single
739 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
“If they died and each one had a brother, each [brother] performs ḥalîṣah with both [sisters]. Everywhere else you say “there cannot be ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah” but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt. “If one had one [brother] but the other had two, the single one performs ḥalîṣah with both [sisters], but of the two brothers one performs ḥalîṣah and the other may marry in levirate. Everywhere else you say, in any case one asks him to perform the levirate one does not say perform ḥalîṣah; but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt. “If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.”
Some Tannaim state, only if the judges know how to instruct what to say. Some Tannaim stated, even if the judges do not know how to instruct what to say. He who said, only if the judges know how to instruct what to say, before they found a hint in Scripture, but he who said, even if the judges do not know how to instruct what to say, after they found a hint in Scripture: “You shall answer and say;” one answers only to a single person. Rebbi Yose said, and only from the mouth of the judge, but one does not follow this.
“With a sandal having a heel it is valid.” There, they say, for example those קנסרוס. But the rabbis here say, like ours. Rav said, if I had not seen my uncle, the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya, performing a ḥalîṣah with a sandal with plaited straps, I would not feel competent to do so. The maternal uncle of Rav Cahana performed ḥalîṣah in the night, as single judge, on Friday night, with a cork sandal, and standing; (Rabbi Zeriqa said) and she did not spit. Rav heard that and said, who would ever do that except the maternal uncle of Rav Cahana?
Not only according to the current Mishnah that a single witness can permit her, but even according to the earlier Mishnah that a single witness cannot permit her, she permits herself. What is the difference between herself and a single witness? A single witness is suspected to want to cause trouble to her; she is not suspected to want to cause trouble to herself.
Not only according to the current Mishnah that a single witness can permit her, but even according to the earlier Mishnah that a single witness cannot permit her, she permits herself. What is the difference between herself and a single witness? A single witness is suspected to want to cause trouble to her; she is not suspected to want to cause trouble to herself.
Not only according to the current Mishnah that a single witness can permit her, but even according to the earlier Mishnah that a single witness cannot permit her, she permits herself. What is the difference between herself and a single witness? A single witness is suspected to want to cause trouble to her; she is not suspected to want to cause trouble to herself.
Not only according to the current Mishnah that a single witness can permit her, but even according to the earlier Mishnah that a single witness cannot permit her, she permits herself. What is the difference between herself and a single witness? A single witness is suspected to want to cause trouble to her; she is not suspected to want to cause trouble to herself.
Is a single witness trustworthy in wartime? Let us hear from the following: A person was living in the times of Rebbi. They asked him about X; he said, he died. They asked him about Y; he said, he died. They asked him, are they all dead? He answered, if they were alive would they not have come? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The case came before Rebbi and he said, the ones married should stay married, the ones not married should not marry. Rebbi Ayvo bar Naggari said, it happened in wartime. That implies that a single witness is trustworthy in wartime.
Is a single witness trustworthy in wartime? Let us hear from the following: A person was living in the times of Rebbi. They asked him about X; he said, he died. They asked him about Y; he said, he died. They asked him, are they all dead? He answered, if they were alive would they not have come? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The case came before Rebbi and he said, the ones married should stay married, the ones not married should not marry. Rebbi Ayvo bar Naggari said, it happened in wartime. That implies that a single witness is trustworthy in wartime.
Rav said, if testimony was contradicted in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradicted in itself, the testimony is void in the opinion of everybody. If testimony was contradicted in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. These say, he counted into his bosom, the others say he counted into his money-belt; everybody agrees that is contradicting testimony after the main testimony, and the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? (Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.) A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.
Rav said, if testimony was contradicted in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradicted in itself, the testimony is void in the opinion of everybody. If testimony was contradicted in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. These say, he counted into his bosom, the others say he counted into his money-belt; everybody agrees that is contradicting testimony after the main testimony, and the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Judah and Rebbi Simeon concede in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? Did they not consider the co-wife’s words as nonexistent for her companion? (Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar said this, he heard it from me and formulated it.) A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Aqiba said, when I left the country for Nahardea for the intercalation of the year, Nehemiah from Badala found me and said to me, I heard that in the Land of Israel one does not let a woman remarry on the testimony of one witness, except Jehudah ben Baba. I told him, that is so. He said to me: Tell them in my name, you know that this country is in bad shape because of armed bands; I learned from Rabban Gamliel the Elder that one lets a woman remarry on the testimony of one witness. When I came and lectured about this before Rabban Gamliel, he was happy about my words and said, we found a colleague for Jehudah ben Baba. During the discussion, Rabban Gamliel remembered that people had been killed at Tel Arza and Rabban Gamliel let their widows remarry on the testimony of a single witness. It was firmly established that one permits to remarry on the words of a witness reporting from another witness, and on the words of a woman or a slave girl.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Aqiba said, when I left the country for Nahardea for the intercalation of the year, Nehemiah from Badala found me,” etc. If it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”; Rebbi Jeremiah said, one lets his wife remarry; Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, one does not let his wife remarry. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Jeremiah: “By the mouth of witnesses,” not on basis of their writings, not on the word of a translator, not on the testimony of a single witness.” Today, does one not let remarry on the testimony of a single witness? Therefore also one lets remarry on basis of their writings and on the word of a translator. A baraita supports Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: The power of witnesses is greater than the power of a document and the power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses. Since if witnesses say, “X died, X was killed”, one lets his wife remarry but if it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”, one does not let his wife remarry. The power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses, since if somebody gives a loan before witnesses, he can foreclose only from unincumbered property; by a document, he can foreclose from mortgaged property.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Aqiba said, when I left the country for Nahardea for the intercalation of the year, Nehemiah from Badala found me,” etc. If it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”; Rebbi Jeremiah said, one lets his wife remarry; Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, one does not let his wife remarry. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Jeremiah: “By the mouth of witnesses,” not on basis of their writings, not on the word of a translator, not on the testimony of a single witness.” Today, does one not let remarry on the testimony of a single witness? Therefore also one lets remarry on basis of their writings and on the word of a translator. A baraita supports Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: The power of witnesses is greater than the power of a document and the power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses. Since if witnesses say, “X died, X was killed”, one lets his wife remarry but if it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”, one does not let his wife remarry. The power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses, since if somebody gives a loan before witnesses, he can foreclose only from unincumbered property; by a document, he can foreclose from mortgaged property.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Joshua say, one does not let a woman remarry on the testimony of a single witness. Rebbi Aqiba says, not on the testimony of a woman nor on that of relatives.
