12262 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:5

The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If he had said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, and afterwards had an attack of seizures and said, do not write, his later words are disregarded.” He explains it: After he regains his sanity, his later words are disregarded. If he gave her a bill of divorce saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If he threw her bill of divorce to her saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Eleazar said that Rebbi Abin asked: If he separated heave from his grain heap and said, it shall be heave only tomorrow but the next day he suffered an attack of seizures, is this the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it: If somebody had been crucified or mortally wounded when he signalled to write a bill of divorce to his wife, one writes and delivers on the assumption that his soul hangs on in him. Is it not impossible that his mind should not have been disturbed for an hour? This disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:5

The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If he had said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, and afterwards had an attack of seizures and said, do not write, his later words are disregarded.” He explains it: After he regains his sanity, his later words are disregarded. If he gave her a bill of divorce saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If he threw her bill of divorce to her saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Eleazar said that Rebbi Abin asked: If he separated heave from his grain heap and said, it shall be heave only tomorrow but the next day he suffered an attack of seizures, is this the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it: If somebody had been crucified or mortally wounded when he signalled to write a bill of divorce to his wife, one writes and delivers on the assumption that his soul hangs on in him. Is it not impossible that his mind should not have been disturbed for an hour? This disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:9

Rebbi Yudan said, there, if he said I did such and such, here, if he says do such and such. Rebbi Benjamin ben Levi inquired: He should have understanding for the future if he has understanding for the past; (if he has no understanding for the past,) he would not have understanding for the future! Rebbi Abba Mari said, here we deal with a mute; there is no agency for a mute. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, we deal with a sane person. Why is there no divorce? Because I say, he was occupied with his documents. We also stated thus: “When was this said? When he was paralyzed while being healthy. But if he was paralyzed by a prior sickness, once is enough.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:12

HALAKHAH: “If they said to him, shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife,” etc. If he said to two people, say to X that he shall write and to Y and Z that they shall sign. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah, this happened in the days of Rebbi, and he said, such a thing should not be done in Israel. Samuel said, it certainly should be done. Rav Jeremiah asked Samuel: If he said to two people, say to X that he write and you sign. He said to him, that is a bill of divorce but it needs study. The opinion of Samuel seems inverted. There, he said, it certainly should be done, and here, he says so? There is a difference, because they changed their testimony.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:12

HALAKHAH: “If they said to him, shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife,” etc. If he said to two people, say to X that he shall write and to Y and Z that they shall sign. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah, this happened in the days of Rebbi, and he said, such a thing should not be done in Israel. Samuel said, it certainly should be done. Rav Jeremiah asked Samuel: If he said to two people, say to X that he write and you sign. He said to him, that is a bill of divorce but it needs study. The opinion of Samuel seems inverted. There, he said, it certainly should be done, and here, he says so? There is a difference, because they changed their testimony.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:12

HALAKHAH: “If they said to him, shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife,” etc. If he said to two people, say to X that he shall write and to Y and Z that they shall sign. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah, this happened in the days of Rebbi, and he said, such a thing should not be done in Israel. Samuel said, it certainly should be done. Rav Jeremiah asked Samuel: If he said to two people, say to X that he write and you sign. He said to him, that is a bill of divorce but it needs study. The opinion of Samuel seems inverted. There, he said, it certainly should be done, and here, he says so? There is a difference, because they changed their testimony.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:14

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should die, this is your bill of divorce if I should die from this illness, this is your bill of divorce after my death,” he did not say anything. “From today if I should die, from now if I should die,” that is a bill of divorce. “From today after my death” is no bill of divorce; if he dies she must receive ḥalîṣah but is barred from levirate marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:14

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should die, this is your bill of divorce if I should die from this illness, this is your bill of divorce after my death,” he did not say anything. “From today if I should die, from now if I should die,” that is a bill of divorce. “From today after my death” is no bill of divorce; if he dies she must receive ḥalîṣah but is barred from levirate marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:14

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should die, this is your bill of divorce if I should die from this illness, this is your bill of divorce after my death,” he did not say anything. “From today if I should die, from now if I should die,” that is a bill of divorce. “From today after my death” is no bill of divorce; if he dies she must receive ḥalîṣah but is barred from levirate marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:14

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should die, this is your bill of divorce if I should die from this illness, this is your bill of divorce after my death,” he did not say anything. “From today if I should die, from now if I should die,” that is a bill of divorce. “From today after my death” is no bill of divorce; if he dies she must receive ḥalîṣah but is barred from levirate marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:15

HALAKHAH: “ ‘This is your bill of divorce if I should die, this is your bill of divorce from this illness, this is your bill of divorce after my death,’ he did not say anything.” But our teachers said, it is a bill of divorce. Who are “our teachers”? Rebbi Jehudah the Prince and his court. In three places is Rebbi Jehudah the Prince called “our teachers”, about bills of divorce, oil, and a sole. They should have called him “permissive court” since any court which permits three [previously forbidden] things is called “permissive court.” Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ismael said, his court disagreed with him about the bills of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:15

HALAKHAH: “ ‘This is your bill of divorce if I should die, this is your bill of divorce from this illness, this is your bill of divorce after my death,’ he did not say anything.” But our teachers said, it is a bill of divorce. Who are “our teachers”? Rebbi Jehudah the Prince and his court. In three places is Rebbi Jehudah the Prince called “our teachers”, about bills of divorce, oil, and a sole. They should have called him “permissive court” since any court which permits three [previously forbidden] things is called “permissive court.” Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ismael said, his court disagreed with him about the bills of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:17

“ ‘From today if I should die, from now if I should die,’ that is a bill of divorce. ‘From today after my death’ is no bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yudan said, the rabbis and our teachers [discussed.] Our teachers objected to the rabbis: Why do you say, it is a bill of divorce? Because he said, “if”! But in the last statement, he said “if” and you say, it is no bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “from today”. We also hold that “from today” is the main point. Rebbi objected to the rabbis. Why do you say, it is not a bill of divorce? Because he said, “from today”! But in the earlier statement, he said “from today” and you say, it is a bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “if”. I also am holding that “if” is the main point. There, they switch attributions. Both Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav say that the words of Rebbi [interpreted] there are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] here: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “on condition.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, “on condition that I die” or “on condition that it be after my death”? He said to him, “on condition that I die.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The words of Rebbi [interpreted] here are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] there: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “after death.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:17

