16891 occurrences across the corpus

The Mishnah

Mishnah Zevachim 1:4

A pesah and a hatat which were slaughtered not in their own name, or he received [the blood], and carried it [to the altar] and sprinkled [it] not in their own name, Or in their own name and not in their own name, or not in their own name and in their own name, they are disqualified. What is the case of ‘in their own name and not in their own name’? In the name of it being a pesah [first] and [then] in the name of it being a shelamim. ‘Not in their own name and in their own name:’ in the name of a shelamim [first] and [then] in the name of a pesah. For a sacrifice can be disqualified in [any one of] the four elements: slaughtering, receiving, carrying and sprinkling. Rabbi Shimon declares it valid if carried [with the wrong intent], for Rabbi Shimon said: it is impossible [to have a valid sacrifice] without slaughtering, without receiving and without sprinkling, but it is possible without carrying. [How so]? One slaughters it at the side of the altar and sprinkles. Rabbi Eliezer says: if one goes where he needs to go, an [illegitimate] intention disqualifies [it]; where he doesn’t need to go, an [illegitimate] intention does not disqualify [it].

Mishnah Zevachim 7:4

If one offered an olah of a bird below [the red line] with the rites of a hatat [and] in the name of a hatat: Rabbi Eliezer says: it involves trespass. But Rabbi Joshua says: it does not involve trespass. Rabbi Eliezer said: if a hatat which does not involve trespass when he offers it for its own name, nevertheless when he changes the name [for which it is offered] it does involve trespass, is it not logical that an olah which does involve trespass when he offers it for its own name, would involve trespass when he changes its name? Rabbi Joshua said to him: No, when you speak of a hatat whose name he changed to that of an olah, [it involves trespass] because he changed its name to something that involves trespass; will you say [the same] of an olah whose name he changed to that of a hatat, seeing that he changed its name to something which does not involve trespass? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Behold, most holy sacrifices which he slaughtered in the south and which he slaughtered in the name of lesser sacrifices will prove the matter, for he changed their name to something which does not involve trespass, and yet they involve trespass, so too, do not be surprised that in the case of the olah, although he changed its name to something that does not involve trespass, it still involves trespass. Rabbi Joshua said: No, when you speak of most holy sacrifices which are slaughtered in the south and in the name of lesser sacrifices, [they involve trespass] because he changed their name to something which is partly forbidden and partly permitted; will you say the same of an olah, where he changed its name to something that is altogether permitted?

Mishnah Zevachim 7:6

If one performed melikah, and he found it [the bird] to be a terefah: Rabbi Meir said: it does not defile in the gullet; Rabbi Judah said: it does defile in the gullet. Rabbi Meir said: if with regard to a beast, when it is carrion (a nevelah) it defiles through contact or carrying, yet slaughtering it purifies its terefah from defiling, when it comes to carrion (nevelah) of a bird which does not defile through contact or carriage, is it not logical that slaughtering would cleanse its terefah? Now, just as we have found that slaughtering, which makes it [a bird of hullin] fit for eating, cleanses its terefah from its uncleanness; so melikah (nipping), which makes it [a bird sacrifice] fit for eating, cleanses its terefah. Rabbi Yose says: it is sufficient for it to be like the nevelah of a beast, which is cleansed by slaughtering, but not by melikah (nipping).

Mishnah Zevachim 8:11

If [blood] which is to be sprinkled inside [the Sanctuary] was mixed with [blood] that is to be sprinkled outside, it must be poured out into the duct. If [the priest] sprinkled outside and then sprinkled inside, it is valid. [If he sprinkled] inside and then went back and sprinkled outside: Rabbi Akiva declares it unfit, But the sages declare it fit. For Rabbi Akiva says: all blood which entered the Sanctuary to make atonement is unfit; But the sages say: the hatat alone [is unfit]. R. Eliezer said: the asham too, for it says, “As is the hatat, so is the asham” (Leviticus 7:7).

Mishnah Zevachim 9:1

The altar sanctifies whatever is eligible for it. Rabbi Joshua says: whatever is eligible for the altar fire does not descend once it has ascended, as it is said, “The olah itself shall remain where it is burned upon the altar [all night until morning, while the fire of the altar is kept going on it]” (Leviticus 6:: just as the olah, which is eligible for the altar fire, does not descend once it has ascended, so whatever is eligible for the altar fire does not descend once it ascended. Rabban Gamaliel said: whatever is eligible for the altar does not descend once it ascended, as it is said: “The olah itself shall remain where it is burned upon the altar [all night until morning, while the fire of the altar is kept going on it]” (Leviticus 6:2): just as the olah, which is eligible for the altar, does not descend once it ascended, so whatever is eligible for the altar does not descend once it ascended. The only difference between Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua is in respect of the blood and libations, for Rabban Gamaliel says that they cannot descend, while Rabbi Joshua says that they can descend. Rabbi Shimon says: if the sacrifice is fit while the libations [which accompanied it] are unfit; or if the libations are fit while the sacrifice is unfit; or even if both are unfit, the sacrifice does not descend, while the libations do descend.

Mishnah Zevachim 9:1

The altar sanctifies whatever is eligible for it. Rabbi Joshua says: whatever is eligible for the altar fire does not descend once it has ascended, as it is said, “The olah itself shall remain where it is burned upon the altar [all night until morning, while the fire of the altar is kept going on it]” (Leviticus 6:: just as the olah, which is eligible for the altar fire, does not descend once it has ascended, so whatever is eligible for the altar fire does not descend once it ascended. Rabban Gamaliel said: whatever is eligible for the altar does not descend once it ascended, as it is said: “The olah itself shall remain where it is burned upon the altar [all night until morning, while the fire of the altar is kept going on it]” (Leviticus 6:2): just as the olah, which is eligible for the altar, does not descend once it ascended, so whatever is eligible for the altar does not descend once it ascended. The only difference between Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua is in respect of the blood and libations, for Rabban Gamaliel says that they cannot descend, while Rabbi Joshua says that they can descend. Rabbi Shimon says: if the sacrifice is fit while the libations [which accompanied it] are unfit; or if the libations are fit while the sacrifice is unfit; or even if both are unfit, the sacrifice does not descend, while the libations do descend.

Mishnah Zevachim 9:4

Just as they do not descend once they have ascended, so they do not ascend if they have descended. And all of these, if they ascended alive to the top of the altar, they must descend. An olah which ascended live to the top of the altar, it must descend. If one slaughtered it on the top of the altar, he must skin it and dismember it where it lies.

Mishnah Zevachim 9:7

Just as the altar sanctifies whatever is eligible for it, so does the ascent sanctify whatever is eligible for it; And just as the altar and the ascent sanctify whatever is eligible for them, so do vessels sanctify. Vessels for liquids sanctify liquids, And the measures sanctify dry material. A liquid vessel does not sanctify dry matter, nor does a dry [measure] sanctify a liquid. If holy vessels were perforated and they can be used for the same purpose as when whole, they sanctify [what is placed in them]; if not, they do not sanctify. And all these sanctify only in the holy place.

Mishnah Zevachim 9:7

Just as the altar sanctifies whatever is eligible for it, so does the ascent sanctify whatever is eligible for it; And just as the altar and the ascent sanctify whatever is eligible for them, so do vessels sanctify. Vessels for liquids sanctify liquids, And the measures sanctify dry material. A liquid vessel does not sanctify dry matter, nor does a dry [measure] sanctify a liquid. If holy vessels were perforated and they can be used for the same purpose as when whole, they sanctify [what is placed in them]; if not, they do not sanctify. And all these sanctify only in the holy place.

