11411 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:21

MISHNAH: If he wrote in the name of an inappropriate government, in the name of the government of Media or the government of Greece, from the construction of the Temple or the destruction of the Temple; if he was in the West and wrote “in the East” or in the East and wrote “in the West”, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥaliṣah but not levirate. If he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her. Referring to all the close relatives about whom they said that their co-wives are permitted, if any of the co-wives went and married otherwise but the relatives turned out to be she-rams, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the aforementioned consequences apply to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:21

MISHNAH: If he wrote in the name of an inappropriate government, in the name of the government of Media or the government of Greece, from the construction of the Temple or the destruction of the Temple; if he was in the West and wrote “in the East” or in the East and wrote “in the West”, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥaliṣah but not levirate. If he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her. Referring to all the close relatives about whom they said that their co-wives are permitted, if any of the co-wives went and married otherwise but the relatives turned out to be she-rams, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the aforementioned consequences apply to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:21

MISHNAH: If he wrote in the name of an inappropriate government, in the name of the government of Media or the government of Greece, from the construction of the Temple or the destruction of the Temple; if he was in the West and wrote “in the East” or in the East and wrote “in the West”, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥaliṣah but not levirate. If he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her. Referring to all the close relatives about whom they said that their co-wives are permitted, if any of the co-wives went and married otherwise but the relatives turned out to be she-rams, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the aforementioned consequences apply to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:21

MISHNAH: If he wrote in the name of an inappropriate government, in the name of the government of Media or the government of Greece, from the construction of the Temple or the destruction of the Temple; if he was in the West and wrote “in the East” or in the East and wrote “in the West”, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥaliṣah but not levirate. If he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her. Referring to all the close relatives about whom they said that their co-wives are permitted, if any of the co-wives went and married otherwise but the relatives turned out to be she-rams, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the aforementioned consequences apply to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:21

MISHNAH: If he wrote in the name of an inappropriate government, in the name of the government of Media or the government of Greece, from the construction of the Temple or the destruction of the Temple; if he was in the West and wrote “in the East” or in the East and wrote “in the West”, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥaliṣah but not levirate. If he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her. Referring to all the close relatives about whom they said that their co-wives are permitted, if any of the co-wives went and married otherwise but the relatives turned out to be she-rams, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the aforementioned consequences apply to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:21

MISHNAH: If he wrote in the name of an inappropriate government, in the name of the government of Media or the government of Greece, from the construction of the Temple or the destruction of the Temple; if he was in the West and wrote “in the East” or in the East and wrote “in the West”, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥaliṣah but not levirate. If he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her. Referring to all the close relatives about whom they said that their co-wives are permitted, if any of the co-wives went and married otherwise but the relatives turned out to be she-rams, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the aforementioned consequences apply to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:23

MISHNAH: If somebody married his sister-in-law while her co-wife went and married somebody else, if the sister-in-law turns out to be a she-ram, the co-wife shall be divorced from both of them and all the aforementioned consequences apply to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:24

HALAKHAH: “If somebody married his sister-in-law,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” Therefore she must leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:24

HALAKHAH: “If somebody married his sister-in-law,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” Therefore she must leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:24

HALAKHAH: “If somebody married his sister-in-law,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” Therefore she must leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:24

HALAKHAH: “If somebody married his sister-in-law,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” Therefore she must leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:25

MISHNAH: If the scribe wrote and then in error handed the bill of divorce to the woman and the receipt to the man and they exchanged them, then later the bill of divorce is found with the man and the receipt with the woman, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her. Rebbi Eliezer says: If it was found out immediately, this is no bill of divorce. If it was found out later, it is a bill of divorce since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:27

“Rebbi Eleazar says: If it was found out immediately, this is no bill of divorce. If it was found out later, it is a bill of divorce since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.” What is immediately? Rebbi Ze‘ira says, before she was preliminarily married, or when she was preliminarily married. Rebbi Isaac ben Ḥaqula said, before she was definitively married, or when she was definitively married. The Mishnah supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “Since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:27