“ ‘From today if I should die, from now if I should die,’ that is a bill of divorce. ‘From today after my death’ is no bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yudan said, the rabbis and our teachers [discussed.] Our teachers objected to the rabbis: Why do you say, it is a bill of divorce? Because he said, “if”! But in the last statement, he said “if” and you say, it is no bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “from today”. We also hold that “from today” is the main point. Rebbi objected to the rabbis. Why do you say, it is not a bill of divorce? Because he said, “from today”! But in the earlier statement, he said “from today” and you say, it is a bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “if”. I also am holding that “if” is the main point. There, they switch attributions. Both Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav say that the words of Rebbi [interpreted] there are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] here: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “on condition.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, “on condition that I die” or “on condition that it be after my death”? He said to him, “on condition that I die.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The words of Rebbi [interpreted] here are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] there: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “after death.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:20

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce from today if I should die from this illness;” if he got up, walked on the market, fell ill again and died, one estimates whether he died from the original sickness, in which case it is a bill of divorce; otherwise it is no bill of divorce. She may not be alone with him except in the presence of witnesses, which may be even a male or a female slave except her personal slave girl since she has no shame in the presence of her personal slave girl. What is her status in those days? Rebbi Jehudah says, she is a married woman in all respects. Rebbi Yose says, she is divorced and not divorced.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:22

“If he died from that sickness,” and a stone heap fell on him, or a snake bit him, it cannot be a bill of divorce unless he died of that sickness. “If I should not recover from that sickness,” and a stone heap fell on him, or a snake bit him it is a bill of divorce since he did not recover from that sickness.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:33

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A anddefinitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, maybe in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:33

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A anddefinitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, maybe in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:34

A person gave money for a ship when the canal dried up. The case came before Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: There is the ship, bring the canal! Abba bar Huna in the name of Rebbi Abba was praying that the canal should dry up and he could recover his money. He said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Abba are of the same opinion as Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. If she cut off, she hindered. If her hand (?) was cut off, it is not as if she hindered.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:35

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Judea to Galilee, came to Antipatris, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Galilee to Judea, came to Kefar Othnay, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go overseas, came to Acco, and returned, it isinvalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should be absent from you for thirty days;” even if he repeatedly came and left, it is a bill of divorce if he never was alone with her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:35

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Judea to Galilee, came to Antipatris, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Galilee to Judea, came to Kefar Othnay, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go overseas, came to Acco, and returned, it isinvalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should be absent from you for thirty days;” even if he repeatedly came and left, it is a bill of divorce if he never was alone with her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:35

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Judea to Galilee, came to Antipatris, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Galilee to Judea, came to Kefar Othnay, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go overseas, came to Acco, and returned, it isinvalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should be absent from you for thirty days;” even if he repeatedly came and left, it is a bill of divorce if he never was alone with her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:35

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Judea to Galilee, came to Antipatris, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Galilee to Judea, came to Kefar Othnay, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go overseas, came to Acco, and returned, it isinvalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should be absent from you for thirty days;” even if he repeatedly came and left, it is a bill of divorce if he never was alone with her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:38

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within twelve months,” if he died within the twelve months it is no bill of divorce. “This is your bill of divorce from today if I should not return within twelve months,” if he died within the twelve months it is a bill of divorce. “If I should not return within twelve months from today write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife;” if they wrote a bill of divorce within twelve months and delivered it within twelve months, it is no bill of divorce. “Write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife if I should not return within twelve months from today;” if they wrote a bill of divorce within twelve months and delivered it after twelve months, it is no bill of divorce; Rebbi Yose says, this is an example of a bill of divorce. If they wrote after twelve months and delivered after twelve months but he had died, if the bill of divorce preceded the death it is a bill of divorce but if the death preceded the bill of divorce it is no bill of divorce. If it is not known, it is a case where they say, she is divorced and not divorced.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:38

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within twelve months,” if he died within the twelve months it is no bill of divorce. “This is your bill of divorce from today if I should not return within twelve months,” if he died within the twelve months it is a bill of divorce. “If I should not return within twelve months from today write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife;” if they wrote a bill of divorce within twelve months and delivered it within twelve months, it is no bill of divorce. “Write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife if I should not return within twelve months from today;” if they wrote a bill of divorce within twelve months and delivered it after twelve months, it is no bill of divorce; Rebbi Yose says, this is an example of a bill of divorce. If they wrote after twelve months and delivered after twelve months but he had died, if the bill of divorce preceded the death it is a bill of divorce but if the death preceded the bill of divorce it is no bill of divorce. If it is not known, it is a case where they say, she is divorced and not divorced.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:38

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within twelve months,” if he died within the twelve months it is no bill of divorce. “This is your bill of divorce from today if I should not return within twelve months,” if he died within the twelve months it is a bill of divorce. “If I should not return within twelve months from today write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife;” if they wrote a bill of divorce within twelve months and delivered it within twelve months, it is no bill of divorce. “Write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife if I should not return within twelve months from today;” if they wrote a bill of divorce within twelve months and delivered it after twelve months, it is no bill of divorce; Rebbi Yose says, this is an example of a bill of divorce. If they wrote after twelve months and delivered after twelve months but he had died, if the bill of divorce preceded the death it is a bill of divorce but if the death preceded the bill of divorce it is no bill of divorce. If it is not known, it is a case where they say, she is divorced and not divorced.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:38

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within twelve months,” if he died within the twelve months it is no bill of divorce. “This is your bill of divorce from today if I should not return within twelve months,” if he died within the twelve months it is a bill of divorce. “If I should not return within twelve months from today write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife;” if they wrote a bill of divorce within twelve months and delivered it within twelve months, it is no bill of divorce. “Write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife if I should not return within twelve months from today;” if they wrote a bill of divorce within twelve months and delivered it after twelve months, it is no bill of divorce; Rebbi Yose says, this is an example of a bill of divorce. If they wrote after twelve months and delivered after twelve months but he had died, if the bill of divorce preceded the death it is a bill of divorce but if the death preceded the bill of divorce it is no bill of divorce. If it is not known, it is a case where they say, she is divorced and not divorced.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:39

HALAKHAH: “If I should not return within twelve months from today,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? Because he mentioned writing earlier. But did he not also mention delivering earlier, and you say that it is no bill of divorce?

