there
19876 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.
HALAKHAH: “They came and told her, your son died,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” They only said, “there is no bastard from a sister-in-law,” therefore she must leave. And we have stated, “she must leave”. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, she must leave.
HALAKHAH: “They came and told her, your son died,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” They only said, “there is no bastard from a sister-in-law,” therefore she must leave. And we have stated, “she must leave”. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, she must leave.
HALAKHAH: “If a man’s wife went overseas,”, etc. It is written: “If a man slept with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her. There, it also says “replacing your husband,” that excludes rape cases.
It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel agree that one who copulates with his mother-in-law disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his wife’s sister; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rebbi Jehudah: “In fire they should burn him and them.” Where do we hold? If it is about burning, only one of them is burned. So if it cannot be relevant for burning, let it be relevant for prohibition. So far following Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “In fire they should burn him and them,” him and the second one. And the House of Shammai was arguing: Since in a case where a slightly prohibited person copulated with a slightly prohibited person the cause of the prohibition became forbidden, if a strongly prohibited person copulated with a strongly prohibited person, it is only logical that the cause of the prohibition is forbidden. Which rule is slight? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the beginning of the chapter. But this is very strong! There is a difference since she was permitted to be married to him.
Immi the father of Samuel bar Immi in the name of Rav Jehudah: Practice follows Rebbi Simeon. There came a case before Rebbi Mana and he removed her from him. Does he hold with Rebbi Jehudah? No, she regularly came to him.
“If he allots her to his son;” he allots her to his son but he may not allot her to his grandson. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: In matters of inheritance you take the grandson like the son but here you do not take the grandson like the son? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if anybody explains this matter, I shall pour him spiced wine. Rebbi Tanḥum answered: In matters of inheritance where the brother can take the place of the son and all others can take the place of the son, the grandson takes the place of the son. The rabbis of Caesarea answered: In matters of impurity you consider the brother like the son and all [near] relatives like the son but not the grandson like the son. He said, there went the spiced wine.
“If he allots her to his son;” with [the girl’s] agreement. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no agreement here. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said so, the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, even if you say the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, is he not a minor? “If he allots her to his son;” with [the latter’s] agreement. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he allots her to his minor or adult son, with and without the latter’s agreement. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he allots her only to his adult son with the latter’s agreement.
“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of R. Joḥanan who will explain this for allotments it is understandable; since he acquires by allotment he makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.
Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one dead [husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, “any one who cannot marry me in levirate, cannot marry my co-wife in levirate.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Eleazar formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis.
There, we have stated: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” Rebbi Eleazar said, [Symmachos] and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be guilty because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees to the earlier [part of the Mishnah]. If was found stated, it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition.
There, we have stated: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” Rebbi Eleazar said, [Symmachos] and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be guilty because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees to the earlier [part of the Mishnah]. If was found stated, it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition.
It is written: “If a man takes a woman and her mother, it is taboo.” Everywhere is written “lying with” but here is written “taking”, to teach you that he cannot be guilty for the second [woman] unless the first one is prepared for him. Or maybe only by marriage? We already said that there is no incestuous marriage. But is it not written: “Nobody may marry his father’s wife, and he should not uncover his father’s garment’s corner”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his father married her. But is it not written: “If a man take his brother’s wife, it is despicable”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his brother married her. This is confirmed by levirate. But is it not written: “You should not take a woman in addition to her sister to make her a co-wife”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before he married her sister. This is confirmed after her sister’s death. But is it not written: “A man who would take his sister, his father’s daughter or his mother’s daughter; he sees her genitals and she sees his genitals, it is ḥesed.” Rebbi Avin said, that you should not say that Kain married his sister, Abel married his sister, “it is charitable”, I was charitable with the first generations so the world could be inhabited; “I said, the world was built on ḥesed.” But is it not written: “Widow, divorcee, and desecrated, these he shall not take”? This comes to tell you that if he became betrothed to her that the betrothal is valid.
Rebbi Ḥuna understood all of them from this verse: “The genitals of a woman and her daughter you should not uncover, etc.” Taboo - taboo, for an equal cut. Since there are three generations downwards, so there are three generations upwards. Since there is a prohibition downwards, so there is a prohibition upwards. Since upwards one requires marriage, so downwards one requires marriage. Since upwards they are burned, so downwards they are burned. Since downwards, He gave the male’s daughter the same status as the female’s daughter, so upwards we give the male’s mother the same status as the female’s mother.
Rebbi Ḥuna understood all of them from this verse: “The genitals of a woman and her daughter you should not uncover, etc.” Taboo - taboo, for an equal cut. Since there are three generations downwards, so there are three generations upwards. Since there is a prohibition downwards, so there is a prohibition upwards. Since upwards one requires marriage, so downwards one requires marriage. Since upwards they are burned, so downwards they are burned. Since downwards, He gave the male’s daughter the same status as the female’s daughter, so upwards we give the male’s mother the same status as the female’s mother.
Rebbi Ḥuna understood all of them from this verse: “The genitals of a woman and her daughter you should not uncover, etc.” Taboo - taboo, for an equal cut. Since there are three generations downwards, so there are three generations upwards. Since there is a prohibition downwards, so there is a prohibition upwards. Since upwards one requires marriage, so downwards one requires marriage. Since upwards they are burned, so downwards they are burned. Since downwards, He gave the male’s daughter the same status as the female’s daughter, so upwards we give the male’s mother the same status as the female’s mother.
Rebbi Ḥuna understood all of them from this verse: “The genitals of a woman and her daughter you should not uncover, etc.” Taboo - taboo, for an equal cut. Since there are three generations downwards, so there are three generations upwards. Since there is a prohibition downwards, so there is a prohibition upwards. Since upwards one requires marriage, so downwards one requires marriage. Since upwards they are burned, so downwards they are burned. Since downwards, He gave the male’s daughter the same status as the female’s daughter, so upwards we give the male’s mother the same status as the female’s mother.
Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah. If there are two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. What is the reason? “On human flesh it may not be rubbed and in its proportions you should not make [a compound] like it.” And it is written: “A man who would compound like it”. Here are two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation. The prohibitions divide the extirpation. This follows Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael said one infers from an argument de minore ad majus but one does not punish from an argument de minore ad majus. Where does he have that from? It comes following what Ḥizqiah stated: “If the daughter of a Cohen is desecrated by whoring.” Why does the verse say, “a man”? To include him who cohabits with his daughter’s daughter from a rape that she should be [under sentence of] burning. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one may even understand this from the warning: “Do not desecrate your daughter.”
What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? “ A man may not take his father’s wife,” that refers to his father’s wife; “and he should not uncover his father’s wing,” that is his rape victim. How do the rabbis explain “his father’s wing”? There, they say and they do not know the origin of the tradition, that refers to a wing which leans on his father. Would he not anyhow be guilty for her because of his father’s wife? Rebbi Hila said, because of forewarning, that if he was warned because of his father’s wife, he will be whipped, and because of his father’s wing, he will be whipped. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about whipping. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about sacrifice. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about all other doubtful cases that he is free. Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if he gave her qiddušin that these qiddušin are legally valid.
A Gentile has to separate from his sister, whether paternal or maternal, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his maternal halfsister; a paternal halfsister he may keep. He must separate from his mother’s sister but may keep his father’s sister, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, he must separate from his mother’s maternal halfsister but may keep his mother’s paternal halfsister. Rav Ḥanin said, he explained us the words of Rebbi Meïr simply: “Therefore, a man has to abandon his father and his mother.” What is close to him from his father’s side, what is close to him from his mother’s side. Rebbi Vivian asked: Then his father’s sister should be forbidden because she is close to his father! His mother’s sister should be forbidden because she is close to his mother! Rebbi Simeon, the son of Rebbi Ayvo objected: “Amram took his aunt Yokhebed as wife.” Does that mean that the Israelites did not even behave as descendants of Noah? Rebbi Hila said, what is close to him from his father’s side, what is close to him from his mother’s side. They objected to Rebbi Meïr: “And truly she is my sister, my father’s daughter, but not my mother’s.” He said to them: Is a proof from there? Not “she became my wife”?
MISHNAH: If the children of five women were mixed up, and the mixed-up became adults, married wives, and died, then four perform ḥalîṣah and one marries in levirate. This one and three others perform ḥalîṣah for another one and another one marries in levirate. It turns out that there are four ḥaliṣot and one levirate marriage for every one.
HALAKHAH: “If the children of five women were mixed up,” etc. Everywhere you say, there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, and here, you say so? There, it is was sure, here it is in doubt. Everywhere you say, if one does not say to him, take in levirate, one does not say, perform ḥalîṣah, and here, you say so? There, it is was sure, here it is doubtful.
HALAKHAH: “If the children of five women were mixed up,” etc. Everywhere you say, there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, and here, you say so? There, it is was sure, here it is in doubt. Everywhere you say, if one does not say to him, take in levirate, one does not say, perform ḥalîṣah, and here, you say so? There, it is was sure, here it is doubtful.
HALAKHAH: “If the children of five women were mixed up,” etc. Everywhere you say, there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, and here, you say so? There, it is was sure, here it is in doubt. Everywhere you say, if one does not say to him, take in levirate, one does not say, perform ḥalîṣah, and here, you say so? There, it is was sure, here it is doubtful.
MISHNAH: If a woman’s child was mixed up with her daughter-in-law’s child, the mixed-up children became adults, married wives, and died. The other sons of the daughter-in-law must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate since for them it is doubtful whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But the sons of the old woman may either perform ḥalîṣah or levirate since for them she was either a brother’s wife or a nephew’s wife. If one of the identified ones died, the mixed-up ones must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate for a son of the old woman since there is a doubt whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But for the sons of the daughter-in-law, one performs ḥalîṣah; the other may marry in levirate.
It was stated: Rebbi Simeon ben Gamliel says, any human who lives for thirty days is not a still birth, “all redeemed you shall redeem at the age of one month;” and an animal which lives for eight days is not a still birth, “from the eighth day and further it will be welcome as a sacrifice, a gift to the Eternal.” There, they say that practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. Rebbi Abba said, where do they disagree? If he was not born in his months. But if he was born in his months, even Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel will agree.
“If he injured one and then injured the other, or cursed one and then cursed the other, he cannot be prosecuted.” Rebbi Ḥanania asked, does that not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan? Since they disagree about the second day of holidays in the diaspora. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one accepts forwarning in a case of doubt, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one does not accept forwarning in a case of doubt. Rebbi Ḥanina said in the name of Rebbi, there is no disagreement. There, it would have been possible to make a determination, here it is impossible to make the determination.
“If he injured one and then injured the other, or cursed one and then cursed the other, he cannot be prosecuted.” Rebbi Ḥanania asked, does that not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan? Since they disagree about the second day of holidays in the diaspora. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one accepts forwarning in a case of doubt, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one does not accept forwarning in a case of doubt. Rebbi Ḥanina said in the name of Rebbi, there is no disagreement. There, it would have been possible to make a determination, here it is impossible to make the determination.
“If he injured both of them at the same time or cursed them at the same time, he is guilty. Rebbi Jehudah frees him.” Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Is not the argument of Rebbi Jehudah inverted? As we have stated there: “If he ate the volume of an olive of one of them and the volume of an olive of the other, he absorbs eighty [lashes]; Rebbi Jehudah says, he absorbs only forty [lashes].” Rebbi Crispus said, it is not inverted. There, it was in doubt what is forbidden. Here, it was certain but it became doubtful for him. Rebbi Judan asked: If it is so, in case carcass meat was mixed up with slaughtered meat, since it was certain but became doubtful for him, should he be free if he ate it? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Jehudah agrees for all other prohibitions that he is (free). But here, Rebbi Jehudah is interpreting verses: “His father,” certain but not uncertain, “his mother”, certain but not uncertain.
