stipulation

A worker who does not trust his employer [in respect of tithes], may take one dried fig and say: “This one and the nine which come after it shall become tithe for the ninety which I shall eat. This one shall become the terumat maaser for them, and the last ones shall be second tithe which shall be exchanged for money.” And he must put aside one dried fig. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: he does not put one aside, because this reduces the work for his employer. Rabbi Yose says: he does not put one aside, because this is a court stipulation [imposed upon the employer].

At first they said: a man may gather wood, stones and grasses from his field, just as he was allowed to do from the field of his fellow, the large ones. When the transgressors increased, they decreed that this one may gather from this one’s field and this one may gather from this one’s field, but not as a [mutual] favor. It doesn’t need to be said that no stipulation can be made for food.

[The produce of] a vineyard in its fourth year was brought up to Jerusalem within a distance of one day’s journey on each side. And what is the border [of a day’s journey on each side]? Eilat to the south, Akrabat on the north, Lod to the west, and the Jordan [river] to the east. When produce increased, it was decreed that it can be redeemed even if the vineyard was close to the wall. And there was a stipulation on this matter, that whenever it was so desired, the arrangement would be restored as it had been before. Rabbi Yose says: this was the stipulation after the Temple was destroyed, and the stipulation was that when the Temple should be rebuilt the arrangement would be restored as it had been before.

[The produce of] a vineyard in its fourth year was brought up to Jerusalem within a distance of one day’s journey on each side. And what is the border [of a day’s journey on each side]? Eilat to the south, Akrabat on the north, Lod to the west, and the Jordan [river] to the east. When produce increased, it was decreed that it can be redeemed even if the vineyard was close to the wall. And there was a stipulation on this matter, that whenever it was so desired, the arrangement would be restored as it had been before. Rabbi Yose says: this was the stipulation after the Temple was destroyed, and the stipulation was that when the Temple should be rebuilt the arrangement would be restored as it had been before.

[The produce of] a vineyard in its fourth year was brought up to Jerusalem within a distance of one day’s journey on each side. And what is the border [of a day’s journey on each side]? Eilat to the south, Akrabat on the north, Lod to the west, and the Jordan [river] to the east. When produce increased, it was decreed that it can be redeemed even if the vineyard was close to the wall. And there was a stipulation on this matter, that whenever it was so desired, the arrangement would be restored as it had been before. Rabbi Yose says: this was the stipulation after the Temple was destroyed, and the stipulation was that when the Temple should be rebuilt the arrangement would be restored as it had been before.

A man may make a stipulation concerning his eruv and say, “If foreigners came from the east, let my eruv be that of the west; [if they came] from the west let my eruv be that of the east; if they came from both directions, I will go in whatever direction I desire; and if they came from neither direction I will be like the people of my town.” [Likewise say,] “If a sage came from the east let my eruv be that of the east; if from the west let my eruv be that of the west; If he came from either direction I will go in whatever direction I desire; and if no one came from either direction I will be like the people of my town.” Rabbi Judah says: if one of them was his teacher he may go only to his teacher, but if both were his teachers he may go in whatever direction he prefers.

They may not sell a synagogue except with the stipulation that it may be bought back whenever they want, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: they may sell it in perpetuity, except for four purposes for it to become one of four things: a bathhouse, a tannery, a ritual bath, or a urinal. Rabbi Judah says: they may sell it to be a courtyard, and the purchaser may do what he likes with it.

All agree that he cannot make a stipulation with her with regard to the time before she was betrothed or after she is divorced. If she secludes herself [with the man about whom she was warned, but after being divorced] and was defiled and subsequently [her husband] took her back, he cannot make a stipulation with her [in regard to this]. This is the general rule: any with whom she has intercourse and was not prohibited to him [at that time] the husband cannot make a stipulation on this.

All agree that he cannot make a stipulation with her with regard to the time before she was betrothed or after she is divorced. If she secludes herself [with the man about whom she was warned, but after being divorced] and was defiled and subsequently [her husband] took her back, he cannot make a stipulation with her [in regard to this]. This is the general rule: any with whom she has intercourse and was not prohibited to him [at that time] the husband cannot make a stipulation on this.

All agree that he cannot make a stipulation with her with regard to the time before she was betrothed or after she is divorced. If she secludes herself [with the man about whom she was warned, but after being divorced] and was defiled and subsequently [her husband] took her back, he cannot make a stipulation with her [in regard to this]. This is the general rule: any with whom she has intercourse and was not prohibited to him [at that time] the husband cannot make a stipulation on this.

If a scribe wrote a get for the husband and a receipt for the wife and by mistake gave the get to the wife and the receipt to the husband and the two exchanged them and after some time the get came out of the hands of the man and the receipt out of the hands of the woman, she must leave both husbands and all these things apply to her. Rabbi Eliezer says: if [it comes out of her hands] immediately, it is not a get, but if [it comes out of her hands] after some time, it is a get; it is not in the power of the first to render void the right of the second. If a man wrote a get with which to divorce his wife and then changed his mind, Bet Shammai says that he has disqualified her from marrying a priest. Bet Hillel says that even if he gave it to her with a certain stipulation, if the condition was not fulfilled, he has not disqualified her for marrying a priest.

