so
16891 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
Originally, a husband would bring together a court wherever he was and annul the get. Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that this should not be done, because of tikkun olam. Originally the husband would change his name, or his wife’s name, or the name of his town or of his wife’s town. Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that he should write, “The man so-and-so or any name that he has,”; “the woman so-and-so or any name that she has,” because of tikkun olam.
Originally, a husband would bring together a court wherever he was and annul the get. Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that this should not be done, because of tikkun olam. Originally the husband would change his name, or his wife’s name, or the name of his town or of his wife’s town. Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that he should write, “The man so-and-so or any name that he has,”; “the woman so-and-so or any name that she has,” because of tikkun olam.
Originally, a husband would bring together a court wherever he was and annul the get. Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that this should not be done, because of tikkun olam. Originally the husband would change his name, or his wife’s name, or the name of his town or of his wife’s town. Rabban Gamaliel the Elder established that he should write, “The man so-and-so or any name that he has,”; “the woman so-and-so or any name that she has,” because of tikkun olam.
If orphans relied on a householder or if their father appointed a guardian for them, he must tithe their produce. A guardian who was appointed by the father of the orphans is required to take an oath. [A guardian who was] appointed by the court does not need to take an oath. Abba Shaul says that the rule is the reverse. One who renders impure [someone else’s pure food] or mixes terumah [with someone else’s non-terumah produce] or makes a libation [with someone else’s wine], if he does so inadvertently, he is exempt, but if intentionally he is liable. Priests who intentionally made someone else’s sacrifice piggul in the Temple are liable.
There was no Sicaricon in Judea for those killed in war. After the war’s slaughter ended there is Sicaricon there. How so? If a man buys a field from the Sicaricon and then buys it again from the original owner, his purchase is void, but if he buys it first from the original owner and then from the Sicaricon it is valid. If a man buys [a piece of a married woman’s property] from the husband and then buys it from the wife, the purchase is void, but if he buys it first from the wife and then from the husband it is valid. This was [the ruling] of the first mishnah. The court that came after them said if a man buys property from the Sicaricon he had to give the original owner a quarter [of the value]. When is this so? When the original owners cannot buy it themselves, but if they can they have preemption over everyone else. Rabbi assembled a court and they decided by vote that if the property had been in the hands of the Sicaricon twelve months, whoever purchased it first acquired the title, but he had to give a quarter [of the price] to the original owner.
There was no Sicaricon in Judea for those killed in war. After the war’s slaughter ended there is Sicaricon there. How so? If a man buys a field from the Sicaricon and then buys it again from the original owner, his purchase is void, but if he buys it first from the original owner and then from the Sicaricon it is valid. If a man buys [a piece of a married woman’s property] from the husband and then buys it from the wife, the purchase is void, but if he buys it first from the wife and then from the husband it is valid. This was [the ruling] of the first mishnah. The court that came after them said if a man buys property from the Sicaricon he had to give the original owner a quarter [of the value]. When is this so? When the original owners cannot buy it themselves, but if they can they have preemption over everyone else. Rabbi assembled a court and they decided by vote that if the property had been in the hands of the Sicaricon twelve months, whoever purchased it first acquired the title, but he had to give a quarter [of the price] to the original owner.
If a man says, “Receive this get on behalf of my wife”, or, “Carry this get to my wife”, if he desires to retract [before the wife receives it] he may do so. If a woman says, “Receive the get on my behalf”, [and he does so], if [the husband] wants to retract he may not do so. Therefore if the husband said to him, “I do not want you to receive it on her behalf, but rather carry it and give it to her”, then if he wishes to retract he may do so. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even if the wife says “Take for me”, [and he does so] the husband may not retract.
If a man says, “Receive this get on behalf of my wife”, or, “Carry this get to my wife”, if he desires to retract [before the wife receives it] he may do so. If a woman says, “Receive the get on my behalf”, [and he does so], if [the husband] wants to retract he may not do so. Therefore if the husband said to him, “I do not want you to receive it on her behalf, but rather carry it and give it to her”, then if he wishes to retract he may do so. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even if the wife says “Take for me”, [and he does so] the husband may not retract.
If a man says, “Receive this get on behalf of my wife”, or, “Carry this get to my wife”, if he desires to retract [before the wife receives it] he may do so. If a woman says, “Receive the get on my behalf”, [and he does so], if [the husband] wants to retract he may not do so. Therefore if the husband said to him, “I do not want you to receive it on her behalf, but rather carry it and give it to her”, then if he wishes to retract he may do so. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even if the wife says “Take for me”, [and he does so] the husband may not retract.
If a man says, “Receive this get on behalf of my wife”, or, “Carry this get to my wife”, if he desires to retract [before the wife receives it] he may do so. If a woman says, “Receive the get on my behalf”, [and he does so], if [the husband] wants to retract he may not do so. Therefore if the husband said to him, “I do not want you to receive it on her behalf, but rather carry it and give it to her”, then if he wishes to retract he may do so. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even if the wife says “Take for me”, [and he does so] the husband may not retract.
If a man says, “Receive this get on behalf of my wife”, or, “Carry this get to my wife”, if he desires to retract [before the wife receives it] he may do so. If a woman says, “Receive the get on my behalf”, [and he does so], if [the husband] wants to retract he may not do so. Therefore if the husband said to him, “I do not want you to receive it on her behalf, but rather carry it and give it to her”, then if he wishes to retract he may do so. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even if the wife says “Take for me”, [and he does so] the husband may not retract.
A man divorces his wife and then stays with her over night in an inn: Bet Shammai says: she does not require from him a second get, But Beth Hillel say she does require a second get from him. When is this so? When she was divorced after marriage. And [Beth Hillel] agrees that if she is divorced after betrothal, she does not require a second get from him, because he would not [yet] take liberties with her. If a man marries a [divorced] woman through a “bald” get, she must leave both husbands and all the above-mentioned consequences apply to her.
If a man divorces his wife and said to her, “You are free to marry any man but so-and-so”, Rabbi Eliezer permits her [to marry on the strength of this get], but the rabbis forbid her. What should he do? He should take it back from her and give it to her again saying, “You are free to marry any man.” If he wrote [the restriction] in the get, even though he went back and erased it, it is invalid.
If a man divorces his wife and said to her, “You are free to marry any man but so-and-so”, Rabbi Eliezer permits her [to marry on the strength of this get], but the rabbis forbid her. What should he do? He should take it back from her and give it to her again saying, “You are free to marry any man.” If he wrote [the restriction] in the get, even though he went back and erased it, it is invalid.
Two men sent two identical gittin [to their wives] and they became mixed up they give both of them to this wife and both of them to this wife. Therefore, if one of them was lost the other is void. If five men wrote jointly in the same get, “So-and-so divorces so-and-so and so-and-so [divorces] so-and-so and the witnesses [signed] below, all are valid and the get is to be given to each [of the women]. If the scribe wrote out the formula for each one and the witnesses signed below, only the one with which the signatures are read is valid.
Two men sent two identical gittin [to their wives] and they became mixed up they give both of them to this wife and both of them to this wife. Therefore, if one of them was lost the other is void. If five men wrote jointly in the same get, “So-and-so divorces so-and-so and so-and-so [divorces] so-and-so and the witnesses [signed] below, all are valid and the get is to be given to each [of the women]. If the scribe wrote out the formula for each one and the witnesses signed below, only the one with which the signatures are read is valid.