It was stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Eliezer, he declares his jealousy by the testimony of one witness or his own testimony; he takes her to drink on the testimony of two witnesses.” It is said here: “For he found in her a word of nakedness”; “finding” anywhere has to be validated by witnesses. How does Rebbi Eliezer explain “a word”? A circumstance that brings into the habit of nakedness. May a single witness let him take her to drink? His own testimony can never obligate him to swear in money matters but it will let him take her to drink, a single witness who will obligate him to swear in money matters not so much more? May a relative bring her to drink? Who is a closer relative than her husband? May a hearsay witness bring her to drink? What is the difference between him and a relative? A relative may be disabled today but he might be enabled later, a hearsay witness is not acceptable either today or later.
It was stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Eliezer, he declares his jealousy by the testimony of one witness or his own testimony; he takes her to drink on the testimony of two witnesses.” It is said here: “For he found in her a word of nakedness”; “finding” anywhere has to be validated by witnesses. How does Rebbi Eliezer explain “a word”? A circumstance that brings into the habit of nakedness. May a single witness let him take her to drink? His own testimony can never obligate him to swear in money matters but it will let him take her to drink, a single witness who will obligate him to swear in money matters not so much more? May a relative bring her to drink? Who is a closer relative than her husband? May a hearsay witness bring her to drink? What is the difference between him and a relative? A relative may be disabled today but he might be enabled later, a hearsay witness is not acceptable either today or later.
If she was seen going to a secluded place by one witness in the morning and by one witness in the evening, it is to be treated like the following: “If she was together alone with him by the testimony of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him; if there was a single witness she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. With one witness in the morning and one witness in the evening, such a case happened and Rebbi Eleazar ben Thaddeus asked the Sages, who told him that this is not being together alone.” If he declared his jealousy before one witness in the morning and before one witness in the evening; since he is a man and she is a woman, his declaration is nothing. Or is it to be treated like the following: “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar [Rav] Isaac in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on her back and the other says, I saw one hair on her back, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia the son of Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. Two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement; Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.
If she was seen going to a secluded place by one witness in the morning and by one witness in the evening, it is to be treated like the following: “If she was together alone with him by the testimony of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him; if there was a single witness she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. With one witness in the morning and one witness in the evening, such a case happened and Rebbi Eleazar ben Thaddeus asked the Sages, who told him that this is not being together alone.” If he declared his jealousy before one witness in the morning and before one witness in the evening; since he is a man and she is a woman, his declaration is nothing. Or is it to be treated like the following: “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar [Rav] Isaac in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on her back and the other says, I saw one hair on her back, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia the son of Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. Two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement; Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.
If she was seen going to a secluded place by one witness in the morning and by one witness in the evening, it is to be treated like the following: “If she was together alone with him by the testimony of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him; if there was a single witness she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. With one witness in the morning and one witness in the evening, such a case happened and Rebbi Eleazar ben Thaddeus asked the Sages, who told him that this is not being together alone.” If he declared his jealousy before one witness in the morning and before one witness in the evening; since he is a man and she is a woman, his declaration is nothing. Or is it to be treated like the following: “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar [Rav] Isaac in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on her back and the other says, I saw one hair on her back, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia the son of Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. Two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement; Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.
If she was seen going to a secluded place by one witness in the morning and by one witness in the evening, it is to be treated like the following: “If she was together alone with him by the testimony of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him; if there was a single witness she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. With one witness in the morning and one witness in the evening, such a case happened and Rebbi Eleazar ben Thaddeus asked the Sages, who told him that this is not being together alone.” If he declared his jealousy before one witness in the morning and before one witness in the evening; since he is a man and she is a woman, his declaration is nothing. Or is it to be treated like the following: “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar [Rav] Isaac in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on her back and the other says, I saw one hair on her back, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia the son of Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. Two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement; Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.
If she was seen going to a secluded place by one witness in the morning and by one witness in the evening, it is to be treated like the following: “If she was together alone with him by the testimony of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him; if there was a single witness she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. With one witness in the morning and one witness in the evening, such a case happened and Rebbi Eleazar ben Thaddeus asked the Sages, who told him that this is not being together alone.” If he declared his jealousy before one witness in the morning and before one witness in the evening; since he is a man and she is a woman, his declaration is nothing. Or is it to be treated like the following: “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar [Rav] Isaac in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on her back and the other says, I saw one hair on her back, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia the son of Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. Two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement; Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.
There, we have stated: “In all matters of incest, He made him who touches equal to him who completes and one is guilty for each single intercourse. He was more stringent with the slave girl since in her case He treated the intentional as unintentional.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abba bar Mamai in the name of Rav: “Flow of semen,” until he ejaculates. Here is written “flow of semen”, and here is written “flow of semen.” Here, you say “flow of semen” until he ejaculates. And here, you say so? Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for it is written: “She was hidden and became impure.” From the moment she was hidden, the Torah calls her “impure”. But here, “flow of semen,” until he ejaculates. For what reason is written “flow of semen”? For measures, as it is stated: “She was hidden and became impure”; what is counted as hiding? Time to become impure. What is the time for impurity? Time for intercourse. What is the time for intercourse? Time for ‘touching’.