Mishnah Zevachim 10:6

Just as they take precedence in being offered, so they take precedence in being eaten. Yesterday’s shelamim and today’s shelamim, yesterday’s takes precedence. Yesterday’s shelamim and today’s hatat and asham, yesterday's shelamim takes precedence, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: the hatat takes precedence, because it is a most sacred sacrifice.

Mishnah Zevachim 10:7

And in all of these, the priests may deviate in how they eat, and eat them roasted, stewed or boiled. And one may season them with hullin spices or terumah spices, the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Meir says: one should not season them with terumah spices, so as not to bring terumah to unfitness.

Mishnah Zevachim 13:8

As for a hatat whose blood was received in one goblet: If one [first] sprinkled [the blood] outside and then sprinkled [it] inside; [Or] inside and then outside, he is liable, because the whole of it was eligible inside. If the blood was received in two goblets: If he sprinkled both inside, he is exempt; Both outside, he is liable. One inside and one outside, he is exempt; One outside and one inside, he is liable on account of the one outside, while the one inside makes atonement. To what may this be compared? To one who set aside [an animal for] a hatat, then it was lost, and he set aside another in its place; then the first was found, and [so] both are present. If he slaughtered both of them inside, he is exempt; Both of them outside, he is liable. [If he slaughtered] one inside and one outside, he is exempt; One outside and one inside, he is liable on account of the one outside, while the one inside makes atonement. Just as the blood exempts its own flesh, so does it exempt the flesh of its companion [the other animal].

Mishnah Zevachim 13:8

As for a hatat whose blood was received in one goblet: If one [first] sprinkled [the blood] outside and then sprinkled [it] inside; [Or] inside and then outside, he is liable, because the whole of it was eligible inside. If the blood was received in two goblets: If he sprinkled both inside, he is exempt; Both outside, he is liable. One inside and one outside, he is exempt; One outside and one inside, he is liable on account of the one outside, while the one inside makes atonement. To what may this be compared? To one who set aside [an animal for] a hatat, then it was lost, and he set aside another in its place; then the first was found, and [so] both are present. If he slaughtered both of them inside, he is exempt; Both of them outside, he is liable. [If he slaughtered] one inside and one outside, he is exempt; One outside and one inside, he is liable on account of the one outside, while the one inside makes atonement. Just as the blood exempts its own flesh, so does it exempt the flesh of its companion [the other animal].

Mishnah Menachot 2:3

The todah can render the bread piggul but the bread does not render the todah piggul. How so? If he slaughtered the todah intending to eat part of it on the next day, both it and the bread are piggul; if he intended to eat part of the bread the next day, the bread is piggul but the todah is not piggul. The lambs can render the bread piggul but the bread cannot render the lambs piggul. How so? If he slaughtered the lambs intending to eat part of them the next day, both they and the bread are piggul; if he intended to eat part of the bread the next day, the bread is piggul but the lambs are not.

Mishnah Menachot 2:3

The todah can render the bread piggul but the bread does not render the todah piggul. How so? If he slaughtered the todah intending to eat part of it on the next day, both it and the bread are piggul; if he intended to eat part of the bread the next day, the bread is piggul but the todah is not piggul. The lambs can render the bread piggul but the bread cannot render the lambs piggul. How so? If he slaughtered the lambs intending to eat part of them the next day, both they and the bread are piggul; if he intended to eat part of the bread the next day, the bread is piggul but the lambs are not.

Mishnah Menachot 4:3

The [absence of the] bull, or the rams, or the lambs or the goat does not invalidate the bread, neither does the [absence of the] bread invalidate them. The [absence of the] bread invalidates the lambs, but the [absence of the] lambs does not invalidate the bread, the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Shimon b. Nanas said: it is not so, but rather the [absence of the] lambs invalidates the bread, while the [absence of the] bread does not invalidate the lambs; for so we find that when the Israelites were in the wilderness for forty years they offered the lambs without the bread, therefore now too they may offer the lambs without the bread. Rabbi Shimon said: the halakhah is according to the words of Ben Nanas but not for the reason he stated; for every offering stated in the Book of Numbers was offered in the wilderness, but not every offering stated in the book of Leviticus was offered in the wilderness; however, when they came into the land of Israel they offered both kinds. Why then do I say that the lambs may be offered without the bread? Because the lambs render themselves permissible without the bread, whereas bread without lambs, there is nothing that renders it permissible.

Mishnah Menachot 4:3

The [absence of the] bull, or the rams, or the lambs or the goat does not invalidate the bread, neither does the [absence of the] bread invalidate them. The [absence of the] bread invalidates the lambs, but the [absence of the] lambs does not invalidate the bread, the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Shimon b. Nanas said: it is not so, but rather the [absence of the] lambs invalidates the bread, while the [absence of the] bread does not invalidate the lambs; for so we find that when the Israelites were in the wilderness for forty years they offered the lambs without the bread, therefore now too they may offer the lambs without the bread. Rabbi Shimon said: the halakhah is according to the words of Ben Nanas but not for the reason he stated; for every offering stated in the Book of Numbers was offered in the wilderness, but not every offering stated in the book of Leviticus was offered in the wilderness; however, when they came into the land of Israel they offered both kinds. Why then do I say that the lambs may be offered without the bread? Because the lambs render themselves permissible without the bread, whereas bread without lambs, there is nothing that renders it permissible.

Mishnah Menachot 4:4

The [absence of the] daily offerings (tamidin) does not invalidate the additional offerings (musafin), neither does [the absence of] the additional offerings invalidate the daily offerings, neither does the absence of [one of the] additional offerings invalidate the other additional offerings. Even though they did not offer the [tamid] lamb in the morning they must offer [the lamb] towards evening. Rabbi Shimon said: When is this so? Only when they had acted under constraint or in error, but if they acted deliberately and did not offer the lamb in the morning they may not offer [the lamb] towards evening. If they did not burn the incense in the morning they burn it towards evening. Rabbi Shimon said: all of it was burned towards evening. For the golden altar was dedicated only by the incense of spices. And the altar for the olah by the daily offering of the morning, And the table only by the showbread on Shabbat, And the menorah only by [the kindling of] seven lamps towards evening.

Mishnah Menachot 5:1

All minhahs must be offered unleavened, with the exception of the leavened cakes of the todah and the two loaves [of Shavuot] which are offered leavened. Rabbi Meir says: the leaven must be taken from [the minhahs] themselves and with this they are leavened. Rabbi Judah says: that is not the best way, rather [first of all] he brings leaven and puts into the measuring vessel and then he fills the measuring vessel up [with flour]. But they said to him: even so [it is not satisfactory], for it would be sometimes too little and sometimes too much.

Mishnah Menachot 6:1

From the following menahot the handful must be taken and the remainder is for the priests: The minhah of fine flour, that prepared on a griddle, that prepared in a pan, the loaves and the wafers, the minhah of a Gentile, the minhah of women, the minhah of the omer, the sinners’ minhah, and the minhah of jealousy. Rabbi Shimon says: a sinners’ minhah brought by priests the handful is taken, and the handful is offered by itself and so also the remainder is offered by itself.

Mishnah Menachot 7:3

One who slaughtered the todah within [the Temple court] while its bread was outside the wall, the bread has not been sanctified. If he slaughtered it before [the loaves] had become crusted in the oven, even if all except one had become crusted, the bread is not sanctified. If he slaughtered the todah [intending to eat it] outside its proper time or outside its proper place, the bread is sanctified. If he slaughtered it and it was found to be terefah, the bread is not sanctified. If he slaughtered it and it was found to have a blemish: Rabbi Eliezer says: the bread is sanctified. But the sages say: it is not sanctified. If he slaughtered it under another name, and so, too, if the ram of the consecration-offering or the two lambs offered at Shavuot were slaughtered under another name, the bread is not sanctified.

