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16891 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.
So far if he said, that I shall not eat, but he drank. If he said, that I shall not drink, but he ate? Drinking is subsumed under eating but eating is not subsumed under drinking.
MISHNAH: Whether matters of himself, or matters of others, or material matters, or immaterial matters. How is this? An oath that I shall give to X, or that I shall not give, that I gave, or that I did not give, that I shall sleep, or that I shall not sleep, that I slept, or that I did not sleep, that I shall throw a pebble into the sea, or that I shall not throw, that I threw, or that I did not throw. Rebbi Ismael said, he is liable only for the future, for it is said to cause evil or cause good. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, if it is so then this refers only to matters of causing evil or good; from where matters which do not refer to causing evil or good? He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the additional text of the verse is for this, the additional text of the verse is for the other.
HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.
HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.
HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.
HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.
How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.
How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.
How does Rebbi Ismael explain the verse? Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. A general statement followed by a detail; the general statement contains only what is in the detail. But the detail only contains matters of causing evil or good! But it is so: To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A detail followed by a general statement, everything is included; this adds matters directed towards the past. But it is so: Or a person, if he would swear blurting out with his lips, a general statement. To cause evil or cause good, a detail. Anything which a person will blurt out, a general statement. A general statement followed by a detail followed by a general statement, you only argue in the pattern of the detail. Since the detail is explicit, matters of causing evil or good, from where matters not causing evil or good? “He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the verse added for this, the verse added for the other.” You cannot, as Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba. Do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath but if in oblivion because of a blurted oath? Could he not have objected, do we find cases where one is liable for intentional action because of a false oath and he has to bring a sacrifice? He said to him, do you agree that there are cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, even if they are not written? He told him, even though I accept cases which are not matters of causing evil or good, are they only written if they be matters of causing evil or good? Therefore never for the past.
HALAKHAH: “If he swore not to observe a commandment,” etc. Rebbi Mani said, so is the Mishnah: “He is liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.” What Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said refers to prohibitions in general. “An oath that I shall eat carcass meat,” but he did not eat it. He is not liable. “An oath that I shall eat,” and he ate. If you would say that he is liable, they should have objected to him: No. You declare about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes” and “yes” equal to “no”, can you declare this about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”?
“If I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press.” Did not the snake of king Sapor swallow camels and carts? When they wanted to kill it, they filled camel bags with straw and put glowing coals inside; it swallowed them and died. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi said, I saw the hide of a snake made over eight spaces between pillars. Rebbi Samuel ben Jacob said, I saw the hide of a snake covering a state coach. Samuel said, square. If square one could state even a small one. Rebbi Yudan the father of Rebbi Mattaniah said, so it is. It is the way of this Tanna to use only big words, as we have stated: “A flying camel.” Could he not have stated, “a flying rat”?
“An oath that I shall eat this loaf;” etc. Vain and untruth both were said together, which is impossible for the ear to hear and the mouth to say. Its desecrator shall be put to death and on the Sabbath day two sheep were said together. Do not wear ša`aṭnez, fringes you shall make for yourselves, both were said together. The nakedness of your brother’s wife and her brother-in-law shall come to her were said together. You shall not move property; any daughter inheriting real estate both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. And so it says, God spoke once, two I heard from this. And it says, is not My word like fire, says the Eternal.
It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted, so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. You may even say in both cases if they insist; here it is about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted, so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged.
It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted, so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. You may even say in both cases if they insist; here it is about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted, so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged.
HALAKHAH: “A vain oath,” etc. A person, a person. Since by a person which was said for an oath of testimony He made the one at whom the oath was directed like one swearing, so also by a person which was said for an oath of deposit He made the one at whom the oath was directed like one swearing.
From where that witnesses may not be relatives of one another? Think of it, if they be found perjured, would each of them not be killed by the other’s testimony? From where that witnesses may not be relatives of the judges? Think of it, if one of them be found perjured, he could not be killed unless the other also was found perjured. If you say so, would he not be killed by the other’s sentencing?
So far only fathers and sons; from where the other relatives? Rebbi Ze`ira says, and sons includes the remaining relatives.
So far according to Rebbi Aqiba.
From where that witnesses may not be relatives of the judges? Think of it, if one of them be found perjured, he could not be killed unless the other also was found perjured. If you say so, would he not be killed by his sentence?
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.
HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative liable for an oath about testimony formulated by himself? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by himself for an oath about testimony only from oaths about deposits, and since there relatives are liable, so they also are here? Rebbi Yose said, can relatives here be inferred from relatives there?
So is the Mishnah: “If one disavowed but one confessed, the one who disavowed is liable.” Rebbi Yose said, our Mishnah if the second changed his opinion immediately after the speaking of the first. Because if the first changed his opinion, one would accept him; then the second would become the first.
If they were ten. There are Tannaïm who state, the first one is liable and all the rest are not liable. There are Tannaïm who state, the last one is not liable and all the rest are liable. The one who said, the first one is liable and all the rest are not liable, holds with him who said, the testimony can be verified by the remaining [witnesses]. The one who said, the last one is not liable and all the rest are liable, holds with him who said, testimony that was partially invalidated is totally invalidated. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “if there were two groups of witnesses.” He only said “two”. Therefore if there had been one, testimony that was partially invalidated it is totally invalidated.
HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.
MISHNAH: “I put an oath upon you, I command you, I bind you,” these are liable. “By Heaven and Earth,” they are not liable. “By א-ד, by י-ה, by the Almighty, by Sabaoth, by the Gracious and Merciful, by the Forbearing and Most Benevolent,” and all substitute names, they are liable. One who curses by any of these is liable, the words of Rebbi Meїr; but the Sages declare him not liable. One who curses his father or mother by any of these is liable, the words of Rebbi Meїr; but the Sages declare him not liable. One who curses himself or another person by any of these violates a prohibition. “May God punish you, so may God punish you,” this is the imprecation mentioned in the Torah. “May He not punish you, may He bless you, may He do well with you,” Rebbi Meїr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable.
Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai, as our Mishnah. But some say, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, so is our Mishnah: “Rebbi Meïr declares liable but Rebbi Jehudah declares not liable.” Rebbi Meїr follows his own opinion and Rebbi Jehudah follows his own opinion, as we have stated: “If he cursed them by a substitute name, Rebbi Meїr declares him guilty but the Sages free him from prosecution.”
Rebbi La: Both Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both are saying, there is no ”witnesses “here. Why? Because they might die. But might not a document be lost? Therefore, the reason can only be that they might forget their testimony. There, we have stated: “Where is my ox? He told him, it is lost. I want you to swear, he said, Amen. But witnesses testify that he ate it. He has to pay the value. If he confessed himself, he has to pay the value, and the fifth, and the reparation sacrifice.” The Mishnah [applies] if he does not know that there are witnesses. He comes to tell you, even if he knows that there are witnesses. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so: “If there were two groups of witnesses, if the first group reneged and after this the second, both are liable.” One understands that the first group becomes liable. Why the second? Not because they might forget their testimony? [Here also, because they (are commanded) to forget their testimony.]
He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”
He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”
HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about a deposit,” etc. A person, a person. Since here it is from his own words, also there from his own words. Since there it is from others’ words, also here it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut at the place it comes from: Since here it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said about it. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.
Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative not liable for an oath about deposits formulated by others? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by others for an oath about deposits only from oaths about testimony, and since there relatives are not liable, so they neither are here? Rebbi Yose said, relatives here can be inferred from non-relatives there.
HALAKHAH: “If five people were claiming from him,” etc. I could think that also for an oath about a deposit He did not make one assenting to an oath like making an oath? Rebbi Eleazar said, this is not so. But also for an oath about a deposit we are treating one assenting to an oath like one formulating an oath.
Rebbi Joḥanan said: The words of Rebbi Eleazar, only if he mentioned “oath” at the start and at the end. The words of the Sages, if he mentioned “oath” at the start but not at the end. Or if he mentioned it at the end but not at the start in the opinion of the rabbis he brings a sacrifice for each single one, in Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one sacrifice for everything. If he mentions “oath” at the start but did not mention it at the end, does the oath fall on the middle ones? Come and see: If he had mentioned it at the start and the end, did he mention it for the middle ones? But you are saying that it is valid; so here it is valid.
Rebbi Yudan from Cappadocia asked: What about “an oath that neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt I am holding for you”? Is it as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. “I am not holding for you wheat, or barley, or spelt, an oath,” is this as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. Is it so if this were a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall not eat; I shall not eat, an oath”? In the rabbis’ opinion he brings a sacrifice for each one. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion does he bring one for the entirety? Even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that he is only emphasizing the prohibitions. It only would be problematic if it were about the past. “An oath that I did not eat; I did not eat, an oath.” In the rabbis’ opinion he brings two sacrifices (for each one). In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one (for each).
HALAKHAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi (Yasa) will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a baraita supports what the colleagues said. “A woman made a vow as a nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I’; the first woman’s husband heard it and dissolved [the vow] for her; the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. If she said, ‘my intention was only to be like her,’ both are permitted.” Because she said, “to be like her, in her state”. Therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state”, the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where the essence is not an oath, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? What Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest, if he connects: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.
HALAKHAH: “Give me the deposit, the loan,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi (Yasa) will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, a baraita supports what the colleagues said. “A woman made a vow as a nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I’; the first woman’s husband heard it and dissolved [the vow] for her; the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. If she said, ‘my intention was only to be like her,’ both are permitted.” Because she said, “to be like her, in her state”. Therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state”, the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where the essence is not an oath, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? What Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not liable for the rest, if he connects: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.
“Give me the wheat, and the barley,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Jehudah imply collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. How is this? A detail wheat, a detail barley, a detail spelt. Collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. Detail a third wheat, detail a third barley, detail a third spelt, are these taken together? Come and see; although he holds many details, even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. In which respect? To make him liable for sacrifices. If he held four kinds, two kinds in one detail, two kinds on two details. even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. As Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything. What means “collectively”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, “X divorces Y and Z U.” What means “collectively”? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A.” Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately that he needs the typical text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit from this one; a qorban for this one and a qorban for that one.’ Each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.”
“Give me the wheat, and the barley,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Jehudah imply collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. How is this? A detail wheat, a detail barley, a detail spelt. Collectively one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. Detail a third wheat, detail a third barley, detail a third spelt, are these taken together? Come and see; although he holds many details, even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. In which respect? To make him liable for sacrifices. If he held four kinds, two kinds in one detail, two kinds on two details. even so they can be formulated collectively or in detail. As Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed concerning everything. What means “collectively”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, “X divorces Y and Z U.” What means “collectively”? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A.” Rebbi Ze`ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately that he needs the typical text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit from this one; a qorban for this one and a qorban for that one.’ Each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.”
