5254 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:22

HALAKHAH: “The dissolution of vows may take place the entire day,” etc. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon say, the dissolution of vows may take place from time to time.” What is the reason of the rabbis? “From day to day.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah? “On the day of his hearing.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s reason, “on the day of his hearing”? Explain it that she made the vow on the start of the night. How does Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah explain the rabbis’ reason, “from day to day”? Explain it that she made the vow at the start of Friday night, he became paralyzed, and then his power of speech returned. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one gives him 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he has only that day. If he became paralyzed, and later his power of speech returned, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one adds up to a total of 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he always can dissolve when his speech returns. But if it happened one hour before sundown, he can no longer dissolve.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:22

HALAKHAH: “The dissolution of vows may take place the entire day,” etc. It was stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon say, the dissolution of vows may take place from time to time.” What is the reason of the rabbis? “From day to day.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah? “On the day of his hearing.” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s reason, “on the day of his hearing”? Explain it that she made the vow on the start of the night. How does Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah explain the rabbis’ reason, “from day to day”? Explain it that she made the vow at the start of Friday night, he became paralyzed, and then his power of speech returned. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one gives him 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he has only that day. If he became paralyzed, and later his power of speech returned, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one adds up to a total of 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he always can dissolve when his speech returns. But if it happened one hour before sundown, he can no longer dissolve.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:12

MISHNAH: ‘A qônām that I shall not have benefit from people’ he cannot dissolve, and she may benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and peah. ‘A qônām that priests and Levites can have no benefit from me’; they may take forcibly. ‘These priests and these Levites can have no benefit from me;’ others may take.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:12

MISHNAH: ‘A qônām that I shall not have benefit from people’ he cannot dissolve, and she may benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and peah. ‘A qônām that priests and Levites can have no benefit from me’; they may take forcibly. ‘These priests and these Levites can have no benefit from me;’ others may take.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:15

A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaninah: “A vow that no Cohanim or Levites should have any advantage from me, they should take against his will.” He explains it about a person who says, I cannot possibly give them any gifts. You should know that this is so, since we have stated: “These Cohanim and Levites should [not] have any advantage from me, let others take.” A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “An Israel can say to another Israel, here you have a tetradrachma and give this firstling to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.” He explains, if he already wanted to give it to two [Cohanim] and that daughter’s son was one of them; then one said, here you have a tetradrachma and give it whole to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:15

A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaninah: “A vow that no Cohanim or Levites should have any advantage from me, they should take against his will.” He explains it about a person who says, I cannot possibly give them any gifts. You should know that this is so, since we have stated: “These Cohanim and Levites should [not] have any advantage from me, let others take.” A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “An Israel can say to another Israel, here you have a tetradrachma and give this firstling to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.” He explains, if he already wanted to give it to two [Cohanim] and that daughter’s son was one of them; then one said, here you have a tetradrachma and give it whole to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:34

MISHNAH: ‘A qônām that I shall not take any benefit from my father, or your father, if I shall do anything for you.’ ‘[A qônām] that I shall not have any benefit from you if I shall do anything for my father, or for your father.’ These he can dissolve.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:35

HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not take any benefit from my father, or your father,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Nathan says, he cannot dissolve, but the Sages say, he can dissolve. Why can he dissolve? The colleagues say, because of his mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila say, because of her mortification.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 1:9

“ ‘I have to bring birds’, Rebbi Meïr says, he is a nazir, but the Sages say, he is not a nazir.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of substitutes of substitutes: “Until his hair became mighty as an eagle’s and his fingernails like those of birds.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, because an impure nazir brings birds. Does he bring birds? He brings turtledoves or young pigeons. There are some Tannaïm who state that all pure birds are called צפור, and there are some Tannaïm who state that all birds, whether pure or impure, are called צפור. He who says that all pure birds are called צפור, “you may eat any pure bird.” He who says that all birds, whether pure or impure, are called צפור, “say to any winged bird. “What is the rabbi’s reason? He is like somebody offering birds for the upkeep of the Temple. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? He is like somebody offering a reparation sacrifice for the upkeep of the Temple. What is the difference between them? If somebody says, “I take upon myself to bring a reparation sacrifice.” In the opinion of Rebbi Meïr he is a nazir since one cannot bring a reparation sacrifice for the upkeep of the Temple. In the opinion of the rabbis he is a nazir since an impure nazir brings a reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:2

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir [abstaining] from dried figs and fig cake,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the reason of the House of Shammai: because he mentioned the state of nazir. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, because of substitutes of substitutes. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, a verse supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “So says the Eternal, as cider is found in the grape bunch, etc.” The Torah called a grape bunch “cider”. And people call a dried fig cider, because of substitutes of substitutes. What is the difference between them? If he said, “I shall be a nazir[abstaining] from dried figs and fig cake.” In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is a nazir, in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion he is not a nazir. “I shall be a nazir[abstaining] from a loaf of bread,” in Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is a nazir, in Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is not a nazir. “From a loaf of bread,” he did not say anything. Rebbi Uqba asked before Rebbi Mana: The opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted, as we have stated there: “ ‘I take upon myself the obligation to bring a flour offering from barley.’ He shall bring from wheat.” And Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, because he mentioned “flour offering.” And here, he says so? He accepts one and he accepts the other. He accepts because he mentioned the state of nazir, and he accepts because of substitutes of substitutes. You should know that it is so since we have stated: “If he said, the cow said.” She did not say anything; it is because he mentioned the state of nazir, and here he mentioned the state of nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:18

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 5:24

Where do we hold? If one says, Reuben, and the other says, Simeon, as you take it, if he is Reuben, one is a nazir, if he is Simeon, one is anazir. But we must hold that one says, Reuben, and the other says, Simeon. He suddenly disappeared, he was neither Reuben nor Simeon; nobody is a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:11

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Ḥiya bar Yosef objected before Rebbi Joḥanan: Take, for example, meat in milk, where he did not taste the forbidden thing itself and you say that he is whipped! He accepted that. What is meant by: he accepted that? Rebbi Ḥiya bar Abun said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Like a person who listens to the argument of the opposing party he accepted it.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:52

