state
1887 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”
If he did not say: “it was written and signed before me”? Should not an Amora have asked this question? He said to him, that is what Rabin ben Rav said: If he brought a bill of divorce, gave it to her, but did not tell her: “It was written and signed before me”? There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said to him, take it from her and say in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” Does Rebbi Joḥanan follow Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce? Can the position of Rebbi Joḥanan be derived from Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar? Would Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar agree that if he told her at the moment of delivery that it was her bill of divorce it would not be a bill of divorce? But here, even if he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” But Rebbi Joḥanan might hold that a woman cannot be believed if she says, I received a bill of divorce from my husband’s agents. But we did state: “The wife herself can bring her bill of divorce.” Would you not have to be afraid that she might have received the bill from a representative of the husband? How is it? The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan is to make her known as divorcee in front of two [witnesses].
A case came before Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. He said to him, it is unnecessary. The opinion of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi seems inverted. There, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce, but here, he says so? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: What you said was in earlier times when no Fellows were found outside the Land, but now that there are Fellows found outside the Land, they are competent. But did we not state, “and one who brings there”? And even if you say that no Fellows are found outside the Land, are we not found in the Land of Israel? In order not to make a distinction in the bills of divorce from outside the Land. But then one who brings from overseas should not have to say: “It was written before me and signed before me.” Not to make a distinction in the bills of divorce in the Land of Israel. What about it? One is restrictive in a simple case because of the complicated one and one is not permissive in the complicated because of the easy one. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Simeon bar Abba: This of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, if it was done. But from the start even Rebbi Joshua ben Levi agrees.
HALAKHAH: “One writes with anything,” etc. “He shall write”, not engrave. “He shall write”, not dropping points. “He shall write”, not pouring. “He shall write”, not engrave; some Tannaïm state, he even may engrave. Rav Ḥisda said, he who says not to engrave, if the writing stands out as on a denar. He who says even to engrave, as on a writing tablet. “He shall write”, not dropping points; Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom and Rebbi Mattaniah: One said, if he did not connect the points; the other said, even if he connected the points. “He shall write”, not pouring. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, those Orientals are very sophisticated. If one of them wants to write a secret letter to another, he writes with juice of gall-nuts. The recipient pours ink without gall over it, which is absorbed at the place of the writing. If one did that on the Sabbath, what? There, we have stated: “Writing on top of writing is not prosecutable.” Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both said, only if he wrote ink on ink or vermilion on vermilion. But if he wrote ink on vermilion or vermilion on ink, he is guilty. Rebbi Isaac bar Mesharshia in the name of the rabbis from there: He is doubly guilty, once for erasing and once for writing.
HALAKHAH: “If the minor received it and became an adult,” etc. There came a case before Rebbi Immi that a slave brought a bill of divorce; [he declared it] valid. Rebbi Abba said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that if a slave brought a bill of divorce, it would be invalid? Rebbi Assi said, if not for Rebbi Abba, we would have permitted a married woman! Even if you say that Rebbi Assi did not accept what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, did he not accept what the rabbis said? Let us hear from the following which Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave could accept a bill of manumission [for delivery] but he should not accept [a bill of divorce] as we do. They thought, he formulated “he should not accept,” therefore, if he transgressed and accepted, it would be valid. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Hoshaiah: It happened that she was a Cohen’s wife and they were not afraid of a hint of invalidity.
Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose asked before Rebbi Yose: Concerning what you say that one bill of divorce is invalid for two women, should not two bills of divorce be invalid for two women? He asked him, what is the question? He answered, did we not state: “If two people sent two [identical] bills of divorce which were intermingled, he gives both documents to both women.” There, it is a divorce for this one and a divorce for the other one; the mix-up caused [the problem]. But here, neither this one is divorced in her name nor is that one divorced in her name.
Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Jehudah for bills of divorce and Rebbi Eleazar in commercial documents. Could we not say, practice follows Rebbi Eleazar? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Eleazar for bills of divorce and Rebbi Jehudah in commercial documents. Could we not say, practice follows Rebbi Jehudah? But because Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar; in order not to let you think that here it is the same, it was necessary to state that practice follows Rebbi Jehudah for bills of divorce and Rebbi Eleazar in commercial documents.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it,” etc. What means “on the spot”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as nobody passed by there. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: as long as three people did not pass by there. If a Gentile passed by there? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana transported a bill of divorce; he lost it and a Saracen found it. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan; they declared [the bill] valid. This means that if a Gentile passed by it is valid. Could we say that he had a mark to identify it? But was it not stated: There are no marks for bills of divorce. That is, if he said, two or three lines. But here, the ה in it had a spot. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Why is it invalid here? I say, it was another [husband] whose name was like his name. Think of it, if they checked out that entire place and did not find another man whose name was like his name! But it is because of the severity of adultery. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry”? Rebbi Mana told him: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid, the other invalid. He lost the valid one and threw away the invalid. When he found it, I say that what he found was the invalid bill.
But did we not state: From where that “if somebody says to his wife, this is your bill of divorce one hour before my death, or he says to his slave girl, this is the document of your manumission one hour before my death, each would be immediately forbidden to eat heave?” There, she is disabled immediately, but here she will only be disabled when he has died.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate, but from his own he may separate.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate, but from his own he may separate.
For example Doso, Dodo’s brother, divorced his wife. The case came before the rabbis who said that she should pay the fee. But did we not state: “the husband pays the fee”? Rebbi Ilai in the name of Samuel: If she forgives him her ketubah.
HALAKHAH: “If orphans rely on a property owner, etc.” (Num. 18:28) “you” excludes partners, “you” excludes guardians, “you” excludes one who gives heave from what is not his. Did we not state (Terumot 3:3): “Partners who gave heave one after the other?” But one must be for Great Heave, the other for heave of the tithe. Did we not infer the laws of the Great Heave from heave of the tithe? But one is for practice, the other for action. “You” excludes guardians; but did we not state: “Orphans dependent on a home owner, or for whom the father had appointed a guardian, must tithe their produce.” The colleagues say, here for a permanent guardian, there for a temporary guardian. Rebbi Yose asked, does that apply to: “he may sell slaves but not real estate?” But here one deals with an adult orphan, there with an underage orphan.