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:10

HALAKHAH: “The same applies for preliminary marriages”, etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Abba Cohen Bar Dalaia: A person acquires a find within four cubits of himself. What is the reason? (1Chr. 22:14) “Look, in my poverty I prepared for the House of the Eternal 100’000 kikkar of gold, 1’000’000 kikkar of silver, bronze and iron unweighed because it was so much; I prepared wood and stones, and you should add to them.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:13

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Did we not state: (Mishnah Baba Meẓi‘a 1:4) “If somebody saw a find and fell on it, when another person came and grabbed it, he who grabbed it had the rights to it?” He answered him: Explain it if the first one did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did we not state: “If he fell on it or spread his talith on it, one removes him from it?” He said to him, that is the same, if he did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: (Tosephta Peah 2:2) “If two were pushing one another because of a sheaf and another person came and grabbed it from before them, the one who grabbed is entitled to it. He said to him, it is the same, they did not say that our four cubits should acquire it for us.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:13

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Did we not state: (Mishnah Baba Meẓi‘a 1:4) “If somebody saw a find and fell on it, when another person came and grabbed it, he who grabbed it had the rights to it?” He answered him: Explain it if the first one did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did we not state: “If he fell on it or spread his talith on it, one removes him from it?” He said to him, that is the same, if he did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: (Tosephta Peah 2:2) “If two were pushing one another because of a sheaf and another person came and grabbed it from before them, the one who grabbed is entitled to it. He said to him, it is the same, they did not say that our four cubits should acquire it for us.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:13

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Did we not state: (Mishnah Baba Meẓi‘a 1:4) “If somebody saw a find and fell on it, when another person came and grabbed it, he who grabbed it had the rights to it?” He answered him: Explain it if the first one did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did we not state: “If he fell on it or spread his talith on it, one removes him from it?” He said to him, that is the same, if he did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: (Tosephta Peah 2:2) “If two were pushing one another because of a sheaf and another person came and grabbed it from before them, the one who grabbed is entitled to it. He said to him, it is the same, they did not say that our four cubits should acquire it for us.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:14

Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That refers to divorce documents, but it does not apply to a gift. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something. Since a find which cannot be acquired by the knowledge of another person can be acquired within four cubits, should this rule not apply a fortiori to a gift that is acquired by the knowledge of another person? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Since a gift which could only be acquired within four cubits by the knowledge of another person, should this not a fortiori apply to a find?

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:14

Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That refers to divorce documents, but it does not apply to a gift. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something. Since a find which cannot be acquired by the knowledge of another person can be acquired within four cubits, should this rule not apply a fortiori to a gift that is acquired by the knowledge of another person? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Since a gift which could only be acquired within four cubits by the knowledge of another person, should this not a fortiori apply to a find?

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:15

Rebbi Zeïra objected before Rebbi Yasa: But did we not state: The same applies to marriage? He answered him, divorce documents and marriage contracts have the same rules. But did we not state: The same applies to debt? He said to him, because if he said to him: Throw it into the sea and your debt will be forgiven, it would be forgiven. But if that is true, even if it fell down close to the debtor, the debtor should have the benefit! But we have stated, if it falls down close to the debtor, the debtor is still obligated. For he said to him, throw it so that it will enter my domain, but it did not yet enter his domain. Rebbi Abbahu said, all those objections that Rebbi Zeïra raised before Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish raised before Rebbi Joḥanan. Did he accept them from him? He solved them with those same solutions.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:19

HALAKHAH: “The House of Shammai say,” etc. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: And any one of them if she was married should not leave, in order not to cause talk about her children.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:24

HALAKHAH: “If somebody married his sister-in-law,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” Therefore she must leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:33

If somebody divorces his wife she should not live in the same courtyard or the same place. If the courtyard was the wife’s property, the husband has to move out, if the husband’s, the wife has to move out. If it was common property, who has to move because of whom? The woman because of the man, unless they can manage to have separate exits. When has this been said? If they were definitively married, not if they were not definitively married. But the wife of a Cohen if she was not definitively married, as well as the status of a preliminarily married woman in Jehudah, is that of one definitively married. Nobody has to move if a person gives ḥalȋṣah to his sister-in-law even if he had “bespoken” her since “bespeaking” does not fully acquire.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:35

HALAKHAH: “Anybody can supplement a bald document,” etc. From where that a document can be knotted? Rebbi Immi said, it is written: “I took the document,” etc. “And [the sealed]”, that is the knotted [document]. “And the open,” that is the simple, part of the knotted. “And the orders and the rules”; orders and rules differ between these, for one is with two {witnesses], the other with three; one in it, the other on its back. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah, on a simple document, the witnesses sign parallel, on a knotted one the witnesses sign lengthwise. Rebbi Idi said, the witnesses sign between any two knots, but it must be on top. But should one not be afraid that maybe he falsifies? Rav Naḥman wanted to argue that witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that two times “I accept” makes it invalid. But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Does Rav Huna not consider that he might write another text, erase and change to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that an erasure makes invalid even if the correction is certified.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:35

HALAKHAH: “Anybody can supplement a bald document,” etc. From where that a document can be knotted? Rebbi Immi said, it is written: “I took the document,” etc. “And [the sealed]”, that is the knotted [document]. “And the open,” that is the simple, part of the knotted. “And the orders and the rules”; orders and rules differ between these, for one is with two {witnesses], the other with three; one in it, the other on its back. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah, on a simple document, the witnesses sign parallel, on a knotted one the witnesses sign lengthwise. Rebbi Idi said, the witnesses sign between any two knots, but it must be on top. But should one not be afraid that maybe he falsifies? Rav Naḥman wanted to argue that witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that two times “I accept” makes it invalid. But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Does Rav Huna not consider that he might write another text, erase and change to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that an erasure makes invalid even if the correction is certified.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:35

