not witnesses? Bring them! They went overseas. Is there not an agreement? Is there no registrar of agreements? There is a registrar of agreements; as you say, if a document is lost, one writes a replacement. This is what one says, if the ketubah was lost, one writes a new one. Rebbi Abba objected: Was it not stated, she might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, wait until he dies, and collect a second time? Rebbi Yose bar Abun said to him: Would she not have to prove that she lived with him until he died?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:45

HALAKHAH: “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah,” etc. “Two bills of divorce and two ketubot” etc. But only if the bill of divorce is dated between the two ketubot. So far if they are equal. If one was for a mina, the other for 200 [zuz]? Rav Huna and Rav Jeremiah and Rav Ḥisda. One said, she collects the first one. The other said, she collects the second one and the excess she collects from the date of the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:45

HALAKHAH: “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah,” etc. “Two bills of divorce and two ketubot” etc. But only if the bill of divorce is dated between the two ketubot. So far if they are equal. If one was for a mina, the other for 200 [zuz]? Rav Huna and Rav Jeremiah and Rav Ḥisda. One said, she collects the first one. The other said, she collects the second one and the excess she collects from the date of the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:1

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to two women when he died, the first one precedes the second, and the heirs of the first precede the heirs of the second. If the first one he had married died, then he married the second one and he himself died, the second and her heirs precede the heirs of the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:1

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to two women when he died, the first one precedes the second, and the heirs of the first precede the heirs of the second. If the first one he had married died, then he married the second one and he himself died, the second and her heirs precede the heirs of the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:1

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to two women when he died, the first one precedes the second, and the heirs of the first precede the heirs of the second. If the first one he had married died, then he married the second one and he himself died, the second and her heirs precede the heirs of the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:1

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to two women when he died, the first one precedes the second, and the heirs of the first precede the heirs of the second. If the first one he had married died, then he married the second one and he himself died, the second and her heirs precede the heirs of the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:3

It says only, “she died”. Therefore, if she was divorced, her status is that of a creditor. As it was stated: “He married a woman and wrote her a ketubah. He divorced her but did not pay the ketubah. He married another woman and wrote her a ketubah. He took back the first one and wrote her a ketubah in addition to the first ketubah. The [second ketubah] of the first [wife] has precedence over that of the second [wife] and her heirs, and the second [wife] and her heirs have precedence over the heirs of the first.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:3

It says only, “she died”. Therefore, if she was divorced, her status is that of a creditor. As it was stated: “He married a woman and wrote her a ketubah. He divorced her but did not pay the ketubah. He married another woman and wrote her a ketubah. He took back the first one and wrote her a ketubah in addition to the first ketubah. The [second ketubah] of the first [wife] has precedence over that of the second [wife] and her heirs, and the second [wife] and her heirs have precedence over the heirs of the first.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:3

It says only, “she died”. Therefore, if she was divorced, her status is that of a creditor. As it was stated: “He married a woman and wrote her a ketubah. He divorced her but did not pay the ketubah. He married another woman and wrote her a ketubah. He took back the first one and wrote her a ketubah in addition to the first ketubah. The [second ketubah] of the first [wife] has precedence over that of the second [wife] and her heirs, and the second [wife] and her heirs have precedence over the heirs of the first.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:4

Ben Azay says, the heirs of the first say to the heirs of the second: If you are creditors, take what is yours and leave; otherwise let us split evenly between yourselves and us. Rebbi Aqiba said to him: Biblical inheritance “jumped” on the sons of the second; they take their mother’s ketubah and come back to split. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree if there is an excess denar. But if there is no excess denar, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree with Ben Nanas that both parties split evenly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to him, a situation which was stated without disagreement you turn into a disagreement. They must disagree if there is no excess denar. But if there is an excess denar even Ben Nanas agrees with Rebbi Aqiba that biblical inheritance “jumped” on the sons of the second; they take their mother’s ketubah and come back to split.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:4

