should
12262 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.
If the first [sister] had a co-wife, he can marry the co-wife, keep his wife, but the second [sister] is forbidden to him. That is “the sister of the co-wife of one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah is permitted to a person.” Should the co-wife not be forbidden to him as co-wife of a relative of one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah? Rebbi Yudan said, if he wanted to have intercourse with the co-wife before he married, would he not have been permitted? At the start, he is permitted; at the end, he is prohibited? If you say so, you are creating a co-wife after death and there can be no co-wife after death.
MISHNAH: Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters and the third is a bachelor. One of the sisters’ husbands died; the bachelor “bespoke” her; then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce, and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. That is what people say, he is unlucky with his wife and with his brother’s wife.
HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. Do the House of Shammai follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely? If they would follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, in case he had divorced the “bespoken” widow, she would not need ḥalîṣah! But Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the House of Shammai agree that if he divorced the “bespoken”, she needs ḥalîṣah! It must be they follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. If they would follow Rebbi Simeon, in any case, if “bespeaking” acquires, nothing follows it. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, why “his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? Maybe “bespeaking” for the House of Shammai is like candidacy for Rebbi Simeon in the interpretation of the rabbis there. As the rabbis there say, “bespeaking” acquires and leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, [candidacy] acquires and leaves a remainder. Rebbi Simeon says, no candidacy can come after a candidacy, so the House of Shammai say here, no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”.
Rebbi Yudan asked: If somebody gave qiddushin to a woman “from now and after thirty days” and her sister became a candidate for levirate with him during these thirty days, is even in this “his wife with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? He said, the House of Shammai said that only after candidacy and “bespeaking”. But that what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a hundred qiddushin are valid for her, does not follow the House of Shammai.
Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ḥalaphta from Haifa: Any who were married on the basis of such a document should not leave in order not to give a bad reputation to her children. His daughter who was married outside on the basis of such a document should not leave in order to damage her co-wife to her father. Her co-wife who was married outside on the basis of such a document has to leave. His daughter who married his brother on the basis of such a document has to leave. Her co-wife who was married to his brother on the basis of such a document, or even to her father, should not leave.
Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ḥalaphta from Haifa: Any who were married on the basis of such a document should not leave in order not to give a bad reputation to her children. His daughter who was married outside on the basis of such a document should not leave in order to damage her co-wife to her father. Her co-wife who was married outside on the basis of such a document has to leave. His daughter who married his brother on the basis of such a document has to leave. Her co-wife who was married to his brother on the basis of such a document, or even to her father, should not leave.
Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ḥalaphta from Haifa: Any who were married on the basis of such a document should not leave in order not to give a bad reputation to her children. His daughter who was married outside on the basis of such a document should not leave in order to damage her co-wife to her father. Her co-wife who was married outside on the basis of such a document has to leave. His daughter who married his brother on the basis of such a document has to leave. Her co-wife who was married to his brother on the basis of such a document, or even to her father, should not leave.
It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed, he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abun said, because it is invalid. So far, if the old man took the loan and [later] the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and [later] the son mortgaged, can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun said, and was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce. Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” etc. If he transgressed, but not from the start. That follows the Mishnah: “The widow should not perform ḥalîṣah or have levirate until after three months.” Why can she not have ḥalîṣah immediately? As you take it, if she has a live birth, ḥalîṣah did not affect her. If she has a still birth, she holds ḥalîṣah in her hand. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Hoshaiah stated: “My levir refuses.” To the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him one says: perform ḥalîṣah; but to the one to whom one cannot say: perform levirate, to him one cannot say: perform ḥalîṣah! What is the difference between them? If she had been acceptable and was desecrated, e. g., a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. According to him who says that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood; that one, who does not need a proclamation for the priesthood, should have ḥalîṣah. According to him who says that to the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him does one say: perform ḥalîṣah?
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” etc. If he transgressed, but not from the start. That follows the Mishnah: “The widow should not perform ḥalîṣah or have levirate until after three months.” Why can she not have ḥalîṣah immediately? As you take it, if she has a live birth, ḥalîṣah did not affect her. If she has a still birth, she holds ḥalîṣah in her hand. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Hoshaiah stated: “My levir refuses.” To the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him one says: perform ḥalîṣah; but to the one to whom one cannot say: perform levirate, to him one cannot say: perform ḥalîṣah! What is the difference between them? If she had been acceptable and was desecrated, e. g., a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. According to him who says that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood; that one, who does not need a proclamation for the priesthood, should have ḥalîṣah. According to him who says that to the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him does one say: perform ḥalîṣah?
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” etc. If he transgressed, but not from the start. That follows the Mishnah: “The widow should not perform ḥalîṣah or have levirate until after three months.” Why can she not have ḥalîṣah immediately? As you take it, if she has a live birth, ḥalîṣah did not affect her. If she has a still birth, she holds ḥalîṣah in her hand. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Hoshaiah stated: “My levir refuses.” To the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him one says: perform ḥalîṣah; but to the one to whom one cannot say: perform levirate, to him one cannot say: perform ḥalîṣah! What is the difference between them? If she had been acceptable and was desecrated, e. g., a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. According to him who says that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood; that one, who does not need a proclamation for the priesthood, should have ḥalîṣah. According to him who says that to the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him does one say: perform ḥalîṣah?
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” etc. If he transgressed, but not from the start. That follows the Mishnah: “The widow should not perform ḥalîṣah or have levirate until after three months.” Why can she not have ḥalîṣah immediately? As you take it, if she has a live birth, ḥalîṣah did not affect her. If she has a still birth, she holds ḥalîṣah in her hand. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Hoshaiah stated: “My levir refuses.” To the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him one says: perform ḥalîṣah; but to the one to whom one cannot say: perform levirate, to him one cannot say: perform ḥalîṣah! What is the difference between them? If she had been acceptable and was desecrated, e. g., a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. According to him who says that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood; that one, who does not need a proclamation for the priesthood, should have ḥalîṣah. According to him who says that to the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him does one say: perform ḥalîṣah?