HALAKHAH: “You raped or seduced my daughter,” etc. Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The words of Rebbi Simeon [imply that] the main claim is for the fine, which is not so for the words of the Sages. Rebbi Illa said, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he claims the fine, shame and diminution; the words of the Sages if he claims shame, diminution, and fine. The rabbis say, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he advances three claims; the words of the Sages if he advances one claim. Rebbi Ze`ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, did you hear explicitly from Rebbi Joḥanan, or from his word? Rebbi Yasa said, for he is of the rabbis’ opinion. Rebbi Mana said, even if he is of Rebbi Illa’s opinion, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he advances one claim; the words of the Sages if he advances three claims. “Not only matters for which he has to pay the capital, from where double payment, quadruple and quintuple payment, the rapist, and the seducer, and the calumniator? The verse says, everything about which one would swear falsely.” Is the calumniator’s not a fine? Rebbi Jeremiah says, this is Rebbi Simeon’s who said, all depends on the collection.
HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
HALAKHAH: “A judicial oath,” etc. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolos, but the House of Hillel say, two oboloi. The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolos. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say that “money” is a peruṭah but here, they say that “money” is two oboloi. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The House of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said, she leaves gratis, without silver. Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, without silver? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolos and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolos, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. Think of it, if there is only one peruṭah’s worth left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.
The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. If a person give to his neighbor, etc. If to teach that the court will not act on less than a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written, to incur liability for it? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. From here, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two oboloi. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Or vessels; since vessels are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret or vessels? Following what Rebbi Nathan stated, or vessels, including clay vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is liable. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two peruṭot, that the claim should be about a peruṭah’s worth and the confession about a peruṭah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since vessels are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two oboloi, also “vessels” means two oboloi’s worth.
Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: In any case where two [witnesses] make him liable to pay money, a single witness sets him up for an oath. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for real estate? It is a difference since one does not swear about real estate. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a fine? There is a difference since one does not swear about a fine. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a peruṭah? Is it so? Have we not stated: “A judicial oath is about a claim of two silver coins and the acknowledgment of one peruṭah.” Our Mishnah, when he swears by his own formulation. What (Rebbi) Samuel said, when he swears by the formulation of others. Rav Ḥisda and his group disagree. “A judicial oath”, any judicial oath. There is no difference whether he swears by his own formulation or he swears by the formulation of others, he cannot be liable except for a claim.
HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.
HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.
So is the Mishnah: If he denied part of the real estate he is liable, part of the vessels he is not liable.
HALAKHAH: “One does not swear on the claim of a deaf-and-dumb person, an insane person, or a minor,” etc. It is written: If a man give to his neighbor, to exclude the minor. So far if a minor gave to him and the minor requested from him. If he gave it as a minor and requested it as an adult? The verse says, his neighbor; only if giving and requesting are equal. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, is that not obvious by what Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of theft in respect of his neighbor’s lost object is liable? “Where is my lost object?” He told him, it was stolen. Rebbi Abba said, explain it if he told him, you already asked me when you were underage and I was freed from swearing for you. An oath of the Eternal shall be between both of them, to exclude the heir. Rebbi Illa in the name of Rebbi Yasa: The baraita is about the heir.
HALAKHAH: “About the following one does not swear,” etc. If he transgressed and swore, Rebbi Joḥanan said he brings a sacrifice for the oath; Rebbi Eleazar says, he does not bring. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, so does Rebbi Johanan answer Rebbi Eleazar. No. If you pronounced about an oath about testimony which may apply to slaves, documents, and real estate, what can you say about oaths concerning deposits which do not apply to slaves, documents, and real estate? But an oath for testimony is not in court. Would the court admit an oath of a suspect person? Only when he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath; here also if he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath.
Samuel says, the oath does not move away from between them. If the lender swears, he swears and takes. But if the borrower swears, the other will present the pledge. “Who has to swear? The one who holds the pledge.” Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, about the first part: “ ‘You loaned me a tetradrachma on it but it was worth two,’ and the other says ‘no, but I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a tetradrachma;’ he is not liable. ‘You loaned me a tetradrachma on it,’ ” etc. “And the other says, ‘I do not know’.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: You do not know, the other knows. Rebbi Joshua [the Southerner] asked before Rebbi Jonah: There you say, you do not know, the other knows; but here you say so? There is desecration of an oath, here there is no desecration of an oath.
Rav Huna said: Who is the Tanna of “participants in pigeon contests”? Rebbi Eliezer, as we have stated there: “Participants in pigeon contests are disqualified from testimony.” Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: Is that statement in Sanhedrin Rebbi Eliezer’s? He told him, it is everybody’s opinion. So said Rebbi Yose: We knew that he was disqualified for testimony in money matters. What does he come to testify about? For as he is disqualified in money matters, so he is disqualified to testify in criminal trials. The witnesses for the New Moon are held to the standards of criminal trials, as we have stated: “Any testimony for which a woman is not qualified, they are not qualified for.” Who stated this? The rabbis! Do the rabbis follow Rebbi Eliezer? They agree with him and disagree with him. Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Jonah said: It follows Rebbi Eliezer in everything. It turns out that this disagreement parallels another disagreement, as it was stated: A perjured witness is disqualified for any and all testimony required by the Torah, the words of Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Yose said, when has this been said? When he was found perjured in criminal matters. But if he was found perjured in money matters, he is disqualified only from that particular testimony. It turns out that Rebbi Yose parallels the rabbis and Rebbi Meїr Rebbi Eliezer.
Rav Huna said: Who is the Tanna of “participants in pigeon contests”? Rebbi Eliezer, as we have stated there: “Participants in pigeon contests are disqualified from testimony.” Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: Is that statement in Sanhedrin Rebbi Eliezer’s? He told him, it is everybody’s opinion. So said Rebbi Yose: We knew that he was disqualified for testimony in money matters. What does he come to testify about? For as he is disqualified in money matters, so he is disqualified to testify in criminal trials. The witnesses for the New Moon are held to the standards of criminal trials, as we have stated: “Any testimony for which a woman is not qualified, they are not qualified for.” Who stated this? The rabbis! Do the rabbis follow Rebbi Eliezer? They agree with him and disagree with him. Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Jonah said: It follows Rebbi Eliezer in everything. It turns out that this disagreement parallels another disagreement, as it was stated: A perjured witness is disqualified for any and all testimony required by the Torah, the words of Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Yose said, when has this been said? When he was found perjured in criminal matters. But if he was found perjured in money matters, he is disqualified only from that particular testimony. It turns out that Rebbi Yose parallels the rabbis and Rebbi Meїr Rebbi Eliezer.
