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The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:25

Rebbi Jeremiah was of the opinion, only heave prepared in the purity of sancta. Therefore not in its own. Rebbi Yose said, even if prepared in its own. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose: “He has to watch them until they immersed themselves.” Explain it: not in the time of the olive harvest. Could you say not in the time of the grape harvest? Rebbi Isaac ben Rebbi Eleazar said, if food prepared in purity touched it before three people used it, at the time of olive and grape harvests the food prepared in purity remains pure, not at the time of olive and grape harvests the food prepared in purity becomes impure. Does there exist any clay vessel which is pure and then makes impure? Are not all these of the same kind? But it must be the following: if food prepared in purity touched it before the time of olive and grape harvests the food prepared in purity remains pure. Does there exist any clay vessel which is impure and then pure? Are not all these of the same kind? But it must be the following: if food prepared in purity touched it when it was full the food prepared in purity remains pure. If he cleared it, the food prepared in purity becomes impure. Does there exist any clay vessel which is pure and then makes impure? Are not all these of the same kind? But it must be the following: if food prepared in purity touched it when it was empty the food prepared in purity becomes impure. If he filled it, the food prepared in purity remains pure. Does there exist any clay vessel which is pure and then makes impure? Are not all these of the same kind?

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:25

Rebbi Jeremiah was of the opinion, only heave prepared in the purity of sancta. Therefore not in its own. Rebbi Yose said, even if prepared in its own. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose: “He has to watch them until they immersed themselves.” Explain it: not in the time of the olive harvest. Could you say not in the time of the grape harvest? Rebbi Isaac ben Rebbi Eleazar said, if food prepared in purity touched it before three people used it, at the time of olive and grape harvests the food prepared in purity remains pure, not at the time of olive and grape harvests the food prepared in purity becomes impure. Does there exist any clay vessel which is pure and then makes impure? Are not all these of the same kind? But it must be the following: if food prepared in purity touched it before the time of olive and grape harvests the food prepared in purity remains pure. Does there exist any clay vessel which is impure and then pure? Are not all these of the same kind? But it must be the following: if food prepared in purity touched it when it was full the food prepared in purity remains pure. If he cleared it, the food prepared in purity becomes impure. Does there exist any clay vessel which is pure and then makes impure? Are not all these of the same kind? But it must be the following: if food prepared in purity touched it when it was empty the food prepared in purity becomes impure. If he filled it, the food prepared in purity remains pure. Does there exist any clay vessel which is pure and then makes impure? Are not all these of the same kind?

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:25

Rebbi Jeremiah was of the opinion, only heave prepared in the purity of sancta. Therefore not in its own. Rebbi Yose said, even if prepared in its own. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose: “He has to watch them until they immersed themselves.” Explain it: not in the time of the olive harvest. Could you say not in the time of the grape harvest? Rebbi Isaac ben Rebbi Eleazar said, if food prepared in purity touched it before three people used it, at the time of olive and grape harvests the food prepared in purity remains pure, not at the time of olive and grape harvests the food prepared in purity becomes impure. Does there exist any clay vessel which is pure and then makes impure? Are not all these of the same kind? But it must be the following: if food prepared in purity touched it before the time of olive and grape harvests the food prepared in purity remains pure. Does there exist any clay vessel which is impure and then pure? Are not all these of the same kind? But it must be the following: if food prepared in purity touched it when it was full the food prepared in purity remains pure. If he cleared it, the food prepared in purity becomes impure. Does there exist any clay vessel which is pure and then makes impure? Are not all these of the same kind? But it must be the following: if food prepared in purity touched it when it was empty the food prepared in purity becomes impure. If he filled it, the food prepared in purity remains pure. Does there exist any clay vessel which is pure and then makes impure? Are not all these of the same kind?

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:25

Rebbi Jeremiah was of the opinion, only heave prepared in the purity of sancta. Therefore not in its own. Rebbi Yose said, even if prepared in its own. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose: “He has to watch them until they immersed themselves.” Explain it: not in the time of the olive harvest. Could you say not in the time of the grape harvest? Rebbi Isaac ben Rebbi Eleazar said, if food prepared in purity touched it before three people used it, at the time of olive and grape harvests the food prepared in purity remains pure, not at the time of olive and grape harvests the food prepared in purity becomes impure. Does there exist any clay vessel which is pure and then makes impure? Are not all these of the same kind? But it must be the following: if food prepared in purity touched it before the time of olive and grape harvests the food prepared in purity remains pure. Does there exist any clay vessel which is impure and then pure? Are not all these of the same kind? But it must be the following: if food prepared in purity touched it when it was full the food prepared in purity remains pure. If he cleared it, the food prepared in purity becomes impure. Does there exist any clay vessel which is pure and then makes impure? Are not all these of the same kind? But it must be the following: if food prepared in purity touched it when it was empty the food prepared in purity becomes impure. If he filled it, the food prepared in purity remains pure. Does there exist any clay vessel which is pure and then makes impure? Are not all these of the same kind?