“If he injured both of them at the same time or cursed them at the same time, he is guilty. Rebbi Jehudah frees him.” Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Is not the argument of Rebbi Jehudah inverted? As we have stated there: “If he ate the volume of an olive of one of them and the volume of an olive of the other, he absorbs eighty [lashes]; Rebbi Jehudah says, he absorbs only forty [lashes].” Rebbi Crispus said, it is not inverted. There, it was in doubt what is forbidden. Here, it was certain but it became doubtful for him. Rebbi Judan asked: If it is so, in case carcass meat was mixed up with slaughtered meat, since it was certain but became doubtful for him, should he be free if he ate it? Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Jehudah agrees for all other prohibitions that he is (free). But here, Rebbi Jehudah is interpreting verses: “His father,” certain but not uncertain, “his mother”, certain but not uncertain.
There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid. And there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid. He who says that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid follows him who says “in Israel” to include converts. He who says that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid follows him who says “in Israel” to exclude converts.
There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid. And there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid. He who says that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid follows him who says “in Israel” to include converts. He who says that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid follows him who says “in Israel” to exclude converts.
Here, you say, to exclude converts. But there, you say, to include converts. There, “the citizen” to exclude converts, “in Israel” to exclude converts; an exclusion after an exclusion to include converts. But here, “in Israel”, not converts.
Here, you say, to exclude converts. But there, you say, to include converts. There, “the citizen” to exclude converts, “in Israel” to exclude converts; an exclusion after an exclusion to include converts. But here, “in Israel”, not converts.
There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is valid. Does he who says, ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid, and he who says, ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is valid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid? Even he who holds that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid will agree that in the presence of two men it is invalid since judgments in civil matters are valid from converts but invalid from two [judges].
There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is valid. Does he who says, ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid, and he who says, ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is valid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid? Even he who holds that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid will agree that in the presence of two men it is invalid since judgments in civil matters are valid from converts but invalid from two [judges].
There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the night is valid; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid. Does he who says, ḥalîṣah in the night is valid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid, and he who says, ḥalîṣah in the night is invalid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid? Even he who holds that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid will agree that in the night it is invalid since judgments in civil matters are valid from converts but invalid in the night.
There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the night is valid; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid. Does he who says, ḥalîṣah in the night is valid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid, and he who says, ḥalîṣah in the night is invalid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid? Even he who holds that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid will agree that in the night it is invalid since judgments in civil matters are valid from converts but invalid in the night.
“If she performed ḥalîṣah with a shoe, the ḥalîṣah is valid.” For whom is this statement needed? For Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Meїr said, one does not perform ḥalîṣah with a shoe. It was stated: Rebbi Yose said, it happened that I went to Nsebin and saw there an old man to whom I said, did you ever know Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra in your lifetime? He told me, Rabbi, I was a banker in my city and he was a constant customer of my bank. I told him, did you ever see him supervising a ḥalîṣah in your lifetime and what he did use for ḥalîṣah, a shoe or a sandal? He said to me, Rabbi, is there a sandal in our place? I wondered, how could Rebbi Meïr say that one does not perform ḥalîṣah with a shoe?
“If she performed ḥalîṣah with a shoe, the ḥalîṣah is valid.” For whom is this statement needed? For Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Meїr said, one does not perform ḥalîṣah with a shoe. It was stated: Rebbi Yose said, it happened that I went to Nsebin and saw there an old man to whom I said, did you ever know Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra in your lifetime? He told me, Rabbi, I was a banker in my city and he was a constant customer of my bank. I told him, did you ever see him supervising a ḥalîṣah in your lifetime and what he did use for ḥalîṣah, a shoe or a sandal? He said to me, Rabbi, is there a sandal in our place? I wondered, how could Rebbi Meïr say that one does not perform ḥalîṣah with a shoe?
Rebbi Yannai said, if he took off [his shoe] and she put it on again, or she took it off but he had untied, the ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back, he may not go back on it. Why? Is it since the two actions are not there together or because they are not in the right order? What is the difference? If she afterwards untied [the shoestrings]. If you say, because the two actions are not there together? They are there together! The reason therefore must be that they are not in the right order.
Rebbi Yannai said, if he took off [his shoe] and she put it on again, or she took it off but he had untied, the ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back, he may not go back on it. Why? Is it since the two actions are not there together or because they are not in the right order? What is the difference? If she afterwards untied [the shoestrings]. If you say, because the two actions are not there together? They are there together! The reason therefore must be that they are not in the right order.
Rebbi Yannai said, if he took off [his shoe] and she put it on again, or she took it off but he had untied, the ḥalîṣah is invalid and if he wants to go back, he may not go back on it. Why? Is it since the two actions are not there together or because they are not in the right order? What is the difference? If she afterwards untied [the shoestrings]. If you say, because the two actions are not there together? They are there together! The reason therefore must be that they are not in the right order.
“With a sandal having a heel it is valid.” There, they say, for example those קנסרוס. But the rabbis here say, like ours. Rav said, if I had not seen my uncle, the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya, performing a ḥalîṣah with a sandal with plaited straps, I would not feel competent to do so. The maternal uncle of Rav Cahana performed ḥalîṣah in the night, as single judge, on Friday night, with a cork sandal, and standing; (Rabbi Zeriqa said) and she did not spit. Rav heard that and said, who would ever do that except the maternal uncle of Rav Cahana?
So is the Mishnah: “If he ties lower than the knee, it is valid, above the knee it is invalid.” It is written: “Aaron and his sons shall wash their hands and feet from it.” It was stated about this: The hand up to the wrist, the foot up to the calf; and here you say so? There is a difference, since it is written “from above his foot”. In that case, even higher than the knee should be valid! There is a difference, since it is written “from above his foot”, and not from higher than above his foot. Cahana objected: Is it not written, “and the afterbirth which comes out from between her feet;” does it come out from between her feet? It looks as if it was between her feet; as we have stated there: “The water pit was between the Temple hall and the alter drawn towards the South.” Was it put between the hall and the altar? Only it looked as if between hall and altar.