HALAKHAH: “If orphans rely on a property owner, etc.” (Num. 18:28) “you” excludes partners, “you” excludes guardians, “you” excludes one who gives heave from what is not his. Did we not state (Terumot 3:3): “Partners who gave heave one after the other?” But one must be for Great Heave, the other for heave of the tithe. Did we not infer the laws of the Great Heave from heave of the tithe? But one is for practice, the other for action. “You” excludes guardians; but did we not state: “Orphans dependent on a home owner, or for whom the father had appointed a guardian, must tithe their produce.” The colleagues say, here for a permanent guardian, there for a temporary guardian. Rebbi Yose asked, does that apply to: “he may sell slaves but not real estate?” But here one deals with an adult orphan, there with an underage orphan.
Following the opinion of the rabbis there it is acceptable since there, they say in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: One to whom one gives a nut and he throws it away, a pebble and he keeps it, what is found in his hand is as if found on a garbage heap; a nut and he keeps it, a pebble and he throws it away, what is robbed from him is robbed because of communal peace; a nut or a pebble he takes, hides them, and produces them later, what is robbed from him is total robbery. He can acquire for himself but not for others. Rav Huna said, just as he can acquire for himself so he can acquire for others. Everybody agrees that his gift is not a gift since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “If a man give.” The gift of a man is a gift, but the gift of a minor is no gift, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, robbing from him is not clear unless he grew two pubic hairs. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that is, to recover from him by a law suit, but to have to bring a sacrifice for [a false] oath only if he grew two pubic hairs. But following the rabbis here, Rebbi Yose asked that even for himself he should not be able to acquire since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “A man to his neighbor”, until he be like his neighbor. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac explained it by the method of the artless. As we have stated there: “For underage children, their buying is buying and their selling selling, for movables.” But did we not state there: “He cannot make them acquire through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is like his hand.” The rabbis of Caesarea say, here a minor with knowledge, there a minor without knowledge.
A weaver asked Rebbi Immi, what about a Gentile wedding feast? He wanted to permit it to them from this: “Because of peaceful coexistence.” Rebbi Abba told them, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that the holiday of a Gentile wedding feast is forbidden? Rebbi Immi said, if it had not been for Rebbi Abba, we would have come to permit their strange worship; praised be He Who separated us from them.
Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina asked: Has this been said for all of this chapter or only for this Mishnah? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Titus: From the fact that we state this Mishnah in Giṭṭin it follows that it was said only for this Mishnah.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody who says, accept this bill of divorce for my wife,” etc. Everywhere you say that “accept” is the equivalent of “obtain,” but here you say that “accept” is the equivalent of “bring”? There is a difference, for one can obtain something for a person without him being present. Rebbi Shammai objected: Think of it, if she was shouting to obtain a divorce? I say, maybe she changed her mind. But did we not state: “A woman herself may bring her bill of divorce”? Could you say that she may have changed her mind? There, she is damaging herself; here it is to her detriment.
Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said: If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he went and said to him, your wife said, accept the bill of divorce for me, even after the bill came into her hand it is not a valid bill of divorce, since he thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. Rebbi Huna bar Ḥiyya objected: But did we not state that if a woman said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand? Then even if the bill came into her hand it should not be a valid bill! For she thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that practice is that “accept” and “obtain” mean “bring”. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” Then it should not be a valid bill even if the bill of divorce reaches her hand. For she thinks that maybe she is divorced by the acceptance of the agent, but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that a minor cannot appoint an agent.
Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said: If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he went and said to him, your wife said, accept the bill of divorce for me, even after the bill came into her hand it is not a valid bill of divorce, since he thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. Rebbi Huna bar Ḥiyya objected: But did we not state that if a woman said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand? Then even if the bill came into her hand it should not be a valid bill! For she thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that practice is that “accept” and “obtain” mean “bring”. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” Then it should not be a valid bill even if the bill of divorce reaches her hand. For she thinks that maybe she is divorced by the acceptance of the agent, but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that a minor cannot appoint an agent.
Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: So far if she said, bring me, but [the agent] said [to the husband] “receive for me”. If she said, receive for me but [the agent] said [to the husband] “bring me”? If was found stated in both cases, this is a bill of divorce and if he wants to retract he cannot retract. But did we not state: “He shall deliver into her hand,” that includes not only her hand, from where through his agent’s hand, into her agent’s hand, from his agent to her agent, and from her agent to his agent; the verse says, “he shall deliver, he shall deliver.” Who said, “it is impossible for me”? Rebbi! As it was stated: “If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he said to him, your wife said, accept my bill of divorce for me: If he brought it to her, gave it to her, he acquired it for her, it was received for her; if he wants to retract, he may not retract, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Nathan says, ‘bring it to her, give it to her,’ [if he wants to retract, he may retract; ‘acquire it for her, receive it for her’, if he wants to retract, he may not retract. Rebbi says, in any of these cases] he may not retract except if he says, ‘It is impossible for me that you accept it for her, but give it to her.’” It is difficult for Rebbi, “here you have it from my word”, if he wants to retract, he may retract. It is difficult for Rebbi Nathan, “here you have it from her word”, if he wants to retract, he may retract! Rav Ḥuna said, he becomes his and her agent. Assi said, everywhere we have stated “his and her agent”, she is both divorced and not divorced.
“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody was thrown into a cistern,” etc. Rebbi Ḥanina said, Rebbi Jonathan taught us, only if they saw a man’s shadow. There we have stated: “One testifies by the light of a candle or by the light of the moon and one permits to remarry on the basis of a disembodied voice”, and Rebbi Jonathan said, only if they saw a man’s shadow. Rebbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina, in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: That means, in the fields, but in town even without a man’s shadow. But did we not state: “If somebody had been thrown into a cistern,” and Rebbi Jonathan said, only if they saw a man’s shadow? Rebbi Abin said, damaging spirits were as frequent in cisterns as they are frequent on the fields.
If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.