Mishnah Menachot 7:6

From where [is it derived] that if one says, “I take upon myself to bring a todah,” he can bring it only from hullin? As it is said, “And you shall sacrifice the pesah to the Lord your God, from the flock or the herd” (Deuteronomy 16:. But is not the pesah sacrifice brought only from the lambs and from the goats? Why then is it written, “from the flock or the herd”? It is to compare whatever is brought from the flock and the herd with the pesah: just as the pesah is obligatory and offered only from what is hullin, so everything that is obligatory may be offered only from what is hullin. Therefore if a man says, “I take upon myself to bring a todah,” or “I take upon myself [to offer] a shelamim,” since [in these cases] these are obligatory they may be offered only from what is hullin. The libations in every case may be offered only from what is hullin.

Mishnah Menachot 8:7

They did not put [the wine] in large casks but in small barrels. And one did not fill the barrels to the brim so that its scent might spread. One may not take the wine at the mouth of the barrel because of the scum, nor that at the bottom because of the lees; but one should take it only from the third or the middle of the barrel. How was it tested? The temple-treasurer used to sit nearby with his stick in his hand; when the froth burst forth he would knock with his stick. Rabbi Yose bar Judah says: wine on which there is a scum is invalid, for it is written, “They shall be for you without blemish, and their minhah,” and “They shall be for you without blemish, and their libations” (Numbers 28:19-20,.

Mishnah Menachot 9:9

Laying on of hands is [in certain respects] more stringent than waving and waving is [in other respects] more stringent than laying on of hands. For one may perform the waving on behalf of all the others, but one may not perform the laying on of hands on behalf of all the others. Waving is more stringent, for waving takes place for offerings of the individual and for offerings of the community, for living animals and for slaughtered animals, and for things that have life and for things that do not have life; but it is not so with laying on of the hands.

Mishnah Menachot 10:3

How would they do it [reap the omer]? The agents of the court used to go out on the day before the festival and tie the unreaped grain in bunches to make it the easier to reap. All the inhabitants of the towns near by assembled there, so that it might be reaped with a great demonstration. As soon as it became dark he says to them: “Has the sun set?” And they answer, “Yes.” “Has the sun set?” And they answer, “Yes.” “With this sickle?” And they answer, “Yes.” “With this sickle?” And they answer, “Yes.” “Into this basket?” And they answer, “Yes.” “Into this basket?” And they answer, “Yes.” On the Sabbath he says to them, “On this Sabbath?” And they answer, “Yes.” “On this Sabbath?” And they answer, “Yes.” “Shall I reap?” And they answer, “Reap.” “Shall I reap?” And they answer, “Reap.” He repeated every matter three times, and they answer, “yes, yes, yes.” And why all of this? Because of the Boethusians who held that the reaping of the omer was not to take place at the conclusion of the [first day of the] festival.

Mishnah Menachot 10:4

They reaped it, put it into the baskets, and brought it to the Temple courtyard; Then they would parch it with fire in order to fulfill the mitzvah that it should be parched [with fire], the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: they beat it with reeds or stems of plants that the grains should not be crushed, and then they put it into a pipe that was perforated so that the fire might take hold of all of it. They spread it out in the Temple courtyard so that the wind might blow over it. Then they put it into a gristmill and took out of it a tenth [of an ephah of flour] which was sifted through thirteen sieves. What was left over was redeemed and might be eaten by any one; It was liable for hallah but exempt from tithes. Rabbi Akiba made it liable both to hallah and to tithes. He then came to the tenth, put in its oil and its frankincense, poured in the oil, mixed it, waved it, brought it near [to the altar], took from it the handful and burnt it; and the remainder was eaten by the priests.

Mishnah Menachot 10:4

They reaped it, put it into the baskets, and brought it to the Temple courtyard; Then they would parch it with fire in order to fulfill the mitzvah that it should be parched [with fire], the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: they beat it with reeds or stems of plants that the grains should not be crushed, and then they put it into a pipe that was perforated so that the fire might take hold of all of it. They spread it out in the Temple courtyard so that the wind might blow over it. Then they put it into a gristmill and took out of it a tenth [of an ephah of flour] which was sifted through thirteen sieves. What was left over was redeemed and might be eaten by any one; It was liable for hallah but exempt from tithes. Rabbi Akiba made it liable both to hallah and to tithes. He then came to the tenth, put in its oil and its frankincense, poured in the oil, mixed it, waved it, brought it near [to the altar], took from it the handful and burnt it; and the remainder was eaten by the priests.

Mishnah Menachot 10:5

After the omer was offered they used to go out and find the market of Jerusalem already full of flour and parched grain [of the new produce]; This was without the approval of the rabbis, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: it was with the approval of the rabbis. After the omer was offered the new grain was permitted immediately, but for those that lived far off it was permitted only after midday. After the Temple was destroyed Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai decreed that it should be forbidden throughout the day of the waving. Rabbi Judah said: is it not so forbidden by the law of the Torah, for it is said, “Until this very day?” Why was it permitted for those that lived far away from midday? Because they know that the court would not be negligent with it.

Mishnah Menachot 10:6

The omer permits [the new grain] throughout the land, and the two loaves permit it in the Temple. One may not offer minhahs, first-fruits, or minhahs that accompany animal offerings, before the omer. And if one did so, it is invalid. Nor may one offer these before the two loaves. But if one did so it was valid.

Mishnah Menachot 10:6

The omer permits [the new grain] throughout the land, and the two loaves permit it in the Temple. One may not offer minhahs, first-fruits, or minhahs that accompany animal offerings, before the omer. And if one did so, it is invalid. Nor may one offer these before the two loaves. But if one did so it was valid.

Mishnah Menachot 10:8

[Before the omer] one may reap [grain] in irrigated fields in the valley, but one may not stack it. The people of Jericho used to reap [before the omer] with the approval of the sages, and used to stack it without the approval of the sages, but the sages did not protest. One may reap the unripe grain for cattle feed. Rabbi Judah said: When is this so? If one had begun to reap it before it had reached a third of its growth. Rabbi Shimon says: one may reap it and feed [his cattle with it] even after it has reached a third of its growth.

Mishnah Menachot 11:4

All menahot require a vessel [for works that are performed] within, but do not require a vessel [for those works that are performed] outside. How so? The two loaves were seven handbreadths long and four wide and their horns were four fingerbreadths. The [cakes of the] showbread were ten handbreadths long and five wide and their horns were seven fingerbreadths. Rabbi Judah says: lest you err [remember but the words] “zadad yahaz.” Ben Zoma says: “And you shall set upon the table showbread (lehem panim) before me continually:” panim signifies that it should have faces.

Mishnah Menachot 11:5

The table was ten handbreadths long and five wide; the showbread was ten handbreadths long and five wide. Each cake was placed lengthwise across the breadth of the table, and two and a half handbreadths were turned up at either side so that its length filled the entire breadth of the table, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir says: the table was twelve handbreadths long and six wide; the showbread was ten handbreadths long and five wide. Each cake was placed lengthwise across the breadth of the table, and two handbreadths were turned up at either side; and there was a space of two handbreadths between [the two sets] so that the wind could blow between them. Abba Shaul says: there they used to put the two dishes of frankincense for the showbread. They said to him: Has it not already been said, “And you shall put pure frankincense upon [al] each row” (Leviticus 24:7)? He replied, But has it not also been said, “And next unto [al] him shall be the tribe of Manasseh” (Numbers 2:20)?

