6016 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:22

HALAKHAH: “They said to him, did not the teacher use to say,” etc. Rebbi Yose the Southerner said before Rebbi Jonah: Would it not have been necessary to state, if it is so then those of the Days of the New Moon could be brought on the Day of Atonement since one increases holiness but one does not diminish; but those of the Day of Atonement cannot be brought on the Days of the New Moon since one does not diminish holiness. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Bun explained it by another explanation: if it is so then those of the Day of Atonement could be brought on the Days of the New Moon, for included in their atoning is the atoning of the Days of the New Moon, but those of the days of the New Moon cannot be brought on the Day of Atonement, for they atone only their atonement. For if anybody ate five olive-sized pieces of fat and dedicated four sacrifices, being of the impression that he had dedicated five, did he atone? Or if he ate four olive sized pieces of fat, dedicated five sacrifices, being of the impression that he had dedicated four, not so much more? And so “Rebbi Simeon used to say, thirty-two rams are brought for the public every year. Thirty one outside, they are eaten. One inside which is not eaten. And the scapegoat. Twelve for the twelve months of the year. Eight on Tabernacles, seven on Passover, two on Pentecost, one for the day and one for the bread. One on New Year’s Day and one on the Day of Atonement.” When Moses heard this he said, it follows that anybody for whom the doubt of a transgression arises should bring all these sacrifices! Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: When the Holy One, praise to Him, said to Moses, he shall confess on it etc., he started and said, A Song of confession, inspired by he shall confess on it.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:22

HALAKHAH: “They said to him, did not the teacher use to say,” etc. Rebbi Yose the Southerner said before Rebbi Jonah: Would it not have been necessary to state, if it is so then those of the Days of the New Moon could be brought on the Day of Atonement since one increases holiness but one does not diminish; but those of the Day of Atonement cannot be brought on the Days of the New Moon since one does not diminish holiness. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Bun explained it by another explanation: if it is so then those of the Day of Atonement could be brought on the Days of the New Moon, for included in their atoning is the atoning of the Days of the New Moon, but those of the days of the New Moon cannot be brought on the Day of Atonement, for they atone only their atonement. For if anybody ate five olive-sized pieces of fat and dedicated four sacrifices, being of the impression that he had dedicated five, did he atone? Or if he ate four olive sized pieces of fat, dedicated five sacrifices, being of the impression that he had dedicated four, not so much more? And so “Rebbi Simeon used to say, thirty-two rams are brought for the public every year. Thirty one outside, they are eaten. One inside which is not eaten. And the scapegoat. Twelve for the twelve months of the year. Eight on Tabernacles, seven on Passover, two on Pentecost, one for the day and one for the bread. One on New Year’s Day and one on the Day of Atonement.” When Moses heard this he said, it follows that anybody for whom the doubt of a transgression arises should bring all these sacrifices! Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: When the Holy One, praise to Him, said to Moses, he shall confess on it etc., he started and said, A Song of confession, inspired by he shall confess on it.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The kinds of awareness of impurity,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: It is obvious about the last awareness, until he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Is the same true for the first awareness? Let us hear from the following: Two paths, one impure and one pure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary, left, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, walked on the second one, and entered the Sanctuary; he is liable and he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, we thought that one could say that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said this if he was certain that he was impure, he had forgotten the impurity and entered the Sanctuary. But not if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure, he was oblivious of the Sanctuary and entered the Sanctuary. Since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary: this implies even if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion since a doubt of awareness is awareness. Since at a time when he does not know whether he was impure or pure you say it is certain knowledge, if he knows for certain that he is impure but does not know whether he is liable for a sacrifice then certainly this should be awareness.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The kinds of awareness of impurity,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: It is obvious about the last awareness, until he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Is the same true for the first awareness? Let us hear from the following: Two paths, one impure and one pure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary, left, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, walked on the second one, and entered the Sanctuary; he is liable and he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, we thought that one could say that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said this if he was certain that he was impure, he had forgotten the impurity and entered the Sanctuary. But not if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure, he was oblivious of the Sanctuary and entered the Sanctuary. Since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary: this implies even if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion since a doubt of awareness is awareness. Since at a time when he does not know whether he was impure or pure you say it is certain knowledge, if he knows for certain that he is impure but does not know whether he is liable for a sacrifice then certainly this should be awareness.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The kinds of awareness of impurity,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: It is obvious about the last awareness, until he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Is the same true for the first awareness? Let us hear from the following: Two paths, one impure and one pure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary, left, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, walked on the second one, and entered the Sanctuary; he is liable and he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, we thought that one could say that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said this if he was certain that he was impure, he had forgotten the impurity and entered the Sanctuary. But not if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure, he was oblivious of the Sanctuary and entered the Sanctuary. Since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary: this implies even if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion since a doubt of awareness is awareness. Since at a time when he does not know whether he was impure or pure you say it is certain knowledge, if he knows for certain that he is impure but does not know whether he is liable for a sacrifice then certainly this should be awareness.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:7

Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:7

Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:8

Somebody became impure through a corpse and knew it; by a crawling animal and did not know it. The minor impurity is not mentioned with the severe impurity. Somebody became impure through a corpse and did not know it; by a crawling animal and did not know it. Then it became known to him about the crawling animal, and after that it became known to him about the corpse. Since it first became known to him about the crawling animal, is there minor impurity together with the severe one, or since the impurity of the corpse preceded, should the impurity of the crawling animal and the knowledge about it be pushed aside so that the minor impurity not be mentioned with the severe impurity? Somebody became impure through a corpse and knew it; by a crawling animal and did not know it, and entered the Sanctuary. When he was oblivious of the corpse he is liable; when he was oblivious of the crawling animal he is not liable. If he went to immerse himself for the severe impurity and the minor impurity was additional, it is counted also for the minor impurity. In which respect? If he immersed himself and then entered the Sanctuary he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:8

Somebody became impure through a corpse and knew it; by a crawling animal and did not know it. The minor impurity is not mentioned with the severe impurity. Somebody became impure through a corpse and did not know it; by a crawling animal and did not know it. Then it became known to him about the crawling animal, and after that it became known to him about the corpse. Since it first became known to him about the crawling animal, is there minor impurity together with the severe one, or since the impurity of the corpse preceded, should the impurity of the crawling animal and the knowledge about it be pushed aside so that the minor impurity not be mentioned with the severe impurity? Somebody became impure through a corpse and knew it; by a crawling animal and did not know it, and entered the Sanctuary. When he was oblivious of the corpse he is liable; when he was oblivious of the crawling animal he is not liable. If he went to immerse himself for the severe impurity and the minor impurity was additional, it is counted also for the minor impurity. In which respect? If he immersed himself and then entered the Sanctuary he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:9

If he went to immerse himself for a minor impurity and a severe impurity was additional, it does not count for him for the severe impurity. In which respect? If he immersed himself and then entered the Sanctuary he is liable. Therefore not for a severe impurity and a severe impurity was additional. Therefore not for a minor impurity and a minor impurity was additional. If he went to immerse himself for severe impurity and tree limbs and wall extensions were additional are these like severe impurity since Rebbi Joḥanan said that for heave all of them are [impure] from the Torah, or are they like minor impurity since the nazir does not shave because of them?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:9

If he went to immerse himself for a minor impurity and a severe impurity was additional, it does not count for him for the severe impurity. In which respect? If he immersed himself and then entered the Sanctuary he is liable. Therefore not for a severe impurity and a severe impurity was additional. Therefore not for a minor impurity and a minor impurity was additional. If he went to immerse himself for severe impurity and tree limbs and wall extensions were additional are these like severe impurity since Rebbi Joḥanan said that for heave all of them are [impure] from the Torah, or are they like minor impurity since the nazir does not shave because of them?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:10

An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:10

An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:21

HALAKHAH: “What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman,” etc. Cahana said, is it impossible that there was knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end and oblivion in between? Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon objected before Rebbi Mana: Could that be for the teachers? He told him, we have a problem with those entering and you bring us teachers? What about it? Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, commandments, commandments. Since commandments mentioned there are about fixed-value [offerings], here also about fixed-value [offerings].

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:4

Does not the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where do we find that somebody talks and brings a sacrifice that this one talks and brings a sacrifice? Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inverted? There he said, for Rebbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaïm following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:6

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate,” etc. Drinking is subsumed under eating but eating is not subsumed under drinking. Rebbi Jonah understood all this from: Therefore, I told the Children of Israel, none of you shall eat blood. Where do we hold? If about congealed blood, was it not stated that congealed blood is neither food nor drink? (But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating.) And was it not stated: If one liquefied the blood and swallowed it, or froze fat and ate it, if there is the volume of an olive he is liable. What does Rebbi Jonah do with this? It is not food to become impure in the impurity of food, or fluid to become impure in the impurity of fluids. Rebbi Jonah changed and explained the Mishnah: You shall spend the money for anything you desire. Where do we hold? If about one who gives the taste of wine into a cooked dish, is that not spoiling the taste? But we hold with everything and the Merciful called it “eating.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain if about gomraya and orzaraya, since anything that is auxiliary to food is like food.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:16

Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who said that comprehensive oaths fall on prohibitions, should we not state “an oath that I shall not eat; when he ate”? Rebbi Ze`ira said, in the whole lifetime of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal we did not find an answer; after he had died, we found an answer. Where do we stand? If one said, an oath that I shall not eat meat, including Passover; that I shall not eat during these ten days, including the Day of Atonement, then the oath falls on prohibitions. Rebbi Yose said, one may infer from here if in front of him were olive-sized pieces of slaughtered [meat] and one of carcass meat and he said, [an oath] that I shall eat these ten olive-sized pieces, since he is not liable for the carcass meat, he neither is liable for the remainder.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:18

