should
12262 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
If a man sold his fellow a place to build him a house, so, too, if a man contracted with his fellow to build him a bridal-house for his son, or a widow’s house for his daughter, he must build it four cubits by six cubits (80 inches x 120 inches), according to Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yishmael says: “This is a cattle-shed”. He who wants to build a cattle-shed, should build it four cubits by six. A small house six by eight (120 x. A large house eight by ten (160 x. An eating hall ten by ten (200 x. The height should be [the sum] of half its length and half its breadth. Proof of the matter is the sanctuary. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “Should all [houses] be according to the building of the Sanctuary?”
If a man sold his fellow a place to build him a house, so, too, if a man contracted with his fellow to build him a bridal-house for his son, or a widow’s house for his daughter, he must build it four cubits by six cubits (80 inches x 120 inches), according to Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yishmael says: “This is a cattle-shed”. He who wants to build a cattle-shed, should build it four cubits by six. A small house six by eight (120 x. A large house eight by ten (160 x. An eating hall ten by ten (200 x. The height should be [the sum] of half its length and half its breadth. Proof of the matter is the sanctuary. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “Should all [houses] be according to the building of the Sanctuary?”
If a man sold his fellow a place to build him a house, so, too, if a man contracted with his fellow to build him a bridal-house for his son, or a widow’s house for his daughter, he must build it four cubits by six cubits (80 inches x 120 inches), according to Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yishmael says: “This is a cattle-shed”. He who wants to build a cattle-shed, should build it four cubits by six. A small house six by eight (120 x. A large house eight by ten (160 x. An eating hall ten by ten (200 x. The height should be [the sum] of half its length and half its breadth. Proof of the matter is the sanctuary. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “Should all [houses] be according to the building of the Sanctuary?”
If he had a cistern behind his fellow’s house, he may go in and out only at the time when others are accustomed to go in and out. And he may not bring in his cattle and let them drink from his cistern, rather he must draw water and let them drink outside. He and the owner of the house should each make themselves a lock.
If a public path passed through a man’s field and he took it and gave them [another path] by the side of the field, what he has given he has given and what he has taken for himself does not become his. A private path is four cubits. A public path is sixteen cubits. The king’s path has no prescribed measure. The path to a grave has no prescribed measure. The halting places, according to the judges of Tzippori, should be four kab’s space of ground.
If a man says, “So and so, my firstborn son, shall not receive a double portion”, or “So and so, my son, shall not inherit with his brothers”, he has said nothing, for he has made a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah. If a man apportioned his property to his sons by word of mouth, and gave much to one and little to another, or made them equal to the firstborn, his words are valid. But if he had said [that it should be so] “by inheritance”, he has said nothing. If he had written down, whether at the beginning or in the middle or at the end [of his will] that it should be as a gift, his words are valid. If a man said, “So and so a man shall inherit from me” and he has a daughter; or “My daughter shall inherit from me”, and he has a son, he has said nothing, for he has made a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah. Rabbi Johanan ben Baroka says: “If he said [that so and so shall inherit from me] of one that was qualified to inherit from him, his words are valid, but if of one that was not qualified to inherit from him his words do not remain valid.” If a man wrote away his property to others and passed over his sons, what he has done is done, but the Sages are not comfortable with it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If has sons did not behave properly, it should be counted to his credit.”
If a man says, “So and so, my firstborn son, shall not receive a double portion”, or “So and so, my son, shall not inherit with his brothers”, he has said nothing, for he has made a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah. If a man apportioned his property to his sons by word of mouth, and gave much to one and little to another, or made them equal to the firstborn, his words are valid. But if he had said [that it should be so] “by inheritance”, he has said nothing. If he had written down, whether at the beginning or in the middle or at the end [of his will] that it should be as a gift, his words are valid. If a man said, “So and so a man shall inherit from me” and he has a daughter; or “My daughter shall inherit from me”, and he has a son, he has said nothing, for he has made a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah. Rabbi Johanan ben Baroka says: “If he said [that so and so shall inherit from me] of one that was qualified to inherit from him, his words are valid, but if of one that was not qualified to inherit from him his words do not remain valid.” If a man wrote away his property to others and passed over his sons, what he has done is done, but the Sages are not comfortable with it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If has sons did not behave properly, it should be counted to his credit.”
If a man says, “So and so, my firstborn son, shall not receive a double portion”, or “So and so, my son, shall not inherit with his brothers”, he has said nothing, for he has made a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah. If a man apportioned his property to his sons by word of mouth, and gave much to one and little to another, or made them equal to the firstborn, his words are valid. But if he had said [that it should be so] “by inheritance”, he has said nothing. If he had written down, whether at the beginning or in the middle or at the end [of his will] that it should be as a gift, his words are valid. If a man said, “So and so a man shall inherit from me” and he has a daughter; or “My daughter shall inherit from me”, and he has a son, he has said nothing, for he has made a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah. Rabbi Johanan ben Baroka says: “If he said [that so and so shall inherit from me] of one that was qualified to inherit from him, his words are valid, but if of one that was not qualified to inherit from him his words do not remain valid.” If a man wrote away his property to others and passed over his sons, what he has done is done, but the Sages are not comfortable with it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If has sons did not behave properly, it should be counted to his credit.”
If a man who lies dying wrote over his property to others [as a gift] and kept back any land whatsoever, his gift remains valid [even should he not die]. If he did not keep back any land whatsoever, his gift does not remain valid [if he should not die]. If it was not written in the document, “who lies dying”, but he said that [he had written the document] while he lay dying and they (those who received the gift) said that he was healthy [when he wrote the document], he must bring proof that he had been dying, according to Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: “He who makes a claim against his fellow bears the burden of proof.”
If a man who lies dying wrote over his property to others [as a gift] and kept back any land whatsoever, his gift remains valid [even should he not die]. If he did not keep back any land whatsoever, his gift does not remain valid [if he should not die]. If it was not written in the document, “who lies dying”, but he said that [he had written the document] while he lay dying and they (those who received the gift) said that he was healthy [when he wrote the document], he must bring proof that he had been dying, according to Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: “He who makes a claim against his fellow bears the burden of proof.”
A simple document has the signatures within (at the bottom of the page); a sewn document has signatures behind [each fold]. If in a simple document its witnesses signed behind, or if in a sewn document its witnesses signed within, they are invalid. Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel says: “If in a sewn document its witnesses signed within, it is valid, since it can be made into a simple document.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “Everything should follow local custom.”
If a man had paid part of his debt and gave the debt document to a third party, and the debtor said to him, “If I have not paid you back by such and such a day, give him (the creditor) back the debt document” and the time came and he had not paid, Rabbi Yose says: “He should give it to him.” Rabbi Judah says: “He should not give it to him.”
If a man had paid part of his debt and gave the debt document to a third party, and the debtor said to him, “If I have not paid you back by such and such a day, give him (the creditor) back the debt document” and the time came and he had not paid, Rabbi Yose says: “He should give it to him.” Rabbi Judah says: “He should not give it to him.”
If a man’s debt document was erased, he must have witnesses testify with regards to the loan, and come before the court to make this attestation: “So and so, the son of so and so, his debt document was erased on such and such a day, and so and so and so and so are his witnesses.” If a man had paid part of his debt, Rabbi Judah says: “He should exchange the debt document for a new one.” Rabbi Yose says: “He should write a receipt.” Rabbi Judah said: “It turns out that this one (the debtor) will have to guard his receipt from mice.” Rabbi Yose said to him: “That’s good for him, as long as the rights of the other (the creditor) have not been damaged.
If a man’s debt document was erased, he must have witnesses testify with regards to the loan, and come before the court to make this attestation: “So and so, the son of so and so, his debt document was erased on such and such a day, and so and so and so and so are his witnesses.” If a man had paid part of his debt, Rabbi Judah says: “He should exchange the debt document for a new one.” Rabbi Yose says: “He should write a receipt.” Rabbi Judah said: “It turns out that this one (the debtor) will have to guard his receipt from mice.” Rabbi Yose said to him: “That’s good for him, as long as the rights of the other (the creditor) have not been damaged.
If there were two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bath house or an olive press, if the father had made them for hire, the profit is split equally. But if he made them for his own use alone, the rich brother may say to the poor brother, “Buy for yourself slaves and they can wash in the bath house” or “Buy for yourself olives and prepare them in the olive press.” If there were two in the same town, and one’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon and other’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon, neither can bring forth a debt document on the other, and another person cannot bring forth a debt document against them. And if some person finds amongst his documents a document that states, “The [debt] document of Joseph ben Shimon is paid”, both of their [debt] documents are paid. What should they do? They should write their names to the third generation. And if the names are the same through the third generation, they should give themselves a sign. And if their signs are the same, they should write “Cohen”. If a man said to his son, “One of my debt documents is paid and I do not know which one”, then all are deemed to be paid. If two documents were found [amongst his documents] written to the same debtor, then the large one is paid and the small one is not paid. If a man lent money to his fellow on a guarantor’s security, he may not exact payment from the guarantor. But if he had said, “On the condition that I may exact payment from whom I wish”, then he may exact payment from the guarantor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If the borrower had property, in neither case can he exact payment from the guarantor.” Moreover, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel used to say: “If a man was a guarantor for a woman’s ketubah and her husband divorced her, the husband must vow to derive no further benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of the guarantor and take his wife back again.”