Mishnah Menachot 11:5

The table was ten handbreadths long and five wide; the showbread was ten handbreadths long and five wide. Each cake was placed lengthwise across the breadth of the table, and two and a half handbreadths were turned up at either side so that its length filled the entire breadth of the table, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir says: the table was twelve handbreadths long and six wide; the showbread was ten handbreadths long and five wide. Each cake was placed lengthwise across the breadth of the table, and two handbreadths were turned up at either side; and there was a space of two handbreadths between [the two sets] so that the wind could blow between them. Abba Shaul says: there they used to put the two dishes of frankincense for the showbread. They said to him: Has it not already been said, “And you shall put pure frankincense upon [al] each row” (Leviticus 24:7)? He replied, But has it not also been said, “And next unto [al] him shall be the tribe of Manasseh” (Numbers 2:20)?

Mishnah Menachot 11:9

The two loaves were eaten never earlier than on the second day and never later than on the third day. How so? [Normally] they were baked on the day before the festival and eaten on the festival, that is, on the second day. If the festival fell on the day after Shabbat, they would be eaten on the third day. The showbread was eaten never earlier than on the ninth day and never later than on the eleventh day. How so? [Normally] it was baked on the day before Shabbat and eaten on Shabbat [of the following week], that is on the ninth day. If a festival fell on the day before Shabbat, it would be eaten on the tenth day. If the two days of Rosh Hashanah [fell before Shabbat], it would then be eaten on the eleventh day. [Baking] overrides neither Shabbat nor the festival. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon, son of the deputy [high priest]: it overrides the festival but not the fast day (Yom Kippur).

Mishnah Menachot 11:9

The two loaves were eaten never earlier than on the second day and never later than on the third day. How so? [Normally] they were baked on the day before the festival and eaten on the festival, that is, on the second day. If the festival fell on the day after Shabbat, they would be eaten on the third day. The showbread was eaten never earlier than on the ninth day and never later than on the eleventh day. How so? [Normally] it was baked on the day before Shabbat and eaten on Shabbat [of the following week], that is on the ninth day. If a festival fell on the day before Shabbat, it would be eaten on the tenth day. If the two days of Rosh Hashanah [fell before Shabbat], it would then be eaten on the eleventh day. [Baking] overrides neither Shabbat nor the festival. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon, son of the deputy [high priest]: it overrides the festival but not the fast day (Yom Kippur).

Mishnah Menachot 12:4

A man may offer a minhah consisting of sixty tenths and bring them in one vessel. If one said, “I take upon myself to offer sixty-one tenths,” he must bring sixty in one vessel and the one in another vessel, since the congregation brings on the first day of the festival [of Sukkot] when it falls on Shabbat sixty-one tenths [as a minhah], it is enough for an individual that [his minhah] should be one tenth less than that of the congregation. Rabbi Shimon said: but some of these [sixty-one tenths] are for the bullocks and some for the lambs, and they may not be mixed one with the other! Rather sixty tenths mingles [in one vessel]. They said to him: can sixty be mingled [in one vessel] and not sixty-one? He answered, so it is with all the measures prescribed by the sages: a man may immerse himself in forty seahs of water, but he may not immerse himself in forty seahs less one kortob. One may not offer one [log], two, or five [logs], but one may offer three, four, six, or anything above six.

Mishnah Menachot 12:5

One may offer wine but not oil, the words of Rabbi Akiva. But Rabbi Tarfon says: one may also offer oil. Rabbi Tarfon said: just as we find that wine is offered as an obligation may be offered as a freewill-offering, so oil which is offered as an obligation may be offered as a freewill-offering. Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you say so of wine it is because it is offered by itself even when offered as an obligation, can you say the same of oil which is not offered by itself when offered as an obligation? Two [men] may not jointly offer one tenth [of flour for a minhah]; but they may jointly offer an olah or a shelamim, and bird sacrifices even a single bird.

Mishnah Menachot 12:5

One may offer wine but not oil, the words of Rabbi Akiva. But Rabbi Tarfon says: one may also offer oil. Rabbi Tarfon said: just as we find that wine is offered as an obligation may be offered as a freewill-offering, so oil which is offered as an obligation may be offered as a freewill-offering. Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, if you say so of wine it is because it is offered by itself even when offered as an obligation, can you say the same of oil which is not offered by itself when offered as an obligation? Two [men] may not jointly offer one tenth [of flour for a minhah]; but they may jointly offer an olah or a shelamim, and bird sacrifices even a single bird.

Mishnah Menachot 13:4

“I take upon myself to offer gold,” he must bring not less than a golden denar. “Silver,” he must bring not less than a silver denar. “Copper,” he must bring not less than [the value of] a silver maah. [If he said] “I specified [how much I would bring] but I do not know what I specified,” he must bring until he says, “I certainly did not intend to give so much!”

Mishnah Menachot 13:9

[If one said,] “This ox shall be an olah,” and it becomes blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring two with its price. [If he said,] “These two oxen are for an olah,” and they become blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring one ox with their price. But Rabbi forbids it. [If he said,] “This ram shall be an olah,” and it becomes blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring a lamb with its price. [If he said,] “This lamb shall be an olah,” and it becomes blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring a ram with its price thereof. But Rabbi forbids it. One who says, “One of my lambs shall be holy,” or “one of my oxen shall be holy,” and he had only two, the larger one is holy. If he had three, the middle one is holy. [If he said,] “I specified one but I do not know which it was I specified,” or [if he said,] “My father told me [that he had specified one] but I do not know which it is,” the largest one among them must be holy.

Mishnah Menachot 13:9

[If one said,] “This ox shall be an olah,” and it becomes blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring two with its price. [If he said,] “These two oxen are for an olah,” and they become blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring one ox with their price. But Rabbi forbids it. [If he said,] “This ram shall be an olah,” and it becomes blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring a lamb with its price. [If he said,] “This lamb shall be an olah,” and it becomes blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring a ram with its price thereof. But Rabbi forbids it. One who says, “One of my lambs shall be holy,” or “one of my oxen shall be holy,” and he had only two, the larger one is holy. If he had three, the middle one is holy. [If he said,] “I specified one but I do not know which it was I specified,” or [if he said,] “My father told me [that he had specified one] but I do not know which it is,” the largest one among them must be holy.

Mishnah Menachot 13:9

[If one said,] “This ox shall be an olah,” and it becomes blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring two with its price. [If he said,] “These two oxen are for an olah,” and they become blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring one ox with their price. But Rabbi forbids it. [If he said,] “This ram shall be an olah,” and it becomes blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring a lamb with its price. [If he said,] “This lamb shall be an olah,” and it becomes blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring a ram with its price thereof. But Rabbi forbids it. One who says, “One of my lambs shall be holy,” or “one of my oxen shall be holy,” and he had only two, the larger one is holy. If he had three, the middle one is holy. [If he said,] “I specified one but I do not know which it was I specified,” or [if he said,] “My father told me [that he had specified one] but I do not know which it is,” the largest one among them must be holy.

Mishnah Menachot 13:9

[If one said,] “This ox shall be an olah,” and it becomes blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring two with its price. [If he said,] “These two oxen are for an olah,” and they become blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring one ox with their price. But Rabbi forbids it. [If he said,] “This ram shall be an olah,” and it becomes blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring a lamb with its price. [If he said,] “This lamb shall be an olah,” and it becomes blemished, he may, if he so desires, bring a ram with its price thereof. But Rabbi forbids it. One who says, “One of my lambs shall be holy,” or “one of my oxen shall be holy,” and he had only two, the larger one is holy. If he had three, the middle one is holy. [If he said,] “I specified one but I do not know which it was I specified,” or [if he said,] “My father told me [that he had specified one] but I do not know which it is,” the largest one among them must be holy.