“Rebbi Eleazar says: If it was found out immediately, this is no bill of divorce. If it was found out later, it is a bill of divorce since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.” What is immediately? Rebbi Ze‘ira says, before she was preliminarily married, or when she was preliminarily married. Rebbi Isaac ben Ḥaqula said, before she was definitively married, or when she was definitively married. The Mishnah supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “Since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:27

“Rebbi Eleazar says: If it was found out immediately, this is no bill of divorce. If it was found out later, it is a bill of divorce since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.” What is immediately? Rebbi Ze‘ira says, before she was preliminarily married, or when she was preliminarily married. Rebbi Isaac ben Ḥaqula said, before she was definitively married, or when she was definitively married. The Mishnah supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “Since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:27

“Rebbi Eleazar says: If it was found out immediately, this is no bill of divorce. If it was found out later, it is a bill of divorce since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.” What is immediately? Rebbi Ze‘ira says, before she was preliminarily married, or when she was preliminarily married. Rebbi Isaac ben Ḥaqula said, before she was definitively married, or when she was definitively married. The Mishnah supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “Since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:31

MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him in a hostelry, the House of Shammai say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him, but the House of Hillel say that she needs a second bill of divorce from him. When? If she was divorced after definitive marriage. But they agree that if she was divorced after preliminary marriage, she does not need a second bill of divorce from him since he was not intimate with her. If somebody married her based on a bald bill of divorce, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:31

MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him in a hostelry, the House of Shammai say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him, but the House of Hillel say that she needs a second bill of divorce from him. When? If she was divorced after definitive marriage. But they agree that if she was divorced after preliminary marriage, she does not need a second bill of divorce from him since he was not intimate with her. If somebody married her based on a bald bill of divorce, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:31

MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him in a hostelry, the House of Shammai say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him, but the House of Hillel say that she needs a second bill of divorce from him. When? If she was divorced after definitive marriage. But they agree that if she was divorced after preliminary marriage, she does not need a second bill of divorce from him since he was not intimate with her. If somebody married her based on a bald bill of divorce, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:31

MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him in a hostelry, the House of Shammai say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him, but the House of Hillel say that she needs a second bill of divorce from him. When? If she was divorced after definitive marriage. But they agree that if she was divorced after preliminary marriage, she does not need a second bill of divorce from him since he was not intimate with her. If somebody married her based on a bald bill of divorce, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:31

MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him in a hostelry, the House of Shammai say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him, but the House of Hillel say that she needs a second bill of divorce from him. When? If she was divorced after definitive marriage. But they agree that if she was divorced after preliminary marriage, she does not need a second bill of divorce from him since he was not intimate with her. If somebody married her based on a bald bill of divorce, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:31

MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him in a hostelry, the House of Shammai say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him, but the House of Hillel say that she needs a second bill of divorce from him. When? If she was divorced after definitive marriage. But they agree that if she was divorced after preliminary marriage, she does not need a second bill of divorce from him since he was not intimate with her. If somebody married her based on a bald bill of divorce, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:31

MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him in a hostelry, the House of Shammai say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him, but the House of Hillel say that she needs a second bill of divorce from him. When? If she was divorced after definitive marriage. But they agree that if she was divorced after preliminary marriage, she does not need a second bill of divorce from him since he was not intimate with her. If somebody married her based on a bald bill of divorce, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:32

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man may send away his wife with an old bill of divorce,” they say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man shall not divorce his wife unless he found in her a matter of immorality,” thy say that she is dirty in his eyes and he is not suspected of having relations with her, therefore she does not need a second bill of divorce from him.. Since the House of Hillel say, “even if she spoiled his food”, they say that she is not dirty in his eyes, he is suspected of having relations with her, and she needs a second bill of divorce from him’.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:32

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man may send away his wife with an old bill of divorce,” they say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man shall not divorce his wife unless he found in her a matter of immorality,” thy say that she is dirty in his eyes and he is not suspected of having relations with her, therefore she does not need a second bill of divorce from him.. Since the House of Hillel say, “even if she spoiled his food”, they say that she is not dirty in his eyes, he is suspected of having relations with her, and she needs a second bill of divorce from him’.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:32