Rebbi Ḥinena asked: Why did he not say, “an oath if I would eat of X” without detail? Because of Rebbi Simeon. But if following Rebbi Simeon, how could we state the Day of Atonement, since Rebbi Simeon stated, you shall deprive yourselves, of what is (forbidden) to you, not of what is (permitted) to you. Only one has a fixed rate sacrifice, the other a variable one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:24

HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:25

How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:26

MISHNAH: If he swore not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, he is not liable; to observe a commandment and did not observe it, he is not liable, though it would have been logical that he should be liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, since he is liable for a permitted purpose, for which he is not sworn to from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he should be liable about a commandment to which he is sworn from Mount Sinai? They said to him, no. What you say about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes”, can you say that about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”? Since one who swears not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:26

MISHNAH: If he swore not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, he is not liable; to observe a commandment and did not observe it, he is not liable, though it would have been logical that he should be liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, since he is liable for a permitted purpose, for which he is not sworn to from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he should be liable about a commandment to which he is sworn from Mount Sinai? They said to him, no. What you say about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes”, can you say that about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”? Since one who swears not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:31

Rebbi Phineas asked, if he was asthenic? Since it is not in his hand for the future, it is not in his hand for the past.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:46

HALAKHAH: “A blurted oath,” etc. “ ‘An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it’, he is liable only once”. Something which would be forbidden for vows and is permitted for oaths. Not on this was it said but on the following: “Whether matters of himself, or matters of others,” as Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: ‘An oath that X gave a mina to Y.’ If it turns out that he had not given, since it is not in his hand for the future it is not in his hand for the past. It was found stated on both cases: This is more stringent for the past than for the future: If he says “I shall not eat, I shall not eat,” he is liable only once. “I did not eat, I did not eat,” he is liable for each single time.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:54

HALAKHAH: “A vain oath,” etc. A person, a person. Since by a person which was said for an oath of testimony He made the one at whom the oath was directed like one swearing, so also by a person which was said for an oath of deposit He made the one at whom the oath was directed like one swearing.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:55

This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:55

This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:6

Rebbi Ḥaggai objected to Rebbi Yose. Is there not written: The two men shall stand? Now, is not two the minimum of “men”? Why does the verse say two? That both be equal? But it is written: Do not bend the lawsuit of the proselyte, the orphan, … That means that a proselyte can have a lawsuit against one who is not a proselyte, an orphan may have a lawsuit against one who is not an orphan, a widow against a married woman. Then why is there written two? It is free to be combined and to infer from it an equal cut. It is said here two and it is said there two men were left. Since there one speaks of men but not women nor underaged, also here men but not women nor underaged. From this we learn that a woman may not be a judge; consequently a woman may not be a witness.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:7

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Yose. It is said here two and it is said there by the mouth of two witnesses. Since there it must be by the testimony of two witnesses, also here by the testimony of two witnesses. Then why does the verse say two? Lest one of them be standing while the other be sitting; one says everything he has to say, but to the other one says, make your statement short. With one he puts up, to the other he is unfriendly.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:12

From where that judges may not be relatives of one another? The Torah said, kill on the testimony of witnesses, kill on the sentence of judges. Since witnesses may not be relatives of one another, neither may judges be relatives of one another.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:15

From where following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: The congregation shall judge between the beater, etc. The congregation be neither relatives of the murderer nor relatives of the murdered. Rebbi Yose said, otherwise you would say that the court is engaged in vendetta. This implies that the judges may not be related to the accused. And from where that the witnesses may not be related to the accused? The Torah said, kill on the testimony of witnesses, kill on the sentence of those who vote. Since judges may not be related to the accused, neither may witnesses be related to the accused. From where that witnesses may not be relatives of one another? Think of it, if they be found perjured, would they not be killed by each other’s testimony?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:20

From where two witnesses? And he is a witness, this makes two. Following Rebbi Ismael, who said, any place where the Torah mentions a witness without further determination it implies two witnesses; unless the verse informs you that a single witness is meant. It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “Two witnesses.” Can a single witness be found guilty of a blurted oath? Since it is possible to say that one person could team up with him, then he would be subject to the oath of testimony, you could find him liable for an oath of testimony. How could you find him guilty of a blurted oath?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:21

Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “Where is my ox?” He responded, “I do not know what you are referring to.” Rebbi declares him not liable for a keeper’s oath but liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In the rabbis’ opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:21

Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “Where is my ox?” He responded, “I do not know what you are referring to.” Rebbi declares him not liable for a keeper’s oath but liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In the rabbis’ opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:22

Rebbi Ismael stated: He has to bear his punishment, a sacrifice. From where that one needs a court? “Telling, telling”. Since telling mentioned there is before a court, also telling here is before a court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:25

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:25

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:25

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:25

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:26

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative liable for an oath about testimony formulated by himself? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by himself for an oath about testimony only from oaths about deposits, and since there relatives are liable, so they also are here? Rebbi Yose said, can relatives here be inferred from relatives there?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:26