What is the status of her intercourse? Some Tannaïm state, her intercourse is certain, but some Tannaïm state, her intercourse is in doubt. According to him who says that her intercourse is certain, he brings a “hung” sacrifice. According to him who says that her intercourse is in doubt, if [the husband] dies, he is free; if [the husband] does not die, he brings a purification sacrifice.
What is the status of her intercourse? Some Tannaïm state, her intercourse is certain, but some Tannaïm state, her intercourse is in doubt. According to him who says that her intercourse is certain, he brings a “hung” sacrifice. According to him who says that her intercourse is in doubt, if [the husband] dies, he is free; if [the husband] does not die, he brings a purification sacrifice.
Rebbi Yudan said, we deal with the case that it was lost by compulsion. They treated her like an unpaid trustee who may stipulate to be free from an oath. Rebbi Yose said, do we state here that the unpaid trustee is free from an oath? But we deal with the case that it was lost by mishandling. They treated the stole according to its value. But the rabbis say that in any case it has to be treated as a case of condition of a bill of divorce.
Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Did we not state: (Mishnah Baba Meẓi‘a 1:4) “If somebody saw a find and fell on it, when another person came and grabbed it, he who grabbed it had the rights to it?” He answered him: Explain it if the first one did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did we not state: “If he fell on it or spread his talith on it, one removes him from it?” He said to him, that is the same, if he did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: (Tosephta Peah 2:2) “If two were pushing one another because of a sheaf and another person came and grabbed it from before them, the one who grabbed is entitled to it. He said to him, it is the same, they did not say that our four cubits should acquire it for us.
Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Did we not state: (Mishnah Baba Meẓi‘a 1:4) “If somebody saw a find and fell on it, when another person came and grabbed it, he who grabbed it had the rights to it?” He answered him: Explain it if the first one did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did we not state: “If he fell on it or spread his talith on it, one removes him from it?” He said to him, that is the same, if he did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: (Tosephta Peah 2:2) “If two were pushing one another because of a sheaf and another person came and grabbed it from before them, the one who grabbed is entitled to it. He said to him, it is the same, they did not say that our four cubits should acquire it for us.
Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Did we not state: (Mishnah Baba Meẓi‘a 1:4) “If somebody saw a find and fell on it, when another person came and grabbed it, he who grabbed it had the rights to it?” He answered him: Explain it if the first one did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did we not state: “If he fell on it or spread his talith on it, one removes him from it?” He said to him, that is the same, if he did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: (Tosephta Peah 2:2) “If two were pushing one another because of a sheaf and another person came and grabbed it from before them, the one who grabbed is entitled to it. He said to him, it is the same, they did not say that our four cubits should acquire it for us.
Rebbi Zeïra objected before Rebbi Yasa: But did we not state: The same applies to marriage? He answered him, divorce documents and marriage contracts have the same rules. But did we not state: The same applies to debt? He said to him, because if he said to him: Throw it into the sea and your debt will be forgiven, it would be forgiven. But if that is true, even if it fell down close to the debtor, the debtor should have the benefit! But we have stated, if it falls down close to the debtor, the debtor is still obligated. For he said to him, throw it so that it will enter my domain, but it did not yet enter his domain. Rebbi Abbahu said, all those objections that Rebbi Zeïra raised before Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish raised before Rebbi Joḥanan. Did he accept them from him? He solved them with those same solutions.
Rebbi Zeïra objected before Rebbi Yasa: But did we not state: The same applies to marriage? He answered him, divorce documents and marriage contracts have the same rules. But did we not state: The same applies to debt? He said to him, because if he said to him: Throw it into the sea and your debt will be forgiven, it would be forgiven. But if that is true, even if it fell down close to the debtor, the debtor should have the benefit! But we have stated, if it falls down close to the debtor, the debtor is still obligated. For he said to him, throw it so that it will enter my domain, but it did not yet enter his domain. Rebbi Abbahu said, all those objections that Rebbi Zeïra raised before Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish raised before Rebbi Joḥanan. Did he accept them from him? He solved them with those same solutions.
We stated: “After he wrote it for her.” Some Tannaïm state “after he delivered it to her.” He who says “after he wrote it for her” supports the House of Shammai; he who says “after he delivered it to her” supports the House of Hillel.
Where do we hold? If he knotted and signed it inside, everybody agrees that it can be made simple. If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple. {Rebbi objected to the statement of Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: “The body of the document.” If he knotted and signed it outside, everybody agrees that it cannot be made simple. But we must deal with the case that he knotted it from the inside and then signed it on the outside; in that case Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel said that it can be made simple, but the rabbis say, it cannot be made simple.) Rebbi objected to the statement of Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Gamliel: The body of the document shows whether it is simple or not simple. What is the body of the document? Rebbi Abba said, as Rav Huna said, witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But did we not state: “That is the formula of a document”? Rebbi Mana said, that is the formula of a knotted document. Rebbi Abin said, even if you say it is the same for knotted and simple, for a knotted document it is a necessity, for a simple one it is not a necessity. Rebbi Aḥa said, if one adds to practice. A simple document [is witnessed] by two persons. If common usage is to have three, one makes it with three. A knotted document is signed on its back. If common usage is to sign it inside and out, one signs it inside and out.
The condition of validity is stated here and was stated there. It was necessary to state it there. If it had been stated here but not there, we would have said that here it is invalid because of the restrictions connected with adultery but there, since no restrictions connected with adultery are involved, it would be valid. Or if it had been stated there but not here, we would have said that there it is invalid since one comes to collect money based on that document but here, where one does not collect money, it would be valid. Therefore, it was necessary both to state it here and to state it there.
The condition of validity is stated here and was stated there. It was necessary to state it there. If it had been stated here but not there, we would have said that here it is invalid because of the restrictions connected with adultery but there, since no restrictions connected with adultery are involved, it would be valid. Or if it had been stated there but not here, we would have said that there it is invalid since one comes to collect money based on that document but here, where one does not collect money, it would be valid. Therefore, it was necessary both to state it here and to state it there.
The condition of validity is stated here and was stated there. It was necessary to state it there. If it had been stated here but not there, we would have said that here it is invalid because of the restrictions connected with adultery but there, since no restrictions connected with adultery are involved, it would be valid. Or if it had been stated there but not here, we would have said that there it is invalid since one comes to collect money based on that document but here, where one does not collect money, it would be valid. Therefore, it was necessary both to state it here and to state it there.