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:28

Hollowed squash as we have stated: “A hollowed squash which one immersed in water is suitable for sanctification, and one uses it to sanctify until it becomes impure. Once it is impure one may not use it to sanctify. Rebbi Joshua says, if one uses it to sanctify at the start then also at the end. If one does not use at the end then also not at the start.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, restrictive, one may not sanctify either at the beginning or at the end.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:28

Hollowed squash as we have stated: “A hollowed squash which one immersed in water is suitable for sanctification, and one uses it to sanctify until it becomes impure. Once it is impure one may not use it to sanctify. Rebbi Joshua says, if one uses it to sanctify at the start then also at the end. If one does not use at the end then also not at the start.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, restrictive, one may not sanctify either at the beginning or at the end.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:35

MISHNAH: From Modiin and closer one is trustworthy about clay vessels, but from Modiin and outside one is not trustworthy. How is this? The potter who sells pots, if he is inside from Modiin then the potter, the pots, and the buyers, are trustworthy. If he left he is not trustworthy.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:40

Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, Jerusalem, built like a city which combines in fellowship, the city which confers fellowship on all of Israel. Then even on all other days of the year? Rebbi Ze`ira said, in the time when the tribes ascended.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:42

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They permitted its end because of its beginning. Since if you would tell him that he may not finish he would not open. Let him not open! Then he diminishes the enjoyment of the holiday.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:46

HALAKHAH: Do vessels need immersion? Rebbi Abba said, I am saying that possibly one of the vessels there was not sprinkled upon. Then should we not suspect all of them? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, I am saying that there was one of the Cohanim who left to speak with a woman about her nest and a drop of spittle fell on his clothing from her mouth and made him impure. Then should we not suspect all of them? Explain it if it became impure by fluids of uncertain status. There we have stated: “Fluids of uncertain status, to become impure they are impure, to make impure they are pure.” There about heave, here about sancta. One is restrictive for sancta.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:46

HALAKHAH: Do vessels need immersion? Rebbi Abba said, I am saying that possibly one of the vessels there was not sprinkled upon. Then should we not suspect all of them? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, I am saying that there was one of the Cohanim who left to speak with a woman about her nest and a drop of spittle fell on his clothing from her mouth and made him impure. Then should we not suspect all of them? Explain it if it became impure by fluids of uncertain status. There we have stated: “Fluids of uncertain status, to become impure they are impure, to make impure they are pure.” There about heave, here about sancta. One is restrictive for sancta.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 3:49

Rebbi Shiloh from Kefar-Tamarta in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Eliezer: And you shall cover it with pure gold, etc. The Torah called it real estate. So far the golden altar. From where the altar of the elevation sacrifices? It is a logical argument. Since the golden altar which is one cubit square is called real estate, the altar of elevation sacrifices which is five cubits square not so much more? Some want to say, square, square. Since here it is real estate, also there it is real estate. Rebbi Hila said, the reason of the rabbis, the altar is of wood, three cubits its height, etc. The Torah called it movable. So far the altar of the elevation sacrifices. From where the golden altar? It is a logical argument. Since the the altar of the elevation sacrifices which is five cubit square is called soil, the golden altar which is one cubit square not so much more? Some want to say, square, square. Since here it is movable, also there it is movable. “But the Sages say, because they are covered.” But is it not cover which stands because of it? Did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Its thickness was that of a Gordian denar Rebbi La said, for its purpose it does not stand because of it. This parallels what Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, you shall make an altar for incense smoke is not written here but burning incense; the altar was burning the incense. But is it not like a table made to be moved and deposited? Does not Rebbi Immi say in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: why is the table impure? Not because one was removing it and showing it to the pilgrims? But this one remains in its place. It also served as a vessel in the Sanctuary. Then it should be pure, why is it impure? Rebbi Mana said, as what we have stated there, “there are three baskets”. Rebbi Ze`ira said, because one uses it for its bales; so also here one uses it for its bales.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 1:3

One understands pumped water. Rain water? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they decided about rain water because it is like pumped water. Rebbi Bisna in the name of Rebbi La: They stated this only on a holiday; therefore in the Sabbatical it is permitted. What is the difference between Sabbatical and holiday? In the Sabbatical when work is permitted they permitted both activities requiring effort and activities not requiring effort. On a holiday when work is forbidden they only permitted to avoid loss and only activities not requiring effort. Some want to understand it from the following: In the Sabbatical which is extended they permitted, on a holiday which is short they forbade. Then these last seven days should be compared to the seven days of a holiday and be forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 1:15

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Mana said it anonymously, Rebbi Abun in the name of Samuel. They disagree anonymously. Where are we holding? If they are widely spaced everybody agrees that it is forbidden. If they are tightly planted everybody agrees that it is permitted. But we deal with the case that they are planted ten to a bet seah. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob treats it as widely spaced, the rabbis treat it as tightly planted. So the rabbis said, if widely spaced it is forbidden to irrigate; may one continue? Let us learn the opinion of the rabbis from that of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob. Just as Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, it is forbidden to irrigate but permitted to continue, so the rabbis say that it is forbidden to irrigate but permitted to continue. Did we not think that according to everybody if they are widely spaced it is forbidden; but is white dust not as if widely spaced? But here it is the Sabbatical, there the holiday. What is the difference between Sabbatical and holiday? In the Sabbatical when work is permitted they permitted both activities requiring effort and activities not requiring effort. On a holiday when work is forbidden they only permitted to avoid loss and only activities not requiring effort. Some want to understand it from the following: In the Sabbatical which is extended they permitted, on a holiday which is short they forbade. Then these last seven days should be compared to the seven days of a holiday and be forbidden. It was found stated: “One may sprinkle with water on white dust during the Sabbatical year but not during the holiday, <the words of Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Eliezer Ben Jacob forbids.>”