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative liable for an oath about testimony formulated by himself? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by himself for an oath about testimony only from oaths about deposits, and since there relatives are liable, so they also are here? Rebbi Yose said, can relatives here be inferred from relatives there?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:27

Rebbi Yudan the Cappadocian asked: He made him swear five times by his own formulation before the court: would he not be liable for each instance separately? Rebbi Yose said, is this not the Mishnah: “Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit?” But here, since they can come back and admit, they are liable for each single instance.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:28

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times in his own words and let him swear five times by the mouth of others, what? Since Rebbi Meїr considered “in his own words” as if in court, would they determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request? It should come like the following: “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. Should they be liable? The verse says, and he heard the voice of an imprecation. Only one who hears an imprecation. This excludes those who did not hear a voice.” Would he be liable from his own mouth for real estate? From his own mouth would he be liable for fines? From his own mouth would he be liable for a variable value sacrifice?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:30

MISHNAH: If both of them disavowed simultaneously, both of them are liable; one after the other, the first is liable but the second is not liable. If one reneged but one confessed, the one who disavowed is liable. If there were two groups of witnesses, if the first group disavowed and after this the second, both are liable since testimony could be upheld by either one of them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:31

HALAKHAH: “If both of them disavowed simultaneously,” etc. If they dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to disavowe in court. This is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, his sacrifice for the Eternal for his vow of nazir; that his vow of nazir precede his sacrifice, not that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. If they were sworn to out of court, dedicated a sacrifice and said, we are going to renege in court, how do you treat this? As if his sin did precede his sacrifice or since the are liable only in court as if their sacrifice did precede their sin?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:37

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:39

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Halakhah 8: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. A person who would sin, a person who would sin as an equal cut. Since a person who would sin which was said further on refers to an active monetary claim, also a person who would sin must refer to an active monetary claim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:40

“I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, there is no money when there is flogging. He explains it following Rebbi Meїr who said, he is flogged and he pays. In any case he did not make him lose money. Is it not that since he wanted to give him but did not give to him; it is as if he made him lose money.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:41

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that Mr. X promised to give me 200 zuz but did not give them to me.” These are not liable since one is liable only for an (oath about) money similar to a deposit. “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me when you know testimony for me.” These are not liable since the oath preceded the testimony. If he stood in the synagogue and said, “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me if you know testimony for me.” These are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:41

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that Mr. X promised to give me 200 zuz but did not give them to me.” These are not liable since one is liable only for an (oath about) money similar to a deposit. “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me when you know testimony for me.” These are not liable since the oath preceded the testimony. If he stood in the synagogue and said, “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me if you know testimony for me.” These are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:45

HALAKHAH: “If he said to two persons, I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Rebbi Mana understood it from the following, “or one of them was a relative or disqualified.” Therefore, unless one of them was a relative or disqualified, they are liable. And he knows who they are. Therefore the reason can only be that he does not intend them. Rebbi Yose understood it from the preceding, “since the oath preceded the testimony.” Therefore, if the oath did not precede the testimony, they are liable. And he knows who they are. Therefore the reason can only be that he does not intend them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:2

HALAKHAH: “An oath about a deposit,” etc. It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation; in his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation? Rebbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person”, everything is here and everything is there. Rebbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and the Sages. He lied to his fellow man, if his confession was eliminated by the oath. It excludes one who lied to one of partners; it excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and warrantors for one another”, they are responsible and warrantors for one another; but one does not act on this. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him. Should he not be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable. If the deposit was worth one peruṭa, does this not result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? What here? If one would swear, and swear, and swear, would he not bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? There, each oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:6

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about a deposit,” etc. A person, a person. Since here it is from his own words, also there from his own words. Since there it is from others’ words, also here it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut at the place it comes from: Since here it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said about it. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:6

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about a deposit,” etc. A person, a person. Since here it is from his own words, also there from his own words. Since there it is from others’ words, also here it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut at the place it comes from: Since here it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said about it. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:6

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about a deposit,” etc. A person, a person. Since here it is from his own words, also there from his own words. Since there it is from others’ words, also here it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut at the place it comes from: Since here it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said about it. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:6

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about a deposit,” etc. A person, a person. Since here it is from his own words, also there from his own words. Since there it is from others’ words, also here it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut at the place it comes from: Since here it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said about it. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:7

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative not liable for an oath about deposits formulated by others? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by others for an oath about deposits only from oaths about testimony, and since there relatives are not liable, so they neither are here? Rebbi Yose said, relatives here can be inferred from non-relatives there.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:7

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative not liable for an oath about deposits formulated by others? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by others for an oath about deposits only from oaths about testimony, and since there relatives are not liable, so they neither are here? Rebbi Yose said, relatives here can be inferred from non-relatives there.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:8