If a report goes out in the town: “[A certain woman is] betrothed,” she is regarded as betrothed; [If a report goes out in the town: “A certain woman is] divorced,” she is regarded as divorced. [This is only the case] provided the report has no qualification. What is meant by a qualification? [If the report is,] “So-and-so divorced his wife with a stipulation” [or], “He threw her the betrothal money, but it is uncertain whether it landed nearer to her or nearer to him” this is a qualification.

Rabbi Meir says: every stipulation which is not like that of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben is not a [valid] stipulation, as it say, “And Moses said to them, ‘If the children of Gad and the children of Reuben will pass [with you over the Jordan, then you shall give them the land of Gilead for a possession].” and it is also written, “But if they will not pass over with you armed, [then they shall have possessions among you in the land of Canaan]” (Numbers 32:29-30). Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel says: the matter had to be stated, for had it not been stated it would have implied that even in Canaan they should not inherit.

Rabbi Meir says: every stipulation which is not like that of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben is not a [valid] stipulation, as it say, “And Moses said to them, ‘If the children of Gad and the children of Reuben will pass [with you over the Jordan, then you shall give them the land of Gilead for a possession].” and it is also written, “But if they will not pass over with you armed, [then they shall have possessions among you in the land of Canaan]” (Numbers 32:29-30). Rabbi Hanina ben Gamaliel says: the matter had to be stated, for had it not been stated it would have implied that even in Canaan they should not inherit.

If a beast died a natural death this counts as an unavoidable accident [for which a hirer or paid guardian is not liable]. But if he tortured it and it died it does not count as an unavoidable accident [and the hirer and paid guardian would be liable]. If it was led up to the top of a crag and it fell down and died, this does not count as an unavoidable accident. An unpaid guardian may make a stipulation that he will be exempt from taking an oath, and a borrower [may make a stipulation that he will be exempt] from making restitution, and a paid guardian and a hirer [may make a stipulation that they will be exempt] from taking an oath or from making restitution.

If a beast died a natural death this counts as an unavoidable accident [for which a hirer or paid guardian is not liable]. But if he tortured it and it died it does not count as an unavoidable accident [and the hirer and paid guardian would be liable]. If it was led up to the top of a crag and it fell down and died, this does not count as an unavoidable accident. An unpaid guardian may make a stipulation that he will be exempt from taking an oath, and a borrower [may make a stipulation that he will be exempt] from making restitution, and a paid guardian and a hirer [may make a stipulation that they will be exempt] from taking an oath or from making restitution.

If a beast died a natural death this counts as an unavoidable accident [for which a hirer or paid guardian is not liable]. But if he tortured it and it died it does not count as an unavoidable accident [and the hirer and paid guardian would be liable]. If it was led up to the top of a crag and it fell down and died, this does not count as an unavoidable accident. An unpaid guardian may make a stipulation that he will be exempt from taking an oath, and a borrower [may make a stipulation that he will be exempt] from making restitution, and a paid guardian and a hirer [may make a stipulation that they will be exempt] from taking an oath or from making restitution.

If one makes a stipulation contrary to that which is written in the Torah he stipulation is void. Any stipulation that mentions first the action is void. Any stipulation that can in the end be fulfilled and was laid down as a condition from the beginning, such a condition is valid.

If one makes a stipulation contrary to that which is written in the Torah he stipulation is void. Any stipulation that mentions first the action is void. Any stipulation that can in the end be fulfilled and was laid down as a condition from the beginning, such a condition is valid.

If one makes a stipulation contrary to that which is written in the Torah he stipulation is void. Any stipulation that mentions first the action is void. Any stipulation that can in the end be fulfilled and was laid down as a condition from the beginning, such a condition is valid.

If one makes a stipulation contrary to that which is written in the Torah he stipulation is void. Any stipulation that mentions first the action is void. Any stipulation that can in the end be fulfilled and was laid down as a condition from the beginning, such a condition is valid.

If one was taking terumah from a cistern and said: "Let this be terumah provided it comes up safely," [it is implied that he meant] safely from being broken or spilled, but not from becoming impure; But Rabbi Shimon says: also from impurity. If it were broken, it does not render [the contents of the cistern] subject to the restrictions of terumah. How far away can it be broken and still not make [the contents of the cistern] subject to terumah restrictions? Only so far that if it rolls back, it can reach the cistern. Rabbi Yose says: even if one had the intention of making such a stipulation, but did not do so, and it broke, it does not make the [contents of the cistern] subject to terumah restrictions, for this is a stipulation laid down by the court.

If one was taking terumah from a cistern and said: "Let this be terumah provided it comes up safely," [it is implied that he meant] safely from being broken or spilled, but not from becoming impure; But Rabbi Shimon says: also from impurity. If it were broken, it does not render [the contents of the cistern] subject to the restrictions of terumah. How far away can it be broken and still not make [the contents of the cistern] subject to terumah restrictions? Only so far that if it rolls back, it can reach the cistern. Rabbi Yose says: even if one had the intention of making such a stipulation, but did not do so, and it broke, it does not make the [contents of the cistern] subject to terumah restrictions, for this is a stipulation laid down by the court.

It was stated only for someone acting in error, not intentionally, as we have stated: If he forgot to tithe, if he had made no previous stipulation. But with a stipulation, one eats even on the stipulation by a friend.

It was stated only for someone acting in error, not intentionally, as we have stated: If he forgot to tithe, if he had made no previous stipulation. But with a stipulation, one eats even on the stipulation by a friend.