Two men sent two identical gittin [to their wives] and they became mixed up they give both of them to this wife and both of them to this wife. Therefore, if one of them was lost the other is void. If five men wrote jointly in the same get, “So-and-so divorces so-and-so and so-and-so [divorces] so-and-so and the witnesses [signed] below, all are valid and the get is to be given to each [of the women]. If the scribe wrote out the formula for each one and the witnesses signed below, only the one with which the signatures are read is valid.
Two men sent two identical gittin [to their wives] and they became mixed up they give both of them to this wife and both of them to this wife. Therefore, if one of them was lost the other is void. If five men wrote jointly in the same get, “So-and-so divorces so-and-so and so-and-so [divorces] so-and-so and the witnesses [signed] below, all are valid and the get is to be given to each [of the women]. If the scribe wrote out the formula for each one and the witnesses signed below, only the one with which the signatures are read is valid.
Two men sent two identical gittin [to their wives] and they became mixed up they give both of them to this wife and both of them to this wife. Therefore, if one of them was lost the other is void. If five men wrote jointly in the same get, “So-and-so divorces so-and-so and so-and-so [divorces] so-and-so and the witnesses [signed] below, all are valid and the get is to be given to each [of the women]. If the scribe wrote out the formula for each one and the witnesses signed below, only the one with which the signatures are read is valid.
Two men sent two identical gittin [to their wives] and they became mixed up they give both of them to this wife and both of them to this wife. Therefore, if one of them was lost the other is void. If five men wrote jointly in the same get, “So-and-so divorces so-and-so and so-and-so [divorces] so-and-so and the witnesses [signed] below, all are valid and the get is to be given to each [of the women]. If the scribe wrote out the formula for each one and the witnesses signed below, only the one with which the signatures are read is valid.
Two men sent two identical gittin [to their wives] and they became mixed up they give both of them to this wife and both of them to this wife. Therefore, if one of them was lost the other is void. If five men wrote jointly in the same get, “So-and-so divorces so-and-so and so-and-so [divorces] so-and-so and the witnesses [signed] below, all are valid and the get is to be given to each [of the women]. If the scribe wrote out the formula for each one and the witnesses signed below, only the one with which the signatures are read is valid.
Two men sent two identical gittin [to their wives] and they became mixed up they give both of them to this wife and both of them to this wife. Therefore, if one of them was lost the other is void. If five men wrote jointly in the same get, “So-and-so divorces so-and-so and so-and-so [divorces] so-and-so and the witnesses [signed] below, all are valid and the get is to be given to each [of the women]. If the scribe wrote out the formula for each one and the witnesses signed below, only the one with which the signatures are read is valid.
A get which was written in Hebrew and whose signatures are in Greek, or was written in Greek and whose signatures are in Hebrew, or which has one Hebrew signature and one Greek signature, or which was written by a scribe and signed by one witness, is valid. [If a man signs], “So-and-so, witness,” it is valid. [If he signs,] “Son of so-and-so, witness, it is valid. [If he signs,] “So-and-so son of so-and-so” and he didn’t write “witness”, it is valid. If he wrote his own family name and hers, the get is valid. And this is how the scrupulous in Jerusalem would do. A get given imposed by court: in the case of a Jewish court is valid, and in the case of a Gentile court is invalid. And with regard to Gentiles, if they beat him and say to him, “Do what the Israelites say to you,” (and it is valid).
A get which was written in Hebrew and whose signatures are in Greek, or was written in Greek and whose signatures are in Hebrew, or which has one Hebrew signature and one Greek signature, or which was written by a scribe and signed by one witness, is valid. [If a man signs], “So-and-so, witness,” it is valid. [If he signs,] “Son of so-and-so, witness, it is valid. [If he signs,] “So-and-so son of so-and-so” and he didn’t write “witness”, it is valid. If he wrote his own family name and hers, the get is valid. And this is how the scrupulous in Jerusalem would do. A get given imposed by court: in the case of a Jewish court is valid, and in the case of a Gentile court is invalid. And with regard to Gentiles, if they beat him and say to him, “Do what the Israelites say to you,” (and it is valid).
A get which was written in Hebrew and whose signatures are in Greek, or was written in Greek and whose signatures are in Hebrew, or which has one Hebrew signature and one Greek signature, or which was written by a scribe and signed by one witness, is valid. [If a man signs], “So-and-so, witness,” it is valid. [If he signs,] “Son of so-and-so, witness, it is valid. [If he signs,] “So-and-so son of so-and-so” and he didn’t write “witness”, it is valid. If he wrote his own family name and hers, the get is valid. And this is how the scrupulous in Jerusalem would do. A get given imposed by court: in the case of a Jewish court is valid, and in the case of a Gentile court is invalid. And with regard to Gentiles, if they beat him and say to him, “Do what the Israelites say to you,” (and it is valid).
A get which was written in Hebrew and whose signatures are in Greek, or was written in Greek and whose signatures are in Hebrew, or which has one Hebrew signature and one Greek signature, or which was written by a scribe and signed by one witness, is valid. [If a man signs], “So-and-so, witness,” it is valid. [If he signs,] “Son of so-and-so, witness, it is valid. [If he signs,] “So-and-so son of so-and-so” and he didn’t write “witness”, it is valid. If he wrote his own family name and hers, the get is valid. And this is how the scrupulous in Jerusalem would do. A get given imposed by court: in the case of a Jewish court is valid, and in the case of a Gentile court is invalid. And with regard to Gentiles, if they beat him and say to him, “Do what the Israelites say to you,” (and it is valid).
A get which was written in Hebrew and whose signatures are in Greek, or was written in Greek and whose signatures are in Hebrew, or which has one Hebrew signature and one Greek signature, or which was written by a scribe and signed by one witness, is valid. [If a man signs], “So-and-so, witness,” it is valid. [If he signs,] “Son of so-and-so, witness, it is valid. [If he signs,] “So-and-so son of so-and-so” and he didn’t write “witness”, it is valid. If he wrote his own family name and hers, the get is valid. And this is how the scrupulous in Jerusalem would do. A get given imposed by court: in the case of a Jewish court is valid, and in the case of a Gentile court is invalid. And with regard to Gentiles, if they beat him and say to him, “Do what the Israelites say to you,” (and it is valid).
A get which was written in Hebrew and whose signatures are in Greek, or was written in Greek and whose signatures are in Hebrew, or which has one Hebrew signature and one Greek signature, or which was written by a scribe and signed by one witness, is valid. [If a man signs], “So-and-so, witness,” it is valid. [If he signs,] “Son of so-and-so, witness, it is valid. [If he signs,] “So-and-so son of so-and-so” and he didn’t write “witness”, it is valid. If he wrote his own family name and hers, the get is valid. And this is how the scrupulous in Jerusalem would do. A get given imposed by court: in the case of a Jewish court is valid, and in the case of a Gentile court is invalid. And with regard to Gentiles, if they beat him and say to him, “Do what the Israelites say to you,” (and it is valid).