How is this? One says, all sources of flavor by one in 100; the other says, all sources of flavor by one in 60. For him who says all sources of taste by one in 100, you take the foreleg as one in 100 of the ram. For him who says all sources of taste by one in 60, you take the foreleg as one in 60 of the ram. For him who says one in 100, you remove the bones from the foreleg. But if you remove the bones from the foreleg, remove them from the ram! This you cannot do, as it was stated: “The waste of heave does not combine with heave to forbid the profane, but the waste of profane combines with the profane to lift the heave.” Rebbi Vivian asked: Does the waste of heave combine with profane to lift the heave? Since Rav Ḥuna said, the husks of what is forbidden combine to permit; that means waste of heave combines with profane to lift the heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:52

How is this? One says, all sources of flavor by one in 100; the other says, all sources of flavor by one in 60. For him who says all sources of taste by one in 100, you take the foreleg as one in 100 of the ram. For him who says all sources of taste by one in 60, you take the foreleg as one in 60 of the ram. For him who says one in 100, you remove the bones from the foreleg. But if you remove the bones from the foreleg, remove them from the ram! This you cannot do, as it was stated: “The waste of heave does not combine with heave to forbid the profane, but the waste of profane combines with the profane to lift the heave.” Rebbi Vivian asked: Does the waste of heave combine with profane to lift the heave? Since Rav Ḥuna said, the husks of what is forbidden combine to permit; that means waste of heave combines with profane to lift the heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:18

Rebbi Zeïra bent down during a eulogy. They wanted to straighten him up and found that he tarried. They said to him, what is this? He said to them, because we will go there, following (Eccl. 7:2): “Let the one who is alive take it to heart.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:19

If somebody finds a corpse of obligation, he has to take care of it and bury it at its place. When is that? If he finds it outside the town limits. But if he found it inside the town limits, he brings it to the cemetary to bury it.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:1

MISHNAH: Gentiles cannot take a vow as nazir. Women and slaves can take a vow as nazir. A man’s power is restricted for his wives more than for his slaves since he can force his slave but he cannot force his wife. His power is restricted for his slaves more than for his wives since he can dissolve his wife’s vows but not his slave’s vows. If he dissolved his wife’s, they are eternally dissolved. If he dissolved his slave’s, once the slave gains his freedom he has to fulfill his nezirut. If [the slave] is not in the presence of his master, Rebbi Meïr says, he cannot drink, but Rebbi Yose says, he may drink.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:1

MISHNAH: Gentiles cannot take a vow as nazir. Women and slaves can take a vow as nazir. A man’s power is restricted for his wives more than for his slaves since he can force his slave but he cannot force his wife. His power is restricted for his slaves more than for his wives since he can dissolve his wife’s vows but not his slave’s vows. If he dissolved his wife’s, they are eternally dissolved. If he dissolved his slave’s, once the slave gains his freedom he has to fulfill his nezirut. If [the slave] is not in the presence of his master, Rebbi Meïr says, he cannot drink, but Rebbi Yose says, he may drink.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:32

HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:5

If he did not say: “it was written and signed before me”? Should not an Amora have asked this question? He said to him, that is what Rabin ben Rav said: If he brought a bill of divorce, gave it to her, but did not tell her: “It was written and signed before me”? There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said to him, take it from her and say in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” Does Rebbi Joḥanan follow Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce? Can the position of Rebbi Joḥanan be derived from Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar? Would Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar agree that if he told her at the moment of delivery that it was her bill of divorce it would not be a bill of divorce? But here, even if he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” But Rebbi Joḥanan might hold that a woman cannot be believed if she says, I received a bill of divorce from my husband’s agents. But we did state: “The wife herself can bring her bill of divorce.” Would you not have to be afraid that she might have received the bill from a representative of the husband? How is it? The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan is to make her known as divorcee in front of two [witnesses].

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:32

“If somebody says, give this mina to X because I owe it to him, bring this mina to X for the pledge which he has from me, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so but he himself is responsible until X receives his due.” Rebbi Ila said, a gift is like a debt. “Give this mina to X, bring this mina to X, give this gift document to X, if he wants to change his mind he can(not) do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should return it to the sender, and if that one had died he should give it to the latter’s heirs.” “Acquire this mina for X, accept this mina for X, acquire this gift document for X, accept this gift document for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should deliver it to his heirs. But if he acquired after [X’s] death he should return it to the sender since nobody can acquire documents after his death.” “If somebody says, this mina is for X, take this mina for X, this mina shall be in your hand for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so” because if somebody acquires for another person it cannot be changed.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:33

Explanation: Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Yose ben Kipper descended to collect there for a colleague when they were slandered. They came and wanted to take it back from them. They answered, we already acquired it. They said, we wish for you to accept it in good faith; they answered, we are unpaid trustees. They approached Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai who told them, there it is, all of it. They took Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, whipped him with ropes, and took it from him. When they returned here, he went to his father and told him, look what your son did to me! He asked him, what did he do to you? He answered, if he had taken my position, they could not have taken anything from us. He asked him, why did you act in such a way? He said, I saw that they were a unanimous court, their hats were a cubit wide, they were directing blows, my brother Yose was bound and the whip ascended and descended. I said, does my father have another Dositheos? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, you say that for somebody who cannot give a warranty in good faith. But if somebody gives a warranty in good faith, one takes from this one and gives to the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:3

Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:3

Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:18

MISHNAH: If somebody is transporting a bill of divorce in the Land of Israel when he falls sick, he may send it by somebody else. If [the husband] had told him, take from her such and such, he cannot send it by somebody else since he does not want to see his valuables in somebody else’s hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:29

MISHNAH: If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation, he cannot take her back; because of a vow, he cannot take her back. Rebbi Jehudah says, for any vow known in public, he cannot take her back; not known in public, he can take her back. Rebbi Meїr says, for any vow which needs investigation by a Sage, he cannot take her back; if it does not need investigation by a Sage, he can take her back. Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other. Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah said, it happened in Sidon that one said to his wife, a qonam if I do not divorce you, and he divorced her, and the Sages permitted him to take her back, for the public good.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:29

MISHNAH: If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation, he cannot take her back; because of a vow, he cannot take her back. Rebbi Jehudah says, for any vow known in public, he cannot take her back; not known in public, he can take her back. Rebbi Meїr says, for any vow which needs investigation by a Sage, he cannot take her back; if it does not need investigation by a Sage, he can take her back. Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other. Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah said, it happened in Sidon that one said to his wife, a qonam if I do not divorce you, and he divorced her, and the Sages permitted him to take her back, for the public good.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:29