HALAKHAH: “Anybody can supplement a bald document,” etc. From where that a document can be knotted? Rebbi Immi said, it is written: “I took the document,” etc. “And [the sealed]”, that is the knotted [document]. “And the open,” that is the simple, part of the knotted. “And the orders and the rules”; orders and rules differ between these, for one is with two {witnesses], the other with three; one in it, the other on its back. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah, on a simple document, the witnesses sign parallel, on a knotted one the witnesses sign lengthwise. Rebbi Idi said, the witnesses sign between any two knots, but it must be on top. But should one not be afraid that maybe he falsifies? Rav Naḥman wanted to argue that witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that two times “I accept” makes it invalid. But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Does Rav Huna not consider that he might write another text, erase and change to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that an erasure makes invalid even if the correction is certified.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:1

MISHNAH: If somebody in divorcing his wife says to her: Herewith you are permitted to any man except Mr. X, Rebbi Eliezer permits but the Sages prohibit. What should he do? He should take the document back from her and deliver it again while saying, herewith you are permitted to any man. If he had written the condition in the document it would be invalid even if he had later erased it.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:1

MISHNAH: If somebody in divorcing his wife says to her: Herewith you are permitted to any man except Mr. X, Rebbi Eliezer permits but the Sages prohibit. What should he do? He should take the document back from her and deliver it again while saying, herewith you are permitted to any man. If he had written the condition in the document it would be invalid even if he had later erased it.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:3

After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:3

After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:4

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:13

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ḥalaphta from Haifa: Any who were married on the basis of such a document should not leave in order not to give a bad reputation to her children. His daughter who was married outside on the basis of such a document should not leave in order to damage her co-wife to her father. Her co-wife who was married outside on the basis of such a document has to leave. His daughter who married his brother [on the basis of such a document has to leave. Her co-wife who was married to his brother] on the basis of such a document, or even to her father, should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:13

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ḥalaphta from Haifa: Any who were married on the basis of such a document should not leave in order not to give a bad reputation to her children. His daughter who was married outside on the basis of such a document should not leave in order to damage her co-wife to her father. Her co-wife who was married outside on the basis of such a document has to leave. His daughter who married his brother [on the basis of such a document has to leave. Her co-wife who was married to his brother] on the basis of such a document, or even to her father, should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:13

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ḥalaphta from Haifa: Any who were married on the basis of such a document should not leave in order not to give a bad reputation to her children. His daughter who was married outside on the basis of such a document should not leave in order to damage her co-wife to her father. Her co-wife who was married outside on the basis of such a document has to leave. His daughter who married his brother [on the basis of such a document has to leave. Her co-wife who was married to his brother] on the basis of such a document, or even to her father, should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:14

It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. [But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed,] he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abina said, because it is invalid And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abin asked, so far, if the old man took the loan [and the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and the son mortgaged,] can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun asked, was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce? Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:16

Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥa in the name of Rav: This is Rebbi Meїr’s. Why did you have to say this? Rebbi Mana said, since Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: “This entire Chapter is Rebbi Meїr’s except for ‘if he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city.’ ” You should not come to say that the first is Rebbi Meїr’s, the second the rabbis’. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s. Rebbi Yose said, since Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar, that you should not be led to say the same here. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:16

Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥa in the name of Rav: This is Rebbi Meїr’s. Why did you have to say this? Rebbi Mana said, since Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: “This entire Chapter is Rebbi Meїr’s except for ‘if he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city.’ ” You should not come to say that the first is Rebbi Meїr’s, the second the rabbis’. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s. Rebbi Yose said, since Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar, that you should not be led to say the same here. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:20

HALAKHAH: “If two men sent two identical bills of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose asked before Rebbi Yose: Just as you say that a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce is invalid in the case of two wives, similarly two bills of divorce should be invalid for two women. He answered, that is correct. He said to him, but did we not state: “If two men sent two identical bills of divorce and they became mixed up, one delivers both to both women”? There, each of the bills was written in the name of the respective wife; the mix-up caused the problem. But here, neither one was written as divorce in her name; when it was delivered, could it be considered as divorce in her name from the start?

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:24

HALAKHAH: “If he wrote two bills of divorce side by side,” etc. “It is invalid if the witnesses are separated from the text by the width of two lines; less than that it is valid”. Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines in a text about one subject makes invalid in any case. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said: The Mishnah says so: “One Hebrew- and one Greek-writing witness are under each of them, reaching from one column to the other, are all invalid.” Is not Hebrew combined with Greek one item? Rebbi Mana said, if he started at the end of the second line and ended at the fourth line, it is valid. “How far from the text should the witnesses sign? That they can be read with it, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, one full line. Rebbi Dositheos ben Yannai says, the width of the witnesses’ handwriting.” What kind of writing does one use to estimate? Rebbi Yasa ben Rebbi Sabbatai says, the width of the witnesses’ handwriting. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Isaac ben Ḥaqula: Corresponding to לך ולך. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does the signature of Yose ben Yannai have equal weight with the signature of Shaul ben Barukh? He said to him: For that it is needed, that the signature of Yose ben Yannai has equal weight with the signature of Shaul ben Barukh.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:30

Rav said: Judges may sign even if they cannot read, but no witnesses may sign unless they know how to read. He said, such should come over me if I ever acted thus. Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose: Did no Greek document come before Rav that he could confirm it by its signatures? The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “A bill of divorce written in Hebrew with its witnesses signing in Greek, written in Greek with its witnesses signing in Hebrew, or one witness signing in Hebrew and one in Greek, is valid.” He explains that they knew how to read but not how to sign; or if they knew both [languages], they could sign in either one of their choice.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:31

Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is Rebbi Jehudah’s. Rebbi Yose said, you should not infer that the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan is that he differs, but he answered him following his argument. Lengthwise. That is what he said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Since pairing is infrequent, there was no pairing. So is the Mishnah: “If the scribe wrote with one witness, is it valid. “X” is valid. “The son of Y” is valid. “X the son of Y” but he did not write “witness”, is valid. If he wrote his or her surname, it is invalid. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even if he wrote “he is it”, it is valid. Rebbi Abbahu wrote א. Rav Ḥisda wrote ס. Samuel wrote a palm branch.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:37

MISHNAH: The House of Shammai say, a person should not divorce his wife unless he found her immoral, as it was said: “For he found with her a matter of nakedness.” But the House of Hillel say, even if she spoiled his dish, as it was said: “For he found with her a bad thing.” Rebbi Aqiba said, even if he found another more beautiful than her, as it was said: “It will be if she does not appear pleasing in his eyes, etc.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:6