If there were two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bath house or an olive press, if the father had made them for hire, the profit is split equally. But if he made them for his own use alone, the rich brother may say to the poor brother, “Buy for yourself slaves and they can wash in the bath house” or “Buy for yourself olives and prepare them in the olive press.” If there were two in the same town, and one’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon and other’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon, neither can bring forth a debt document on the other, and another person cannot bring forth a debt document against them. And if some person finds amongst his documents a document that states, “The [debt] document of Joseph ben Shimon is paid”, both of their [debt] documents are paid. What should they do? They should write their names to the third generation. And if the names are the same through the third generation, they should give themselves a sign. And if their signs are the same, they should write “Cohen”. If a man said to his son, “One of my debt documents is paid and I do not know which one”, then all are deemed to be paid. If two documents were found [amongst his documents] written to the same debtor, then the large one is paid and the small one is not paid. If a man lent money to his fellow on a guarantor’s security, he may not exact payment from the guarantor. But if he had said, “On the condition that I may exact payment from whom I wish”, then he may exact payment from the guarantor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If the borrower had property, in neither case can he exact payment from the guarantor.” Moreover, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel used to say: “If a man was a guarantor for a woman’s ketubah and her husband divorced her, the husband must vow to derive no further benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of the guarantor and take his wife back again.”
If there were two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bath house or an olive press, if the father had made them for hire, the profit is split equally. But if he made them for his own use alone, the rich brother may say to the poor brother, “Buy for yourself slaves and they can wash in the bath house” or “Buy for yourself olives and prepare them in the olive press.” If there were two in the same town, and one’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon and other’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon, neither can bring forth a debt document on the other, and another person cannot bring forth a debt document against them. And if some person finds amongst his documents a document that states, “The [debt] document of Joseph ben Shimon is paid”, both of their [debt] documents are paid. What should they do? They should write their names to the third generation. And if the names are the same through the third generation, they should give themselves a sign. And if their signs are the same, they should write “Cohen”. If a man said to his son, “One of my debt documents is paid and I do not know which one”, then all are deemed to be paid. If two documents were found [amongst his documents] written to the same debtor, then the large one is paid and the small one is not paid. If a man lent money to his fellow on a guarantor’s security, he may not exact payment from the guarantor. But if he had said, “On the condition that I may exact payment from whom I wish”, then he may exact payment from the guarantor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If the borrower had property, in neither case can he exact payment from the guarantor.” Moreover, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel used to say: “If a man was a guarantor for a woman’s ketubah and her husband divorced her, the husband must vow to derive no further benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of the guarantor and take his wife back again.”
If there were two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bath house or an olive press, if the father had made them for hire, the profit is split equally. But if he made them for his own use alone, the rich brother may say to the poor brother, “Buy for yourself slaves and they can wash in the bath house” or “Buy for yourself olives and prepare them in the olive press.” If there were two in the same town, and one’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon and other’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon, neither can bring forth a debt document on the other, and another person cannot bring forth a debt document against them. And if some person finds amongst his documents a document that states, “The [debt] document of Joseph ben Shimon is paid”, both of their [debt] documents are paid. What should they do? They should write their names to the third generation. And if the names are the same through the third generation, they should give themselves a sign. And if their signs are the same, they should write “Cohen”. If a man said to his son, “One of my debt documents is paid and I do not know which one”, then all are deemed to be paid. If two documents were found [amongst his documents] written to the same debtor, then the large one is paid and the small one is not paid. If a man lent money to his fellow on a guarantor’s security, he may not exact payment from the guarantor. But if he had said, “On the condition that I may exact payment from whom I wish”, then he may exact payment from the guarantor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If the borrower had property, in neither case can he exact payment from the guarantor.” Moreover, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel used to say: “If a man was a guarantor for a woman’s ketubah and her husband divorced her, the husband must vow to derive no further benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of the guarantor and take his wife back again.”
The greater Sanhedrin was made up of seventy one and the little Sanhedrin of twenty three. From where do we learn that the greater Sanhedrin should be made up of seventy one? As it says, “Gather unto me seventy men of the elders of Israel” (Num. 11:16), and when Moses is added to them there is seventy one. Rabbi Judah says: “Seventy.” From where do we learn that the little Sanhedrin should be made up of twenty three? As it says, “The assembly shall judge”, “The assembly shall deliver” (Num. 35:24-25), an assembly that judges and an assembly that delivers, thus we have twenty. And from where do we know that an assembly has ten? As it says, “How long shall I bear this evil congregation?” (Num. 14:27) [which refers to the twelve spies] but Joshua and Caleb were not included. And from where do we learn that we should bring three others [to the twenty]? By inference from what it says, “You shall not follow after the many to do evil” (Ex. 23:2), I conclude that I must be with them to do well. Then why does it say, “[To follow] after the many to change judgment” (Ex. 23:2). [It means that] your verdict of condemnation should not be like your verdict of acquittal, for your verdict of acquittal is reached by the decision of a majority of one, but your verdict of condemnation must be reached by the decision of a majority of two. The court must not be divisible equally, therefore they add to them one more; thus they are twenty three. And how many should there be in a city that it may be fit to have a Sanhedrin? A hundred and twenty. Rabbi Nehemiah says: “Two hundred and thirty, so that [the Sanhedrin of twenty three] should correspond with them that are chiefs of [at least] groups of ten.
The greater Sanhedrin was made up of seventy one and the little Sanhedrin of twenty three. From where do we learn that the greater Sanhedrin should be made up of seventy one? As it says, “Gather unto me seventy men of the elders of Israel” (Num. 11:16), and when Moses is added to them there is seventy one. Rabbi Judah says: “Seventy.” From where do we learn that the little Sanhedrin should be made up of twenty three? As it says, “The assembly shall judge”, “The assembly shall deliver” (Num. 35:24-25), an assembly that judges and an assembly that delivers, thus we have twenty. And from where do we know that an assembly has ten? As it says, “How long shall I bear this evil congregation?” (Num. 14:27) [which refers to the twelve spies] but Joshua and Caleb were not included. And from where do we learn that we should bring three others [to the twenty]? By inference from what it says, “You shall not follow after the many to do evil” (Ex. 23:2), I conclude that I must be with them to do well. Then why does it say, “[To follow] after the many to change judgment” (Ex. 23:2). [It means that] your verdict of condemnation should not be like your verdict of acquittal, for your verdict of acquittal is reached by the decision of a majority of one, but your verdict of condemnation must be reached by the decision of a majority of two. The court must not be divisible equally, therefore they add to them one more; thus they are twenty three. And how many should there be in a city that it may be fit to have a Sanhedrin? A hundred and twenty. Rabbi Nehemiah says: “Two hundred and thirty, so that [the Sanhedrin of twenty three] should correspond with them that are chiefs of [at least] groups of ten.
The greater Sanhedrin was made up of seventy one and the little Sanhedrin of twenty three. From where do we learn that the greater Sanhedrin should be made up of seventy one? As it says, “Gather unto me seventy men of the elders of Israel” (Num. 11:16), and when Moses is added to them there is seventy one. Rabbi Judah says: “Seventy.” From where do we learn that the little Sanhedrin should be made up of twenty three? As it says, “The assembly shall judge”, “The assembly shall deliver” (Num. 35:24-25), an assembly that judges and an assembly that delivers, thus we have twenty. And from where do we know that an assembly has ten? As it says, “How long shall I bear this evil congregation?” (Num. 14:27) [which refers to the twelve spies] but Joshua and Caleb were not included. And from where do we learn that we should bring three others [to the twenty]? By inference from what it says, “You shall not follow after the many to do evil” (Ex. 23:2), I conclude that I must be with them to do well. Then why does it say, “[To follow] after the many to change judgment” (Ex. 23:2). [It means that] your verdict of condemnation should not be like your verdict of acquittal, for your verdict of acquittal is reached by the decision of a majority of one, but your verdict of condemnation must be reached by the decision of a majority of two. The court must not be divisible equally, therefore they add to them one more; thus they are twenty three. And how many should there be in a city that it may be fit to have a Sanhedrin? A hundred and twenty. Rabbi Nehemiah says: “Two hundred and thirty, so that [the Sanhedrin of twenty three] should correspond with them that are chiefs of [at least] groups of ten.