A get which was written in Hebrew and whose signatures are in Greek, or was written in Greek and whose signatures are in Hebrew, or which has one Hebrew signature and one Greek signature, or which was written by a scribe and signed by one witness, is valid. [If a man signs], “So-and-so, witness,” it is valid. [If he signs,] “Son of so-and-so, witness, it is valid. [If he signs,] “So-and-so son of so-and-so” and he didn’t write “witness”, it is valid. If he wrote his own family name and hers, the get is valid. And this is how the scrupulous in Jerusalem would do. A get given imposed by court: in the case of a Jewish court is valid, and in the case of a Gentile court is invalid. And with regard to Gentiles, if they beat him and say to him, “Do what the Israelites say to you,” (and it is valid).
A get which was written in Hebrew and whose signatures are in Greek, or was written in Greek and whose signatures are in Hebrew, or which has one Hebrew signature and one Greek signature, or which was written by a scribe and signed by one witness, is valid. [If a man signs], “So-and-so, witness,” it is valid. [If he signs,] “Son of so-and-so, witness, it is valid. [If he signs,] “So-and-so son of so-and-so” and he didn’t write “witness”, it is valid. If he wrote his own family name and hers, the get is valid. And this is how the scrupulous in Jerusalem would do. A get given imposed by court: in the case of a Jewish court is valid, and in the case of a Gentile court is invalid. And with regard to Gentiles, if they beat him and say to him, “Do what the Israelites say to you,” (and it is valid).
If a report goes out in the town: “[A certain woman is] betrothed,” she is regarded as betrothed; [If a report goes out in the town: “A certain woman is] divorced,” she is regarded as divorced. [This is only the case] provided the report has no qualification. What is meant by a qualification? [If the report is,] “So-and-so divorced his wife with a stipulation” [or], “He threw her the betrothal money, but it is uncertain whether it landed nearer to her or nearer to him” this is a qualification.
If a report goes out in the town: “[A certain woman is] betrothed,” she is regarded as betrothed; [If a report goes out in the town: “A certain woman is] divorced,” she is regarded as divorced. [This is only the case] provided the report has no qualification. What is meant by a qualification? [If the report is,] “So-and-so divorced his wife with a stipulation” [or], “He threw her the betrothal money, but it is uncertain whether it landed nearer to her or nearer to him” this is a qualification.
Whatever can be used as payment for another object, as soon as this one takes possession [of the object], the other one assumes liability for what is given in exchange. How so? If one exchanges an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox, as soon as this one takes possession, the other one assumes liability for what is given in exchange. The sanctuary’s title to property [is acquired] by money; the title of an ordinary person to property by hazakah. Dedication to the sanctuary is equal to delivery to an ordinary person.
If he says to his agent, “Go out and betroth to me so-and-so in such and such a place,” and he goes and betroths her elsewhere, she is not betrothed. “She is in such and such a place,” and he betroths her elsewhere, she is betrothed.
If he says to his agent, “Go out and betroth to me so-and-so in such and such a place,” and he goes and betroths her elsewhere, she is not betrothed. “She is in such and such a place,” and he betroths her elsewhere, she is betrothed.
Rabbi Tarfon says: mamzerim can be purified. How is this so? If a mamzer marries a slave woman, her son is a slave; if he frees him, it is found that the son is a free man. Rabbi Eliezer says: behold, he is a slave mamzer.
Rabbi Judah said: an unmarried man must not tend cattle, nor may two unmarried men sleep together under the same cover. But the sages permit it. One whose business is with women must not be alone with women. And one should not teach his son a woman’s trade. Rabbi Meir says: one should always teach his son a clean and easy profession, and pray to Him to whom wealth and property belong. For a profession does not contain [the potential for] poverty and wealth, for poverty is not due to one’s profession nor is wealth due to the profession, but all depends on merit. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: have you ever seen a wild beast or a bird with a profession? Yet they are sustained without trouble. Now, were they not created only to serve me, while I was created to serve my master: surely then I should make a living without trouble! But my evil acts have done me in and withheld my livelihood. Abba Gurion a man of Sidon says in the name of Abba Guria: one should not teach his son [to be] a donkey-driver, camel-driver, wagon-driver, sailor, shepherd, or shopkeeper, because their profession is the profession of robbers. Rabbi Judah says in his name: most donkey-drivers are wicked, while most camel-drivers are worthy men; and most sailors are pious. The best of doctors are destined for Gehenna, and the worthiest of butchers is Amalek’s partner. Rabbi Nehorai says: I will abandon every profession in the world and I will not teach my son anything but Torah, for a person enjoys its reward in this world while the principal remains for him in the world to come. But all other professions are not so; for when a man comes to sickness or old age or suffering and cannot engage in his profession, he must die of starvation, whereas the Torah is not so, for it guards him from all evil in his youth and gives him a future and hope in his old age. Of his youth what is said? “But they that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength” (Isaiah 40:31). Of his old age what is said? “They shall still bring forth fruit in old age” (Psalms 92:15). And it is also said of our father Abraham, “And Abraham was old … And the Lord blessed Abraham with everything” (Genesis 24:1). We find that Abraham our father observed the whole Torah before it was given, for it is said, “Because Abraham obeyed My voice, and kept My charge, My commandments, My statutes, and My laws” (Genesis 26:5).
Rabbi Judah said: an unmarried man must not tend cattle, nor may two unmarried men sleep together under the same cover. But the sages permit it. One whose business is with women must not be alone with women. And one should not teach his son a woman’s trade. Rabbi Meir says: one should always teach his son a clean and easy profession, and pray to Him to whom wealth and property belong. For a profession does not contain [the potential for] poverty and wealth, for poverty is not due to one’s profession nor is wealth due to the profession, but all depends on merit. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: have you ever seen a wild beast or a bird with a profession? Yet they are sustained without trouble. Now, were they not created only to serve me, while I was created to serve my master: surely then I should make a living without trouble! But my evil acts have done me in and withheld my livelihood. Abba Gurion a man of Sidon says in the name of Abba Guria: one should not teach his son [to be] a donkey-driver, camel-driver, wagon-driver, sailor, shepherd, or shopkeeper, because their profession is the profession of robbers. Rabbi Judah says in his name: most donkey-drivers are wicked, while most camel-drivers are worthy men; and most sailors are pious. The best of doctors are destined for Gehenna, and the worthiest of butchers is Amalek’s partner. Rabbi Nehorai says: I will abandon every profession in the world and I will not teach my son anything but Torah, for a person enjoys its reward in this world while the principal remains for him in the world to come. But all other professions are not so; for when a man comes to sickness or old age or suffering and cannot engage in his profession, he must die of starvation, whereas the Torah is not so, for it guards him from all evil in his youth and gives him a future and hope in his old age. Of his youth what is said? “But they that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength” (Isaiah 40:31). Of his old age what is said? “They shall still bring forth fruit in old age” (Psalms 92:15). And it is also said of our father Abraham, “And Abraham was old … And the Lord blessed Abraham with everything” (Genesis 24:1). We find that Abraham our father observed the whole Torah before it was given, for it is said, “Because Abraham obeyed My voice, and kept My charge, My commandments, My statutes, and My laws” (Genesis 26:5).