Mishnah Menachot 13:10

[If one said,] “I take upon myself to offer an olah,” he must offer it in the Temple. And if he offered it in the Temple of Onias, he has not fulfilled his obligation. [If one said,] “I take upon myself to offer an olah but I will offer it in the Temple of Onias,” he must offer it in the Temple, yet if he offered it in the Temple of Onias he has fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Shimon says: this is not an olah. [If one said,] “I will be a nazirite,” he must bring his offerings and shave his hair in the Temple. And if he brought them and shaved his hair in the Temple of Onias he has not fulfilled his obligation. [If he said,] “I will be a nazirite but I will bring my offerings and shave my hair in the Temple of Onias,” he must bring them in the Temple, yet if he brought them and shaved his hair in the Temple of Onias he has fulfilled his obligation. Rabbi Shimon says: such a one is not a nazirite. The priests who served in the Temple of Onias may not serve in the Temple in Jerusalem; and needless to say [this is so of priests who served] something else; for it is said, “The priests of the shrines, however, did not ascend the altar of the Lord in Jerusalem. But they did eat unleavened bread along with their kinsmen” (II Kings 23:9). Thus they are like those that had a blemish: they are entitled to share and eat [of the holy things] but they are not permitted to offer sacrifices.

Mishnah Menachot 13:11

It is said of the olah of cattle, “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor” (Leviticus 1:9); and of the olah of birds, “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor (vs. 17); and of the minhah, “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor” (Leviticus 2:2): to teach you that it is the same whether one offers much or little, so long as one directs one’s heart to heaven.

Mishnah Chullin 2:3

If he chopped off the head with one stroke, the slaughtering is invalid. He was slaughtering and he cut through the neck with one stroke, if the knife was as long as the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If he was slaughtering and he cut off two heads at the same time, if the knife is as long as the neck it is valid. When is this so? When the slaughterer moved the knife forward and not backward, or backward and not forward; but if he moved the knife to and fro, however small it was, even if it was a scalpel, the slaughtering is valid. If a knife fell down and slaughtered [an animal], even though it slaughtered it in the proper way, the slaughtering is invalid, for it is said, "And you shall slaughter and eat," that which you slaughter, you may eat. If [while slaughtering] the knife fell and he picked it up, if his clothes fell and he picked them up, if he sharpened the knife, or if he got tired and his friend came and [continued] slaughtering, if he delayed the time that it takes to slaughter, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon says: if he delayed the time it takes to examine the slaughtering.

Mishnah Chullin 2:9

One may not slaughter [so that the blood runs] into the sea or into rivers, or into vessels, But one may slaughter into a pool (or vessel) of water. And when on board a ship on to vessels. One may not slaughter at all into a hole, but one may dig a hole in his own house for the blood to run into. In the street, however, he should not do so as not to follow the ways of the heretics.

Mishnah Chullin 2:9

One may not slaughter [so that the blood runs] into the sea or into rivers, or into vessels, But one may slaughter into a pool (or vessel) of water. And when on board a ship on to vessels. One may not slaughter at all into a hole, but one may dig a hole in his own house for the blood to run into. In the street, however, he should not do so as not to follow the ways of the heretics.

Mishnah Chullin 4:4

If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.

Mishnah Chullin 4:4

If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.

Mishnah Chullin 4:6

If the hind legs of an animal were cut off below the joint, it is permitted; If above the joint, it is terefah. So too if the juncture of the tendons was gone, [it is terefah]. If the bone was broken but the greater part of the flesh [around the fracture] remained, it is rendered clean by the slaughtering; otherwise it is not rendered clean by the slaughtering.

Mishnah Chullin 5:1

[The law of] “It and its young” applies both within the land of Israel and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of both unconsecrated and consecrated animals. How so? If a person slaughtered an animal and its young, both animals being unconsecrated, [and they slaughtered them] outside [the sanctuary], they are both valid, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes. If both animals were consecrated [and they were slaughtered] outside [the sanctuary], [he who slaughtered] the first incurs the penalty of karet, both animals are invalid, and each incurs forty lashes. If both animals were unconsecrated [and they were slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], both animals are invalid, and [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes. If both animals were consecrated [and they were slaughtered] inside [the sanctuary], the first is valid and [he who slaughtered it is] not culpable, but [he who slaughtered] the second incurs forty lashes, and it is invalid.

Mishnah Chullin 5:3

If a person slaughtered [an animal] and it was found to be terefah, or if he slaughtered [it as an offering] to idols, or if he slaughtered the red cow, or an ox which was condemned to be stoned, or a heifer whose neck was to be broken: Rabbi Shimon exempts [him from having transgressed the law of “it and its young”]; but the sages make him liable. If a person slaughtered [an animal] and it became nevelah under his hand, or if he stabbed it, or tore away [the organs of the throat], he does not thereby transgress the law of it and its young. If two people bought a cow and its young, he who bought first can slaughter first; but if the second preceded him, he holds his advantage. If a person slaughtered a cow and then two of its calves, he is liable for eighty lashes. If he slaughtered its two calves and then the cow, he is liable for forty lashes. If he slaughtered it and then its calf and then the calf's offspring, he is liable for eighty lashes. If he slaughtered it and then its calf's offspring and then the calf, he is liable for forty lashes. Symmachos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: he is liable for eighty lashes. At four periods in the year he who sells a beast to another must inform him, “I sold today its mother to be slaughtered,” or “I sold today its young to be slaughtered,” and these are they: on the eve of the last day of the feast [of Sukkot], on the eve of the first day of Pesah, on the eve of Shavuot, and on the eve of Rosh Hashanah. According to Rabbi Yose the Galilean, also on the eve of Yom Kippur, in the Galilee. Rabbi Judah says, this is so, only when there was no time in between the sales, but if there was time, he need not inform him. Rabbi Judah agrees that if he sold the mother to the bridegroom and the young to the bride, he must inform them of it, for it is certain that they will each slaughter on the same day.

Mishnah Chullin 5:4

At these four periods a butcher can be compelled to slaughter against his will. Even if the ox was worth a thousand dinars and the purchaser has only [paid] a dinar, they can force the butcher to slaughter it. Therefore if the animal died, the loss is upon the purchaser. At other times of the year it is not so, therefore if the animal died, the loss is upon the seller.

Mishnah Chullin 5:5

The “one day” mentioned in connection with the law of “it and its young” means the day and the night preceding it. This was how Rabbi Shimon ben Zoma expounded (darash): it says “one day” (Genesis 1:5) in connection with the creation and it also says “one day” (Leviticus 22:28) in connection with “it and its young” Just as the “one day” mentioned in connection with the creation means the day and the night preceding it, so too the “one day” mentioned in connection with “it and its young” means the day and the night preceding it.

Mishnah Chullin 7:2

One may send to a non-Jew a thigh in which the sciatic nerve has not been removed, because its place is known. When a person removes the sciatic nerve he must remove all of it. Rabbi Judah says: only so much as is necessary to fulfill the mitzvah of removing it.

Mishnah Chullin 7:5

A sciatic nerve which was cooked with other [permitted] nerves: If it can still be recognized, [then all the nerves are prohibited] if [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor. But if it can no longer [be recognized] then they are all forbidden. And the broth [is prohibited] if it [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor. And so it is with a piece of nevelah, or a piece of an unclean fish that was cooked together with other pieces of flesh [or fish]: If it can still be recognized, [then all are prohibited] if it imparts a flavor. But if it can no longer [be recognized] then they are all forbidden. And the broth [is prohibited] if it [the sciatic nerve] imparts a flavor.