Ben Azay says, the heirs of the first say to the heirs of the second: If you are creditors, take what is yours and leave; otherwise let us split evenly between yourselves and us. Rebbi Aqiba said to him: Biblical inheritance “jumped” on the sons of the second; they take their mother’s ketubah and come back to split. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree if there is an excess denar. But if there is no excess denar, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree with Ben Nanas that both parties split evenly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to him, a situation which was stated without disagreement you turn into a disagreement. They must disagree if there is no excess denar. But if there is an excess denar even Ben Nanas agrees with Rebbi Aqiba that biblical inheritance “jumped” on the sons of the second; they take their mother’s ketubah and come back to split.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:4

Ben Azay says, the heirs of the first say to the heirs of the second: If you are creditors, take what is yours and leave; otherwise let us split evenly between yourselves and us. Rebbi Aqiba said to him: Biblical inheritance “jumped” on the sons of the second; they take their mother’s ketubah and come back to split. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree if there is an excess denar. But if there is no excess denar, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree with Ben Nanas that both parties split evenly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to him, a situation which was stated without disagreement you turn into a disagreement. They must disagree if there is no excess denar. But if there is an excess denar even Ben Nanas agrees with Rebbi Aqiba that biblical inheritance “jumped” on the sons of the second; they take their mother’s ketubah and come back to split.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:15

Samuel said, if they empower one another. If the third empowered the second to deal with the first. She said to her, is not a mina due to you? Take 50 and leave!

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:17

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to four women when he died, the first one precedes the second, the second the third, and the third the fourth. The first one swears to the second, the second to the third, and the third to the fourth; the fourth is paid out without an oath. Ben Nanas said, should she be preferred because she is the last one? She also should be paid only after an oath. If all [ketubot] were executed on the same day, one who precedes another one even if only by an hour has acquired [precedence]; therefore in Jerusalem one used to note hours. If [the documents] were all executed at the same hour and there is only one mina, they split evenly.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:17

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to four women when he died, the first one precedes the second, the second the third, and the third the fourth. The first one swears to the second, the second to the third, and the third to the fourth; the fourth is paid out without an oath. Ben Nanas said, should she be preferred because she is the last one? She also should be paid only after an oath. If all [ketubot] were executed on the same day, one who precedes another one even if only by an hour has acquired [precedence]; therefore in Jerusalem one used to note hours. If [the documents] were all executed at the same hour and there is only one mina, they split evenly.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:17

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to four women when he died, the first one precedes the second, the second the third, and the third the fourth. The first one swears to the second, the second to the third, and the third to the fourth; the fourth is paid out without an oath. Ben Nanas said, should she be preferred because she is the last one? She also should be paid only after an oath. If all [ketubot] were executed on the same day, one who precedes another one even if only by an hour has acquired [precedence]; therefore in Jerusalem one used to note hours. If [the documents] were all executed at the same hour and there is only one mina, they split evenly.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:17

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to four women when he died, the first one precedes the second, the second the third, and the third the fourth. The first one swears to the second, the second to the third, and the third to the fourth; the fourth is paid out without an oath. Ben Nanas said, should she be preferred because she is the last one? She also should be paid only after an oath. If all [ketubot] were executed on the same day, one who precedes another one even if only by an hour has acquired [precedence]; therefore in Jerusalem one used to note hours. If [the documents] were all executed at the same hour and there is only one mina, they split evenly.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:20

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to two wives when he sold his field and the first wife wrote to the buyers “I have no claims against you”, the second takes from the buyer, the first from the second, and the buyer from the first; they go on in circles until they compromise between them. The same holds for a creditor and a woman who is a creditor.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:20

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to two wives when he sold his field and the first wife wrote to the buyers “I have no claims against you”, the second takes from the buyer, the first from the second, and the buyer from the first; they go on in circles until they compromise between them. The same holds for a creditor and a woman who is a creditor.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:21

