there
19876 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
If he performed the preliminary marriage in the bridal chamber, these strictures do not apply. They said that Rebbi Mattaniah acted thus for his daughter. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, could she be married any day at a place where courts are in session every day? And at a place where there are no courts (every day) could she never be married? One does not want to abolish the time of Wednesday. Why does one not want to abolish the time of Wednesday? Because he also accepts what Bar Qappara stated. Bar Qappara said, because a blessing is written there. Could she not be married on Sunday, that he might quickly go to court on Monday? Some want to say, not to abolish the time of Wednesday; some want to say, because of what Bar Qappara stated, for Bar Qappara said, because a blessing is written there.
Rebbi Abba bar Cohen said before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Idi: A man may not [preliminarily] marry on a Friday. That means, to make an engagement feast. This implies that the preliminary marriage itself is permitted. Samuel says, even on the Ninth of Ab a preliminary marriage is permitted, lest another forestall him. The argument of Samuel seems inverted. There, he says, “God puts singles in a house, etc.,” “To rise on scales; they all are of vapor!” And there, he says so? That means, that he should not forestall him in prayer. Even so, it would not be permanent.
Rebbi Abba bar Cohen said before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Idi: A man may not [preliminarily] marry on a Friday. That means, to make an engagement feast. This implies that the preliminary marriage itself is permitted. Samuel says, even on the Ninth of Ab a preliminary marriage is permitted, lest another forestall him. The argument of Samuel seems inverted. There, he says, “God puts singles in a house, etc.,” “To rise on scales; they all are of vapor!” And there, he says so? That means, that he should not forestall him in prayer. Even so, it would not be permanent.
Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Crispus: An adult woman is like an open amphora. That means, not to let her lose her ketubah. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what Rebbi Ḥanina said, since Rebbi Ḥanina said: It happened that a woman was found without virginity and the case came before Rebbi. He said to her, where is it? She said, the stairs in my father’s house were high and it was rubbed off. Rebbi believed her. That means, not to let her lose her ketubah. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated there: “The ketubah sum of a virgin who is a widow, or a divorcee, or one who had received ḥalîṣah, after a preliminary marriage is 200 [zuz], and they are subject to complaints about virginity.” That means, referring to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated there: “One who eats unchaperoned at his father-in-law’s in Judea cannot go to court about virginity since he was alone with her.” That means, referring to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated: “If somebody married a woman and found her not to be a virgin. She says, I was raped after the preliminary marriage and your field was flooded, but he says, no, it was before the preliminary marriage and my acquisition was in error,” that refers to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated: “She says, I was injured by a piece of wood, but he says no, you were trampled on by a man,” that refers to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. All these cases are based on what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful.
Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Crispus: An adult woman is like an open amphora. That means, not to let her lose her ketubah. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what Rebbi Ḥanina said, since Rebbi Ḥanina said: It happened that a woman was found without virginity and the case came before Rebbi. He said to her, where is it? She said, the stairs in my father’s house were high and it was rubbed off. Rebbi believed her. That means, not to let her lose her ketubah. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated there: “The ketubah sum of a virgin who is a widow, or a divorcee, or one who had received ḥalîṣah, after a preliminary marriage is 200 [zuz], and they are subject to complaints about virginity.” That means, referring to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated there: “One who eats unchaperoned at his father-in-law’s in Judea cannot go to court about virginity since he was alone with her.” That means, referring to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated: “If somebody married a woman and found her not to be a virgin. She says, I was raped after the preliminary marriage and your field was flooded, but he says, no, it was before the preliminary marriage and my acquisition was in error,” that refers to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated: “She says, I was injured by a piece of wood, but he says no, you were trampled on by a man,” that refers to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. All these cases are based on what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful.
When is an adult married following Rebbi Eleazar? When is a virgin after marriage married? When is a woman injured by a piece of wood married following Rebbi Meïr? Let us hear from the following: “If there are witnesses that she went out in hinuma.” Wednesday was not mentioned. This means that Wednesday does not mean anything.
It was stated: The marriage benedictions are said all seven days. [Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say that one re-enacts the marriage all seven days.] Rebbi Yose said to him, but did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: The benedictions of mourners are said all seven days. Can you say that one buries the dead all seven days? How is that? Since here he consoles with him, so there he enjoys with him; as here one remembers, so there one remembers.
It was stated: The marriage benedictions are said all seven days. [Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say that one re-enacts the marriage all seven days.] Rebbi Yose said to him, but did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: The benedictions of mourners are said all seven days. Can you say that one buries the dead all seven days? How is that? Since here he consoles with him, so there he enjoys with him; as here one remembers, so there one remembers.
There, we have stated: “Every vine gives wine; if there is no wine it is dried up.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Does that mean that Rebbi Jehudah does not admit claims of missing virginity? Rebbi Yose said, in itself it means that Rebbi Jehudah admits claims of missing virginity, as it was stated: Rebbi Jehudah said, in Judea in earlier times they appointed two best men, one for the groom and one for the bride, but they appointed them only for the wedding day. In contrast, this was not done in Galilee … they were sleeping in the room with groom and bride; in contrast, this was not done in Galilee. How is this? She has to bring proof that she comes from a family of dryness.
There, we have stated: “Every vine gives wine; if there is no wine it is dried up.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Does that mean that Rebbi Jehudah does not admit claims of missing virginity? Rebbi Yose said, in itself it means that Rebbi Jehudah admits claims of missing virginity, as it was stated: Rebbi Jehudah said, in Judea in earlier times they appointed two best men, one for the groom and one for the bride, but they appointed them only for the wedding day. In contrast, this was not done in Galilee … they were sleeping in the room with groom and bride; in contrast, this was not done in Galilee. How is this? She has to bring proof that she comes from a family of dryness.
It was stated: The claim of virginity is based on any amount (of blood). It happened that for a certain woman nothing was found except for [a stain the size of] a mustard seed. She came before Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose, who said to her, there should be many like you in Israel. Rebbi Zachariah the son-in-law of Rebbi Levi: He cursed her, like people who, when they see a blind man, call him “much light”. The colleagues said, he needled her, any woman with little blood has few children. Rebbi Yose said, he praised her, any woman with little blood will not cause impurity to food prepared in purity.
There came a case before Rebbi Ḥanina of a woman whose ketubah was less than 200 zuz, and he said, she should take what he had written for her. He said to Rebbi Mana, sit down and sign. He answered, follow your argument and sign yourself, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in the name of Samuel, by the Temple šeqel? Rebbi Eudaimon of Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: Because of a renunciation. Now, should a woman whose ketubah was for less than 200 [zuz] not hide her ketubah in order to collect by the Temple šeqel? They said in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she presents she collects. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: If a deaf-mute man married a hearing wife, she has no claim for support nor ketubah, but if she died, he inherits from her, for she wanted to connect him with her property, but he could not want to connect her with his property. If a hearing male married a deaf-mute woman, she has a claim to support and ketubah, but if she died, he does not inherit, for he wanted to connect her with his property, but she could not want to connect him with her property. But can a deaf-mute woman acquire and have ketubah? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that at the moment he married her, she was hearing. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, he married her when she was hearing but she turned deaf-mute. In any case, did he not marry her when she was hearing? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that she was deaf-mute and turned hearing; he married her when she was hearing and she turned deaf. That you should not say, because at the start she was deaf-mute she has [no] ketubah, therefore it is necessary to say that she (does not have) [has]. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but since if one has sexual relations with a deaf-mute, is he not liable for a fine? Only if there were no fine would there be no ketubah. Rebbi Yudan said, does that depend on a fine? Look, the adult woman collects no fine but her ketubah is 200, the virgin after marriage collects a fine but her ketubah is a mina!