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” etc. If he transgressed, but not from the start. That follows the Mishnah: “The widow should not perform ḥalîṣah or have levirate until after three months.” Why can she not have ḥalîṣah immediately? As you take it, if she has a live birth, ḥalîṣah did not affect her. If she has a still birth, she holds ḥalîṣah in her hand. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Hoshaiah stated: “My levir refuses.” To the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him one says: perform ḥalîṣah; but to the one to whom one cannot say: perform levirate, to him one cannot say: perform ḥalîṣah! What is the difference between them? If she had been acceptable and was desecrated, e. g., a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. According to him who says that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood; that one, who does not need a proclamation for the priesthood, should have ḥalîṣah. According to him who says that to the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him does one say: perform ḥalîṣah?
If there was ḥalîṣah during these three months, does she need another one after three months? Let us hear from the following: “A minor who performed ḥalîṣah should perform ḥalîṣah after she grows up; if she performed [only one] ḥalîṣah, the ḥalîṣah she performed is valid.” Rebbi Mana said it anonymously, Rebbi Isaac the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya brought it in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan; this is Rebbi Meïr‘s, since Rebbi Meïr says one does neither perform ḥalîṣah nor levirate with a minor: maybe she would turn out to be a she-ram. As you say there, even though she already performed ḥalîṣah, she again performs ḥalîṣah; so here also though she did perform ḥalîṣah, she performs ḥalîṣah.
Rebbi Yudan asked: If he performed ḥalîṣah with a pregnant woman and she had a miscarriage? Let us hear from the following: If somebody died and left a pregnant widow, should I think that she must have recourse to her levir? The verse says, “that his name should not be extinguished from Israel,” only one whose name is extinguished. The verse says, “to establish a name in Israel for his brother,” until you know whether there is a live child or not. I could think that the wife of an eunuch should need levirate, the verse says “that his name should not be extinguished from Israel,” only one whose name is not extinguished; this excludes this one whose name was already extinguished.
Rebbi Yudan asked: If he performed ḥalîṣah with a pregnant woman and she had a miscarriage? Let us hear from the following: If somebody died and left a pregnant widow, should I think that she must have recourse to her levir? The verse says, “that his name should not be extinguished from Israel,” only one whose name is extinguished. The verse says, “to establish a name in Israel for his brother,” until you know whether there is a live child or not. I could think that the wife of an eunuch should need levirate, the verse says “that his name should not be extinguished from Israel,” only one whose name is not extinguished; this excludes this one whose name was already extinguished.
Rebbi Yudan asked: If he performed ḥalîṣah with a pregnant woman and she had a miscarriage? Let us hear from the following: If somebody died and left a pregnant widow, should I think that she must have recourse to her levir? The verse says, “that his name should not be extinguished from Israel,” only one whose name is extinguished. The verse says, “to establish a name in Israel for his brother,” until you know whether there is a live child or not. I could think that the wife of an eunuch should need levirate, the verse says “that his name should not be extinguished from Israel,” only one whose name is not extinguished; this excludes this one whose name was already extinguished.
Rebbi Yudan asked: If he performed ḥalîṣah with a pregnant woman and she had a miscarriage? Let us hear from the following: If somebody died and left a pregnant widow, should I think that she must have recourse to her levir? The verse says, “that his name should not be extinguished from Israel,” only one whose name is extinguished. The verse says, “to establish a name in Israel for his brother,” until you know whether there is a live child or not. I could think that the wife of an eunuch should need levirate, the verse says “that his name should not be extinguished from Israel,” only one whose name is not extinguished; this excludes this one whose name was already extinguished.
Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”
How do we hold? If he came to her immediately after her husband’s death, and the fetus was recognized after two months, one should have stated: A nine-month child of either one of them or a seven-month of either one of them! But it may be that he came to her after two months and the fetus was recognized after three months, one should have stated: The sister-in-law should not perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate until after five months! But it must be that he came to her after 40 days and the fetus was recognized after 50 days. That would be complete months for [a child of] the first [brother] and incomplete ones for the second. This implies that a woman may give birth after full months. This implies that there are two creations. This implies that a woman may give birth after incomplete months. This implies that a woman may become pregnant repeatedly. This implies that a woman cannot become pregnant simultaneously from two men. And it disagrees with the sermonizing rabbis, since the sermonizing rabbis say “the middleman” “from the orders of the Philistines”, from 100 prepuces of Philistines, that 100 prepuces of Philistines touched her. Rebbi Mattaniah said, there is no disagreement. As long as the semen is not spoiled, a woman can become pregnant from several men simultaneously. After the semen is spoiled, a woman cannot become pregnant from several men simultaneously.
How do we hold? If he came to her immediately after her husband’s death, and the fetus was recognized after two months, one should have stated: A nine-month child of either one of them or a seven-month of either one of them! But it may be that he came to her after two months and the fetus was recognized after three months, one should have stated: The sister-in-law should not perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate until after five months! But it must be that he came to her after 40 days and the fetus was recognized after 50 days. That would be complete months for [a child of] the first [brother] and incomplete ones for the second. This implies that a woman may give birth after full months. This implies that there are two creations. This implies that a woman may give birth after incomplete months. This implies that a woman may become pregnant repeatedly. This implies that a woman cannot become pregnant simultaneously from two men. And it disagrees with the sermonizing rabbis, since the sermonizing rabbis say “the middleman” “from the orders of the Philistines”, from 100 prepuces of Philistines, that 100 prepuces of Philistines touched her. Rebbi Mattaniah said, there is no disagreement. As long as the semen is not spoiled, a woman can become pregnant from several men simultaneously. After the semen is spoiled, a woman cannot become pregnant from several men simultaneously.