Five [agents of damage] rank as harmless and five as an attested danger. Cattle are not an attested danger to butt, push, bite, lie down, or kick. The tooth [of an animal] is an attested danger to eat that which is for it; The leg [of an animal] is an attested danger to break [things] as it walks along; So also is a warned ox [an ox that has gored before]; And an ox that damages in the domain of the damaged party, and human beings. The wolf, the lion, the bear, the leopard, the panther and the snake all rank as attested danger. Rabbi Eliezer says: When they are tame they are not attested danger, but the snake is always an attested danger. What is the difference between that which is harmless and that which is an attested danger? The harmless pays half-damages from its own body and the attested danger pays full damages from the best property (of its owner and guardian).
How is the leg [of a beast] an attested danger to break [what it tramples upon] as it walks along? A beast is an attested danger [only] in so far as it goes along in its usual way and breaks [an object]. If it kicked, or if small stones were tossed out from beneath its feet and it thus broke other vessels, one pays half damages. If it trampled upon a vessel and broke it, and this [broken vessel] fell upon another vessel and broke it, for the first one pays full damages and for the other half damages. Fowls (chickens and roosters) are an attested danger in so far as they go along in their usual way and break [objects]. But if the fowl had its feet entangled, or if it was jumping and it thereby broke any vessel one pays half damages.
How is the leg [of a beast] an attested danger to break [what it tramples upon] as it walks along? A beast is an attested danger [only] in so far as it goes along in its usual way and breaks [an object]. If it kicked, or if small stones were tossed out from beneath its feet and it thus broke other vessels, one pays half damages. If it trampled upon a vessel and broke it, and this [broken vessel] fell upon another vessel and broke it, for the first one pays full damages and for the other half damages. Fowls (chickens and roosters) are an attested danger in so far as they go along in their usual way and break [objects]. But if the fowl had its feet entangled, or if it was jumping and it thereby broke any vessel one pays half damages.
“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
This one comes carrying his jar and another one comes carrying his beam: this one’s jar is broken by that one’s beam, [The owner of the beam] is exempt, since this one has the right to walk along and this one has the right to walk along. If the owner of the beam came first and the owner of the jar came after, and the jar was broken by the beam, the owner of the beam is exempt. If the owner of the beam stopped [walking suddenly], he is liable. If [the owner of the beam had said] “Stop” to the owner of the jar, he is exempt. If the owner of the jar came first and owner of the beam came after, and the jar was broken by the beam, [the owner of the beam] is liable. If the owner of the jar stopped [walking suddenly],he is exempt. If [the owner of the jar had said] “Stop” to the owner of the beam, he is liable. So too when one comes with his candle and one with his flax.
If two oxen which were accounted harmless hurt one another, the owner pays half-damages for that one which suffered the greater hurt. If both were attested dangers full damages are payable for that one which suffered the greater hurt. If one was accounted harmless and the other was an attested danger, that which was an attested danger as against that which was accounted harmless must pay full damages for the greater hurt that the other has suffered, while that which was accounted harmless, as against that which was an attested danger, pays only half damages for the greater hurt that the other has suffered. So, too, if two men hurt one another, full damages are payable for that one which suffered the greater hurt. If a man and an ox which was accounted harmless hurt one another, the man as against the ox accounted harmless must pay full damages for the greater hurt that the other has suffered, while the ox accounted harmless, as against the man, pays only half damages for the greater hurt that the other suffered. Rabbi Akiva says: “Even if an ox accounted harmless hurt a man, full damages must be paid for that one which suffered the greater hurt.
If an ox gored a person and he died, if it was an attested danger [its owner] must pay the ransom, if it was accounted harmless he is exempt from paying the ransom. In both cases the ox is obligated for the death penalty. So too [if it killed] a son or a daughter. If it gored a male slave or a female slave its owner pays 30 sela, Whether [the slave] was worth a maneh or not even worth a dinar.
If an ox intended [to gore] another ox and struck a woman and her offspring came forth [as a miscarriage], its owner is not liable for the value of the offspring. But if a man intended to strike his fellow and struck a woman and her offspring came forth [as a miscarriage], he must pay the value of the offspring. How does he pay the value of the offspring? They assess the value of the woman before she gave birth and the value after she gave birth. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “If so, once a woman gives birth she is more valuable. Rather, they assess how much the offspring would be worth, and he pays it to the husband, or if she has no husband to his heirs.” If she was a freed bondwoman or a proselyte no penalty is incurred.
If a man dug a pit in a private domain and opened it into the public domain, or if he dug it in the public domain and opened it into a private domain, or if he dug it in a private domain and opened it into another private domain, he is liable [if any is injured by the pit]. If he dug a pit in the public domain and an ox or ass fell into and died, he is liable. No matter whether he digs a pit, trench, or cavern, or ditches or channels he is liable. If so, why does it say “a pit” (Exodus 21:33)? Just as a pit which is deep enough to cause death is ten handbreadths deep, so anything is deep enough to cause death if it is ten handbreadths deep. If they were less than ten handbreadths deep and an ox or an ass fell in and died, the owner is not liable; but if it was damaged he is liable.
If a man dug a pit in a private domain and opened it into the public domain, or if he dug it in the public domain and opened it into a private domain, or if he dug it in a private domain and opened it into another private domain, he is liable [if any is injured by the pit]. If he dug a pit in the public domain and an ox or ass fell into and died, he is liable. No matter whether he digs a pit, trench, or cavern, or ditches or channels he is liable. If so, why does it say “a pit” (Exodus 21:33)? Just as a pit which is deep enough to cause death is ten handbreadths deep, so anything is deep enough to cause death if it is ten handbreadths deep. If they were less than ten handbreadths deep and an ox or an ass fell in and died, the owner is not liable; but if it was damaged he is liable.
An ox and all other beasts are alike under the laws concerning falling into a pit, keeping apart from Mount Sinai, two-fold restitution, the restoring of lost property, unloading, muzzling, diverse kinds, and the Sabbath. So to wild animals and birds. If so, why is it written “an ox or an ass”? But Scripture spoke of prevailing conditions.
An ox and all other beasts are alike under the laws concerning falling into a pit, keeping apart from Mount Sinai, two-fold restitution, the restoring of lost property, unloading, muzzling, diverse kinds, and the Sabbath. So to wild animals and birds. If so, why is it written “an ox or an ass”? But Scripture spoke of prevailing conditions.
If a person sends forth fire in the hands of a deaf-mute, an idiot or a minor he is not liable by the laws of man, but he is liable by the laws of Heaven. If he sent it forth in the hands of a person of sound senses, the one of sound senses is liable. If one brought the fire, and then another brought the wood, he that brought the wood is liable. If one brought the wood and then another brought fire, he that brought the fire is liable. If another came and fanned the flames, the one who fanned the flame is liable. If the wind fanned the flame, they are all exempt. If a man sent forth fire, and it consumed wood or stones or dust, he is liable, for it says: “When a fire breaks out and spreads to thorns so that the stacked corn is consumed, or the standing corn, or the field, he that kindled the fire shall surely make restitution.” If it passed over a fence four cubits high, or over a public way, or over a river, he is exempt. If a man kindled fire within his own domain, how far may it spread [and he will still be liable]? Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah says: “It is looked at as if it was in the middle of a kor’s space.” [ Rabbi Eliezer says: “Sixteen cubits [in every direction] like a public highway.” Rabbi Akiva says: “Fifty cubits.” Rabbi Shimon says: “[It is said] ‘He that kindled the fire shall surely make restitution’, all is in accordance with the nature of the fire.”