Rebbi Yudan the Cappadocian asked: He made him swear five times by the formulation of others out of the court: would he not be liable only once? Rebbi Yose said, is this not the Mishnah: “Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they can come back and admit?” But here, since they cannot come back and admit, they are liable only once.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:9

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times, since Rebbi Meїr considered “by his own words” as in court, would this determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request? It should come like the following: “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. He pays the value plus a fifth and brings a reparation sacrifice for two tetradrachmas, in distinction from an oath about testimony.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:14

Rebbi Yudan from Cappadocia asked: What about “an oath that neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt I am holding for you”? Is it as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. “I am not holding for you wheat, or barley, or spelt, an oath,” is this as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. Is it so if this were a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall not eat; I shall not eat, an oath”? In the rabbis’ opinion he brings a sacrifice for each one. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion does he bring one for the entirety? Even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that he is only emphasizing the prohibitions. It only would be problematic if it were about the past. “An oath that I did not eat; I did not eat, an oath.” In the rabbis’ opinion he brings two sacrifices (for each one). In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one (for each).

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:14

Rebbi Yudan from Cappadocia asked: What about “an oath that neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt I am holding for you”? Is it as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. “I am not holding for you wheat, or barley, or spelt, an oath,” is this as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. Is it so if this were a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall not eat; I shall not eat, an oath”? In the rabbis’ opinion he brings a sacrifice for each one. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion does he bring one for the entirety? Even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that he is only emphasizing the prohibitions. It only would be problematic if it were about the past. “An oath that I did not eat; I did not eat, an oath.” In the rabbis’ opinion he brings two sacrifices (for each one). In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one (for each).

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:17

Rebbi Yose asked: “An oath, an oath that I am not holding for you,” what? Rebbi Yose said, let us hear from the following: “ ‘An oath that I shall not eat this loaf; an oath that I shall not eat it’. Then he ate it. He is liable only once.” Because he mentioned “this”. Therefore, had he not mentioned “this” we would be liable for each one. Is it the same for a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall eat carcass meat, and wheat bread, and barley bread, and spelt bread.” Since he is not liable for carcass meat he is not liable for the remainder.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:19

HALAKHAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi (Yasa) will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a baraita supports what the colleagues said. “A woman made a vow as a nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I’; the first woman’s husband heard it and dissolved [the vow] for her; the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. If she said, ‘my intention was only to be like her,’ both are permitted.” Because she said, “to be like her, in her state”. Therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state”, the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where the essence is not an oath, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? What Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest, if he connects: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:20

The following is obvious: If her husband did not dissolve [the vow] for the first woman and she (remained) in her vow, she is whipped. Can the second he whipped? Rebbi Yose said, since one is whipped, the other also is whipped. Rebbi Yudan said, is this a stipulation of the court? Should not the second be treated as one who said, “a shall be a nezirah[after] thirty days”? Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion, for he said, it depends on the collection.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:23

MISHNAH: “You raped or seduced my daughter,” and he says “I did not rape, I did not seduce.” “I am asking you to swear,” and he says “Amen,” he is liable. Rebbi Simeon frees him from liability since he would not pay the fine by his own admission. They told him, even though he does not pay the fine by his own admission, he pays for shame and diminution by his own admission.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:1

MISHNAH: A judicial oath is about a claim of two silver coins and the acknowledgment of one peruṭah. If the acknowledgment is not of the kind of the claim he is not liable. How is this? “You are holding two silver coins for me;” “I am holding only one peruṭah.” He is not liable. “You are holding two silver coins and a peruṭah for me;” “I am holding only one peruṭah.” He is liable. “You are holding a mina for me,” “I am not holding anything for you,” he is not liable. “You are holding a mina for me,” “I am holding only 50 denar for you,” he is liable. “You are holding a mina for my father,” “I am holding only 50 denar for you,” he is not liable since he is like one returning a lost object.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:2

HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:2

HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:2

HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:3

The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. If a person give to his neighbor, etc. If to teach that the court will not act on less than a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written, to incur liability for it? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. From here, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two oboloi. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Or vessels; since vessels are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret or vessels? Following what Rebbi Nathan stated, or vessels, including clay vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is liable. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two peruṭot, that the claim should be about a peruṭah’s worth and the confession about a peruṭah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since vessels are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two oboloi, also “vessels” means two oboloi’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:3

The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. If a person give to his neighbor, etc. If to teach that the court will not act on less than a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written, to incur liability for it? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. From here, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two oboloi. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Or vessels; since vessels are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret or vessels? Following what Rebbi Nathan stated, or vessels, including clay vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is liable. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two peruṭot, that the claim should be about a peruṭah’s worth and the confession about a peruṭah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since vessels are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two oboloi, also “vessels” means two oboloi’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:3