So is the Mishnah: “If he ties lower than the knee, it is valid, above the knee it is invalid.” It is written: “Aaron and his sons shall wash their hands and feet from it.” It was stated about this: The hand up to the wrist, the foot up to the calf; and here you say so? There is a difference, since it is written “from above his foot”. In that case, even higher than the knee should be valid! There is a difference, since it is written “from above his foot”, and not from higher than above his foot. Cahana objected: Is it not written, “and the afterbirth which comes out from between her feet;” does it come out from between her feet? It looks as if it was between her feet; as we have stated there: “The water pit was between the Temple hall and the alter drawn towards the South.” Was it put between the hall and the altar? Only it looked as if between hall and altar.
So is the Mishnah: “If he ties lower than the knee, it is valid, above the knee it is invalid.” It is written: “Aaron and his sons shall wash their hands and feet from it.” It was stated about this: The hand up to the wrist, the foot up to the calf; and here you say so? There is a difference, since it is written “from above his foot”. In that case, even higher than the knee should be valid! There is a difference, since it is written “from above his foot”, and not from higher than above his foot. Cahana objected: Is it not written, “and the afterbirth which comes out from between her feet;” does it come out from between her feet? It looks as if it was between her feet; as we have stated there: “The water pit was between the Temple hall and the alter drawn towards the South.” Was it put between the hall and the altar? Only it looked as if between hall and altar.
HALAKHAH: “If she performed ḥalîṣah with a sandal that was not his,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar says, a ram’s horn belonging to idolatry or to a “seduced city” is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, it is valid. Rebbi Hoshaia stated, it is invalid. Everybody agrees that such a palmbranch is invalid. What is the difference between a ram’s horn and a palmbranch? Rebbi Yose said, for a palmbranch it is written: “You shall take for yourselves,” from your own money. But here, “a day of horn blowing it shall be for you,” from any source. Rebbi Eleazar said, there he fulfills his obligation with the article itself, but here with its sound. Is any sound forbidden usufruct? Everybody agrees that a sandal from a “seduced city” is valid. For it is written “stripped of shoe,” from any source. Rebbi Mana said, as you say there, “a day of horn blowing it shall be for you,” from any source, so you say here, “stripped of shoe,” from any source.
HALAKHAH: “If she performed ḥalîṣah with a sandal that was not his,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar says, a ram’s horn belonging to idolatry or to a “seduced city” is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, it is valid. Rebbi Hoshaia stated, it is invalid. Everybody agrees that such a palmbranch is invalid. What is the difference between a ram’s horn and a palmbranch? Rebbi Yose said, for a palmbranch it is written: “You shall take for yourselves,” from your own money. But here, “a day of horn blowing it shall be for you,” from any source. Rebbi Eleazar said, there he fulfills his obligation with the article itself, but here with its sound. Is any sound forbidden usufruct? Everybody agrees that a sandal from a “seduced city” is valid. For it is written “stripped of shoe,” from any source. Rebbi Mana said, as you say there, “a day of horn blowing it shall be for you,” from any source, so you say here, “stripped of shoe,” from any source.
“A wooden sandal.” The colleagues in the name of Rav: If only the edges are wooden. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: If only the bottom of the sole is wooden. There, they say in the name of Rav: If only the loops are wooden. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even if it is entirely of wood it is valid. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “ A straw sandal becomes impure by being stepped on and a woman may use it for ḥalîṣah, the words of Rebbi Aqiba, but the Sages do not agree about impurity by being stepped on.”
What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? “Before the Elders’ eyes.” How do the rabbis uphold “before the Elders’ eyes”? That excludes a court of blind people. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems to be inverted. There, he says that the right hand is obligatory, but here, he says that the right hand is not obligatory. Rebbi Yose said, there it is written “the right hand”, the right hand is obl;igatory, but here, where “the right hand” is not written, the right hand is notobligatory. Rebbi Yose from Sidon stated before Rebbi Jeremiah: “His ear”, “his ear”. Since “his ear” mentioned there refers to the right ear, so “his ear” mentioned here means the right ear. It also says “his foot”, “his foot”. He who infers from “his ear”, “his ear” infers from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not infer from “his ear”, “his ear” does not infer from “his foot”, “his foot”. But it was stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: “his foot”, “his foot”. That means, there are two statements about the words of Rebbi Eliezer. He who argues from “his ear”, “his ear” argues from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not argue from “his ear”, “his ear” does not argue from “his foot”. And this Mishnah accepts neither “his ear”, “his ear” nor “his foot”, “his foot”.
What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? “Before the Elders’ eyes.” How do the rabbis uphold “before the Elders’ eyes”? That excludes a court of blind people. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems to be inverted. There, he says that the right hand is obligatory, but here, he says that the right hand is not obligatory. Rebbi Yose said, there it is written “the right hand”, the right hand is obl;igatory, but here, where “the right hand” is not written, the right hand is notobligatory. Rebbi Yose from Sidon stated before Rebbi Jeremiah: “His ear”, “his ear”. Since “his ear” mentioned there refers to the right ear, so “his ear” mentioned here means the right ear. It also says “his foot”, “his foot”. He who infers from “his ear”, “his ear” infers from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not infer from “his ear”, “his ear” does not infer from “his foot”, “his foot”. But it was stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: “his foot”, “his foot”. That means, there are two statements about the words of Rebbi Eliezer. He who argues from “his ear”, “his ear” argues from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not argue from “his ear”, “his ear” does not argue from “his foot”. And this Mishnah accepts neither “his ear”, “his ear” nor “his foot”, “his foot”.
What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? “Before the Elders’ eyes.” How do the rabbis uphold “before the Elders’ eyes”? That excludes a court of blind people. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems to be inverted. There, he says that the right hand is obligatory, but here, he says that the right hand is not obligatory. Rebbi Yose said, there it is written “the right hand”, the right hand is obl;igatory, but here, where “the right hand” is not written, the right hand is notobligatory. Rebbi Yose from Sidon stated before Rebbi Jeremiah: “His ear”, “his ear”. Since “his ear” mentioned there refers to the right ear, so “his ear” mentioned here means the right ear. It also says “his foot”, “his foot”. He who infers from “his ear”, “his ear” infers from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not infer from “his ear”, “his ear” does not infer from “his foot”, “his foot”. But it was stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: “his foot”, “his foot”. That means, there are two statements about the words of Rebbi Eliezer. He who argues from “his ear”, “his ear” argues from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not argue from “his ear”, “his ear” does not argue from “his foot”. And this Mishnah accepts neither “his ear”, “his ear” nor “his foot”, “his foot”.