He who wounds his fellow is liable to compensate him on five counts: for injury, for pain, for healing, for loss of income and for indignity. ‘For injury’: How so? If he blinded his fellow’s eye, cut off his hand or broke his foot, [his fellow] is looked upon as if he was a slave to be sold in the market and they assess how much he was worth and how much he is worth. ‘For pain’? If he burned him with a spit or a nail, even though it was on his fingernail, a place where it leaves no wound, they estimate how much money such a man would be willing to take to suffer so. ‘Healing’? If he struck him he is liable to pay the cost of his healing. If sores arise on him on account of the blow, he is liable [for the cost of their healing]. If not on account of the blow, he is not liable. If the wound healed and then opened and healed and then opened, he is liable for the cost of the healing. If it healed completely, he is no longer liable to pay the cost of the healing. ‘Loss of income’: He is looked upon as a watchman of a cucumber field, since he already gave him compensation for the loss of his hand or foot. ‘Indignity’: All is according to the status of the one that inflicts indignity and the status of the one that suffers indignity. If a man inflicted indignity on a naked man, or a blind man, or a sleeping man, he is [still] liable. If a sleeping man inflicted indignity, he is exempt. If a man fell from the roof and caused injury and inflicted indignity, he is liable for the injury but not for the indignity, as it says, “And she puts forth her hand and grabs him by the private parts”, a man is liable only when he intended [to inflict indignity].
He who wounds his fellow is liable to compensate him on five counts: for injury, for pain, for healing, for loss of income and for indignity. ‘For injury’: How so? If he blinded his fellow’s eye, cut off his hand or broke his foot, [his fellow] is looked upon as if he was a slave to be sold in the market and they assess how much he was worth and how much he is worth. ‘For pain’? If he burned him with a spit or a nail, even though it was on his fingernail, a place where it leaves no wound, they estimate how much money such a man would be willing to take to suffer so. ‘Healing’? If he struck him he is liable to pay the cost of his healing. If sores arise on him on account of the blow, he is liable [for the cost of their healing]. If not on account of the blow, he is not liable. If the wound healed and then opened and healed and then opened, he is liable for the cost of the healing. If it healed completely, he is no longer liable to pay the cost of the healing. ‘Loss of income’: He is looked upon as a watchman of a cucumber field, since he already gave him compensation for the loss of his hand or foot. ‘Indignity’: All is according to the status of the one that inflicts indignity and the status of the one that suffers indignity. If a man inflicted indignity on a naked man, or a blind man, or a sleeping man, he is [still] liable. If a sleeping man inflicted indignity, he is exempt. If a man fell from the roof and caused injury and inflicted indignity, he is liable for the injury but not for the indignity, as it says, “And she puts forth her hand and grabs him by the private parts”, a man is liable only when he intended [to inflict indignity].
If a man boxed the ear of his fellow, he must pay him a sela (four. Rabbi Judah says in the name of Rabbi Yose the Galilean: “A maneh (one hundred.” If he slapped him he must pay 200 zuz. If with the back of his hand, he must pay him 400 zuz. If he tore at his ear, plucked out his hair, spat at him and his spit touched him, or pulled his cloak from off him, or loosed a woman’s hair in the street, he must pay 400 zuz. This is the general rule: all is in accordance with the person’s honor. Rabbi Akiva said: “Even the poor in Israel are regarded as free people who have lost their possessions, for they are the children of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. It once happened that a man unloosed a woman’s hair in the street and she came before Rabbi Akiva and he condemned him to pay her 400 zuz. He said, “Rabbi, give me time”. And he gave him time. He caught her standing at the entrance to her courtyard, and he broke a jug of one issar’s worth of oil in front of her. She unloosed her hair and scooped up the oil in her hand and laid her hand on her head. He had set up witnesses up against her and he came before Rabbi Akiva and said to him, “Rabbi, should I give one such as this 400 zuz?” He answered, “You have said nothing.” If a man injures himself, even though he has no right to do so, is not liable. But others who injure him are liable. If a man cuts down his own saplings, even though he has no right to do so, is not liable. But, if others cut them down, they are liable.
If a man boxed the ear of his fellow, he must pay him a sela (four. Rabbi Judah says in the name of Rabbi Yose the Galilean: “A maneh (one hundred.” If he slapped him he must pay 200 zuz. If with the back of his hand, he must pay him 400 zuz. If he tore at his ear, plucked out his hair, spat at him and his spit touched him, or pulled his cloak from off him, or loosed a woman’s hair in the street, he must pay 400 zuz. This is the general rule: all is in accordance with the person’s honor. Rabbi Akiva said: “Even the poor in Israel are regarded as free people who have lost their possessions, for they are the children of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. It once happened that a man unloosed a woman’s hair in the street and she came before Rabbi Akiva and he condemned him to pay her 400 zuz. He said, “Rabbi, give me time”. And he gave him time. He caught her standing at the entrance to her courtyard, and he broke a jug of one issar’s worth of oil in front of her. She unloosed her hair and scooped up the oil in her hand and laid her hand on her head. He had set up witnesses up against her and he came before Rabbi Akiva and said to him, “Rabbi, should I give one such as this 400 zuz?” He answered, “You have said nothing.” If a man injures himself, even though he has no right to do so, is not liable. But others who injure him are liable. If a man cuts down his own saplings, even though he has no right to do so, is not liable. But, if others cut them down, they are liable.
Even though a man pays [him that suffers the indignity], he is not forgiven until he seeks [forgiveness] from him, for it says: “Therefore restore the man’s wife… [and he shall pray for you]” (Genesis 20:7). And from where do we learn that he who must forgive should not be cruel? As it says: “And Abraham prayed unto God and God healed Avimelech” (Genesis 20:17). If a man said, “Blind my eye”, or “Cut off my hand”, or “Break my foot”, he [that does so] is liable. [If he added] “On the condition that you will be exempt”, he is still liable. [If he said] “Tear my garment”, or “Break my jug”, he that does so is liable. [If he added] “On the condition that you will be exempt”, he is exempt. [If he said], “Do so to so-and-so, on the condition that you will be exempt, he is liable, whether it was [an offense] against his person or his property.
Even though a man pays [him that suffers the indignity], he is not forgiven until he seeks [forgiveness] from him, for it says: “Therefore restore the man’s wife… [and he shall pray for you]” (Genesis 20:7). And from where do we learn that he who must forgive should not be cruel? As it says: “And Abraham prayed unto God and God healed Avimelech” (Genesis 20:17). If a man said, “Blind my eye”, or “Cut off my hand”, or “Break my foot”, he [that does so] is liable. [If he added] “On the condition that you will be exempt”, he is still liable. [If he said] “Tear my garment”, or “Break my jug”, he that does so is liable. [If he added] “On the condition that you will be exempt”, he is exempt. [If he said], “Do so to so-and-so, on the condition that you will be exempt, he is liable, whether it was [an offense] against his person or his property.