It was stated only for someone acting in error, not intentionally, as we have stated: If he forgot to tithe, if he had made no previous stipulation. But with a stipulation, one eats even on the stipulation by a friend.

If one gives tithe and after that heave, one has preceded. First heave and after that tithe, might he not give too little tithe or add to his tithe? As we have stated, he who gives too little tithe, his tithes are in order but his produce is damaged, if he gives too much tithe, his tithes are damaged but his produce is in order. Rebbi Yose said, he relies on a stipulation by the Court. What is the stipulation by the Court? As far as one’s mind might err.

If one gives tithe and after that heave, one has preceded. First heave and after that tithe, might he not give too little tithe or add to his tithe? As we have stated, he who gives too little tithe, his tithes are in order but his produce is damaged, if he gives too much tithe, his tithes are damaged but his produce is in order. Rebbi Yose said, he relies on a stipulation by the Court. What is the stipulation by the Court? As far as one’s mind might err.

What is a stipulation by the Court? That one should fix the First Tithe to the North, Second Tithe to the South, and the heave of the tithe at the extreme North. What is a stipulation by the Court? It is that if the Second Tithe is redeemed, that which is in excess is also redeemed. All this refers to dry produce; for fluids?

What is a stipulation by the Court? That one should fix the First Tithe to the North, Second Tithe to the South, and the heave of the tithe at the extreme North. What is a stipulation by the Court? It is that if the Second Tithe is redeemed, that which is in excess is also redeemed. All this refers to dry produce; for fluids?

HALAKHAH: The rabbis object to Rebbi Eliezer: How did they acquire? He said to them, do you not agree with me that if they agreed among themselves, tithes go to the workers? Even if they made a condition, how did they acquire? If there is nothing said, it is as if somebody said: Harvest from this land so that its tithes should be yours. They said to him, there is no stipulation here; if nothing is said there is no stipulation. It is as if he said, harvest this land on condition that you take one tenth for yourselves.

HALAKHAH: The rabbis object to Rebbi Eliezer: How did they acquire? He said to them, do you not agree with me that if they agreed among themselves, tithes go to the workers? Even if they made a condition, how did they acquire? If there is nothing said, it is as if somebody said: Harvest from this land so that its tithes should be yours. They said to him, there is no stipulation here; if nothing is said there is no stipulation. It is as if he said, harvest this land on condition that you take one tenth for yourselves.

MISHNAH: A worker who does not believe his employer takes one dried fig and says: This one and the next nine shall be tithe for ninety that I shall eat. This one is made heave of the tithe for them. The Second Tithe is at the end and it is redeemed by a coin. He saves one fig. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he should not save because he reduces the work he will be able to do for his employer. But Rebbi Yose said, he should not save because that is a stipulation of the Court.

Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: It is a stipulation of the Court that the heave of the tithe should be from the worker and the Second Tithe from the employer.

HALAKHAH: : Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one has to specify a stipulation and say: If ṭevel is in my hands, it shall be tithe, but if tithe is in my hands, it shall be heave of the tithe. Rebbi Jonah said, one has to add the converse stipulation and say, otherwise I did not do anything. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not have to add the converse stipulation. Either one of them follows his own opinion, since they disagreed: Two heaps of grain, in one of them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are both forbidden as dema‘, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they are not forbidden.

HALAKHAH: : Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one has to specify a stipulation and say: If ṭevel is in my hands, it shall be tithe, but if tithe is in my hands, it shall be heave of the tithe. Rebbi Jonah said, one has to add the converse stipulation and say, otherwise I did not do anything. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not have to add the converse stipulation. Either one of them follows his own opinion, since they disagreed: Two heaps of grain, in one of them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are both forbidden as dema‘, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they are not forbidden.

HALAKHAH: : Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one has to specify a stipulation and say: If ṭevel is in my hands, it shall be tithe, but if tithe is in my hands, it shall be heave of the tithe. Rebbi Jonah said, one has to add the converse stipulation and say, otherwise I did not do anything. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not have to add the converse stipulation. Either one of them follows his own opinion, since they disagreed: Two heaps of grain, in one of them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are both forbidden as dema‘, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they are not forbidden.

Rebbi Jehudah ben Shalom, Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazy in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan. They formulated the symphon according to Rebbi Meïr in Qiddušin. Rebbi Jeremiah: Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, asked: Why does it have to follow Rebbi Meïr but not also the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” Why can he not say “on condition” but not double his stipulation? If he did not double his stipulation, could this eliminate the preliminary marriage? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everywhere Rebbi Meïr holds that from “no” you infer “yes”, except here? Rebbi Mattaniah said, one is more restrictive in matters of incest and adultery.

Rebbi Jehudah ben Shalom, Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazy in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan. They formulated the symphon according to Rebbi Meïr in Qiddušin. Rebbi Jeremiah: Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, asked: Why does it have to follow Rebbi Meïr but not also the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” Why can he not say “on condition” but not double his stipulation? If he did not double his stipulation, could this eliminate the preliminary marriage? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everywhere Rebbi Meïr holds that from “no” you infer “yes”, except here? Rebbi Mattaniah said, one is more restrictive in matters of incest and adultery.