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man may send away his wife with an old bill of divorce,” they say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man shall not divorce his wife unless he found in her a matter of immorality,” thy say that she is dirty in his eyes and he is not suspected of having relations with her, therefore she does not need a second bill of divorce from him.. Since the House of Hillel say, “even if she spoiled his food”, they say that she is not dirty in his eyes, he is suspected of having relations with her, and she needs a second bill of divorce from him’.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:32

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man may send away his wife with an old bill of divorce,” they say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man shall not divorce his wife unless he found in her a matter of immorality,” thy say that she is dirty in his eyes and he is not suspected of having relations with her, therefore she does not need a second bill of divorce from him.. Since the House of Hillel say, “even if she spoiled his food”, they say that she is not dirty in his eyes, he is suspected of having relations with her, and she needs a second bill of divorce from him’.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:32

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man may send away his wife with an old bill of divorce,” they say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man shall not divorce his wife unless he found in her a matter of immorality,” thy say that she is dirty in his eyes and he is not suspected of having relations with her, therefore she does not need a second bill of divorce from him.. Since the House of Hillel say, “even if she spoiled his food”, they say that she is not dirty in his eyes, he is suspected of having relations with her, and she needs a second bill of divorce from him’.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:32

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man may send away his wife with an old bill of divorce,” they say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man shall not divorce his wife unless he found in her a matter of immorality,” thy say that she is dirty in his eyes and he is not suspected of having relations with her, therefore she does not need a second bill of divorce from him.. Since the House of Hillel say, “even if she spoiled his food”, they say that she is not dirty in his eyes, he is suspected of having relations with her, and she needs a second bill of divorce from him’.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:32

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man may send away his wife with an old bill of divorce,” they say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man shall not divorce his wife unless he found in her a matter of immorality,” thy say that she is dirty in his eyes and he is not suspected of having relations with her, therefore she does not need a second bill of divorce from him.. Since the House of Hillel say, “even if she spoiled his food”, they say that she is not dirty in his eyes, he is suspected of having relations with her, and she needs a second bill of divorce from him’.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:33

If somebody divorces his wife she should not live in the same courtyard or the same place. If the courtyard was the wife’s property, the husband has to move out, if the husband’s, the wife has to move out. If it was common property, who has to move because of whom? The woman because of the man, unless they can manage to have separate exits. When has this been said? If they were definitively married, not if they were not definitively married. But the wife of a Cohen if she was not definitively married, as well as the status of a preliminarily married woman in Jehudah, is that of one definitively married. Nobody has to move if a person gives ḥalȋṣah to his sister-in-law even if he had “bespoken” her since “bespeaking” does not fully acquire.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:33

If somebody divorces his wife she should not live in the same courtyard or the same place. If the courtyard was the wife’s property, the husband has to move out, if the husband’s, the wife has to move out. If it was common property, who has to move because of whom? The woman because of the man, unless they can manage to have separate exits. When has this been said? If they were definitively married, not if they were not definitively married. But the wife of a Cohen if she was not definitively married, as well as the status of a preliminarily married woman in Jehudah, is that of one definitively married. Nobody has to move if a person gives ḥalȋṣah to his sister-in-law even if he had “bespoken” her since “bespeaking” does not fully acquire.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:36