It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Matthias: It says, “but if the woman was not impure but was pure.” Would we not know that if she was not impure she was pure? Why does the verse say, “but she was pure”? Only that at the end the Omnipresent rewards her for the abuse, that if she was sterile she will become pregnant, [if she] was having difficult births she will have easy ones, [if she] had ugly children she will have good looking ones, black ones she will have white ones, short ones she will have tall ones, females she will have males, single children she will have twins. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said to him: If it were so then all women should be misbehaving in order to become pregnant! But does Rebbi Simeon not interpret “she will be found innocent and become pregnant with seed”? He does, legitimate seed, not illegitimate.
Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.
MISHNAH: If a single witness said “I saw her when she became impure”, she could not drink. Not only that, but even a slave or a slave-girl are believed to cause her to lose her ketubah. Her mother-in-law, the mother-in-law’s daughter, her co-wife, her sister-in-law, and her husband’s daughter are trustworthy. They said this not to make her lose her ketubah but that she could not drink.
HALAKHAH: “If a single witness said ‘I saw her when she became impure’,” etc. “And there is no witness against her”; not only a witness [of good standing], from where even a male or female slave? The verse says, “and there is no witness against her”, any one. And following Rebbi Ismael? As Rebbi Ismael said, at any place where the Torah mentions “a witness”, in principle that means two witnesses unless the verse makes it clear that he is a single witness. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says two witnesses.
HALAKHAH: “If a single witness said ‘I saw her when she became impure’,” etc. “And there is no witness against her”; not only a witness [of good standing], from where even a male or female slave? The verse says, “and there is no witness against her”, any one. And following Rebbi Ismael? As Rebbi Ismael said, at any place where the Torah mentions “a witness”, in principle that means two witnesses unless the verse makes it clear that he is a single witness. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says two witnesses.
Was our Mishnah [formulated] after Rebbi Aqiba agreed with Rebbi Ṭarphon? As it was stated: Rebbi Ṭarphon says, a single witness is believed to declare her impure but not to let her lose her ketubah. Rebbi Aqiba says, just as a single witness is believed to declare her impure, so he is believed to let her lose her ketubah. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to him: Where do we find that a single witness proves anything in money matters? Rebbi Aqiba answered him, but where do we find that a single witness proves anything in matrimonial matters? But just as a single witness is believed to declare her impure, so he is believed to let her lose her ketubah. Rebbi Aqiba changed his mind and taught following Rebbi Ṭarphon.
Was our Mishnah [formulated] after Rebbi Aqiba agreed with Rebbi Ṭarphon? As it was stated: Rebbi Ṭarphon says, a single witness is believed to declare her impure but not to let her lose her ketubah. Rebbi Aqiba says, just as a single witness is believed to declare her impure, so he is believed to let her lose her ketubah. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to him: Where do we find that a single witness proves anything in money matters? Rebbi Aqiba answered him, but where do we find that a single witness proves anything in matrimonial matters? But just as a single witness is believed to declare her impure, so he is believed to let her lose her ketubah. Rebbi Aqiba changed his mind and taught following Rebbi Ṭarphon.
Was our Mishnah [formulated] after Rebbi Aqiba agreed with Rebbi Ṭarphon? As it was stated: Rebbi Ṭarphon says, a single witness is believed to declare her impure but not to let her lose her ketubah. Rebbi Aqiba says, just as a single witness is believed to declare her impure, so he is believed to let her lose her ketubah. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to him: Where do we find that a single witness proves anything in money matters? Rebbi Aqiba answered him, but where do we find that a single witness proves anything in matrimonial matters? But just as a single witness is believed to declare her impure, so he is believed to let her lose her ketubah. Rebbi Aqiba changed his mind and taught following Rebbi Ṭarphon.
Was our Mishnah [formulated] after Rebbi Aqiba agreed with Rebbi Ṭarphon? As it was stated: Rebbi Ṭarphon says, a single witness is believed to declare her impure but not to let her lose her ketubah. Rebbi Aqiba says, just as a single witness is believed to declare her impure, so he is believed to let her lose her ketubah. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to him: Where do we find that a single witness proves anything in money matters? Rebbi Aqiba answered him, but where do we find that a single witness proves anything in matrimonial matters? But just as a single witness is believed to declare her impure, so he is believed to let her lose her ketubah. Rebbi Aqiba changed his mind and taught following Rebbi Ṭarphon.
Was our Mishnah [formulated] after Rebbi Aqiba agreed with Rebbi Ṭarphon? As it was stated: Rebbi Ṭarphon says, a single witness is believed to declare her impure but not to let her lose her ketubah. Rebbi Aqiba says, just as a single witness is believed to declare her impure, so he is believed to let her lose her ketubah. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to him: Where do we find that a single witness proves anything in money matters? Rebbi Aqiba answered him, but where do we find that a single witness proves anything in matrimonial matters? But just as a single witness is believed to declare her impure, so he is believed to let her lose her ketubah. Rebbi Aqiba changed his mind and taught following Rebbi Ṭarphon.
From what Rebbi Yose said, “X ate suet, and they warned him,” he is not whipped. If one person said to him, that is suet, and two warned him, he is whipped. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness? From what Rebbi Jehudah is saying: “X is a nazir, he became defiled, and I had warned him,” he is not whipped. If one person said to him, you are a nazir, and based on this testimony he behaved like a nazir, when then he drank wine or became impure in the impurity of the dead, if two warned him, he is whipped. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness? From what Rebbi Mana said, “X is the wife of a Cohen and whored; her husband, a Cohen, then had relations with her but I had warned him;” he is [not] whipped. If she went to a secluded place in the presence of two, and one said, I saw her that she became impure; when her husband, the Cohen, had relations with her but two had warned him, he is whipped. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness?