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: It is a stipulation of the Court that one dedicate his Pesaḥ and the other his money. He lets him subscribe to his [part] and the money automatically becomes profane. How? It becomes profane and then dedicated again? Or for this purpose it was dedicated from the start? What is the difference between them? If he dedicated 100 mina for his Pesaḥ and used 50 to subscribe. If you are saying that it becomes profane and is dedicated again, the remainder of the monies are profane. If you are saying that for this purpose he dedicated it from the start, the rest of the monies are (profane) [dedicated]. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Samuel bar Abba asked: Think of it if he lets him subscribe gratis. Where do you have “becomes profane and is dedicated again”? The words of the rabbis imply that it does not become profane and then dedicated again. We have stated there: “If he gave her monies, they are permitted; wines, oils, and fine flour, or anything of whose kind one offers on the altar, are forbidden.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he lets him subscribe to his Pesaḥ and to his festival offering. This implies that it does not become profane and then dedicated again. If you would say that it becomes profane and then dedicated again, it would be forbidden as harlot’s wages. Explain it if nothing was given into his hand; you should know as it was stated there, “he can bring for him nests for male or female sufferers from genital discharges, nests for childbirth;” not if nothing came into his hands? Here also if nothing came into his hands.

HALAKHAH: The members of a group of which one had beautiful hands were entitled to tell him, take your part and eat alone Not only Pesaḥ, but even if they made a meal by contributions they are entitled to tell him, take your part and eat alone, if they did know him, since this was a stipulation from the start.

As they disagreed: If it was compounded as profane, Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, it is disqualified; Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, it is qualified. What is Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina’s reason? It is holy, that it shall be brought into the Sanctuary. What is Rebbi Joshua ben Levi’s reason? It is holy, that it shall be brought from the contributions to the treasury. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina’s parallels Samuel and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi’s Rebbi Joḥanan , as we have stated, “if one dedicated his property to the Temple and there were objects appropriate as public offerings.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, incense. Rebbi Hoshaia said, explain it about an artisan of the family Eutinos [who took incense as his wages.] And Rebbi Joshua ben Levi’s is like Samuel, as Rebbi Ḥuna said in the name of Samuel, they made the mortar a vessel of sacred service. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Ḥuna said this before Rebbi Yose: something sanctified in a vessel may be redeemed. He said to him, is that not Samuel’s? Since Samuel said, it is slight in the case of leftovers. As they disagreed: If daily sacrifices were left over, Samuel says, they are redeemed unblemished. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are redeemed as disqualified sancta. Leftover he-goats, in Samuel’s opinion if elevation sacrifices are redeemed, a purification sacrifice so much more. In Rebbi Joḥanan ’s opinion? Rebbi Zeˋira said, they shall graze. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, one uses them to adorn the altar. This is difficult. May a purification sacrifice be brought as elevation sacrifice? Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for public sacrifices are determined only by slaughter. Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Tradion said, it is a stipulation of the Court that all leftovers should be brought as elevation sacrifices.

As they disagreed: If it was compounded as profane, Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, it is disqualified; Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, it is qualified. What is Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina’s reason? It is holy, that it shall be brought into the Sanctuary. What is Rebbi Joshua ben Levi’s reason? It is holy, that it shall be brought from the disbursement from the lodge. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina’s parallels Samuel and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi’s Rebbi Joḥanan, as we have stated, “if one dedicated his property to the Temple and there were objects appropriate as public offerings.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, incense. Rebbi Hoshaia said, explain it about an artisan of the family Eutinos who took incense as his wages. And Rebbi Joshua ben Levi’s is like Samuel, as Rav Ḥuna said in the name of Samuel, they made the mortar a vessel to sanctify. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Ḥuna said this before Rebbi Yose: something sanctified in a vessel may be redeemed. He said to him, is that not Samuel’s? Since Samuel said, one is lenient in the case of leftovers. As they disagreed: If unblemished animals were left over, Samuel says, they are redeemed unblemished. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they are redeemed as disqualified sancta. Leftover he-goats, in Samuel’s opinion if elevation sacrifices are redeemed, a purification sacrifice so much more. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion? Rebbi Ze`ira said, they shall graze. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, one uses them to adorn the altar. This is difficult. May a purification sacrifice be brought as elevation sacrifice? Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for public sacrifices are determined only by slaughter. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is a stipulation of the Court that all leftovers should be brought as elevation sacrifices.

And it is difficult. May purification offering be brought as elevation offering? Rebbi Ḥizqiah (brother) in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is a stipulation of the Court that the excesses be brought as elevation sacrifices. By what is that woman atoned for? Rebbi Isaac said, it is a stipulation of the Court that the providers of nests also provide the disqualified ones. Would it not also be necessary between incense and wood, and frankincense, and gold for the cover? As it is stated at the end, “one follows nearness; in the middle one is stringent.”

And it is difficult. May purification offering be brought as elevation offering? Rebbi Ḥizqiah (brother) in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is a stipulation of the Court that the excesses be brought as elevation sacrifices. By what is that woman atoned for? Rebbi Isaac said, it is a stipulation of the Court that the providers of nests also provide the disqualified ones. Would it not also be necessary between incense and wood, and frankincense, and gold for the cover? As it is stated at the end, “one follows nearness; in the middle one is stringent.”