There came a case before Rebbi Ḥanina of a woman whose ketubah was less than 200 zuz, and he said, she should take what he had written for her. He said to Rebbi Mana, sit down and sign. He answered, follow your argument and sign yourself, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in the name of Samuel, by the Temple šeqel? Rebbi Eudaimon of Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: Because of a renunciation. Now, should a woman whose ketubah was for less than 200 [zuz] not hide her ketubah in order to collect by the Temple šeqel? They said in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she presents she collects. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: If a deaf-mute man married a hearing wife, she has no claim for support nor ketubah, but if she died, he inherits from her, for she wanted to connect him with her property, but he could not want to connect her with his property. If a hearing male married a deaf-mute woman, she has a claim to support and ketubah, but if she died, he does not inherit, for he wanted to connect her with his property, but she could not want to connect him with her property. But can a deaf-mute woman acquire and have ketubah? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that at the moment he married her, she was hearing. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, he married her when she was hearing but she turned deaf-mute. In any case, did he not marry her when she was hearing? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that she was deaf-mute and turned hearing; he married her when she was hearing and she turned deaf. That you should not say, because at the start she was deaf-mute she has [no] ketubah, therefore it is necessary to say that she (does not have) [has]. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but since if one has sexual relations with a deaf-mute, is he not liable for a fine? Only if there were no fine would there be no ketubah. Rebbi Yudan said, does that depend on a fine? Look, the adult woman collects no fine but her ketubah is 200, the virgin after marriage collects a fine but her ketubah is a mina!
There came a case before Rebbi Ḥanina of a woman whose ketubah was less than 200 zuz, and he said, she should take what he had written for her. He said to Rebbi Mana, sit down and sign. He answered, follow your argument and sign yourself, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in the name of Samuel, by the Temple šeqel? Rebbi Eudaimon of Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: Because of a renunciation. Now, should a woman whose ketubah was for less than 200 [zuz] not hide her ketubah in order to collect by the Temple šeqel? They said in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she presents she collects. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: If a deaf-mute man married a hearing wife, she has no claim for support nor ketubah, but if she died, he inherits from her, for she wanted to connect him with her property, but he could not want to connect her with his property. If a hearing male married a deaf-mute woman, she has a claim to support and ketubah, but if she died, he does not inherit, for he wanted to connect her with his property, but she could not want to connect him with her property. But can a deaf-mute woman acquire and have ketubah? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that at the moment he married her, she was hearing. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, he married her when she was hearing but she turned deaf-mute. In any case, did he not marry her when she was hearing? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that she was deaf-mute and turned hearing; he married her when she was hearing and she turned deaf. That you should not say, because at the start she was deaf-mute she has [no] ketubah, therefore it is necessary to say that she (does not have) [has]. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but since if one has sexual relations with a deaf-mute, is he not liable for a fine? Only if there were no fine would there be no ketubah. Rebbi Yudan said, does that depend on a fine? Look, the adult woman collects no fine but her ketubah is 200, the virgin after marriage collects a fine but her ketubah is a mina!
They objected to Rebbi Meïr: There is no hymen and you say, her ketubah is 200 [zuz]? He answered them, is that dependent on the hymen? But the adult has no hymen and her ketubah is 200! the virgin widow has a hymen and her ketubah is a mina! What is the reason? The adult still has all her grace; the virgin widow has lost her grace. Where do they disagree? If she was injured by wood. Rebbi Meïr says, she did not lose her grace, but the rabbis say, she lost her grace.
Rebbi Jeremiah and Rebbi Ammi asked: What is the difference between her and one who had sex with a finger? Is the one who had sex with a finger not disabled for priesthood? Rebbi Haggai said, explain it that there was no penetration. Rebbi Haggai wanted to change his mind; Rebbi Abba said to him, do not change your mind. Why did Rebbi Haggai want to change his mind? Because of the verse: “But he shall marry a wife in her virginities,” only if she is a virgin in both respects. Similarly, “a virgin and no man had known her.” A virgin, with respect to penetration. No man had known her, without penetration. Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar said, [no man] ever had wanted to touch her hand, for it was said: “The staff of evil shall not rest on the just’s lot.” Why did Rebbi Haggai want to change his mind? He could explain it by “touching”. Why does (Rav Yosef) [Rebbi Yasa] not explain it by “touching”? Rebbi Mana said, because it presented a problem for him: Rebbi Yasa asked: What is the legal status of “touching” with a male? “Touching” with an animal? When Rebbi Jeremiah heard that of Rebbi Haggai, he said, that was not Rebbi Ammi’s problem.
It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must deal with the case that it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meïr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meïr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child of unknown paternity? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṢah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṢah with her.” And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody eats at his father-in-law’s,” etc. In earlier times they decided on a persecution in Judea because they had a tradition from their forefathers that Jehudah had killed Esaw, as it is written: “Your hand is on your enemies’ neck.” They went and enslaved them and raped their daughters; they decided that a soldier would have sex with her first. They decreed that her husband should come to her when still in her father’s house; for when she knows that her husband’s fear is on her she is drawn after him. But is she not in the end being used for sex by a soldier? She is raped, and a rape victim is permitted to her husband. What did Cohanot do? They were hiding them. Why did they not also hide the daughters of Israel? That becomes talk and the government hears it; then these and those will be taken together. What kind of a sign did they have? The talk of a cook in town: There is a wedding meal, there is a wedding meal; there is light in Beror-Ḥayil: a week for a son, a week for a son. When the persecution ended, the custom did not end. Rebbi Hoshaia’s daughter-in-law was pregnant when she married definitively.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody eats at his father-in-law’s,” etc. In earlier times they decided on a persecution in Judea because they had a tradition from their forefathers that Jehudah had killed Esaw, as it is written: “Your hand is on your enemies’ neck.” They went and enslaved them and raped their daughters; they decided that a soldier would have sex with her first. They decreed that her husband should come to her when still in her father’s house; for when she knows that her husband’s fear is on her she is drawn after him. But is she not in the end being used for sex by a soldier? She is raped, and a rape victim is permitted to her husband. What did Cohanot do? They were hiding them. Why did they not also hide the daughters of Israel? That becomes talk and the government hears it; then these and those will be taken together. What kind of a sign did they have? The talk of a cook in town: There is a wedding meal, there is a wedding meal; there is light in Beror-Ḥayil: a week for a son, a week for a son. When the persecution ended, the custom did not end. Rebbi Hoshaia’s daughter-in-law was pregnant when she married definitively.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody eats at his father-in-law’s,” etc. In earlier times they decided on a persecution in Judea because they had a tradition from their forefathers that Jehudah had killed Esaw, as it is written: “Your hand is on your enemies’ neck.” They went and enslaved them and raped their daughters; they decided that a soldier would have sex with her first. They decreed that her husband should come to her when still in her father’s house; for when she knows that her husband’s fear is on her she is drawn after him. But is she not in the end being used for sex by a soldier? She is raped, and a rape victim is permitted to her husband. What did Cohanot do? They were hiding them. Why did they not also hide the daughters of Israel? That becomes talk and the government hears it; then these and those will be taken together. What kind of a sign did they have? The talk of a cook in town: There is a wedding meal, there is a wedding meal; there is light in Beror-Ḥayil: a week for a son, a week for a son. When the persecution ended, the custom did not end. Rebbi Hoshaia’s daughter-in-law was pregnant when she married definitively.