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two wives,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody borrowed from two persons and the second comes and says to him, get up and let us settle, and [the borrower] says, will not in the end the first hear of it and come to foreclose, he [the second lender] may say let us settle, and if he forecloses, he forecloses. If he settled, one may assume that the first will come and foreclose. If he settled with the first, Rebbi Phineas said, such a case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who said, he settled. Rebbi Yose said, did he not write “what I shall acquire”? It happens only with an heir. Rebbi Ḥanina said, even with a creditor it can happen if he did not write “anything I shall acquire”, or if he said, “you shall not be paid except from this.” Rav Mattaniah said, this follows him who said, for ketubah but not for stipulations. But for him who said, for ketubah and for stipulations, does it not return?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:21

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two wives,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody borrowed from two persons and the second comes and says to him, get up and let us settle, and [the borrower] says, will not in the end the first hear of it and come to foreclose, he [the second lender] may say let us settle, and if he forecloses, he forecloses. If he settled, one may assume that the first will come and foreclose. If he settled with the first, Rebbi Phineas said, such a case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who said, he settled. Rebbi Yose said, did he not write “what I shall acquire”? It happens only with an heir. Rebbi Ḥanina said, even with a creditor it can happen if he did not write “anything I shall acquire”, or if he said, “you shall not be paid except from this.” Rav Mattaniah said, this follows him who said, for ketubah but not for stipulations. But for him who said, for ketubah and for stipulations, does it not return?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:17

MISHNAH: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid unless there would have been left a field [for sowing] nine qab, and in a garden half a qab, or following the words of Rebbi Aqiba, a fourth. If her ketubah was 400 zuz and she sold to one person worth 100, to a second 100, to a third 100, and to the last the value of a mina and a denar for a mina, the last transaction is invalid but all others are valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:27

MISHNAH: If somebody protests about a field when he himself had signed as a witness, Admon says: “The second one fits me, the first one was harder”; but the Sages say, he lost his right [of appeal]. If he made [the field] a marker for another, he lost his right.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:10

HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:7

HALAKHAH: “If anyone from outside was,” etc. And we did not state “one forces”! Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “If he was a frequent maker of vows, one forces him,” because the other [partner] can say to him, one came to me and you did such and such to him; a second person and you did such and such to him; the third time he tells him either you undo your vow or sell your part.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:12

HALAKHAH: “ “I am ḥerem for you”, etc. ‘A qônām that I shall not have any usufruct from you and anyone I would ask about you’, he has to ask about the first but not the second. Some Tannaïm state: He has to ask both about the first and the second. Samuel the son of Rebbi Joseph ben Rebbi Abun said, that follows the one who said “after the prohibition”. But for the one who said “after the vow”, a vow which is partially invalid is totally invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:12

HALAKHAH: “ “I am ḥerem for you”, etc. ‘A qônām that I shall not have any usufruct from you and anyone I would ask about you’, he has to ask about the first but not the second. Some Tannaïm state: He has to ask both about the first and the second. Samuel the son of Rebbi Joseph ben Rebbi Abun said, that follows the one who said “after the prohibition”. But for the one who said “after the vow”, a vow which is partially invalid is totally invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:17

“This is the rule Rebbi Simeon declared in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For everything that may become permitted through some action, such as ṭevel, Second Tithe, donations to the Temple, and “new grain”, the Sages did not fix any limits, but a kind with its own is forbidden in the minutest amount, a kind with a different kind if it can be tasted. But for everything that cannot become permitted through any action, such as heave, ḥallah, orlah, and kilaim in a vineyard, the Sages did fix as limit both a kind with itself or with a different kind if it can be tasted.” How do you treat vows? As referring to something that can become permitted or to something that cannot become permitted? It seems reasonable that we treat them as referring to things that can become permitted, as we have stated there “for the Elder uproots the vow from the start.” They said, he only uproots for the future. Certainly a Mishnah treats it as referring to something that cannot become permitted, as we have stated there: “The growth from heave is heave; the growth from their growth is profane. But the growths from ṭevel, First Tithe, aftergrowth of the Sabbatical, heaves from outside the Land, dema‘, and First Fruits are profane as are growths from their growths. Growths from dedicated [seeds] and Second Tithe become profane; one redeems them corresponding to the time of sowing.” We have stated on this: When has this been said? Anything whose seeds disappear. But in produce whose seeds do not disappear, the growth from their growth is forbidden. There is a restriction on growth, as Rebbi Zeïra said in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: An onion of kilaim in a vineyard, taken out of the ground and replanted, stays forbidden even if it grows enormously because growth of something forbidden cannot neutralize the prohibition. But another Mishnah treats it as something that can become permitted, as we have stated there: “For if somebody vowed not to have a certain thing and it became mixed with something else, if it can be tasted it is forbidden.” This explains that it was mixed with another kind, following the rules of something that can become permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:17