MISHNAH: If it was found in the countryside, limbs are carrion, cuts are permitted. On holidays, when meat is abundant, even limbs are permitted. Rebbi Simeon said, the Court stipulated seven things, and this was one of them: If a Gentile sent his elevation offering from overseas also sent its libations, they are brought from his property; otherwise they are brought from public money. Similarly, if a proselyte died and the estate includes well-being offerings; if he also has flour offerings they are brought from his property; otherwise they are brought from public money. It is a stipulation of the Court that the flour offering of a deceased High Priest be brought from public money; Rebbi Jehudah says, from his heirs, and it was brought whole. About salt and wood that the Cohanim may use them, and about the Cow that one does not commit larceny with its ashes. And about disqualified nests that they be charged to the public; Rebbi Yose says, he who provides the nests provides the disqualified ones.

HALAKHAH: The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said (more)<to his son>` this was taught for their monetary value. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, does one say to a person, go and commit larceny with sacrifices? But they followed the majority of cases: If most are male, they are elevation offerings, if most are female, well-being offerings. But do not well-being offerings come from males and females? What does he do? He redeems them as profane and then turns them into elevation offerings. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it is a stipulation by the court that all redundant animals should be brought as elevation offerings, so it is a stipulation by the court that lost animals should be brought as elevation offerings. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, is that not intentional misuse? He said to him, since it is a stipulation by the court, it is not intentional misuse.

HALAKHAH: The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said (more)<to his son>` this was taught for their monetary value. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, does one say to a person, go and commit larceny with sacrifices? But they followed the majority of cases: If most are male, they are elevation offerings, if most are female, well-being offerings. But do not well-being offerings come from males and females? What does he do? He redeems them as profane and then turns them into elevation offerings. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it is a stipulation by the court that all redundant animals should be brought as elevation offerings, so it is a stipulation by the court that lost animals should be brought as elevation offerings. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, is that not intentional misuse? He said to him, since it is a stipulation by the court, it is not intentional misuse.

HALAKHAH: The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said (more)<to his son>` this was taught for their monetary value. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, does one say to a person, go and commit larceny with sacrifices? But they followed the majority of cases: If most are male, they are elevation offerings, if most are female, well-being offerings. But do not well-being offerings come from males and females? What does he do? He redeems them as profane and then turns them into elevation offerings. Rebbi Ze`ira said, it is a stipulation by the court that all redundant animals should be brought as elevation offerings, so it is a stipulation by the court that lost animals should be brought as elevation offerings. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, is that not intentional misuse? He said to him, since it is a stipulation by the court, it is not intentional misuse.

By what is that woman atoned for? Rebbi Isaac said, it is a stipulation of the Court that the providers of nests also provide the disqualified and the lost ones.

It is difficult for the House of Hillel, could he not have the right to separate heave? Think of it, if he made a stipulation! One because of the other. And why was ḥallah stated? Because of ḥallah which was separated on the holiday. As it was stated: “if one kneads dough on a holiday, he separates its ḥallah on the holiday. If he kneaded it before the holiday but forgot to take its ḥallah, it is forbidden to move it; it is unnecessary to say, to take ḥallah from it.” If he mixed water and flour? He only mentioned “kneaded”, so not when he mixed? Rebbi Samuel, brother of Rebbi Berekhiah, said: explain it if the dough was impure where he takes ḥallah only at the end. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it should have been the rule that for pure dough one should take ḥallah only at the end. They instituted that one should take it at the start, lest the dough become impure. The Mishnah is about the holiday of Passover; therefore on Pentecost and Tabernacles it is permitted. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, Rebbi Ḥuna in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, even on Pentecost and Tabernacles it is prohibited, because of no work shall be done on them.

Rebbi Ḥiyya the Elder came to his house. They told him, we forgot to make eruv. He asked them, are there peas left from yesterday? They said to him, yes. Does this imply, even one kind? It contained spinach. Does this imply even if it is less than the volume of an olive? It was a full measure. Does that imply that it does not need a declaration? Rav Ḥisda said, the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya had made a stipulation.

HALAKHAH: “She says, I was injured by wood,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, that follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said the ketubah of one injured by wood is 200 [zuz]. Rebbi Yose said, we would think to say, when did Rebbi Meïr disagree with those rabbis? If he took her in assuming she was injured by wood. But if he took her in assuming she was a virgin and it turned out she was injured by wood, then even Rebbi Meïr agrees, since we have stated: “She says, I was injured by wood, but he says not so, you were trampled on by a man.” That means, there is a disagreement even if he took her in assuming she was injured by wood and she turned out to have been injured by wood. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and my ketubah is 200 [zuz]. He says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and you have no claim on me. What are we talking about? If he married her as a virgin and she turns out to have been injured by wood, Rebbi Meïr will agree. If he married her as one injured by wood and she turns out to have been injured by wood, is there a recognizable difference in the opening of the door between wood or man? Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and so I stipulated with you, but he says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and there was no stipulation between you and me.

MISHNAH: If he did not write her a ketubah, a virgin collects 200 [zuz] and a widow 100, for this is a stipulation enforced by the court. If he substituted something valued at a mina for the 200 zuz and did not write “that all my property is guaranty for your ketubah,” he still is obligated by it, for this is a stipulation enforced by the court.

MISHNAH: If he did not write her a ketubah, a virgin collects 200 [zuz] and a widow 100, for this is a stipulation enforced by the court. If he substituted something valued at a mina for the 200 zuz and did not write “that all my property is guaranty for your ketubah,” he still is obligated by it, for this is a stipulation enforced by the court.