Rebbi Joḥanan said: There is no “she shall be divorced”. Rebbi Immi said, several boxes of cases came before Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and they said, go and complete following Rebbi Aqiba.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody in divorcing his wife,” etc. Rebbi Ilai said, the reason of Rebbi Eliezer: “She left his house, went, and became another man’s”, even if he did permit her only to one other man. This argument proves more than the Mishnah! The Mishnah said if she was permitted to all but forbidden to one other man; the argument is that he forbade her to all but permitted her only to one other man. What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? Death permits and divorce permits. Since death permits only partially, so the bill of divorce permits only partially. What is the reason of the rabbis? “She left his house, went, and became another man’s”; it brackets marriage and divorce. Since her divorce is without participation of a third party, so her marriage must be without participation of a third party.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody in divorcing his wife,” etc. Rebbi Ilai said, the reason of Rebbi Eliezer: “She left his house, went, and became another man’s”, even if he did permit her only to one other man. This argument proves more than the Mishnah! The Mishnah said if she was permitted to all but forbidden to one other man; the argument is that he forbade her to all but permitted her only to one other man. What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? Death permits and divorce permits. Since death permits only partially, so the bill of divorce permits only partially. What is the reason of the rabbis? “She left his house, went, and became another man’s”; it brackets marriage and divorce. Since her divorce is without participation of a third party, so her marriage must be without participation of a third party.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody in divorcing his wife,” etc. Rebbi Ilai said, the reason of Rebbi Eliezer: “She left his house, went, and became another man’s”, even if he did permit her only to one other man. This argument proves more than the Mishnah! The Mishnah said if she was permitted to all but forbidden to one other man; the argument is that he forbade her to all but permitted her only to one other man. What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? Death permits and divorce permits. Since death permits only partially, so the bill of divorce permits only partially. What is the reason of the rabbis? “She left his house, went, and became another man’s”; it brackets marriage and divorce. Since her divorce is without participation of a third party, so her marriage must be without participation of a third party.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:3

After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:3

After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:3

After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:5

Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:5

Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:8

MISHNAH: “You are permitted to any man except to my father and your father, to my brother and your brother, to a slave, a Gentile,” or anybody she is unable to contract a preliminary marriage with, it is valid. “You are permitted to any man except as a widow to the High Priest, a divorcee or one having received ḥalȋṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite girl to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a a bastard or a Gibeonite,” or anybody she could contract a preliminary marriage with even if it is sinful, it is invalid. The essence of the bill of divorce: You are herewith permitted to any man. Rebbi Jehudah says: This shall be for you from me a divorce scroll and a letter of abandonment, to enable you to marry any man you desire. The essence of the bill of manumission: You are a free person, you are on your own.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:8

MISHNAH: “You are permitted to any man except to my father and your father, to my brother and your brother, to a slave, a Gentile,” or anybody she is unable to contract a preliminary marriage with, it is valid. “You are permitted to any man except as a widow to the High Priest, a divorcee or one having received ḥalȋṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite girl to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a a bastard or a Gibeonite,” or anybody she could contract a preliminary marriage with even if it is sinful, it is invalid. The essence of the bill of divorce: You are herewith permitted to any man. Rebbi Jehudah says: This shall be for you from me a divorce scroll and a letter of abandonment, to enable you to marry any man you desire. The essence of the bill of manumission: You are a free person, you are on your own.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:11

MISHNAH: Three kinds of bills of divorce are invalid, but if she married, the child is legitimate: If he wrote in his own handwriting but it was not signed by witnesses; it was signed by witnesses but is not dated; it is dated but only one witness signed it. These are three invalid kinds of bills of divorce, but if she married, the child is legitimate.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:11

MISHNAH: Three kinds of bills of divorce are invalid, but if she married, the child is legitimate: If he wrote in his own handwriting but it was not signed by witnesses; it was signed by witnesses but is not dated; it is dated but only one witness signed it. These are three invalid kinds of bills of divorce, but if she married, the child is legitimate.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:17

MISHNAH: Rebbi Eleazar says, it is valid even if there are no signatures of witnesses on it if only he delivered it in the presence of witnesses; and she can use it to collect from encumbered property. For the witnesses sign on the bill of divorce only for the public good.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:18

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eleazar says, it is valid even if there are no signatures of witnesses on it,” etc. Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: The words of the Sages: It is invalid. There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan about a Cohen’s wife and he wanted to act on Rebbi Yannai’s statement when it was heard that Rav and Samuel disagreed. There came before him [another case] involving an Israel, and he listened to that. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, in the opinion of everybody it is valid. But did not Rebbi Eleazar say, it is valid, and the rabbis say, it is invalid? What is their disagreement? Rebbi Eleazar said, it is valid and she can collect from encumbered property. The rabbis said, it is invalid and she can collect only from unencumbered property.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:18