“Similarly, the orphans can collect only by an oath;” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only if interest is due; Rebbi Nathan says, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Mana said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattania said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, all depends on the female. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should jump to marry her. Rebbi Nathan said, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from minor orphans’ property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from minor orphans’ property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated, the son shall stand in the father’s place; one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it as everybody’s opinion about testamentary dispositions.
You find that one may say that Ḥanan and Rebbi Simeon said the same thing. Just as you say that practice follows Ḥanan, so practice follows Rebbi Simeon.
Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, watch it for it is otherwise. What do we say? Watch it, for it is not negligible. “Owner,” “owner.” Since the owner mentioned there is subject to annulment, so also here he is subject to annulment. The Sabbatical annuls things which are his hand’s loans and annuls the corresponding oaths; the Sabbatical does not annul things which are not his hand’s loans, nor does it annul the corresponding oaths. “For anything which the Sabbatical annuls it annuls the corresponding oath; anything which the Sabbatical does not annul it does not annul the corresponding oath.”
HALAKHAH: “There are four kinds of keepers,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there are four kinds of keepers and they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Also in matters of robbery they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, a baraita said so: “one who contracts with another for a field,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, Rebbi Abun, also in theft cases they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Phineas, our Mishnah said so: “If he was pulling it to lead it out but it died on the owner’s property, he is not liable. If he lifted it or had it led outside the owner’s property when it died, he is liable.” If he lifted it inside the owner’s property it is as if he had taken it out of the entire property of the owner. If he was pulling it and it left, only after it left the entire property of the owner. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If it was standing at his feeding trough then even if he did not pull it! But we must deal with the case that it was standing in the public domain. Does Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya follow the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, “he shall be hit by less or more”? How do we hold? If it was standing in the public domain and he intended to rustle it when it died, according to everybody he became liable by that intention. If he did not start to pull it, according to everybody he is not liable. But we most hold that it was standing at a feeding trough on his property. As Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, following the House of Shammai. Rebbi Abun said, there he acquired without the knowledge of its owner; but here when he acquires with the knowledge of its owner.
HALAKHAH: “There are four kinds of keepers,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there are four kinds of keepers and they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Also in matters of robbery they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, a baraita said so: “one who contracts with another for a field,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, Rebbi Abun, also in theft cases they become liable only through acquisition. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Phineas, our Mishnah said so: “If he was pulling it to lead it out but it died on the owner’s property, he is not liable. If he lifted it or had it led outside the owner’s property when it died, he is liable.” If he lifted it inside the owner’s property it is as if he had taken it out of the entire property of the owner. If he was pulling it and it left, only after it left the entire property of the owner. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If it was standing at his feeding trough then even if he did not pull it! But we must deal with the case that it was standing in the public domain. Does Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya follow the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, “he shall be hit by less or more”? How do we hold? If it was standing in the public domain and he intended to rustle it when it died, according to everybody he became liable by that intention. If he did not start to pull it, according to everybody he is not liable. But we most hold that it was standing at a feeding trough on his property. As Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, following the House of Shammai. Rebbi Abun said, there he acquired without the knowledge of its owner; but here when he acquires with the knowledge of its owner.
It is written, if a man give to his neighbor a donkey, or an ox, or a sheep etc. An oath before the Eternal shall be between the two of them. Stolen, if it was stolen stealing from him. Lost, and if, to include the lost one. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Since you say that he pays for theft which is close to duress, for loss which is not close to duress not so much more?
It is written, if a man give to his neighbor a donkey, or an ox, or a sheep etc. An oath before the Eternal shall be between the two of them. Stolen, if it was stolen stealing from him. Lost, and if, to include the lost one. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Since you say that he pays for theft which is close to duress, for loss which is not close to duress not so much more?
For the borrower only the broken is written. From where loss and theft? It is logical. Since the paid keeper and the renter who do not pay for the broken or the dead have to pay for theft and loss, the borrower who pays for the broken or the dead certainly has to pay for theft and loss. It was stated about this: This is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged. From where the abducted? It is said here, it was broken or died; and it is said there, it dies or was broken. Since there the abducted was included, here also the abducted was included. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael follows Rebbi Nathan. Rebbi Nathan says, or, to include the abducted. Or following Rebbi Meïr who said, an equal cut at the place it comes from. Since there one swears for duress, also here one swears for duress. Still following Rebbi Nathan, for Rebbi Nathan said, or it died, to include the abducted one.
Rebbi Yudan asked: If he claimed the claim of a thief and duress? He told him, an armed robber came and took it; does he have to pay double restitution of duress? Rebbi Yose said, if it were so one should state “the paid keeper and the renter;” but we have stated: We do not find that the paid keeper and the renter pay double restitution of duress. On this we have stated, “this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable”. Rebbi Ḥanina said, if you say so, should you say, this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable, for he can tell him, let us say that the borrower pays double restitution. On this it was stated, this is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged.
Rebbi Yudan asked: If he claimed the claim of a thief and duress? He told him, an armed robber came and took it; does he have to pay double restitution of duress? Rebbi Yose said, if it were so one should state “the paid keeper and the renter;” but we have stated: We do not find that the paid keeper and the renter pay double restitution of duress. On this we have stated, “this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable”. Rebbi Ḥanina said, if you say so, should you say, this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable, for he can tell him, let us say that the borrower pays double restitution. On this it was stated, this is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged.
Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: “Grabbing” is mentioned for the unpaid keeper and “grabbing” is mentioned for the paid keeper, but “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper is not comparable to “grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper. “Grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper does not make him liable unless he move it. “Grabbing” mentioned for the paid keeper, he is liable from the moment he puts his staff and his bag on it. Rebbi Yose ben Nehorai heard this and said, I am not accepting this, but in any case he is not liable unless he move it. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state it in this way? If “grabbing” had not been mentioned for the unpaid keeper as unnecessary, I would have inferred from the recipient of a fee. Since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, it is only logical that an unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, not be liable unless he move it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the unpaid keeper since it was unnecessary? To be strict with the recipient of a fee; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable. Rebbi Yose said, if you say so, you infer about the premise to restrict it. For one could say to him, since the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, does not become liable unless he move it, the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, should not be liable even if he move it. But it must be the following: “Grabbing” should not have been mentioned for the paid keeper as unnecessary, for I would have inferred from the unpaid keeper. Since the unpaid keeper, with whom the Torah was lenient, is not liable unless he move it, the recipient of a fee, with whom the Torah was strict, becomes liable when he moves it. For which purpose was “grabbing” mentioned for the recipient of a fee since it was unnecessary? To be strict; from the moment he puts his staff or his bag on it he is liable.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody claims against another a claim of thief he pays double restitution. If he slaughtered or sold, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. There, they say, he pays quadruple or quintuple restitution. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: There we state and it supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was lost.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he ate it; he has to pay its value. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” Is there eating without slaughtering? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, explain it if another slaughtered. And the following said so: He said to one in the market place, “where is my ox which you stole?” He says, “I did not steal.” “I want you to swear,” and he says “Amen.” He is (not) liable. Because he is one in the market place. But if he said it to one of the keepers, that one would be liable. The baraita when he ate it and then swore. What Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he swore and after that ate it.
“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.
“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.
“He said to the recipient of a fee,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief in a case of loss is liable. “Where is my lost object?” He told him, “it was stolen.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after an oath. What is the reason? It is said here “grabbing” and it says there “grabbing.” Since “grabbing” mentioned there only applies after an oath, so also “grabbing” mentioned here only applies after an oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: May one be liable for a blurted oath in case of an oath regarding a claim of thief? The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There he said, if he claimed a claim of loss, swore to him, and afterwards claimed a claim of thief is not liable. And here he says so? There it is obvious to him, here it is problematic for him. What is problematic for him? He saw and found it simple. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, one who claims before his neighbor a claim of thief is liable only after he denied in court. Where do we hold? If about him who already owes an oath to his neighbor, even if he was swearing out of court he is liable. But we must hold about him who saw them coming. They wanted to make him swear but he jumped in and swore. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When it was standing at his feeding trough. Rebbi Ze`ira asked: how was it said? “If it was standing” or “even if it was standing”? If you say “even if it was standing,” it makes no difference. If you say “if it was standing,” then the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is inverted. There, he said, if he claimed before him a claim of loss, had been swearing to him, selected a sacrifice, and then claimed a claim of duress, he is not liable. But here you are saying so? Rebbi La said, there is a difference since he absolved himself of confession by the oath. They objected to the opinion of Rebbi Ze`ira: “‘Where is my ox?’ He told him, ‘it was stolen.’ ‘I want you to swear;’ he answered ‘Amen’. Witnesses testify that he stole it: he has to pay double restitution. If he confessed himself he pays the value, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.” But here when he moved it by claiming that it was lost. Afterwards he claimed a claim of thief and is not liable. Explain it that he swore to him but slaughtered it afterwards. The students of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus say, explain it that he slaughtered it when it was lying down. Is there slaughter without sale? Following Symmachos who said, there can be slaughter and sale without theft. Samuel said, if there came no witnesses of the theft, but there came witnesses of the slaughter; he is liable.
HALAKHAH: It was stated: If it was neither to his benefit nor to his detriment, he is liable. Rebbi said, a baraita says so: “If he said to the borrower, the unpaid trustee, the recipient of a fee, or the renter, ‘where is my ox?’ This one said, ‘it died.’” May he tell him, “come and swear to me that you never thought of rustling it”? In any case he would not pay; what could he say? “Even if you would pay me a lot, I want from you what is mine.”
HALAKHAH: “Within three days before Gentile holidays,” etc. Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba understood all from here: Bring your sacrifices in the morning, on the third day your tithes. Rebbi Yose said to him, if it were so, even in the diasporas. But it was stated, Nahum the Mede said, in the diasporas one day is forbidden. What about this? There, they checked and found that they supplied their needs in one day and forbade them one day. But here they checked and found that they cover their needs in three days and forbade them three days.
Rebbi Abin bar Cahana said, we find that Jeroboam also invented Sabbaths and holidays. That is what is written: Jeroboam made the holiday in the eighth month, on the fifteenth of the month, like the holiday in Jehudah, and went on the altar; so did he at Bethel to sacrifice … in the month which he invented. “In addition to” is written, as you say, in addition to the Sabbaths of the Eternal.
It was stated: If one transgressed and traded with him, it is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Yose, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even on his holiday. It was stated so: When was this said? About a Gentile whom he does not know. But with a Gentile of his acquaintance it is permitted since he is flattering him. It was stated: If one enters a town and finds them celebrating, he celebrates with them because he only is flattering them.