Mishnah Chullin 12:3

If the mother was hovering [over the nest]: If her wings touch the nest, one is obligated to let her go; if her wings do not touch the nest, one is not obligated to let her go. If there was but one young bird or one egg [in the nest], one is still obligated to let the mother go, for it is written: “A nest,” [implying], any nest whatsoever. If there were there young birds able to fly or spoiled eggs, one is not obligated to let [the mother] go, for it is written, “And the mother sitting up on the young or upon the eggs:” Just as the young are living beings so the eggs must be such as [would produce] living beings; this excludes spoiled eggs. And just as the eggs need the care of the mother so the young must be such as need the care of the mother; this excludes those that are able to fly. If one let [the mother] go and she returned, even four of five times, he is still obligated [to let her go again], for it is written, “You shall surely let the mother go.” If one said, “I will take the mother and let the young go,” he is still obligated [to let her go], for it is written, “You shall surely let the mother go.” If one took the young and brought them back again to the nest, and afterwards the mother returned to them, he is not obligated to let her go.

Mishnah Chullin 12:3

If the mother was hovering [over the nest]: If her wings touch the nest, one is obligated to let her go; if her wings do not touch the nest, one is not obligated to let her go. If there was but one young bird or one egg [in the nest], one is still obligated to let the mother go, for it is written: “A nest,” [implying], any nest whatsoever. If there were there young birds able to fly or spoiled eggs, one is not obligated to let [the mother] go, for it is written, “And the mother sitting up on the young or upon the eggs:” Just as the young are living beings so the eggs must be such as [would produce] living beings; this excludes spoiled eggs. And just as the eggs need the care of the mother so the young must be such as need the care of the mother; this excludes those that are able to fly. If one let [the mother] go and she returned, even four of five times, he is still obligated [to let her go again], for it is written, “You shall surely let the mother go.” If one said, “I will take the mother and let the young go,” he is still obligated [to let her go], for it is written, “You shall surely let the mother go.” If one took the young and brought them back again to the nest, and afterwards the mother returned to them, he is not obligated to let her go.

Mishnah Chullin 12:5

One may not take the mother with the young even for the sake of purifying the metzora. If in respect of so light a commandment, which deals with that which is but worth an issar, the Torah said, “In order that you may fare well and have a long life”, how much more [must be the reward] for the observance of the more difficult commandments in the Torah!

Mishnah Bekhorot 1:1

[An Israelite] who buys a fetus of a donkey belonging to a non-Jew or who sells one to him, although this is not permitted, or who forms a partnership with him, or who receives [an animal] from him to look after or who gives [his donkey] to him to look after, is exempt from the [law of the] bekhor, for it says: [“I sanctified to me all the firstborn] in Israel,” (Numbers 3:13) but not in non-Jews. Priests and levites are exempt through [an argument made by a] kal vehomer: if they exempted the first-born belonging to the Israelites in the wilderness, it follows all the more so that they should exempt their own.

Mishnah Bekhorot 1:7

If he does not wish to redeem it, he breaks its neck from behind with a large knife and buries it. The mitzvah of redemption takes priority over the miztzah of breaking its neck, for it says: “And if you don’t redeem it, you must break its neck” (Exodus 13:13). The mitzvah of designation takes priority over the mitzvah of redemption, for it says: “Who has betrothed her to himself, he must let her be redeemed” (Exodus 21:8). The mitzvah of yibbum is prior to the mitzvah of halitzah. [This was so] at first when they intended to carry out the mitzvah. But now that they do not intend to carry out the mitzvah, the [rabbis] have said: the mitzvah of halitzah takes priority over the mitzvah of yibbum. The mitzvah of redemption [of an unclean animal whose value has been dedicated to the Temple] is upon the owner. He takes priority over any other man, for it says: “If it is not redeemed, then it shall be sold according to your evaluation” (Leviticus 27:27).

Mishnah Bekhorot 4:1

For how long is an Israelite bound to take care of a first born? In the case of small cattle, for thirty days, and large cattle, fifty days. Rabbi Yose says: in the case of small cattle, three months. If the priest says [to the Israelite] during this period “Give it to me,” he must not give it to him. But if the first born was blemished and the priest said to him “Give it to me so that I may eat it,” then it is allowed. And in Temple times, if [the first born] was in an unblemished state and the priest said to him “Give it to me, and I will offer it up it was allowed.” A first born is eaten year by year both in an unblemished as well as in a blemished state, for it is said: “You shall eat it before the Lord your God year by year” (Deuteronomy 15:20).

Mishnah Bekhorot 6:10

Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus says: if [a first born] has a wart in its eye or if a bone of its fore-leg or hind-leg is defective, or if the bone of the mouth split, or one eye is large and the other small, or one ear is large and the other small, being visibly so and not merely in measurement [all of these are blemishes]. Rabbi Judah says: if one testicle is as large as two of the other [this is a blemish]. But the sages didn’t agree with him.

Mishnah Bekhorot 8:8

We must not redeem [a first-born] with slaves, nor with notes of indebtedness, nor with immovable properties, nor with objects of hekdesh. If one gives a written acknowledgment to a priest that he owes him five selas he is bound to give them to him, although his son is not considered as redeemed. Therefore, if the priest wishes to give him [the note of indebtedness] as a gift he is permitted to do so. If one set aside the redemption money of his son and it became lost, he is responsible for it, because it says: “Shall be for you [but] you shall surely redeem” (Numbers 18:15).

Mishnah Bekhorot 9:2

Animals are combined for purposes of tithing so long as they can still pasture within the distance that cattle wander. And what is the distance over which they wander while pasturing? Sixteen mils. If there was between two groups of animals a distance of thirty-two mils, they do not combine for the purpose of tithing. If however there was one in the middle [of the distance of thirty-two mils] he brings them into the middle and tithes them. Rabbi Meir says: the [river] Jordan is regarded as forming a division as regards the tithing of animals.

Mishnah Bekhorot 9:6

All those born from the first of Tishrei until the twenty-ninth of Elul combine [for matters of tithing]. Five lambs born before Rosh Hashanah and five born after Rosh Hashanah do not combine. But five lambs born before the period [of tithing] and five after the period [of tithing] do combine [for tithing]. If so, why did they speak of three periods for the tithe of cattle? Until the arrival of the [tithing] period it is permitted to sell and slaughter [the animals], but when the period has arrived he must not kill, but if he killed, he is exempt.

Mishnah Bekhorot 9:7

How does one tithe animals? He brings them to a shed and makes for them a small opening so that two cannot go out at the same time. And he counts them with a rod: one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine. And the one that comes out tenth he marks with red chalk and he says: “Behold, this is [the tithe].” If he did not mark it, or if he did not count them with a rod, or if he counted them while they were crouching or standing, they are still considered tithed. If he had one hundred [lambs] and he took ten or if he had ten and he took one [without counting], this is not [a valid] tithe. Rabbi Yose bar Judah says: this is a [valid] tithe. If one [of the lambs] already counted jumped back into the flock [in the shed] they are all exempt. If one of the lambs that was a tithe jumped back into the flock [in the shed], they all go to pasture until they become unfit for sacrifice, and the owners may eat them in their unfit state.

Mishnah Arakhin 2:1

There is no evaluation less than one sela, nor more than fifty selas. How so? If one paid a sela and became rich, he need not give any [more]. But if he gave less than a sela and became rich, he must pay fifty selas. If he had five selas in his possession: Rabbi Meir says: he need not give more than one; The sages say he must give them all. There is no evaluation less than one sela, nor more than fifty selas. If a woman makes a mistake in her reckoning there is no re-opening for her [of the niddah count] earlier than seven, nor later than after seventeen days. No signs of leprosy are shut up for less than one week and none more than three weeks.