Rebbi Abin said that Ḥisqiah stated: “After he acquires,” which means that she is acquired by money. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the Hebrew slave girl, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by money, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, should be acquired by money? This is proved by the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money but is acquired by intercourse. Therefore you would not be astonished if this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, might not be acquired by money. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:7

“And has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money, can be acquired by intercourse, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by money, should be acquired by intercourse? The Hebrew slave girl proves, who cannot be acquired by intercourse but is acquired by money. You likewise do not wonder that this one, who may be acquired by money, might not be acquired by intercourse. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money; “and has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:8

By a document. Since money which does not send out permits to enter, would it not be logical that a document which sends out should permit to enter? No. If you speak about money which eliminates dedication through redemption, what can you say about a document which does not eliminate dedication through redemption? The argument de minore ad majus is broken and you have to return to Scripture. Therefore, it was necessary to say: “He shall write her a bill of divorce, hand it to her, and send her out of his house. If she left his house and went to be another man’s.” It brackets her being with her leaving. Since her leaving was by a document, so her being is by a document.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:11

“A man.” Why does the verse say, “any man”? To include that Gentiles who committed adultery or incest by Gentile rules should be judged by Gentile law, but if they committed adultery with a Jewishwoman, one judges them by Jewish law. Rebbi Eleazar said, of all of them there is only the Jewish betrothed, for if he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty, with a betrothed Gentile woman he cannot be prosecuted. If he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty. How is he found to be guilty? By their rules or by Jewish rules? If you say by Jewish rules, by two witnesses, 23 judges, after warning, and by stoning. If you say by their rules, by one witness, one judge, without warning, and by the sword.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:18

If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:19

There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:20

The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. It is written: “If a person give to his neighbor money or vessels to watch over.” If to teach that the court will not act on less that a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written: “To incur liability for it”? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. (Why does the verse say, “without silver”?) From there, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two obols. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? “Or vessels”; since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret “or vessels”? As we have stated: Rebbi Nathan says, “or vessels”, to include all kinds of vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is guilty. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two perutot, that the claim should be about a perutah’s worth and the confession about a perutah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two obols, also “vessels” means two oboli’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:20

The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. It is written: “If a person give to his neighbor money or vessels to watch over.” If to teach that the court will not act on less that a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written: “To incur liability for it”? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. (Why does the verse say, “without silver”?) From there, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two obols. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? “Or vessels”; since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret “or vessels”? As we have stated: Rebbi Nathan says, “or vessels”, to include all kinds of vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is guilty. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two perutot, that the claim should be about a perutah’s worth and the confession about a perutah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two obols, also “vessels” means two oboli’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:21

“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:21

“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:27

“She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce,” as it is written: “He shall write her a bill of divorce.” “Or the husband’s death,” as it is written: “Or if the latter husband dies.” So far, if the latter one dies, [what about] the death of the former? Since the latter’s death releases her, even though his death does not cause a complete release, it is only logical that the former’s death should release her since his death will cause a complete release. Rebbi Ḥuna said, the verse implies that death releases, as it is written: “If brothers live together and one of them dies childless, etc.” Therefore, if he had a child, death releases. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if you would say that death does not release, how could we find a widow for a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah for a common priest? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, explain it for a sister-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:35

HALAKHAH: “A Hebrew slave is acquired by money,” etc. It is written: “If your Hebrew brother or sister be sold to you,” he bracketed the male Hebrew with the female. Since the female Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract, also the male Hebrew can be acquired by money or contract. One understands money since it is written: “She leaves gratis, without money [due].” From where by contract? The female Hebrew is inferred from the free woman, and the male Hebrew from the female. This is a combination of inferences. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who accepts combination of inferences. Following Rebbi Ismael who rejects combination of inferences? It was found that Rebbi Ismael stated: In the case of the word חֻפְשָׁה, “free” is inferred from חֻפְשָׁה. Everywhere Rebbi Ismael rejects combination of inferences and here, he accepts combination of inferences? Rebbi Ismael stated it in the name of the Sages. From where is it derived for Rebbi Ismael? “Sending away, sending away.” Since “sending away” mentioned there means by a contract, also “sending away” here means by a contract. But it does not compare. There it is to gain autonomy, here it is to be acquired by others! Rebbi Mattaniah said, “sale, sale”. Since “sale” mentioned there means by a contract, “sale” here also means by a contract. But since there it is possible by possession, then here it should be possible by possession. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, the male Hebrew is like the female Hebrew.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:51

“If he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother. He should be able to allot her to his brother by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance, what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:51

“If he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother. He should be able to allot her to his brother by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance, what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:54

“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:60

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:63

Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: At three places teaching circumvents Scripture and at another place the interpretation.The Torah said, “in a scroll”, but practice said on anything separated from the ground. The Torah said, “in dust”, but practice said in anything on which plants grow. The Torah said, “with an awl”, but practice said, even a buck-thorn, even a thorn, even glass. And at one place the interpretation: Rebbi Ismael stated: “It shall be on the seventh day that he shave all his hair,” inclusion. “His head, his beard, and his eyebrows,” detail. Since it continues “and all his hair he shall shave,” it repeats inclusion. Inclusion, detail, and inclusion is judged only by what is similar to the detail. Since the detail is explained as place of bunching and exposed, it should refer only [hair growing] in bunches at exposed places. But practice is that he shaves to be like a gourd. “With an awl”, since an awl is made of metal, so anything made of metal. Rebbi Yose said, this is a large drill. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, that is the engraving-knife. “He shall bring him to the door.” I could think, even if it was lying flat. The verse says, “or to the door-post”. Since the door-post is upright, so also the door has to be upright: a shame to him and to his family.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:64

It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, why at the door? Because by the door they went from servitude to freedom. The students asked Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai: Why should the slave be pierced in his ear rather than in any of his other body parts? He said to them, the ear which heard at Mount Sinai: “You shall have no other powers besides Me,” and removed from himself the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven but accepted the yoke of flesh and blood; the ear which heard before Mount Sinai: “For the Children of Israel are My servants,” and went and acquired another master; therefore the ear should come and be pierced for he did not follow what his ear heard.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:64