There, we have stated: “Rebbi Jehudah says, a woman should not apply lime because it disfigures her.” Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Mana. One said, they disagreed about lime which she removed on the holiday, but lime which she removes after the holiday is forbidden. But the other says, they disagreed about lime which she removes after the holiday. But lime which she removes during the holiday is permitted. We did not know who said what. From what R. Ḥanina, Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jehudah is consistent. Just as Rebbi Jehudah said there, temporary disfiguration is disfiguration, so he says here, temporary pain is pain. This implies that they disagreed about lime which she removed on the holiday, but lime which she removes after the holiday is forbidden.
Rebbi Joḥanan does not say so, but the empire of Egypt and the empire of Rome were fighting with one another. They said, how long are we killing one another in this war? Let us institute the rule that the empire should be preeminent which will tell its army commander, fall on your sword, and he will obey. The Egyptian did not obey. In Rome there was an old man by the name of Januarius who had twelve sons. They told him, if you obey us we shall make your sons dukes, eparchoi, and generals. He listened to them. Therefore, it is called Calendae Januarii. The next day they mourn him, a black day. Rebbi Yudan from Antodra said, if one sows lentils on that day, they will not succeed.
“Birthday, and the day of death.” The preceding was for the public, from here on private. But it is written: You shall die in peace, and what was burned for your earlier forefathers … So is the Mishnah: “Any death where there is smoke and burning is idolatrous; if there is not smoke and burning it is not idolatrous.
If he transgressed and sold one fines him. Just as one fines for practice so one fines for custom. From where that one fines for custom? A person sold his camel to an Aramean. The case came before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who fined him double to make him take back the camel. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they fined the broker and called him son who brokers to Arameans. Does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow Rebbi Jehudah? As it was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehuda: “If somebody buys an animal from a Gentile and it gave birth to a firstling, he buys it up to its worth and gives half of its worth to a Cohen. If it was given to him as contractor, he has to pay for up to ten times its worth and gives all of its worth to the Cohen. But the Sages say, since the finger of the Gentile in involved it is no longer liable as firstling.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is more than Rebbi Jehudah. What Rebbi Jehudah said because of the practice of firstlings; but what Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said because of practice regarding a large animal.
“Ben Bathyra permits horses.” Ben Bathyra said this only about a male horse because it kills its owner in war. Some say, because it runs after females, and some say, because it stands still to urinate. What is between them? A gelding. He who says because it runs after females, it does not run. He who says because it stands still to urinate, this one also stands still to urinate. [Rebbi Aḥa in the name of] Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya: If it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Huna: Ben Bathyra and Rebbi Nathan both said the same, as it was stated: “If he carried out domestic animals, wild animals, or birds, whether alive or dead, he is liable. Rebbi Nathan says, dead he is liable, alive he is not liable.” The rabbis hold that he is liable for a purification sacrifice and they answer him so? They answer following his own argument. Following your argument, since you are saying because of rabbinic Sabbath prohibition, also we hold that if it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi says, I am saying that it is forbidden for two reasons, as a weapon and as a large animal. It was stated so: A large wild animal is like a (small) [large] domestic animal. Who stated this? Rebbi. The words of the Sages: Rebbi Bisna, Rebbi Ḥanan bar Abba in the name of Rav: A wild animal is like a (large) [small] domestic animal.
“Ben Bathyra permits horses.” Ben Bathyra said this only about a male horse because it kills its owner in war. Some say, because it runs after females, and some say, because it stands still to urinate. What is between them? A gelding. He who says because it runs after females, it does not run. He who says because it stands still to urinate, this one also stands still to urinate. [Rebbi Aḥa in the name of] Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya: If it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Huna: Ben Bathyra and Rebbi Nathan both said the same, as it was stated: “If he carried out domestic animals, wild animals, or birds, whether alive or dead, he is liable. Rebbi Nathan says, dead he is liable, alive he is not liable.” The rabbis hold that he is liable for a purification sacrifice and they answer him so? They answer following his own argument. Following your argument, since you are saying because of rabbinic Sabbath prohibition, also we hold that if it gets old he binds it to the grindstone. Rebbi says, I am saying that it is forbidden for two reasons, as a weapon and as a large animal. It was stated so: A large wild animal is like a (small) [large] domestic animal. Who stated this? Rebbi. The words of the Sages: Rebbi Bisna, Rebbi Ḥanan bar Abba in the name of Rav: A wild animal is like a (large) [small] domestic animal.
“When he was leaving Akzib there came a person to ask about his vow. He asked his travel companion, would you say that we drank a quartarius of Italian wine? He said to him, yes. He told the person who asked, walk with us until we dissipate our wine. When they came to the Tyrian Ladder Rabban Gamliel dismounted, covered himself, sat down, and dissolved his vow. From his words we learned that a quartarius of wine intoxicates and that travelling dissipates the wine. Also that one does not ask about vows and gives no instruction after drinking wine. Also one does not dissolve vows while walking but covered and sitting.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, so he opened for him: Some blurt out unthinkingly like sword piercing etc. For example, one who made a vow not [to eat] a loaf. Woe if he eats, woe if he does not eat. If he eats he violates his vow. If he does not eat he sins against himself. What should he do? He should go to the Sages who will dissolve his vow as is written, but the sayings of the Sages are healing.
“A Jewish woman should not be a midwife for a Non-Jew, for she brings a son to pagan worship; but a Non-Jew may be a midwife for a Jewish woman.” It was stated so: From the outside but not the inside. She should not put her hand inside not to squish the fetus in her innards, and she should not give her a cup of root-extract to drink. If she was a medical doctor? This will come as what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he was a professional healer it is permitted. And here, if she was a medical doctor it is permitted. [Rebbi Yose bar Abun, these questions … [doc]tor permitted.]