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 2:3

Text of Scribe If we had stated but Rebbi Hiyya had not stated, we would have said, we only said if he repeatedly had turned them over, but if he turned then over once everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Therefore our Mishnah needs the statement of Rebbi Hiyya. Or if Rebbi Hiyya had stated but not we, we would have said that we only said if he turned them over once. But if he repeatedly turned them over, everybody agrees that it is permitted. Therefore there is need for our Mishnah and need for the baraita of Rebbi Hiyya. Text of Venice editor If we had stated but Rebbi Hiyya had not stated, we would have said, we only said if he had turned them over only once, but if he turned then over repeatedly everybody agrees that it is permitted. Therefore our Mishnah needs the statement of Rebbi Hiyya. Or if Rebbi Hiyya had stated but not we, we would have said that we only said if he turned them over repeatedly. But if he turned them over only once, everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Therefore there is need for our Mishnah and need for the baraita of Rebbi Hiyya.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 2:3

Text of Scribe If we had stated but Rebbi Hiyya had not stated, we would have said, we only said if he repeatedly had turned them over, but if he turned then over once everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Therefore our Mishnah needs the statement of Rebbi Hiyya. Or if Rebbi Hiyya had stated but not we, we would have said that we only said if he turned them over once. But if he repeatedly turned them over, everybody agrees that it is permitted. Therefore there is need for our Mishnah and need for the baraita of Rebbi Hiyya. Text of Venice editor If we had stated but Rebbi Hiyya had not stated, we would have said, we only said if he had turned them over only once, but if he turned then over repeatedly everybody agrees that it is permitted. Therefore our Mishnah needs the statement of Rebbi Hiyya. Or if Rebbi Hiyya had stated but not we, we would have said that we only said if he turned them over repeatedly. But if he turned them over only once, everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Therefore there is need for our Mishnah and need for the baraita of Rebbi Hiyya.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:3

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: Shaving is forbidden to someone who comes from overseas. Rebbi Jehudah follows his own opinion since Rebbi Jehudah said, it is forbidden to sail on the ocean. Then a Cohen who left for outside the Land and left against the will of the Sages should be forbidden to shave. A Cohen came to Rebbi Ḥanina. He said to him, may one leave for Tyre for as religious obligation, to give ḥaliṣah or to enter levirate marriage? He answered him, this man’s brother left; praised be the Omnipresent Who smote him. And you want to do what he did. Some want to say, so he spoke to him: This man’s brother disdained his mother’s bosom and embraced another’s bosom, and you want to do what he did. Simeon bar Abba came to Rebbi Ḥanina and asked him to write a letter of recommendation so he could leave for his sustenance outside the Land. He said to him, tomorrow I shall go to your forefathers; they would say to me, one desirable plant we had in the Land of Israel and you permitted it to leave the Land.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:30

Something happened to Rebbi Immi and he shaved on the 30th day. Something happened [to one rabbi] and he shaved on the 31st day. Rebbi Zeriqan said, Rebbi Immi learned this from our Mishnah, as we have stated there: “If somebody vowed two neziriot, he shaves for the first on the 31st day, for the second on the 61st day.” Rebbi Yose said, there after it happened, here from the start. Rebbi Jeremiah instructed Rebbi Isaac from Aṭoshia, and some say, Rav Ḥiyya ben Rebbi Isaac from Aṭoshia, to shave on the 30th day, following the Mishnah: “Eight days, the decree of 30 days is waived for him.” The eighth has the same status as the 30th day. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference; there they permitted in order to honor the holiday. You should know this, since Rebbi Ḥelbo, Rav Ḥuna said in the name of Rav: If his eighth day fell on the Sabbath, he shaves Friday. If you say that they did permit not in order to honor the holiday, then even if his 30th day falls on the Sabbath, he should shave Sabbath eve. In addition, from what was stated: “For all deceased he stitches together after seven days and mends after 30.” Why should he not stitch on the seventh day and mend on the 30th day? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, this has been transmitted in this way and that has been transmitted in that way.

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:75

They told him, Reuben died, and he rent. After that they said to him, it was Simeon. He already fulfilled his obligation tearing. They told him, Reuben died, and he rent. After that they said to him, he was alive but then died. There are Tannaim who state, he fulfilled his obligation tearing. There are Tannaim who state, he did not fulfill his obligation tearing. He who said, he fulfilled his obligation tearing; already he rent. He who said, he did not fulfill his obligation tearing, did he not rent about a living person? Furthermore, from what was stated: He rent but then his soul returned. If immediately, he does not have to rend. If after a delay he has to rend. What is immediately? The time for speech. What is the time for speech? Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: up to a greeting from one person to another. Abba bar bar Ḥana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: up to a greeting from a student to his teacher, that he would say: “peace be with you, my teacher.”