The greater Sanhedrin was made up of seventy one and the little Sanhedrin of twenty three. From where do we learn that the greater Sanhedrin should be made up of seventy one? As it says, “Gather unto me seventy men of the elders of Israel” (Num. 11:16), and when Moses is added to them there is seventy one. Rabbi Judah says: “Seventy.” From where do we learn that the little Sanhedrin should be made up of twenty three? As it says, “The assembly shall judge”, “The assembly shall deliver” (Num. 35:24-25), an assembly that judges and an assembly that delivers, thus we have twenty. And from where do we know that an assembly has ten? As it says, “How long shall I bear this evil congregation?” (Num. 14:27) [which refers to the twelve spies] but Joshua and Caleb were not included. And from where do we learn that we should bring three others [to the twenty]? By inference from what it says, “You shall not follow after the many to do evil” (Ex. 23:2), I conclude that I must be with them to do well. Then why does it say, “[To follow] after the many to change judgment” (Ex. 23:2). [It means that] your verdict of condemnation should not be like your verdict of acquittal, for your verdict of acquittal is reached by the decision of a majority of one, but your verdict of condemnation must be reached by the decision of a majority of two. The court must not be divisible equally, therefore they add to them one more; thus they are twenty three. And how many should there be in a city that it may be fit to have a Sanhedrin? A hundred and twenty. Rabbi Nehemiah says: “Two hundred and thirty, so that [the Sanhedrin of twenty three] should correspond with them that are chiefs of [at least] groups of ten.
The greater Sanhedrin was made up of seventy one and the little Sanhedrin of twenty three. From where do we learn that the greater Sanhedrin should be made up of seventy one? As it says, “Gather unto me seventy men of the elders of Israel” (Num. 11:16), and when Moses is added to them there is seventy one. Rabbi Judah says: “Seventy.” From where do we learn that the little Sanhedrin should be made up of twenty three? As it says, “The assembly shall judge”, “The assembly shall deliver” (Num. 35:24-25), an assembly that judges and an assembly that delivers, thus we have twenty. And from where do we know that an assembly has ten? As it says, “How long shall I bear this evil congregation?” (Num. 14:27) [which refers to the twelve spies] but Joshua and Caleb were not included. And from where do we learn that we should bring three others [to the twenty]? By inference from what it says, “You shall not follow after the many to do evil” (Ex. 23:2), I conclude that I must be with them to do well. Then why does it say, “[To follow] after the many to change judgment” (Ex. 23:2). [It means that] your verdict of condemnation should not be like your verdict of acquittal, for your verdict of acquittal is reached by the decision of a majority of one, but your verdict of condemnation must be reached by the decision of a majority of two. The court must not be divisible equally, therefore they add to them one more; thus they are twenty three. And how many should there be in a city that it may be fit to have a Sanhedrin? A hundred and twenty. Rabbi Nehemiah says: “Two hundred and thirty, so that [the Sanhedrin of twenty three] should correspond with them that are chiefs of [at least] groups of ten.
The greater Sanhedrin was made up of seventy one and the little Sanhedrin of twenty three. From where do we learn that the greater Sanhedrin should be made up of seventy one? As it says, “Gather unto me seventy men of the elders of Israel” (Num. 11:16), and when Moses is added to them there is seventy one. Rabbi Judah says: “Seventy.” From where do we learn that the little Sanhedrin should be made up of twenty three? As it says, “The assembly shall judge”, “The assembly shall deliver” (Num. 35:24-25), an assembly that judges and an assembly that delivers, thus we have twenty. And from where do we know that an assembly has ten? As it says, “How long shall I bear this evil congregation?” (Num. 14:27) [which refers to the twelve spies] but Joshua and Caleb were not included. And from where do we learn that we should bring three others [to the twenty]? By inference from what it says, “You shall not follow after the many to do evil” (Ex. 23:2), I conclude that I must be with them to do well. Then why does it say, “[To follow] after the many to change judgment” (Ex. 23:2). [It means that] your verdict of condemnation should not be like your verdict of acquittal, for your verdict of acquittal is reached by the decision of a majority of one, but your verdict of condemnation must be reached by the decision of a majority of two. The court must not be divisible equally, therefore they add to them one more; thus they are twenty three. And how many should there be in a city that it may be fit to have a Sanhedrin? A hundred and twenty. Rabbi Nehemiah says: “Two hundred and thirty, so that [the Sanhedrin of twenty three] should correspond with them that are chiefs of [at least] groups of ten.
The king can neither judge nor be judged, he cannot testify and others cannot testify against him. He may not perform halitzah, nor may others perform halitzah for his wife. He may not contract levirate marriage nor may his brothers contract levirate marriage with his wife. Rabbi Judah says: “If he wished to perform halitzah or to contract levirate marriage his memory is a blessing.” They said to him: “They should not listen to him.” None may marry his widow. Rabbi Judah says: “The king may marry the widow of a king, for so have we found it with David, who married the widow of Saul, as it says, “And I gave you my master’s house and my master’s wives into your embrace” (II Samuel 12:8).
He may send forth the people to a battle waged of free choice by the decision of the court of seventy one. He may break through [the private domain of any man] to make himself a road and none may protest him. The king’s road has no limit. Whatsoever the people take in plunder they must place before him, and he may take first. “And he shall not have many wives” (Deut. 17:17) eighteen only. Rabbi Judah says: “He may take many wives provided they don’t turn his heart away [from worshipping God]. Rabbi Shimon says: “Even one that might turn his heart away, he should not marry. Why then does it say, “He shall not have many wives”, even if they are like Avigayil. “He shall not keep many horses” (Deut. 17:16) enough for his chariot only. “Nor shall he amass silver and gold to excess” (Deut. 17:17) enough to pay his soldier’s wages. He must write a Torah scroll for himself; when he goes forth to battle he shall take it with him, and when he returns he shall bring it back with him; when he sits in judgement it shall be with him, and when he sits to eat it shall be with him, as it says, “Let it remain with him and let him read it all his life” (Deut. 17:19)
None may ride his horse and none may sit on his throne and none may make use of his scepter. No one may see him when his hair is being cut or when he is naked or when he is in the bath house, for it says, “You shall set a king upon yourself” (Deut. 17:15) that his awe should be over you.
How did they admonish witnesses in capital cases? They brought them in and admonished them, [saying], “Perhaps you will say something that is only a supposition or hearsay or secondhand, or even from a trustworthy man. Or perhaps you do not know that we shall check you with examination and inquiry? Know, moreover, that capital cases are not like non-capital cases: in non-capital cases a man may pay money and so make atonement, but in capital cases the witness is answerable for the blood of him [that is wrongfully condemned] and the blood of his descendants [that should have been born to him] to the end of the world.” For so have we found it with Cain that murdered his brother, for it says, “The bloods of your brother cry out” (Gen. 4:10). It doesn’t say, “The blood of your brother”, but rather “The bloods of your brother” meaning his blood and the blood of his descendants. Another saying is, “The bloods of your brother” that his blood was cast over trees and stones. Therefore but a single person was created in the world, to teach that if any man has caused a single life to perish from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had caused a whole world to perish; and anyone who saves a single soul from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had saved a whole world. Again [but a single person was created] for the sake of peace among humankind, that one should not say to another, “My father was greater than your father”. Again, [but a single person was created] against the heretics so they should not say, “There are many ruling powers in heaven”. Again [but a single person was created] to proclaim the greatness of the Holy Blessed One; for humans stamp many coins with one seal and they are all like one another; but the King of kings, the Holy Blessed One, has stamped every human with the seal of the first man, yet not one of them are like another. Therefore everyone must say, “For my sake was the world created.” And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be involved with this trouble”, was it not said, “He, being a witness, whether he has seen or known, [if he does not speak it, then he shall bear his iniquity] (Lev. 5:1). And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be guilty of the blood of this man?,” was it not said, “When the wicked perish there is rejoicing” (Proverbs 11:10).]
How did they admonish witnesses in capital cases? They brought them in and admonished them, [saying], “Perhaps you will say something that is only a supposition or hearsay or secondhand, or even from a trustworthy man. Or perhaps you do not know that we shall check you with examination and inquiry? Know, moreover, that capital cases are not like non-capital cases: in non-capital cases a man may pay money and so make atonement, but in capital cases the witness is answerable for the blood of him [that is wrongfully condemned] and the blood of his descendants [that should have been born to him] to the end of the world.” For so have we found it with Cain that murdered his brother, for it says, “The bloods of your brother cry out” (Gen. 4:10). It doesn’t say, “The blood of your brother”, but rather “The bloods of your brother” meaning his blood and the blood of his descendants. Another saying is, “The bloods of your brother” that his blood was cast over trees and stones. Therefore but a single person was created in the world, to teach that if any man has caused a single life to perish from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had caused a whole world to perish; and anyone who saves a single soul from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had saved a whole world. Again [but a single person was created] for the sake of peace among humankind, that one should not say to another, “My father was greater than your father”. Again, [but a single person was created] against the heretics so they should not say, “There are many ruling powers in heaven”. Again [but a single person was created] to proclaim the greatness of the Holy Blessed One; for humans stamp many coins with one seal and they are all like one another; but the King of kings, the Holy Blessed One, has stamped every human with the seal of the first man, yet not one of them are like another. Therefore everyone must say, “For my sake was the world created.” And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be involved with this trouble”, was it not said, “He, being a witness, whether he has seen or known, [if he does not speak it, then he shall bear his iniquity] (Lev. 5:1). And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be guilty of the blood of this man?,” was it not said, “When the wicked perish there is rejoicing” (Proverbs 11:10).]