How do we hold? If he came to her immediately after her husband’s death, and the fetus was recognized after two months, one should have stated: A nine-month child of either one of them or a seven-month of either one of them! But it may be that he came to her after two months and the fetus was recognized after three months, one should have stated: The sister-in-law should not perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate until after five months! But it must be that he came to her after 40 days and the fetus was recognized after 50 days. That would be complete months for [a child of] the first [brother] and incomplete ones for the second. This implies that a woman may give birth after full months. This implies that there are two creations. This implies that a woman may give birth after incomplete months. This implies that a woman may become pregnant repeatedly. This implies that a woman cannot become pregnant simultaneously from two men. And it disagrees with the sermonizing rabbis, since the sermonizing rabbis say “the middleman” “from the orders of the Philistines”, from 100 prepuces of Philistines, that 100 prepuces of Philistines touched her. Rebbi Mattaniah said, there is no disagreement. As long as the semen is not spoiled, a woman can become pregnant from several men simultaneously. After the semen is spoiled, a woman cannot become pregnant from several men simultaneously.
MISHNAH: If property came to a woman waiting for her levir, the House of Shammai agree with the House of Hillel that she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah and property that enters and leaves with her? The House of Shammai say, the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs. But the House of Hillel say that all property remains where it is; the ketubah in the hands of the husband’s heirs and property that enters and leaves with her in the hands of her father’s heirs.
HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah?” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.
HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah?” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.
HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah?” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.
Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna said: A betrothed woman who died does not have a ketubah since she was not permitted to marry outside. That you should not say [the case] should be considered as if he divorced her and she should have a ketubah; therefore it was necessary to say that she does not have a ketubah.
Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna said: A betrothed woman who died does not have a ketubah since she was not permitted to marry outside. That you should not say [the case] should be considered as if he divorced her and she should have a ketubah; therefore it was necessary to say that she does not have a ketubah.
Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna said: A betrothed woman who died does not have a ketubah since she was not permitted to marry outside. That you should not say [the case] should be considered as if he divorced her and she should have a ketubah; therefore it was necessary to say that she does not have a ketubah.
HALAKHAH: “He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance,” etc. That one should not say, ḥalîṣah is freeing, intercourse is freeing; just as you say, “he who marries his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property,” so he who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property. Therefore, it is necessary to say “he is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance”.
MISHNAH: No sister-in-law should be a party to ḥalîṣah or levirate until after three months. Similarly, no woman should be married or receive qiddushin until after three months, whether virgin or not virgin, widow or divorcee, married or betrothed. Rebbi Jehudah says, those that had been married may receive qiddushin and those that had received qiddushin can be married except those that had received qiddushin in Judea because he is familiar with her. Rebbi Yose said, any woman may receive qiddushin except a widow because of her mourning.
MISHNAH: No sister-in-law should be a party to ḥalîṣah or levirate until after three months. Similarly, no woman should be married or receive qiddushin until after three months, whether virgin or not virgin, widow or divorcee, married or betrothed. Rebbi Jehudah says, those that had been married may receive qiddushin and those that had received qiddushin can be married except those that had received qiddushin in Judea because he is familiar with her. Rebbi Yose said, any woman may receive qiddushin except a widow because of her mourning.
HALAKHAH: “No sister-in-law should be a party to ḥalîṣah,” etc. How long is it until a pregnancy is recognized? Symmachos said in the name of Rebbi Meїr: After three months. Even though it is no proof, there is a hint: “It was after about three months.” Rebbi Yudan said, even for a phantom pregnancy, “we were pregnant, we were sick, as if we gave birth to wind,” “get pregnant with dry grass, give birth to straw.” Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra said, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya: Even most of the first, most of the last, and the middle one complete. Rav Assi said, a full 90 days. Samuel said, they in their fulness. A case came before the rabbis there; we do not know if thirteen of the first and seventeen of the last or seventeen of the first and thirteen of the last, and five complete ones in the middle; they wanted to touch the child because of a doubt of bastardy. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob told them, such a case came before Abba bar Abba and he declared it acceptable. Does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Abba said, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth. A pregnancy is recognized after full months, a birth can happen after fractional months. There, we have stated: “How long can labor be? Rebbi Meїr said, even 40 to 50 days. Rebbi Jehudah said, her month is sufficient. Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon say, no labor is longer than two weeks”. “Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after fractional months. Since otherwise one should have stated “thirty days”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after full months. Since we have stated: “Her month is sufficient.”
HALAKHAH: “No sister-in-law should be a party to ḥalîṣah,” etc. How long is it until a pregnancy is recognized? Symmachos said in the name of Rebbi Meїr: After three months. Even though it is no proof, there is a hint: “It was after about three months.” Rebbi Yudan said, even for a phantom pregnancy, “we were pregnant, we were sick, as if we gave birth to wind,” “get pregnant with dry grass, give birth to straw.” Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra said, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya: Even most of the first, most of the last, and the middle one complete. Rav Assi said, a full 90 days. Samuel said, they in their fulness. A case came before the rabbis there; we do not know if thirteen of the first and seventeen of the last or seventeen of the first and thirteen of the last, and five complete ones in the middle; they wanted to touch the child because of a doubt of bastardy. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob told them, such a case came before Abba bar Abba and he declared it acceptable. Does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Abba said, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth. A pregnancy is recognized after full months, a birth can happen after fractional months. There, we have stated: “How long can labor be? Rebbi Meїr said, even 40 to 50 days. Rebbi Jehudah said, her month is sufficient. Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon say, no labor is longer than two weeks”. “Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after fractional months. Since otherwise one should have stated “thirty days”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after full months. Since we have stated: “Her month is sufficient.”