The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. If a person give to his neighbor, etc. If to teach that the court will not act on less than a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written, to incur liability for it? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. From here, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two oboloi. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Or vessels; since vessels are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret or vessels? Following what Rebbi Nathan stated, or vessels, including clay vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is liable. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two peruṭot, that the claim should be about a peruṭah’s worth and the confession about a peruṭah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since vessels are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two oboloi, also “vessels” means two oboloi’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:4

Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: In any case where two [witnesses] make him liable to pay money, a single witness sets him up for an oath. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for real estate? It is a difference since one does not swear about real estate. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a fine? There is a difference since one does not swear about a fine. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a peruṭah? Is it so? Have we not stated: “A judicial oath is about a claim of two silver coins and the acknowledgment of one peruṭah.” Our Mishnah, when he swears by his own formulation. What (Rebbi) Samuel said, when he swears by the formulation of others. Rav Ḥisda and his group disagree. “A judicial oath”, any judicial oath. There is no difference whether he swears by his own formulation or he swears by the formulation of others, he cannot be liable except for a claim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:4

Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: In any case where two [witnesses] make him liable to pay money, a single witness sets him up for an oath. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for real estate? It is a difference since one does not swear about real estate. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a fine? There is a difference since one does not swear about a fine. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a peruṭah? Is it so? Have we not stated: “A judicial oath is about a claim of two silver coins and the acknowledgment of one peruṭah.” Our Mishnah, when he swears by his own formulation. What (Rebbi) Samuel said, when he swears by the formulation of others. Rav Ḥisda and his group disagree. “A judicial oath”, any judicial oath. There is no difference whether he swears by his own formulation or he swears by the formulation of others, he cannot be liable except for a claim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:9

MISHNAH: “You are holding a mina for me;” he said “yes”. The next day he said, “return it to me,” “I returned it to you;” he is not liable. “You are holding a mina for me;” he said “yes.” “Return it to me only in the presence of witnesses.” The next day he said, “return it to me,” “I returned it to you;” he is liable since he is required to return it in the presence of witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:11

“You are holding a mina for me;” he said “yes.” “Return it to me only in the presence of X and Y.” The next day he said, “return it to me,” “I returned it to you;” he is liable since he is required to return it in the presence of witnesses. Think of it, if he said, I returned it in the presence of witnesses. Bar Kappara stated: “when X and Y are standing there.” Think of it, if he said, “when X were Y are standing there.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Hamnuna, Rebbi Ada bar Ahava in the name of Rav: A case came before Rebbi, and he said, let X and Y come.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:14

MISHNAH: “You are holding for me a pound of gold,” “I am holding for you only a pound of silver;” he is not liable. “You are holding for me a gold denar,” “I am holding for you only a silver denar, or a tressis, or a dupondius, or a peruṭah,” he is liable since all kinds of coin are one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:16

MISHNAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” “I am holding for you only a letek of legumes;” he is not liable. “You are holding for me a kor of produce;” “I am holding for you only a letek of legumes;” he is liable since legumes are subsumed under produce. If one sued for wheat and the other acknowledged barley, he is not liable, but Rebbi Simeon declares him liable. Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and the other admitted to pitchers, Admon says since he admitted of the kind of the claim he has to swear. But the Sages say, the admission is not of the kind of the claim. Rabban Gamliel said, I see the words of Admon. If somebody sued for both vessels and real estate; if [the other] admitted the vessels but denied the real estate, or the real estate and denied the vessels, he is not liable. If he admitted part of the real estate he is not liable. Part of the vessels he is liable since non-guaranteed property obligates guaranteed property to be sworn about.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:16

MISHNAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” “I am holding for you only a letek of legumes;” he is not liable. “You are holding for me a kor of produce;” “I am holding for you only a letek of legumes;” he is liable since legumes are subsumed under produce. If one sued for wheat and the other acknowledged barley, he is not liable, but Rebbi Simeon declares him liable. Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and the other admitted to pitchers, Admon says since he admitted of the kind of the claim he has to swear. But the Sages say, the admission is not of the kind of the claim. Rabban Gamliel said, I see the words of Admon. If somebody sued for both vessels and real estate; if [the other] admitted the vessels but denied the real estate, or the real estate and denied the vessels, he is not liable. If he admitted part of the real estate he is not liable. Part of the vessels he is liable since non-guaranteed property obligates guaranteed property to be sworn about.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:16

MISHNAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” “I am holding for you only a letek of legumes;” he is not liable. “You are holding for me a kor of produce;” “I am holding for you only a letek of legumes;” he is liable since legumes are subsumed under produce. If one sued for wheat and the other acknowledged barley, he is not liable, but Rebbi Simeon declares him liable. Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and the other admitted to pitchers, Admon says since he admitted of the kind of the claim he has to swear. But the Sages say, the admission is not of the kind of the claim. Rabban Gamliel said, I see the words of Admon. If somebody sued for both vessels and real estate; if [the other] admitted the vessels but denied the real estate, or the real estate and denied the vessels, he is not liable. If he admitted part of the real estate he is not liable. Part of the vessels he is liable since non-guaranteed property obligates guaranteed property to be sworn about.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:17

HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:17

HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:24

Some want to understand it from here: An ox, or a donkey, or a sheep. Since these are particular in that they are subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying, this excludes real estate which is not subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying. I shall exclude real estate but shall not exclude slaves. Since these are particular in that they are subject to a fine, this excludes slaves which are not subject to a fine. I shall exclude slaves but shall not exclude documents since they are subject to fines. Since these are particular in that they are subject to overcharging, this excludes documents which are not subject to overcharging. From here they say, if somebody sells documents to the spice trader, it is subject to claims of overcharging. Rebbi Ismael explained: Or a person, if he would swear, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a repeat general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is about monetary claims, [originating] from himself, which can be collected by court order, having monetary value, which is a fixed value, and are movables, and one is not liable for punishment and fines. Monetary claims, excluding one who said to another, give me the 200 denar which you promised me but never gave. [Originating] from himself, excluding one who said to another, you cursed me and shamed me, who is not liable. Which can be collected by court order, excluding one who said to another, you raped or seduced X’s daughter. It has monetary value, excluding documents. Which is a fixed value, excluding slaves. Movables, excluding real estate. One is not liable for punishment, excluding one who said to another, you set fire to my grain stack on the Sabbath; who is not liable. One is not liable for fines, excluding double, quadruple, or quintuple restitution which are fines.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:24

Some want to understand it from here: An ox, or a donkey, or a sheep. Since these are particular in that they are subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying, this excludes real estate which is not subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying. I shall exclude real estate but shall not exclude slaves. Since these are particular in that they are subject to a fine, this excludes slaves which are not subject to a fine. I shall exclude slaves but shall not exclude documents since they are subject to fines. Since these are particular in that they are subject to overcharging, this excludes documents which are not subject to overcharging. From here they say, if somebody sells documents to the spice trader, it is subject to claims of overcharging. Rebbi Ismael explained: Or a person, if he would swear, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a repeat general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is about monetary claims, [originating] from himself, which can be collected by court order, having monetary value, which is a fixed value, and are movables, and one is not liable for punishment and fines. Monetary claims, excluding one who said to another, give me the 200 denar which you promised me but never gave. [Originating] from himself, excluding one who said to another, you cursed me and shamed me, who is not liable. Which can be collected by court order, excluding one who said to another, you raped or seduced X’s daughter. It has monetary value, excluding documents. Which is a fixed value, excluding slaves. Movables, excluding real estate. One is not liable for punishment, excluding one who said to another, you set fire to my grain stack on the Sabbath; who is not liable. One is not liable for fines, excluding double, quadruple, or quintuple restitution which are fines.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:24

Some want to understand it from here: An ox, or a donkey, or a sheep. Since these are particular in that they are subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying, this excludes real estate which is not subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying. I shall exclude real estate but shall not exclude slaves. Since these are particular in that they are subject to a fine, this excludes slaves which are not subject to a fine. I shall exclude slaves but shall not exclude documents since they are subject to fines. Since these are particular in that they are subject to overcharging, this excludes documents which are not subject to overcharging. From here they say, if somebody sells documents to the spice trader, it is subject to claims of overcharging. Rebbi Ismael explained: Or a person, if he would swear, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a repeat general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is about monetary claims, [originating] from himself, which can be collected by court order, having monetary value, which is a fixed value, and are movables, and one is not liable for punishment and fines. Monetary claims, excluding one who said to another, give me the 200 denar which you promised me but never gave. [Originating] from himself, excluding one who said to another, you cursed me and shamed me, who is not liable. Which can be collected by court order, excluding one who said to another, you raped or seduced X’s daughter. It has monetary value, excluding documents. Which is a fixed value, excluding slaves. Movables, excluding real estate. One is not liable for punishment, excluding one who said to another, you set fire to my grain stack on the Sabbath; who is not liable. One is not liable for fines, excluding double, quadruple, or quintuple restitution which are fines.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:24

Some want to understand it from here: An ox, or a donkey, or a sheep. Since these are particular in that they are subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying, this excludes real estate which is not subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying. I shall exclude real estate but shall not exclude slaves. Since these are particular in that they are subject to a fine, this excludes slaves which are not subject to a fine. I shall exclude slaves but shall not exclude documents since they are subject to fines. Since these are particular in that they are subject to overcharging, this excludes documents which are not subject to overcharging. From here they say, if somebody sells documents to the spice trader, it is subject to claims of overcharging. Rebbi Ismael explained: Or a person, if he would swear, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a repeat general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is about monetary claims, [originating] from himself, which can be collected by court order, having monetary value, which is a fixed value, and are movables, and one is not liable for punishment and fines. Monetary claims, excluding one who said to another, give me the 200 denar which you promised me but never gave. [Originating] from himself, excluding one who said to another, you cursed me and shamed me, who is not liable. Which can be collected by court order, excluding one who said to another, you raped or seduced X’s daughter. It has monetary value, excluding documents. Which is a fixed value, excluding slaves. Movables, excluding real estate. One is not liable for punishment, excluding one who said to another, you set fire to my grain stack on the Sabbath; who is not liable. One is not liable for fines, excluding double, quadruple, or quintuple restitution which are fines.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:24