MISHNAH: Somebody married a woman and found that she was no virgin. She says, I was raped after you had married me preliminarily, so your field was flooded. He says not so, but it happened before I married you preliminarily; therefore, my acquisition was made in error. Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer say, she is believed. Rebbi Joshua said, we do not live off her mouth but there is a presumption that she had sexual relations before she was preliminarily married unless she provides proof of her statement.
HALAKHAH: “Somebody married a woman and found that she was no virgin”, etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Does this mean that a claim of missing virginity is impossible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, only following Rebbi Joshua? He turned around and said, a claim of missing virginity is possible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, if she remains silent. And even if you say that she talks, if she said that he found her a virgin and destroyed the evidence. Why should she not be believed? One cannot tolerate it, since Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. Here you say, she is believed. There, you say that she is not believed. In this case, both agree that the door was open.
There, we have stated: “If she had bodily defects while still in her father’s house, the father has to bring proof.” Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan: Is this Mishnah from Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer? Not from Rebbi Joshua? He said to him, those are everybody’s words. There is a difference because bodily defects have a way to appear. Rebbi Yose said, formerly we saw rabbis who compared bodily defects to [defects of] virginity. These can be inferred from those and those can be inferred from these. Bodily defects from claims of missing virginity: For if he slept with her in her father’s house, the father has to provide proof. Claims of missing virginity from bodily defects: For if she developed bodily defects and there is a doubt whether it happened after she entered his domain or before she entered his domain, the husband has to provide proof, from claims of missing virginity. But if she lost her virginity, was it not in her father’s house? Nevertheless, you say, the husband has to provide proof; so here also, the husband has to provide proof.
There, we have stated: “If she had bodily defects while still in her father’s house, the father has to bring proof.” Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan: Is this Mishnah from Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer? Not from Rebbi Joshua? He said to him, those are everybody’s words. There is a difference because bodily defects have a way to appear. Rebbi Yose said, formerly we saw rabbis who compared bodily defects to [defects of] virginity. These can be inferred from those and those can be inferred from these. Bodily defects from claims of missing virginity: For if he slept with her in her father’s house, the father has to provide proof. Claims of missing virginity from bodily defects: For if she developed bodily defects and there is a doubt whether it happened after she entered his domain or before she entered his domain, the husband has to provide proof, from claims of missing virginity. But if she lost her virginity, was it not in her father’s house? Nevertheless, you say, the husband has to provide proof; so here also, the husband has to provide proof.
There, we have stated: “If she had bodily defects while still in her father’s house, the father has to bring proof.” Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan: Is this Mishnah from Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer? Not from Rebbi Joshua? He said to him, those are everybody’s words. There is a difference because bodily defects have a way to appear. Rebbi Yose said, formerly we saw rabbis who compared bodily defects to [defects of] virginity. These can be inferred from those and those can be inferred from these. Bodily defects from claims of missing virginity: For if he slept with her in her father’s house, the father has to provide proof. Claims of missing virginity from bodily defects: For if she developed bodily defects and there is a doubt whether it happened after she entered his domain or before she entered his domain, the husband has to provide proof, from claims of missing virginity. But if she lost her virginity, was it not in her father’s house? Nevertheless, you say, the husband has to provide proof; so here also, the husband has to provide proof.
MISHNAH: She says, I was injured by wood, but he says not so, you were trampled on by a man; Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer say, she is believed. Rebbi Joshua said, we do not live off her mouth but there is a presumption that she was trampled on by a man unless she provides proof of her statement.
HALAKHAH: “She says, I was injured by wood,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, that follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said the ketubah of one injured by wood is 200 [zuz]. Rebbi Yose said, we would think to say, when did Rebbi Meïr disagree with those rabbis? If he took her in assuming she was injured by wood. But if he took her in assuming she was a virgin and it turned out she was injured by wood, then even Rebbi Meïr agrees, since we have stated: “She says, I was injured by wood, but he says not so, you were trampled on by a man.” That means, there is a disagreement even if he took her in assuming she was injured by wood and she turned out to have been injured by wood. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and my ketubah is 200 [zuz]. He says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and you have no claim on me. What are we talking about? If he married her as a virgin and she turns out to have been injured by wood, Rebbi Meïr will agree. If he married her as one injured by wood and she turns out to have been injured by wood, is there a recognizable difference in the opening of the door between wood or man? Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and so I stipulated with you, but he says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and there was no stipulation between you and me.
HALAKHAH: “She says, I was injured by wood,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, that follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said the ketubah of one injured by wood is 200 [zuz]. Rebbi Yose said, we would think to say, when did Rebbi Meïr disagree with those rabbis? If he took her in assuming she was injured by wood. But if he took her in assuming she was a virgin and it turned out she was injured by wood, then even Rebbi Meïr agrees, since we have stated: “She says, I was injured by wood, but he says not so, you were trampled on by a man.” That means, there is a disagreement even if he took her in assuming she was injured by wood and she turned out to have been injured by wood. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and my ketubah is 200 [zuz]. He says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and you have no claim on me. What are we talking about? If he married her as a virgin and she turns out to have been injured by wood, Rebbi Meïr will agree. If he married her as one injured by wood and she turns out to have been injured by wood, is there a recognizable difference in the opening of the door between wood or man? Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and so I stipulated with you, but he says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and there was no stipulation between you and me.
HALAKHAH: “She says, I was injured by wood,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, that follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said the ketubah of one injured by wood is 200 [zuz]. Rebbi Yose said, we would think to say, when did Rebbi Meïr disagree with those rabbis? If he took her in assuming she was injured by wood. But if he took her in assuming she was a virgin and it turned out she was injured by wood, then even Rebbi Meïr agrees, since we have stated: “She says, I was injured by wood, but he says not so, you were trampled on by a man.” That means, there is a disagreement even if he took her in assuming she was injured by wood and she turned out to have been injured by wood. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and my ketubah is 200 [zuz]. He says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and you have no claim on me. What are we talking about? If he married her as a virgin and she turns out to have been injured by wood, Rebbi Meïr will agree. If he married her as one injured by wood and she turns out to have been injured by wood, is there a recognizable difference in the opening of the door between wood or man? Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and so I stipulated with you, but he says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and there was no stipulation between you and me.
MISHNAH: If she was seen speaking to a man and one asked her, what kind of man is this? He is Mr. X, a Cohen; Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer say, she is believed. Rebbi Joshua said, we do not live off her mouth but there is a presumption that she was lying with a Gibeonite and a bastard unless she provides proof of her statement.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshia: Practice follows Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer since two form a majority against one. Rebbi Yose asked: If it is practice, why two? And if two, why practice? Would that mean if Rebbi Joḥanan would hold with Rebbi Joshua that practice would not follow Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer but Rebbi Joshua? What about it? It is a testimony for which a woman in empowered. They wanted to say, when does Rebbi Joshua disagree with these rabbis? At a place where most are disabling, but at a place where most are qualified, even Rebbi Joshua will agree. There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: There is disagreement even at a place where most are qualified. Does Rebbi Joshua think that immorality runs after the disabling? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita stated that even qualified people whore, as it was stated: Even the most pious man cannot be appointed guardian for illicit sex.
Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshia: Practice follows Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer since two form a majority against one. Rebbi Yose asked: If it is practice, why two? And if two, why practice? Would that mean if Rebbi Joḥanan would hold with Rebbi Joshua that practice would not follow Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer but Rebbi Joshua? What about it? It is a testimony for which a woman in empowered. They wanted to say, when does Rebbi Joshua disagree with these rabbis? At a place where most are disabling, but at a place where most are qualified, even Rebbi Joshua will agree. There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: There is disagreement even at a place where most are qualified. Does Rebbi Joshua think that immorality runs after the disabling? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita stated that even qualified people whore, as it was stated: Even the most pious man cannot be appointed guardian for illicit sex.
MISHNAH: If she was pregnant and one asked her, what kind of fetus is this? He is from Mr. X, a Cohen; Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer say, she is believed. Rebbi Joshua said, we do not live off her mouth but there is a presumption that she is pregnant from a Gibeonite or a bastard unless she provides proof of her statement.
Rebbi Eleazar said to him: Is not the dough widow qualified but her daughter is disqualified? He said to him, whoever declares her to be qualified, declares her daughter to be qualified. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, did he not say “whoever declares her to be qualified”? This implies that there is another who disqualifies! Who declares qualified? Rebbi Meïr. Who disqualifies? The rabbis. As we have stated: What is qualified dough, anyone about whom there is [no suspicion of descent from] a desecrated, a bastard, or a Gibeonite. Rebbi Meïr says, the daughter of any woman not tainted with one of these is qualified for thepriesthood. But about a family in which a disability had disappeared, Rebbi Meïr says he checks up to four mothers and marries, but the Sages say, he checks forever.
Rebbi Eleazar said to him: Is not the dough widow qualified but her daughter is disqualified? He said to him, whoever declares her to be qualified, declares her daughter to be qualified. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, did he not say “whoever declares her to be qualified”? This implies that there is another who disqualifies! Who declares qualified? Rebbi Meïr. Who disqualifies? The rabbis. As we have stated: What is qualified dough, anyone about whom there is [no suspicion of descent from] a desecrated, a bastard, or a Gibeonite. Rebbi Meïr says, the daughter of any woman not tainted with one of these is qualified for thepriesthood. But about a family in which a disability had disappeared, Rebbi Meïr says he checks up to four mothers and marries, but the Sages say, he checks forever.
The word of Rebbi Zera implies that a child of unknown paternity is qualified, for Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: Is it the same for families? He said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: There, for families, but here for sanctified food in the country. The word of Rebbi Samuel ben [Rav] Isaac implies that a child of unknown paternity is disqualified, for Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac asked: Does this mean that a child of unknown paternity is does not exist following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, only following Rebbi Joshua? He turned around and said, a child of unknown paternity is possible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, if she remains silent. And even if you say that she talks, if she said that she does not know.
Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: He cohabited with her inside of Sepphoris. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he disqualifies since he cohabited there. What about a thoroughfare? Rebbi Jeremiah bar Abba, Rebbi Yose says: By a majority. The force of Rebbi Jeremiah comes from the following which Rebbi Ḥiyya had said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a wall fell in a dead-end street populated by Gentiles, but where one Jew lived, one digs there because of the Jew; but in a thoroughfare one follows the majority. And what is the interpretation of what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Yannai, if he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he is disqualified since he cohabited there? In the opinion of Rebbi Jeremiah, if one saw him coming out of a house. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, even in a thoroughfare. If Sepphoris was locked. Rebbi Yose says, until there is proof. But here, Rebbi Yose says, by a majority! The force of Rebbi Yose comes from the following, which Rebbi Ze‘ira had said: Rebbi [Ḥiyya] (Yose) in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If his [box] (bread) was exchanged at the miller’s, if it was established that an am haäreẓ gave [grain] to be milled there that day, he has to worry; otherwise, he does not have to worry. Should he not worry? What is the difference between this and the Saracens? Was it not stated: “If a group of Saracens one day provisioned themselves from forbidden supplies, then that day becomes a proof for all days.” It is impossible for Saracens not to supply themselves. But here it was not established that the am haäreẓ was milling there that day. And here, I am saying that the disqualified person went to draw water only that day, and one has to worry. And here, Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: He cohabited with her inside of Sepphoris. And here, Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he is disqualified since he cohabited there.
Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: He cohabited with her inside of Sepphoris. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he disqualifies since he cohabited there. What about a thoroughfare? Rebbi Jeremiah bar Abba, Rebbi Yose says: By a majority. The force of Rebbi Jeremiah comes from the following which Rebbi Ḥiyya had said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a wall fell in a dead-end street populated by Gentiles, but where one Jew lived, one digs there because of the Jew; but in a thoroughfare one follows the majority. And what is the interpretation of what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Yannai, if he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he is disqualified since he cohabited there? In the opinion of Rebbi Jeremiah, if one saw him coming out of a house. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, even in a thoroughfare. If Sepphoris was locked. Rebbi Yose says, until there is proof. But here, Rebbi Yose says, by a majority! The force of Rebbi Yose comes from the following, which Rebbi Ze‘ira had said: Rebbi [Ḥiyya] (Yose) in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If his [box] (bread) was exchanged at the miller’s, if it was established that an am haäreẓ gave [grain] to be milled there that day, he has to worry; otherwise, he does not have to worry. Should he not worry? What is the difference between this and the Saracens? Was it not stated: “If a group of Saracens one day provisioned themselves from forbidden supplies, then that day becomes a proof for all days.” It is impossible for Saracens not to supply themselves. But here it was not established that the am haäreẓ was milling there that day. And here, I am saying that the disqualified person went to draw water only that day, and one has to worry. And here, Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: He cohabited with her inside of Sepphoris. And here, Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he is disqualified since he cohabited there.
Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: He cohabited with her inside of Sepphoris. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he disqualifies since he cohabited there. What about a thoroughfare? Rebbi Jeremiah bar Abba, Rebbi Yose says: By a majority. The force of Rebbi Jeremiah comes from the following which Rebbi Ḥiyya had said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a wall fell in a dead-end street populated by Gentiles, but where one Jew lived, one digs there because of the Jew; but in a thoroughfare one follows the majority. And what is the interpretation of what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Yannai, if he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he is disqualified since he cohabited there? In the opinion of Rebbi Jeremiah, if one saw him coming out of a house. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, even in a thoroughfare. If Sepphoris was locked. Rebbi Yose says, until there is proof. But here, Rebbi Yose says, by a majority! The force of Rebbi Yose comes from the following, which Rebbi Ze‘ira had said: Rebbi [Ḥiyya] (Yose) in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If his [box] (bread) was exchanged at the miller’s, if it was established that an am haäreẓ gave [grain] to be milled there that day, he has to worry; otherwise, he does not have to worry. Should he not worry? What is the difference between this and the Saracens? Was it not stated: “If a group of Saracens one day provisioned themselves from forbidden supplies, then that day becomes a proof for all days.” It is impossible for Saracens not to supply themselves. But here it was not established that the am haäreẓ was milling there that day. And here, I am saying that the disqualified person went to draw water only that day, and one has to worry. And here, Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: He cohabited with her inside of Sepphoris. And here, Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he is disqualified since he cohabited there.
Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: He cohabited with her inside of Sepphoris. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he disqualifies since he cohabited there. What about a thoroughfare? Rebbi Jeremiah bar Abba, Rebbi Yose says: By a majority. The force of Rebbi Jeremiah comes from the following which Rebbi Ḥiyya had said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a wall fell in a dead-end street populated by Gentiles, but where one Jew lived, one digs there because of the Jew; but in a thoroughfare one follows the majority. And what is the interpretation of what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Yannai, if he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he is disqualified since he cohabited there? In the opinion of Rebbi Jeremiah, if one saw him coming out of a house. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, even in a thoroughfare. If Sepphoris was locked. Rebbi Yose says, until there is proof. But here, Rebbi Yose says, by a majority! The force of Rebbi Yose comes from the following, which Rebbi Ze‘ira had said: Rebbi [Ḥiyya] (Yose) in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If his [box] (bread) was exchanged at the miller’s, if it was established that an am haäreẓ gave [grain] to be milled there that day, he has to worry; otherwise, he does not have to worry. Should he not worry? What is the difference between this and the Saracens? Was it not stated: “If a group of Saracens one day provisioned themselves from forbidden supplies, then that day becomes a proof for all days.” It is impossible for Saracens not to supply themselves. But here it was not established that the am haäreẓ was milling there that day. And here, I am saying that the disqualified person went to draw water only that day, and one has to worry. And here, Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: He cohabited with her inside of Sepphoris. And here, Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he is disqualified since he cohabited there.
Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: He cohabited with her inside of Sepphoris. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he disqualifies since he cohabited there. What about a thoroughfare? Rebbi Jeremiah bar Abba, Rebbi Yose says: By a majority. The force of Rebbi Jeremiah comes from the following which Rebbi Ḥiyya had said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a wall fell in a dead-end street populated by Gentiles, but where one Jew lived, one digs there because of the Jew; but in a thoroughfare one follows the majority. And what is the interpretation of what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Yannai, if he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he is disqualified since he cohabited there? In the opinion of Rebbi Jeremiah, if one saw him coming out of a house. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, even in a thoroughfare. If Sepphoris was locked. Rebbi Yose says, until there is proof. But here, Rebbi Yose says, by a majority! The force of Rebbi Yose comes from the following, which Rebbi Ze‘ira had said: Rebbi [Ḥiyya] (Yose) in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If his [box] (bread) was exchanged at the miller’s, if it was established that an am haäreẓ gave [grain] to be milled there that day, he has to worry; otherwise, he does not have to worry. Should he not worry? What is the difference between this and the Saracens? Was it not stated: “If a group of Saracens one day provisioned themselves from forbidden supplies, then that day becomes a proof for all days.” It is impossible for Saracens not to supply themselves. But here it was not established that the am haäreẓ was milling there that day. And here, I am saying that the disqualified person went to draw water only that day, and one has to worry. And here, Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: He cohabited with her inside of Sepphoris. And here, Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he is disqualified since he cohabited there.
Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: He cohabited with her inside of Sepphoris. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he disqualifies since he cohabited there. What about a thoroughfare? Rebbi Jeremiah bar Abba, Rebbi Yose says: By a majority. The force of Rebbi Jeremiah comes from the following which Rebbi Ḥiyya had said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a wall fell in a dead-end street populated by Gentiles, but where one Jew lived, one digs there because of the Jew; but in a thoroughfare one follows the majority. And what is the interpretation of what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Yannai, if he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he is disqualified since he cohabited there? In the opinion of Rebbi Jeremiah, if one saw him coming out of a house. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, even in a thoroughfare. If Sepphoris was locked. Rebbi Yose says, until there is proof. But here, Rebbi Yose says, by a majority! The force of Rebbi Yose comes from the following, which Rebbi Ze‘ira had said: Rebbi [Ḥiyya] (Yose) in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If his [box] (bread) was exchanged at the miller’s, if it was established that an am haäreẓ gave [grain] to be milled there that day, he has to worry; otherwise, he does not have to worry. Should he not worry? What is the difference between this and the Saracens? Was it not stated: “If a group of Saracens one day provisioned themselves from forbidden supplies, then that day becomes a proof for all days.” It is impossible for Saracens not to supply themselves. But here it was not established that the am haäreẓ was milling there that day. And here, I am saying that the disqualified person went to draw water only that day, and one has to worry. And here, Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: He cohabited with her inside of Sepphoris. And here, Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he is disqualified since he cohabited there.
Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: He cohabited with her inside of Sepphoris. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he disqualifies since he cohabited there. What about a thoroughfare? Rebbi Jeremiah bar Abba, Rebbi Yose says: By a majority. The force of Rebbi Jeremiah comes from the following which Rebbi Ḥiyya had said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a wall fell in a dead-end street populated by Gentiles, but where one Jew lived, one digs there because of the Jew; but in a thoroughfare one follows the majority. And what is the interpretation of what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Yannai, if he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he is disqualified since he cohabited there? In the opinion of Rebbi Jeremiah, if one saw him coming out of a house. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, even in a thoroughfare. If Sepphoris was locked. Rebbi Yose says, until there is proof. But here, Rebbi Yose says, by a majority! The force of Rebbi Yose comes from the following, which Rebbi Ze‘ira had said: Rebbi [Ḥiyya] (Yose) in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If his [box] (bread) was exchanged at the miller’s, if it was established that an am haäreẓ gave [grain] to be milled there that day, he has to worry; otherwise, he does not have to worry. Should he not worry? What is the difference between this and the Saracens? Was it not stated: “If a group of Saracens one day provisioned themselves from forbidden supplies, then that day becomes a proof for all days.” It is impossible for Saracens not to supply themselves. But here it was not established that the am haäreẓ was milling there that day. And here, I am saying that the disqualified person went to draw water only that day, and one has to worry. And here, Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: He cohabited with her inside of Sepphoris. And here, Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he was seen coming out of Sepphoris and he cohabited, the presumption is that he is disqualified since he cohabited there.
MISHNAH: If a woman became widowed or divorced and she claims to have been married as a virgin, but he says not so, I married you as a widow, if there are witnesses that she went out in hinuma or with uncovered hair, her ketubah is 200 [zuz]. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa says, the distribution of roasted kernels also is proof.
Should one follow the majority, and most women are married as virgins. Say then that she was married as a virgin! This implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. There, we have stated: “If an ox gored a cow and one finds her fetus beside her.” Do most cows have miscarriages? Say therefore that the goring induced the miscarriage. Rebbi Abbahu said, this implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. Rebbi Abun said, in one case they applied a majority argument, as Rebbi Aḥa stated: If a camel was in heat among camels and one finds one of them dead, I am saying that the one in heat bit it.
If somebody claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced witnesses that the [defendant] owes him 50 [zuz]. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya said, [the defendant] has to swear about the remainder. Rebbi Joḥanan says, he does not have to swear. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya learned it from two who are grabbing a toga, as we have stated there: “Two are grabbing a toga, one says, I found it, and the other says, I found it.” The one who grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that that half belongs to him. The other says, “it belongs to me entirely”, and the fact that he grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that this half belongs to him. The one who says, “it belongs to me entirely”, swears that not the entire [toga] is the other’s. But he did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan that this oath is a rabbinic institution, that a man should not see another in the market and tell him, the toga which you are wearing is mine, come and split your toga with me! Rebbi Abin in the name of Rav: My uncle agrees in the case of a document. How is that? He claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced a document that the [defendant] owed him 50 [zuz]. He has only fifty. And Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, we can understand it from the following: “‘The amount of … tetradrachmas’ and it was illegible, he owes no less than two. “If it is more, if the lender says five but the borrower says three, Ben Azzay says since he partially agreed to the claim, he has to swear, but the Sages say, what he agreed to is not of the kind which was claimed. Because it was not of the kind which was claimed! Therefore, if it were of the kind which was claimed, he would be obligated. And is it not here that the agreed sum was part of the claim? Everybody agrees that he owes her a mina. But she claimsanother mina from him, to which he does not agree. The burden of proof is on the claimant.