The woman who performs ḥalîṣah counts from the moment of death. The one who leaves by a bill of divorce counts from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Ḥanina said, from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the moment of writing. Rav and Samuel, Rav like Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel like Rebbi Joḥanan. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you, since you say from the moment of delivery, about what are you suspicious? Because in the meantime she was alone with him! Then one should worry about an old bill of divorce! Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan: According to you, since you say from the moment of writing, if there were two bills of divorce, one written now and one later, and both delivered on the same day. This one you prohibit and that one you permit! What Rav objected to Samuel, Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan. What Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel objected to Rav. Practice: She counts from the time of writing if he never was alone with her.
Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said, it is written: “His house should be called in Israel the house of the shoe-stripped.” A house which was permitted by one stripping. The same is true for intercourse. Stripping frees and intercourse frees. What you say about stripping you say about intercourse.
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
That means that invalid intercourse does not free. Come and see, invalid ḥalîṣah frees but invalid intercourse does not free! Since the purpose of ḥalîṣah is invalidation, it frees. Intercourse, whose purpose is not invalidation, does not free. It should not free for leniency but might free for restriction. In which respect? If somebody came and gave qiddushin to the co-wife, these should lay hold on her. Rebbi Yudan said, I explained it. Any sister-in-law who is not totally outside remains inside until she leaves for the outside.
That means that invalid intercourse does not free. Come and see, invalid ḥalîṣah frees but invalid intercourse does not free! Since the purpose of ḥalîṣah is invalidation, it frees. Intercourse, whose purpose is not invalidation, does not free. It should not free for leniency but might free for restriction. In which respect? If somebody came and gave qiddushin to the co-wife, these should lay hold on her. Rebbi Yudan said, I explained it. Any sister-in-law who is not totally outside remains inside until she leaves for the outside.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody comes to his sister-in-law,” etc. We have stated: “Even if he is in error and she acts criminally, or he does it criminally but she is in error.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Even if both act in error, even if both act criminally. They wanted to say, a hearing person who is competent acquires both if he has the intention and if he does not have the intention but the deaf-mute, who is not competent, should acquire only if he has the intention. It was found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Both the deaf-mute and the insane who copulated acquired [the widow] and freed the co-wives.
What is touching? Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: That the finger should be seen between the lips. Rebbi Joḥanan said, until the gland enters. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When the gland has entered that is completion of intercourse. What are we dealing with? If about incest prohibitions, He made the one who touches equal to him who finishes. If for a bound slave girl, until he ejaculates, since Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, said in the name of Rav: “Flow of semen”, until he ejaculates. But we must deal with a widow for the High Priest. When he touched her, he became guilty for desecrating her. When the gland entered, he became guilty for having intercourse. When he ejaculated, he became guilty because “he shall not desecrate his semen in his people.”
May she eat heave? Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: It is reasonable that she should eat if she was eating during her husband’s lifetime; otherwise she may not eat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she eats even if she did not eat before. Rebbi Yose said, even if she was only able to eat. There is a baraita in support of either one. There is a baraita supporting Samuel: A hearing daughter of an Israel who married a deaf-mute Cohen does not eat heave. If he died and she came before the levir, if he is hearing, she eats, deaf-mute does not eat. There is a baraita supporting Rebbi Joḥanan: A hearing daughter of an Israel who became engaged to a hearing Cohen, who did not manage to bring her to the bridal chamber before he became deaf-mute or before she became deaf-mute, does not eat heave. If he died and she came before a levir she eats even if he is deaf-mute. In this He increased the power of the levir over that of the husband since the deaf-mute levir enables her to eat, but the deaf-mute husband does not enable her to eat.
HALAKHAH: “Similarly, anybody who comes upon any of the incest-prohibited women,” etc. “He should not take a widow.” Even if under duress? The verse says, “he shall not desecrate his seed in his people.” Even if he touched? The verse does not say לא יחול but לא יחלל, even under duress; לא יחול but לא יחלל, even by touching. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: It says here “taking” and it says there “taking” referring to incest prohibitions. Since regarding “taking” referred to by incest prohibitions He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked, if regarding “taking” referred to by incest prohibitions He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and the child is a bastard, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and treat the child as a bastard. Rebbi Yosa said, for which purpose was “desecrated” written? Is not bastard worse than desecrated? Rebbi Abun bar Bisna came in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal. It says here “taking” and it says there “taking” referring to the woman waiting for the levir. Since regarding “taking” referring to the one waiting for the levir He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and the child is acceptable, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and treat the child as acceptable, since Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said: When he touched, he became guilty because of the desecrated one. When the gland entered, he became guilty for having intercourse. When he ejaculated, he became guilty because of desecrating.
HALAKHAH: “Similarly, anybody who comes upon any of the incest-prohibited women,” etc. “He should not take a widow.” Even if under duress? The verse says, “he shall not desecrate his seed in his people.” Even if he touched? The verse does not say לא יחול but לא יחלל, even under duress; לא יחול but לא יחלל, even by touching. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: It says here “taking” and it says there “taking” referring to incest prohibitions. Since regarding “taking” referred to by incest prohibitions He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked, if regarding “taking” referred to by incest prohibitions He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and the child is a bastard, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and treat the child as a bastard. Rebbi Yosa said, for which purpose was “desecrated” written? Is not bastard worse than desecrated? Rebbi Abun bar Bisna came in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal. It says here “taking” and it says there “taking” referring to the woman waiting for the levir. Since regarding “taking” referring to the one waiting for the levir He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and the child is acceptable, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and treat the child as acceptable, since Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said: When he touched, he became guilty because of the desecrated one. When the gland entered, he became guilty for having intercourse. When he ejaculated, he became guilty because of desecrating.