Jerusalem Talmud Moed Katan 3:75

They told him, Reuben died, and he rent. After that they said to him, it was Simeon. He already fulfilled his obligation tearing. They told him, Reuben died, and he rent. After that they said to him, he was alive but then died. There are Tannaim who state, he fulfilled his obligation tearing. There are Tannaim who state, he did not fulfill his obligation tearing. He who said, he fulfilled his obligation tearing; already he rent. He who said, he did not fulfill his obligation tearing, did he not rent about a living person? Furthermore, from what was stated: He rent but then his soul returned. If immediately, he does not have to rend. If after a delay he has to rend. What is immediately? The time for speech. What is the time for speech? Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: up to a greeting from one person to another. Abba bar bar Ḥana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: up to a greeting from a student to his teacher, that he would say: “peace be with you, my teacher.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:2

HALAKHAH: “Fifteen [categories of] women free their co-wives”, etc. It is written “unleavened it must be eaten”. Since it was permitted and then forbidden, when it became permitted again should one think it returned to its prior permission? The verse states “unleavened it should be eaten” as commandment. Similarly, “her levir shall come upon her” as a commandment. Since she was permitted and then forbidden, when she became permitted again should one think she returned to her prior permission? The verse states “her levir shall come upon her” as commandment.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:2

HALAKHAH: “Fifteen [categories of] women free their co-wives”, etc. It is written “unleavened it must be eaten”. Since it was permitted and then forbidden, when it became permitted again should one think it returned to its prior permission? The verse states “unleavened it should be eaten” as commandment. Similarly, “her levir shall come upon her” as a commandment. Since she was permitted and then forbidden, when she became permitted again should one think she returned to her prior permission? The verse states “her levir shall come upon her” as commandment.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:8

“Together”, this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world. “And one of them died”, of those who lived. Even if he divorced her and then died? This one is exempted. “Without child”. Therefore, if he has a child she is exempted.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:21

Rebbi Yudan asked: Following him who says that everybody agrees about the co-wife that he is guilty, if somebody from the market gave qiddushin to one of them and then the levir came and performed ḥalîṣah with her or had intercourse with her, did the qiddushin become invalid? If he performed ḥalîṣah with her companion but then had intercourse with her, were qiddushin validated retroactively? Rebbi Shammai said, did not Rebbi Yannai say the following: More than 30 elders voted, from where that qiddushin have no legal effect on a sister-in-law? The verse says, “the wife of the deceased may not belong to any outside unrelated man”, that she cannot have any existence with another man. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not a Mishnah? “Or after your levir will have performed ḥalîṣah with you, she is not preliminarily married.” And Rebbi Yannai praised him “those who pour out gold from the wallet,” “my son, they should not be removed from your eyes,” “get wise, my son, and make me happy”, “give to the wise that he shall become wiser,” “let the wise listen that he increase in knowledge.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after all these praises I can explain it following Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba said that there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law! But there is one sister-in-law, here are two sisters-in-law. The prohibition of a single sister-in-law is different from that of two sisters-in-law!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:21

Rebbi Yudan asked: Following him who says that everybody agrees about the co-wife that he is guilty, if somebody from the market gave qiddushin to one of them and then the levir came and performed ḥalîṣah with her or had intercourse with her, did the qiddushin become invalid? If he performed ḥalîṣah with her companion but then had intercourse with her, were qiddushin validated retroactively? Rebbi Shammai said, did not Rebbi Yannai say the following: More than 30 elders voted, from where that qiddushin have no legal effect on a sister-in-law? The verse says, “the wife of the deceased may not belong to any outside unrelated man”, that she cannot have any existence with another man. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not a Mishnah? “Or after your levir will have performed ḥalîṣah with you, she is not preliminarily married.” And Rebbi Yannai praised him “those who pour out gold from the wallet,” “my son, they should not be removed from your eyes,” “get wise, my son, and make me happy”, “give to the wise that he shall become wiser,” “let the wise listen that he increase in knowledge.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after all these praises I can explain it following Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba said that there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law! But there is one sister-in-law, here are two sisters-in-law. The prohibition of a single sister-in-law is different from that of two sisters-in-law!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:35

When was it? She became pregnant and gave birth before she grew two hairs. Could she have lived? Did not Rebbi Redifa, Rebbi Jonah, say in the name of Rebbi Hila: If a woman became pregnant and gave birth before she grew two hairs, she and her son will die. After she grew two hairs, she and her son will live. If she became pregnant before she grew two hairs and gave birth after she grew two hairs, she will live but her son will die. How is the situation? Rebbi Ismael follows RebbiJehudah, until the black covers most [and] Rebbi Simeon, that intercourse occurred with the idea of the prior qiddushin. Following the opinions of Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Jehudah who say that her status depends on the signs of development, it fits. Following the opinion of Rebbi Simeon who says, if he adds another act of acquisition, then even if she is an adult! Rebbi Isaac said, that is so. Only that the daughters of Israel should not be unbridled in breaking tabus.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:37

MISHNAH: How do they free their co-wives? If a man’s daughter or one of the incest-prohibited women was married to his brother who has another wife and dies, just as his daughter is free so her co-wife is free. If his daughter’s co-wife went and was married to a second brother who then died, just as his daughter’s co-wife is freed, so the co-wife’s co-wife is freed; even if this is repeated a hundred times.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:39

