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The Jerusalem Talmud
The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There, he says, “he marries in levirate the one he wants and performs ḥalîṣah with the other,” and here, he says so? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, when I was still there, I learned the reason: There, the candidacy for two brothers-in-law does not interfere and one candidacy can be added to another, but here it is candidacy for one levir and no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”. Rebbi Mattania said, are not sisters different from unrelated women? If you want a difficulty, find it in what Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of RavSheshet: They stated there that Rebbi Simeon forbade both of them. The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There he says, both are forbidden, and here you says, both are permitted.
The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There, he says, “he marries in levirate the one he wants and performs ḥalîṣah with the other,” and here, he says so? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, when I was still there, I learned the reason: There, the candidacy for two brothers-in-law does not interfere and one candidacy can be added to another, but here it is candidacy for one levir and no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”. Rebbi Mattania said, are not sisters different from unrelated women? If you want a difficulty, find it in what Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of RavSheshet: They stated there that Rebbi Simeon forbade both of them. The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There he says, both are forbidden, and here you says, both are permitted.
The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There, he says, “he marries in levirate the one he wants and performs ḥalîṣah with the other,” and here, he says so? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, when I was still there, I learned the reason: There, the candidacy for two brothers-in-law does not interfere and one candidacy can be added to another, but here it is candidacy for one levir and no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”. Rebbi Mattania said, are not sisters different from unrelated women? If you want a difficulty, find it in what Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of RavSheshet: They stated there that Rebbi Simeon forbade both of them. The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There he says, both are forbidden, and here you says, both are permitted.
The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There, he says, “he marries in levirate the one he wants and performs ḥalîṣah with the other,” and here, he says so? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, when I was still there, I learned the reason: There, the candidacy for two brothers-in-law does not interfere and one candidacy can be added to another, but here it is candidacy for one levir and no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”. Rebbi Mattania said, are not sisters different from unrelated women? If you want a difficulty, find it in what Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of RavSheshet: They stated there that Rebbi Simeon forbade both of them. The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There he says, both are forbidden, and here you says, both are permitted.
HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. Do the House of Shammai follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely? If they would follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, in case he had divorced the “bespoken” widow, she would not need ḥalîṣah! But Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the House of Shammai agree that if he divorced the “bespoken”, she needs ḥalîṣah! It must be they follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. If they would follow Rebbi Simeon, in any case, if “bespeaking” acquires, nothing follows it. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, why “his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? Maybe “bespeaking” for the House of Shammai is like candidacy for Rebbi Simeon in the interpretation of the rabbis there. As the rabbis there say, “bespeaking” acquires and leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, [candidacy] acquires and leaves a remainder. Rebbi Simeon says, no candidacy can come after a candidacy, so the House of Shammai say here, no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”.
HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. Do the House of Shammai follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely? If they would follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, in case he had divorced the “bespoken” widow, she would not need ḥalîṣah! But Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the House of Shammai agree that if he divorced the “bespoken”, she needs ḥalîṣah! It must be they follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. If they would follow Rebbi Simeon, in any case, if “bespeaking” acquires, nothing follows it. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, why “his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? Maybe “bespeaking” for the House of Shammai is like candidacy for Rebbi Simeon in the interpretation of the rabbis there. As the rabbis there say, “bespeaking” acquires and leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, [candidacy] acquires and leaves a remainder. Rebbi Simeon says, no candidacy can come after a candidacy, so the House of Shammai say here, no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”.
Rebbi Yudan said, even Rebbi Eliezer agrees. Rebbi Yose said, that is correct. Because, if somebody had children but they died before he died, is his widow not a candidate for levirate? There, if he had children at the moment of death. Here, if they were co-wives after his death.
MISHNAH: In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. What is a questionable divorce? If [the divorce document] was written in his handwriting but without witnesses, or there are witnesses but no date, or there is a date but only one witness, these are questionable divorces.
MISHNAH: In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. What is a questionable divorce? If [the divorce document] was written in his handwriting but without witnesses, or there are witnesses but no date, or there is a date but only one witness, these are questionable divorces.
MISHNAH: In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. What is a questionable divorce? If [the divorce document] was written in his handwriting but without witnesses, or there are witnesses but no date, or there is a date but only one witness, these are questionable divorces.