HALAKHAH: “Similarly, anybody who comes upon any of the incest-prohibited women,” etc. “He should not take a widow.” Even if under duress? The verse says, “he shall not desecrate his seed in his people.” Even if he touched? The verse does not say לא יחול but לא יחלל, even under duress; לא יחול but לא יחלל, even by touching. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: It says here “taking” and it says there “taking” referring to incest prohibitions. Since regarding “taking” referred to by incest prohibitions He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked, if regarding “taking” referred to by incest prohibitions He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and the child is a bastard, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and treat the child as a bastard. Rebbi Yosa said, for which purpose was “desecrated” written? Is not bastard worse than desecrated? Rebbi Abun bar Bisna came in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal. It says here “taking” and it says there “taking” referring to the woman waiting for the levir. Since regarding “taking” referring to the one waiting for the levir He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and the child is acceptable, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and treat the child as acceptable, since Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said: When he touched, he became guilty because of the desecrated one. When the gland entered, he became guilty for having intercourse. When he ejaculated, he became guilty because of desecrating.
HALAKHAH: “Similarly, anybody who comes upon any of the incest-prohibited women,” etc. “He should not take a widow.” Even if under duress? The verse says, “he shall not desecrate his seed in his people.” Even if he touched? The verse does not say לא יחול but לא יחלל, even under duress; לא יחול but לא יחלל, even by touching. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: It says here “taking” and it says there “taking” referring to incest prohibitions. Since regarding “taking” referred to by incest prohibitions He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked, if regarding “taking” referred to by incest prohibitions He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and the child is a bastard, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and treat the child as a bastard. Rebbi Yosa said, for which purpose was “desecrated” written? Is not bastard worse than desecrated? Rebbi Abun bar Bisna came in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal. It says here “taking” and it says there “taking” referring to the woman waiting for the levir. Since regarding “taking” referring to the one waiting for the levir He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and the child is acceptable, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and treat the child as acceptable, since Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said: When he touched, he became guilty because of the desecrated one. When the gland entered, he became guilty for having intercourse. When he ejaculated, he became guilty because of desecrating.
HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.
HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.
A sister injured by a piece of wood, Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon say, he shall not defile himself for her, but the Sages say, he must defile himself for her. Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon follow well what they have stated, but the argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “a girl”, not an adult, “a virgin”, not one injured by a piece of wood; and here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. There, “and for his virgin sister”, that excludes the raped and the seduced one. Or maybe I should exclude the one injured by a piece of wood? The verse says, “who had not been a man’s.” Who became [deflowered] through the action of a man, not one who became it through something else. “The close one”, to include the betrothed one. “To him”, to include the adult. The argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “the close one”, to exclude the betrothed one, “to him”, to exclude the divorcee. And here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. “His sister” is always inside [the family] until she leaves; his betrothed is always outside until she enters.
His own rape victim or seduced woman he should not marry but if he married her one does not remove her from him. Somebody else’s rape victim or seduced woman he should not marry but if he married her one does remove her from him. He should not marry a minor but he may marry the one who repudiated. Is the one who repudiated not a minor? One waits until she grows up.
His own rape victim or seduced woman he should not marry but if he married her one does not remove her from him. Somebody else’s rape victim or seduced woman he should not marry but if he married her one does remove her from him. He should not marry a minor but he may marry the one who repudiated. Is the one who repudiated not a minor? One waits until she grows up.
His own rape victim or seduced woman he should not marry but if he married her one does not remove her from him. Somebody else’s rape victim or seduced woman he should not marry but if he married her one does remove her from him. He should not marry a minor but he may marry the one who repudiated. Is the one who repudiated not a minor? One waits until she grows up.
MISHNAH: A private priest should not marry a she-ram unless he has a wife and children. Rebbi Jehudah says, even one who has a wife and children should not marry a she-ram since she is the harlot mentioned in the Torah. But the Sages say, a harlot is only a convert, a freedwoman, and one who copulated in harlotry.
MISHNAH: A private priest should not marry a she-ram unless he has a wife and children. Rebbi Jehudah says, even one who has a wife and children should not marry a she-ram since she is the harlot mentioned in the Torah. But the Sages say, a harlot is only a convert, a freedwoman, and one who copulated in harlotry.
HALAKHAH: “A private priest should not marry a she-ram,” etc. Does that mean that an Israel without wife and children may marry her? Still he is forbidden. But since we stated afterwards that “a harlot mentioned in the Torah is only a convert, a freedwoman, and one who copulated in harlotry,” all of which refer only to priests, for this reason it was not stated.
MISHNAH: A man should not rest from being fruitful and multiply unless he has children. The House of Shammai say two males, but the House of Hillel say a male and a female, as it is said “male and female He created them.” If he married a wife and she stayed with him for ten years and had no child he is not permitted to rest. If he divorced her, she is permitted to marry another and the second [husband] is permitted to stay with her for ten years, and if she had a miscarriage she counts from the moment of the miscarriage. The man is commanded to be fruitful and multiply but not the woman. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said, for both of them it says “God blessed them and God said to them, be fruitful and multiply,” etc.
HALAKHAH: “A man should not rest from being fruitful and multiply,” etc. The House of Shammai say two males, since “Gershom and Eliezer” are mentioned for Moses. The House of Hillel say a male and a female the way the world was created, as it is said “male and female He created them.” Rebbi Abun said, one has to understand “even a male and a female”. If it were not so, it should have been a Mishnah about the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel. Sons of sons are counted as sons, sons of daughters are not counted as sons. The son’s son and the daughter’s daughter count; the son’s daughter and the daughter’s son do not count. A she-ram, a castrate, and those who cannot have children are not counted.
HALAKHAH: “A man should not rest from being fruitful and multiply,” etc. The House of Shammai say two males, since “Gershom and Eliezer” are mentioned for Moses. The House of Hillel say a male and a female the way the world was created, as it is said “male and female He created them.” Rebbi Abun said, one has to understand “even a male and a female”. If it were not so, it should have been a Mishnah about the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel. Sons of sons are counted as sons, sons of daughters are not counted as sons. The son’s son and the daughter’s daughter count; the son’s daughter and the daughter’s son do not count. A she-ram, a castrate, and those who cannot have children are not counted.