MISHNAH: How are their co-wives permitted if they die? If his daughter or one of the incest-prohibited women was married to his brother who has another wife, if his daughter died and then his brother died her co-wife is permitted. And if a woman could repudiate but did not do so, when she died her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but cannot be married in levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:1

MISHNAH: In which way “the wife of his brother who did not live in his world”? There were two brothers, one of them died, then a brother was born to them, and after that the second brother took his brother’s wife in levirate, and died. The first woman leaves as widow of his brother who did not live in his world and the second one because she is her co-wife. If he had “bespoken” her, the second performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:2

HALAKHAH: Why “the wife of his brother who did not live in his world”? “Together”, this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world. Because if it were not so, what would we say? If he died childless, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, for maybe his father would have another son and his widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Even if [the deceased’s] mother had died, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, [because] maybe the father would go and marry a new wife who could have a son and the widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Then the verse would have to read: “He has neither father nor son”! One would compare this to the case that he left his widow pregnant; does she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Here also, should she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Therefore it was necessary to say “together”; this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:2

HALAKHAH: Why “the wife of his brother who did not live in his world”? “Together”, this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world. Because if it were not so, what would we say? If he died childless, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, for maybe his father would have another son and his widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Even if [the deceased’s] mother had died, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, [because] maybe the father would go and marry a new wife who could have a son and the widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Then the verse would have to read: “He has neither father nor son”! One would compare this to the case that he left his widow pregnant; does she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Here also, should she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Therefore it was necessary to say “together”; this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:2

HALAKHAH: Why “the wife of his brother who did not live in his world”? “Together”, this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world. Because if it were not so, what would we say? If he died childless, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, for maybe his father would have another son and his widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Even if [the deceased’s] mother had died, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, [because] maybe the father would go and marry a new wife who could have a son and the widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Then the verse would have to read: “He has neither father nor son”! One would compare this to the case that he left his widow pregnant; does she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Here also, should she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Therefore it was necessary to say “together”; this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:3

“Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final; the verse says “and act as levir towards her.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to the brothers.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:4

Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:8

HALAKHAH: “If there were two brothers, one of them died”, etc. Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, and you say so? May one permit levirate with the “bespoken” woman? One should suspect that “bespeaking” does not acquire; then he would be guilty because of “wife of his brother who did not live in his world.” Can the “bespoken” one perform ḥalîṣah? Should one not suspect that “bespeaking” does acquire; then the second {widow] is a candidate for [the third brother]. It must be that Rebbi Simeon refers to the first case.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:8

HALAKHAH: “If there were two brothers, one of them died”, etc. Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, and you say so? May one permit levirate with the “bespoken” woman? One should suspect that “bespeaking” does not acquire; then he would be guilty because of “wife of his brother who did not live in his world.” Can the “bespoken” one perform ḥalîṣah? Should one not suspect that “bespeaking” does acquire; then the second {widow] is a candidate for [the third brother]. It must be that Rebbi Simeon refers to the first case.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:10

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:10

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:39

HALAKHAH: “The obligation of levirate is on the oldest [brother] but if a younger one got the start on him, he acquired, etc.” “The obligation of levirate is on the oldest,” since it is said, “the firstborn she will bear shall …”. How do we hold? If about the newborn, the verse should read “he should rise in the name of his dead father.” But it must be that the newborn is a firstborn. In that case, even if he had children and they died before he died, his widow should not be a candidate for levirate! Then the verse should have said, “he never had children”. But if it cannot refer to the newborn; let it refer to the levir, “the obligation of levirate is on the oldest.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:7

If the first [sister] had a co-wife, one [of the brothers] performs ḥalîṣah, the co-wife is freed. If then he had intercourse with her, this is forbidden intercourse and the co-wife is not freed. If he performed ḥalîṣah and then had intercourse with her, as you look at it, either ḥalîṣah should free or intercourse should free! Rebbi Yudan said, I confirmed it following “If somebody married his sister-in-law and she turns out to be pregnant”, as you say there, the co-wife should not marry until she knows by which means she is permitted, whether through the fetus or through intercourse; so here also the co-wife should not marry until she knows by which means she is permitted, whether through ḥalîṣah or through intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:7

If the first [sister] had a co-wife, one [of the brothers] performs ḥalîṣah, the co-wife is freed. If then he had intercourse with her, this is forbidden intercourse and the co-wife is not freed. If he performed ḥalîṣah and then had intercourse with her, as you look at it, either ḥalîṣah should free or intercourse should free! Rebbi Yudan said, I confirmed it following “If somebody married his sister-in-law and she turns out to be pregnant”, as you say there, the co-wife should not marry until she knows by which means she is permitted, whether through the fetus or through intercourse; so here also the co-wife should not marry until she knows by which means she is permitted, whether through ḥalîṣah or through intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:10

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:10

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:18

MISHNAH: Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters and the third is a bachelor. One of the sisters’ husbands died; the bachelor “bespoke” her; then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce, and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. That is what people say, he is unlucky with his wife and with his brother’s wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:25