“In hinuma”. There, a veil. The rabbis here say, a phorema.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua agrees that if somebody says to another: “This field did belong to your father but I bought it from him,” that he is trustworthy since the mouth which forbade is the mouth which permits. But if there are witnesses that it did belong to [the second man’s] father and [the first] said, I bought it, he is not trustworthy.
“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.
“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
MISHNAH: If witnesses said, this is our signature, but we were under duress, or underage, or disqualified, these are trustworthy. But if there are witnesses to identify their signatures, or their signatures are confirmed from another document, they are not trustworthy.
HALAKHAH: “If witnesses said, this is our signature,” etc. It was stated: And similarly, the witnesses who testified whether to declare impure or pure, or to remove or include, or to forbid or permit, or to obligate or absolve, if they say we did invent this before their testimony was investigated by the court, they can be believed; after their testimony was investigated by the court, they are not trustworthy.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been investigated by the court. If they say, these are our signatures, and others say, these are their signatures, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Their [testimony] does not add and does not detract. Rebbi Yose said, our Mishnah says so, “if there are witnesses to identify their signatures, or if their signatures are confirmed from another document, they are not trustworthy.”
Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market place cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. How is that? If one identified his own signature and that of his colleague, but that second witness’s signature was not known to anybody except his colleague, may that colleague together with somebody from the market place testify on that signature? That is what Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, said in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. Another case where there are no two persons: The signature of one is known by everybody, but that second witness’s signature is not known to anybody except his colleague. Can that colleague testify on his signature as if he were someone from the market place? If you say so, the entire testimony is confirmed by one witness. Rebbi Yudan said, that is correct. If two people come from a town that is mostly Gentile, like Hippos. One is known by everybody as a Jew, but the other is not known by anybody except his companion. Can the latter be considered one from the market place to testify about him? If you say so, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness! And in the prior case, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness.
Rebbi Ḥaggai said that Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Can one witness testifying orally and one by a document be taken together? Is a single witness on a written document worth anything? Therefore, his question was, if there are two. They managed to confirm the first signature but not the second. Rebbi Mana asked, is one witness on a written document enough to force anybody to swear? Is a single witness on a written document worth anything? Therefore, his question was, if there are two. They managed to confirm the first signature but not the second. Parallel to it: One does not accept testimony from witnesses unless they had seen together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw one after the other. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac, in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa for witnesses about primogeniture and rights of possession.
Rebbi Ḥaggai said that Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Can one witness testifying orally and one by a document be taken together? Is a single witness on a written document worth anything? Therefore, his question was, if there are two. They managed to confirm the first signature but not the second. Rebbi Mana asked, is one witness on a written document enough to force anybody to swear? Is a single witness on a written document worth anything? Therefore, his question was, if there are two. They managed to confirm the first signature but not the second. Parallel to it: One does not accept testimony from witnesses unless they had seen together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw one after the other. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac, in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa for witnesses about primogeniture and rights of possession.
MISHNAH: If a woman said, I was married but I am divorced, she is to be trusted, since the mouth which forbade is the mouth which permits. But if there are witnesses that she is married and she says, I am divorced, she is not trustworthy.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman said, I was married,” etc. It was stated: If the witnesses came after she remarried, she should not leave. Rav Ḥuna and Rebbi Ḥanina both say, not only after she remarried but even after the court authorized her to remarry. As the following: A woman came to Rebbi Joḥanan and said to him, I was married but I am divorced, and he permitted her. After she left, they said to him, are not her witnesses at Lod? He said, so I am saying: Should she wait even if her witnesses are at קסוסנון? Rebbi Yose bar Rebbi Abun said, there were two cases. In one case, they said to him, are not her witnesses at Lod? In the other case, they said to him, are not her witnesses at Caesarea? And so it was!He said to them, so I am saying: Should she wait even if her witnesses are at קסוסנון?
MISHNAH: 6: If a woman said, I was kidnapped but I am pure, she is to be trusted, since the mouth which forbade is the mouth which permits. But if there are witnesses that she was kidnapped and she says, I am pure, she is not trustworthy. If the witnesses came after she was married, she should not leave.
Women were kidnapped and brought there. The case came before Abba bar Abba, and Samuel. They ordered and gave them over to chaperones who were to return them to the Land of Israel. He said to him: What did we do for the earlier times when they were alone with them? Abba bar Abba said to him, would you say so if they were your daughters? Samuel’s daughters were kidnapped, “like an error which comes from the ruler”. When they were brought here, their kidnappers came with them. They came before Rebbi Ḥanina and left their kidnappers outside. They said to him, we were kidnapped but we are pure. He permitted them. After they left, their kidnappers sent after them. He said, it is obvious that these are the daughters of a Sage. When they came to know who they were, they said to Simeon bar Abba, take care of your relatives. He married the first one, but she died. The second one and she died. Why? Because they lied? God forbid, they did not lie. But because of the sin of Ḥanania, Rebbi Joshua’s nephew, who intercalated the year outside the Land.
“In the Land of Israel there are two legal claims to priestly status, the priestly blessings and the distribution from the threshing floor. In Syria, priestly blessings but not distribution from the threshing floor. Up to the place where the messengers for the New Moon arrive, up to Nimerin. Babylonia is like Syria. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, also in Alexandria in the time when regular courts are sitting there. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel stated: Just as heave establishes a legal claim to priesthood, so First Tithe establishes a legal claim to priesthood. If somebody gives his heave to the court to distribute he has no legal claim to priesthood;” I am saying that the heave came to him from his mother’s father, a Cohen.
“In the Land of Israel there are two legal claims to priestly status, the priestly blessings and the distribution from the threshing floor. In Syria, priestly blessings but not distribution from the threshing floor. Up to the place where the messengers for the New Moon arrive, up to Nimerin. Babylonia is like Syria. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, also in Alexandria in the time when regular courts are sitting there. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel stated: Just as heave establishes a legal claim to priesthood, so First Tithe establishes a legal claim to priesthood. If somebody gives his heave to the court to distribute he has no legal claim to priesthood;” I am saying that the heave came to him from his mother’s father, a Cohen.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Jehudah says, one does not elevate to the priesthood by the testimony of one witness. Rebbi Eleazar said, when is this? If there are protesters; but if there are no protesters, one elevates to the priesthood by the testimony of one witness. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says in the name of Rebbi Simeon, the son of the second in command, that one elevates to the priesthood by the testimony of one witness.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Jehudah says, one does not elevate to the priesthood by the testimony of one witness. Rebbi Eleazar said, when is this? If there are protesters; but if there are no protesters, one elevates to the priesthood by the testimony of one witness. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says in the name of Rebbi Simeon, the son of the second in command, that one elevates to the priesthood by the testimony of one witness.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, one does not elevate,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A complaint needs at least two [plaintiffs]. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, how do we hold? If they elevated him on the testimony of one person, they should demote him on the testimony of one person. If they elevated him on the testimony of two persons, even if there are many [opposed] they should not demote him! Rebbi Ḥuna said, it follows the rabbis there. But following the rabbis here and Rav Naḥman bar Jacob, just as one elevates him on the testimony of two persons, one demotes him on the testimony of two persons.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, one does not elevate,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A complaint needs at least two [plaintiffs]. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, how do we hold? If they elevated him on the testimony of one person, they should demote him on the testimony of one person. If they elevated him on the testimony of two persons, even if there are many [opposed] they should not demote him! Rebbi Ḥuna said, it follows the rabbis there. But following the rabbis here and Rav Naḥman bar Jacob, just as one elevates him on the testimony of two persons, one demotes him on the testimony of two persons.