How did they admonish witnesses in capital cases? They brought them in and admonished them, [saying], “Perhaps you will say something that is only a supposition or hearsay or secondhand, or even from a trustworthy man. Or perhaps you do not know that we shall check you with examination and inquiry? Know, moreover, that capital cases are not like non-capital cases: in non-capital cases a man may pay money and so make atonement, but in capital cases the witness is answerable for the blood of him [that is wrongfully condemned] and the blood of his descendants [that should have been born to him] to the end of the world.” For so have we found it with Cain that murdered his brother, for it says, “The bloods of your brother cry out” (Gen. 4:10). It doesn’t say, “The blood of your brother”, but rather “The bloods of your brother” meaning his blood and the blood of his descendants. Another saying is, “The bloods of your brother” that his blood was cast over trees and stones. Therefore but a single person was created in the world, to teach that if any man has caused a single life to perish from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had caused a whole world to perish; and anyone who saves a single soul from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had saved a whole world. Again [but a single person was created] for the sake of peace among humankind, that one should not say to another, “My father was greater than your father”. Again, [but a single person was created] against the heretics so they should not say, “There are many ruling powers in heaven”. Again [but a single person was created] to proclaim the greatness of the Holy Blessed One; for humans stamp many coins with one seal and they are all like one another; but the King of kings, the Holy Blessed One, has stamped every human with the seal of the first man, yet not one of them are like another. Therefore everyone must say, “For my sake was the world created.” And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be involved with this trouble”, was it not said, “He, being a witness, whether he has seen or known, [if he does not speak it, then he shall bear his iniquity] (Lev. 5:1). And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be guilty of the blood of this man?,” was it not said, “When the wicked perish there is rejoicing” (Proverbs 11:10).]
How did they admonish witnesses in capital cases? They brought them in and admonished them, [saying], “Perhaps you will say something that is only a supposition or hearsay or secondhand, or even from a trustworthy man. Or perhaps you do not know that we shall check you with examination and inquiry? Know, moreover, that capital cases are not like non-capital cases: in non-capital cases a man may pay money and so make atonement, but in capital cases the witness is answerable for the blood of him [that is wrongfully condemned] and the blood of his descendants [that should have been born to him] to the end of the world.” For so have we found it with Cain that murdered his brother, for it says, “The bloods of your brother cry out” (Gen. 4:10). It doesn’t say, “The blood of your brother”, but rather “The bloods of your brother” meaning his blood and the blood of his descendants. Another saying is, “The bloods of your brother” that his blood was cast over trees and stones. Therefore but a single person was created in the world, to teach that if any man has caused a single life to perish from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had caused a whole world to perish; and anyone who saves a single soul from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had saved a whole world. Again [but a single person was created] for the sake of peace among humankind, that one should not say to another, “My father was greater than your father”. Again, [but a single person was created] against the heretics so they should not say, “There are many ruling powers in heaven”. Again [but a single person was created] to proclaim the greatness of the Holy Blessed One; for humans stamp many coins with one seal and they are all like one another; but the King of kings, the Holy Blessed One, has stamped every human with the seal of the first man, yet not one of them are like another. Therefore everyone must say, “For my sake was the world created.” And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be involved with this trouble”, was it not said, “He, being a witness, whether he has seen or known, [if he does not speak it, then he shall bear his iniquity] (Lev. 5:1). And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be guilty of the blood of this man?,” was it not said, “When the wicked perish there is rejoicing” (Proverbs 11:10).]
How did they admonish witnesses in capital cases? They brought them in and admonished them, [saying], “Perhaps you will say something that is only a supposition or hearsay or secondhand, or even from a trustworthy man. Or perhaps you do not know that we shall check you with examination and inquiry? Know, moreover, that capital cases are not like non-capital cases: in non-capital cases a man may pay money and so make atonement, but in capital cases the witness is answerable for the blood of him [that is wrongfully condemned] and the blood of his descendants [that should have been born to him] to the end of the world.” For so have we found it with Cain that murdered his brother, for it says, “The bloods of your brother cry out” (Gen. 4:10). It doesn’t say, “The blood of your brother”, but rather “The bloods of your brother” meaning his blood and the blood of his descendants. Another saying is, “The bloods of your brother” that his blood was cast over trees and stones. Therefore but a single person was created in the world, to teach that if any man has caused a single life to perish from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had caused a whole world to perish; and anyone who saves a single soul from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had saved a whole world. Again [but a single person was created] for the sake of peace among humankind, that one should not say to another, “My father was greater than your father”. Again, [but a single person was created] against the heretics so they should not say, “There are many ruling powers in heaven”. Again [but a single person was created] to proclaim the greatness of the Holy Blessed One; for humans stamp many coins with one seal and they are all like one another; but the King of kings, the Holy Blessed One, has stamped every human with the seal of the first man, yet not one of them are like another. Therefore everyone must say, “For my sake was the world created.” And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be involved with this trouble”, was it not said, “He, being a witness, whether he has seen or known, [if he does not speak it, then he shall bear his iniquity] (Lev. 5:1). And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be guilty of the blood of this man?,” was it not said, “When the wicked perish there is rejoicing” (Proverbs 11:10).]
The manner in which burning is executed is as follows: They would lower him into dung up to his armpits, then a hard cloth was placed within a soft one, wound round his neck, and the two loose ends pulled in opposite directions, forcing him to open his mouth. A wick was then lit, and thrown into his mouth, so that it descended into his body and burned his bowels. R. Judah says: “Should he have died at their hands [being strangled by the bandage before the wick was thrown into his mouth], they would not have fulfilled the requirements of execution by fire. Rather his mouth was forced open with pincers against his wish, the wick lit and thrown into his mouth, so that it descended into his body and burned his bowels. Rabbi Eleazar ben Zadok said: “It once happened that a priest’s daughter committed adultery, whereupon bundles of sticks were placed around her and she was burnt. The Sages said to him: “That was because the court at that time was not well learned in law.
The following are stoned: He who has sexual relations with his mother, with his father’s wife, with his daughter-in-law, with a male; with a beast; a woman who commits bestiality with a beast; a blasphemer; an idolater; one who gives of his seed to molech; a necromancer or a wizard; one who desecrates the Sabbath; he who curses his father or mother; he who commits adultery with a betrothed woman; one who incites [individuals to idolatry]; one who seduces [a whole town to idolatry]; a sorcerer; and a wayward and rebellious son. He who has sexual relations with his mother incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his mother and as his father’s wife. R. Judah says: “He is liable in respect of her as his mother only.” He who has sexual relations with his father’s wife incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his father’s wife, and as a married woman, both during his father’s lifetime and after his death, whether she was widowed from betrothal or from marriage. He who has sexual relations with his daughter-in-law incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his daughter-in-law and as a married woman, both during his son’s lifetime and after his death, whether she was widowed from betrothal or from marriage. He who has sexual relations with a male or a beast, and a woman that commits bestiality: if the man has sinned, how has the animal sinned? But because the human was enticed to sin by the animal, therefore scripture ordered that it should be stoned. Another reason is that the animal should not pass through the market, and people say, this is the animal on account of which so and so was stoned.
The following are stoned: He who has sexual relations with his mother, with his father’s wife, with his daughter-in-law, with a male; with a beast; a woman who commits bestiality with a beast; a blasphemer; an idolater; one who gives of his seed to molech; a necromancer or a wizard; one who desecrates the Sabbath; he who curses his father or mother; he who commits adultery with a betrothed woman; one who incites [individuals to idolatry]; one who seduces [a whole town to idolatry]; a sorcerer; and a wayward and rebellious son. He who has sexual relations with his mother incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his mother and as his father’s wife. R. Judah says: “He is liable in respect of her as his mother only.” He who has sexual relations with his father’s wife incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his father’s wife, and as a married woman, both during his father’s lifetime and after his death, whether she was widowed from betrothal or from marriage. He who has sexual relations with his daughter-in-law incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his daughter-in-law and as a married woman, both during his son’s lifetime and after his death, whether she was widowed from betrothal or from marriage. He who has sexual relations with a male or a beast, and a woman that commits bestiality: if the man has sinned, how has the animal sinned? But because the human was enticed to sin by the animal, therefore scripture ordered that it should be stoned. Another reason is that the animal should not pass through the market, and people say, this is the animal on account of which so and so was stoned.