“This is the rule Rebbi Simeon declared in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For everything that may become permitted through some action, such as ṭevel, Second Tithe, donations to the Temple, and “new grain”, the Sages did not fix any limits, but a kind with its own is forbidden in the minutest amount, a kind with a different kind if it can be tasted. But for everything that cannot become permitted through any action, such as heave, ḥallah, orlah, and kilaim in a vineyard, the Sages did fix as limit both a kind with itself or with a different kind if it can be tasted.” How do you treat vows? As referring to something that can become permitted or to something that cannot become permitted? It seems reasonable that we treat them as referring to things that can become permitted, as we have stated there “for the Elder uproots the vow from the start.” They said, he only uproots for the future. Certainly a Mishnah treats it as referring to something that cannot become permitted, as we have stated there: “The growth from heave is heave; the growth from their growth is profane. But the growths from ṭevel, First Tithe, aftergrowth of the Sabbatical, heaves from outside the Land, dema‘, and First Fruits are profane as are growths from their growths. Growths from dedicated [seeds] and Second Tithe become profane; one redeems them corresponding to the time of sowing.” We have stated on this: When has this been said? Anything whose seeds disappear. But in produce whose seeds do not disappear, the growth from their growth is forbidden. There is a restriction on growth, as Rebbi Zeïra said in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: An onion of kilaim in a vineyard, taken out of the ground and replanted, stays forbidden even if it grows enormously because growth of something forbidden cannot neutralize the prohibition. But another Mishnah treats it as something that can become permitted, as we have stated there: “For if somebody vowed not to have a certain thing and it became mixed with something else, if it can be tasted it is forbidden.” This explains that it was mixed with another kind, following the rules of something that can become permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:29

It was stated: “One does not intercalate for a year because of impurity; Rebbi Jehudah says, one does, since we find that Hezekia intercalated because of impurity, as it was said: ‘For most of the people, etc.’ Rebbi Simeon said, even though they intercalated in Nisan, only Adar was intercalated. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah said in the name of Rebbi Simeon, Hezekia forced the multitude to celebrate the Second Passover.” Some Tannaïm state: One intercalates for the year because of impurity. Some Tannaïm state: One does not intercalate. He who says, one does not intercalate, from the following: “For they ate the pesaḥ not as it was written.” How does the one who says one does intercalate, explain “for they ate the pesaḥ”? They intercalated in Nisan but only Adar was intercalated. This follows what Rebbi Simon bar Zavdi said, they found the skull of Oman the Jebusite under the altar.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:33

“When they sanctified the year at Usha, on the first day Rebbi Ismael, the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Baroqa, led and recited following the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, we did not follow this at Jabneh. On the second day, Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Yose the Galilean led and recited following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, this we did follow at Jabneh.” But does this not mean that they sanctified it on the first and the second day? Rebbi Zeїra in the name of Rav Ḥisda: That year was disorganized. What is “the first, the second”? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: The first year, the second year! But was it not stated: the first day, the second day?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:33