MISHNAH: In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. What is a questionable divorce? If [the divorce document] was written in his handwriting but without witnesses, or there are witnesses but no date, or there is a date but only one witness, these are questionable divorces.
HALAKHAH: “In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate,” etc. There really is no questionable divorce here. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. And here, if he threw the divorce document to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that is a questionable divorce.
HALAKHAH: “In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate,” etc. There really is no questionable divorce here. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. And here, if he threw the divorce document to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that is a questionable divorce.
HALAKHAH: “In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate,” etc. There really is no questionable divorce here. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. And here, if he threw the divorce document to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that is a questionable divorce.
HALAKHAH: “In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate,” etc. There really is no questionable divorce here. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. And here, if he threw the divorce document to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that is a questionable divorce.
It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed, he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abun said, because it is invalid. So far, if the old man took the loan and [later] the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and [later] the son mortgaged, can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun said, and was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce. Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.
HALAKHAH: “Three brothers married to three women,” etc. Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. One understands that he has to perform ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” because the wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Why can the other one not be married in levirate? Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, of any one you cannot marry in levirate, you cannot marry the co-wife in levirate. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar formulated this, he formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “ A boy at least nine years and one day old who had intercourse with his sister-in-law and when he grew up he married another wife; if he never had intercourse with the first again after he became an adult, the second [wife] may perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis. Rebbi Abun bar Bisna in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, but only if first he married in levirate and then performed ḥalîṣah. But if he performed ḥalîṣah first, it is forbidden; perhaps “bespeaking” acquired and she was freed by her co-wife’s ḥalîṣah.
If there was ḥalîṣah during these three months, does she need another one after three months? Let us hear from the following: “A minor who performed ḥalîṣah should perform ḥalîṣah after she grows up; if she performed [only one] ḥalîṣah, the ḥalîṣah she performed is valid.” Rebbi Mana said it anonymously, Rebbi Isaac the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya brought it in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan; this is Rebbi Meïr‘s, since Rebbi Meïr says one does neither perform ḥalîṣah nor levirate with a minor: maybe she would turn out to be a she-ram. As you say there, even though she already performed ḥalîṣah, she again performs ḥalîṣah; so here also though she did perform ḥalîṣah, she performs ḥalîṣah.
If there was ḥalîṣah during these three months, does she need another one after three months? Let us hear from the following: “A minor who performed ḥalîṣah should perform ḥalîṣah after she grows up; if she performed [only one] ḥalîṣah, the ḥalîṣah she performed is valid.” Rebbi Mana said it anonymously, Rebbi Isaac the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya brought it in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan; this is Rebbi Meïr‘s, since Rebbi Meïr says one does neither perform ḥalîṣah nor levirate with a minor: maybe she would turn out to be a she-ram. As you say there, even though she already performed ḥalîṣah, she again performs ḥalîṣah; so here also though she did perform ḥalîṣah, she performs ḥalîṣah.
Rebbi Yudan asked: If he performed ḥalîṣah with a pregnant woman and she had a miscarriage? Let us hear from the following: If somebody died and left a pregnant widow, should I think that she must have recourse to her levir? The verse says, “that his name should not be extinguished from Israel,” only one whose name is extinguished. The verse says, “to establish a name in Israel for his brother,” until you know whether there is a live child or not. I could think that the wife of an eunuch should need levirate, the verse says “that his name should not be extinguished from Israel,” only one whose name is not extinguished; this excludes this one whose name was already extinguished.
Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”
Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”
HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yose said, in any case where the true fact can be ascertained, one does not have to bring a reparation offering because of doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them and the other is locked up.He says, since I could determine the true fact if I would find the key, does one have to bring a reparation offering in this case of doubt? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody marries his sister-in-law but she turned out to have been pregnant”, as long as it is not known whether the child lives or does not live, does he have to bring a reparation offering because of the doubt? This means that he does not bring.
Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!
Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!