After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.
HALAKHAH: “If two men sent two identical bills of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose asked before Rebbi Yose: Just as you say that a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce is invalid in the case of two wives, similarly two bills of divorce should be invalid for two women. He answered, that is correct. He said to him, but did we not state: “If two men sent two identical bills of divorce and they became mixed up, one delivers both to both women”? There, each of the bills was written in the name of the respective wife; the mix-up caused the problem. But here, neither one was written as divorce in her name; when it was delivered, could it be considered as divorce in her name from the start?
HALAKHAH: “That is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write. A forced bill of divorce among Jews is valid, from Gentiles it is invalid”. Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies from the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalȋṣah in the case of a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him for up to 30 days shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?
HALAKHAH: “That is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write. A forced bill of divorce among Jews is valid, from Gentiles it is invalid”. Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies from the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalȋṣah in the case of a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him for up to 30 days shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?
HALAKHAH: “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married”. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If lights are burning and people talk. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected before Rebbi Yasa: But did we not state: “If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced”? Can you say that lights are burning? No, people talk. So here also, people talk. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the title was checked and found to be from the mouth of women or minors, the title is abolished. Rav said, they permitted only in case of a hearsay witness.
“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.
Ḥilfai said: Bring me to the river’s edge. If I cannot derive Rebbi Ḥiyya the Elder’s baraita from the Mishnah, throw me into the river. They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “A tetradrachma are four denar.” He said to them, we also have stated: “By how much can a tetradrachma be deficient without being fraudulent? Rebbi Meïr said four as, one as per denar.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Six silver obols are a denar.” He said to him, I also have stated it: “Fraud is four silver coins for twenty-four silver coins, a tetradrachma, one sixth of the selling price.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two dupondii are an obolus.” He said to them, we also have stated thus: “He gives a tetradrachma and a dupondius per year.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two as are a dupondius”. He said to them, we also have stated thus: “He who put aside an as and ate for half of its worth, then went to another place where it is worth a dupondius, has to eat another as for it.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two semisses are an as, two quadrantes are a semis, two peruṭot are a quadrans.” He said to them, we also have stated thus: “How much is a peruṭah? One eighth of an Italic as.”
Ḥilfai said: Bring me to the river’s edge. If I cannot derive Rebbi Ḥiyya the Elder’s baraita from the Mishnah, throw me into the river. They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “A tetradrachma are four denar.” He said to them, we also have stated: “By how much can a tetradrachma be deficient without being fraudulent? Rebbi Meïr said four as, one as per denar.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Six silver obols are a denar.” He said to him, I also have stated it: “Fraud is four silver coins for twenty-four silver coins, a tetradrachma, one sixth of the selling price.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two dupondii are an obolus.” He said to them, we also have stated thus: “He gives a tetradrachma and a dupondius per year.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two as are a dupondius”. He said to them, we also have stated thus: “He who put aside an as and ate for half of its worth, then went to another place where it is worth a dupondius, has to eat another as for it.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two semisses are an as, two quadrantes are a semis, two peruṭot are a quadrans.” He said to them, we also have stated thus: “How much is a peruṭah? One eighth of an Italic as.”
Ḥilfai said: Bring me to the river’s edge. If I cannot derive Rebbi Ḥiyya the Elder’s baraita from the Mishnah, throw me into the river. They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “A tetradrachma are four denar.” He said to them, we also have stated: “By how much can a tetradrachma be deficient without being fraudulent? Rebbi Meïr said four as, one as per denar.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Six silver obols are a denar.” He said to him, I also have stated it: “Fraud is four silver coins for twenty-four silver coins, a tetradrachma, one sixth of the selling price.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two dupondii are an obolus.” He said to them, we also have stated thus: “He gives a tetradrachma and a dupondius per year.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two as are a dupondius”. He said to them, we also have stated thus: “He who put aside an as and ate for half of its worth, then went to another place where it is worth a dupondius, has to eat another as for it.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two semisses are an as, two quadrantes are a semis, two peruṭot are a quadrans.” He said to them, we also have stated thus: “How much is a peruṭah? One eighth of an Italic as.”
Ḥilfai said: Bring me to the river’s edge. If I cannot derive Rebbi Ḥiyya the Elder’s baraita from the Mishnah, throw me into the river. They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “A tetradrachma are four denar.” He said to them, we also have stated: “By how much can a tetradrachma be deficient without being fraudulent? Rebbi Meïr said four as, one as per denar.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Six silver obols are a denar.” He said to him, I also have stated it: “Fraud is four silver coins for twenty-four silver coins, a tetradrachma, one sixth of the selling price.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two dupondii are an obolus.” He said to them, we also have stated thus: “He gives a tetradrachma and a dupondius per year.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two as are a dupondius”. He said to them, we also have stated thus: “He who put aside an as and ate for half of its worth, then went to another place where it is worth a dupondius, has to eat another as for it.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two semisses are an as, two quadrantes are a semis, two peruṭot are a quadrans.” He said to them, we also have stated thus: “How much is a peruṭah? One eighth of an Italic as.”
Ḥilfai said: Bring me to the river’s edge. If I cannot derive Rebbi Ḥiyya the Elder’s baraita from the Mishnah, throw me into the river. They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “A tetradrachma are four denar.” He said to them, we also have stated: “By how much can a tetradrachma be deficient without being fraudulent? Rebbi Meïr said four as, one as per denar.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Six silver obols are a denar.” He said to him, I also have stated it: “Fraud is four silver coins for twenty-four silver coins, a tetradrachma, one sixth of the selling price.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two dupondii are an obolus.” He said to them, we also have stated thus: “He gives a tetradrachma and a dupondius per year.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two as are a dupondius”. He said to them, we also have stated thus: “He who put aside an as and ate for half of its worth, then went to another place where it is worth a dupondius, has to eat another as for it.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two semisses are an as, two quadrantes are a semis, two peruṭot are a quadrans.” He said to them, we also have stated thus: “How much is a peruṭah? One eighth of an Italic as.”