“When they sanctified the year at Usha, on the first day Rebbi Ismael, the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Baroqa, led and recited following the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, we did not follow this at Jabneh. On the second day, Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Yose the Galilean led and recited following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, this we did follow at Jabneh.” But does this not mean that they sanctified it on the first and the second day? Rebbi Zeїra in the name of Rav Ḥisda: That year was disorganized. What is “the first, the second”? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: The first year, the second year! But was it not stated: the first day, the second day?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:33

“When they sanctified the year at Usha, on the first day Rebbi Ismael, the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Baroqa, led and recited following the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, we did not follow this at Jabneh. On the second day, Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Yose the Galilean led and recited following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, this we did follow at Jabneh.” But does this not mean that they sanctified it on the first and the second day? Rebbi Zeїra in the name of Rav Ḥisda: That year was disorganized. What is “the first, the second”? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: The first year, the second year! But was it not stated: the first day, the second day?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:33

“When they sanctified the year at Usha, on the first day Rebbi Ismael, the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Baroqa, led and recited following the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, we did not follow this at Jabneh. On the second day, Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Yose the Galilean led and recited following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, this we did follow at Jabneh.” But does this not mean that they sanctified it on the first and the second day? Rebbi Zeїra in the name of Rav Ḥisda: That year was disorganized. What is “the first, the second”? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: The first year, the second year! But was it not stated: the first day, the second day?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:33

“When they sanctified the year at Usha, on the first day Rebbi Ismael, the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Baroqa, led and recited following the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, we did not follow this at Jabneh. On the second day, Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Yose the Galilean led and recited following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, this we did follow at Jabneh.” But does this not mean that they sanctified it on the first and the second day? Rebbi Zeїra in the name of Rav Ḥisda: That year was disorganized. What is “the first, the second”? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: The first year, the second year! But was it not stated: the first day, the second day?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:36

Jeremiah intercalated outside the Land. Ezechiel intercalated outside the Land. Baruch intercalated outside the Land. Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua intercalated outside the Land. Rebbi sent him three letters through Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Nathan. In one he wrote, to His holiness Ḥanania. And in one he wrote, the kid goats you left behind became rams. And in one he wrote, if you do not accept, go to the thistle desert, do slaughter and let Onias sprinkle. After the first [letter], he honored them. After the second, he honored them. After the third, he wanted to disgrace them. They said to him, you cannot do that since you already did honor us. Rebbi Isaac rose and quoted, it is written in the Torah: These are the holidays of Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. They said to him, “the holdays of the Eternal”. He said to them, that is with us. Rebbi Nathan rose and finished: “For from Babylonia will go Torah forth and the Eternal’s word from Nahar-Peqod.” They said to him, “for from Zion will Torah go forth and the Eternal’s word from Jerusalem”. He said to them, that is with us. He went to complain about them to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis. He said to him, follow them, follow them. He said to him, I do not know whom I left there. Who would tell me that they are wise to the computations as I am? If he had said, they are not wise, they should listen to him. Since they are wise to the computations as he is, he has to listen to them. He got up and rode on a horse. Where he reached, he reached. Where he did not reach, they continued following the corrupt [calendar].

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 7:21

MISHNAH: ‘These fruits shall be qônām for me, a qônām they shall be for my mouth’, he is forbidden what is exchanged for them or what grows from them. ‘That I shall not eat, that I shall not taste,’ he is permitted what is exchanged for them, or what grows from them if the seed disappears. But if the seed does not disappear, even second generation growth is forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 7:23

MISHNAH: If one says to his wife, a qônām shall be anything you work for, a qônām shall it be for my mouth, a qônām shall it be to my mouth; he is forbidden what is exchanged for it or what grows from it. ‘That I shall not eat, that I shall not taste,’ he is permitted what is exchanged for them, or what grows from them if the seed disappears. But if the seed does not disappear, even second generation growth is forbidden. ‘What you prepare I would eat until Passover, what you make I would wear until Passover,’ if she made before Passover, he may eat or wear after Passover.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 8:16