One who incites [individuals to idolatry] -- this refers to an ordinary person who incites an individual who said, “There is an idol in such and such a place; it eats thus, it drinks thus, it does good [to those who worship it] and harm [to those who do not].” For all who are liable for the death penalty according to the Torah no witnesses are hidden to entrap them, excepting for this one. If he said [these things] to two, they themselves are witnesses against him, and he is brought to court and stoned. But if he said [these things] to one, he should reply, “I have friends who wish to do so likewise [come and propose it to them too].” But if he was cunning and declined to speak before them, witnesses are hidden behind a partition, while he [who was incited] says to him, make your proposal to me now in private. When the inciter says to him (repeats to him what he had already said), the other replies, “How can we abandon our God in heaven to go and serve wood and stones?” Should he retract, it is well. But if he answers, “It is our duty [to worship idols], and is seemly for us”, then the witnesses stationed behind the partition take him to court, and have him stoned. He who incites [individuals to idolatry is one who] is one who says, “I will worship it”, or, “I will go and worship”, or, “let us go and worship”; or, “I will sacrifice [to it]”, “I will go and sacrifice”, “let us go and sacrifice”; “I will burn incense, “I will go and burn incense”; “let us go and burn incense”; or “I will make libations to it”, “I will go and make libations to it”, “let us go and make libations”; “I will prostrate myself before it”, “I will go and prostrate myself”, “let us go and prostrate ourselves”. One who seduces [a whole town to idolatry] is one who says, “Let us go and serve idols”.
One who incites [individuals to idolatry] -- this refers to an ordinary person who incites an individual who said, “There is an idol in such and such a place; it eats thus, it drinks thus, it does good [to those who worship it] and harm [to those who do not].” For all who are liable for the death penalty according to the Torah no witnesses are hidden to entrap them, excepting for this one. If he said [these things] to two, they themselves are witnesses against him, and he is brought to court and stoned. But if he said [these things] to one, he should reply, “I have friends who wish to do so likewise [come and propose it to them too].” But if he was cunning and declined to speak before them, witnesses are hidden behind a partition, while he [who was incited] says to him, make your proposal to me now in private. When the inciter says to him (repeats to him what he had already said), the other replies, “How can we abandon our God in heaven to go and serve wood and stones?” Should he retract, it is well. But if he answers, “It is our duty [to worship idols], and is seemly for us”, then the witnesses stationed behind the partition take him to court, and have him stoned. He who incites [individuals to idolatry is one who] is one who says, “I will worship it”, or, “I will go and worship”, or, “let us go and worship”; or, “I will sacrifice [to it]”, “I will go and sacrifice”, “let us go and sacrifice”; “I will burn incense, “I will go and burn incense”; “let us go and burn incense”; or “I will make libations to it”, “I will go and make libations to it”, “let us go and make libations”; “I will prostrate myself before it”, “I will go and prostrate myself”, “let us go and prostrate ourselves”. One who seduces [a whole town to idolatry] is one who says, “Let us go and serve idols”.
[The thief] who burrows his way in [to someone’s home] is judged on account of his outcome. If he burrowed his way in and broke a jug, should there be blood-guiltiness for him, he must pay [for the jug], but if there is no blood-guiltiness for him, he is not liable.
An elder rebelling against the ruling of the court [is strangled], for it says, “If there arise a matter too hard for you for judgement […you shall promptly repair to the place that the Lord your God will have chosen, and appear before the levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case, you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the Lord chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you. You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left. Should a man act presumptuously and disregard the priest charged with serving there the Lord your God, or the magistrate, that man shall die” (Deut. 17:8-13, JPS translation). Three courts of law were there, one situated at the entrance to the Temple mount, another at the door of the [Temple] court, and the third in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. They [first] went to the court which is at the entrance to the Temple mount, and he [the rebellious elder] stated, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this first court] had heard [a ruling on the matter], they state it. If not, they go to the [second court] which is at the entrance of the Temple court, and he declares, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this second court] had heard [a ruling on the matter] they state it; if not, they all proceed to the great court of the Chamber of Hewn Stone from whence instruction issued to all Israel, for it says, [you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you] from that place that the Lord chose (Deut. 17:10). If he returned to his town and taught again as he did before, he is not liable. But if he gave a practical decision, he is guilty, for it says, “Should a man act presumptuously” (Deut. 17:12) he is liable only for a practical ruling. But if a disciple gave a practical decision [opposed to the court], he is exempt: thus his stringency is his leniency.
An elder rebelling against the ruling of the court [is strangled], for it says, “If there arise a matter too hard for you for judgement […you shall promptly repair to the place that the Lord your God will have chosen, and appear before the levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case, you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the Lord chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you. You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left. Should a man act presumptuously and disregard the priest charged with serving there the Lord your God, or the magistrate, that man shall die” (Deut. 17:8-13, JPS translation). Three courts of law were there, one situated at the entrance to the Temple mount, another at the door of the [Temple] court, and the third in the Chamber of Hewn Stone. They [first] went to the court which is at the entrance to the Temple mount, and he [the rebellious elder] stated, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this first court] had heard [a ruling on the matter], they state it. If not, they go to the [second court] which is at the entrance of the Temple court, and he declares, “Thus have I expounded and thus have my colleagues expounded; thus have I taught, and thus have my colleagues taught.” If [this second court] had heard [a ruling on the matter] they state it; if not, they all proceed to the great court of the Chamber of Hewn Stone from whence instruction issued to all Israel, for it says, [you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you] from that place that the Lord chose (Deut. 17:10). If he returned to his town and taught again as he did before, he is not liable. But if he gave a practical decision, he is guilty, for it says, “Should a man act presumptuously” (Deut. 17:12) he is liable only for a practical ruling. But if a disciple gave a practical decision [opposed to the court], he is exempt: thus his stringency is his leniency.
How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers? [If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years.
How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers? [If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years.
How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers? [If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years.
How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers? [If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years.
How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers? [If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years.
How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers? [If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years.
If the trial was concluded when there was no high priest [in office], or if one kills a high priest, or a high priest that kills, [in these cases the manslayer] can never come away from that place [of refuge]. He [the manslayer] may not go out to bear witness, neither for cases having to do with a religious observance, nor to bear witness in a monetary suit, nor to bear witness in a capital case. Even should [all] Israel need him, and even a general like Yoav the son of Zeruiah, he may never go out, as it is said, “to there he fled”: ‘there’ must be his abode, ‘there’ his death, ‘there’ his burial. Just as the city affords asylum so does its Sabbath boundary afford asylum. If a manslayer went beyond the boundary [of the city] and the blood avenger found him: Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: “For the avenger it is a matter of obligation [to kill him]; for everyone else, a matter of option.” Rabbi Akiba says: “It is a matter of option for the avenger, and anyone else [who kills him] is not liable for doing so.” If a tree was standing within the boundary and its boughs extended beyond [the boundary] or if it was standing outside of the boundary and its boughs extended within, it wholly follows [the position of] the boughs. If he slew [someone] in that city [of refuge] he is banished from one neighborhood to another neighborhood. And a Levite is banished from one city to another.
A manslayer who went to his city of his refuge and the men of that city wished to do him honor, should [refuse] by saying to them, “I am a manslayer!”. If they say to him, “Nevertheless” he should accept from them [the proffered honor], as it is said: “and this is the word of the manslayer.” They used to pay rent to the Levites, according to the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir says: “They did not pay them rent.” And [on his return home] he returns to the office he formerly held, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: “He does not return to the office he formerly held.”
A manslayer who went to his city of his refuge and the men of that city wished to do him honor, should [refuse] by saying to them, “I am a manslayer!”. If they say to him, “Nevertheless” he should accept from them [the proffered honor], as it is said: “and this is the word of the manslayer.” They used to pay rent to the Levites, according to the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir says: “They did not pay them rent.” And [on his return home] he returns to the office he formerly held, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: “He does not return to the office he formerly held.”
Oaths are two, subdivided into four. “I swear I shall eat”, and “[I swear] I shall not eat”; “[I swear] I have eaten”, and “[I swear] I have not eaten”. “I swear I shall not eat”, and he ate [even] a minute quantity, he is liable, the words of Rabbi Akiva. They [the Sages] said to Rabbi Akiva: “Where do we find that he who eats a minute quantity is liable, that this one should be liable?” Rabbi Akiba said to them: “But where do we find that he who [merely] speaks brings a sacrifice, that this one should bring a sacrifice?” [If a man says,] “I swear I shall not eat” and he ate and drank, he is liable only once. “I swear I shall not eat and I shall not drink,” and he ate and drank, he is liable twice.
Oaths are two, subdivided into four. “I swear I shall eat”, and “[I swear] I shall not eat”; “[I swear] I have eaten”, and “[I swear] I have not eaten”. “I swear I shall not eat”, and he ate [even] a minute quantity, he is liable, the words of Rabbi Akiva. They [the Sages] said to Rabbi Akiva: “Where do we find that he who eats a minute quantity is liable, that this one should be liable?” Rabbi Akiba said to them: “But where do we find that he who [merely] speaks brings a sacrifice, that this one should bring a sacrifice?” [If a man says,] “I swear I shall not eat” and he ate and drank, he is liable only once. “I swear I shall not eat and I shall not drink,” and he ate and drank, he is liable twice.