Mishnah Arakhin 2:6

There were never less than twelve levites standing on the platform and their number could be increased into infinity. No minor could enter the court of the sanctuary to take part in the service except when the Levites stood up to sing. Nor did they join in the singing with harp and lyre, but with the mouth alone, to add flavor to the music. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said: they did not count in the required number, nor did they stand on the platform. Rather they would stand on the ground, so that their heads were between the feet of the levites. And they were called the youth of the Levites.

Mishnah Arakhin 3:1

The law of evaluation is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict. The law of the field of possession is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict. The law concerning a warned ox that has killed a slave is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict. The law of the rapist and the seducer and the defamer is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict. The law of evaluation is sometimes lenient, and at others times strict. How so? Whether one has evaluated the fairest in Israel, or the ugliest in Israel, he must pay fifty selas. But if he said: “Behold, his monetary worth is upon me,” he pays only as much as he is worth.

Mishnah Arakhin 3:2

“The law of the field of possession is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”How so? Whether one dedicates a field in the sandy plain of Mahoz or in the orchards of Savaste, [if he would redeem it] he must pay fifty shekels of silver for [every part of the field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. But if it was a field which he bought, he must pay what it is worth. Rabbi Eliezer says: it is all the same whether it is a field of possession or one that he bought. What is the difference between the field of possession and one that he bought? A field of possession he must pay the [added] fifth, whereas for a field that he has bought he need not pay the added fifth.

Mishnah Arakhin 3:3

“The law concerning a warned ox that has killed a slave is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”How so? Whether it killed the fine looking slave or an ugly slave, he must pay thirty selas. If it killed a free man he must pay what he is worth. If it wounded, whether this one or the other, he must pay the full damage.

Mishnah Arakhin 3:4

“The law of the rapist and seducer is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”How so? Whether he raped or seduced a girl from among the best of the priestly stock or the humblest in Israel, he must pay fifty selas. But compensation for shaming and for blemish is in accord with the [circumstances] of him who shames and of the one who suffers the shame.

Mishnah Arakhin 3:5

The law of the defamer is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict. How so? Whether he defamed a girl from among the best of the priestly stock or the humblest in Israel, he must pay one hundred selas. Thus it turns out that he who speaks with his mouth suffers more than he that commits an act. For thus we have also found that the judgment against our fathers in the wilderness was sealed only because of their evil tongue, as it is written: “Yet you have tested me these ten times, and you have not listened to My voice” (Numbers 14:22).

Mishnah Arakhin 4:1

The sufficiency of means is according to the ability of the vower. And the age is according to the subject of the vow. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation. The sufficiency of means is according to the ability of the vower. How so? If a poor man evaluated a rich man, he pays only the valuation of a poor man. But if a rich man evaluated a poor man, he must pay the valuation of a rich man.

Mishnah Arakhin 4:2

But it is not so with sacrifices. If he said: “I take upon myself the sacrifices of this metzora,” and the metzora was poor, he brings the sacrifices of a poor metzora. But if the metzora was rich, he must bring the sacrifices of a rich man. Rabbi says: I say the same applies with regard to an evaluation. Why is a poor man who evaluated a rich man obliged to pay only the evaluation of a poor man? Because the rich man is not obligated at all. But if the rich man said: “My value is upon me” and the poor man, hearing that, said: “What this man has said, I take upon myself,” then he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. If he was poor and then became rich, or rich and then became poor, he must pay the evaluation of a rich man. Rabbi Judah says: even if he was poor and became rich and then again became poor he must pay the evaluation of a rich man.

Mishnah Arakhin 4:3

But it is not so with sacrifices. Even if his father was dying [when a man vowed] and left him ten thousand, or if he had a ship on the sea and it brought to him ten thousand, the sanctuary has no claim at all on them.

Mishnah Arakhin 4:4

“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.

Mishnah Arakhin 4:4

“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.

Mishnah Arakhin 4:4

“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.

Mishnah Arakhin 4:4

“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.

Mishnah Arakhin 4:4

“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.

Mishnah Arakhin 4:4

“And the age is according to the subject of the vow:” How so? If a child evaluates an old man, he must pay the value of an old man. And if an old man evaluates a child he must pay the value of a child. The evaluation is according to the subject of the evaluation. How so? If a man evaluated a woman, he must pay the value of a woman. And if a woman evaluated a man, she must pay the value of a man. “And the evaluations [shall be paid according to the rate prescribed] at the time of the evaluation.” How so? If he evaluated one who was less than five years of age, and he became [meantime] older than five years of age, or if [he evaluated one] who was less than twenty years of age and he became twenty years old, he must pay [only] in accord with the age at the time of the valuation. The thirtieth day is considered to be under this age. The fifth year or twentieth year is considered to be under this age. For it says: “And if he is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), thus we can learn thus with regard to all others from what is said about sixty years: just as the sixtieth year is considered to be under this age, so also the fifth and twentieth years are under this age. Is that so! Just because [the Torah] accounts the sixtieth year to be under this age, thereby being more stringent, shall we make the fifth or the twentieth year be considered under this age, in order to be lenient? Scripture says, “Years,” “years” as a gezerah shavah: just as with the sixtieth year the word “years” means that it is considered under this age, so the word “years” with the fifth and with the twentieth year are considered under this age, whether this results in being lenient or being stringent. Rabbi Elazar says: [this rule holds good] until they are a month and a day beyond the year.

Mishnah Arakhin 5:2

[If one said] “The worth of my hand is upon me,” they estimate his worth with his hand and [what it would be] without his hand. In this respect vows of worth are more stringent than vows of value. There is an aspect of vows of value that is more stringent than vows of worth. How so? If one said: “My value is upon me” and then he dies, his heirs must pay it. [But if he said:] “My worth is upon me,” and then he dies, his heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth. [If he said,] “The value of my hand or foot is upon me,” he has said nothing, [But if he said,] “The value of my head is upon me,” he must pay his whole value. This is the general rule: Anything upon which his life depends, he must pay his full value.

Mishnah Arakhin 5:4

If he said: “The value of so-and-so is upon me,” if both the vower and the subject of the vow died, then the heirs must pay it. [If he said,] “The worth of so-and-so is upon me,” and the vower died, the heirs must pay it. But if the subject of the vow died, the heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth.

Mishnah Arakhin 5:4

If he said: “The value of so-and-so is upon me,” if both the vower and the subject of the vow died, then the heirs must pay it. [If he said,] “The worth of so-and-so is upon me,” and the vower died, the heirs must pay it. But if the subject of the vow died, the heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth.

Mishnah Arakhin 5:4

If he said: “The value of so-and-so is upon me,” if both the vower and the subject of the vow died, then the heirs must pay it. [If he said,] “The worth of so-and-so is upon me,” and the vower died, the heirs must pay it. But if the subject of the vow died, the heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth.

Mishnah Arakhin 5:4

If he said: “The value of so-and-so is upon me,” if both the vower and the subject of the vow died, then the heirs must pay it. [If he said,] “The worth of so-and-so is upon me,” and the vower died, the heirs must pay it. But if the subject of the vow died, the heirs need not pay anything because dead persons have no worth.

Mishnah Arakhin 6:1

[The property] of orphans which has been evaluated [must be proclaimed for] thirty days. And [the property of] the Sanctuary which has been evaluated, [for] sixty days. They must make the proclamation in the morning and in the evening. If a man dedicates his property to the Sanctuary and he is still liable for his wife’s ketubah: Rabbi Eliezer says: when he divorces her he must vow that he will not derive any further benefit from her. Rabbi Joshua says: he need not do so. Similarly, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: Also if one guarantees a woman's ketubah and her husband divorces her, the husband must vow to derive no benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of that man [the guarantor] and take his wife back again.