What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? “Before the Elders’ eyes.” How do the rabbis uphold “before the Elders’ eyes”? That excludes a court of blind people. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems to be inverted. There, he says that the right hand is obligatory, but here, he says that the right hand is not obligatory. Rebbi Yose said, there it is written “the right hand”, the right hand is obl;igatory, but here, where “the right hand” is not written, the right hand is notobligatory. Rebbi Yose from Sidon stated before Rebbi Jeremiah: “His ear”, “his ear”. Since “his ear” mentioned there refers to the right ear, so “his ear” mentioned here means the right ear. It also says “his foot”, “his foot”. He who infers from “his ear”, “his ear” infers from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not infer from “his ear”, “his ear” does not infer from “his foot”, “his foot”. But it was stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: “his foot”, “his foot”. That means, there are two statements about the words of Rebbi Eliezer. He who argues from “his ear”, “his ear” argues from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not argue from “his ear”, “his ear” does not argue from “his foot”. And this Mishnah accepts neither “his ear”, “his ear” nor “his foot”, “his foot”.
HALAKHAH: “If she stripped off and spat,” etc. Samuel said, if she stripped but did not spit, she shall spit. This follows Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If she stripped but did not recite nor spit, her ḥalîṣah is invalid. Still that is Rebbi Eliezer’s. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah, Zeriqan turned to it in the name of Rav: If she stripped but did not spit, or spat but did not strip, she did not do anything until she strips and spits. Rebbi Abba asked before Rebbi Immi: If she spat before she stripped? He said, it is as if in the correct order. If he made a betrothal with a cluster of end-of-harvest [figs]? He said to him, with the figs hanging there he made the betrothal. May one open an Egyptian window into a common backyard higher than four cubits? He said to him, so we are saying: He comes simply for the air. Rebbi Nasa said, that is what he said: If somebody wants to build his house in the form of a dovecot, does one not listen to him?
There, we have stated: “Everybody is obligated for appearance except the deaf-mute, the insane, and the minor.” The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Eleazar (Deut. 31:12): “So they should hear and learn.” So far one who speaks but cannot hear; what about one who hears but cannot speak? Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Eleazar (Deut. 31:12): “So they should learn,” so they should teach. Rebbi Jonah said, this means that the principles of Rebbi are no principles, since we have stated: “A ḥereš who speaks but cannot hear should not give heave,” and we thought that one who speaks but does not hear is ḥereš, one who hears but does not speak isḥereš. But we have stated: “Ḥalîṣah is invalid if performed for a ḥereš man, or by a ḥereš woman, or for an underage male.” And Rebbi Joḥanan said, because they cannot say (Deut. 25:8): “he shall say”, (Deut. 25:7,9) “she shall say.” We also have stated: “A ḥereš mentioned anywhere by the Sages is a deaf-mute.” This supports Rebbi Jonah, for Rebbi Jonah said that the principles of Rebbi are no principles.
There, they say: “She came before us, stripped his shoe from his right foot, spat before us spittle that was visible on the ground, and said: ‘So should be done to a man who would not build his brother’s house.’ ” Rebbi Abbahu said, since the spittle was visible when it left her mouth it is valid, even if the wind dissipated it. If she spat blood? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah, Rebbi Zeriqan turned to it, Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Abba bar Abba, Rebbi Ze‘ira turned to it in the name of Samuel: If it contains some liquid spittle, it is valid. How does the handless [woman] perform ḥalîṣah? With her teeth.
There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah is shameful; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah is praiseworthy. Rav Ḥisda said, he who says that ḥalîṣah is shameful follows the early Mishnah, that ḥalîṣah is praiseworthy follows the late Mishnah. Rebbi Yose said, you might even say, in both cases one follows the early Mishnah, or in both cases one follows the late Mishnah. He who says that ḥalîṣah is shameful, since he damaged one thing in the Torah he shall come and take his damage: “his house shall be called in Israel the house of the one stripped of shoe.” He who says that ḥalîṣah is praiseworthy, it mentions here “calling” and it is said there: “My name will be called about them”. Since “calling” there is a praise, so here it is a praise.
There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah is shameful; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah is praiseworthy. Rav Ḥisda said, he who says that ḥalîṣah is shameful follows the early Mishnah, that ḥalîṣah is praiseworthy follows the late Mishnah. Rebbi Yose said, you might even say, in both cases one follows the early Mishnah, or in both cases one follows the late Mishnah. He who says that ḥalîṣah is shameful, since he damaged one thing in the Torah he shall come and take his damage: “his house shall be called in Israel the house of the one stripped of shoe.” He who says that ḥalîṣah is praiseworthy, it mentions here “calling” and it is said there: “My name will be called about them”. Since “calling” there is a praise, so here it is a praise.
There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah is shameful; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah is praiseworthy. Rav Ḥisda said, he who says that ḥalîṣah is shameful follows the early Mishnah, that ḥalîṣah is praiseworthy follows the late Mishnah. Rebbi Yose said, you might even say, in both cases one follows the early Mishnah, or in both cases one follows the late Mishnah. He who says that ḥalîṣah is shameful, since he damaged one thing in the Torah he shall come and take his damage: “his house shall be called in Israel the house of the one stripped of shoe.” He who says that ḥalîṣah is praiseworthy, it mentions here “calling” and it is said there: “My name will be called about them”. Since “calling” there is a praise, so here it is a praise.
There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah is shameful; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah is praiseworthy. Rav Ḥisda said, he who says that ḥalîṣah is shameful follows the early Mishnah, that ḥalîṣah is praiseworthy follows the late Mishnah. Rebbi Yose said, you might even say, in both cases one follows the early Mishnah, or in both cases one follows the late Mishnah. He who says that ḥalîṣah is shameful, since he damaged one thing in the Torah he shall come and take his damage: “his house shall be called in Israel the house of the one stripped of shoe.” He who says that ḥalîṣah is praiseworthy, it mentions here “calling” and it is said there: “My name will be called about them”. Since “calling” there is a praise, so here it is a praise.