Rebbi Isaac asked: Why do we not say: “either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife?” He turned around and said: Did we state “by her own ḥalîṣah”? Not “by her own ḥalîṣah”! But here either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife. But did we not state, “by intercourse”? Can you say, either by her own intercourse or the intercourse of her cowife? The Mishnah speaks of one sister-in-law; the problem arises for two sisters-in-law.
Rebbi Isaac asked: Why do we not say: “either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife?” He turned around and said: Did we state “by her own ḥalîṣah”? Not “by her own ḥalîṣah”! But here either by her own ḥalîṣah or that of her co-wife. But did we not state, “by intercourse”? Can you say, either by her own intercourse or the intercourse of her cowife? The Mishnah speaks of one sister-in-law; the problem arises for two sisters-in-law.
“He regains his autonomy by years.” Some Tannaїm state: He may be sold for less than six [years], but he cannot be sold for more than six. But some Tannaïm state: He may not be sold for less than six [years] or more than to [year] seven. Rebbi Jeremiah said, the reason of that Tanna: Sometimes he is sold two or three years before the Jubilee; then the Jubilee arrives and frees him automatically.
“He regains his autonomy by years.” Some Tannaїm state: He may be sold for less than six [years], but he cannot be sold for more than six. But some Tannaïm state: He may not be sold for less than six [years] or more than to [year] seven. Rebbi Jeremiah said, the reason of that Tanna: Sometimes he is sold two or three years before the Jubilee; then the Jubilee arrives and frees him automatically.
“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.
“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.
A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate. A baraita states, the rules of movables. A baraita states, neither the rules of realestate nor the rules of movables. A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate, as we have stated there: “Possession of houses, cisterns, ditches, and caves, bath houses, and dovecots, olive presses, and irrigated fields, and slaves.” A baraita states, slaves do not follow the rules of movables. As it is stated: What is possession of a slave? He tied his shoe for him, or untied his shoe, carried his things to the bath. Rebbi Simeon says, if he lifted him, that is possession. If he lifted his master, there is no stronger possession than this. A statement of the rabbis says that slaves follow the rules of movables. For Rebbi Yose said in the name of rabbis, there is no lien for a gift; one does not collect from slaves as from real estate. Rebbi Mana asked Rebbi Shammai, who are those rabbis? He told him, Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Immi. A widow took a slave girl. The case came before Rebbi Isaac who said, what she took, she took. Rebbi Immi took her away, for she thought that she was hers but she was not hers. Not of real estate, as it was stated: Real estate and slaves; he took possession of the real estate. If you say that slaves follow the rules of real estate, when he took possession of the real estate he would have taken possession of the slaves, since Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he had two fields, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with intention to take possession also of that in Galilee, or of the one in Galilee with intention to take possession also of that in Judea, he acquired. Not of movables. If you say that slaves follow the rules of movables, when he took possession of the movables he would have taken possessionof the slaves, since we did state there: “For property that is not guaranteed will cause guaranteed properties to be objects of swearing about them.”
Why did we not state: By important limbs that do not regenerate? Rebbi Joḥanan ben Marius said, because of the disagreement. Some Tannaīm state that he needs a bill of manumission; some Tannaīm state that he does not need a bill of manumission.
Why did we not state: By important limbs that do not regenerate? Rebbi Joḥanan ben Marius said, because of the disagreement. Some Tannaīm state that he needs a bill of manumission; some Tannaīm state that he does not need a bill of manumission.
Why did we not state: By important limbs that do not regenerate? Rebbi Joḥanan ben Marius said, because of the disagreement. Some Tannaīm state that he needs a bill of manumission; some Tannaīm state that he does not need a bill of manumission.
It is obvious that a slave may accept a gift by one third party to another, by a third party to his master, [but] not from his master to himself. From a third party to himself is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the Sages. If one said: Here [I am giving] you this money on condition that your master have no power over it, the slave acquired it and with him his master, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, the slave acquired it [but not] his master. What is the problem? From his master to a third party. Since the slave may receive from a third party for his master, may he receive from his master for a third party? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his slave, his son, or his agent.” Does this not mean that the slave is able to transfer rights from his master to a third party? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it for a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you have to explain if for a Canaanite slave; explain it that he said, open [the gate] for her and she will come by herself, as we have stated: “If he led her, drew her to himself, called her and she followed him, he is responsible as a borrower.” Rebbi Zeïra understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his underage son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If two fields were involved, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with the intent of taking possession of the one in Galilee, or the one in Galilee with the intent of taking possession of the one in Judea, he took possession. But in [the case of] property of a proselyte he did not acquire even the boundary strip between them. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: If he intended to acquire starting from the boundary strip and below? Rav Ḥisda said, property of a proselyte which he took possession of in the North with the intent of also acquiring that in the South, or in the South with the intent of acquiring also that in the North, but did not have the intent of acquiring the strip in the middle, he did not acquire unless he also intended to acquire the middle part. A baraita disagrees with Rav Ḥisda: If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his property, if one takes possession of the ground he is obligated for everything. If he took possession of standing grain, he is obligated for fallen stalks, forgotten sheaves, and peah but freed from tithes. Does not the air separate between stalks? There, we have stated: “If he tore off anything connected to the ground, he took possession.” Samuel said, he took possession only of that leaf. But did we not state: “If it was connected to the ground and he tore off anything, he took possession”? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Eudaimon the emigrant confirmed it: Samuel will agree, for proselyte’s property.
Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?
Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?
Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?
Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?
Rebbi Eleazar said: The Passover sacrifice of women is voluntary but one pushes the Sabbath away for it. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The Passover sacrifice by women and slaves is voluntary; certainly one does push the Sabbath away for it. What is their maẓẓah? He said to him, it is obligatory. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is in dispute. Rebbi Hila said, it is everybody’s [opinion]. A baraita supports the one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: Lettuce, maẓẓah and Passover sacrifice are obligatory in the first night; on all other days they are voluntary. A baraita supports Rebbi Hila: It was said: “Do not eat leavened matter with it,” and it was said: “For seven days you shall eat with it maẓẓot, the bread of deprivation’.” Anybody under the prohibition of leavened matter is under the obligation to eat maẓẓah, and women, being under the prohibition of leavened matter, are under the obligation to eat maẓẓah. But did we not state: “For any positive commandment triggered by time, men are obligated but women are free”? Rebby Mana said, it is a positive commandment which is implied by a prohibition.