Mishnah Arakhin 8:4

A man may proscribe [part] of his flock or of his herd, of his Canaanite slaves or female slaves or of his field of possession. But if he proscribed all of them, they are not considered [validly] proscribed, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah said: just as when it comes to the Highest One, one is not permitted to proscribe all of his possessions, how much more so should one be careful with his property.

Mishnah Arakhin 8:6

Things proscribed for [the use of] the priests cannot be redeemed but are to be given to the priests. Rabbi Judah ben Batera says: things proscribed without specification fall to [the fund for] Temple repairs, as it was said: “Every proscribed thing is most holy to the Lord” (Leviticus 27:25). But the sages say: things proscribed without specification go to the priests, as it is said: “As a field proscribed: its possession belongs to the priest” (Leviticus 27:21). If so, why is it said: “Every proscribed thing is most holy to the Lord”? This teaches that it applies to most holy and less holy things.

Mishnah Arakhin 9:4

If the [last] day of the twelve months has arrived and it was not redeemed, it becomes his permanent [possession]. This applies whether he bought it or received it as a gift, as it is said: “beyond reclaim” (Leviticus 25:30). In earlier times, he [the buyer] would hide on the last day of the twelve months, so that [the house] might become his permanent [possession]. Hillel enacted that he [the seller] could deposit his money in the chamber and break down the door and enter, and that the other [the buyer], whenever he wanted, might come and take his money.

Mishnah Arakhin 9:8

If an Israelite inherited from his mother's father who was a Levite, he cannot redeem it according to the order prescribed here. Also if a Levite inherited from his mother's father who was an Israelite, he cannot redeem it according to the order prescribed here, As it says, “As for the houses of the cities of the Levites” (Leviticus 25:32) [this order does not apply] unless he is a Levite and in the cities of the Levites, the words of Rabbi. The sages say: these things apply to the cities of the Levites. One may not turn a field into pasture land, nor pasture land into a field, nor pasture land into a city, nor a city into pasture land. Rabbi Eliezer said: When is this so? When it comes to the cities of the Levites, but when it comes to cities of Israelites one may turn a field into pasture land, pasture land into a field, pasture land into a city, but not a city into pasture land, in order that they should not destroy the cities of Israel. Priests and Levites may sell [a house] at any time and redeem it at any time, as it is said: “The Levites shall forever have the right of redemption” (Leviticus 25:32).

Mishnah Temurah 1:1

All persons can substitute, both men and women. Not that one is permitted to substitute, but that if one did so, the substitute is sacred, and he receives forty lashes. Priests have the power to substitute their own [animal] and Israelites also have the power to substitute their own [animal]. Priests do not have the power to substitute a hatat, an asham or a first-born: Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri: what is the reason [priests] do not have the power to substitute a first-born? Rabbi Akiva said: a hatat and an asham are priestly gifts and a first-born is also a priestly gift. Just as in the case of a hatat and an asham [priests] have no power to substitute them, so in the case of a first-born [priests] have no power to substitute it. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said to him: So what that priests should have no power to substitute a hatat and an asham, for there they have do not have a claim on these [offerings] while they are alive. How can you say that the same applies to a first-born upon which [the priests] do have a claim when it is alive? Rabbi Akiva replied to him: Has not Scripture already said: “Then it and its substitute shall be holy?” (Leviticus 27:10). Now where does the holiness [of the original animal] occur? In the house of the owners; so too the substitution occurs in the house of the owners.

Mishnah Temurah 1:1

All persons can substitute, both men and women. Not that one is permitted to substitute, but that if one did so, the substitute is sacred, and he receives forty lashes. Priests have the power to substitute their own [animal] and Israelites also have the power to substitute their own [animal]. Priests do not have the power to substitute a hatat, an asham or a first-born: Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri: what is the reason [priests] do not have the power to substitute a first-born? Rabbi Akiva said: a hatat and an asham are priestly gifts and a first-born is also a priestly gift. Just as in the case of a hatat and an asham [priests] have no power to substitute them, so in the case of a first-born [priests] have no power to substitute it. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said to him: So what that priests should have no power to substitute a hatat and an asham, for there they have do not have a claim on these [offerings] while they are alive. How can you say that the same applies to a first-born upon which [the priests] do have a claim when it is alive? Rabbi Akiva replied to him: Has not Scripture already said: “Then it and its substitute shall be holy?” (Leviticus 27:10). Now where does the holiness [of the original animal] occur? In the house of the owners; so too the substitution occurs in the house of the owners.

Mishnah Temurah 1:1

All persons can substitute, both men and women. Not that one is permitted to substitute, but that if one did so, the substitute is sacred, and he receives forty lashes. Priests have the power to substitute their own [animal] and Israelites also have the power to substitute their own [animal]. Priests do not have the power to substitute a hatat, an asham or a first-born: Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri: what is the reason [priests] do not have the power to substitute a first-born? Rabbi Akiva said: a hatat and an asham are priestly gifts and a first-born is also a priestly gift. Just as in the case of a hatat and an asham [priests] have no power to substitute them, so in the case of a first-born [priests] have no power to substitute it. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said to him: So what that priests should have no power to substitute a hatat and an asham, for there they have do not have a claim on these [offerings] while they are alive. How can you say that the same applies to a first-born upon which [the priests] do have a claim when it is alive? Rabbi Akiva replied to him: Has not Scripture already said: “Then it and its substitute shall be holy?” (Leviticus 27:10). Now where does the holiness [of the original animal] occur? In the house of the owners; so too the substitution occurs in the house of the owners.

Mishnah Temurah 1:1

All persons can substitute, both men and women. Not that one is permitted to substitute, but that if one did so, the substitute is sacred, and he receives forty lashes. Priests have the power to substitute their own [animal] and Israelites also have the power to substitute their own [animal]. Priests do not have the power to substitute a hatat, an asham or a first-born: Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri: what is the reason [priests] do not have the power to substitute a first-born? Rabbi Akiva said: a hatat and an asham are priestly gifts and a first-born is also a priestly gift. Just as in the case of a hatat and an asham [priests] have no power to substitute them, so in the case of a first-born [priests] have no power to substitute it. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said to him: So what that priests should have no power to substitute a hatat and an asham, for there they have do not have a claim on these [offerings] while they are alive. How can you say that the same applies to a first-born upon which [the priests] do have a claim when it is alive? Rabbi Akiva replied to him: Has not Scripture already said: “Then it and its substitute shall be holy?” (Leviticus 27:10). Now where does the holiness [of the original animal] occur? In the house of the owners; so too the substitution occurs in the house of the owners.

Mishnah Temurah 1:2

One can substitute Herd animals for flock animals and flock animals for herd animals; Sheep for goats and goats for sheep; Males for females and females for males; Unblemished animals for blemished animals and blemished animals for unblemished animals, since Scripture says: “One may not exchange or substitute another for it, either good for bad, or bad for good” (Leviticus 27:10). What is meant by “good for bad”? Blemished animals whose dedication was prior to their blemish. One can substitute one [hullin animal] for two [consecrated animals], and two [hullin animals] for one [consecrated animal]; One [hullin animal] for a hundred [consecrated animals] and a hundred [hullin animals] for one [consecrated animal]; Rabbi Shimon says: one can only substitute one for one, as it says, “Then it and its substitute” (ibid), just as “it” [the consecrated animal] is only one, so [its substitute] must also be only one.