MISHNAH: ‘Until the rains, until there be rain,’ until the second rainy spell; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, until the time of the second rainy spell. ‘Until the rains stop’, until the end of the Month of Nisan, the words of Rebbi Meїr; Rebbi Jehudah says, until after Passover.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 8:16

MISHNAH: ‘Until the rains, until there be rain,’ until the second rainy spell; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, until the time of the second rainy spell. ‘Until the rains stop’, until the end of the Month of Nisan, the words of Rebbi Meїr; Rebbi Jehudah says, until after Passover.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 8:18

It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, anything depending on the fertilizing rain, until the second fertilizing rain comes. And anything not depending on the fertilizing rain, until the time of the second fertilizing rain. It was stated: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if rain came down for seven days without interruption, that includes the second fertilizing rain.” Why is it called fertilizing? Because it fertilizes the land.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 8:18

It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, anything depending on the fertilizing rain, until the second fertilizing rain comes. And anything not depending on the fertilizing rain, until the time of the second fertilizing rain. It was stated: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if rain came down for seven days without interruption, that includes the second fertilizing rain.” Why is it called fertilizing? Because it fertilizes the land.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 8:18

It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, anything depending on the fertilizing rain, until the second fertilizing rain comes. And anything not depending on the fertilizing rain, until the time of the second fertilizing rain. It was stated: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if rain came down for seven days without interruption, that includes the second fertilizing rain.” Why is it called fertilizing? Because it fertilizes the land.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 8:22

Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: That is only if he vowed before they intercalated. But if they intercalated and then he vowed, that is not so. Is it no different for rent of houses? If one said, the First Adar, and the other one says, the Second Adar, they should split the intercalary month. Come and see, for vows you have no problem but for money matters you have a problem? Rebbi Hila said, that is, if they intercalated and after that he leased. But if he leased and after that they intercalated, that is not so. And in matters of documents one writes First Adar, Second Adar, only that for Second Adar one writes תניין. Rebbi Jehudah says, for Second Adar one writes ת̇ and that is enough.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 8:22

Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: That is only if he vowed before they intercalated. But if they intercalated and then he vowed, that is not so. Is it no different for rent of houses? If one said, the First Adar, and the other one says, the Second Adar, they should split the intercalary month. Come and see, for vows you have no problem but for money matters you have a problem? Rebbi Hila said, that is, if they intercalated and after that he leased. But if he leased and after that they intercalated, that is not so. And in matters of documents one writes First Adar, Second Adar, only that for Second Adar one writes תניין. Rebbi Jehudah says, for Second Adar one writes ת̇ and that is enough.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 8:22

Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: That is only if he vowed before they intercalated. But if they intercalated and then he vowed, that is not so. Is it no different for rent of houses? If one said, the First Adar, and the other one says, the Second Adar, they should split the intercalary month. Come and see, for vows you have no problem but for money matters you have a problem? Rebbi Hila said, that is, if they intercalated and after that he leased. But if he leased and after that they intercalated, that is not so. And in matters of documents one writes First Adar, Second Adar, only that for Second Adar one writes תניין. Rebbi Jehudah says, for Second Adar one writes ת̇ and that is enough.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 8:22

Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: That is only if he vowed before they intercalated. But if they intercalated and then he vowed, that is not so. Is it no different for rent of houses? If one said, the First Adar, and the other one says, the Second Adar, they should split the intercalary month. Come and see, for vows you have no problem but for money matters you have a problem? Rebbi Hila said, that is, if they intercalated and after that he leased. But if he leased and after that they intercalated, that is not so. And in matters of documents one writes First Adar, Second Adar, only that for Second Adar one writes תניין. Rebbi Jehudah says, for Second Adar one writes ת̇ and that is enough.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:6