MISHNAH: If he did not write her “if you are kidnapped I shall ransom you and bring you back as my wife,” or for Cohens’ wives “I shall return you to your country,” he is obligated, for this is a stipulation enforced by the court. If she was kidnapped he is obligated to ransom her. If he said, here is her divorce document and her ketubah, let her redeem herself; he is not allowed to do that. If she was smitten, he is obligated to heal her. If he said, here is her divorce document and her ketubah, let her redeem herself; he is allowed to do that.

MISHNAH: If he did not write her “the male children you will have from me shall inherit the amount of your ketubah in addition to their part with their brothers”; he is obligated, for this is a stipulation enforced by the court.

MISHNAH: “The female children you will have by me shall live in my house and be supported by my estate until they are married to men”; he is obligated, for this is a stipulation enforced by the court.

MISHNAH: “And you shall dwell in my house and be supported by my property during all of your widowhood”; he is obligated, for this is a stipulation enforced by the court.

A man said when he was dying: “This man’s wife should be paid her ketubah.” The case came before Rebbi Mana, who said, let the words of the deceased be confirmed. Rebbi Ḥanina said to him: Can a person do away verbally with a ketubah stipulation? He answered, since you are saying that, what is your reason? He said to him, are we not living in Galilee? And we are taught to say that the people of Galilee prefer their honor over their money.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody went overseas,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, if he sues with reasons. This means, only if four [owners] surround him. Samuel says, even if one surrounds him on all sides. Joshua’s stipulation! “If he was lost in vineyards or fields, he crosses and leaves until he reaches a road to his house, even a plot full of vineyards, for this is one of the conditions under which Joshua distributed the Land to Israel.” Joshua stated this to leave, maybe to enter? Joshua stipulated for a person, perhaps for his cow? Rebbi Yose said, his cow usually returns; since a swarm of bees does not usually return, they treated it as if it were his body.

HALAKHAH: The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr says, one has to double one’s stipulation. It follows everybody’s opinion; one tells him: Watch and keep discipline. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr or Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema, as it was stated: “This is your bill of divorce, on condition that you not fly in the air, that you not cross the Sea on your feet, that is a bill of divorce. On condition that you fly in the air, that you cross the Sea on your feet, that is no bill of divorce; Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema said, it is a bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you should realize that he seeks a subterfuge for the bill of divorce, since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied. What is Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema’s reason? Since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied, it is as if the condition attached to the bill of divorce were satisfied.

“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.

“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.

“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.

“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.

“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.

There, we have stated: “An animal that is found as from Jerusalem to Migdal-Eder in every direction.” The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, this was taught for their monetary value. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, does one say to a person, go and commit larceny with sacrifices? But in every case they followed the majority of cases: If most are male, they are elevation offerings, if most are female, well-being offerings. But do not well-being offerings come from males and females? What does he do? He redeems them as profane and then turns them into elevation offerings. This is difficult. Can a purification offering become an elevation offering? Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is a stipulation by the court that all redundant animals should be brought as elevation offerings. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Jacob bar Ḥama, is that not intentional [misuse]? He said to him, since it is a stipulation by the court, it is not intentional [misuse]. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, as you say there, it is a stipulation by the court that lost animals should be brought as elevation offerings.

There, we have stated: “An animal that is found as from Jerusalem to Migdal-Eder in every direction.” The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, this was taught for their monetary value. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, does one say to a person, go and commit larceny with sacrifices? But in every case they followed the majority of cases: If most are male, they are elevation offerings, if most are female, well-being offerings. But do not well-being offerings come from males and females? What does he do? He redeems them as profane and then turns them into elevation offerings. This is difficult. Can a purification offering become an elevation offering? Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is a stipulation by the court that all redundant animals should be brought as elevation offerings. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Jacob bar Ḥama, is that not intentional [misuse]? He said to him, since it is a stipulation by the court, it is not intentional [misuse]. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, as you say there, it is a stipulation by the court that lost animals should be brought as elevation offerings.

There, we have stated: “An animal that is found as from Jerusalem to Migdal-Eder in every direction.” The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, this was taught for their monetary value. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, does one say to a person, go and commit larceny with sacrifices? But in every case they followed the majority of cases: If most are male, they are elevation offerings, if most are female, well-being offerings. But do not well-being offerings come from males and females? What does he do? He redeems them as profane and then turns them into elevation offerings. This is difficult. Can a purification offering become an elevation offering? Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is a stipulation by the court that all redundant animals should be brought as elevation offerings. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Jacob bar Ḥama, is that not intentional [misuse]? He said to him, since it is a stipulation by the court, it is not intentional [misuse]. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, as you say there, it is a stipulation by the court that lost animals should be brought as elevation offerings.

Rebbi Jehudah bar Sisin, Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazy in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. They formulated the symphōn according to Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, asked: Why does it have to follow Rebbi Meïr but not also the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” Why can he not say “on condition” but not double his stipulation? If he did not double his stipulation, could this eliminate the preliminary marriage? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everywhere Rebbi Meïr holds that from “no” you infer “yes”, except here? Rebbi Mattaniah said, one is more restrictive in matters of incest and adultery.

Rebbi Jehudah bar Sisin, Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazy in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. They formulated the symphōn according to Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, asked: Why does it have to follow Rebbi Meïr but not also the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” Why can he not say “on condition” but not double his stipulation? If he did not double his stipulation, could this eliminate the preliminary marriage? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everywhere Rebbi Meïr holds that from “no” you infer “yes”, except here? Rebbi Mattaniah said, one is more restrictive in matters of incest and adultery.