Some want to understand it from here: An ox, or a donkey, or a sheep. Since these are particular in that they are subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying, this excludes real estate which is not subject to breaking, kidnapping, and dying. I shall exclude real estate but shall not exclude slaves. Since these are particular in that they are subject to a fine, this excludes slaves which are not subject to a fine. I shall exclude slaves but shall not exclude documents since they are subject to fines. Since these are particular in that they are subject to overcharging, this excludes documents which are not subject to overcharging. From here they say, if somebody sells documents to the spice trader, it is subject to claims of overcharging. Rebbi Ismael explained: Or a person, if he would swear, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a repeat general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is about monetary claims, [originating] from himself, which can be collected by court order, having monetary value, which is a fixed value, and are movables, and one is not liable for punishment and fines. Monetary claims, excluding one who said to another, give me the 200 denar which you promised me but never gave. [Originating] from himself, excluding one who said to another, you cursed me and shamed me, who is not liable. Which can be collected by court order, excluding one who said to another, you raped or seduced X’s daughter. It has monetary value, excluding documents. Which is a fixed value, excluding slaves. Movables, excluding real estate. One is not liable for punishment, excluding one who said to another, you set fire to my grain stack on the Sabbath; who is not liable. One is not liable for fines, excluding double, quadruple, or quintuple restitution which are fines.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:29

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Ḥanina said, One says, a large candelabra, but the other says, a small candelabra; he is liable since we have stated: “One swears only on matters of measure, or weight, or count.” Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, explain it if it was a candelabra composed of sections. One says, a large belt; the other says, a small belt. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated something but we do not know what he stated. If you say “liable”, a Mishnah disagrees, as we have stated: “One swears only on matters of measure, or weight, or count.” If you say “not liable”, a Mishnah disagrees, as we have stated: “If one says the adult one and the other says the underage one, let the seller swear that he sold the underage one. If both say that they do not know, they shall split.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:31

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Joḥanan said, the lender can be believed if he said, I lent to you up to the value of the pledge. The Mishnah says, also the borrower can be believed, as we have stated: “He told him, ‘I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a šeqel,’ but the other one says ‘no, a tetradrachma you loaned me and it was worth a tetradrachma‘; he is not liable.” A person encountered another in the market and said, you owe me two denarii and your pledge is worth two denarii. He answered, I owe you one denar but my pledge is worth two denarii. The case came before the judges of Nahardea. They said, since everybody agrees that it is worth two denarii, he has to bring witnesses on the other [denar]. They had not heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, the lender can be believed if he said, I lent to you up to the value of the pledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:3

Rebbi Abin said, since the householder has many occupations they instituted that the journeyman should swear and collect. [Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there they instituted that the journeyman should swear and collect;] similarly they instituted for the householder that if its deadline had elapsed, he cannot swear and collect. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, if there are witnesses that he claimed it in time, he swears and collects even after a year. Rebbi Yose said, he has only that single day. Rebbi Jonah said, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. One said, if he claimed from him during daytime, he has only that day; if in the night he has only that night. But the other said, if he claimed from him and he said, I gave. But if he said, I shall give, the presumption is that he gave. We do not know who said what. Since Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: if he claimed from him during daytime, he has only that day; if in the night he has only that night, therefore Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina is the one who said, if he claimed from him and he said, I gave. But if he said, I shall give, the presumption is that he gave. Rebbi Mana said, sometimes he claims after its time and it is considered as in time. How is this? He claimed from him and he said to him, did I not say to you that I gave at that date? That date becomes as if it were yesterday; one gives him one measure.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 7:3

Rebbi Abin said, since the householder has many occupations they instituted that the journeyman should swear and collect. [Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there they instituted that the journeyman should swear and collect;] similarly they instituted for the householder that if its deadline had elapsed, he cannot swear and collect. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, if there are witnesses that he claimed it in time, he swears and collects even after a year. Rebbi Yose said, he has only that single day. Rebbi Jonah said, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. One said, if he claimed from him during daytime, he has only that day; if in the night he has only that night. But the other said, if he claimed from him and he said, I gave. But if he said, I shall give, the presumption is that he gave. We do not know who said what. Since Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: if he claimed from him during daytime, he has only that day; if in the night he has only that night, therefore Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina is the one who said, if he claimed from him and he said, I gave. But if he said, I shall give, the presumption is that he gave. Rebbi Mana said, sometimes he claims after its time and it is considered as in time. How is this? He claimed from him and he said to him, did I not say to you that I gave at that date? That date becomes as if it were yesterday; one gives him one measure.