Rebbi Joḥanan provided an opening by having second thoughts: “If it were not for that, would he have come?” Are second thoughts not something new? Rebbi Hila said, second thoughts are a common occurrence. In this kind, Rebbi Simeon did not find an opening for his own vow until one of the Galilean Elders came; some say, that one was Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. He took him from here and put him there; he took him from here and put him there, until finally he put him into the sun and told him to check his garments for fleas. They said to him, if you had known that this old man would treat you in such a way, would you have made the vow? He said, No. He permitted him. They asked, from where do you have this? He said to them, I was Meïr’s servant both times when he fled, but some say, Rebbi Meïr’s walking stick was in my hand and it teaches me knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:6

Rebbi Joḥanan provided an opening by having second thoughts: “If it were not for that, would he have come?” Are second thoughts not something new? Rebbi Hila said, second thoughts are a common occurrence. In this kind, Rebbi Simeon did not find an opening for his own vow until one of the Galilean Elders came; some say, that one was Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. He took him from here and put him there; he took him from here and put him there, until finally he put him into the sun and told him to check his garments for fleas. They said to him, if you had known that this old man would treat you in such a way, would you have made the vow? He said, No. He permitted him. They asked, from where do you have this? He said to them, I was Meïr’s servant both times when he fled, but some say, Rebbi Meïr’s walking stick was in my hand and it teaches me knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 9:6

Rebbi Joḥanan provided an opening by having second thoughts: “If it were not for that, would he have come?” Are second thoughts not something new? Rebbi Hila said, second thoughts are a common occurrence. In this kind, Rebbi Simeon did not find an opening for his own vow until one of the Galilean Elders came; some say, that one was Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. He took him from here and put him there; he took him from here and put him there, until finally he put him into the sun and told him to check his garments for fleas. They said to him, if you had known that this old man would treat you in such a way, would you have made the vow? He said, No. He permitted him. They asked, from where do you have this? He said to them, I was Meïr’s servant both times when he fled, but some say, Rebbi Meïr’s walking stick was in my hand and it teaches me knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:22

MISHNAH: If his wife made a vow and he was under the impression that it was his daughter, or his daughter made a vow and he was under this impression that it was his wife. If she vowed to be a nazir and he was under the impression that she vowed a sacrifice, or if she vowed a sacrifice and he was under the impression that she vowed to be a nazir. If she woved to abstain from figs and he was under the impression that it was from grapes, or if from grapes and he was under the impression that it was from figs, he shall dissolve a second time.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:18

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:18

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:33

If he was born on the eightieth day, he eliminates ten. If he was born on the ninetieth day, he eliminates twenty. If he finished his nezirut and came to complete his son’s nezirut and became impure within the first ten days, he eliminates everything. Within the last twenty days? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rab and Rebbi Joḥanan both say, he eliminates thirty. Rebbi Samuel said, he eliminates seven only. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Joḥanan think that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical with substantial eliminating? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if Rebbi Joḥanan thought that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical to substantial eliminating, why would he say that he eliminates thirty? Should he not invalidate everything? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Explain it if he was born on a day unsuitable to bring a sacrifice. Think of it, if he was born in the night, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the night caused it. Think of it, if he was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave when [the son] was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave before his son was born, he celebrates one shaving for both. If he had dedicated his sacrifices but did not manage to shave before his son was born. There, they say that he celebrates one shaving for both. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shaves and then shaves a second time. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “They asked Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai: Assume that he was both a nazir and a sufferer from scale disease, may he shave once and have it counted for his nezirut and his scale disease? He said to them: If he shaved to remove hair, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves to remove hair whereas the sufferer from scale disease shaves to have hair grow. They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave to remove hair. (They said to him. If both of them shaved before the sprinkling of the blood, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before the sprinkling of the blood and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after the sprinkling of the blood! They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave before the sprinkling of the blood!) He said to them, if both shaved before they immerse themselves in water, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before he immerses himself in water and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after he immerses himself in water. They said to him, the matter is settled. It cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, it cannot be counted for the days of his count. It cannot be counted for purification; it cannot be counted for impurity. That is, if he was a nazir and sufferer from scale disease. But if he was a nazir and nazir, he may shave once for both.” What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? He explains that they disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.