The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Zavda: Anything inside of the lips one heals on the Sabbath. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected, did we not state: “A person having a tooth ache should not suck vinegar with them”? Is this not inside from the lips? Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Zavda: Anything inside a body cavity one heals on the Sabbath. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi: One treats the bone of the skull on the Sabbath. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Mede, Rebbi Jona, Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi: One treats glands of the throat on the Sabbath. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One treats an infected eye on the Sabbath. There, they say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Tops of hands and feet are a danger. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Red color is dangerous. Rebbi Abin said, one removes the sting of a scorpion on the Sabbath. Rav said, wine for exterior treatment of the eye is permitted, inside the eye it is forbidden. Samuel said, tasteless spit is forbidden for the eye on the Sabbath From this you infer for lichen. The rabbis of Caesarea said, ranula is dangerous. Rebbi Ḥizqiah (said) [from Acco] in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: spider sickness is dangerous. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: gangrene is dangerous. Rebbi Jeremiah said, one can put sour dough on it on Passover. A boil is permitted. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says this: “A small needle to remove a thorn.” Otherwise, what is the difference between a thorn and a boil? Darkening of the eye, they asked Rebbi Jeremiah. He told them, is not Rebbi Abba available for you? They asked Rebbi Abba who permitted it to them. He told them, also I am permitting it.
Rebbi Jacob [bar Idi] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One heals with anything except pagan worship, uncovering nakednesses, and spilling blood. Rebbi Phineas asked: So far if he said, bring me leaves from pagan worship, and he brought him. If he said to him bring me leaves (unspecified) and he brought him from pagan worship? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Aḥa had a fever attack. They brought him from the penis of Dohi but he did not drink. They brought to Rebbi Jonah and he drank. Rebbi Mana said, if my father Rebbi Jonah had known from where it was, he would not have drunk.
HALAKHAH: “The following Gentile properties are forbidden,” etc. Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Bitter, sweet, and hot are not under the rules of being uncovered. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The hot, the bitter, and the sweet are not under the rules of being uncovered or under those of libation wine. Rebbi Simon explains: The hot, spice wine. The bitter, vermouth wine. And the sweet, cooked wine. Rebbi Joshua ben Zeidal had cooked wine which was left unsupervised in the custudy of a Gentile. He asked Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael who said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The sweet is not under the rules of being uncovered or under those of libation wine. Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael fell ill. Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi (Joshua) [Hoshaia], Rebbi Abun bar Cahana, and Rebbi Ḥanianiah the colleague of the rabbis, went to visit him. They saw Rebbi Joshua ben Zeidal sitting there. They said, there is the master of the decision and the person of the happening, let us ask him. He said to them, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the sweet is not under the rules of being uncovered or under those of libation wine. One said to him, maybe that of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is for argument’s sake? He told them, it is for action and you can rely on it. When (they got up) [returned], Rebbi Ila was standing with Rebbi Abun bar Cahana and told him, if you did not prefer decisions, is this not a baraita? As Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, “why is cooked wine of Gentiles forbidden? Because it started out as wine.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so, “wine and vinegar which originally was wine.”
HALAKHAH: “The following Gentile properties are forbidden,” etc. Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Bitter, sweet, and hot are not under the rules of being uncovered. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The hot, the bitter, and the sweet are not under the rules of being uncovered or under those of libation wine. Rebbi Simon explains: The hot, spice wine. The bitter, vermouth wine. And the sweet, cooked wine. Rebbi Joshua ben Zeidal had cooked wine which was left unsupervised in the custudy of a Gentile. He asked Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael who said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The sweet is not under the rules of being uncovered or under those of libation wine. Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael fell ill. Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi (Joshua) [Hoshaia], Rebbi Abun bar Cahana, and Rebbi Ḥanianiah the colleague of the rabbis, went to visit him. They saw Rebbi Joshua ben Zeidal sitting there. They said, there is the master of the decision and the person of the happening, let us ask him. He said to them, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the sweet is not under the rules of being uncovered or under those of libation wine. One said to him, maybe that of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is for argument’s sake? He told them, it is for action and you can rely on it. When (they got up) [returned], Rebbi Ila was standing with Rebbi Abun bar Cahana and told him, if you did not prefer decisions, is this not a baraita? As Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, “why is cooked wine of Gentiles forbidden? Because it started out as wine.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so, “wine and vinegar which originally was wine.”
HALAKHAH: “The following Gentile properties are forbidden,” etc. Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Bitter, sweet, and hot are not under the rules of being uncovered. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The hot, the bitter, and the sweet are not under the rules of being uncovered or under those of libation wine. Rebbi Simon explains: The hot, spice wine. The bitter, vermouth wine. And the sweet, cooked wine. Rebbi Joshua ben Zeidal had cooked wine which was left unsupervised in the custudy of a Gentile. He asked Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael who said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The sweet is not under the rules of being uncovered or under those of libation wine. Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael fell ill. Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi (Joshua) [Hoshaia], Rebbi Abun bar Cahana, and Rebbi Ḥanianiah the colleague of the rabbis, went to visit him. They saw Rebbi Joshua ben Zeidal sitting there. They said, there is the master of the decision and the person of the happening, let us ask him. He said to them, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the sweet is not under the rules of being uncovered or under those of libation wine. One said to him, maybe that of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is for argument’s sake? He told them, it is for action and you can rely on it. When (they got up) [returned], Rebbi Ila was standing with Rebbi Abun bar Cahana and told him, if you did not prefer decisions, is this not a baraita? As Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, “why is cooked wine of Gentiles forbidden? Because it started out as wine.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says so, “wine and vinegar which originally was wine.”