MISHNAH: If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation, he cannot take her back; because of a vow, he cannot take her back. Rebbi Jehudah says, for any vow known in public, he cannot take her back; not known in public, he can take her back. Rebbi Meїr says, for any vow which needs investigation by a Sage, he cannot take her back; if it does not need investigation by a Sage, he can take her back. Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other. Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah said, it happened in Sidon that one said to his wife, a qonam if I do not divorce you, and he divorced her, and the Sages permitted him to take her back, for the public good.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:29

MISHNAH: If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation, he cannot take her back; because of a vow, he cannot take her back. Rebbi Jehudah says, for any vow known in public, he cannot take her back; not known in public, he can take her back. Rebbi Meїr says, for any vow which needs investigation by a Sage, he cannot take her back; if it does not need investigation by a Sage, he can take her back. Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other. Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah said, it happened in Sidon that one said to his wife, a qonam if I do not divorce you, and he divorced her, and the Sages permitted him to take her back, for the public good.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:29

MISHNAH: If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation, he cannot take her back; because of a vow, he cannot take her back. Rebbi Jehudah says, for any vow known in public, he cannot take her back; not known in public, he can take her back. Rebbi Meїr says, for any vow which needs investigation by a Sage, he cannot take her back; if it does not need investigation by a Sage, he can take her back. Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other. Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah said, it happened in Sidon that one said to his wife, a qonam if I do not divorce you, and he divorced her, and the Sages permitted him to take her back, for the public good.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:29

MISHNAH: If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation, he cannot take her back; because of a vow, he cannot take her back. Rebbi Jehudah says, for any vow known in public, he cannot take her back; not known in public, he can take her back. Rebbi Meїr says, for any vow which needs investigation by a Sage, he cannot take her back; if it does not need investigation by a Sage, he can take her back. Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other. Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah said, it happened in Sidon that one said to his wife, a qonam if I do not divorce you, and he divorced her, and the Sages permitted him to take her back, for the public good.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:29

MISHNAH: If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation, he cannot take her back; because of a vow, he cannot take her back. Rebbi Jehudah says, for any vow known in public, he cannot take her back; not known in public, he can take her back. Rebbi Meїr says, for any vow which needs investigation by a Sage, he cannot take her back; if it does not need investigation by a Sage, he can take her back. Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other. Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah said, it happened in Sidon that one said to his wife, a qonam if I do not divorce you, and he divorced her, and the Sages permitted him to take her back, for the public good.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:30

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation,” etc. And it was stated: “Why did the Sages say that he who divorces his wife because of bad reputation cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of bad reputation, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the accusations were baseless and he said, if I had known that the accusations were baseless, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her children bastards. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:31

It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:31

It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:32

MISHNAH: If somebody divorces his wife because she is a she-ram, Rebbi Jehudah says, he cannot take her back, but the Sages say, he may take her back. If she was married to another man, had children by him, and requests her ketubah, Rebbi Jehudah says, he tells her: Your silence would be better than your talking.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:32

MISHNAH: If somebody divorces his wife because she is a she-ram, Rebbi Jehudah says, he cannot take her back, but the Sages say, he may take her back. If she was married to another man, had children by him, and requests her ketubah, Rebbi Jehudah says, he tells her: Your silence would be better than your talking.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:33

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife as a she-ram cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife as a she-ram, when she went, married another man, and bore him children, and he said, if I had known that she can have children, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since there are women she-rams who are married and since [their husbands] are satisfied with them they keep them.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:34

“Rebbi Jehudah says, he cannot take her back,” and you say so? Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no Rebbi Jehudah but Rebbi Meїr. It was stated thus in Rebbi Meїr’s name: Your silence would be better than your talking.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:6

“The best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay,” i. e., the party responsible for the damage, the words of Rebbi Ismael. Rebbi Aqiba says, “the best of his field and the best of his vineyard”, of the person suffering the damage. It is difficult for Rebbi Aqiba, he suffered damage, and you say so? But the court see what the field was worth before it was damaged and estimates accordingly. As it was stated, it is possible if the grazing was on best quality land, one estimates from best quality, from lowest quality one estimates from lowest quality. How is this? The best of the lowest quality is quite good. If you say so you provide a windfall for the person suffering the damage. One looks at the field as if it was full of first quality [produce] and estimates for him from the best quality land; least quality one estimates from least quality land. It turns out that he pays with best quality for best quality and from least quality for least quality. From where has Rebbi Aqiba that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land”? It is not from the Torah, it is a decree. “Why did they say, ‘for tort victims one estimates with best quality land’? Because of the robbers. That a man should say, why should I have robbed [land] in my hand, or land subject to a suit for damages on my hand? Tomorrow, the court will see my good field, take it from me, and support it by the verse, ‘the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay.’ ” So far his real estate. His pledge was inferred from his real estate. Since his real estate [is taken] from the best quality, also his pledge [is taken] from the best.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:7

” ‘For creditors, average quality,’ because of tricksters. That a man should not see a desirable field in his neighbor’s hand, lend him money, and contrives to take it from him. Then one should estimate only from the least quality! Rebbi Jehudah said, that is correct; but not to lock the door before people needing to borrow. For tomorrow he may need to borrow and does not find [a lender.]”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:26

Rebbi Joḥanan said, as a matter of principle one does not appoint guardians for orphans to their detriment, only to their profit; but if they are detrimental, they are detrimental. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, neither as a matter of principle nor as a reaction, neither for profit not for detriment. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: “One appoints a guardian for them” There is a difference about an ox, lest it continue to cause damage. If it did do damage, from whom does one take payment? Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the orphans. Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, from the guardian. And even if Rebbi Joḥanan never taught this, does not his word imply it since he said if in the end they are detrimental, they are detrimental?