If she had intercourse and saw blood repeatedly. Some Tannaïm state, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not. But some Tannaïm state, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah. But he who says, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. If one gave birth to male childen and they died when being circumcised. Some Tannaïm state, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise. Some Tannaïm state, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah He who says, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. Even he, who says that the third time she has ketubah agrees here that one should not circumcise because of the danger. It was stated: Rebbi Nathan said, it happened that I went to Kappadokian Caesarea, and there was a woman who gave birth to male children and they died when being circumcised. She circumcised the first [child] and he died, the second and he died, the third and he died. She brought the fourth one before me, I looked at him and saw that he did not have enough blood for circumcision. I told them, wait for later. They waited, circumsised him, he turned out to be living, and they called him Nathan after me.
If she had intercourse and saw blood repeatedly. Some Tannaïm state, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not. But some Tannaïm state, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah. But he who says, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. If one gave birth to male childen and they died when being circumcised. Some Tannaïm state, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise. Some Tannaïm state, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah He who says, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. Even he, who says that the third time she has ketubah agrees here that one should not circumcise because of the danger. It was stated: Rebbi Nathan said, it happened that I went to Kappadokian Caesarea, and there was a woman who gave birth to male children and they died when being circumcised. She circumcised the first [child] and he died, the second and he died, the third and he died. She brought the fourth one before me, I looked at him and saw that he did not have enough blood for circumcision. I told them, wait for later. They waited, circumsised him, he turned out to be living, and they called him Nathan after me.
If she had intercourse and saw blood repeatedly. Some Tannaïm state, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not. But some Tannaïm state, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah. But he who says, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. If one gave birth to male childen and they died when being circumcised. Some Tannaïm state, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise. Some Tannaïm state, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah He who says, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. Even he, who says that the third time she has ketubah agrees here that one should not circumcise because of the danger. It was stated: Rebbi Nathan said, it happened that I went to Kappadokian Caesarea, and there was a woman who gave birth to male children and they died when being circumcised. She circumcised the first [child] and he died, the second and he died, the third and he died. She brought the fourth one before me, I looked at him and saw that he did not have enough blood for circumcision. I told them, wait for later. They waited, circumsised him, he turned out to be living, and they called him Nathan after me.
If she had intercourse and saw blood repeatedly. Some Tannaïm state, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not. But some Tannaïm state, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah. But he who says, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. If one gave birth to male childen and they died when being circumcised. Some Tannaïm state, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise. Some Tannaïm state, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah He who says, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. Even he, who says that the third time she has ketubah agrees here that one should not circumcise because of the danger. It was stated: Rebbi Nathan said, it happened that I went to Kappadokian Caesarea, and there was a woman who gave birth to male children and they died when being circumcised. She circumcised the first [child] and he died, the second and he died, the third and he died. She brought the fourth one before me, I looked at him and saw that he did not have enough blood for circumcision. I told them, wait for later. They waited, circumsised him, he turned out to be living, and they called him Nathan after me.
If she had intercourse and saw blood repeatedly. Some Tannaïm state, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not. But some Tannaïm state, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah. But he who says, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. If one gave birth to male childen and they died when being circumcised. Some Tannaïm state, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise. Some Tannaïm state, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah He who says, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. Even he, who says that the third time she has ketubah agrees here that one should not circumcise because of the danger. It was stated: Rebbi Nathan said, it happened that I went to Kappadokian Caesarea, and there was a woman who gave birth to male children and they died when being circumcised. She circumcised the first [child] and he died, the second and he died, the third and he died. She brought the fourth one before me, I looked at him and saw that he did not have enough blood for circumcision. I told them, wait for later. They waited, circumsised him, he turned out to be living, and they called him Nathan after me.
If she had intercourse and saw blood repeatedly. Some Tannaïm state, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not. But some Tannaïm state, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah. But he who says, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. If one gave birth to male childen and they died when being circumcised. Some Tannaïm state, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise. Some Tannaïm state, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah He who says, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. Even he, who says that the third time she has ketubah agrees here that one should not circumcise because of the danger. It was stated: Rebbi Nathan said, it happened that I went to Kappadokian Caesarea, and there was a woman who gave birth to male children and they died when being circumcised. She circumcised the first [child] and he died, the second and he died, the third and he died. She brought the fourth one before me, I looked at him and saw that he did not have enough blood for circumcision. I told them, wait for later. They waited, circumsised him, he turned out to be living, and they called him Nathan after me.
If she had intercourse and saw blood repeatedly. Some Tannaïm state, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not. But some Tannaïm state, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah. But he who says, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. If one gave birth to male childen and they died when being circumcised. Some Tannaïm state, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise. Some Tannaïm state, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah He who says, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. Even he, who says that the third time she has ketubah agrees here that one should not circumcise because of the danger. It was stated: Rebbi Nathan said, it happened that I went to Kappadokian Caesarea, and there was a woman who gave birth to male children and they died when being circumcised. She circumcised the first [child] and he died, the second and he died, the third and he died. She brought the fourth one before me, I looked at him and saw that he did not have enough blood for circumcision. I told them, wait for later. They waited, circumsised him, he turned out to be living, and they called him Nathan after me.
If she had intercourse and saw blood repeatedly. Some Tannaïm state, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not. But some Tannaïm state, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah. But he who says, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. If one gave birth to male childen and they died when being circumcised. Some Tannaïm state, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise. Some Tannaïm state, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah He who says, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. Even he, who says that the third time she has ketubah agrees here that one should not circumcise because of the danger. It was stated: Rebbi Nathan said, it happened that I went to Kappadokian Caesarea, and there was a woman who gave birth to male children and they died when being circumcised. She circumcised the first [child] and he died, the second and he died, the third and he died. She brought the fourth one before me, I looked at him and saw that he did not have enough blood for circumcision. I told them, wait for later. They waited, circumsised him, he turned out to be living, and they called him Nathan after me.