How do we hold? If he came to her immediately after her husband’s death, and the fetus was recognized after two months, one should have stated: A nine-month child of either one of them or a seven-month of either one of them! But it may be that he came to her after two months and the fetus was recognized after three months, one should have stated: The sister-in-law should not perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate until after five months! But it must be that he came to her after 40 days and the fetus was recognized after 50 days. That would be complete months for [a child of] the first [brother] and incomplete ones for the second. This implies that a woman may give birth after full months. This implies that there are two creations. This implies that a woman may give birth after incomplete months. This implies that a woman may become pregnant repeatedly. This implies that a woman cannot become pregnant simultaneously from two men. And it disagrees with the sermonizing rabbis, since the sermonizing rabbis say “the middleman” “from the orders of the Philistines”, from 100 prepuces of Philistines, that 100 prepuces of Philistines touched her. Rebbi Mattaniah said, there is no disagreement. As long as the semen is not spoiled, a woman can become pregnant from several men simultaneously. After the semen is spoiled, a woman cannot become pregnant from several men simultaneously.
How do we hold? If he came to her immediately after her husband’s death, and the fetus was recognized after two months, one should have stated: A nine-month child of either one of them or a seven-month of either one of them! But it may be that he came to her after two months and the fetus was recognized after three months, one should have stated: The sister-in-law should not perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate until after five months! But it must be that he came to her after 40 days and the fetus was recognized after 50 days. That would be complete months for [a child of] the first [brother] and incomplete ones for the second. This implies that a woman may give birth after full months. This implies that there are two creations. This implies that a woman may give birth after incomplete months. This implies that a woman may become pregnant repeatedly. This implies that a woman cannot become pregnant simultaneously from two men. And it disagrees with the sermonizing rabbis, since the sermonizing rabbis say “the middleman” “from the orders of the Philistines”, from 100 prepuces of Philistines, that 100 prepuces of Philistines touched her. Rebbi Mattaniah said, there is no disagreement. As long as the semen is not spoiled, a woman can become pregnant from several men simultaneously. After the semen is spoiled, a woman cannot become pregnant from several men simultaneously.
If the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s [inheritance]. one says to him, the other one is your father. If the levir comes to take his part in his brother’s [inheritance], one says to him, that one is his son. How is that? They compromise between themselves and split the property of the deceased. One finds, compromise with his brother is loss to the brothers; competition between the brothers is catastrophy for the brothers. If the old man dies, one finds that certain sons and an uncertain grandson come. If the uncertain [son] dies there exists a certain son of his father’s brother and an uncertain mother. If one of the brothers dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain son of a brother. If the mother of the uncertain [son] dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain husband. If first the uncertain [son] dies and after that his mother, a son of the mother’s brother is certain but the husband uncertain. If the levir dies and the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s inheritance, if the first one was poor, they tell him, that one is your father. If he was rich, the tell him, we all are brothers, sons of his brother. Come and let us inherit our father’s part and the part of our father’s brother.
If the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s [inheritance]. one says to him, the other one is your father. If the levir comes to take his part in his brother’s [inheritance], one says to him, that one is his son. How is that? They compromise between themselves and split the property of the deceased. One finds, compromise with his brother is loss to the brothers; competition between the brothers is catastrophy for the brothers. If the old man dies, one finds that certain sons and an uncertain grandson come. If the uncertain [son] dies there exists a certain son of his father’s brother and an uncertain mother. If one of the brothers dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain son of a brother. If the mother of the uncertain [son] dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain husband. If first the uncertain [son] dies and after that his mother, a son of the mother’s brother is certain but the husband uncertain. If the levir dies and the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s inheritance, if the first one was poor, they tell him, that one is your father. If he was rich, the tell him, we all are brothers, sons of his brother. Come and let us inherit our father’s part and the part of our father’s brother.
If the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s [inheritance]. one says to him, the other one is your father. If the levir comes to take his part in his brother’s [inheritance], one says to him, that one is his son. How is that? They compromise between themselves and split the property of the deceased. One finds, compromise with his brother is loss to the brothers; competition between the brothers is catastrophy for the brothers. If the old man dies, one finds that certain sons and an uncertain grandson come. If the uncertain [son] dies there exists a certain son of his father’s brother and an uncertain mother. If one of the brothers dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain son of a brother. If the mother of the uncertain [son] dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain husband. If first the uncertain [son] dies and after that his mother, a son of the mother’s brother is certain but the husband uncertain. If the levir dies and the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s inheritance, if the first one was poor, they tell him, that one is your father. If he was rich, the tell him, we all are brothers, sons of his brother. Come and let us inherit our father’s part and the part of our father’s brother.