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eleazar says, it is valid even if there are no signatures of witnesses on it,” etc. Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: The words of the Sages: It is invalid. There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan about a Cohen’s wife and he wanted to act on Rebbi Yannai’s statement when it was heard that Rav and Samuel disagreed. There came before him [another case] involving an Israel, and he listened to that. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, in the opinion of everybody it is valid. But did not Rebbi Eleazar say, it is valid, and the rabbis say, it is invalid? What is their disagreement? Rebbi Eleazar said, it is valid and she can collect from encumbered property. The rabbis said, it is invalid and she can collect only from unencumbered property.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:35

MISHNAH: If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced, except if there was an excuse. What would be an excuse? Mr. X divorced his wife conditionally, or he threw valuables for preliminary marriage to her and it was doubtful whether it was closer to her than to him; that is an excuse.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:35

MISHNAH: If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced, except if there was an excuse. What would be an excuse? Mr. X divorced his wife conditionally, or he threw valuables for preliminary marriage to her and it was doubtful whether it was closer to her than to him; that is an excuse.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:35

MISHNAH: If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced, except if there was an excuse. What would be an excuse? Mr. X divorced his wife conditionally, or he threw valuables for preliminary marriage to her and it was doubtful whether it was closer to her than to him; that is an excuse.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:36

HALAKHAH: “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married”. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If lights are burning and people talk. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected before Rebbi Yasa: But did we not state: “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced”? Can you say that lights are burning? No, people talk. So here also, people talk. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the title was checked and found to be from the mouth of women or minors, the title is abolished. Rav said, they permitted only in case of a hearsay witness.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:36

HALAKHAH: “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married”. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If lights are burning and people talk. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected before Rebbi Yasa: But did we not state: “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced”? Can you say that lights are burning? No, people talk. So here also, people talk. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the title was checked and found to be from the mouth of women or minors, the title is abolished. Rav said, they permitted only in case of a hearsay witness.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:36

HALAKHAH: “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married”. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If lights are burning and people talk. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected before Rebbi Yasa: But did we not state: “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced”? Can you say that lights are burning? No, people talk. So here also, people talk. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the title was checked and found to be from the mouth of women or minors, the title is abolished. Rav said, they permitted only in case of a hearsay witness.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:36

HALAKHAH: “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married”. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If lights are burning and people talk. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected before Rebbi Yasa: But did we not state: “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced”? Can you say that lights are burning? No, people talk. So here also, people talk. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the title was checked and found to be from the mouth of women or minors, the title is abolished. Rav said, they permitted only in case of a hearsay witness.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:36

HALAKHAH: “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married”. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If lights are burning and people talk. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected before Rebbi Yasa: But did we not state: “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced”? Can you say that lights are burning? No, people talk. So here also, people talk. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the title was checked and found to be from the mouth of women or minors, the title is abolished. Rav said, they permitted only in case of a hearsay witness.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:37

MISHNAH: The House of Shammai say, a person should not divorce his wife unless he found her immoral, as it was said: “For he found with her a matter of nakedness.” But the House of Hillel say, even if she spoiled his dish, as it was said: “For he found with her a bad thing.” Rebbi Aqiba said, even if he found another more beautiful than her, as it was said: “It will be if she does not appear pleasing in his eyes, etc.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:37

MISHNAH: The House of Shammai say, a person should not divorce his wife unless he found her immoral, as it was said: “For he found with her a matter of nakedness.” But the House of Hillel say, even if she spoiled his dish, as it was said: “For he found with her a bad thing.” Rebbi Aqiba said, even if he found another more beautiful than her, as it was said: “It will be if she does not appear pleasing in his eyes, etc.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:38

HALAKHAH: Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted. Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her.” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:38

HALAKHAH: Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted. Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her.” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:38

HALAKHAH: Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted. Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her.” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:39