“Similarly, a swarm of bees is his if the owners had given up hope of recovery.” Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappos in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah is about a swarm taken in flight and from a schoolboy, and only immediately. But if one left and returned, I am saying that he said it because of fear, or being seduced. It was stated: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa says, it is a stipulation by the court that this one may cut a branch and pay for it since on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land to Israel.

HALAKHAH: “One comes with his amphora of wine,” etc. It was stated: “Two people are in the desert; in the hand of one is an amphora of water, in the other’s hand an amphora of honey. If the water amphora springs a leak it is a stipulation of the court that the other pour out his honey in order to save the water since water sustains life in the desert but not honey.” It was stated: “If a worker and a poor man climbed on a tree and broke a branch; if workers are supposed to climb the tree they are not liable, otherwise they are liable.”

Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: A stipulation produced by the creditor in the creditor’s handwrtiting is invalid, for I am saying that he has trained in writing documents. This implies that in the hand of another it would be valid. Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Samuel: A stipulation is only valid if it is in the possession of the creditor but written by the debtor. But did we not state: “That our father did not charge us, that our father did not tell us, that we did not find a document among our father’s documents that this note was paid.” Therefore, it might be found paid. What about this? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it that it was a testamentary gift., since people are not likely to impair their testamentary gifts.

Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: A stipulation produced by the creditor in the creditor’s handwrtiting is invalid, for I am saying that he has trained in writing documents. This implies that in the hand of another it would be valid. Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Samuel: A stipulation is only valid if it is in the possession of the creditor but written by the debtor. But did we not state: “That our father did not charge us, that our father did not tell us, that we did not find a document among our father’s documents that this note was paid.” Therefore, it might be found paid. What about this? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it that it was a testamentary gift., since people are not likely to impair their testamentary gifts.

In Tiberias one does not work early or late. In Bet Ma‘on one works early and late. People from Tiberias who climb up to be hired in Bet Ma‘on are hired on the terms of Bet Maon. People from Bet Ma‘on who descend to Tiberias are hired on the terms of Tiberias. But an employer from Tiberias who climbs up to hire workers in Bet Maon can tell them, you should not think that I could not find workers to hire in Tiberias but came up because I heard that you start early and work late. At a place where there is no common usage, Jehudah ben Buni, Rebbi Immi, Rav Jehudah: It is a stipulation of the court that the early part of morning belong to the workers and the late part of evening to the employer. What is the reason? “You make darkness, there is night; the young lions roar for prey; You give to them, they are collecting; the sun shines, they return; man leaves for his work.” (In the evening) [Fridays] both early rising and late going is at the employer’s expense. How much? That he may fill an amphora of water, fry himself a fish, and light the candle.

MISHNAH: One wolf is not an unavoidable accident, two wolves are. Rebbi Jehudah says, in times when wolves appear in packs, even a single wolf is an unavoidable accident. Two dogs are not an unavoidable accident. Yaddua the Babylonian says in the name of Rebbi Meїr: From the same direction it is not an unavoidable accident; from two different directions it is an unavoidable accident Robbers are an unavoidable accident. A lion, and a bear, and a leopard, and a panther, and a snake are unavoidable accidents. When? If they came by themselves. But if he led [the flock] to a place of troops of wild animals or robbers, these are not unavoidable accidents. If [an animal] dies a natural death it is an unavoidable accident. If he tortured it and it died, it is not an unavoidable accident. If it climbed to the top of a cliff and fell, it is an unavoidable accident. If he led it onto the top of a cliff and it fell, it is not an unavoidable accident. The unpaid keeper may stipulate that he be free from swearing, the borrower that he not be liable to pay, the paid keeper and the renter that they not be liable to swear or to pay. The stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid. Any stipulation which follows a prior action is invalid. But any stipulation which it is possible to fulfill at the end and he stipulated it at the start is valid.

MISHNAH: One wolf is not an unavoidable accident, two wolves are. Rebbi Jehudah says, in times when wolves appear in packs, even a single wolf is an unavoidable accident. Two dogs are not an unavoidable accident. Yaddua the Babylonian says in the name of Rebbi Meїr: From the same direction it is not an unavoidable accident; from two different directions it is an unavoidable accident Robbers are an unavoidable accident. A lion, and a bear, and a leopard, and a panther, and a snake are unavoidable accidents. When? If they came by themselves. But if he led [the flock] to a place of troops of wild animals or robbers, these are not unavoidable accidents. If [an animal] dies a natural death it is an unavoidable accident. If he tortured it and it died, it is not an unavoidable accident. If it climbed to the top of a cliff and fell, it is an unavoidable accident. If he led it onto the top of a cliff and it fell, it is not an unavoidable accident. The unpaid keeper may stipulate that he be free from swearing, the borrower that he not be liable to pay, the paid keeper and the renter that they not be liable to swear or to pay. The stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid. Any stipulation which follows a prior action is invalid. But any stipulation which it is possible to fulfill at the end and he stipulated it at the start is valid.