It was stated: “The first son could be High Priest, any second son possibly is a bastard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, there is no such thing as a possible bastard.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees in cases of doubt of Samaritans and desecrated persons. This refers to what we have stated there: “Ten classes returned from Babylonia.” In the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, eight. In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, nine. In the opinion of the rabbis, ten.
It was stated: “The first son could be High Priest, any second son possibly is a bastard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, there is no such thing as a possible bastard.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees in cases of doubt of Samaritans and desecrated persons. This refers to what we have stated there: “Ten classes returned from Babylonia.” In the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, eight. In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, nine. In the opinion of the rabbis, ten.
MISHNAH: He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance and, if there is a father, the property goes to the father. He who marries his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property. Rebbi Jehudah says, in any case if there is a father, the property goes to the father.
MISHNAH: He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance and, if there is a father, the property goes to the father. He who marries his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property. Rebbi Jehudah says, in any case if there is a father, the property goes to the father.
Rav Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: He who “bespeaks” his sister-in-law does not acquire his brother’s property. Even the House of Shammai agree to that; even Rebbi Simeon agrees to that, but not Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh. As Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh said, “bespeaking” acquires the sister-in-law totally. If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one and came to the other. As you take it, either by “bespeaking” he acquires or by intercourse he acquires. Rebbi Yose said, since he cannot keep either one, he did not acquire his brother’s property.
So is the Mishnah: “The relative of a co-wife of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is permitted to him, but the co-wife of a relative of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is forbidden”. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Avina: It is an inference de minore ad majus. If the Sages gave a co-wife to the sister of a woman for whom he performed ḥalîṣah, which is rabbinic, here, where there is the prohibition of sisters, not so much more?
HALAKHAH: “No sister-in-law should be a party to ḥalîṣah,” etc. How long is it until a pregnancy is recognized? Symmachos said in the name of Rebbi Meїr: After three months. Even though it is no proof, there is a hint: “It was after about three months.” Rebbi Yudan said, even for a phantom pregnancy, “we were pregnant, we were sick, as if we gave birth to wind,” “get pregnant with dry grass, give birth to straw.” Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra said, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya: Even most of the first, most of the last, and the middle one complete. Rav Assi said, a full 90 days. Samuel said, they in their fulness. A case came before the rabbis there; we do not know if thirteen of the first and seventeen of the last or seventeen of the first and thirteen of the last, and five complete ones in the middle; they wanted to touch the child because of a doubt of bastardy. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob told them, such a case came before Abba bar Abba and he declared it acceptable. Does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Abba said, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth. A pregnancy is recognized after full months, a birth can happen after fractional months. There, we have stated: “How long can labor be? Rebbi Meїr said, even 40 to 50 days. Rebbi Jehudah said, her month is sufficient. Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon say, no labor is longer than two weeks”. “Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after fractional months. Since otherwise one should have stated “thirty days”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after full months. Since we have stated: “Her month is sufficient.”
HALAKHAH: “No sister-in-law should be a party to ḥalîṣah,” etc. How long is it until a pregnancy is recognized? Symmachos said in the name of Rebbi Meїr: After three months. Even though it is no proof, there is a hint: “It was after about three months.” Rebbi Yudan said, even for a phantom pregnancy, “we were pregnant, we were sick, as if we gave birth to wind,” “get pregnant with dry grass, give birth to straw.” Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra said, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya: Even most of the first, most of the last, and the middle one complete. Rav Assi said, a full 90 days. Samuel said, they in their fulness. A case came before the rabbis there; we do not know if thirteen of the first and seventeen of the last or seventeen of the first and thirteen of the last, and five complete ones in the middle; they wanted to touch the child because of a doubt of bastardy. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob told them, such a case came before Abba bar Abba and he declared it acceptable. Does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Abba said, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth. A pregnancy is recognized after full months, a birth can happen after fractional months. There, we have stated: “How long can labor be? Rebbi Meїr said, even 40 to 50 days. Rebbi Jehudah said, her month is sufficient. Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon say, no labor is longer than two weeks”. “Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after fractional months. Since otherwise one should have stated “thirty days”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after full months. Since we have stated: “Her month is sufficient.”