HALAKHAH: “The House of Shammai say, one permits repudiation,” etc. There, we have stated: “Rebbi Jehudah bar Abba testified to five statements: That one makes underage girls repudiate, … ” Does one disagree with testimony? One disagrees about the essence of the testimony. So was the essence of the testimony: “The House of Shammai say, one makes only betrothed girls repudiate, but the House of Hillel say, betrothed or married”. It is difficult following the House of Hillel! Her marriage permitted her, he has the right to what she finds and earns, to dissolve her vows, and she is his wife in every respect. And you say so? They gave you of your own. By right, her marriage should not be a marriage. They said that her marriage is a marriage and they said that she may repudiate him and leave.
Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Mattaniah said: Explain it when they died and did not repudiate since there is a Mishnah: “If a woman could repudiate but did not do so and died, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but cannot be married in levirate.” Rebbi Eudaimon said, you may even say if she still lives; explain it if there is no levir besides her father.
Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Mattaniah said: Explain it when they died and did not repudiate since there is a Mishnah: “If a woman could repudiate but did not do so and died, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but cannot be married in levirate.” Rebbi Eudaimon said, you may even say if she still lives; explain it if there is no levir besides her father.
Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, did not Rebbi Yose say correctly before he changed his mind? Once a man’s daughter is married without being a she-ram, her co-wife is forbidden. If in addition she is a she-ram, does her co-wife become permitted? He said to him, the she-ram is as if non-existent. If there are two sisters-in-law, one a she-ram and one not a she-ram, if the levir comes and performs ḥalîṣah or has intercourse with the first, did he free her companion of anything? That shows that the she-ram is as if non-existent.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: It happened that a girl went to wash at the river when they said to her, your betrothed is passing by. She said, let my mother go and marry him! When the case came before the Sages, they said that there is no repudiation stronger than that. Rebbi Ḥanina said, It happened that a girl went to buy flax from the flax dealer when they said to her, your betrothed is passing by. She said, let my mother go and marry him! When the case came before the Sages, they said that there is no repudiation stronger than that. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: “Even if she went to buy something at the store and said, I cannot endure my husband X, there is no repudiation stronger than this.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: It happened that a girl went to wash at the river when they said to her, your betrothed is passing by. She said, let my mother go and marry him! When the case came before the Sages, they said that there is no repudiation stronger than that. Rebbi Ḥanina said, It happened that a girl went to buy flax from the flax dealer when they said to her, your betrothed is passing by. She said, let my mother go and marry him! When the case came before the Sages, they said that there is no repudiation stronger than that. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: “Even if she went to buy something at the store and said, I cannot endure my husband X, there is no repudiation stronger than this.
Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: It happened that a girl went to wash at the river when they said to her, your betrothed is passing by. She said, let my mother go and marry him! When the case came before the Sages, they said that there is no repudiation stronger than that. Rebbi Ḥanina said, It happened that a girl went to buy flax from the flax dealer when they said to her, your betrothed is passing by. She said, let my mother go and marry him! When the case came before the Sages, they said that there is no repudiation stronger than that. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: “Even if she went to buy something at the store and said, I cannot endure my husband X, there is no repudiation stronger than this.
There, we have stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, the heave given by a minor who has not yet grown two pubic hairs is heave. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Meïr: His heave is never heave unless he grew two pubic hairs. Rebbi Abin, Cahana in the name of the Rebbi Hila (Num.18:32): “You should not carry guilt because of it.” He who may carry guilt can give heave, he who cannot carry guilt cannot give heave. They objected: But a Gentile cannot incur guilt, and he may give heave! Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila (Num. 18:27): “Your heave will be credited to you”, (v. 26) “and you shall lift”. Anybody for whom “thought” is written may give heave. But anybody for whom “thought” is not written cannot give heave. They objected: But “thought” is not written for Gentiles, and he may give heave! Rebbi Hoshaia stated: Gentiles have no “thought” whether for preparation or for heave.
Rebbi Yoḥanan had a difficulty with the words of Rebbi Joshua. Is her marriage valid by biblical standards? The dissolution of her vows must be by biblical standards! And you say so! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, there is no dissolution of vows here, because of what Rebbi Joḥanan had against the words of Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Nissa asked: Would it be the same for prohibitions? Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions. Would that be as we stated there: “Before that time, even though they said, we know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are no vows and their dedications no dedications. After that time, even though they said, we do not know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are vows and their dedications dedications.” What is the status of that Mishnah? For Cahana it is in dispute, for Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it is everybody’s opinion.
Rebbi Yoḥanan had a difficulty with the words of Rebbi Joshua. Is her marriage valid by biblical standards? The dissolution of her vows must be by biblical standards! And you say so! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, there is no dissolution of vows here, because of what Rebbi Joḥanan had against the words of Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Nissa asked: Would it be the same for prohibitions? Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions. Would that be as we stated there: “Before that time, even though they said, we know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are no vows and their dedications no dedications. After that time, even though they said, we do not know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are vows and their dedications dedications.” What is the status of that Mishnah? For Cahana it is in dispute, for Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it is everybody’s opinion.
What is the status of her co-wife? Rav said, her co-wife is forbidden. Rebbi Joḥanan said, her co-wife is forbidden. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, her co-wife is permitted. Rebbi Eleazar said, I looked around at the rabbis here and at the rabbis there and did not find anybody agreeing with me except Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who says, her co-wife is permitted.Rav Hamnuna was sitting before Rav Ada bar Ahava and said, what is the status of her co-wife? He said to him, she is permitted. He asked, divorce? He answered, forbidden. He said, go around. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, it is reasonable following him who said that her co-wife is permitted. But following him who said, her co-wife is forbidden, as you take it: The aspect he acquired in her makes the corresponding aspect forbidden in her co-wife, the aspect he did not acquire in her makes the corresponding aspect permitted in her co-wife! Rebbi Shammai said, does one admit that kind of argument in matters of incest prohibitions? What about it? For any sister-in-law who is not totally outside [the family], the acquired aspect of her belongs to an incest prohibition and an incest prohibition forbids the co-wife.