From what Rebbi Yose said, “X ate suet, and they warned him,” he is not whipped. If one person said to him, that is suet, and two warned him, he is whipped. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness? From what Rebbi Jehudah is saying: “X is a nazir, he became defiled, and I had warned him,” he is not whipped. If one person said to him, you are a nazir, and based on this testimony he behaved like a nazir, when then he drank wine or became impure in the impurity of the dead, if two warned him, he is whipped. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness? From what Rebbi Mana said, “X is the wife of a Cohen and whored; her husband, a Cohen, then had relations with her but I had warned him;” he is [not] whipped. If she went to a secluded place in the presence of two, and one said, I saw her that she became impure; when her husband, the Cohen, had relations with her but two had warned him, he is whipped. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness?
From what Rebbi Yose said, “X ate suet, and they warned him,” he is not whipped. If one person said to him, that is suet, and two warned him, he is whipped. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness? From what Rebbi Jehudah is saying: “X is a nazir, he became defiled, and I had warned him,” he is not whipped. If one person said to him, you are a nazir, and based on this testimony he behaved like a nazir, when then he drank wine or became impure in the impurity of the dead, if two warned him, he is whipped. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness? From what Rebbi Mana said, “X is the wife of a Cohen and whored; her husband, a Cohen, then had relations with her but I had warned him;” he is [not] whipped. If she went to a secluded place in the presence of two, and one said, I saw her that she became impure; when her husband, the Cohen, had relations with her but two had warned him, he is whipped. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness?
MISHNAH: It would have been logical: Since the first testimony, which does not forbid her permanently, is not confirmed if not from two [witnesses], the last testimony, which forbids her permanently, should reasonably only be confirmed by [witnesses]. The verse says: “There is no witness about her”, any kind of testimony about her. There would now be an argument de minore ad majus for the first testimony! Since the last testimony, which forbids her permanently, is confirmed from a single witness, the first testimony, which does not forbid her permanently, should logically be confirmed from a single witness. The verse says, “for he found out about her a matter of sexual misbehavior,” and further, it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses a matter should be confirmed.”
MISHNAH: It would have been logical: Since the first testimony, which does not forbid her permanently, is not confirmed if not from two [witnesses], the last testimony, which forbids her permanently, should reasonably only be confirmed by [witnesses]. The verse says: “There is no witness about her”, any kind of testimony about her. There would now be an argument de minore ad majus for the first testimony! Since the last testimony, which forbids her permanently, is confirmed from a single witness, the first testimony, which does not forbid her permanently, should logically be confirmed from a single witness. The verse says, “for he found out about her a matter of sexual misbehavior,” and further, it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses a matter should be confirmed.”
Rav Ada bar Aḥawah said, a single witness is believed to declare her impure, but a single witness is not believed to make her lose her ketubah. Rav Ḥisda said, why did they say that a single witness is believed to declare her impure? Because the thing has feet to stand on.
Rav Ada bar Aḥawah said, a single witness is believed to declare her impure, but a single witness is not believed to make her lose her ketubah. Rav Ḥisda said, why did they say that a single witness is believed to declare her impure? Because the thing has feet to stand on.
Rav Ada bar Aḥawah said, a single witness is believed to declare her impure, but a single witness is not believed to make her lose her ketubah. Rav Ḥisda said, why did they say that a single witness is believed to declare her impure? Because the thing has feet to stand on.
Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Here, she did not drink but in the case of breaking the calf’s neck they did break it. Rav said, she did drink. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would not drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the end say: “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rav say, she would drink? Rebbi Joḥanan said, she would not drink. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the first statement say: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rebbi Joḥanan say, she would not drink? They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel, the Mishnah talks about those whose testimony is invalid. They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel: The Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What does it mean, “the Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous”? He said to him, so says Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This entire chapter [deals with the case that] he had declared his jealousy and she went to a secluded place. She went to a secluded place by the testimony of two [witnesses]. If one of them said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion and about impurity. After the time of seclusion, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw that she did not become impure while in the secluded place, how do you treat this? As a testimony which, if part of the testimony is thrown out, the entire testimony is thrown out, or does one accept the remainder of the testimony? They said in the name of Rebbi Abba Mari: Even he who says, if part of it is thrown out, all is thrown out, here one accepts the remainder of the testimony, since the matter has feet to stand on.
Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Here, she did not drink but in the case of breaking the calf’s neck they did break it. Rav said, she did drink. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would not drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the end say: “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rav say, she would drink? Rebbi Joḥanan said, she would not drink. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the first statement say: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rebbi Joḥanan say, she would not drink? They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel, the Mishnah talks about those whose testimony is invalid. They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel: The Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What does it mean, “the Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous”? He said to him, so says Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This entire chapter [deals with the case that] he had declared his jealousy and she went to a secluded place. She went to a secluded place by the testimony of two [witnesses]. If one of them said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion and about impurity. After the time of seclusion, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw that she did not become impure while in the secluded place, how do you treat this? As a testimony which, if part of the testimony is thrown out, the entire testimony is thrown out, or does one accept the remainder of the testimony? They said in the name of Rebbi Abba Mari: Even he who says, if part of it is thrown out, all is thrown out, here one accepts the remainder of the testimony, since the matter has feet to stand on.
Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Here, she did not drink but in the case of breaking the calf’s neck they did break it. Rav said, she did drink. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would not drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the end say: “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rav say, she would drink? Rebbi Joḥanan said, she would not drink. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the first statement say: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rebbi Joḥanan say, she would not drink? They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel, the Mishnah talks about those whose testimony is invalid. They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel: The Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What does it mean, “the Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous”? He said to him, so says Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This entire chapter [deals with the case that] he had declared his jealousy and she went to a secluded place. She went to a secluded place by the testimony of two [witnesses]. If one of them said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion and about impurity. After the time of seclusion, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw that she did not become impure while in the secluded place, how do you treat this? As a testimony which, if part of the testimony is thrown out, the entire testimony is thrown out, or does one accept the remainder of the testimony? They said in the name of Rebbi Abba Mari: Even he who says, if part of it is thrown out, all is thrown out, here one accepts the remainder of the testimony, since the matter has feet to stand on.
Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Here, she did not drink but in the case of breaking the calf’s neck they did break it. Rav said, she did drink. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would not drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the end say: “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rav say, she would drink? Rebbi Joḥanan said, she would not drink. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the first statement say: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rebbi Joḥanan say, she would not drink? They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel, the Mishnah talks about those whose testimony is invalid. They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel: The Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What does it mean, “the Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous”? He said to him, so says Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This entire chapter [deals with the case that] he had declared his jealousy and she went to a secluded place. She went to a secluded place by the testimony of two [witnesses]. If one of them said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion and about impurity. After the time of seclusion, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw that she did not become impure while in the secluded place, how do you treat this? As a testimony which, if part of the testimony is thrown out, the entire testimony is thrown out, or does one accept the remainder of the testimony? They said in the name of Rebbi Abba Mari: Even he who says, if part of it is thrown out, all is thrown out, here one accepts the remainder of the testimony, since the matter has feet to stand on.
Blessed in general and blessed in particular; cursed in general and cursed in particular. Sixteen covenants on every detail, to study, to teach, to keep, and to do; and the same on Sinai and the same in the prairie of Moab. Rebbi Simeon does exclude that of Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal and instead includes that of the Tent of Meeting. Also Rebbi Simeon did say, there is no single detail in the Torah about which not 576 covenants were concluded. Twelve in blessing, twelve in cursing. Twelve in general, twelve in detail. That makes 48 covenants. To study, to teach, to keep, and to do, that makes 192 covenants. The same on Sinai and the same in the prairie of Moab, that makes 576 covenants. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah from the village of Emmaus says in the name of Rebbi Simeon: 603’550. Rebbi says, if one follows the words of Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah from the village of Emmaus who said in the name of Rebbi Simeon, then there is no single detail in the Torah about which not 48 times 603’550 covenants were concluded.
Blessed in general and blessed in particular; cursed in general and cursed in particular. Sixteen covenants on every detail, to study, to teach, to keep, and to do; and the same on Sinai and the same in the prairie of Moab. Rebbi Simeon does exclude that of Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal and instead includes that of the Tent of Meeting. Also Rebbi Simeon did say, there is no single detail in the Torah about which not 576 covenants were concluded. Twelve in blessing, twelve in cursing. Twelve in general, twelve in detail. That makes 48 covenants. To study, to teach, to keep, and to do, that makes 192 covenants. The same on Sinai and the same in the prairie of Moab, that makes 576 covenants. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah from the village of Emmaus says in the name of Rebbi Simeon: 603’550. Rebbi says, if one follows the words of Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah from the village of Emmaus who said in the name of Rebbi Simeon, then there is no single detail in the Torah about which not 48 times 603’550 covenants were concluded.
So far subjects which were stated in general and in detail. Subjects which were stated in general but not in detail? He said to him: So says Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Simeon. Anything which was in a set and and left the set to teach, not to teach only about itself did it leave but to teach about the entire set. He said to him: Is that not about a single subject? Perhaps for two subjects? And here, we deal with two different subjects. Rebbi Tanḥuma said, since at the end is written “Amen”, it is as if everything were one subject.
If one found a single marked stone, even though one should not keep it so, if somebody forms a tent over it he is impure; I say a compressed corpse was under it. If there were two, he who forms a tent over any one of them is pure; between them he is impure. If between them was a ploughed strip they are single stones, between them the area is pure and around them impure.
If one found a single marked stone, even though one should not keep it so, if somebody forms a tent over it he is impure; I say a compressed corpse was under it. If there were two, he who forms a tent over any one of them is pure; between them he is impure. If between them was a ploughed strip they are single stones, between them the area is pure and around them impure.
Rebbi Ḥaggai said that Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Can one witness testifying orally and one by a document be taken together? Is a single witness on a written document worth anything? Therefore, his question was, if there are two. They managed to confirm the first signature but not the second. Rebbi Mana asked, is one witness on a written document enough to force anybody to swear? Is a single witness on a written document worth anything? Therefore, his question was, if there are two. They managed to confirm the first signature but not the second. Parallel to it: One does not accept testimony from witnesses unless they had seen together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw one after the other. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac, in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa for witnesses about primogeniture and rights of possession.
Rebbi Ḥaggai said that Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Can one witness testifying orally and one by a document be taken together? Is a single witness on a written document worth anything? Therefore, his question was, if there are two. They managed to confirm the first signature but not the second. Rebbi Mana asked, is one witness on a written document enough to force anybody to swear? Is a single witness on a written document worth anything? Therefore, his question was, if there are two. They managed to confirm the first signature but not the second. Parallel to it: One does not accept testimony from witnesses unless they had seen together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw one after the other. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac, in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa for witnesses about primogeniture and rights of possession.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who saysid it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who said it is valid? Maybe they were rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw two hairs on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid [testimony]. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of possession. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who saysid it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who said it is valid? Maybe they were rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw two hairs on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid [testimony]. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of possession. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who saysid it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who said it is valid? Maybe they were rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw two hairs on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid [testimony]. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of possession. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who saysid it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who said it is valid? Maybe they were rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw two hairs on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid [testimony]. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of possession. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.
Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: If it is so, he who sleeps with his minor sister should be flogged and have to pay since if he sleeps with his adult sister he is flogged. He reversed himself and said, there death and payment fall on him simultaneously. But here, when he muzzled he is subject to flogging but only later for payment. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected before Rebbi Mana: He who sets fire to his neighbor’s grain stack on the Sabbath is subject to capital punishment from the first ear but only later for payment! One cannot say that because for every single ear there is cautioning for the death penalty. Here also, for every moment of muzzling there is cautioning for flogging. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, two Amoraïm. One said, if he muzzled for heave which is Temple property. The other one said, if he muzzled through an agent. Then the agent is flogged and he is free (Lev. 17:4): “As a blood guilt it will be charged on this man,” not on his employers.