If he swore to annul a commandment, and did not annul it, he is exempt. [If he swore] to fulfill [a commandment], and did not fulfill it, he is exempt. For it would have been logical [in the second instance] that he should have been liable, as is the opinion of Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra. [For] Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said, “Now, if for [swearing with regards to] an optional matter, for which he is not adjured from Mount Sinai, he is liable [should he not fulfill his oath], for [swearing with regards to] a commandment, for which he is adjured from Mount Sinai, he should most certainly be liable [should he not fulfill his oath]! They said to him: “No! If you say that for an oath with regards to an optional matter [he is liable], it is because [Scripture] has in that case made negative equal to positive [for liability]; But how can you say that for an oath [to fulfill] a commandment [he is liable], since [Scripture] has not in that case made negative equal to positive, for if he swore to annul [a commandment], and did not annul it, he is exempt!
If he swore to annul a commandment, and did not annul it, he is exempt. [If he swore] to fulfill [a commandment], and did not fulfill it, he is exempt. For it would have been logical [in the second instance] that he should have been liable, as is the opinion of Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra. [For] Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said, “Now, if for [swearing with regards to] an optional matter, for which he is not adjured from Mount Sinai, he is liable [should he not fulfill his oath], for [swearing with regards to] a commandment, for which he is adjured from Mount Sinai, he should most certainly be liable [should he not fulfill his oath]! They said to him: “No! If you say that for an oath with regards to an optional matter [he is liable], it is because [Scripture] has in that case made negative equal to positive [for liability]; But how can you say that for an oath [to fulfill] a commandment [he is liable], since [Scripture] has not in that case made negative equal to positive, for if he swore to annul [a commandment], and did not annul it, he is exempt!
If he swore to annul a commandment, and did not annul it, he is exempt. [If he swore] to fulfill [a commandment], and did not fulfill it, he is exempt. For it would have been logical [in the second instance] that he should have been liable, as is the opinion of Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra. [For] Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said, “Now, if for [swearing with regards to] an optional matter, for which he is not adjured from Mount Sinai, he is liable [should he not fulfill his oath], for [swearing with regards to] a commandment, for which he is adjured from Mount Sinai, he should most certainly be liable [should he not fulfill his oath]! They said to him: “No! If you say that for an oath with regards to an optional matter [he is liable], it is because [Scripture] has in that case made negative equal to positive [for liability]; But how can you say that for an oath [to fulfill] a commandment [he is liable], since [Scripture] has not in that case made negative equal to positive, for if he swore to annul [a commandment], and did not annul it, he is exempt!
If he swore to annul a commandment, and did not annul it, he is exempt. [If he swore] to fulfill [a commandment], and did not fulfill it, he is exempt. For it would have been logical [in the second instance] that he should have been liable, as is the opinion of Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra. [For] Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra said, “Now, if for [swearing with regards to] an optional matter, for which he is not adjured from Mount Sinai, he is liable [should he not fulfill his oath], for [swearing with regards to] a commandment, for which he is adjured from Mount Sinai, he should most certainly be liable [should he not fulfill his oath]! They said to him: “No! If you say that for an oath with regards to an optional matter [he is liable], it is because [Scripture] has in that case made negative equal to positive [for liability]; But how can you say that for an oath [to fulfill] a commandment [he is liable], since [Scripture] has not in that case made negative equal to positive, for if he swore to annul [a commandment], and did not annul it, he is exempt!
“I adjure you that, when you know any testimony for me, you should come and bear testimony for me,” they are exempt, because the oath preceded the testimony.
[If] he stood in the synagogue and said, “I adjure you that if you know any testimony for me you should come and bear testimony for me”, they are exempt unless he directs himself to them.
If he said to two [persons]: “I adjure you, so-and-so and so-and-so, that if you know any testimony for me you should come and bear testimony for me”: [And they replied,] “We swear we know no testimony for you”, and they did know testimony for him, [but it was evidence of] one witness from the mouth of another witness; or if one of them was a relative or [otherwise] ineligible [as a witness], they are exempt.
If he sent by the hand of his servant, or if the defendant said to them: “I adjure you that if you know any testimony for him you should come and bear testimony for him”, they are exempt, until they hear [the adjuration] direct from the claimant.
“You have of mine a hundred denarii”, he said to him, “Yes.” The next day he said to him, “Give them to me”, [and he replied,] “I have given them to you,” he is exempt. [If he says,] “Nothing of yours is in my possession,” he is liable. “You have of mine a hundred denarii”, he said to him, “Yes”. [And then he said], “Do not give them to me except before witnesses.” The next day he said to him, “Give them to me;” [and he replied,] “I have given them to you,” he is liable, because he should have given them to him before witnesses.
And why do they record the opinions of Shammai and Hillel for naught? To teach the following generations that a man should not [always] persist in his opinion, for behold, the fathers of the world did not persist in their opinion.
These are subjects concerning which Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai: A woman who came from overseas and said: “My husband died” may be married again; “My husband died [without children]” she must be married by her husband’s brother (the levir). But Beth Hillel says: “We have heard so only in the case of one who came from the harvesting.” Beth Shammai said to them: “It is the same thing in the case of one who came from the harvesting or who came from the olive-picking or who came from overseas; they mentioned harvesting only because that is how it happened.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to Beth Shammai. Beth Shammai says: “She may be married again and take her kethubah payment.” But Beth Hillel says: “She may be married again but may not take her kethubah payment.” Beth Shammai said to them: “You have permitted the graver matter of a forbidden marriage, should you not permit the lighter matter of property?” Beth Hillel said to them: “We have found that brothers do not inherit on her statement.” Beth Shammai said to them: “Do we not infer it from her marriage document in which he writes to her ‘That if you be married to another you shall take what is written for you’?” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.
Whoever is half a slave and half a free man should work one day for his master and one day for himself, according to Beth Hillel. Beth Shammai said to them: “You have set matters in order with regards to his master, but you have not set matters in order with regards to himself. He is not able to marry a slave-woman, nor is he able [to marry] a woman who is free. Is he to refrain [from marrying]? [How can he] for is it not the case that the world was created in order for people to be fruitful and multiply? For it is said, “He did not create it to be a waste; but formed it for inhabitation” (Isaiah 45:18). But for the rightful ordering of the world his master is compelled to make him free, and he writes out a bond for half his value.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.
They stated three things before Rabbi Yishmael, and he pronounced none of them either unlawful or lawful; and Rabbi Joshua ben Matya explained them. One who lances an abscess on the Sabbath: if it was to make an opening he is liable; if it was to bring out the pus, he is exempt. And concerning one who hunts a snake on the Sabbath: that if he was occupied with it in order that it should not bite him, he is innocent; but if that he might use it as a remedy, he is guilty. And concerning Ironian stewpots: that they do not contract impurity when under the same tent as a corpse; but become impure if they are carried by a zav. Rabbi Eliezer ben Zadok says: “Even if they are carried by a zav they remain pure, because they are unfinished.”
A beast which was born on a festival all agree that it is permitted; and a chicken which was hatched from the egg all agree that it is forbidden. He who slaughters a wild animal or a bird on a festival Beth Shammai says: he may dig with a pronged tool and cover up [the blood] , but Beth Hillel says: he may not slaughter unless he has had earth made ready. But they agree that if he did slaughter he should dig with a pronged tool and cover up [the blood, and] that the ashes of a stove count as being prepared for the holiday.
[In the case of] three brothers, of whom two were married to two sisters and one was unmarried, if one of the husbands of the sisters died and the unmarried one betrothed her (maamar), and afterwards his other brother died, Beth Shammai says: his wife remains with him, and the other [widow] is released on the grounds of [the law forbidding] the wife’s sister. But Beth Hillel says: he should put away his wife with a get and halitzah, and the wife of his brother [he should put away] with halitzah. This is the case of which they said: woe to him because of his wife, and woe to him because of his brother’s wife!
[In the case of] three brothers, of whom two were married to two sisters and one was unmarried, if one of the husbands of the sisters died and the unmarried one betrothed her (maamar), and afterwards his other brother died, Beth Shammai says: his wife remains with him, and the other [widow] is released on the grounds of [the law forbidding] the wife’s sister. But Beth Hillel says: he should put away his wife with a get and halitzah, and the wife of his brother [he should put away] with halitzah. This is the case of which they said: woe to him because of his wife, and woe to him because of his brother’s wife!
[In the case of] four brothers of whom two were married to two sisters, if those married to the sisters died, behold, these should perform halitzah and not enter into levirate marriage (with the brothers-in-law). If they went ahead and married them, they must put them away (divorce them). Rabbi Eliezer says in the name of Beth Shammai: they may keep them. But Beth Hillel say: they must put them away.