HALAKHAH: “No sister-in-law should be a party to ḥalîṣah,” etc. How long is it until a pregnancy is recognized? Symmachos said in the name of Rebbi Meїr: After three months. Even though it is no proof, there is a hint: “It was after about three months.” Rebbi Yudan said, even for a phantom pregnancy, “we were pregnant, we were sick, as if we gave birth to wind,” “get pregnant with dry grass, give birth to straw.” Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra said, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya: Even most of the first, most of the last, and the middle one complete. Rav Assi said, a full 90 days. Samuel said, they in their fulness. A case came before the rabbis there; we do not know if thirteen of the first and seventeen of the last or seventeen of the first and thirteen of the last, and five complete ones in the middle; they wanted to touch the child because of a doubt of bastardy. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob told them, such a case came before Abba bar Abba and he declared it acceptable. Does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Abba said, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth. A pregnancy is recognized after full months, a birth can happen after fractional months. There, we have stated: “How long can labor be? Rebbi Meїr said, even 40 to 50 days. Rebbi Jehudah said, her month is sufficient. Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon say, no labor is longer than two weeks”. “Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after fractional months. Since otherwise one should have stated “thirty days”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after full months. Since we have stated: “Her month is sufficient.”
HALAKHAH: “No sister-in-law should be a party to ḥalîṣah,” etc. How long is it until a pregnancy is recognized? Symmachos said in the name of Rebbi Meїr: After three months. Even though it is no proof, there is a hint: “It was after about three months.” Rebbi Yudan said, even for a phantom pregnancy, “we were pregnant, we were sick, as if we gave birth to wind,” “get pregnant with dry grass, give birth to straw.” Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra said, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya: Even most of the first, most of the last, and the middle one complete. Rav Assi said, a full 90 days. Samuel said, they in their fulness. A case came before the rabbis there; we do not know if thirteen of the first and seventeen of the last or seventeen of the first and thirteen of the last, and five complete ones in the middle; they wanted to touch the child because of a doubt of bastardy. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob told them, such a case came before Abba bar Abba and he declared it acceptable. Does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Abba said, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth. A pregnancy is recognized after full months, a birth can happen after fractional months. There, we have stated: “How long can labor be? Rebbi Meїr said, even 40 to 50 days. Rebbi Jehudah said, her month is sufficient. Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon say, no labor is longer than two weeks”. “Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after fractional months. Since otherwise one should have stated “thirty days”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after full months. Since we have stated: “Her month is sufficient.”
Rebbi Mana said, I heard in the name of Samuel that there is no difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth, but I do not remember from whom I heard this. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen said before Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Jeremiah said this. Rebbi Ḥizqyah said to him, Rebbi Jeremiah did not say this; Rebbi Yose was offended by him. He said to him: Even Joshua who was bound to Moses would not have said so, but you said so! He checked himself and said, it is true that he said that but as a person who quotes something and questions it; does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Berekhiah in the name of Samuel: A woman gives birth only either after 271, 272, 273, or 274, days. Rebbi Mana said to him, from whom did the rabbi hear this? He said to him, from Rebbi Abba. The position of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There, he says, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth, and here, he says so? Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra in the name of Samuel: {If with ה Rabba, with א Rava.} Everything which is “many” is 208.
Rebbi Mana said, I heard in the name of Samuel that there is no difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth, but I do not remember from whom I heard this. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen said before Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Jeremiah said this. Rebbi Ḥizqyah said to him, Rebbi Jeremiah did not say this; Rebbi Yose was offended by him. He said to him: Even Joshua who was bound to Moses would not have said so, but you said so! He checked himself and said, it is true that he said that but as a person who quotes something and questions it; does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Berekhiah in the name of Samuel: A woman gives birth only either after 271, 272, 273, or 274, days. Rebbi Mana said to him, from whom did the rabbi hear this? He said to him, from Rebbi Abba. The position of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There, he says, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth, and here, he says so? Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra in the name of Samuel: {If with ה Rabba, with א Rava.} Everything which is “many” is 208.