HALAKHAH: “A woman who was jailed by Gentiles,” etc. There, we have stated: “Rebbi Yose the Cohen and Rebbi Zachariah the son of the butcher testified about a girl who was given as a pledge in Ascalon and her family excluded her, but her witnesses testified that she never was in a secret place and was not impure.” Because the witnesses testified that she never was in a secret place and was not impure; therefore, not if no witnesses testified that she never was in a secret place and was not impure! Rebbi Eleazar said, there is a difference about a pledge, because many treat her as permitted.
HALAKHAH: “A woman who was jailed by Gentiles,” etc. There, we have stated: “Rebbi Yose the Cohen and Rebbi Zachariah the son of the butcher testified about a girl who was given as a pledge in Ascalon and her family excluded her, but her witnesses testified that she never was in a secret place and was not impure.” Because the witnesses testified that she never was in a secret place and was not impure; therefore, not if no witnesses testified that she never was in a secret place and was not impure! Rebbi Eleazar said, there is a difference about a pledge, because many treat her as permitted.
What are palisades? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: For examples if bells, chains, and ropes, and geese, and chickens and machinery surround the town. And Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥama bar Ashi said, it happened that a blind woman was able to flee from there. If there was one breach, it saves all. If there were hiding places, it is questionable. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zavda, Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqula, in the name of Rebbi Yudan the prince: Only if there were palisades of that government. But palisades from another government are like robbers.
What are palisades? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: For examples if bells, chains, and ropes, and geese, and chickens and machinery surround the town. And Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥama bar Ashi said, it happened that a blind woman was able to flee from there. If there was one breach, it saves all. If there were hiding places, it is questionable. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zavda, Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqula, in the name of Rebbi Yudan the prince: Only if there were palisades of that government. But palisades from another government are like robbers.
What are palisades? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: For examples if bells, chains, and ropes, and geese, and chickens and machinery surround the town. And Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥama bar Ashi said, it happened that a blind woman was able to flee from there. If there was one breach, it saves all. If there were hiding places, it is questionable. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zavda, Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqula, in the name of Rebbi Yudan the prince: Only if there were palisades of that government. But palisades from another government are like robbers.
What are palisades? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: For examples if bells, chains, and ropes, and geese, and chickens and machinery surround the town. And Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥama bar Ashi said, it happened that a blind woman was able to flee from there. If there was one breach, it saves all. If there were hiding places, it is questionable. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zavda, Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqula, in the name of Rebbi Yudan the prince: Only if there were palisades of that government. But palisades from another government are like robbers.
“In the following cases, one is trustworthy to testify as an adult about what he saw in his minority,” etc. They are only trustworthy as adults about what they saw as minors; therefore, not as minors! There, we have stated: “A woman or a minor are trustworthy when they said, from there a swarm of bees left. He then can enter another’s field and take his swarm.” And here, you say so? Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said this only about a swarm of bees because taking it is not robbery by biblical standards. Rav Oshaiah stated, only if it is swarming. But not if it clings to a branch. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Is that not reasonable only when it happens, but not after some time? He said to him, I agree. And we have stated: When is this said? When they testified to what they said. But if they left and came back, I am saying that they speak out of fear or were seduced.
“In the following cases, one is trustworthy to testify as an adult about what he saw in his minority,” etc. They are only trustworthy as adults about what they saw as minors; therefore, not as minors! There, we have stated: “A woman or a minor are trustworthy when they said, from there a swarm of bees left. He then can enter another’s field and take his swarm.” And here, you say so? Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said this only about a swarm of bees because taking it is not robbery by biblical standards. Rav Oshaiah stated, only if it is swarming. But not if it clings to a branch. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Is that not reasonable only when it happens, but not after some time? He said to him, I agree. And we have stated: When is this said? When they testified to what they said. But if they left and came back, I am saying that they speak out of fear or were seduced.
HALAKHAH: “The following adolescent girls,” etc. It is written: “She should be his wife,” one who can be his wife. Can the bastard girl be his wife? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “he should weigh silver appropriate for the bride-price of virgins”, that added many virgins. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if it had said “virgin’s brides-prices”; but it says only “appropriate for the bride-price of virgins”; the verse added them only for the bride-price. But where was this said? As Ḥizqiah stated: “If refusing her father should refuse,” not only if her father refuses; from where even if from Heaven they refuse? The verse says “refusing should refuse”, in any case. But then a man who has intercourse with a slave girl should pay the fine! This is impossible, as it was stated: I could think that one who has intercourse with a Gentile slave-girl should be obligated, the verse says, “by bride-money he should take her as a wife to himself.” Only one whom he can marry; this excludes the Gentile slave whom he cannot marry. But he cannot marry his sister and he pays the fine! There is a difference since she can be married to others. But his daughter can be married to others and he does not pay the fine! There is a difference since it is a capital crime and nobody who commits a capital crime pays money.
HALAKHAH: “The following adolescent girls,” etc. It is written: “She should be his wife,” one who can be his wife. Can the bastard girl be his wife? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “he should weigh silver appropriate for the bride-price of virgins”, that added many virgins. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if it had said “virgin’s brides-prices”; but it says only “appropriate for the bride-price of virgins”; the verse added them only for the bride-price. But where was this said? As Ḥizqiah stated: “If refusing her father should refuse,” not only if her father refuses; from where even if from Heaven they refuse? The verse says “refusing should refuse”, in any case. But then a man who has intercourse with a slave girl should pay the fine! This is impossible, as it was stated: I could think that one who has intercourse with a Gentile slave-girl should be obligated, the verse says, “by bride-money he should take her as a wife to himself.” Only one whom he can marry; this excludes the Gentile slave whom he cannot marry. But he cannot marry his sister and he pays the fine! There is a difference since she can be married to others. But his daughter can be married to others and he does not pay the fine! There is a difference since it is a capital crime and nobody who commits a capital crime pays money.
There, we have stated: “If somebody eats heave intentionally, he pays the principal but not the fifth.” And we have stated: “The following are flogged.” Here you say, he is flogged, and there you say, he pays. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah is two-sided: If he was cautioned, he is flogged; if he was not cautioned, he pays. Rebbi Joḥanan is of the opinion that in a case where there is flogging or restitution, when he pays he is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Corresponding to his guilt.” You sentence him for one offence but you may not sentence him for two offences. The verse speaks of one who may incur two punishments (Deut. 25:2): “The judge shall have him laid down and flogged in his presence a number [of times] because of his guilt.”