MISHNAH: Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and one to an unrelated woman. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the husband of the unrelated married his widow, the wife of the secondbrother died and then the husband of the unrelated died. She is permanently forbidden to him since she was forbidden one moment.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:27

MISHNAH: Of three brothers, two are married to two sisters and one to an unrelated woman. If one of the sisters’ husbands divorced his wife, when the one married to an unrelated woman died and the divorcer married her and then died, that is what they said: Of all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or turned out to be she-rams, the co-wives are permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:34

MISHNAH: Three brothers are married to three unrelated women. If one of them died, his second brother “bespeaks” her and then dies, these perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate, as it is said: “Her levir shall come to her,” if on her is the candidacy from one brother but not from two. Rebbi Simeon says, he takes in levirate the one he prefers and performs ḥalîṣah with the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:35

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers married to three women,” etc. Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. One understands that he has to perform ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” because the wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Why can the other one not be married in levirate? Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, of any one you cannot marry in levirate, you cannot marry the co-wife in levirate. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar formulated this, he formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “ A boy at least nine years and one day old who had intercourse with his sister-in-law and when he grew up he married another wife; if he never had intercourse with the first again after he became an adult, the second [wife] may perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis. Rebbi Abun bar Bisna in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, but only if first he married in levirate and then performed ḥalîṣah. But if he performed ḥalîṣah first, it is forbidden; perhaps “bespeaking” acquired and she was freed by her co-wife’s ḥalîṣah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:36

MISHNAH: Two brothers are married to two sisters. If one of them died and then the wife of the other died, she is eternally forbidden to him since she was forbidden one moment.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:6

Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:6

Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:9

Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:9

Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:9

Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:9

Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:30

MISHNAH: If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law while his brother had married her sister and then died, she must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, if somebody divorces his wife while his brother had married her sister and then died, she is free.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:30

MISHNAH: If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law while his brother had married her sister and then died, she must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, if somebody divorces his wife while his brother had married her sister and then died, she is free.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:38

Rab Ḥiyya bar Ashi was sitting before Rav who saw him disturbed. He said to him, what is the matter? He said to him, my female donkey is pregnant and will give birth; then I have to get her to copulate before she is out of heat. He said to him, when did the male mount her? He said, on day X. He calculated and said, she still has some time until then. It was stated so: A quick female donkey does not need less than the days of the moon and one who is late is not later than the days of the sun. The words of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi disagree, since Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, the cattle herd of the government was there for copulating and those of the house of Rebbi took bulls from them to copulate. Some of them gave birth soon and some of them later. Here it is about a pure animal, there about an impure animal. But is it not written, “do you know the time the mountain goats will give birth, etc.” “Count months, make them complete, you will know the time of their giving birth.” “Do you know the time of giving birth?” A pure wild animal is like a domestic impure animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:38

Rab Ḥiyya bar Ashi was sitting before Rav who saw him disturbed. He said to him, what is the matter? He said to him, my female donkey is pregnant and will give birth; then I have to get her to copulate before she is out of heat. He said to him, when did the male mount her? He said, on day X. He calculated and said, she still has some time until then. It was stated so: A quick female donkey does not need less than the days of the moon and one who is late is not later than the days of the sun. The words of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi disagree, since Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, the cattle herd of the government was there for copulating and those of the house of Rebbi took bulls from them to copulate. Some of them gave birth soon and some of them later. Here it is about a pure animal, there about an impure animal. But is it not written, “do you know the time the mountain goats will give birth, etc.” “Count months, make them complete, you will know the time of their giving birth.” “Do you know the time of giving birth?” A pure wild animal is like a domestic impure animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:42

The woman who performs ḥalîṣah counts from the moment of death. The one who leaves by a bill of divorce counts from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Ḥanina said, from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the moment of writing. Rav and Samuel, Rav like Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel like Rebbi Joḥanan. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you, since you say from the moment of delivery, about what are you suspicious? Because in the meantime she was alone with him! Then one should worry about an old bill of divorce! Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan: According to you, since you say from the moment of writing, if there were two bills of divorce, one written now and one later, and both delivered on the same day. This one you prohibit and that one you permit! What Rav objected to Samuel, Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan. What Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel objected to Rav. Practice: She counts from the time of writing if he never was alone with her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:2

HALAKHAH: “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as a wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final; the verse says “her levir shall come upon her.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to the brothers.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:3

Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:5

Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:7

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:7

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:8

Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:8

Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:12

HALAKHAH: “How? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law,” etc. That means that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired. If you would say that a bill of divorce does not free more than “bespeaking” had acquired, the levir could say: My bill of divorce shall not free more than my “bespeaking” had acquired. But then the bill of divorce did not even free what my “bespeaking” had acquired! “Cutting off.” That is no cutting off!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:15

MISHNAH: If he delivered a bill of divorce and then “bespoke”, she needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he delivered a bill of divorce and then cohabited, she needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he delivered a bill of divorce and then performed ḥalîṣah, after ḥalîṣah nothing more is needed.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:15

MISHNAH: If he delivered a bill of divorce and then “bespoke”, she needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he delivered a bill of divorce and then cohabited, she needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he delivered a bill of divorce and then performed ḥalîṣah, after ḥalîṣah nothing more is needed.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:15