“Two brothers are married,” etc. Rebbi Yudan: One may ask what one asked there. Should he not perform ḥalîṣah for the acquired aspect in her and free her co-wife? So here, should he not perform ḥalîṣah for the acquired aspect in the underage girl and free her (co-wife) [sister]? Before you find Rebbi Eleazar difficult, you might find Rebbi Eliezer difficult! You cannot find this difficult for Rebbi Eliezer, since Rebbi Eliezer is a Shammaite and the House of Shammai say, one lets only the betrothed [women] repudiate?
So is the Mishnah: The underage girl should wait until she grows up, reaches puberty, and is being married. Rebbi Eleazar said, there is no “being married” here, only “being betrothed.” Rebbi Joḥanban said, these are the words of Rabban Gamliel: If somebody gave qiddušin to his sister-in-law’s sister, his sister-in-law was freed from ḥalîṣah and levirate. It follows that what we had stated there, “if somebody gave qiddušin to the sister of a woman waiting for her levir” does not follow Rabban Gamliel.
So is the Mishnah: The underage girl should wait until she grows up, reaches puberty, and is being married. Rebbi Eleazar said, there is no “being married” here, only “being betrothed.” Rebbi Joḥanban said, these are the words of Rabban Gamliel: If somebody gave qiddušin to his sister-in-law’s sister, his sister-in-law was freed from ḥalîṣah and levirate. It follows that what we had stated there, “if somebody gave qiddušin to the sister of a woman waiting for her levir” does not follow Rabban Gamliel.
HALAKHAH: Is the degree of acquisition of one equal to that of the other? What does he do? Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: He marries the deaf-mute and divorces her; the underage girl has to wait until she can perform ḥalîṣah.” Why can she not perform ḥalîṣah immediately? She cannot because of Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Meїr said that one does not perform levirate or ḥalîṣah with an underage girl, since she might be found to be a she-ram. If he sleeps with the underage girl, he has to divorce her, and the deaf-mute is permanently forbidden. If he transgressed and had intercourse with the deaf-mute, he divorces her and she became permitted.” This follows what Rebbi Hila said, in order to fix her status. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Hila: What means, “in order to fix her status”? As you say there, he should perform ḥalîṣah for the aspect that was acquired in her and marry her co-wife; could he not perform ḥalîṣah for the aspect that was acquired in the underage girl and marry the deaf-mute? He said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: We never find two sisters-in-law of whom one performs ḥalîṣah and one is married in levirate. Do we find two sisters-in-law of whom one performs ḥalîṣah and one is divorced? He said to him, that happens. That is what we have stated there: “If he ‘bespoke’ one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, the first one needs a bill of divorce”.
HALAKHAH: Is the degree of acquisition of one equal to that of the other? What does he do? Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: He marries the deaf-mute and divorces her; the underage girl has to wait until she can perform ḥalîṣah.” Why can she not perform ḥalîṣah immediately? She cannot because of Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Meїr said that one does not perform levirate or ḥalîṣah with an underage girl, since she might be found to be a she-ram. If he sleeps with the underage girl, he has to divorce her, and the deaf-mute is permanently forbidden. If he transgressed and had intercourse with the deaf-mute, he divorces her and she became permitted.” This follows what Rebbi Hila said, in order to fix her status. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Hila: What means, “in order to fix her status”? As you say there, he should perform ḥalîṣah for the aspect that was acquired in her and marry her co-wife; could he not perform ḥalîṣah for the aspect that was acquired in the underage girl and marry the deaf-mute? He said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: We never find two sisters-in-law of whom one performs ḥalîṣah and one is married in levirate. Do we find two sisters-in-law of whom one performs ḥalîṣah and one is divorced? He said to him, that happens. That is what we have stated there: “If he ‘bespoke’ one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, the first one needs a bill of divorce”.
HALAKHAH: “If an underage levir,” etc. It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must hold if it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meїr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meїr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child fatherless? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṣah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah with her.” (After thirty days.) And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meїr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is nothing to be learned from the beginning, but there is something to be learned from the end. What is there at the beginning? If the deaf-mute [brother] was the husband of the deaf-mute [woman] and the hearing the husband of the hearing. But if the deaf-mute [brother] was the husband of the hearing [woman] and the hearing the husband of the deaf-mute, that should have been stated at the very end.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is nothing to be learned from the beginning, but there is something to be learned from the end. What is there at the beginning? If the deaf-mute [brother] was the husband of the deaf-mute [woman] and the hearing the husband of the hearing. But if the deaf-mute [brother] was the husband of the hearing [woman] and the hearing the husband of the deaf-mute, that should have been stated at the very end.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is nothing to be learned from the beginning, but there is something to be learned from the end. What is there at the beginning? If the deaf-mute [brother] was the husband of the deaf-mute [woman] and the hearing the husband of the hearing. But if the deaf-mute [brother] was the husband of the hearing [woman] and the hearing the husband of the deaf-mute, that should have been stated at the very end.
MISHNAH: A woman went overseas with her husband. If there was peace between him and her and there was peace in the world and came and said, “my husband died”, she can remarry, “my husband died”, she can marry in levirate. If there was no peace between him and her but there was peace in the world, she cannot be believed. Rebbi Jehudah says, she is never believed unless she comes crying with torn clothes. They said to him, in any case she can remarry.
MISHNAH: A woman went overseas with her husband. If there was peace between him and her and there was peace in the world and came and said, “my husband died”, she can remarry, “my husband died”, she can marry in levirate. If there was no peace between him and her but there was peace in the world, she cannot be believed. Rebbi Jehudah says, she is never believed unless she comes crying with torn clothes. They said to him, in any case she can remarry.
MISHNAH: A woman went overseas with her husband. If there was peace between him and her and there was peace in the world and came and said, “my husband died”, she can remarry, “my husband died”, she can marry in levirate. If there was no peace between him and her but there was peace in the world, she cannot be believed. Rebbi Jehudah says, she is never believed unless she comes crying with torn clothes. They said to him, in any case she can remarry.