Rebbi Abba said, when Rebbi Aqiba went to the tar workers, they came and asked him, how does one purify Gentiles’ jugs? From the following I taught them, since they are permitted if not tarred, if they were tarred but the pitch was shaved off not so much more? But when I came to my colleagues they told me that they are absorbing because of the pitch.
Rebbi Joḥanan went to meet Rebbi Yudan the Prince at Acco. They came and asked him, how does one purify jugs? He said, from the following I taught them, since after the Gentile filled it with fish fluid or fish sauce the Jew fills it with wine. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he puts them into the fire not so much more? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he strips off the tarring not so much more? Do they stand this? If they stand it, they stand.
Rebbi Joḥanan went to meet Rebbi Yudan the Prince at Acco. They came and asked him, how does one purify jugs? He said, from the following I taught them, since after the Gentile filled it with fish fluid or fish sauce the Jew fills it with wine. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he puts them into the fire not so much more? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he strips off the tarring not so much more? Do they stand this? If they stand it, they stand.
There we have stated: “And so it is with new solid matter of olives; but old one is pure.” What is new? Within twelve months. Old, after twelve months.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Jehudah said, Rebbi Ismael asked Rebbi Joshua when they were walking on a road, why did they forbid Gentiles’ cheeses? He told him, because they make them with stomach of cadaver. He answered him, is not the stomach of an elevation offering more serious than the stomach of a cadaver and they said, a Cohen who is not repulsed may burn it raw; they did not agree to this but said one has no usufruct but does not commit larceny. He gave a second argument and said, because they curd it with stomach content of calves for pagan worship. He retorted, then why did they not forbid it for usufruct? He deflected him to an other subject and said to him, my brother Ismael, how do you read, for your (m.) friends are better than wine, or for your (f.) friends are better than wine? He told him, for your (f.) friendship is better. He answered, it is not so since the next verse implies it, by the scent of your (m.) good oils.
Rebbi Ismael stated: In the Torah there are forbidden matters and permitted matters. There are easy parts and severe parts. But in the words of the Sopherim all are severe, since we have stated: “He who says that there are no phylacteries, to transgress the words of the Torah, is not prosecutable. Five compartments to add to the words of the Sopherim is punishable.” Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Idi in the name of Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya: The words of the Sages carry more weight than those of the prophets since it is written, do not preach, they preach. And it is written,I shall preach to you for wine and liquor. The relation of prophet and scholar can be compared to the case of a king who sent two seals to a province. About one of them he wrote, if he does not show you my seal and σημαντήριον, do not believe him. About the other he wrote, even if he does not show you my seal and σημαντήριον, believe him. So about a prophet is written, he gives you a sign or miracle. But here it is written, according to the teachings that they will teach you.
Rebbi Simeon ben Ḥalfuta, Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan. Lambs for your clothing; the price of a field are rams. It is written “suppressings”. How is this? If the students are young, suppress before them the secrets of the Torah. If they grew and became like rams, reveal to them the secrets of the Torah. This lends support to what Rebbi Simoen ben Ioḥai stated: And these are the laws which you shall put before them. Just as this putting is not revealed to everybody so you do have permission to immerse yourself in words of the Torah only before legitimate people.
HALAKHAH: “The following matters of Gentiles are forbidden,” etc. Why is Gentile’s milk forbidden? Rebbi Abba (son of) [in the name of] Rav Jehudah, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Why is Gentile’s milk forbidden? Because of uncovering. Let him make cheese! Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, because of the poison given between the holes. It was stated so: There are three kinds of poison; one swims, one sinks down, and one is similar to a net. Workers were in the field. The water pitcher was uncovered. The first ones drank and were [not] disabled. The second ones died. I say that it was sinking poison. In the days of Rebbi Jeremiah the barrels of the great assembly were uncovered. The first ones drank and were not disabled. The second ones died. I say that it was sinking poison. It was stated thus: “If a watermelon was pecked and ten people ate from it or wine was uncovered and ten people drank from it, it is forbidden to eat or drink after them; I say that there is sinking poison.”
Rebbi Jeremiah said, why is Gentile’s milk forbidden? Because of admixture from forbidden animals. It was stated so: “There is nothing to worry if the Jew sits with the herd while the Gentile milks and brings to him.”
Their bread. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jonathan. Bread is of the practices of obfuscation. [Rebbi Yose said, so I asked before Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: What means “of the practices of obfuscation?] Do I say, at a place where Jewish bread is available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it? Or at a place where Jewish bread is not available it is logical that Gentile bread should be permitted and they obfuscated about it and forbade it? Rebbi Mana said, is there any obfuscation for prohibition? But is bread not like cooking of Gentiles? Are we saying: At a place where no Jewish cooking is available it is logical that Gentile cooking should be permitted? But it must be the following: At a place where Jewish bread is not available it is logical that Gentile bread should be forbidden and they obfuscated about it and permitted it because of the necessities of life. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Following the words of him who was permitting, but only from the store; but one does not do this.
They said before the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya: Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated thus: Food you shall buy from them with money and eat, etc. As water is not changed from its natural state, so anything which was not changed from its natural state. They objected: Are there not their dry beans, פנקריסין and קובטיות, roasted grain, and hot water permitted? One understands all of these because they can be soaked and return to their former state. But roasted grain? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: Any food which can be eaten alone raw is not in the category of Gentile cooking. (With bread it is in the category of Gentile cooking.) How does Rebbi Ḥiyya explain food you shall buy from them? You shall buy with food. If you fed him you bought him. If he causes you trouble buy him with food or otherwise trade (ply him) with him money. They said, that is what Rebbi Jonathan did. When a superior came to [his] town, he sent him an honor gift, that if a suit involving an orphan or a widow came he would have a way to mollify him.