MISHNAH: If he delivered a bill of divorce and then “bespoke”, she needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he delivered a bill of divorce and then cohabited, she needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he delivered a bill of divorce and then performed ḥalîṣah, after ḥalîṣah nothing more is needed.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:16

HALAKHAH: “If he delivered a bill of divorce and then “bespoke”, etc. A bill of divorce for his “bespeaking” and ḥalîṣah for her candidacy.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:26

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:18

He tricked her. He borrowed a בדיומה and seated his mother next to her. She heard and accepted. And we have stated: “If she has a reputation in town to be betrothed, then she is betrothed.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:4

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:10

MISHNAH: If a daughter of an Israel married a Cohen who then died and left her pregnant, her slaves may not eat heave because of the share of the fetus. A fetus disqualifies but cannot enable to eat, the words of Rebbi Yose. They said to him, after you testified before us about the daughter of an Israel [married] to a Cohen, even if a daughter of a Cohen [was married] to a Cohen who died and left her pregnant, her slaves may not eat heave because of the share of the fetus.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:16

HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:8

A slave may be a permanent sojourner. A sojourner is like a Gentile in every respect. Rebbi Samuel bar Ḥiyya bar Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: One keeps the sojourner for twelve months. If he changes his mind, that is fine; otherwise he is like a Gentile in all respects. Rebbi Samuel bar Ḥiyya bar Jehudah, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi: The sojourner has to accept on condition that he may eat cadaver meat. Rebbi Hila said, one would then say, the words are [interpreted] as they are written. What does it mean, the words are [interpreted] as they are written? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, “You shall not eat any cadaver; to the sojourner in your midst you shall give it that he eat it.” Some Tannaim state: One does not receive a sojourner unless he accepts all commandments written in the Torah. Some Tannaim state: One does not receive a sojourner unless he renounces his idolatry. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi: One does not receive a sojourner unless he renounces his idolatry as a Gentile. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, from their consensus: unless he renounces his idolatry as a Gentile. For if it were not so, what would we say? Since he is forbidden idolatry he cannot render profane. But are Gentiles not also forbidden idolatry and they do render profane? Rebbi Yose said, that you should not say, since he is equal to an Israel in three respects, do not oppress, do not cheat, and he is exiled like an Israel, that he has no power to render profane. Therefore, it was necessary to spell out that he renders idols profane like a Gentile. Who is the Tanna who includes “do not oppress”? He is Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated: The sojourner is protected by the prohibition, the words of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:12

“Circumcising he shall circumcise.” A decision for two circumcisions, one for the circumcision, the other for the uncovering. One for the uncovering, the other for the fibers. So far following Rebbi Aqiba who said, these are expressions of additions. From where for Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”? Rebbi Judah bar Pazi said, “then she said, a blood bridegroom for circumcisions,” from here that there are two circumcisions, one for the circumcision, the other for the uncovering; one for the uncovering, the other for the fibers. Rav said, “circumcising he shall circumcise,” from here that one has to draw a drop of covenant blood from one born circumcised. “Circumcising he shall circumcise,” from here that an uncircumcised Jew cannot circumcise until he circumcises himself; not to speak of an uncircumcised Gentile. Rebbi Levi said, it is written: “But you have to keep my covenant.” You and yours.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:25

In the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah, may a male bastard not marry a female bastard? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Jacob from Gebal stated before Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Isaac bar Tevele in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Rebbi Jehudah stated that a male bastard should not marry a female bastard so that bastards should disappear from the world. Similarly, is an Ammonite man forbidden to marry an Ammonite woman? Was that needed for the rabbis? For if Rebbi Jehudah would think that disqualified converts form one of the Eternal’s congregations, then [the Ammonite] could not marry an Ammonite woman since for her he would be of the Eternal’s congregation. He could not marry an Egyptian woman since for her he would be of the Eternal’s congregation. Rebbi Mattania said, one frees a slave girl for him. Similarly, could an Egyptian man not marry an Egyptian woman? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Abbahu stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: “Rebbi Jehudah said, Benjamin, an Egyptian convert, was a student of Rebbi Aqiba. He said, I am an Egyptian convert married to an Egyptian convert. My son is an Egyptian convert; I shall marry him to an Egyptian convert so that my grandson will be qualified to marry into the congregation. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, my son, it is not so. But you marry him to the daughter of an Egyptian woman convert so that there should be three generations on every side.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:35

One verse says, “his name was Yitra the Israelite;” another verse says, “Yeter the Ismaelite.” Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, he was an Ismaelite. And you say, he was an Israelite? But he entered the court of Isaiah and found him sitting and explaining: “turn to me and be saved, all ends of the earth,” and converted. Then he gave him his daughter. But the rabbis say, he was an Israelite, and you say, an Ismaelite? But he girded his loins like an Ismaelite and stuck his sword in the earth in court, to kill or be killed, to support the word of my teacher: I shall kill with this sword anybody who transgresses this practice: “Ammonite,” and not female Ammonite; “Moabite,” and not female Moabite. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, I have only what I did learn: “Naomi returned with Ruth the Moabite, her daughter-in-law, who returned from the fields of Moab.” She is the one who first returned from the fields of Moab. Afterwards, he told her: “You abandoned your father and your mother.” He said to her: If you had come to us yesterday or the day before, we would not have accepted you.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:22