Even though a man pays [him that suffers the indignity], he is not forgiven until he seeks [forgiveness] from him, for it says: “Therefore restore the man’s wife… [and he shall pray for you]” (Genesis 20:7). And from where do we learn that he who must forgive should not be cruel? As it says: “And Abraham prayed unto God and God healed Avimelech” (Genesis 20:17). If a man said, “Blind my eye”, or “Cut off my hand”, or “Break my foot”, he [that does so] is liable. [If he added] “On the condition that you will be exempt”, he is still liable. [If he said] “Tear my garment”, or “Break my jug”, he that does so is liable. [If he added] “On the condition that you will be exempt”, he is exempt. [If he said], “Do so to so-and-so, on the condition that you will be exempt, he is liable, whether it was [an offense] against his person or his property.
Even though a man pays [him that suffers the indignity], he is not forgiven until he seeks [forgiveness] from him, for it says: “Therefore restore the man’s wife… [and he shall pray for you]” (Genesis 20:7). And from where do we learn that he who must forgive should not be cruel? As it says: “And Abraham prayed unto God and God healed Avimelech” (Genesis 20:17). If a man said, “Blind my eye”, or “Cut off my hand”, or “Break my foot”, he [that does so] is liable. [If he added] “On the condition that you will be exempt”, he is still liable. [If he said] “Tear my garment”, or “Break my jug”, he that does so is liable. [If he added] “On the condition that you will be exempt”, he is exempt. [If he said], “Do so to so-and-so, on the condition that you will be exempt, he is liable, whether it was [an offense] against his person or his property.
Even though a man pays [him that suffers the indignity], he is not forgiven until he seeks [forgiveness] from him, for it says: “Therefore restore the man’s wife… [and he shall pray for you]” (Genesis 20:7). And from where do we learn that he who must forgive should not be cruel? As it says: “And Abraham prayed unto God and God healed Avimelech” (Genesis 20:17). If a man said, “Blind my eye”, or “Cut off my hand”, or “Break my foot”, he [that does so] is liable. [If he added] “On the condition that you will be exempt”, he is still liable. [If he said] “Tear my garment”, or “Break my jug”, he that does so is liable. [If he added] “On the condition that you will be exempt”, he is exempt. [If he said], “Do so to so-and-so, on the condition that you will be exempt, he is liable, whether it was [an offense] against his person or his property.
If he had paid him the value and had sworn [falsely] to him concerning the [added] fifth, he must pay a fifth on the fifth [and so on] until the value [of the added fifth] becomes less than a perutah’s worth. So too with a deposit, as it says: “In a matter of deposit or a pledge or through robbery, or by defrauding his fellow, or by finding something lost and lying about it” (Leviticus 5:21-2, such a one must pay the value and the [added] fifth and bring a Guilt-offering. [If a man said], “Where is my deposit?” and the other said, “It is lost,” [if the one says,] “I adjure thee”, and the other says, “Amen!”, and witnesses testify against him that he consumed it, he need pay [only] the value. But if he confessed it of himself, he must repay the value and the [added] fifth and bring a Guilt-offering.
If he had paid him the value and had sworn [falsely] to him concerning the [added] fifth, he must pay a fifth on the fifth [and so on] until the value [of the added fifth] becomes less than a perutah’s worth. So too with a deposit, as it says: “In a matter of deposit or a pledge or through robbery, or by defrauding his fellow, or by finding something lost and lying about it” (Leviticus 5:21-2, such a one must pay the value and the [added] fifth and bring a Guilt-offering. [If a man said], “Where is my deposit?” and the other said, “It is lost,” [if the one says,] “I adjure thee”, and the other says, “Amen!”, and witnesses testify against him that he consumed it, he need pay [only] the value. But if he confessed it of himself, he must repay the value and the [added] fifth and bring a Guilt-offering.
If excise collectors took his donkey and gave him another donkey, or if bandits robbed a man of his coat and gave him another coat, they are his own, since the original owners gave up hope of recovering them. If a man saved something from a flood or from marauding troops or from bandits: if the owner gave up hope of recovering [the item], it belongs to him. So too with a swarm of bees: if the owner gave up hope of recovering [the swarm], it belongs to him. Rabbi Yochanan ben Baroka said: “A woman or child may be believed if they say, ‘The swarm of bees went away from here.’” A man may go into his fellow’s field to save his swarm and if he causes damage he must pay for the damage that he has caused; but he may not cut off a branch of the tree [to save his swarm] even on condition that he pay its value. Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Baroka, says: “He may even cut off [the branch] and repay the value.”
Which found objects belong to the finder and which ones must be proclaimed [in the lost and found]? These found objects belong to the finder: if a man found scattered fruit, scattered money, small sheaves in the public domain, cakes of figs, bakers’ loaves, strings of fish, pieces of meat, wool shearings [as they come] from the country of origin, stalks of flax and strips of purple wool, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: “Anything which has in it something unusual, must be proclaimed. How is this so? If he found a fig cake with a potsherd in it or a loaf with coins in it [he must proclaim them].” Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: “New merchandise need not be proclaimed.”
A garment was also included amongst all these things (which one must proclaim, listed in Deut. 22:3). Why was it mentioned separately? To compare [other things] to it: to teach you just as a garment is distinct in that it has special marks and it has those who claim it, so too everything that has special marks and those who claim it must be proclaimed.
If he found scrolls he must read them once every thirty days, and if he does not know how to read he should unroll them. But he may not learn from them something he has not yet learned, nor may another read with him. If he found clothing he must shake it out once every thirty days, and spread it out for [the clothing’s] own good, but not for his own honor. [If he found] silver or copper vessels he must use them for their own good but not so as to wear them out. [If he found] vessels of gold or glass he may not touch them until Elijah comes. If he found a sack or a large basket or anything that is not generally carried about, he may not carry it.
Two men deposited money with a third, the one 100 zuz and the other 200 zuz. [Afterward] one claimed that he deposited 200 and the other claimed that he deposited 200. He gives this one 100 zuz and this one 100 zuz and the rest remains until Elijah comes. Rabbi Yose says: “If so, what does the deceiver lose? Rather the whole is left until Elijah comes.”
So too, [two men deposited] vessels with a third, one worth 100 zuz and the other worth 1000 zuz. [Afterward] one claimed that the valuable one was his and the other claimed that the valuable one was his. He gives the less valuable one to one of them and from the value of the more valuable one he gives the value of the lesser one to the other person, and the rest remains until Elijah comes. Rabbi Yose says: “If so, what does the deceiver lose? Rather the whole is left until Elijah comes.”
So too, [two men deposited] vessels with a third, one worth 100 zuz and the other worth 1000 zuz. [Afterward] one claimed that the valuable one was his and the other claimed that the valuable one was his. He gives the less valuable one to one of them and from the value of the more valuable one he gives the value of the lesser one to the other person, and the rest remains until Elijah comes. Rabbi Yose says: “If so, what does the deceiver lose? Rather the whole is left until Elijah comes.”
If a man makes personal use of a deposit: Bet Shammai holds that he is at a disadvantage whether the value rises or falls. Bet Hillel says: [He must restore the deposit] at its value at the time at which he put it to use. Rabbi Akiva says: [He must restore the deposit] at its value at the time at which it is claimed. One who expresses his intention to use a deposit [for personal use]: Bet Shammai says he is liable [for any subsequent damage to the deposit, as if he had already made use of it]. Bet Hillel says: He is not liable until he actually uses it, as it says (Exodus 22:7): “If he had not put his hand onto his neighbor’s property”. How is this so? If he tilted the jug and took a quarter-log of wine and the jug was then broken, he only pays the quarter-log. If he lifted it and then took a quarter-log and the jug was then broken, he pays for the whole jug.