It is written: “And the unwell in her menstruation and the sufferer from gonorrhea in his flow.” The earlier Elders used to say, “she shall be in her menstruation”, she shall not use kohl nor any make-up until she comes into water. Rebbi Aqiba said to them: Is that a reason? If you say so, she makes herself ugly and he starts thinking to divorce her. It turns out that the Elders follow the House of Shammai and Rebbi Aqiba the House of Hillel.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:39

It is written: “And the unwell in her menstruation and the sufferer from gonorrhea in his flow.” The earlier Elders used to say, “she shall be in her menstruation”, she shall not use kohl nor any make-up until she comes into water. Rebbi Aqiba said to them: Is that a reason? If you say so, she makes herself ugly and he starts thinking to divorce her. It turns out that the Elders follow the House of Shammai and Rebbi Aqiba the House of Hillel.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:39

It is written: “And the unwell in her menstruation and the sufferer from gonorrhea in his flow.” The earlier Elders used to say, “she shall be in her menstruation”, she shall not use kohl nor any make-up until she comes into water. Rebbi Aqiba said to them: Is that a reason? If you say so, she makes herself ugly and he starts thinking to divorce her. It turns out that the Elders follow the House of Shammai and Rebbi Aqiba the House of Hillel.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:39

It is written: “And the unwell in her menstruation and the sufferer from gonorrhea in his flow.” The earlier Elders used to say, “she shall be in her menstruation”, she shall not use kohl nor any make-up until she comes into water. Rebbi Aqiba said to them: Is that a reason? If you say so, she makes herself ugly and he starts thinking to divorce her. It turns out that the Elders follow the House of Shammai and Rebbi Aqiba the House of Hillel.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:1

MISHNAH: A wife may be acquired in three ways; she regains her autonomy in two ways. She is acquired by money, or by a document, or by intercourse. By money, the House of Shammai say, by a denar or a denar’s value; but the House of Hillel say, by a peruṭa or a peruṭa’s value. How much is a peruṭa? One eighth of an Italic assarius. She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce or by the husband’s death. A sister-in-law is acquired by intercourse; she regains her autonomy by ḥaliṣah or by the brother-in-law’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:1

MISHNAH: A wife may be acquired in three ways; she regains her autonomy in two ways. She is acquired by money, or by a document, or by intercourse. By money, the House of Shammai say, by a denar or a denar’s value; but the House of Hillel say, by a peruṭa or a peruṭa’s value. How much is a peruṭa? One eighth of an Italic assarius. She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce or by the husband’s death. A sister-in-law is acquired by intercourse; she regains her autonomy by ḥaliṣah or by the brother-in-law’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:1

MISHNAH: A wife may be acquired in three ways; she regains her autonomy in two ways. She is acquired by money, or by a document, or by intercourse. By money, the House of Shammai say, by a denar or a denar’s value; but the House of Hillel say, by a peruṭa or a peruṭa’s value. How much is a peruṭa? One eighth of an Italic assarius. She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce or by the husband’s death. A sister-in-law is acquired by intercourse; she regains her autonomy by ḥaliṣah or by the brother-in-law’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:1

MISHNAH: A wife may be acquired in three ways; she regains her autonomy in two ways. She is acquired by money, or by a document, or by intercourse. By money, the House of Shammai say, by a denar or a denar’s value; but the House of Hillel say, by a peruṭa or a peruṭa’s value. How much is a peruṭa? One eighth of an Italic assarius. She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce or by the husband’s death. A sister-in-law is acquired by intercourse; she regains her autonomy by ḥaliṣah or by the brother-in-law’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:3

By money, from where? “After he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money. By marital relations, from where? “And has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse. I would say, by both together. Money without intercourse and intercourse without money, from where? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it is written: “If a man is found lying with a woman having had intercourse with her husband.” Think of it, even if he did only acquire her by intercourse, the one coming after him is [executed] by strangulation. Not only regular intercourse but even perverse. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it is necessary to mention perverse intercourse for if it were regular, why mention her husband? As we have stated there: “If she was raped by two men, the first is stoned, the second strangled.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:3