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:32

MISHNAH: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Gudguedah testified about a deaf-mute girl who was married off by her father, that she must be divorced by a bill of divorce, and about an underage girl who was married to a Cohen, that she may eat heave and her husband inherits from her if she dies, and about a stolen log which was used to build a house, that [the owner] has to take the value, and about a purification sacrifice of a stolen animal which was not known in public, that it atones because of the order of the altar.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:36

“If somebody stole a log and used it in building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, for the benefit of repenting sinners, that he has to pay its full value.” Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? If he stole it planed, but if he stole and planed it himself, he owes him money. If he stole and planed it on the spot, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody appropriates another person’s ruin and rebuilds it without prermission, one appraises it and his hand is weak. If he wants to take his logs and stones, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It was asked in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: If somebody stores his bundle in somebody else’s ruin and wants to take it from there, does one not listen to him? He had not heard that Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of civilisation. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. We would have thought that they disagree only in the Land, but not outside the Land. Since Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, because of civilisation, this implies that there is no difference between the Land and outside the Land. If he wants to take [the value of] his logs and stones, what is the rule? One tells him, wait until he dwells in it. Samuel said, one pays him immediately.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:36

“If somebody stole a log and used it in building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, for the benefit of repenting sinners, that he has to pay its full value.” Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? If he stole it planed, but if he stole and planed it himself, he owes him money. If he stole and planed it on the spot, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody appropriates another person’s ruin and rebuilds it without prermission, one appraises it and his hand is weak. If he wants to take his logs and stones, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It was asked in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: If somebody stores his bundle in somebody else’s ruin and wants to take it from there, does one not listen to him? He had not heard that Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of civilisation. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. We would have thought that they disagree only in the Land, but not outside the Land. Since Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, because of civilisation, this implies that there is no difference between the Land and outside the Land. If he wants to take [the value of] his logs and stones, what is the rule? One tells him, wait until he dwells in it. Samuel said, one pays him immediately.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:36

“If somebody stole a log and used it in building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, for the benefit of repenting sinners, that he has to pay its full value.” Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? If he stole it planed, but if he stole and planed it himself, he owes him money. If he stole and planed it on the spot, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody appropriates another person’s ruin and rebuilds it without prermission, one appraises it and his hand is weak. If he wants to take his logs and stones, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It was asked in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: If somebody stores his bundle in somebody else’s ruin and wants to take it from there, does one not listen to him? He had not heard that Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of civilisation. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. We would have thought that they disagree only in the Land, but not outside the Land. Since Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, because of civilisation, this implies that there is no difference between the Land and outside the Land. If he wants to take [the value of] his logs and stones, what is the rule? One tells him, wait until he dwells in it. Samuel said, one pays him immediately.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:40

“The law of siqariqon always applies in Galilee.” The law of siqariqon does not apply to movables. It was stated: “The law of siqariqon does not apply to foreclosures for a debt and for tenant fees. [A foreclosure for nonpayment of] tenant fees waits twelve months for the owners.” Rebbi Judah ben Pazi said, after twelve months one announces on four consecutive Sabbaths. He explained it in two ways. If he took it from a tenant and gave it to a tenant and the first wants to foreclose, he says to him, are you not a tenant? Leave it for me and what you cut, you cut. If he took it from the owner and gave it to a tenant, the [owner] wants to foreclose, he tells him, what use do you have if you take it from me and he will take it from you, but what I can afford I shall give to you.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:40

“The law of siqariqon always applies in Galilee.” The law of siqariqon does not apply to movables. It was stated: “The law of siqariqon does not apply to foreclosures for a debt and for tenant fees. [A foreclosure for nonpayment of] tenant fees waits twelve months for the owners.” Rebbi Judah ben Pazi said, after twelve months one announces on four consecutive Sabbaths. He explained it in two ways. If he took it from a tenant and gave it to a tenant and the first wants to foreclose, he says to him, are you not a tenant? Leave it for me and what you cut, you cut. If he took it from the owner and gave it to a tenant, the [owner] wants to foreclose, he tells him, what use do you have if you take it from me and he will take it from you, but what I can afford I shall give to you.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:62

Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Ammi. One said: “Plough it well then, I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical.” The other one said: “May you succeed” For him who says, plough it well, then I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical, what means “one greets them” in a Jewish way? “May you succeed.” For him who says to the Gentile “may you succeed”? Explanation: Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa and Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman passed by one of the ploughmen in the Sabbatical. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said to him, are you not Jewish? Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa said to him, did not Rebbi teach us (Ps. 129:8): “The passers-by did not say, the blessing of the Eternal be on you,” these are the nations of the world who pass out of the world, they did not say to Israel “the blessing of the Eternal is on you.” What does Israel say to them, “we bless you in the Name of the Eternal.” All blessings that come into the world because of us are not enough for you; not only do you not say, come and take from these blessings for yourselves, but you roll over us pro-rated contributions and fines, head taxes and annonae.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:1

MISHNAH: Somebody who says, accept this bill of divorce for my wife, or bring this bill of divorce to my wife, may retract if he wants to retract. If a woman said, accept the bill of divorce for me, he cannot retract even if he wants to retract. Therefore, if the husband said, it is not possible for me that you accept for her but bring and deliver it to her, he may retract if he wants to retract. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, even if she says, take my the bill of divorce for me, he cannot retract even if he wants to retract.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:9

Rebbi Ḥanina said, practice follows Rabban Gamliel: if she said “take for me, it should be mine in your hand.” A man sent a bill of divorce to his wife. She told [the agent]: “It should be mine in your hand.” The casecame before Rav, who said, if he wants to retract he cannot retract. Does he disagree? There is a difference between “it should be in your hand” and “it should be mine in your hand.” Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, I know the beginning and the end. A woman appointed an agent to accept her bill of divorce from the husband’s agents. The case came before Rav, who said, if he wants to retract he cannot retract. Rav’s opinion has switched! There, Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: A woman cannot appoint an agent to accept her bill of divorce from her husband’s agent, and here, he says so? I say, he was standing behind the door and heard her voice.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:10

MISHNAH: A woman who said, accept my bill of divorce for me, needs two groups of witnesses; two who say that she appointed in their presence and two who say that in their presence he received it and tore it up, even if the first ones are the latter ones, or one of the first together with one of the latter and a third person is associated with them. A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah says, no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce. Any female who cannot take care of her bill of divorce cannot be divorced. If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand. Therefore, if the husband wants to retract he can retract since an underage person cannot appoint an agent. But if her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody throws a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. “He shall write,” “he shall deliver into her hand.” Not only into her hand; from where also into her garden or into her courtyard? The verse says “he shall deliver, he shall deliver.” Is this following Rebbi Ismael? It is following Rebbi Aqiba. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Ismael, “he took all his land from his hand, up to the Arnon.” Did he take it out of his hand? What means “from his hand”? From his possession.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:6