Akavia ben Mahalalel testified concerning four things. They said to him: Akavia, retract these four things which you say, and we will make you the head of the court in Israel. He said to them: it is better for me to be called a fool all my days than that I should become [even] for one hour a wicked man before God; So they shouldn’t say: “he withdrew his opinions for the sake of power.” He used to pronounce impure the hair which has been left over [in leprosy], And green (yellow) blood (of vaginal discharge); But the Sages declared them clean. He used to permit the wool of a first-born animal which was blemished and which had fallen out and had been put in a niche, the first-born being slaughtered afterwards; But the sages forbid it. He used to say: a woman proselyte and a freed slave-woman are not made to drink of the bitter waters. But the Sages say: they are made to drink. They said to him: it happened in the case of Karkemith, a freed slave-woman who was in Jerusalem, that Shemaiah and Avtalion made her drink. He said to them: they made her drink an example (and not the real water). Whereupon they excommunicated him; and he died while he was under excommunication, and the court stoned his coffin. Rabbi Judah said: God forbid [that one should say] that Akavia was excommunicated; for the courtyard is never locked for any man in Israel who was equal to Akavia ben Mahalalel in wisdom and the fear of sin. But whom did they excommunicate? Eliezer the son of Hanoch who cast doubt against the laws concerning the purifying of the hands. And when he died the court sent and laid a stone on his coffin. This teaches that whoever is excommunicated and dies while under excommunication, his coffin is stoned.
Akavia ben Mahalalel testified concerning four things. They said to him: Akavia, retract these four things which you say, and we will make you the head of the court in Israel. He said to them: it is better for me to be called a fool all my days than that I should become [even] for one hour a wicked man before God; So they shouldn’t say: “he withdrew his opinions for the sake of power.” He used to pronounce impure the hair which has been left over [in leprosy], And green (yellow) blood (of vaginal discharge); But the Sages declared them clean. He used to permit the wool of a first-born animal which was blemished and which had fallen out and had been put in a niche, the first-born being slaughtered afterwards; But the sages forbid it. He used to say: a woman proselyte and a freed slave-woman are not made to drink of the bitter waters. But the Sages say: they are made to drink. They said to him: it happened in the case of Karkemith, a freed slave-woman who was in Jerusalem, that Shemaiah and Avtalion made her drink. He said to them: they made her drink an example (and not the real water). Whereupon they excommunicated him; and he died while he was under excommunication, and the court stoned his coffin. Rabbi Judah said: God forbid [that one should say] that Akavia was excommunicated; for the courtyard is never locked for any man in Israel who was equal to Akavia ben Mahalalel in wisdom and the fear of sin. But whom did they excommunicate? Eliezer the son of Hanoch who cast doubt against the laws concerning the purifying of the hands. And when he died the court sent and laid a stone on his coffin. This teaches that whoever is excommunicated and dies while under excommunication, his coffin is stoned.
Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia ben Elinathan, a man of Kefar Habavli, testified concerning a limb [separated] from a corpse that it is impure; whereas Rabbi Eliezer says: they declared [this] only of a limb from a living [man]. They said to him: is not there an inference from the minor to the major (kal vehomer): If in the case of a living man [who is himself pure] a limb severed from him is impure, how much more in the case of a corpse [which is itself impure] should a limb severed from it be impure! He said to them: they have [nevertheless] declared it only of a limb from a living man. Another answer: The impurity of living men is greater than the impurity of corpses, because a living man causes that on which he lies and sits to become capable of making impure a man and clothing, and [he causes also] what is over him to transfer impurity to foods and liquids- which is defilement that a corpse does not cause.
They testified concerning the boards of bakers, that they are impure (they can receive impurity), whereas Rabbi Eliezer declares them pure (unable to receive impurity). They testified concerning an oven which was cut into rings and sand was put between the rings that it is impure (can receive impurity), whereas Rabbi Eliezer declares it pure (unable to receive impurity). They testified that the year may be intercalated throughout the whole of Adar, whereas they used to say: only until Purim. They testified that the year may be intercalated conditionally. There was such a case with Rabban Gamaliel who went to receive permission from the governor in Syria and he delayed in coming back; and they intercalated the year on condition that rabban gamaliel should approve; and when he came back he said: I approve, and the year was intercalated.
Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Judah ben Bathyra testified concerning the widow of [a man belonging to] a family of doubtful lineage (an issa), that she was fit to marry into the priesthood, [And that those of] a family of doubtful lineage are fit to declare who was unclean and who clean, who was to be put away and who was to be brought near. Rabban Gamaliel said: we accept your testimony, but what can we do since Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai ordained that courts should not be commissioned for this purpose? The priests would listen to you concerning those who might be put away, but not concerning those who might be brought near!
On the three days preceding the festivals of idolaters, it is forbidden to conduct business with them, to lend articles to them or borrow from them, to lend or borrow any money from them, to repay a debt, or receive repayment from them. Rabbi Judah says: we should receive repayment from them, as this can only depress them; But they [the Rabbis] said to him: even though it is depressing at the time, they are glad of it subsequently.
The following things are forbidden to be sold to idolaters: iztroblin, bnoth-shuah with their stems, frankincense, and a white rooster. Rabbi Judah says: it is permitted to sell a white rooster to an idolater among other roosters; but if it be by itself, one should clip its spur and then sell it to him, because a defective [animal] is not sacrificed to an idol. As for other things, if they are not specified their sale is permitted, but if specified it is forbidden. Rabbi Meir says: also a “good-palm”, hazab and niklivas are forbidden to be sold to idolaters.
One should not sell them bears, lions or anything which may injure the public. One should not join them in building a basilica, a scaffold, a stadium, or a platform. But one may join them in building public or private bathhouses. When however he reaches the cupola in which the idol is placed he must not build.
One should not sell them bears, lions or anything which may injure the public. One should not join them in building a basilica, a scaffold, a stadium, or a platform. But one may join them in building public or private bathhouses. When however he reaches the cupola in which the idol is placed he must not build.
One should not make jewelry for an idol [such as] necklaces, ear-rings, or finger-rings. Rabbi Eliezer says, for payment it is permitted. One should not sell to idolaters a thing which is attached to the soil, but when cut down it may be sold. R. Judah says, one may sell it on condition that it be cut down. One should not let houses to them in the land of Israel; and it is not necessary to mention fields. In Syria houses may be let to them, but not fields. Outside of the land of Israel, houses may be sold and fields let to them, these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: in the land of Israel, one may let to them houses but not fields; In Syria, we may sell them houses and let fields; Outside of the land of Israel, both may be sold.
One should not make jewelry for an idol [such as] necklaces, ear-rings, or finger-rings. Rabbi Eliezer says, for payment it is permitted. One should not sell to idolaters a thing which is attached to the soil, but when cut down it may be sold. R. Judah says, one may sell it on condition that it be cut down. One should not let houses to them in the land of Israel; and it is not necessary to mention fields. In Syria houses may be let to them, but not fields. Outside of the land of Israel, houses may be sold and fields let to them, these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: in the land of Israel, one may let to them houses but not fields; In Syria, we may sell them houses and let fields; Outside of the land of Israel, both may be sold.
One should not make jewelry for an idol [such as] necklaces, ear-rings, or finger-rings. Rabbi Eliezer says, for payment it is permitted. One should not sell to idolaters a thing which is attached to the soil, but when cut down it may be sold. R. Judah says, one may sell it on condition that it be cut down. One should not let houses to them in the land of Israel; and it is not necessary to mention fields. In Syria houses may be let to them, but not fields. Outside of the land of Israel, houses may be sold and fields let to them, these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: in the land of Israel, one may let to them houses but not fields; In Syria, we may sell them houses and let fields; Outside of the land of Israel, both may be sold.
One should not place animals in inns of non-Jews, because they are suspected of bestiality. A woman should not be alone with them, because they are suspected of licentiousness; Nor should a man be alone with them, because they are suspected of shedding blood. A Jewish woman should not act as midwife to a non-Jewish woman, because she would be delivering a child for idolatry. But a non-Jewish woman may act as midwife to a Jewish woman. A Jewish woman should not suckle the child of a non-Jewish woman, But a non-Jewish woman may suckle the child of a Jewish woman in her premises.
One should not place animals in inns of non-Jews, because they are suspected of bestiality. A woman should not be alone with them, because they are suspected of licentiousness; Nor should a man be alone with them, because they are suspected of shedding blood. A Jewish woman should not act as midwife to a non-Jewish woman, because she would be delivering a child for idolatry. But a non-Jewish woman may act as midwife to a Jewish woman. A Jewish woman should not suckle the child of a non-Jewish woman, But a non-Jewish woman may suckle the child of a Jewish woman in her premises.
One should not place animals in inns of non-Jews, because they are suspected of bestiality. A woman should not be alone with them, because they are suspected of licentiousness; Nor should a man be alone with them, because they are suspected of shedding blood. A Jewish woman should not act as midwife to a non-Jewish woman, because she would be delivering a child for idolatry. But a non-Jewish woman may act as midwife to a Jewish woman. A Jewish woman should not suckle the child of a non-Jewish woman, But a non-Jewish woman may suckle the child of a Jewish woman in her premises.