By money, from where? “After he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money. By marital relations, from where? “And has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse. I would say, by both together. Money without intercourse and intercourse without money, from where? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it is written: “If a man is found lying with a woman having had intercourse with her husband.” Think of it, even if he did only acquire her by intercourse, the one coming after him is [executed] by strangulation. Not only regular intercourse but even perverse. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it is necessary to mention perverse intercourse for if it were regular, why mention her husband? As we have stated there: “If she was raped by two men, the first is stoned, the second strangled.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:3

By money, from where? “After he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money. By marital relations, from where? “And has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse. I would say, by both together. Money without intercourse and intercourse without money, from where? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it is written: “If a man is found lying with a woman having had intercourse with her husband.” Think of it, even if he did only acquire her by intercourse, the one coming after him is [executed] by strangulation. Not only regular intercourse but even perverse. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, it is necessary to mention perverse intercourse for if it were regular, why mention her husband? As we have stated there: “If she was raped by two men, the first is stoned, the second strangled.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:4

So we learned intercourse without money. Money without intercourse, from where? “She shall go free, without money.” “If he did acquire another one.” Since one was by money, so the other is by money.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:5

By a document? “He shall write her a bill of divorce, hand it to her, and send her out of his house. If she left his house and went to be another man’s.” It brackets her being with her leaving. Since her leaving was by a document, so her being is by a document.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:6

Rebbi Abin said that Ḥisqiah stated: “After he acquires,” which means that she is acquired by money. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the Hebrew slave girl, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by money, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, should be acquired by money? This is proved by the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money but is acquired by intercourse. Therefore you would not be astonished if this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, might not be acquired by money. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:6

Rebbi Abin said that Ḥisqiah stated: “After he acquires,” which means that she is acquired by money. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the Hebrew slave girl, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by money, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, should be acquired by money? This is proved by the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money but is acquired by intercourse. Therefore you would not be astonished if this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, might not be acquired by money. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:7

“And has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money, can be acquired by intercourse, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by money, should be acquired by intercourse? The Hebrew slave girl proves, who cannot be acquired by intercourse but is acquired by money. You likewise do not wonder that this one, who may be acquired by money, might not be acquired by intercourse. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money; “and has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:7

“And has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money, can be acquired by intercourse, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by money, should be acquired by intercourse? The Hebrew slave girl proves, who cannot be acquired by intercourse but is acquired by money. You likewise do not wonder that this one, who may be acquired by money, might not be acquired by intercourse. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money; “and has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:7

“And has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money, can be acquired by intercourse, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by money, should be acquired by intercourse? The Hebrew slave girl proves, who cannot be acquired by intercourse but is acquired by money. You likewise do not wonder that this one, who may be acquired by money, might not be acquired by intercourse. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money; “and has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:8

By a document. Since money which does not send out permits to enter, would it not be logical that a document which sends out should permit to enter? No. If you speak about money which eliminates dedication through redemption, what can you say about a document which does not eliminate dedication through redemption? The argument de minore ad majus is broken and you have to return to Scripture. Therefore, it was necessary to say: “He shall write her a bill of divorce, hand it to her, and send her out of his house. If she left his house and went to be another man’s.” It brackets her being with her leaving. Since her leaving was by a document, so her being is by a document.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:10

So far for Israel. For the Gentiles? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It is written “you shall die because of the woman whom you took, since she is having marital relations with a husband.” They are guilty for those having marital relations; they are not guilty for the betrothed. The words of Rebbi Eleazar imply, only if he had intention of acquiring her; the words of Samuel imply, even if he had no intention of acquiring her; since Rebbi Jonah said in the name of Samuel: “A prostitute stands in a window. Two men sleep with her. The first one is not killed, the second one is killed because of him.” But did the first one intend to acquire her?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:17

By a document. This means, by a document which is not worth a peruṭah, but a document which is worth a peruṭah is money’s worth. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in this respect: “Not only a document which is worth a peruṭah since a woman can have herself preliminarily married by anything which is worth a peruṭah. But even if he wrote it on an ostrakon or on papyrus and gave it to her, she is preliminarily married.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:18

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:18

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:18

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:18

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:18

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:18

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:18

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:18

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:18

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:18

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:18

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.