MISHNAH: If he said to her, “take this bond,” or she found it behind his back, she read it and it turned out to be her bill of divorce, it is no bill of divorce until he says to her “this is your bill of divorce”. If he put it into her hand while she was asleep, after she awoke she read it and it turned out to be her bill of divorce, it is no bill of divorce until he says to her “this is your bill of divorce”. If she was standing in the public domain when he threw it to her and it landed close to her it is a bill of divorce, close to him it is no bill of divorce, half and half she is divorced and not divorced.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:7

HALAKHAH: “If he said to her, ‘take this bond,’ ” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan says, this follows Rebbi Eleazar ben Simeon, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Simeon says it never is a bill of divorce unless he says at the moment of delivery: “this is your bill of divorce.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:1

MISHNAH: If somebody in divorcing his wife says to her: Herewith you are permitted to any man except Mr. X, Rebbi Eliezer permits but the Sages prohibit. What should he do? He should take the document back from her and deliver it again while saying, herewith you are permitted to any man. If he had written the condition in the document it would be invalid even if he had later erased it.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:22

In this matter, it was stated: “About anybody who wanted to take upon himself the stringencies both of the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel it was said: ‘The silly one walks in darkness’. The leniencies of both of them, he is called wicked. Either following the words of the House of Shammai in their leniencies and stringencies, or following the words of the House of Hillel in their leniencies and stringencies.” That is, before there came the disembodied voice. But after the disembodied voice was heard, “practice follows the House of Hillel forever.” And any who transgress the words of the House of Hillel are deserving of death. It was stated: There came the disembodied voice and said: Both of them are the words of God, but practice follows the House of Hillel. Where was the disembodied voice heard? Rebbi Bebai in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The disembodied voice was heard at Yabneh.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:28

“Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as a wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final; the verse says “and take her in levirate.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to his brothers.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:28

“Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as a wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final; the verse says “and take her in levirate.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to his brothers.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:29

Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:30

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as a wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for the preliminary marriage of a woman. Just as preliminary marriage acquires completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:51

“If he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother. He should be able to allot her to his brother by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance, what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:51

“If he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother. He should be able to allot her to his brother by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance, what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:51

“If he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother. He should be able to allot her to his brother by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance, what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:51

“If he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother. He should be able to allot her to his brother by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance, what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:52

“If he allots her to his son;” but he may not allot her to his grandson. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: In matters of inheritance you recognize the grandson like a son but here you do not recognize the grandson like a son? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if anybody explains this matter, I shall pour him spiced wine. Rebbi Naḥum answered: In matters of inheritance where the brother can take the place of a son and all others can take the place of the son, the grandson takes the place of a son. But here, where neither the brother nor any other relative can take the place of a son, the grandson cannot take the place of a son. The rabbis of Caesarea answered: In matters of impurity you consider a brother like a son and all [near] relatives like a son but not a grandson like a son. They said, there went the spiced wine.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:52

“If he allots her to his son;” but he may not allot her to his grandson. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: In matters of inheritance you recognize the grandson like a son but here you do not recognize the grandson like a son? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if anybody explains this matter, I shall pour him spiced wine. Rebbi Naḥum answered: In matters of inheritance where the brother can take the place of a son and all others can take the place of the son, the grandson takes the place of a son. But here, where neither the brother nor any other relative can take the place of a son, the grandson cannot take the place of a son. The rabbis of Caesarea answered: In matters of impurity you consider a brother like a son and all [near] relatives like a son but not a grandson like a son. They said, there went the spiced wine.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:52

“If he allots her to his son;” but he may not allot her to his grandson. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: In matters of inheritance you recognize the grandson like a son but here you do not recognize the grandson like a son? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if anybody explains this matter, I shall pour him spiced wine. Rebbi Naḥum answered: In matters of inheritance where the brother can take the place of a son and all others can take the place of the son, the grandson takes the place of a son. But here, where neither the brother nor any other relative can take the place of a son, the grandson cannot take the place of a son. The rabbis of Caesarea answered: In matters of impurity you consider a brother like a son and all [near] relatives like a son but not a grandson like a son. They said, there went the spiced wine.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:52

“If he allots her to his son;” but he may not allot her to his grandson. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: In matters of inheritance you recognize the grandson like a son but here you do not recognize the grandson like a son? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if anybody explains this matter, I shall pour him spiced wine. Rebbi Naḥum answered: In matters of inheritance where the brother can take the place of a son and all others can take the place of the son, the grandson takes the place of a son. But here, where neither the brother nor any other relative can take the place of a son, the grandson cannot take the place of a son. The rabbis of Caesarea answered: In matters of impurity you consider a brother like a son and all [near] relatives like a son but not a grandson like a son. They said, there went the spiced wine.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:72

A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate. A baraita states, the rules of movables. A baraita states, neither the rules of realestate nor the rules of movables. A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate, as we have stated there: “Possession of houses, cisterns, ditches, and caves, bath houses, and dovecots, olive presses, and irrigated fields, and slaves.” A baraita states, slaves do not follow the rules of movables. As it is stated: What is possession of a slave? He tied his shoe for him, or untied his shoe, carried his things to the bath. Rebbi Simeon says, if he lifted him, that is possession. If he lifted his master, there is no stronger possession than this. A statement of the rabbis says that slaves follow the rules of movables. For Rebbi Yose said in the name of rabbis, there is no lien for a gift; one does not collect from slaves as from real estate. Rebbi Mana asked Rebbi Shammai, who are those rabbis? He told him, Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Immi. A widow took a slave girl. The case came before Rebbi Isaac who said, what she took, she took. Rebbi Immi took her away, for she thought that she was hers but she was not hers. Not of real estate, as it was stated: Real estate and slaves; he took possession of the real estate. If you say that slaves follow the rules of real estate, when he took possession of the real estate he would have taken possession of the slaves, since Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he had two fields, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with intention to take possession also of that in Galilee, or of the one in Galilee with intention to take possession also of that in Judea, he acquired. Not of movables. If you say that slaves follow the rules of movables, when he took possession of the movables he would have taken possessionof the slaves, since we did state there: “For property that is not guaranteed will cause guaranteed properties to be objects of swearing about them.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:72