“Except ‘do not destroy’, ‘do not shear,’ and ‘do not become impure for the dead’.” Issy says, also because of “do not make a bald spot.” What is the reason? “They shall not make a bald spot.” One subject to the rules of the beard is subject to the rules of the bald spot; women who have no beard are free from the rules of the bald spot. And also from the following: “sons,” not daughters. Rebbi Eleazar said, women are obligated by the rules of the bald spot. What is the reason? “For you are a holy people for the Eternal, your God.” Both men and women. How does Rebbi Eleazar explain “sons”? When they do the will of the Holy One, praise to Him, they are called sons, but when they do not do the will of the Holy One, praise to Him, they are not called sons. Rav was ordering his students, there came Rav Hamnuna ordering the colleagues: Order you wives not to tear out their hair when standing by a deceased, that they should not make a bald spot. What is a bald spot? There are Tannaïm who stated: Any size. There are Tannaïm who state: The size of a peeled grain. The one who says, any size, because the meaning of “bald spot” is of any size. The one who says, a peeled grain, for it is said here “to make a bald spot”, and it says there, a bald spot. Since “bald spot” mentioned there means in the size of a peeled grain, here also it means the size of a peeled grain. Rebbi Yose bar Mamal: A Cohenet is permitted to leave the Land. What is the reason? “Say to the Cohanim,” not to the Cohanot. If it were otherwise, what would we say? Since she is included in the decision, she may not leave. If you say so, you push aside the paragraph of impurities.
“Rebbi Eliezer says, also new grain.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? (Lev. 23:14) “In all your dwelling places,” both inside and outside the Land. How do the rabbis explain the reason of Rebbi Eliezer, “in all your dwelling places”? New grain from here which was exported. Rebbi Jonah asked: Why did we not state ḥallah with these? Rebbi Yose said to him, our Mishnah only deals with something which applies to Israel and the Gentiles. But ḥallah only applies to Israel, not to Gentiles. What is the reason? (Num. 15:20): The first of your dough,” not of Gentiles.
Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.
We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage, while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber, so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it to be for a loan when the lender said, buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage, while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber, so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it to be for a loan when the lender said, buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage, while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber, so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it to be for a loan when the lender said, buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage, while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber, so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it to be for a loan when the lender said, buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The baraita if he said to her, by the deposit you are holding for me. But if he said, by everything which I deposited with you, she is not preliminarily married unless all of it is available. What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was given to be spent; this was not given to be spent. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah.” Then even if a peruṭah’ s worth was left, she should not be preliminarily married unless all of them were available! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Abun said, were we not of the opinion to say, who is the Tanna of Wawim? Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joḥanan said: The words of Rebbi Jehudah imply comprehensive one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. Just as he says there, comprehensive one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices, so he says here, comprehensive one preliminary marriage, in detail three preliminary marriages.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The baraita if he said to her, by the deposit you are holding for me. But if he said, by everything which I deposited with you, she is not preliminarily married unless all of it is available. What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was given to be spent; this was not given to be spent. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah.” Then even if a peruṭah’ s worth was left, she should not be preliminarily married unless all of them were available! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Abun said, were we not of the opinion to say, who is the Tanna of Wawim? Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joḥanan said: The words of Rebbi Jehudah imply comprehensive one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. Just as he says there, comprehensive one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices, so he says here, comprehensive one preliminary marriage, in detail three preliminary marriages.
“If she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The Elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, it would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, because the Elder uproots the vow from its start. Why did they forbid a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. What is the reason of him who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children became bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
“If she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The Elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, it would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, because the Elder uproots the vow from its start. Why did they forbid a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. What is the reason of him who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children became bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
“If she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The Elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, it would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, because the Elder uproots the vow from its start. Why did they forbid a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. What is the reason of him who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children became bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
“And all defects which disqualify a priest disqualify a woman. They added to them for women mouth odor, sweat odor, and a hairless mole.” Rebbi Ḥamai bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: They taught this about the skin of the face. But did we not state: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” Is this not of the visible defects? Explain it if she hid it under her headgear. It was stated: “A mole with hairs is a defect, whether it be large or small, whether it be on the body or on the face. Without a hair it is a defect on the face but not on the body. When has this been said? If it is small. But if it is large, it is a defect whether it be on the body or on the face. How big is large? Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, up to an Italic as.” Rebbi Eleazar bar Ḥanina said, for example such a Gordianic denar: its measure is half a ubiquitous gold piece. Rebbi Radifa, Rebbi Jonah: Rebbi Jeremiah asked: A bald woman with a row of hair going from one ear to the other? They wanted to understand it from the following: “They added to them for women mouth odor, sweat odor, and a hairless mole.” They did not mention baldness. They wanted to conclude that it is not a defect. There came Rebbi Samuel the son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun: Rebbi Nasa said, it is a defect. It is listed only if it is ugly for both sexes. But something which is beautiful in one sex but ugly in the other, like a bald pate, even though it is a defect it was not listed. You should know that this is so because a beard is beautiful for a man and a defect for a woman, and we did not state: In addition, for a woman a beard. There are breasts which are beautiful for a woman and a defect for men, and we did not state: In addition, for a man women’s breasts.