MISHNAH: An Israel woman married to a Cohen shall eat heave. If he died but she had a son from him, she shall eat heave. If [then] she married a Levite, she shall eat tithe. If he died but she had a son from him, she shall eat tithe. If [then] she marries an Israel, she may eat neither heave nor tithe.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:22

MISHNAH: An Israel woman married to a Cohen shall eat heave. If he died but she had a son from him, she shall eat heave. If [then] she married a Levite, she shall eat tithe. If he died but she had a son from him, she shall eat tithe. If [then] she marries an Israel, she may eat neither heave nor tithe.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:24

MISHNAH: A Cohen’s daughter married to an Israel may not eat heave. If he died but she had a son from him, she may not eat heave. If [then] she married a Levite, she may eat tithe. If he died but she had a son from him, she may eat tithe. If [then] she married a Cohen, she may eat heave. If he died but she had a son from him, she may eat heave. If her son from the Cohen died, she may eat tithe; from the Levite, she may not eat tithe. If her son from the Israel died, she returns to her father’s house and for this case it was said: “She returns to her father’s house as in her youth.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:24

MISHNAH: A Cohen’s daughter married to an Israel may not eat heave. If he died but she had a son from him, she may not eat heave. If [then] she married a Levite, she may eat tithe. If he died but she had a son from him, she may eat tithe. If [then] she married a Cohen, she may eat heave. If he died but she had a son from him, she may eat heave. If her son from the Cohen died, she may eat tithe; from the Levite, she may not eat tithe. If her son from the Israel died, she returns to her father’s house and for this case it was said: “She returns to her father’s house as in her youth.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:1

MISHNAH: A woman’s husband went overseas and some persons came and told her, your husband died. If she remarried and then the husband returned, she has to leave both husbands, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:2

HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:2

HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:2

HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:6

“Any child from either of the men is a bastard.” One understands that the child is a bastard from the second [husband]. Is it a bastard from the first? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, this follows Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says if a man copulates with his wife whom he accuses of infidelity the child is a bastard, if a man takes back his divorcee after she had remarried the child is a bastard. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila, according to everybody the child is acceptable; the status of her bill of divorce is the status of her bastardy. What is the difference between them? If the second one gave her a bill of divorce and then the first one copulated with her. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the child is a bastard following Rebbi Aqiba; in the opinion of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila, according to everybody the child is acceptable.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:12

Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:15

What does Rebbi Eleazar say about ketubah? If you say that he is entitled to things that come to him in prohibition, then ketubah that came to him in permission certainly!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:17

Would it not be reasonable that she should be permitted if she remarried with permission, forbidden if she remarried without permission? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Simeon [imply] that the court made their decision like intentional [relations between] man and woman, if she remarried without permission like erroneous [relations between] man and woman. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no “free” here but “obligated”. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: should it not be an act of instruction? When they instructed that it is permitted to sleep with an [otherwise] married woman. Is that not uprooting a principle? When they instructed that she is forbidden for five years, from then on permitted. Then it should be so if she misbehaved! Misbehaving is like eating fat or blood. When they instructed that fat is permitted and [she ate] blood.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:17

Would it not be reasonable that she should be permitted if she remarried with permission, forbidden if she remarried without permission? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Simeon [imply] that the court made their decision like intentional [relations between] man and woman, if she remarried without permission like erroneous [relations between] man and woman. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no “free” here but “obligated”. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: should it not be an act of instruction? When they instructed that it is permitted to sleep with an [otherwise] married woman. Is that not uprooting a principle? When they instructed that she is forbidden for five years, from then on permitted. Then it should be so if she misbehaved! Misbehaving is like eating fat or blood. When they instructed that fat is permitted and [she ate] blood.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:18

MISHNAH: A woman’s husband and son went overseas and people came and told her, your husband died and after that your son died, and she remarried. After that, they said to her, the sequence was inverted. Then she must leave and the first and the last children are bastards.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:23

MISHNAH: They came and told her, your son died and after that your husband died, and she was married in levirate. After that, they said to her, the sequence was inverted. Then she must leave and the first and the last children are bastards.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:25

MISHNAH: If they told her, your husband died, and she remarried, and then they told her, he was alive but died, she must leave and the first child is a bastard, but the last is not a bastard. If they told her, your husband died; she was betrothed and after that her husband returned, she is permitted to return to him. Even though the second [husband] gave her a bill of divorce he did not disable her from priesthood. This Rebbi Eleazar ben Matthew explained, “a woman divorced from her husband,” and not a woman divorced from a non-husband.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:27

How do you explain these? With one witness or with two witnesses? If you explain with one witness, then one witness would permit her to the levir. If you explain with two witnesses, then it disagrees with Rav since Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said in the name of Rav, if she was married by the testimony of two witnesses, even if he returns, she says to him, you are not him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:27

How do you explain these? With one witness or with two witnesses? If you explain with one witness, then one witness would permit her to the levir. If you explain with two witnesses, then it disagrees with Rav since Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said in the name of Rav, if she was married by the testimony of two witnesses, even if he returns, she says to him, you are not him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:33

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.