As it was stated: “Living married to a husband,” that includes one who had received her husband in her father’s house while preliminarily married; the one who comes after him is strangled. Not only a regular intercourse but even perverse. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan; it is necessary to mention perverse intercourse for if it were regular, why mention her husband? As we have stated: If she was raped by two men, the first is stoned, the second strangled. The preliminarily married adolescent girl. If ten men came upon her perversely and then one regularly, they are all stoned. If they all come upon her regularly, the first is stoned and the remainder strangled. If ten men “touched” her and then one penetrated, they are all stoned. If they all penetrated, the first is stoned and the remainder strangled. A single girl. If ten men came upon her perversely and then one regularly, they all pay the fine. If they all come upon her regularly, the first is stoned and the remainder is free. If she chose one of them, the others were freed from the prohibition. If she said, he is impossible, she repeatedly chooses. If he was married to her sister, he already is freed. If she died, he is freed. If he died, one does not force the levir.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Since we stated there: “If one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath,” should it be similar that if one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was reduced, she shall not be able to collect the reduced sum without an oath? Rebbi Yose said, at the moment that one witness testifies that the amount should be reduced, he is like a single witness who contradicts the testimony of two [witnesses] but no single witness can contradict the testimony of two.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Since we stated there: “If one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath,” should it be similar that if one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was reduced, she shall not be able to collect the reduced sum without an oath? Rebbi Yose said, at the moment that one witness testifies that the amount should be reduced, he is like a single witness who contradicts the testimony of two [witnesses] but no single witness can contradict the testimony of two.
Rebbi commanded three things on his death-bed: My widow should not move from my house; do not eulogize me in small towns; and he who served me during my lifetime should also serve me in death. “My widow should not move from my house,” is that not a Mishnah? “The widow who said, I cannot possibly move from my husband’s house …” Rebbi Dositheos said, that they should not say, this is the house of the patriarchate and must serve the patriarchate. Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose said, as we have stated: “She lives in the houses just as she lived while her husband was overseas, she uses silver and gold vessels just as she used to while her husband was overseas, she is fed just as she was fed while her husband was overseas.” “Do not eulogize me in small towns” because of the quarrels. “He who served me during my lifetime should also serve me in death;” Rebbi Ḥananiah from Sepphoris said, for example Yose Ephrati and Joseph from Haifa. Rebbi Ḥizqiah added, do not use many shrouds on me and let my coffin have holes at the bottom. These words say that Rebbi was buried in a single shroud since Rebbi said, not as a man left, he will come. But the rabbis say, just as a man left, he will come. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: The garment that went with a person to the grave will come back with him. What is the reason? (Job 38:14) “The seal turns itself around like clay, they appear in dress.” Antoninus asked Rebbi, what is the meaning of what is written: “The seal turns itself around like clay?” He said to him, He Who brings the generation clothes it.
Rebbi Ḥizqiya in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: Rebbi used to explain three verses for praise. “She sat at the entrance to the double spring.” Is this possible? Even the most brazen whore would not do that. But she lifted her eyes to the door to which all hope is directed; she said before Him: Master of the universe, do not let me leave this house empty. Another explanation: “She sat at the entrance to the double spring;” she opened his eyes and told him, I am single and pure. “And Eli was very old; …, that they slept with.” It is written “they bedded them”. Rebbi said, the women were bringing their nests to become purified for their husbands and they were deferring the sacrifices; the verse counts it as if they had slept with them. Rebbi Tanḥuma said, that is what he scolds them for: “Why do you disregard my slaughter sacrifice and my flour sacrifice?” Could he remove them from the serious sin and scold them for the simple one? “His sons did not walk in his ways,” that they were taking tithe and judging. Rebbi Berekhiah said, a camel caravan was passing by, they neglected public needs and dealt in merchandise.
“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.
“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.
“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.
“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.
“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.
“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’, is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”? Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna. If he said it in the language of a vow you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated, “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once.” Rebbi Yudan said, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions.
HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.
HALAKHAH: “Indeterminate oaths are interpreted restrictively,” etc. They wanted to say, salted for preservation, not short-term salted. Rebbi Yudan said, since we have stated: “this is for me like salted meat, like libation wine,” this imples that short-term salted is called “salted”. What is short-term salted? As it was stated: “He puts the limbs on the salt and turns them over.” Rebbi Abba Mari said, there is a difference, for if he leaves them there, they become salted meat. But which text says it? As Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, “one who takes olives from the vat dips each single one in salt and eats it.” That implies that short-term salted is called “salted”.
“This one can come and eat, but Rebbi Yose forbids.” What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? Because his vow preceded his abandonment. Therefore, not if his abandonment preceded his vow. They asked before Rebbi Yose: What is the difference if his vow preceded his abandonment? He said to them, it did not occur to him to forbid what he abandoned. Rebbi Jonah said, so they asked before him: That means, not if it applies to a single person? But did we not state: “This one can come and eat, but Rebbi Yose forbids”? He said to them, it did not occur to him to forbid what he abandoned. Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Joṣadaq: If somebody abandons his field to ten persons he cannot retract. Rebbi Yose said, that follows Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana asked: When you said, “to three,” [did you not mean] “in the presence of three”? Instead of asking about Rebbi Meïr, ask about Rebbi Yose! When you said, “to ten,” [did you not mean] “in the presence of ten”? He said to him, if he abandoned it before two persons, he can retract and it remains subject to tithes. If he abandoned it before three persons, he cannot retract and it is free from tithes.