If she had intercourse and saw blood repeatedly. Some Tannaïm state, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not. But some Tannaïm state, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah. But he who says, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. If one gave birth to male childen and they died when being circumcised. Some Tannaïm state, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise. Some Tannaïm state, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah He who says, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. Even he, who says that the third time she has ketubah agrees here that one should not circumcise because of the danger. It was stated: Rebbi Nathan said, it happened that I went to Kappadokian Caesarea, and there was a woman who gave birth to male children and they died when being circumcised. She circumcised the first [child] and he died, the second and he died, the third and he died. She brought the fourth one before me, I looked at him and saw that he did not have enough blood for circumcision. I told them, wait for later. They waited, circumsised him, he turned out to be living, and they called him Nathan after me.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Zimra: The reason of that Tanna: “Be fruitful and multiply, fill the earth and conquer it.” It is written “he shall conquer it.” Who usually conquers? The man, not the woman. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Isaac bar Marion, in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa and Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqula in the name of Rebbi Jehudah Neśia: If she requests to be married, she has the law on her side. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said to him, I was with you and it was only said that if she requests to be married, she has the law on her side. In a similar case, referring to what we have stated there: “In the week in which the Ninth of Av falls, it is forbidden to get a haircut and to wash. But on Thursday one is permitted, in preparation for the Sabbath.” Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Rebbi wanted to do away with the Ninth of Av but they did not let him. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, I was with you and it was only said that Rebbi wanted to do away with the Ninth of Av which happened to be on the Sabbath but they did not let him. He said, since it is pushed away, let it be pushed away. They said to him, it should be pushed to the next day. He recited on these: “Two are better than one.”
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.
The offspring of a paraphernalia animal belongs to the husband, that of a paraphernalia slave girl belongs to the wife. Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua said, the offspring of a paraphernalia animal is like that of a paraphernalia slave girl. Rebbi Eleazar said to the colleagues, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan follows Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. Rav and Samuel, Rav follows the rabbis, but Samuel follows Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you who says, they belong to the wife, should the first-born not take a double portion? Think of it, if she brought them when they were small and they grew up, are they not the wife’s, and you agree with me that the first-born takes a double portion!
The offspring of a paraphernalia animal belongs to the husband, that of a paraphernalia slave girl belongs to the wife. Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua said, the offspring of a paraphernalia animal is like that of a paraphernalia slave girl. Rebbi Eleazar said to the colleagues, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan follows Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. Rav and Samuel, Rav follows the rabbis, but Samuel follows Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you who says, they belong to the wife, should the first-born not take a double portion? Think of it, if she brought them when they were small and they grew up, are they not the wife’s, and you agree with me that the first-born takes a double portion!
It was stated: If she brought them when they were small, she takes them when they are lads. If she brought him two vessels. If one of them was worth the value of her marriage contract, she takes it for her marriage contract. If one and a half was the value of her marriage contract, [disagreement of] Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman bar Jacob. One of them said, he pays for the second vessel and takes it; the other one says, she pays for the second vessel and takes it. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said before Rebbi Immi, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Even if one was worth one and a half times the value of her marriage contract, she pays for the second vessel and takes it, because it is unthinkable that others should use her vessels. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: A baraita says so: If she brought them for their monetary value, she takes them for their monetary value.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Eleazar said, so is the Mishnah: Her slaves may eat, his slaves may not eat. For if it were not so, she would eat but her slaves would not eat! Rebbi Josia in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it is from this, she also should not eat. Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Not that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees, he only said, for if it were not so, she would eat but her slaves would not eat. There came a case before Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. He said, go out and look how the public behaves. Rebbi Abin said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, not only this practice, but in any practical question which is weak in court and you do not know how to decide, go out and see how the public acts, and act accordingly. And we see that they do not eat. Rebbi Yose said, this means that [the fetus] does not disable anybody able to eat and does not enable anybody unable to eat.
HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?
HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?
HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?
HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?
HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?
“If they are unable to marry in Israel they disable.” These are: “A child of nine years and one day, an Ammonite, Moabite, or Egyptian proselyte, or a bastard, desecrated, Gibeonite, Samaritan, and Gentile who had intercourse with the daughter of an Israel, a Cohen, or a Levite, disqualified her for the priesthood. Rebbi Yose said, everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified; his intercourse does not disqualify those whose descendant would not be disqualified. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in all cases, if his daughter is permitted to you, so is his widow; if his daughter is not permitted to you, neither is his widow.” In what do they differ? Rebbi Joḥanan says, an Ammonite or Moabite proselyte is between them. For him who says, everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified, here since his descendant would be disqualified, his intercourse disqualifies. For him who says, if you may marry his daughter you may marry his widow, here since you may marry his daughter you may marry his widow. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of [the rabbis], Rebbi Abba, both say: Regarding the daughter of an Ammonite or Moabite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian, even though his daughter is permitted to you, his widow is forbidden to you. Rebbi Zakkai: Rebbi Alexander sent to ask [about] the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte and the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian. Rebbi Yose said to him, did you not hear that Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of the rabbis, Rebbi Abba, both say: Regarding the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian, even though his daughter is permitted to you, his widow is forbidden to you. And everybody’s intercourse disqualifies whose descendant would be disqualified. Do we not need it when her mother was from Israel? That you should not say that since her mother was desecrated so her daughter was desecrated. In addition, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed, the daughter of an Ammonite proselyte or the daughter of a second-generation Egyptian, Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are acceptable, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they are disqualified. Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, they disagree about the old women: Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are acceptable, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they are disqualified.