One should not place animals in inns of non-Jews, because they are suspected of bestiality. A woman should not be alone with them, because they are suspected of licentiousness; Nor should a man be alone with them, because they are suspected of shedding blood. A Jewish woman should not act as midwife to a non-Jewish woman, because she would be delivering a child for idolatry. But a non-Jewish woman may act as midwife to a Jewish woman. A Jewish woman should not suckle the child of a non-Jewish woman, But a non-Jewish woman may suckle the child of a Jewish woman in her premises.
One should not place animals in inns of non-Jews, because they are suspected of bestiality. A woman should not be alone with them, because they are suspected of licentiousness; Nor should a man be alone with them, because they are suspected of shedding blood. A Jewish woman should not act as midwife to a non-Jewish woman, because she would be delivering a child for idolatry. But a non-Jewish woman may act as midwife to a Jewish woman. A Jewish woman should not suckle the child of a non-Jewish woman, But a non-Jewish woman may suckle the child of a Jewish woman in her premises.
We may allow them to heal us when the healing relates to money, but not personal healing; Nor should we have our hair cut by them in any place, this is the opinion of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages said: in a public place it is permitted, but not when the two persons are alone.
If [a Jew] has a house next to an idolatrous shrine and it collapsed, he is forbidden to rebuild it. What should he do? He withdraws a distance of four cubits into his own ground and build there. [If the wall] belonged both to him and the shrine, it is judged as being half and half. Its stones, timber and rubbish defile like a creeping thing, as it says, “you shall utterly detest it” (Deut. 7:26). ] Rabbi Akiba says: [it defiles] like a menstruous woman, as it says, “[and you will treat as unclean the silver overlay of your images and the golden plating of your idols]. You will cast them away like a menstruous woman. Out, you will call to them” (Isaiah 30:22), just as a menstruous woman impurifies [an object] by carrying it, so also an idolatrous object defiles by its being carried.
They asked the elders in Rome, “If [your God] has no desire for idolatry, why does he not abolish it?” They replied, “If it was something unnecessary to the world that was worshipped, he would abolish it; but people worship the sun, moon, stars and planets; should he destroy his universe on account of fools!” They said [to the elders], “If so, he should destroy what is unnecessary for the world and leave what is necessary for the world!” They replied, “[If he did that], we should merely be strengthening the hands of the worshippers of these, because they would say, “know that these are deities, for behold they have not been abolished!”
They asked the elders in Rome, “If [your God] has no desire for idolatry, why does he not abolish it?” They replied, “If it was something unnecessary to the world that was worshipped, he would abolish it; but people worship the sun, moon, stars and planets; should he destroy his universe on account of fools!” They said [to the elders], “If so, he should destroy what is unnecessary for the world and leave what is necessary for the world!” They replied, “[If he did that], we should merely be strengthening the hands of the worshippers of these, because they would say, “know that these are deities, for behold they have not been abolished!”
They asked the elders in Rome, “If [your God] has no desire for idolatry, why does he not abolish it?” They replied, “If it was something unnecessary to the world that was worshipped, he would abolish it; but people worship the sun, moon, stars and planets; should he destroy his universe on account of fools!” They said [to the elders], “If so, he should destroy what is unnecessary for the world and leave what is necessary for the world!” They replied, “[If he did that], we should merely be strengthening the hands of the worshippers of these, because they would say, “know that these are deities, for behold they have not been abolished!”
If a non-Jew was found standing by the side of a vat of wine, if he had loaned money to the Jew, then [the wine] is prohibited; but should he not have loaned money to the Jew, then it is permitted. If [a non-Jew] fell into a vat and climbed out, or measured it with a reed, or flicked out a hornet with a reed, or tapped on the top of a frothing cask All of these things actually happened, and [the Rabbis] said that the wine may be sold, but Rabbi Shimon permits it [even to be drunk]. If [a non-Jew] took a cask, and in his anger threw it into the vat this actually happened and [the Rabbis] declared it fit [for drinking].
If [an Jew] prepares a non-Jew's wine in a state of ritual purity and leaves it in [the non-Jew’s] domain, in a house which is open to the public domain, should it be in a city where non-Jews and Jews reside, it is permitted. But should it be in a city where only non-Jews reside it is prohibited unless [an Jew] sits and guard. There is no need for the guard to sit and watch [the whole time]; even if he keeps going out and coming in it is permitted. Rabbi Shimon ben Eleazar says: it is all one with the domain of a non-Jew.
If [an Jew] prepares a non-Jew's wine in a state of ritual purity and leaves it in [the non-Jew’s] domain, in a house which is open to the public domain, should it be in a city where non-Jews and Jews reside, it is permitted. But should it be in a city where only non-Jews reside it is prohibited unless [an Jew] sits and guard. There is no need for the guard to sit and watch [the whole time]; even if he keeps going out and coming in it is permitted. Rabbi Shimon ben Eleazar says: it is all one with the domain of a non-Jew.
If yen nesekh fell upon grapes, one may rinse them and they are permitted, but if they were split they are prohibited. If it fell upon figs or upon dates, should there be in them [sufficient wine] to impart a flavor, they are prohibited. It happened with Boethus ben Zpnin that he carried dried figs in a ship and a cask of yen nesekh was broken and it fell upon them; and he consulted the Sages who declared them permitted. This is the general rule: whatever derives advantage [from yen nesekh by its] imparting a flavor is prohibited, but whatever does not derive advantage [from yen nesekh by its] imparting a flavor is permitted, as, for example vinegar which fell upon split beans.
If [a Jew] was eating with [a non-Jew] at a table and set some flasks upon the table and others upon a side-table and leaving them there went out, what is upon the table is prohibited and what is upon the side-table is permitted. And should he have said to him, “mix [some of the wine with water] and drink,” even what is upon the side-table is prohibited. Opened casks are prohibited, and the closed ones are permitted [except when he was absent a length of time] sufficient for [the non-Jew] to open it, put a new stopper on and [the new stopper] to become dry.
If a non-Jew sent to Jewish craftsmen a cask of yen nesekh as their wages, they are allowed to say to him, “give us its value in money”; But after [the wine] has come into their possession [the exchange] is prohibited. If [a Jew] sells his wine to a non-Jew, should he have set the price before he measured it out, the purchase-money is permitted; But should he have measured it out before he set the price, the purchase-money is prohibited. If [a Jew] took a funnel and measured [wine] into a non-Jew’s flask and then measured some into a Jew’s flask, should a drop of the [first] wine have remained [in the funnel], then [the wine measured into the second flask] is prohibited. If he poured from [his own] vessel into [a non-Jew’s] vessel, [the wine in the vessel] from which he poured is permitted and [the wine in the vessel] into which he poured is prohibited.
If a non-Jew sent to Jewish craftsmen a cask of yen nesekh as their wages, they are allowed to say to him, “give us its value in money”; But after [the wine] has come into their possession [the exchange] is prohibited. If [a Jew] sells his wine to a non-Jew, should he have set the price before he measured it out, the purchase-money is permitted; But should he have measured it out before he set the price, the purchase-money is prohibited. If [a Jew] took a funnel and measured [wine] into a non-Jew’s flask and then measured some into a Jew’s flask, should a drop of the [first] wine have remained [in the funnel], then [the wine measured into the second flask] is prohibited. If he poured from [his own] vessel into [a non-Jew’s] vessel, [the wine in the vessel] from which he poured is permitted and [the wine in the vessel] into which he poured is prohibited.
If a non-Jew sent to Jewish craftsmen a cask of yen nesekh as their wages, they are allowed to say to him, “give us its value in money”; But after [the wine] has come into their possession [the exchange] is prohibited. If [a Jew] sells his wine to a non-Jew, should he have set the price before he measured it out, the purchase-money is permitted; But should he have measured it out before he set the price, the purchase-money is prohibited. If [a Jew] took a funnel and measured [wine] into a non-Jew’s flask and then measured some into a Jew’s flask, should a drop of the [first] wine have remained [in the funnel], then [the wine measured into the second flask] is prohibited. If he poured from [his own] vessel into [a non-Jew’s] vessel, [the wine in the vessel] from which he poured is permitted and [the wine in the vessel] into which he poured is prohibited.
Rabbi said: which is the straight path that a man should choose for himself? One which is an honor to the person adopting it, and [on account of which] honor [accrues] to him from others. And be careful with a light commandment as with a grave one, for you did know not the reward for the fulfillment of the commandments. Also, reckon the loss [that may be sustained through the fulfillment] of a commandment against the reward [accruing] thereby, and the gain [that may be obtained through the committing] of a transgression against the loss [entailed] thereby. Apply your mind to three things and you will not come into the clutches of sin: Know what there is above you: an eye that sees, an ear that hears, and all your deeds are written in a book.