How is this so? If [the buyer] drew the produce away from [the seller] but did not give over the money, he cannot retract. If [the buyer] gave the money but did not draw the produce away from [the seller], he can retract. But they said: “He that exacted punishment from the generation of the flood and the generation of the dispersion (at the time of the Tower of Babel) will exact punishment from one who does not keep by his word. Rabbi Shimon says: “He that has the money has the upper hand.”
Both the buyer and the seller are subject to the law of fraud. Just as the ordinary person is subject to the law of fraud so too is the merchant. Rabbi Judah said: “The law of fraud does not apply to the merchant.” He who has been subjected to [fraud] has the upper hand: if he wants he may say to him, “Give me back my money or give me back the amount you defrauded me.”
Just as the laws of fraud apply to buying and selling, so to do they apply to the spoken word. One may not say, “How much is this object?, if he does not wish to buy it. If one had repented, another should not say to him, “Remember your earlier deeds”. If one descended from converts, another should not say to him, “Remember the deeds of your ancestors”. For it is said (Exodus 22:21), “And a stranger you shall not wrong or oppress.”
Produce may not be mixed together with other produce, even new produce with new produce, and needless to say new with old. In truth they permitted sharp wine to be mixed with weak wine, since this improves [the taste]. Wine lees may not be mixed with wine, but [the seller] may give [the buyer] the lees that come from the same wine. One whose wine has been mixed with water may not sell it in a store unless he informs [the buyer] and not to a merchant even if he has informed him, since [the merchant would buy it] only to deceive with it. In a place where they are accustomed to put water in wine, they may do so.
What is usury (neshech) and what is increase (tarbit)? It is usury (neshech) when a man lends a sela for five dinars, or two seahs of wheat for three, because he bites (noshech) [off too much]. And what is increase? When a man increases [his gains] by [selling] produce. How is this so? [If] one bought wheat at a golden dinars [=25 silver dinars] for a kor when such was the market price, and then wheat rose to thirty [silver] dinars [per kor]. [If] he said to him, “Give me my wheat since I would sell it and buy wine with the proceeds” and the other said, “Let your wheat be reckoned with me at thirty dinars and you now have a claim on me for wine [to that value], although the creditor has no wine.
One who lends money to his fellow may not dwell in his courtyard for free or rent it from him at a reduced rate, since that counts as usury. One may increase rent-charge [not paid in advance] but not purchase price [not paid in advance]. How so? If his fellow rented him his courtyard, and said to him, “If you pay me now the cost is 10 selas per year, but if you pay me on a monthly basis, the rent is one sela per month”, this is permitted. However, if he sold him his field, and said to him, “If you pay me now it is yours for 1,000 zuz, but if you pay me at the time of threshing it will be 1,200 zuz”, it is forbidden.
One may evaluate cows and donkeys and anything that works and eats [and give them to one’s fellow to raise] in order to share the profit. Where the custom is to share the offspring immediately at birth, they do so; and where the custom is to first rear them [and then give them over to the owner], they do so. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “One may evaluate a calf with its mother, and a foal with its mother [and give them to one’s fellow to raise in order to share the profit.] A tenant may offer increased rent in exchange for a loan to improve his field, without fearing that this is usury.
One may evaluate cows and donkeys and anything that works and eats [and give them to one’s fellow to raise] in order to share the profit. Where the custom is to share the offspring immediately at birth, they do so; and where the custom is to first rear them [and then give them over to the owner], they do so. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “One may evaluate a calf with its mother, and a foal with its mother [and give them to one’s fellow to raise in order to share the profit.] A tenant may offer increased rent in exchange for a loan to improve his field, without fearing that this is usury.
One may say to his fellow, “Help me weed and I will help you weed” or “Help me hoe and I will help you hoe.” But one may not say, “Help me weed and I will help you hoe”, or “Help me hoe and I will help you weed”. All days of the dry season are accounted alike, and all days of the rainy season are accounted alike. One may not say to another, “Help me plow in the dry season and I will help you plow in the rainy season.” Rabban Gamaliel says: “There is interest that is paid in advance and interest that is paid afterward. How is this so? If a one intended to borrow from another and made him a present and said, “This is so that you will lend to me”, this is interest that is paid in advance. If one borrowed from another and repaid it to him, and then sent a present and said, “This is for your money of which you have not had use while it was with me”, this is interest that is paid afterward. Rabbi Shimon says: “There is interest paid in words: one may not say to his creditor, “Know that such and such a person has come form such and such a place.”
One may say to his fellow, “Help me weed and I will help you weed” or “Help me hoe and I will help you hoe.” But one may not say, “Help me weed and I will help you hoe”, or “Help me hoe and I will help you weed”. All days of the dry season are accounted alike, and all days of the rainy season are accounted alike. One may not say to another, “Help me plow in the dry season and I will help you plow in the rainy season.” Rabban Gamaliel says: “There is interest that is paid in advance and interest that is paid afterward. How is this so? If a one intended to borrow from another and made him a present and said, “This is so that you will lend to me”, this is interest that is paid in advance. If one borrowed from another and repaid it to him, and then sent a present and said, “This is for your money of which you have not had use while it was with me”, this is interest that is paid afterward. Rabbi Shimon says: “There is interest paid in words: one may not say to his creditor, “Know that such and such a person has come form such and such a place.”
If one hired laborers and told them to work early or to work late, he has no right to compel them to do so where the custom is not to work early or not to work late. In a place where the custom is to give them their food he should give it to them, and where the custom is to provide them with sweet food, he must give it to them. Everything should follow local custom. It once happened that Rabbi Yochanan ben Mattia said to his son: “Go and hire laborers for us”. He went and struck a deal to provide them with food. When he came to his father, his father said to him, “My son, even if you make them a banquet like Solomon’s in his time you will not have fulfilled your obligation to them. For they are sons of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. But, rather, before they begin to work go and say to them, “On condition that I am not bound to give you more than bread and beans only.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “It was not necessary to speak thus, for everything should follow local use.”
If one wolf [attacked the flock that he was watching] it does not count as an unavoidable accident [for which no blame is placed on the guardian]. Two wolves do count as an unavoidable accident. Rabbi Judah says: “In a time where wolves are commonly attacking the settlements, even one wolf is considered to be an unavoidable accident.” Two dogs do not count as an unavoidable accident. Yadua the Babylonian said in the name of Rabbi Meir says: “If [two dogs came] from one direction they do not count as an unavoidable accident, but if [they came] from two directions they count as an unavoidable accident. A bandit counts as an unavoidable accident. A lion or a bear or a leopard or a panther or a serpent counts as an unavoidable accident. When [is this so]? When they come of themselves. But if he took the flock to a place of wild animals or bandits they do not count as an unavoidable accident.
If one borrowed a cow and the owner sent it by the hand of his son or his slave or his agent, or by the hand of the borrower’s son or slave or agent and it died [on the way], the borrower is not liable. But if the borrower said, “Send it to me by the hand of my son or my slave or my agent, or by the hand of your son or your slave or your agent”, or if the lender said, “I am sending it to you by the hand of my son or my slave or my agent”, or “by the hand of your son or your slave or your agent”, and the borrower said, “Send it”, and he sent it and it died [on the way], the borrower is liable. So, too, when the cow is returned.