HALAKHAH: “Partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another,” etc. The rabbis say, every single [square] hand-breadth is common property of the partners. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, each one enters into what is his. If the courtyard was divided by pebbles, even the rabbis agree. If one of them went and sold his part, even Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees. If they contracted between themselves to concede, it is still in the hands of the partners. It is only needed if they did not contract between themselves to concede; what is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he buys higher and sells lower”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he should not lend him nor ask him for anything,”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And what Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim said, that he should not stay long?
HALAKHAH: “ ‘From the salted’ he is forbidden only salted fish,” etc. They wanted to say, salted for preservation, not short-term salted. Rebbi Yudan said, since we have stated: “this is for me like salted meat, like libation wine,” this imples that short-term salted is called “salted”. What is short-term salted? As it was stated: “He puts the limbs on the salt and turns them over.” Rebbi Abba Mari said, there is a difference, for if he left them there, they would become salted meat. But which text says it? As Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Zabda said, “one who takes olives from the vat dips each single one in salt and eats it.” This implies that short-term salted is called “salted”.
HALAKHAH: ‘Until the fig harvest, until there be fig harvest’, etc. “baskets”. Baskets of figs or baskets of raisins? Let us hear from this: “Until they fold the knives”. You have to say, knives for figs, not knives for raisins. Let us hear from the following: A load of raisins came up to Tiberias. Gamliel the twin asked Rebbi Abba bar Zavda. He said to him: All of the Land of Israel does not produce a load of raisins. But so he said to him: No single place in the land of Israel produces a load of raisins.
MISHNAH: One opens about festive days and Sabbaths. In earlier times, they said that these days are permitted but the rest forbidden, until Rebbi Aqiba came and taught that a vow which was partially voided is totally voided. How is this? ‘A qônām that I shall not benefit any one of you,’ if one was permitted, all are permitted. ‘That I shall not benefit this one and this one and this one,’ if the first one becomes permitted, all are permitted; if the last one becomes permitted, he is permitted and the others are prohibited. ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one, a qorbān for that one’; each single one needs a separate opening. ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine, for wine is bad for the intestines.’ If they told him, but old [wine] is good for the intestines, old [wine] was permitted; not only old wine is permitted but all wines. ‘A qônām that I shall not taste onion, for onion is bad for the heart.’ If they told him, but the rural kind is good for the heart, rural [onion] was permitted; not only rural is permitted but all onions. It happened that Rebbi Meїr permitted all onions to him.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “If two groups of witnesses,” etc. Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, and that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five. Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent in what he said, since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that refer [to] the facts, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Eliezer concedes in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to that of her companion. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.
HALAKHAH: “If two groups of witnesses,” etc. Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, and that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five. Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent in what he said, since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that refer [to] the facts, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Eliezer concedes in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to that of her companion. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.
HALAKHAH: “If one of the bloods was sprinkled for her,” etc. He dissolves for her because of her hair. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It is a decision of Scripture: “He dissolved her vows,” he dissolves what is on her. Whenever he dissolves her vow, he dissolves what is on her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion, after she was transferred from the prohibition to the positive commandment. The rabbis say, “afterwards, the nazir shall drink wine,” after all these actions. Rebbi Simeon says, even after a single action. Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi (Bevai). “When has this been said? If she shaves in purity. But if she shaves in impurity, he may dissolve since he can say, I cannot stand an unseemly wife.” Therefore, shaving in purity does not make her unseemly. Who holds that shaving does not make unseemly? Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even Rebbi thinks so: “Rebbi says, he may dissolve even if she shaves [in purity], since he can say, I cannot stand a shorn wife.” Should he not say, I cannot stand an unseemly and shorn wife? Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi (Jehudah) said that only for the purification sacrifice, since a purification sacrifice would be invalid if not in her name. That means, as long as it is alive it is surrendered to Heaven only by slaughter.
Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.
Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.
MISHNAH: A nazir who was drinking wine all day long is guilty only once. If he was told “do not drink, do not drink” and he did drink, he is guilty for each single infraction. One who shaved all day long is guilty only once. If he was told “do not shave, do not shave” and he did shave, he is guilty for each single infraction. One who defiled himself for the dead all day long is guilty only once. If he was told “do not defile yourself, do not defile yourself” and he did defile himself, he is guilty for each single infraction.
MISHNAH: A nazir who was drinking wine all day long is guilty only once. If he was told “do not drink, do not drink” and he did drink, he is guilty for each single infraction. One who shaved all day long is guilty only once. If he was told “do not shave, do not shave” and he did shave, he is guilty for each single infraction. One who defiled himself for the dead all day long is guilty only once. If he was told “do not defile yourself, do not defile yourself” and he did defile himself, he is guilty for each single infraction.
MISHNAH: A nazir who was drinking wine all day long is guilty only once. If he was told “do not drink, do not drink” and he did drink, he is guilty for each single infraction. One who shaved all day long is guilty only once. If he was told “do not shave, do not shave” and he did shave, he is guilty for each single infraction. One who defiled himself for the dead all day long is guilty only once. If he was told “do not defile yourself, do not defile yourself” and he did defile himself, he is guilty for each single infraction.
From what Rebbi Yose said, “X ate suet, and they warned him,” he is not whipped. If one person said to him, you are a nazir, and based on this testimony he behaved like a nazir, when then he drank wine or became impure in the impurity of the dead, if two warned him, he is whipped. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness? From what Rebbi Mana said, “X is the wife of a Cohen and whored; her husband, a Cohen, then had relations with her but I had warned him;” he is [not] whipped. If she went to a secluded place in the presence of two, and one said, I saw her that she became impure; when her husband, the Cohen, had relations with her but two had warned him, he is whipped. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness?