It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, why at the door? Because by the door they went from servitude to freedom. The students asked Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai: Why should the slave be pierced in his ear rather than in any of his other body parts? He said to them, the ear which heard at Mount Sinai: “You shall have no other powers besides Me,” and removed from himself the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven but accepted the yoke of flesh and blood; the ear which heard before Mount Sinai: “For the Children of Israel are My servants,” and went and acquired another master; therefore the ear should come and be pierced for he did not follow what his ear heard.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:78

Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission since a bill of manumission applies to him. But he should not be able to accept a bill of divorce since a bill of divorce does not apply to him. If you say, is that not a baraita? “Your are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission but he should not be able to accept a bill of his equal. If you say, the preceding baraita? “You are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:78

Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission since a bill of manumission applies to him. But he should not be able to accept a bill of divorce since a bill of divorce does not apply to him. If you say, is that not a baraita? “Your are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave be able to accept a bill of manumission but he should not be able to accept a bill of his equal. If you say, the preceding baraita? “You are a slave but your child is free; if she was pregnant, she acquired for him.” They considered her fetus as one of her limbs.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:79

“For my slave girl X I want a document that she should not be enslaved.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan. He said, he has no power to enslave. What are her children? Slaves. What did he retain for her? Her earnings. Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Yose both said, this follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. If he wrote all his possessions jointly to two of his slaves, both are free and both have to free one another. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This follows Rebbi who said that a person frees half of his slave. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Abba: Does this not imply that one slave accepts from his master for another one? He answered, what do you think? Since they acquired the properties they went free? No, simultaneously slaves and properties went free.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:83

Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: One who handles a wine-skin and it splits in his hand is not responsible for it. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, it is necessary even if he takes it in the store when he had no other intention than that no other person should take it. Can he take possession at a minimal rate? Rebbi Ḥaggai said in the name of Rebbi Yose: A Mishnah says that it cannot become his possession at a minimal rate, as we have stated there: “If somebody sells his wine to a Non-Jew. If he fixed the price before he measured, the proceeds are permitted; if he measured before he fixed the price, the proceeds are forbidden.” If you say that it can come into his possession at a minimal rate, even if he measured before he fixed the price, it should be as if he fixed the price before he measured and the proceeds would be permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:83

Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: One who handles a wine-skin and it splits in his hand is not responsible for it. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, it is necessary even if he takes it in the store when he had no other intention than that no other person should take it. Can he take possession at a minimal rate? Rebbi Ḥaggai said in the name of Rebbi Yose: A Mishnah says that it cannot become his possession at a minimal rate, as we have stated there: “If somebody sells his wine to a Non-Jew. If he fixed the price before he measured, the proceeds are permitted; if he measured before he fixed the price, the proceeds are forbidden.” If you say that it can come into his possession at a minimal rate, even if he measured before he fixed the price, it should be as if he fixed the price before he measured and the proceeds would be permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:102

“By money.” Rebbi Abba was of the opinion, by money if there was no intention to write a deed. But if money was given with the intention to write a deed for him, possession was transferred only when the deed was written. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose disagree. It follows that Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel and Rav Huna Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel. Samuel asked Rav Ḥuna: He was slaughtering sacrifices while being occupied? He answered, “for your intention,” this excludes one otherwise occupied. If one wrote a gift in the language of a sale? He answered, he made it ride on two racing horses; Rebbi Abba said this; Samuel did not accept it. What means “he made it ride on two shining racing horses”? They wanted to say, one brings two crazy horses and makes it ride on both. One goes in one direction and the other in another; he has nothing in his hand. Rebbi Yose from Mamelia said, he doubly empowered him, for there is a title guarantee in a sale but none for a gift; the seller did not sell everything but the giver of a gift gave everything. And Rav Ḥuna parallels Rebbi Joḥanan. A person, when he lay dying, said: my property should be given to X. Afterwards he said: write and deliver. Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim brought the case before Rebbi Joḥanan who said: If he said to transfer to him, everybody agrees that he entered into possession. If the transfer was to be in writing, everybody agrees that nobody transfers rights in writing after his death. Who would notify the greatness? Explain it if witnesses know. Think of it, if no witnesses know it? Rebbi Yose said, the field remains in the hand of its proprietors; the burden of proof is on the claimant.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:116

HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:116

HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:117

There, we have stated: “The father bestows on his son beauty, strength, riches, wisdom, and years.” From where beauty? “May Your deeds appear on Your servants, and Your glory on their sons.” Strength, “strong on earth will be his descendants.” Riches, “I was young and became old, but never saw a just man abandoned and his descendants in need of bread.” Wisdom, “you shall teach your sons to argue about them.” Years, “that your and your sons’ days be many.” And just as he inherits five qualities, so he owes him the following five things. He feeds him, he gives him to drink, he clothes him, he puts on his shoes, he leads him. That is what is written: “This should fall on Joab’s head: sufferer from flux and from skin disease, holding the distaff, falling by the sword, and senseless.” Sufferer from flux, weak. From skin disease, abandoned. Holding the distaff, uneducated. Falling by the sword, short lived. Without bread, poor. When Solomon came to kill Joab, he said to him: Your father gave me five sentences; accept them and I can be killed. He accepted them and all of them came to pass on the House of David. Sufferer from flux was Rehabeam: “King Rehabeam with difficulty climbed on his chariot to flee to Jerusalem;” some say, he suffered from flux; some say, he was weak. Suffering from skin disease was Uziahu: “King Uziahu suffered from skin disease until the day of his death.” Holding the distaff was Joash: “They punished Joash.” Rebbi Ismael stated: This teaches that they gave him over to hardened hoodlums who had never known a woman and they raped him the way women are raped. That is what is written: “Israel’s pride will testify against it,” Israel’s pride will be raped in its face. Falling by the sword, this is Josiah, as is written: “The archers shot at king Josia,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, this teaches that they made his body like a sieve. Rebbi Ismael stated: 300 arrows were shot at the Eternal’s anointed. Without bread, that is Jehoiachin: “And his meal, a permanent meal was given to him,.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:118