Rebbi Mana said, I heard in the name of Samuel that there is no difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth, but I do not remember from whom I heard this. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen said before Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Jeremiah said this. Rebbi Ḥizqyah said to him, Rebbi Jeremiah did not say this; Rebbi Yose was offended by him. He said to him: Even Joshua who was bound to Moses would not have said so, but you said so! He checked himself and said, it is true that he said that but as a person who quotes something and questions it; does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Berekhiah in the name of Samuel: A woman gives birth only either after 271, 272, 273, or 274, days. Rebbi Mana said to him, from whom did the rabbi hear this? He said to him, from Rebbi Abba. The position of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There, he says, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth, and here, he says so? Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra in the name of Samuel: {If with ה Rabba, with א Rava.} Everything which is “many” is 208.
Rab Ḥiyya bar Ashi was sitting before Rav who saw him disturbed. He said to him, what is the matter? He said to him, my female donkey is pregnant and will give birth; then I have to get her to copulate before she is out of heat. He said to him, when did the male mount her? He said, on day X. He calculated and said, she still has some time until then. It was stated so: A quick female donkey does not need less than the days of the moon and one who is late is not later than the days of the sun. The words of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi disagree, since Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, the cattle herd of the government was there for copulating and those of the house of Rebbi took bulls from them to copulate. Some of them gave birth soon and some of them later. Here it is about a pure animal, there about an impure animal. But is it not written, “do you know the time the mountain goats will give birth, etc.” “Count months, make them complete, you will know the time of their giving birth.” “Do you know the time of giving birth?” A pure wild animal is like a domestic impure animal.
Rab Ḥiyya bar Ashi was sitting before Rav who saw him disturbed. He said to him, what is the matter? He said to him, my female donkey is pregnant and will give birth; then I have to get her to copulate before she is out of heat. He said to him, when did the male mount her? He said, on day X. He calculated and said, she still has some time until then. It was stated so: A quick female donkey does not need less than the days of the moon and one who is late is not later than the days of the sun. The words of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi disagree, since Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, the cattle herd of the government was there for copulating and those of the house of Rebbi took bulls from them to copulate. Some of them gave birth soon and some of them later. Here it is about a pure animal, there about an impure animal. But is it not written, “do you know the time the mountain goats will give birth, etc.” “Count months, make them complete, you will know the time of their giving birth.” “Do you know the time of giving birth?” A pure wild animal is like a domestic impure animal.
Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah is suspicious about a child. Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. Could you say that Rebbi Meїr is not suspicious about bills of divorce, as we have stated: “Those that had received qiddushin can be married.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Gedula: The one who repudiates does not have to wait three months; the one who leaves by a bill of divorce needs to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Me‘ir since Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Jeremiah: A woman who has been raped does not have to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Yose, since Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. It was stated: The proselyte, the captive, and the slave woman who were redeemed, or converted, or freed, have to wait three months, the words of Rebbi Judah. Rebbi Yose says, they do not have to wait. Their blood, Rebbi Jehudah says, makes impure 24 hours retroactively; Rebbi Yose says, from its moment onwards. Rebbi said, the words of Rebbi Judah are reasonable for the blood, and the words of Rebbi Yose for the child. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu said, my father had a case and he asked Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa, and Rebbi Immi, and they instructed him following Rebbi Yose for the child. For if it were not so, what could we say? Between Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Yose, practice does not follow Rebbi Yose? But because Rebbi said, “they are reasonable”. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, every time Rebbi taught “they are reasonable”, the disagreement is unresolved except in the case of the fig cake where each party to the controversy accepts the opposition’s argument. Rebbi Yose said, I stated a difficulty before Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu: Even if it is certain that they had sex? He said to him, is a normal Gentile not like one who had sex? Simeon bar Abba said, there came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan and he instructed following Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Eleazar was sorry about this; he said, one disregards the anonymous [Mishnah] and follows an isolated opinion! He found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He understood that following Rebbi Simeon, he found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He said, the old man certainly understands the chapters about bills of divorce.
Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: There Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu, said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Every place where Rebbi taught a disagreement and afterwards taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous Mishnah. And here, you say so? He said to him, if not Rebbi, maybe somebody else said it? Since when Rebbi taught a disagreement and afterwards taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous [text]. It must be that Rebbi did not find a disagreement in the Mishnah; but if others taught it in disagreement and Rebbi taught it anonymously, certainly practice follows the anonymous [text]. There come Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jacob bar Abba and Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Even if others taught a disagreement but Rebbi taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous [text]. Why does he agree here with a dissenting opinion? Rebbi Samuel ben Inaya in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. That means, if no diagreement is stated together with the anonymous [text], but if a disagreement is stated together with the anonymous [text], practice does not follow the anonymous [opinion]. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. That is, if individual disagrees with individual. But if an individual disagrees next to the [anonymous] Sages, practice does not follow the anonymous [text].
Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: There Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu, said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Every place where Rebbi taught a disagreement and afterwards taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous Mishnah. And here, you say so? He said to him, if not Rebbi, maybe somebody else said it? Since when Rebbi taught a disagreement and afterwards taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous [text]. It must be that Rebbi did not find a disagreement in the Mishnah; but if others taught it in disagreement and Rebbi taught it anonymously, certainly practice follows the anonymous [text]. There come Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jacob bar Abba and Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Even if others taught a disagreement but Rebbi taught it anonymously, practice follows the anonymous [text]. Why does he agree here with a dissenting opinion? Rebbi Samuel ben Inaya in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. That means, if no diagreement is stated together with the anonymous [text], but if a disagreement is stated together with the anonymous [text], practice does not follow the anonymous [opinion]. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. That is, if individual disagrees with individual. But if an individual disagrees next to the [anonymous] Sages, practice does not follow the anonymous [text].
The woman who performs ḥalîṣah counts from the moment of death. The one who leaves by a bill of divorce counts from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Ḥanina said, from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the moment of writing. Rav and Samuel, Rav like Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel like Rebbi Joḥanan. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you, since you say from the moment of delivery, about what are you suspicious? Because in the meantime she was alone with him! Then one should worry about an old bill of divorce! Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan: According to you, since you say from the moment of writing, if there were two bills of divorce, one written now and one later, and both delivered on the same day. This one you prohibit and that one you permit! What Rav objected to Samuel, Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan. What Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel objected to Rav. Practice: She counts from the time of writing if he never was alone with her.
HALAKHAH: “Four of the brothers,” etc. Explanation: There were thirteen brothers, of whom twelve died childless. They [the widows] came and wanted to be married in levirate before Rebbi. He said to him, go and take in levirate. He said to him, it overtaxes my means. But each one of them said, I will support during my month. He said, and who will support during that intercalary month? Rebbi said, I shall support during that intercalary month. He prayed for them and they went from him. After three years they came, carrying 36 toddlers. They came and stood in front of Rebbi’s dwelling. [People] went in and told [Rebbi], outside are rural toddlers who want to greet you. Rebbi looked down from the window and saw them. He asked them, for what are you here? They said to him, we beg that you give us [support for] that intercalary month; he gave them [support for] that intercalary month.
May one apply a trick? Did Rebbi Ṭarphon, the father of all of Israel, not apply a trick? He gave qiddushin to 300 women in times of famine to let them eat heave! There, every one of them was able to eat heave. But here, is each one able to perform levirate? Rebbi Yudan the son of Rebbi Ismael: One deals with him is such a way.
HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.
HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.
HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.
HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.
HALAKHAH: “What is a bastard,” etc; “Rebbi Simeon ben Azai said,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, all of them learned from the father’s wife. “A man shall not take his father’s wife and not uncover his father’s garment’s wing.” Rebbi Aqiba explains: Just as his father’s wife is special in that she is a forbidden relation from which the child is a bastard, so in any case there is a forbidden relation, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not a widow for the High Priest? There is a difference, since desecration is spelled out. Simeon from Timna explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to extirpation for her, the child is a bastard. They objected, is there not the menstruating woman? There is a difference, since “blood-relation” is not written in reference to her. Rebbi Joshua explained: Just as his father’s wife is special in that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard, so in any case that one is subject to the death penalty for her, the child is a bastard.
Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.
Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.
Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.
Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.
Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.
Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.
Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.
MISHNAH: Rabban Gamliel says, there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce, no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, no copulation after copulation, and no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah. But the Sages say, there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce and “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, but nothing after copulation or after ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: Rabban Gamliel says, there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce, no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, no copulation after copulation, and no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah. But the Sages say, there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce and “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, but nothing after copulation or after ḥalîṣah.
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, does he say similarly that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Simeon says, there is nothing after copulation if it is primary. Therefore, if it is secondary, there is something afterwards. That must deal with copulation after a bill of divorce. For if it were copulation after “bespeaking”, what could you say? If “bespeaking” acquired, there is nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse will acquire and there is nothing after that. So we must speak about copulation after a bill of divorce. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially.