If one swapped a cow for a donkey, and it gave birth, So too if one sold his slave and she gave birth, [And] one (the seller) says, “It was born before I sold her”, and the other (the buyer) says, “It was born after I bought her”, they shall divide [the value of what was born]. If one had two slaves, one large and the other small, or two fields, one large and the other small,[And he sold one of them], If the buyer says, “I bought the large one” and the other says, “I don’t know”, the buyer can rightly claim the large one. If the seller said, “I sold the small one” and the buyer said, “I do not know”, he may only take the small one. If one said, “It was the large one” and the other said, “It was the small one”, the seller must take an oath that it was the small one that he sold [and the buyer can only take the small one]. If one said, “I do not know”, and the other said, “I do not know”, they shall divide the value [of both slaves or fields].
If one leased a field from his fellow and the custom of the place was to cut the crops, he must cut them; If the custom was to uproot them, he must uproot them; If the custom was to plough after reaping, he must plough. Everything should follow local custom. Just as they share the grain, so too they share the chopped straw and the stubble. Just as they share the wine, so too they share the [dead] branches and the reeds [used to prop the vines]. And both parties must [at the outset] provide [their share of] the reeds.
If one leased a field from his fellow and the custom of the place was to cut the crops, he must cut them; If the custom was to uproot them, he must uproot them; If the custom was to plough after reaping, he must plough. Everything should follow local custom. Just as they share the grain, so too they share the chopped straw and the stubble. Just as they share the wine, so too they share the [dead] branches and the reeds [used to prop the vines]. And both parties must [at the outset] provide [their share of] the reeds.
The laws “You must pay him his wages on the same day” (Deut. 24:15) and “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning” (Lev. 19:13) apply both to the hire of a man or of a beast or of utensils. When is this so? When the employee has laid claim to it, but if he had not laid claim to it the employer does not commit a transgression. If he gave him a draft on a shopkeeper or moneychanger [the employer] does not commit a transgression [even though the employee has not yet collected]. If an employee [claimed his wages] within the set time he may take an oath and take his wages. [But] if the set time had passed he may not take an oath and take his wages. If witnesses testified that he had claimed his wages at the set time [and was not paid], he may take an oath and receive his wages. The law “You must pay him his wages on the same day” applies also to the resident alien, but not the law, “The wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until the morning”.
So, too, if an olive press was built in a rock and another had a garden on top of it, and [the olive press] was in part broken down, the owner of the garden may come down and sow below until the other rebuilds the ceiling of his olive press. If a wall or a tree fell into the public domain and caused damage, the owner is not liable to make restitution. If a set time had been given to him to cut down the tree or pull down the wall, and they fell down within the time, he is not liable. If after that time, he is liable.
If two partners wish to make a partition in a courtyard they build the wall in the middle. In a place where the custom is to build of unshaped stones, or of hewn stones, or of half-bricks, or of whole bricks, so they should build it everything is according to local custom. [If the wall is made of] unshaped stones this one supplies [from his property] three handbreadths, and this one supplies [from his property] three handbreadths. [If the wall is made of] hewn stones this one supplies [from his property] two and a half handbreadths, and this one supplies [from his property] two and a half handbreadths. [If the wall is made of] half-bricks this one supplies [from his property] two handbreadths, and this one supplies [from his property] two handbreadths. [If the wall is made of] whole bricks this one supplies [from his property] one and a half handbreadths, and this one supplies [from his property] one and a half handbreadths.
The same is true with a garden: in a place where the custom is to build a fence, they can obligate him to do so. However, in a valley, where it is not customary to build a fence, they cannot obligate him to do so. But if he wants to [build a fence] he must gather into his own portion and build, and he puts a finishing on the outside of the wall. Therefore if the wall falls, the place and the stones belong to him. If they acted with each other’s consent, they should build the wall in the middle and put a finishing on both sides. Therefore if the wall falls, the place and the stones belong to them both.
The same is true with a garden: in a place where the custom is to build a fence, they can obligate him to do so. However, in a valley, where it is not customary to build a fence, they cannot obligate him to do so. But if he wants to [build a fence] he must gather into his own portion and build, and he puts a finishing on the outside of the wall. Therefore if the wall falls, the place and the stones belong to him. If they acted with each other’s consent, they should build the wall in the middle and put a finishing on both sides. Therefore if the wall falls, the place and the stones belong to them both.
They do not divide a courtyard until there is four cubits for this [partner] and four cubits for this [partner]. Nor [do they divide up] a field until it has nine kavs for this [partner] and nine kavs for this [partner]. Rabbi Judah says: “Until it has nine half-kavs for this [partner] and nine half-kavs for this [partner]. Nor [do they divide up] a garden until it has a half-kav for this [partner] and a half-kav for this [partner]. Rabbi Akiva says: “A quarter-kav.” Nor [do they divide up] an eating hall, a watch-tower, a dovecote, a cloak, a bathhouse, or an olive-press until there is sufficient for this [partner] and for this [partner]. This is the general rule: whatever can be divided and still be called by the same name, they divide; otherwise they do not divide. When is this so? When they do not both wish [to divide the property]. However, if both wish they can divide it even if it is smaller. And with regards to the Sacred Books, they may not be divided even if both are willing.
One may not set up an oven inside a house unless there is a space of four cubits above it. If he sets it up in the upper room, the flooring beneath it must be three handbreadths deep, or for a stove one handbreadth. And if it causes damage [to the floor] he must pay for the damage caused. Rabbi Shimon says: “They only mentioned these measurements so that if the object caused damage he would be exempt.”
A person’s ladder must not be kept within four cubits of [his neighbor’s] dovecote, lest a marten (a small animal that eats doves) should jump in. His wall may not be built four cubits from [his neighbor’s] roof-gutter, so that the other can set up his ladder [to clean it out]. A dovecote may not be kept within fifty cubits of a town, and none may build a dovecote in his own domain unless his ground extends fifty cubits in every direction. Rabbi Judah says: Four kor’s space of ground, which is the length of a pigeon’s flight. But if he had bought it [and it was built already in that place] and there was only a quarter-kab’s space of ground, he has a right to the dovecote.
A permanent threshing floor may not be made within fifty cubits of the town. One may not make a permanent threshing floor within his own domain unless his ground extends fifty cubits in every direction. And he must distance it from his fellow's plants and ploughed land so that it will not cause damage.
A person may not plant a tree near another’s field unless it is four cubits away, no matter whether it be a vine or any other kind of tree. If there was a wall between, each may plant up to the wall on either side. If its roots entered within the other’s property, the other may cut them away to a depth of three handbreadths so that they shall not hinder the plough. If he dug a cistern, trench or cave, he may cut them away as far down as he digs, and the wood shall belong to him.
There are three regions with regards to possession: Judea, beyond the Jordan and the Galilee. If the owner was in Judea and another took possession [of his property] in the Galilee; Or if he was in the Galilee and another took possession [of his property] in Judea, such possession does not demonstrate ownership, until he is in the same region. Rabbi Judah said: “They have specified a period of three years so that if the owner was in Spain and another took possession [of his property] during one year, they could make it known to the owner during the next year and he could return in the third year.”