There, we have stated: “If they started, one does not interrupt.” What is the start of bathing? Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: When he opened his belt. Rav said, when he took off his shoe. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi used to hear the lesson of his grandson every Friday. Once he forgot and went bathing in the public baths of Tiberias; he was leaning on Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba’s shoulder. He remembered and left the public bath. He said, so it was: Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose said, he had taken off [his clothes]. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him, did our teacher not teach us, “if they started, one does not interrupt”? He said to him, Ḥiyya my son, is that unimportant in your eyes? For anyone who hears the lesson from his grandson is as if he heard it from Mount Sinai. What is the reason? “ You shall make them known to you sons and grandsons,” etc., “the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb.” Like the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb. Rebbi Ḥizqiah bar Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If you can link the tradition back to Moses, link it. Otherwise take either the very first or the very last [source]. Giddul said, anybody who quotes somebody should consider it as if the author of the quote stood before him. What is the reason? “Only in image a man wanders.” “Many a man professes good will, but where will you find one you can trust?” That is Rebbi Ze‘ira, as Rebbi Ze‘ira said, we do take the traditions of Rav Sheshet into account since he is blind. And Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Yasa, does the Rabbi know Bar Pedaiah, that you quote in his name? He said to him, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa said it in his name.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:119

Commandments which the son is obligated to fulfill towards his father. What is fear? He may not sit in his place and may not speak in his stead nor contradict his words. What is honor? He feeds and gives him to drink, clothes him, covers him, and puts on his shoes, leads him out and in. From whose money? Huna bar Ḥiyya said, from the old man’s. Some want to say, from his own. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: From where do we know that even if his father tells him to throw the wallet into the sea that he should obey him? That is, if he has another one and if it helps to quiet his father’s spirit. Both men and women. Only the man has the power in his hand, but the woman does not have the power in her own hand because others have disposition over her. If she is widowed or divorced, the power is in her own hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:120

[They asked Rebbi Eliezer,] how far does honoring father and mother go? He said to them, you are asking me? Go and ask Dama ben Netinah. Dama ben Netinah was the head of the city council. Once his mother was slapping him in front of the entire council and a slipper fell from her hand, and he handed it back to her so that she should feel no inconvenience. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said: He was a Gentile from Ascalon and the head of the city council. He never sat on the stone on which his father used to sit and when his father died, he worshipped the stone. Once the jaspis of Benjamin was lost. They inquired, who would have one of similar quality? They were informed that Dama ben Netinah did. They went to him and agreed on 100 denars. He went to the upper floor to bring it and found his father sleeping. Some say that the key to the chest was in his father’s fingers; some say his father’s foot was resting on the chest. He descended to them and told them: I could not bring it to you. They thought, maybe he wants more money, and raised the price to two hundred, then to a thousand. When his father woke up from his sleep, he went up and brought it to them. They wanted to give him according to the amount last mentioned, but he refused. He said: Do I sell my father’s honor for money? I will not have any advantage from honoring my father. What reward did the Holy One, praise to Him, give him? Rebbi Yose bar Abun said: The following night, his cow gave birth to a red heifer and Israel gave him its weight in gold and took it. Rebbi Sabbatai said (Job 37:23), it is written: “Justice and much charity He will not suppress.” The Holy One, praise to Him, will not wait to give the reward for good deeds to the Gentiles.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:124

Some person might serve his father fattened meat and inherit hell. Some person might bind his father to the grindstone and inherit paradise. How does one serve his father fattened meat and inherit hell? A person used to serve his father fattened chickens. One day, his father said to him: My son, from where do you get the money for these? He said to him: Old man, old man, eat and shut up just as dogs eat and are silent. It turns out that he serves his father fattened meat and inherits hell. How does one bind his father to the grindstone and inherits paradise? A person was a miller at a grindstone; there came a requisition for millers. He said: Father, go and grind in my stead. If it should come to pass that anyone be degraded, it is better that it should happen to me rather than to you. If it should come to pass that anyone be beaten, it is better that it should happen to me rather than to you. It turns out that he binds his father to the grindstone and inherits paradise.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:124

Some person might serve his father fattened meat and inherit hell. Some person might bind his father to the grindstone and inherit paradise. How does one serve his father fattened meat and inherit hell? A person used to serve his father fattened chickens. One day, his father said to him: My son, from where do you get the money for these? He said to him: Old man, old man, eat and shut up just as dogs eat and are silent. It turns out that he serves his father fattened meat and inherits hell. How does one bind his father to the grindstone and inherits paradise? A person was a miller at a grindstone; there came a requisition for millers. He said: Father, go and grind in my stead. If it should come to pass that anyone be degraded, it is better that it should happen to me rather than to you. If it should come to pass that anyone be beaten, it is better that it should happen to me rather than to you. It turns out that he binds his father to the grindstone and inherits paradise.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:124

Some person might serve his father fattened meat and inherit hell. Some person might bind his father to the grindstone and inherit paradise. How does one serve his father fattened meat and inherit hell? A person used to serve his father fattened chickens. One day, his father said to him: My son, from where do you get the money for these? He said to him: Old man, old man, eat and shut up just as dogs eat and are silent. It turns out that he serves his father fattened meat and inherits hell. How does one bind his father to the grindstone and inherits paradise? A person was a miller at a grindstone; there came a requisition for millers. He said: Father, go and grind in my stead. If it should come to pass that anyone be degraded, it is better that it should happen to me rather than to you. If it should come to pass that anyone be beaten, it is better that it should happen to me rather than to you. It turns out that he binds his father to the grindstone and inherits paradise.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:124

Some person might serve his father fattened meat and inherit hell. Some person might bind his father to the grindstone and inherit paradise. How does one serve his father fattened meat and inherit hell? A person used to serve his father fattened chickens. One day, his father said to him: My son, from where do you get the money for these? He said to him: Old man, old man, eat and shut up just as dogs eat and are silent. It turns out that he serves his father fattened meat and inherits hell. How does one bind his father to the grindstone and inherits paradise? A person was a miller at a grindstone; there came a requisition for millers. He said: Father, go and grind in my stead. If it should come to pass that anyone be degraded, it is better that it should happen to me rather than to you. If it should come to pass that anyone be beaten, it is better that it should happen to me rather than to you. It turns out that he binds his father to the grindstone and inherits paradise.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:128

Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Cahana: It is written (Prov. 5:6): “She does not smooth the way of life, her tracks deviate and you will not notice it.” The Holy One, praise to Him, moved the rewards of those who fulfill the commandments (to the future world) so that they should act in faith. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Isaac: It is written (Prov. 4:23): “Observe carefully everything which must be kept, for from it comes life,” observe carefully all the things you were told in the Torah, for you do not know from which of them life will come to you. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said, the verse equals the easiest commandment with the most difficult one. The easiest commandment is sending away [the mother] from the nest. The most difficult one is honoring father and mother. For both of them it is written: “Your days will be lengthened.” Rebbi Abun said, if for anything that is repayment of debt it is written (Deut. 5:16): “That you shall be well and that your days shall be lengthened,” so much more something that involves monetary loss and personal danger. Rebbi Levi said, this one is greater; repaying a debt is greater than fulfilling an obligation that does not involve repaying a debt. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: Just as their rewards are the same, so their punishments are identical. (Prov. 30:17) “The eye that scoffs at the father and despises to obey the mother,” the eye that scoffs about honoring father and mother and despises the commandment not to take the mother with the chicks, “the river ravens should pick it out,” the cruel raven should come, pick it out, and not have any enjoyment from it, “the sons of the eagle should eat it,” the merciful eagle should come and enjoy it.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:128

Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Cahana: It is written (Prov. 5:6): “She does not smooth the way of life, her tracks deviate and you will not notice it.” The Holy One, praise to Him, moved the rewards of those who fulfill the commandments (to the future world) so that they should act in faith. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Isaac: It is written (Prov. 4:23): “Observe carefully everything which must be kept, for from it comes life,” observe carefully all the things you were told in the Torah, for you do not know from which of them life will come to you. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said, the verse equals the easiest commandment with the most difficult one. The easiest commandment is sending away [the mother] from the nest. The most difficult one is honoring father and mother. For both of them it is written: “Your days will be lengthened.” Rebbi Abun said, if for anything that is repayment of debt it is written (Deut. 5:16): “That you shall be well and that your days shall be lengthened,” so much more something that involves monetary loss and personal danger. Rebbi Levi said, this one is greater; repaying a debt is greater than fulfilling an obligation that does not involve repaying a debt. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: Just as their rewards are the same, so their punishments are identical. (Prov. 30:17) “The eye that scoffs at the father and despises to obey the mother,” the eye that scoffs about honoring father and mother and despises the commandment not to take the mother with the chicks, “the river ravens should pick it out,” the cruel raven should come, pick it out, and not have any enjoyment from it, “the sons of the eagle should eat it,” the merciful eagle should come and enjoy it.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:128

Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Cahana: It is written (Prov. 5:6): “She does not smooth the way of life, her tracks deviate and you will not notice it.” The Holy One, praise to Him, moved the rewards of those who fulfill the commandments (to the future world) so that they should act in faith. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Isaac: It is written (Prov. 4:23): “Observe carefully everything which must be kept, for from it comes life,” observe carefully all the things you were told in the Torah, for you do not know from which of them life will come to you. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said, the verse equals the easiest commandment with the most difficult one. The easiest commandment is sending away [the mother] from the nest. The most difficult one is honoring father and mother. For both of them it is written: “Your days will be lengthened.” Rebbi Abun said, if for anything that is repayment of debt it is written (Deut. 5:16): “That you shall be well and that your days shall be lengthened,” so much more something that involves monetary loss and personal danger. Rebbi Levi said, this one is greater; repaying a debt is greater than fulfilling an obligation that does not involve repaying a debt. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: Just as their rewards are the same, so their punishments are identical. (Prov. 30:17) “The eye that scoffs at the father and despises to obey the mother,” the eye that scoffs about honoring father and mother and despises the commandment not to take the mother with the chicks, “the river ravens should pick it out,” the cruel raven should come, pick it out, and not have any enjoyment from it, “the sons of the eagle should eat it,” the merciful eagle should come and enjoy it.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:128

Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Cahana: It is written (Prov. 5:6): “She does not smooth the way of life, her tracks deviate and you will not notice it.” The Holy One, praise to Him, moved the rewards of those who fulfill the commandments (to the future world) so that they should act in faith. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Isaac: It is written (Prov. 4:23): “Observe carefully everything which must be kept, for from it comes life,” observe carefully all the things you were told in the Torah, for you do not know from which of them life will come to you. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said, the verse equals the easiest commandment with the most difficult one. The easiest commandment is sending away [the mother] from the nest. The most difficult one is honoring father and mother. For both of them it is written: “Your days will be lengthened.” Rebbi Abun said, if for anything that is repayment of debt it is written (Deut. 5:16): “That you shall be well and that your days shall be lengthened,” so much more something that involves monetary loss and personal danger. Rebbi Levi said, this one is greater; repaying a debt is greater than fulfilling an obligation that does not involve repaying a debt. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: Just as their rewards are the same, so their punishments are identical. (Prov. 30:17) “The eye that scoffs at the father and despises to obey the mother,” the eye that scoffs about honoring father and mother and despises the commandment not to take the mother with the chicks, “the river ravens should pick it out,” the cruel raven should come, pick it out, and not have any enjoyment from it, “the sons of the eagle should eat it,” the merciful eagle should come and enjoy it.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:128

Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Cahana: It is written (Prov. 5:6): “She does not smooth the way of life, her tracks deviate and you will not notice it.” The Holy One, praise to Him, moved the rewards of those who fulfill the commandments (to the future world) so that they should act in faith. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Isaac: It is written (Prov. 4:23): “Observe carefully everything which must be kept, for from it comes life,” observe carefully all the things you were told in the Torah, for you do not know from which of them life will come to you. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said, the verse equals the easiest commandment with the most difficult one. The easiest commandment is sending away [the mother] from the nest. The most difficult one is honoring father and mother. For both of them it is written: “Your days will be lengthened.” Rebbi Abun said, if for anything that is repayment of debt it is written (Deut. 5:16): “That you shall be well and that your days shall be lengthened,” so much more something that involves monetary loss and personal danger. Rebbi Levi said, this one is greater; repaying a debt is greater than fulfilling an obligation that does not involve repaying a debt. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: Just as their rewards are the same, so their punishments are identical. (Prov. 30:17) “The eye that scoffs at the father and despises to obey the mother,” the eye that scoffs about honoring father and mother and despises the commandment not to take the mother with the chicks, “the river ravens should pick it out,” the cruel raven should come, pick it out, and not have any enjoyment from it, “the sons of the eagle should eat it,” the merciful eagle should come and enjoy it.