MISHNAH: One wolf is not an unavoidable accident, two wolves are. Rebbi Jehudah says, in times when wolves appear in packs, even a single wolf is an unavoidable accident. Two dogs are not an unavoidable accident. Yaddua the Babylonian says in the name of Rebbi Meїr: From the same direction it is not an unavoidable accident; from two different directions it is an unavoidable accident Robbers are an unavoidable accident. A lion, and a bear, and a leopard, and a panther, and a snake are unavoidable accidents. When? If they came by themselves. But if he led [the flock] to a place of troops of wild animals or robbers, these are not unavoidable accidents. If [an animal] dies a natural death it is an unavoidable accident. If he tortured it and it died, it is not an unavoidable accident. If it climbed to the top of a cliff and fell, it is an unavoidable accident. If he led it onto the top of a cliff and it fell, it is not an unavoidable accident. The unpaid keeper may stipulate that he be free from swearing, the borrower that he not be liable to pay, the paid keeper and the renter that they not be liable to swear or to pay. The stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid. Any stipulation which follows a prior action is invalid. But any stipulation which it is possible to fulfill at the end and he stipulated it at the start is valid.

HALAKHAH: “One wolf is not an unavoidable accident,” etc. “The stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah,” etc. It was stated: “The stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, monetary stipulations are valid, nonmonetary stipulations are invalid.” How is this? If one said to a woman: be preliminarily married to me on condition that you have no claim on me for sustenance, clothing, and marital relations, she is preliminarily married [and his stipulation is valid. “On condition] that it I die you shall not be obligated for levirate marriage, she is preliminarily married but his stipulation is invalid.”

HALAKHAH: “One wolf is not an unavoidable accident,” etc. “The stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah,” etc. It was stated: “The stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, monetary stipulations are valid, nonmonetary stipulations are invalid.” How is this? If one said to a woman: be preliminarily married to me on condition that you have no claim on me for sustenance, clothing, and marital relations, she is preliminarily married [and his stipulation is valid. “On condition] that it I die you shall not be obligated for levirate marriage, she is preliminarily married but his stipulation is invalid.”

HALAKHAH: “One wolf is not an unavoidable accident,” etc. “The stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah,” etc. It was stated: “The stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, monetary stipulations are valid, nonmonetary stipulations are invalid.” How is this? If one said to a woman: be preliminarily married to me on condition that you have no claim on me for sustenance, clothing, and marital relations, she is preliminarily married [and his stipulation is valid. “On condition] that it I die you shall not be obligated for levirate marriage, she is preliminarily married but his stipulation is invalid.”

HALAKHAH: “One wolf is not an unavoidable accident,” etc. “The stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah,” etc. It was stated: “The stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, monetary stipulations are valid, nonmonetary stipulations are invalid.” How is this? If one said to a woman: be preliminarily married to me on condition that you have no claim on me for sustenance, clothing, and marital relations, she is preliminarily married [and his stipulation is valid. “On condition] that it I die you shall not be obligated for levirate marriage, she is preliminarily married but his stipulation is invalid.”

Rebbi Isaac said: About those who write, if she should die without children, all that was hers shall revert to her father. This is a stipulation about money; the stipulation is valid.

Rebbi Isaac said: About those who write, if she should die without children, all that was hers shall revert to her father. This is a stipulation about money; the stipulation is valid.

Rebbi Yose said: About those who write, “if she hates, if she is hated”. This is a stipulation about money; the rabbis upheld it.

The following is obvious: If her husband did not dissolve [the vow] for the first woman and she (remained) in her vow, she is whipped. Can the second he whipped? Rebbi Yose said, since one is whipped, the other also is whipped. Rebbi Yudan said, is this a stipulation of the court? Should not the second be treated as one who said, “a shall be a nezirah[after] thirty days”? Rebbi Simeon follows his own opinion, for he said, it depends on the collection.

“The army of Persia and Media, the governors” (Esther 1:3). But elsewhere it is written, [The chronicles] of the kings of Media and Persia” (Esther 10:2). Rava said: They [the Medes and Persians] made a stipulation with one another, saying, if we supply the kings, you will supply the Governors, and if you supply the kings we will supply the Governors.

Abaye objected: What was this a case of? If we say that they sold [something sacred] and had money left over [after purchasing a new one], then even if they made a stipulation [that they could do what they liked with it], what does it matter?

Rather, ... we must say that they collected money and some was left over, and the reason is given that “they made a stipulation” but if they made no stipulation they cannot [use the left over].

Rather, ... we must say that they collected money and some was left over, and the reason is given that “they made a stipulation” but if they made no stipulation they cannot [use the left over].

[No, what is meant] is that they sold and had something left, and this is what it should say: When does this rule apply? When the seven “good men” of the town did not make any stipulation in the assembly of the townspeople; but if the seven good men of the town made a stipulation in the assembly of the townspeople, it may be used even for paying a dukhsusya.

[No, what is meant] is that they sold and had something left, and this is what it should say: When does this rule apply? When the seven “good men” of the town did not make any stipulation in the assembly of the townspeople; but if the seven good men of the town made a stipulation in the assembly of the townspeople, it may be used even for paying a dukhsusya.

They may not sell a synagogue except with the stipulation that it may be bought back whenever they want, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: they may sell it in perpetuity, except for four purposes for it to become one of four things: a bathhouse, a tannery, a ritual bath, or a urinal. Rabbi Judah says: they may sell it to be a courtyard, and the purchaser may do what he likes with it.

Assi said: The synagogues of Babylon have been built with a stipulation, and even so we do not act frivolously in them. What [for instance] is this? Doing calculations [for business purposes] in them.