From what Rebbi Yose said, “X ate suet, and they warned him,” he is not whipped. If one person said to him, you are a nazir, and based on this testimony he behaved like a nazir, when then he drank wine or became impure in the impurity of the dead, if two warned him, he is whipped. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness? From what Rebbi Mana said, “X is the wife of a Cohen and whored; her husband, a Cohen, then had relations with her but I had warned him;” he is [not] whipped. If she went to a secluded place in the presence of two, and one said, I saw her that she became impure; when her husband, the Cohen, had relations with her but two had warned him, he is whipped. Is not the main testimony given by a single witness?
If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.
Rebbi Isaac bar Gufta asked before Rebbi Mana: In a statement you say, “he collects every single bone and everything is pure;” and here, you say so? He answered him, say what comes afterwards: “If he prepared it from the start as a grave, it has surroundings.”
Rebbi Jacob bar Ada, Bar Athlay in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Practice follows Rebbi Meïr in matters of bills of divorce. Rebbi Ze‘ira was looking at him. He asked him, why do you look at me? Was it not said that practice follows the lenient opinion in rabbinic matters? They thought, that is a single opinion against a single opinion, but not a single opinion against the Sages, and here even a single opinion against the Sages.
Rebbi Jacob bar Ada, Bar Athlay in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Practice follows Rebbi Meïr in matters of bills of divorce. Rebbi Ze‘ira was looking at him. He asked him, why do you look at me? Was it not said that practice follows the lenient opinion in rabbinic matters? They thought, that is a single opinion against a single opinion, but not a single opinion against the Sages, and here even a single opinion against the Sages.
Rebbi Jacob bar Ada, Bar Athlay in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Practice follows Rebbi Meïr in matters of bills of divorce. Rebbi Ze‘ira was looking at him. He asked him, why do you look at me? Was it not said that practice follows the lenient opinion in rabbinic matters? They thought, that is a single opinion against a single opinion, but not a single opinion against the Sages, and here even a single opinion against the Sages.
Rebbi Jacob bar Ada, Bar Athlay in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Practice follows Rebbi Meïr in matters of bills of divorce. Rebbi Ze‘ira was looking at him. He asked him, why do you look at me? Was it not said that practice follows the lenient opinion in rabbinic matters? They thought, that is a single opinion against a single opinion, but not a single opinion against the Sages, and here even a single opinion against the Sages.
Rav Huna said, why did they require a date on the bill of divorce? Because of an actual case. It so happened that a man was married to his sister’s daughter who committed adultery when she was still married. He predated the bill of divorce and said, it is better she should be judged as single rather than as a married woman.
HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.
If it is so, they should have been freed once they were redeemed. It is written (Neh. 8:17): “All the congregation coming from captivity … since the days of Joshua bin Nun.” Why Joshua? Rebbi Hillel, the son of Samuel ben Naḥmani: The verse damaged the reputation of the just person in his grave for the reputation of the just person in his time; it compares their coming in the days of Ezra to the coming in the days of Joshua. As at the coming in the days of Joshua they had been free and became obligated, also at the coming in the days of Ezra they had been free and became obligated. How did they become obligated? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they became obligated by the words of the Torah; that is what is written (Deut. 30:5): “The Eternal, your God, will bring you to the Land that your fathers inherited and you will inherit it.” Just as the inheritance of your fathers was by the words of the Torah, so your inheritance is by the words of the Torah. “He will be good to you and give increase to you more than to your forefathers.” Your fathers had been free and became obligated, also you had been free and became obligated. On your fathers there was no yoke of government, but you [are obligated] even though there is on you the yoke of government. Your fathers did become obligated only after fourteen years, seven they conquered and seven they distributed, but you became obligated [immediately when you entered. Your fathers did become obligated only after they had acquired all, but you become obligated] for every single piece at the moment you acquire it.
Ben Azai preached: “A dead fly will permanently spoil perfumer’s oil.” Does not one dead fly spoil perfumer’s oil? And this person by one sin spoiled all merits he had. Rebbi Aqiba preached: “ So the abyss opened wide and its mouth swallowed the one without law.” It does not say “without laws”, but “without law”, him who has not a single merit that should help him on the scale of merit. That is, for the Future World. But in this world, even if 999 angels plead for his conviction and one angel pleads for his acquittal, the Holy One, praise to Him, lends His weight to the scale of merit. What is the reason? “If there is for him one angel out of a thousand, to tell a man his straightness. He will act with him in grace and say, let him be redeemed, not go down to destruction; I found weregilt.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, if you find a saying of Rebbi Eliezer, son of Rebbi Yose the Galilean, bend your ear like this funnel and listen, since Rebbi Joḥanan reported that Rebbi Eliezer, the son of Rebbi Yose the Galilean, said: Even if 999 angles plead for his conviction and one angel pleads for his acquittal, the Holy One, praise to Him, lends His weight to the scale of merit. Not only this entire angel, but if 999 aspects of that angel plead for conviction and one aspect for acquittal, the Holy One, praise to Him, lends His weight to the scale of merit. What is the reason? It does not say, “if there is for him one angel of a thousand,” but “one out of a thousand”, one aspect out of a thousand aspects of that angel. What is written afterwards? “He will act with him in grace and say, let him be hurt, not go down to destruction; I found weregilt.” “Let him be hurt,” by suffering. “I found weregilt,” he found means to redeem himself. That is, in this world. But in the Future World, if he has a majority of merits, he inherits paradise; a majority of sins, he inherits hell. If he was 50–50. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, “he carries his iniquity.” Rebbi Abbahu said, it is written: “He carries.” What does the Holy One, praise to Him, do? He grabs one of his demerits, and the merits decide. Rebbi Eleazar said: “You, Eternal, are acting in grace, for You will complete for everybody according to his deeds.” And if he has none, You will give him from Yours. That is Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, for Rebbi Eleazar said, “You, Eternal, are acting in grace,” this teaches that He turns to the aspect of grace.