“And all defects which disqualify a priest disqualify a woman. They added to them for women mouth odor, sweat odor, and a hairless mole.” Rebbi Ḥamai bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: They taught this about the skin of the face. But did we not state: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” Is this not of the visible defects? Explain it if she hid it under her headgear. It was stated: “A mole with hairs is a defect, whether it be large or small, whether it be on the body or on the face. Without a hair it is a defect on the face but not on the body. When has this been said? If it is small. But if it is large, it is a defect whether it be on the body or on the face. How big is large? Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, up to an Italic as.” Rebbi Eleazar bar Ḥanina said, for example such a Gordianic denar: its measure is half a ubiquitous gold piece. Rebbi Radifa, Rebbi Jonah: Rebbi Jeremiah asked: A bald woman with a row of hair going from one ear to the other? They wanted to understand it from the following: “They added to them for women mouth odor, sweat odor, and a hairless mole.” They did not mention baldness. They wanted to conclude that it is not a defect. There came Rebbi Samuel the son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun: Rebbi Nasa said, it is a defect. It is listed only if it is ugly for both sexes. But something which is beautiful in one sex but ugly in the other, like a bald pate, even though it is a defect it was not listed. You should know that this is so because a beard is beautiful for a man and a defect for a woman, and we did not state: In addition, for a woman a beard. There are breasts which are beautiful for a woman and a defect for men, and we did not state: In addition, for a man women’s breasts.
“And all defects which disqualify a priest disqualify a woman. They added to them for women mouth odor, sweat odor, and a hairless mole.” Rebbi Ḥamai bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: They taught this about the skin of the face. But did we not state: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” Is this not of the visible defects? Explain it if she hid it under her headgear. It was stated: “A mole with hairs is a defect, whether it be large or small, whether it be on the body or on the face. Without a hair it is a defect on the face but not on the body. When has this been said? If it is small. But if it is large, it is a defect whether it be on the body or on the face. How big is large? Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, up to an Italic as.” Rebbi Eleazar bar Ḥanina said, for example such a Gordianic denar: its measure is half a ubiquitous gold piece. Rebbi Radifa, Rebbi Jonah: Rebbi Jeremiah asked: A bald woman with a row of hair going from one ear to the other? They wanted to understand it from the following: “They added to them for women mouth odor, sweat odor, and a hairless mole.” They did not mention baldness. They wanted to conclude that it is not a defect. There came Rebbi Samuel the son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun: Rebbi Nasa said, it is a defect. It is listed only if it is ugly for both sexes. But something which is beautiful in one sex but ugly in the other, like a bald pate, even though it is a defect it was not listed. You should know that this is so because a beard is beautiful for a man and a defect for a woman, and we did not state: In addition, for a woman a beard. There are breasts which are beautiful for a woman and a defect for men, and we did not state: In addition, for a man women’s breasts.
Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Pedaiah: Intentionally desecrated Temple property becomes profane without redemption. But did we not state: “In error,” that excludes intention? That you say for the additional fifth and the sacrifice, but profaned it is. Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: The excluded well-being offerings become profane without redemption. But did we not state: “From the sancta,” not all sancta? That you say for the additional fifth and the sacrifice, but profaned it is.
Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Pedaiah: Intentionally desecrated Temple property becomes profane without redemption. But did we not state: “In error,” that excludes intention? That you say for the additional fifth and the sacrifice, but profaned it is. Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: The excluded well-being offerings become profane without redemption. But did we not state: “From the sancta,” not all sancta? That you say for the additional fifth and the sacrifice, but profaned it is.
“As daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen she may eat heave.” Some Tannaïm state: She may not eat heave. Rebbi Hila said, the one who says that she may eat heave refers to the case that the second man is a Cohen, but the one who says that she may not eat heave refers to the case that the second man is not a Cohen.
“From today and after 30 days.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even preliminary marriages of a hundred men apply to her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it was necessary [to state], even if the second preliminarily married her absolutely. Rebbi Isaac bar Tebele asked before Rebbi Eleazar: As you take it; what the first acquired, he acquired; the remainder the second finished. He answered, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? How is that? To any woman who is not acquired by one man only, even preliminary marriages of a hundred men apply.
Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: A proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly wives. What is the reason? Qualified men are warned against disqualified women and disqualified women against qualified men but not qualified women against disqualified men nor disqualified men against qualified women. Did we not state: “they should not take, should not take”, which teaches that the woman is warned through the man? They wanted to say, qualified women against disqualified men but it is only disqualified women against qualified men.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said: There, they state that the one who disqualifies, disqualifies from an unmarried woman, and the one who qualifies, qualifies even from a married woman. Rebbi Tanḥum bar Pappus sent and asked Rebbi Yose about two cases from Alexandria, one involving an unmarried woman, the other a married woman. About the married woman, he wrote him: “A bastard shall not come into the Eternal’s congregation.” About the unmarried woman he wrote, be inventive, for your are not forewarned about the holy daughters of Israel. He said to Rebbi Mana, take and sign; he signed. He said to Rebbi Berekhiah, take and sign, but he did not agree. After they ended the session Rebbi Mana was standing with Rebbi Berekhiah and asked him, why did you not sign? He answered, did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say that there, they state that the one who disqualifies, disqualifies from an unmarried woman, and the one who qualifies, qualifies even from a married woman? He said, praised be the Merciful that I had not heard this doctrine, for if I had heard this doctrine I would not have signed and people would have said that the student disagrees with his teacher. Mar Uqban said, here, you say that the one who disqualifies, disqualifies from an unmarried woman, and the one who qualifies, qualifies from an unmarried woman, but about a married woman, nothing was said. The next morning he came and wanted to sign. He said to him, there is no space.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said: There, they state that the one who disqualifies, disqualifies from an unmarried woman, and the one who qualifies, qualifies even from a married woman. Rebbi Tanḥum bar Pappus sent and asked Rebbi Yose about two cases from Alexandria, one involving an unmarried woman, the other a married woman. About the married woman, he wrote him: “A bastard shall not come into the Eternal’s congregation.” About the unmarried woman he wrote, be inventive, for your are not forewarned about the holy daughters of Israel. He said to Rebbi Mana, take and sign; he signed. He said to Rebbi Berekhiah, take and sign, but he did not agree. After they ended the session Rebbi Mana was standing with Rebbi Berekhiah and asked him, why did you not sign? He answered, did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say that there, they state that the one who disqualifies, disqualifies from an unmarried woman, and the one who qualifies, qualifies even from a married woman? He said, praised be the Merciful that I had not heard this doctrine, for if I had heard this doctrine I would not have signed and people would have said that the student disagrees with his teacher. Mar Uqban said, here, you say that the one who disqualifies, disqualifies from an unmarried woman, and the one who qualifies, qualifies from an unmarried woman, but about a married woman, nothing was said. The next morning he came and wanted to sign. He said to him, there is no space.
Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba went to Tyre. When he came before Rebbi Joḥanan, he asked him, what case did you handle? He said to him, a proselyte who had been circumcised but had not immersed himself. He asked him, why did you not injure him? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi told him, leave him alone, he acted correctly not to injure him. The argument of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi seems inverted. There, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, in the name of Rebbi Gamliel ben Rebbi: The child is neither qualified nor disqualified but dirtied. And here, he says so? Did we not state: If a proselyte was circumcised but not immersed, immersed but not circumcised, everything depends on circumcision, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Joshua says, immersion also is necessary. But Rebbi Joshua ben Levi follows what Bar Qappara stated, as Bar Qappara stated: A proselyte who was circumcised but not immersed is qualified since there is no proselyte who did not immerse himself for his emission of semen. Is that not difficult? The cleansing from a minor impurity is counted for him for a major impurity? Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, since either one is for the holiness of Israel, it is counted for him.
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Jeremiah said, as a matter of principle, an Israel with an injured testicle may marry a female bastard. Rebbi Yose said, it applies only to family disabilities, not to bodily defects. The strength of Rebbi Yose comes from the statement of Rebbi Ḥilqiah, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One did state this only for an Israel with an injured testicle, but not a Cohen, since, as you say there, if he is certainly a Cohen he is forbidden to marry a convert; here also, he is certainly an Israel and forbidden to marry a female bastard.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says, this my son is a bastard, he cannot be believed,” etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody said, this is my son, he is to be believed.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: To give him, but not to take from him. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah: “Even if both of them say about the fetus in her belly that he is a bastard, they cannot be believed”? Maybe it was said following Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah said, they can be believed; Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: To give him, but not to take from him. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, still it is a baraita: “For he has to recognize the firstborn, the son of the hated one.” If they maintained that he was his son but at the moment of his death he said that he was not his son, he cannot be believed. That he was not his son but at the moment of his death he said that he was his son, he is believed. Some Tannaïm state on the first case that he is believed. Rebbi Ḥisqiah, Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Huna: If they maintained that he was from his slave girl, he is believed. If he was standing next to the customs collectors and said, he is my son, but later he said, he is my slave, he is believed. He is my slave, but later he said, he is my son, he is not believed. Some Tannaïm state, he is believed. Rebbi Mana said, because of those Samaritans who use their sons as slaves.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says, this my son is a bastard, he cannot be believed,” etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody said, this is my son, he is to be believed.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: To give him, but not to take from him. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah: “Even if both of them say about the fetus in her belly that he is a bastard, they cannot be believed”? Maybe it was said following Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah said, they can be believed; Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: To give him, but not to take from him. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, still it is a baraita: “For he has to recognize the firstborn, the son of the hated one.” If they maintained that he was his son but at the moment of his death he said that he was not his son, he cannot be believed. That he was not his son but at the moment of his death he said that he was his son, he is believed. Some Tannaïm state on the first case that he is believed. Rebbi Ḥisqiah, Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Huna: If they maintained that he was from his slave girl, he is believed. If he was standing next to the customs collectors and said, he is my son, but later he said, he is my slave, he is believed. He is my slave, but later he said, he is my son, he is not believed. Some Tannaïm state, he is believed. Rebbi Mana said, because of those Samaritans who use their sons as slaves.
New paragraph. “Rebbi Jehudah says, a bachelor shall not be a shepherd and two bachelors shall not sleep under one cover, but the Sages permit.” Does not Rebbi Jehudah say it correctly? What is the rabbi’s reason? Perish the thought! Jews are not suspected either with males or with animals. But did we not state: “A bachelor shall not be a school teacher”? Because his mother or his sister will come with him.
We have stated: “Four main categories of damages.” But Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thirteen: Damages, suffering, medical costs, loss of earning power, shame; the unpaid trustee, and the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Say now, what we stated [refers to] responsibility for damages. What Rebbi Ḥiyya stated [refers to] both responsibility for damages and bodily injury. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: How can we state “four main categories”? If everything was said about one bull; let us state “three,” if it was said about three bulls, let us state “five”! But as it is presented in the verse, thus it is presented in the Mishnah.
We have stated: “Four main categories of damages.” But Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thirteen: Damages, suffering, medical costs, loss of earning power, shame; the unpaid trustee, and the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Say now, what we stated [refers to] responsibility for damages. What Rebbi Ḥiyya stated [refers to] both responsibility for damages and bodily injury. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: How can we state “four main categories”? If everything was said about one bull; let us state “three,” if it was said about three bulls, let us state “five”! But as it is presented in the verse, thus it is presented in the Mishnah.
We have stated: “Four main categories of damages.” But Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thirteen: Damages, suffering, medical costs, loss of earning power, shame; the unpaid trustee, and the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Say now, what we stated [refers to] responsibility for damages. What Rebbi Ḥiyya stated [refers to] both responsibility for damages and bodily injury. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: How can we state “four main categories”? If everything was said about one bull; let us state “three,” if it was said about three bulls, let us state “five”! But as it is presented in the verse, thus it is presented in the Mishnah.
Derivatives of the tooth. They wanted to say that if a cow ate barley, or a donkey ate leeks, or a dog licked olive oil, or a pig ate meat, all of these are derivatives of the tooth. Rebbi Isaac said, all these are of the essence of the tooth. But did we not state “derivatives of the tooth”? If it stepped on a skin full of oil, since its body enjoys anointing. As one says in general, the tooth eats and the body enjoys, so also here the body enjoys. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If in walking if was disgorging grasses, what is the rule? Rebbi Yose said, just as one who puts a burning coal to the public domain, it causes damage as far as it moves. What does this mean? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it if somebody puts a knife close to the public domain. As you say there, if the fire touches one side, it trembles in its entirety, so also here, a human touches on one side and trembles in his entirety. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Levi: If a pit is full of water and a small lamb fell in, if water enters its ears it trembles in its entirety, so here it trembles in its entirety. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If in walking it tore out grasses with its body or its horns, what is the rule? Is this out of the ordinary? It is its common behavior.