A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate. A baraita states, the rules of movables. A baraita states, neither the rules of realestate nor the rules of movables. A Mishnah says that slaves follow the rules of real estate, as we have stated there: “Possession of houses, cisterns, ditches, and caves, bath houses, and dovecots, olive presses, and irrigated fields, and slaves.” A baraita states, slaves do not follow the rules of movables. As it is stated: What is possession of a slave? He tied his shoe for him, or untied his shoe, carried his things to the bath. Rebbi Simeon says, if he lifted him, that is possession. If he lifted his master, there is no stronger possession than this. A statement of the rabbis says that slaves follow the rules of movables. For Rebbi Yose said in the name of rabbis, there is no lien for a gift; one does not collect from slaves as from real estate. Rebbi Mana asked Rebbi Shammai, who are those rabbis? He told him, Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Immi. A widow took a slave girl. The case came before Rebbi Isaac who said, what she took, she took. Rebbi Immi took her away, for she thought that she was hers but she was not hers. Not of real estate, as it was stated: Real estate and slaves; he took possession of the real estate. If you say that slaves follow the rules of real estate, when he took possession of the real estate he would have taken possession of the slaves, since Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he had two fields, one in Judea and one in Galilee. If he took possession of the one in Judea with intention to take possession also of that in Galilee, or of the one in Galilee with intention to take possession also of that in Judea, he acquired. Not of movables. If you say that slaves follow the rules of movables, when he took possession of the movables he would have taken possessionof the slaves, since we did state there: “For property that is not guaranteed will cause guaranteed properties to be objects of swearing about them.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:82

HALAKHAH: “Large animals are taken possession of by handing over,” etc. Rebbi Huna said, the halter gives possession only for property of the proselyte. Rav Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abba: Rebbi Eleazar asked, if there were ten camels tied one to another and he handed him the halter of one of them. Did he take possession of all of them or only of the one of which he handed him [the halter]? Rav Ḥisda said: “Draw this animal to take possession of it, he took possession. To take possession of its offspring, he did not take possession. To take possession of it together with its offspring, he took possession.” If somebody said to another person, draw this animal close to take possession of its load, would he not take possession? Rebbi Yose said, that is, if the animal was not pregnant. But if it was pregnant, they considered it as if carrying a load.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:82

HALAKHAH: “Large animals are taken possession of by handing over,” etc. Rebbi Huna said, the halter gives possession only for property of the proselyte. Rav Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abba: Rebbi Eleazar asked, if there were ten camels tied one to another and he handed him the halter of one of them. Did he take possession of all of them or only of the one of which he handed him [the halter]? Rav Ḥisda said: “Draw this animal to take possession of it, he took possession. To take possession of its offspring, he did not take possession. To take possession of it together with its offspring, he took possession.” If somebody said to another person, draw this animal close to take possession of its load, would he not take possession? Rebbi Yose said, that is, if the animal was not pregnant. But if it was pregnant, they considered it as if carrying a load.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:82

HALAKHAH: “Large animals are taken possession of by handing over,” etc. Rebbi Huna said, the halter gives possession only for property of the proselyte. Rav Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abba: Rebbi Eleazar asked, if there were ten camels tied one to another and he handed him the halter of one of them. Did he take possession of all of them or only of the one of which he handed him [the halter]? Rav Ḥisda said: “Draw this animal to take possession of it, he took possession. To take possession of its offspring, he did not take possession. To take possession of it together with its offspring, he took possession.” If somebody said to another person, draw this animal close to take possession of its load, would he not take possession? Rebbi Yose said, that is, if the animal was not pregnant. But if it was pregnant, they considered it as if carrying a load.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:82

HALAKHAH: “Large animals are taken possession of by handing over,” etc. Rebbi Huna said, the halter gives possession only for property of the proselyte. Rav Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abba: Rebbi Eleazar asked, if there were ten camels tied one to another and he handed him the halter of one of them. Did he take possession of all of them or only of the one of which he handed him [the halter]? Rav Ḥisda said: “Draw this animal to take possession of it, he took possession. To take possession of its offspring, he did not take possession. To take possession of it together with its offspring, he took possession.” If somebody said to another person, draw this animal close to take possession of its load, would he not take possession? Rebbi Yose said, that is, if the animal was not pregnant. But if it was pregnant, they considered it as if carrying a load.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:82

HALAKHAH: “Large animals are taken possession of by handing over,” etc. Rebbi Huna said, the halter gives possession only for property of the proselyte. Rav Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abba: Rebbi Eleazar asked, if there were ten camels tied one to another and he handed him the halter of one of them. Did he take possession of all of them or only of the one of which he handed him [the halter]? Rav Ḥisda said: “Draw this animal to take possession of it, he took possession. To take possession of its offspring, he did not take possession. To take possession of it together with its offspring, he took possession.” If somebody said to another person, draw this animal close to take possession of its load, would he not take possession? Rebbi Yose said, that is, if the animal was not pregnant. But if it was pregnant, they considered it as if carrying a load.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:82

HALAKHAH: “Large animals are taken possession of by handing over,” etc. Rebbi Huna said, the halter gives possession only for property of the proselyte. Rav Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abba: Rebbi Eleazar asked, if there were ten camels tied one to another and he handed him the halter of one of them. Did he take possession of all of them or only of the one of which he handed him [the halter]? Rav Ḥisda said: “Draw this animal to take possession of it, he took possession. To take possession of its offspring, he did not take possession. To take possession of it together with its offspring, he took possession.” If somebody said to another person, draw this animal close to take possession of its load, would he not take possession? Rebbi Yose said, that is, if the animal was not pregnant. But if it was pregnant, they considered it as if carrying a load.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:82

HALAKHAH: “Large animals are taken possession of by handing over,” etc. Rebbi Huna said, the halter gives possession only for property of the proselyte. Rav Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abba: Rebbi Eleazar asked, if there were ten camels tied one to another and he handed him the halter of one of them. Did he take possession of all of them or only of the one of which he handed him [the halter]? Rav Ḥisda said: “Draw this animal to take possession of it, he took possession. To take possession of its offspring, he did not take possession. To take possession of it together with its offspring, he took possession.” If somebody said to another person, draw this animal close to take possession of its load, would he not take possession? Rebbi Yose said, that is, if the animal was not pregnant. But if it was pregnant, they considered it as if carrying a load.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:83

Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: One who handles a wine-skin and it splits in his hand is not responsible for it. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, it is necessary even if he takes it in the store when he had no other intention than that no other person should take it. Can he take possession at a minimal rate? Rebbi Ḥaggai said in the name of Rebbi Yose: A Mishnah says that it cannot become his possession at a minimal rate, as we have stated there: “If somebody sells his wine to a Non-Jew. If he fixed the price before he measured, the proceeds are permitted; if he measured before he fixed the price, the proceeds are forbidden.” If you say that it can come into his possession at a minimal rate, even if he measured before he fixed the price, it should be as if he fixed the price before he measured and the proceeds would be permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:83

Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: One who handles a wine-skin and it splits in his hand is not responsible for it. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, it is necessary even if he takes it in the store when he had no other intention than that no other person should take it. Can he take possession at a minimal rate? Rebbi Ḥaggai said in the name of Rebbi Yose: A Mishnah says that it cannot become his possession at a minimal rate, as we have stated there: “If somebody sells his wine to a Non-Jew. If he fixed the price before he measured, the proceeds are permitted; if he measured before he fixed the price, the proceeds are forbidden.” If you say that it can come into his possession at a minimal rate, even if he measured before he fixed the price, it should be as if he fixed the price before he measured and the proceeds would be permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:84

Samuel said, if somebody take a small gold vessel and it be snatched, who is responsible for it? Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is at Tyre or a similar place, at Caesarea or a similar place. But here, so far it usually would be recovered.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:89

“But the Sages say, small animals are taken possession of by drawing near.” What is the reason of the rabbis? “Draw near and take for yourselves small animals for your families.” As Rav Jehudah sent to ask: By what means is possession of large animals established? He answered, by handing over; and asked, is that not the Mishnah? There are Tannaïm who switch the attributions. Rav Jehudah asked Rebbi Eleazar: If a firstborn became “torn” within thirty days? He answered, he is as if dead and free from the five tetradrachmas of a son. Rav Jehudah sent and asked Rebbi Eleazar: A placenta which was delivered partially today and partially tomorrow? He answered, for pure blood she counts from the first day, for impure blood from the second day. Rebbi Mattaniah said, that is, if no child was produced with it. But if there was a child, both for pure and impure blood she counts only from the moment of birth of the child.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:96

HALAKHAH: “Guaranteed properties,” etc. In earlier times, transfer of possession was effected by taking off a shoe. That is what is written: “This was earlier in Israel about redemption and exchange, a person would take off his shoe.” Who took it off? There, they say Rav and Levi, one said the acquirer, and one said the transferer. It turns out that this disagreement parallels the following disagreement which was stated: Boaz was giving to the redeemer; Rebbi Jehudah said that the redeemer gave to Boaz.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:111

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One has a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had died, the donkey’s owner has to bring proof that his donkey was alive at the moment he took the cow. For the burden of proof is on the claimant except for barter. And anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree. Rebbi Abba said to Rebbi Ze‘ira: A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” Not the husband has to prove to regain the [money given] for preliminary marriage from the father. The students of Rebbi Jonah said, explain it if little money was involved. An example: Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yosef to learn from him. They said to him, the Mishnah supports Samuel: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove, to extract the ketubah from the husband’s possession? He answered them, does not Samuel agree that if the cow’s owner took possession of the donkey, he has to prove that it was defective before it came into his possession? And this one, when he took her in it is as if he drew close.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:112

Rebbi Abba, Rav Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa in the name of Rav: If he sold a cow for money, then grabbed him and said, give me that money. He answered, for what do you need it? He said, to buy a donkey for him[self]. If the owner of the cow took possession of the donkey, the cow was not taken into possession. Was the donkey taken into possession? Rebbi Abba said, it was taken into possession. Rebbi Yose said, it was not taken into possession. Rebbi Abba thought that this was barter, but it was not barter. Rebbi Mana in the name of Rebbi Yose: Sometimes it is a new deal for one party and a new deal for the other party. How is that? He sold him a cow for money; he left the money standing with him. The next day, he found him standing there and said, what are you doing here? He said, I want to collect the money. He answered, for what do you want it? He said, to buy myself a donkey. He answered, there is a donkey before you. If either one of them drew, the other one did not enter into possession; each one has to take possession separately.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:118

There, we have stated: “If they started, one does not interrupt.” What is the start of bathing? Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: When he opened his belt. Rav said, when he took off his shoe. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi used to hear the lesson of his grandson every Friday. Once he forgot and went bathing in the public baths of Tiberias; he was leaning on Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba’s shoulder. He remembered and left the public bath. He said, so it was: Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose said, he had taken off [his clothes]. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him, did our teacher not teach us, “if they started, one does not interrupt”? He said to him, Ḥiyya my son, is that unimportant in your eyes? For anyone who hears the lesson from his grandson is as if he heard it from Mount Sinai. What is the reason? “ You shall make them known to you sons and grandsons,” etc., “the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb.” Like the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb. Rebbi Ḥizqiah bar Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If you can link the tradition back to Moses, link it. Otherwise take either the very first or the very last [source]. Giddul said, anybody who quotes somebody should consider it as if the author of the quote stood before him. What is the reason? “Only in image a man wanders.” “Many a man professes good will, but where will you find one you can trust?” That is Rebbi Ze‘ira, as Rebbi Ze‘ira said, we do take the traditions of Rav Sheshet into account since he is blind. And Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Yasa, does the Rabbi know Bar Pedaiah, that you quote in his name? He said to him, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa said it in his name.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:118

There, we have stated: “If they started, one does not interrupt.” What is the start of bathing? Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: When he opened his belt. Rav said, when he took off his shoe. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi used to hear the lesson of his grandson every Friday. Once he forgot and went bathing in the public baths of Tiberias; he was leaning on Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba’s shoulder. He remembered and left the public bath. He said, so it was: Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose said, he had taken off [his clothes]. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him, did our teacher not teach us, “if they started, one does not interrupt”? He said to him, Ḥiyya my son, is that unimportant in your eyes? For anyone who hears the lesson from his grandson is as if he heard it from Mount Sinai. What is the reason? “ You shall make them known to you sons and grandsons,” etc., “the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb.” Like the day when you stood before the Eternal, your God, at Horeb. Rebbi Ḥizqiah bar Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If you can link the tradition back to Moses, link it. Otherwise take either the very first or the very last [source]. Giddul said, anybody who quotes somebody should consider it as if the author of the quote stood before him. What is the reason? “Only in image a man wanders.” “Many a man professes good will, but where will you find one you can trust?” That is Rebbi Ze‘ira, as Rebbi Ze‘ira said, we do take the traditions of Rav Sheshet into account since he is blind. And Rebbi Ze‘ira said to Rebbi Yasa, does the Rabbi know Bar Pedaiah, that you quote in his name? He said to him, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa said it in his name.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:128

Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Cahana: It is written (Prov. 5:6): “She does not smooth the way of life, her tracks deviate and you will not notice it.” The Holy One, praise to Him, moved the rewards of those who fulfill the commandments (to the future world) so that they should act in faith. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Isaac: It is written (Prov. 4:23): “Observe carefully everything which must be kept, for from it comes life,” observe carefully all the things you were told in the Torah, for you do not know from which of them life will come to you. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said, the verse equals the easiest commandment with the most difficult one. The easiest commandment is sending away [the mother] from the nest. The most difficult one is honoring father and mother. For both of them it is written: “Your days will be lengthened.” Rebbi Abun said, if for anything that is repayment of debt it is written (Deut. 5:16): “That you shall be well and that your days shall be lengthened,” so much more something that involves monetary loss and personal danger. Rebbi Levi said, this one is greater; repaying a debt is greater than fulfilling an obligation that does not involve repaying a debt. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: Just as their rewards are the same, so their punishments are identical. (Prov. 30:17) “The eye that scoffs at the father and despises to obey the mother,” the eye that scoffs about honoring father and mother and despises the commandment not to take the mother with the chicks, “the river ravens should pick it out,” the cruel raven should come, pick it out, and not have any enjoyment from it, “the sons of the eagle should eat it,” the merciful eagle should come and enjoy it.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:2

HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.” But do all of them slaughter? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house.” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:2

HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.” But do all of them slaughter? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house.” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:2

HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.” But do all of them slaughter? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house.” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:18

“ ‘Hold this tetradrachma for me’ and at the moment of delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ she is preliminarily married. After delivery, if she agrees, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. ‘Here is the tetradrachma which I owe you,’ and at the moment of delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ if she agrees, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. If after delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ she is not preliminarily married even if both parties agree. What can he do? He should take the coin back, deliver it again and say, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me.’ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this mina,’ if it turns out that a denar was missing, she is not preliminarily married. If one denar was bad, she is preliminarily married if he replaces it. If he was counting the coins into her hand, she can change her mind any time before he finishes.” Rebbi Eleazar said, she is preliminarily married by the first [coin]; the remainder is a condition. Rebbi Joḥanan said, only after he completes [the count.] It was said that Rebbi Joḥanan changed his mind about this.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:23

One understands “Cohen and he turns out to be a Levite.” “Levite and he turns out to be a Cohen”? She may say, I do not want one who is haughty towards me. One understands “from a walled city” and he turned out to be a villager; “from a village” and he turned out to be from a walled city? She may say, I want to be in a quiet place. “On condition that my house be close to the public baths” and it turned out to be far. One understands “close and it turned out to be far.” “Far and it turned out to be close”? She can say, I want to take a walk going and returning. “On condition that I have a daughter or slave-girl hairdresser” and it turned out that he had none, that one understands. “On condition that I have” and it turned out that he did not have? Think of it, if he had one at the end of the world! Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, so is the Mishnah: “A daughter to dress your hair, and a slave-girl to serve you.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:52

A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaninah: “A vow that no Cohanim or Levites should have any advantage from me: they should take against his will.” He explains it about a person who says, I cannot possibly give them any gifts. You should know that this is so, since we have stated: “These Cohanim and Levites should [not] have any advantage from me; let others take.” A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “One may say, here you have a tetradrachma and give this firstling to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.” He explains, if he already wanted to give it to two Cohanim and that daughter’s son was one of them; then one said, here you have a tetradrachma and give it whole to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:52

A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaninah: “A vow that no Cohanim or Levites should have any advantage from me: they should take against his will.” He explains it about a person who says, I cannot possibly give them any gifts. You should know that this is so, since we have stated: “These Cohanim and Levites should [not] have any advantage from me; let others take.” A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “One may say, here you have a tetradrachma and give this firstling to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.” He explains, if he already wanted to give it to two Cohanim and that daughter’s son was one of them; then one said, here you have a tetradrachma and give it whole to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:10

“From today and after 30 days.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even preliminary marriages of a hundred men apply to her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it was necessary [to state], even if the second preliminarily married her absolutely. Rebbi Isaac bar Tebele asked before Rebbi Eleazar: As you take it; what the first acquired, he acquired; the remainder the second finished. He answered, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? How is that? To any woman who is not acquired by one man only, even preliminary marriages of a hundred men apply.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:11

A student asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he gave it to her in the morning on condition that he divorce her in the afternoon? A certain David was of the opinion that anything acquires; Rebbi Ze‘ira said that after thirty days he acquires absolutely. But if the second one added absolute acquisition, I am reading for her: “Her first husband who had sent her away cannot return to take her back.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:12

If both were Cohanim or brothers, both are forbidden. If there were three brothers; two of them contracted a preliminary marriage with her and then died. That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one deceased contracts levirate marriage but not the wife of two deceased men. If they were brothers, both contracted a preliminary marriage with her and then one of them died. Is she permitted to the second? As you take it, what he had acquired, he had acquired; the rest he inherits from his brother. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, she is forbidden to him. Rebbi Yose said, the reason of Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi is that the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law who is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees the co-wife. Rebbi Ḥanina said, Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said it correctly. Does she not become his because of his brother? To his brother she was forbidden; to him she should be permitted?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 3:20

If he performed a preliminary marriage during the validity of the symphōn, this is unconditional preliminary marriage. If he divorced, the students of Rebbi Jonah said, divorce touched her; Rebbi Jonah said, divorce did not touch her. When Rebbi Jonah died, his students acted following him. They said, since after 30 [days] she would leave without a bill of divorce, how can you say that divorce touched her? But divorce did not touch her. If he died during the time stipulated in the symphōn, Rebbi Abbahu said, she is permitted to marry; Rebbi Abba said, she is not permitted to marry. Rebbi Mana asked the family of Rebbi Yose’s father: How did your master usually act? He said to him, when it was a long time, he said that she should go and marry immediately. If the time was short, he said, what is the hurt if she waits? If he sent things during the validity of the symphōn, Rebbi Mana said, [it follows the rules of] symphōn; Rebbi Abba said, [it follows the rules of] preliminary marriage. The rabbis take note of Rebbi Mana’s opinion.