MISHNAH: A woman went overseas with her husband. If there was peace between him and her and there was peace in the world and came and said, “my husband died”, she can remarry, “my husband died”, she can marry in levirate. If there was no peace between him and her but there was peace in the world, she cannot be believed. Rebbi Jehudah says, she is never believed unless she comes crying with torn clothes. They said to him, in any case she can remarry.
HALAKHAH: “A woman went with her husband,” etc. Just as you say, “if there are witnesses that she is a married woman and she says, I was divorced, she is not trustworthy;” would I say it is the same here? There is a difference for witnesses of death since if he comes he disproves [the testimony]. Then she should be trustworthy to say: “my levir died”! That is impossible since we have stated: “A woman is not trustworthy if she says ‘my levir died’ to remarry, or ‘my sister died’ to enter her house.” Rebbi Abba said, she is trustworthy for her husband whom she married out of her free will; she is not trustworthy about her levir on whom she was thrown against her will. Rebbi Hoshaia asked, think of it, then she should not be trustworthy if she was forced to marry him!
HALAKHAH: “A woman went with her husband,” etc. Just as you say, “if there are witnesses that she is a married woman and she says, I was divorced, she is not trustworthy;” would I say it is the same here? There is a difference for witnesses of death since if he comes he disproves [the testimony]. Then she should be trustworthy to say: “my levir died”! That is impossible since we have stated: “A woman is not trustworthy if she says ‘my levir died’ to remarry, or ‘my sister died’ to enter her house.” Rebbi Abba said, she is trustworthy for her husband whom she married out of her free will; she is not trustworthy about her levir on whom she was thrown against her will. Rebbi Hoshaia asked, think of it, then she should not be trustworthy if she was forced to marry him!
What is the difference whether peace is in the world or war is in the world? If war is in the world, she might think that he died although he is not dead. So far if war was in the North and she came from the North, in the South and she came from the South. If there was war in the North and she came from the South; she says I am coming from the North, but I am arguing that you came from the South. If she says, I am coming from the South, it is because she thinks to free herself. If she says, he died on his bed, I am arguing that he went to war; it is because she thinks to free herself.
“Rebbi Jehudah says, she is never believed unless she comes crying with torn clothes.” They objected to Rebbi Jehudah: Think of it, if one came crying, the other did not cry. To this one you forbid, to that one you permit. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Think of it, maybe her son went overseas and died there, she remembers that and cries.
HALAKHAH: “The House of Hillel say, we heard only,” etc. The House of Shammai said to them: Is there not harvest the entire year? How is that? At the end of barley harvest starts wheat harvest. At the end of wheat harvest starts grape harvest. At the end of grape harvest starts olive harvest. That means, there is some harvest the year round. They accepted this argument. And why the grain harvest? Rebbi Mana said, because there accidents are frequent, for the sun only hits a person’s head at grain harvest time. That is what is written: “The child grew and some day it went to his father, to the harvesters. He said to his father, ‘my head, my head’; who said to the servant, ‘carry him to his mother’. He carried him and brought him to his mother where he sat on her knees until noontime, when he died.” But the rabbis say, because snakes are abundant. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, “You shielded my head at the day of kissing,” at the day summer and winter are kissing. Another explanation: “At the day of weaponry,” that is Gog’s weaponry. Another explanation, on a day when two worlds kiss one another, when this world leaves and the future world enters.
HALAKHAH: “The House of Hillel say, we heard only,” etc. The House of Shammai said to them: Is there not harvest the entire year? How is that? At the end of barley harvest starts wheat harvest. At the end of wheat harvest starts grape harvest. At the end of grape harvest starts olive harvest. That means, there is some harvest the year round. They accepted this argument. And why the grain harvest? Rebbi Mana said, because there accidents are frequent, for the sun only hits a person’s head at grain harvest time. That is what is written: “The child grew and some day it went to his father, to the harvesters. He said to his father, ‘my head, my head’; who said to the servant, ‘carry him to his mother’. He carried him and brought him to his mother where he sat on her knees until noontime, when he died.” But the rabbis say, because snakes are abundant. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, “You shielded my head at the day of kissing,” at the day summer and winter are kissing. Another explanation: “At the day of weaponry,” that is Gog’s weaponry. Another explanation, on a day when two worlds kiss one another, when this world leaves and the future world enters.
HALAKHAH: “The House of Hillel say, we heard only,” etc. The House of Shammai said to them: Is there not harvest the entire year? How is that? At the end of barley harvest starts wheat harvest. At the end of wheat harvest starts grape harvest. At the end of grape harvest starts olive harvest. That means, there is some harvest the year round. They accepted this argument. And why the grain harvest? Rebbi Mana said, because there accidents are frequent, for the sun only hits a person’s head at grain harvest time. That is what is written: “The child grew and some day it went to his father, to the harvesters. He said to his father, ‘my head, my head’; who said to the servant, ‘carry him to his mother’. He carried him and brought him to his mother where he sat on her knees until noontime, when he died.” But the rabbis say, because snakes are abundant. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, “You shielded my head at the day of kissing,” at the day summer and winter are kissing. Another explanation: “At the day of weaponry,” that is Gog’s weaponry. Another explanation, on a day when two worlds kiss one another, when this world leaves and the future world enters.
The House of Shammai insist on interpretation of the ketubah. As the House of Shammai explain, we can infer that from the text of her ketubah document in which he writes: “If you would be married to another man you shall take the amount I wrote for you.” The House of Hillel reversed themselves and taught following the House of Shammai. The House of Hillel insist on interpretation of the ketubah. Hillel the Elder explained it, using the vernacular. In Alexandria they were writing that a man there became betrothed to a woman. Another man abducted her from a public place. When this came before the Sages, they intended to declare [the children] as bastards. Hillel the Elder told them, bring your mothers’ ketubah. They brough their mothers’ ketubah. They found written there: “When you enter my house you shall be my wife according to the laws of Moses and the Jews.”