HALAKHAH: “The uncircumcised and any impure persons,” etc. “Every man”, to include the uncircumcised. Or “every man” to include the mourner? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, it is written, “no outsider shall eat sanctified [food]”. I forbade to you because of outside status, I did not forbid because of prepuce. The reddish Rebbi Tiufa asked before Rebbi Yose: may we not say, I did not forbid because of prepuce and because of mourning? He said to him, since one verse includes and the other excludes, I am including the uncircumcised who is missing some procedure performed on his body and excluding the mourner who is not missing some procedure performed on his body. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: It said “sojourner and hireling” with regard to Passover and “sojourner and hireling” with regard to heave. Since “sojourner and hireling” with regard to Passover implies disabling the uncircumcised, so “sojourner and hireling” with regard to heave must imply disabling the uncircumcised. Rebbi Ḥaggai questioned: If “sojourner and hireling” with regard to Passover is in a group of laws disabling the mourner, also “sojourner and hireling” with regard to heave should imply disabling the mourner. Rebbi Hila answered: They inferred from “under, under” only items mentioned in the paragraph. The sexless and the hermaphrodite came under another category. The mourner comes from second tithe.
Rebbi Abun asked: Should not heave be forbidden to the mourner by an inference de minore ad majus? Since tithe, which is permitted to outsiders, is forbidden to the mourner, should not heave, which is forbidden to outsiders, be forbidden to the mourner? No. If you said it about tithe which needs an enclosure, what can you say about heave which does not need an enclosure? Therefore, since each of them has an aspect missing in the other, they cannot teach an inference from one to the other.
Rebbi Abun asked: Should not heave be forbidden to the mourner by an inference de minore ad majus? Since tithe, which is permitted to outsiders, is forbidden to the mourner, should not heave, which is forbidden to outsiders, be forbidden to the mourner? No. If you said it about tithe which needs an enclosure, what can you say about heave which does not need an enclosure? Therefore, since each of them has an aspect missing in the other, they cannot teach an inference from one to the other.
Is it free? Has it not been used for a derivation? As it was stated: “Sojourner”, that is the one who is permanently acquired, “hireling” the one temporarily acquired. It should only say “sojourner”; why does the verse mention “hireling”? Should the one who is permanently acquired be forbidden to eat and the one temporarily acquired be permitted? But I would have said that “sojourner” means the one temporarily acquired; the mention of the “hireling” teaches that “sojourner” means the one permanently acquired. Rebbi Mathias said, since it is written “no uncircumcised person may eat from it,” it is as if free from one side.
Is it free? Has it not been used for a derivation? As it was stated: “Sojourner”, that is the one who is permanently acquired, “hireling” the one temporarily acquired. It should only say “sojourner”; why does the verse mention “hireling”? Should the one who is permanently acquired be forbidden to eat and the one temporarily acquired be permitted? But I would have said that “sojourner” means the one temporarily acquired; the mention of the “hireling” teaches that “sojourner” means the one permanently acquired. Rebbi Mathias said, since it is written “no uncircumcised person may eat from it,” it is as if free from one side.
A slave may be a permanent sojourner. A sojourner is like a Gentile in every respect. Rebbi Samuel bar Ḥiyya bar Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: One keeps the sojourner for twelve months. If he changes his mind, that is fine; otherwise he is like a Gentile in all respects. Rebbi Samuel bar Ḥiyya bar Jehudah, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi: The sojourner has to accept on condition that he may eat cadaver meat. Rebbi Hila said, one would then say, the words are [interpreted] as they are written. What does it mean, the words are [interpreted] as they are written? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, “You shall not eat any cadaver; to the sojourner in your midst you shall give it that he eat it.” Some Tannaim state: One does not receive a sojourner unless he accepts all commandments written in the Torah. Some Tannaim state: One does not receive a sojourner unless he renounces his idolatry. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi: One does not receive a sojourner unless he renounces his idolatry as a Gentile. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, from their consensus: unless he renounces his idolatry as a Gentile. For if it were not so, what would we say? Since he is forbidden idolatry he cannot render profane. But are Gentiles not also forbidden idolatry and they do render profane? Rebbi Yose said, that you should not say, since he is equal to an Israel in three respects, do not oppress, do not cheat, and he is exiled like an Israel, that he has no power to render profane. Therefore, it was necessary to spell out that he renders idols profane like a Gentile. Who is the Tanna who includes “do not oppress”? He is Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated: The sojourner is protected by the prohibition, the words of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah.
It was stated: “A Jew may circumcise a Samaritan but a Samaritan may not circumcise a Jew since he is circumcised in the name of Mount Gerizim, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yose said to him, where do we find in the Torah that circumcision needs intent? Let him continue to circumcise in the name of Mount Gerizim until he dies!” “The drawn should not circumcise [again] lest he get into danger, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yose said to him, many drawn ones were in the days of Ben Koziba, they all circumcised, lived, and begat sons and daughters. One has to draw a drop of covenant blood from the drawn [circumcised], the one born circumcised, and the circumcised before he converted. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar stated: The House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one has to draw a drop of covenant blood from the one born circumcised since that is a compressed prepuce; what did they disagree about? About the convert who converted when already circumcised, for the House of Shammai said one has to draw a drop of covenant blood from him, but the House of Hillel say, one does not have to draw a drop of covenant blood from him.” Rebbi Issac bar Naḥman said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Practice follows the words of the student. There came a case before Rav, who said: Who is he who said that it is a compressed prepuce? That means, he certainly is uncircumcised and one pushes the Sabbath away for him. Rebbi Abbahu said, one does not push the Sabbath away for him but one has to draw a drop of covenant blood from him. A male child was born to Rav Ada bar Aḥawa in that condition. He squeezed it, he died. Rebbi Abin said, his penis was damaged and he fasted for him that he should die. The rabbis of Caesarea said, his testicles became injured and he fasted for him that he should die.