Since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, does he say similarly that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Simeon says, there is nothing after copulation if it is primary. Therefore, if it is secondary, there is something afterwards. That must deal with copulation after a bill of divorce. For if it were copulation after “bespeaking”, what could you say? If “bespeaking” acquired, there is nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse will acquire and there is nothing after that. So we must speak about copulation after a bill of divorce. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially.
Since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, does he say similarly that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Simeon says, there is nothing after copulation if it is primary. Therefore, if it is secondary, there is something afterwards. That must deal with copulation after a bill of divorce. For if it were copulation after “bespeaking”, what could you say? If “bespeaking” acquired, there is nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse will acquire and there is nothing after that. So we must speak about copulation after a bill of divorce. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially.
Since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, does he say similarly that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Simeon says, there is nothing after copulation if it is primary. Therefore, if it is secondary, there is something afterwards. That must deal with copulation after a bill of divorce. For if it were copulation after “bespeaking”, what could you say? If “bespeaking” acquired, there is nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse will acquire and there is nothing after that. So we must speak about copulation after a bill of divorce. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.
Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.
Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.
Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.
Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.
Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.
Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.
Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.
Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.
In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, can there be invalid intercourse after invalid intercourse, or the intercourse of a nine-years-old after the intercourse of [another] nine-years-old, or invalid intercourse after the intercourse of a nine-years-old, or intercourse of a nine-years-old after invalid intercourse? Do the Sages agree with Rabban Gamliel that there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” for one sister-in-law? How is that? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law, gave her a bill of divorce, and “bespoke” her again. If you say, there can be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she did not become free by that bill of divorce. If you say, there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she was freed by that bill of divorce.
In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, can there be invalid intercourse after invalid intercourse, or the intercourse of a nine-years-old after the intercourse of [another] nine-years-old, or invalid intercourse after the intercourse of a nine-years-old, or intercourse of a nine-years-old after invalid intercourse? Do the Sages agree with Rabban Gamliel that there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” for one sister-in-law? How is that? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law, gave her a bill of divorce, and “bespoke” her again. If you say, there can be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she did not become free by that bill of divorce. If you say, there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she was freed by that bill of divorce.
In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, can there be invalid intercourse after invalid intercourse, or the intercourse of a nine-years-old after the intercourse of [another] nine-years-old, or invalid intercourse after the intercourse of a nine-years-old, or intercourse of a nine-years-old after invalid intercourse? Do the Sages agree with Rabban Gamliel that there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” for one sister-in-law? How is that? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law, gave her a bill of divorce, and “bespoke” her again. If you say, there can be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she did not become free by that bill of divorce. If you say, there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she was freed by that bill of divorce.
In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, can there be invalid intercourse after invalid intercourse, or the intercourse of a nine-years-old after the intercourse of [another] nine-years-old, or invalid intercourse after the intercourse of a nine-years-old, or intercourse of a nine-years-old after invalid intercourse? Do the Sages agree with Rabban Gamliel that there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” for one sister-in-law? How is that? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law, gave her a bill of divorce, and “bespoke” her again. If you say, there can be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she did not become free by that bill of divorce. If you say, there cannot be “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, she was freed by that bill of divorce.
Rebbi Yudan asked: If somebody gave qiddushin to a woman “from now and after thirty days” and her sister became a candidate for levirate with him during these thirty days, is there even in this case no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking? He said, Rabban Gamliel said only “after a bill of divorce and ‘bespeaking’ ”. But what Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a hundred qiddushin are valid for her, does not follow Rabban Gamliel.
Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, this means that there is an obligation first to give qiddushin and only after that to cohabit. Since here, where qiddushin are not written, you say “that is as it is commanded”, for a wife, where it is written, not so much more!
MISHNAH: If he performed ḥalîṣah, “bespoke” her, gave a bill of divorce, and cohabited, or cohabited, “bespoke”, gave a bill of divorce, and performed ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah. There is no difference between one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
MISHNAH: If there are bills of divorce for both of them, they need a ḥalîṣah. If there is a bill of divorce to one and he copulated with the other, [the latter] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and “bespoke” the other, [the second one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, nothing follows after ḥalîṣah.