There, we have stated: “If somebody eats heave intentionally, he pays the principal but not the fifth.” And we have stated: “The following are flogged.” Here you say, he is flogged, and there you say, he pays. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah is two-sided: If he was cautioned, he is flogged; if he was not cautioned, he pays. Rebbi Joḥanan is of the opinion that in a case where there is flogging or restitution, when he pays he is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Corresponding to his guilt.” You sentence him for one offence but you may not sentence him for two offences. The verse speaks of one who may incur two punishments (Deut. 25:2): “The judge shall have him laid down and flogged in his presence a number [of times] because of his guilt.”
There, we have stated: “If somebody eats heave intentionally, he pays the principal but not the fifth.” And we have stated: “The following are flogged.” Here you say, he is flogged, and there you say, he pays. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah is two-sided: If he was cautioned, he is flogged; if he was not cautioned, he pays. Rebbi Joḥanan is of the opinion that in a case where there is flogging or restitution, when he pays he is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Corresponding to his guilt.” You sentence him for one offence but you may not sentence him for two offences. The verse speaks of one who may incur two punishments (Deut. 25:2): “The judge shall have him laid down and flogged in his presence a number [of times] because of his guilt.”
Everybody agrees that there is no money payment in capital cases, as it is written (Lev. 24:21): “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money. Where do they differ? About money in a flogging case. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no money in a capital case but there is money in a flogging case, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, just as there is no money in a capital case so there is no money in a flogging case.
Everybody agrees that there is no money payment in capital cases, as it is written (Lev. 24:21): “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money. Where do they differ? About money in a flogging case. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no money in a capital case but there is money in a flogging case, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, just as there is no money in a capital case so there is no money in a flogging case.
Everybody agrees that there is no money payment in capital cases, as it is written (Lev. 24:21): “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money. Where do they differ? About money in a flogging case. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no money in a capital case but there is money in a flogging case, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, just as there is no money in a capital case so there is no money in a flogging case.
Everybody agrees that there is no money payment in capital cases, as it is written (Lev. 24:21): “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money. Where do they differ? About money in a flogging case. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no money in a capital case but there is money in a flogging case, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, just as there is no money in a capital case so there is no money in a flogging case.
Everybody agrees that there is no money payment in capital cases, as it is written (Lev. 24:21): “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money. Where do they differ? About money in a flogging case. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no money in a capital case but there is money in a flogging case, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, just as there is no money in a capital case so there is no money in a flogging case.
Rebbi Immi the Babylonian in the name of the rabbis from there: The reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is “criminal, criminal.” “Criminal” is mentioned in capital cases, “criminal” is mentioned in cases of flogging. Just as for the criminal in capital cases there is no monetary fine, so for the criminal mentioned in flogging cases there is no monetary fine.
Rebbi Immi the Babylonian in the name of the rabbis from there: The reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is “criminal, criminal.” “Criminal” is mentioned in capital cases, “criminal” is mentioned in cases of flogging. Just as for the criminal in capital cases there is no monetary fine, so for the criminal mentioned in flogging cases there is no monetary fine.
Rebbi Immi the Babylonian in the name of the rabbis from there: The reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is “criminal, criminal.” “Criminal” is mentioned in capital cases, “criminal” is mentioned in cases of flogging. Just as for the criminal in capital cases there is no monetary fine, so for the criminal mentioned in flogging cases there is no monetary fine.
Nathan bar Hoshiah said, one speaks about an adolescent girl, the other about an adult woman. The adolescent has a fine but nobody is flogged for her; for the adult he is flogged but pays no fine, she cannot be sold; she has no claim for shame and blemish. The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it that she seduced him or remitted [the fine] for him. Nathan bar Hoshaiah thinks that in a case of flogging and payment he pays but is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” You sentence him for one offence but you may not sentence him for two offences. From perjured witnesses. Just as you say there, perjured witnesses pay but are not flogged, here also he pays and is not flogged. Rebbi Jonah said, the reason of Rebbi Nathan bar Hoshaiah: (Deut. 25:2): “For his evil deed.” It refers to one whose flogging frees him from his guilt, excluding one who is told: get up and pay.
Our Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish! “If somebody eats heave intentionally he pays the principal but not the fifth.” In the opinion of Nathan bar Hoshaiah who said he pays, it is understandable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, if he was cautioned he is flogged, but if he was not cautioned he pays, he explains it as intentional without cautioning. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish there is no difference between intentional and unintentional, between cautioned or not cautioned. He explains following Rebbi Meïr who says, he is flogged and he pays.
Rebbi Ḥinena said before Rebbi Mana: Even if Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish thought the entire Mishnaiot were Rebbi Meïr’s, does the verse agree with Rebbi Meïr? Is it not written (Lev. 22:14): “If a person ate consecrated food in error”? But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish must hold that the fifth is a sacrifice. But even if he holds that the fifth is a sacrifice, can the principal be a sacrifice? Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said, the Mishnah declares that the principal is a fine, as we have stated: “He does not pay in heave but in totally profane food which is turned into heave.” If he had to pay from what he ate, it would be fine. And it was stated: “If he ate impure heave, he has to pay in pure profane food, but if he paid in impure profane, he discharged his obligation.” Does he not owe him the price of wood? That shows that the principal is a fine and since the principal is a fine, the fifth also is a fine. But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows his own opinion. Just as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there, everybody was under the obligation of (Ex. 20:16) “Do not become a false witness against your neighbor”, but this one was treated separately, (Deut. 19:19) “do to him what he intended to do to his brother”, to pay money; also here, everybody was under the obligation of (Lev. 22:10) “no outsider shall eat holy [food],” but this one was treated separately, (Lev. 22:14) “if somebody should eat holy [food] in error,” to pay money.
Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: If it is so, he who sleeps with his minor sister should be flogged and have to pay since if he sleeps with his adult sister he is flogged. He reversed himself and said, there death and payment fall on him simultaneously. But here, when he muzzled he is subject to flogging but only later for payment. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected before Rebbi Mana: He who sets fire to his neighbor’s grain stack on the Sabbath is subject to capital punishment from the first ear but only later for payment! One cannot say that because for every single ear there is cautioning for the death penalty. Here also, for every moment of muzzling there is cautioning for flogging. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, two Amoraïm. One said, if he muzzled for heave which is Temple property. The other one said, if he muzzled through an agent. Then the agent is flogged and he is free (Lev. 17:4): “As a blood guilt it will be charged on this man,” not on his employers.
Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: If it is so, he who sleeps with his minor sister should be flogged and have to pay since if he sleeps with his adult sister he is flogged. He reversed himself and said, there death and payment fall on him simultaneously. But here, when he muzzled he is subject to flogging but only later for payment. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected before Rebbi Mana: He who sets fire to his neighbor’s grain stack on the Sabbath is subject to capital punishment from the first ear but only later for payment! One cannot say that because for every single ear there is cautioning for the death penalty. Here also, for every moment of muzzling there is cautioning for flogging. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, two Amoraïm. One said, if he muzzled for heave which is Temple property. The other one said, if he muzzled through an agent. Then the agent is flogged and he is free (Lev. 17:4): “As a blood guilt it will be charged on this man,” not on his employers.
Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: If it is so, he who sleeps with his minor sister should be flogged and have to pay since if he sleeps with his adult sister he is flogged. He reversed himself and said, there death and payment fall on him simultaneously. But here, when he muzzled he is subject to flogging but only later for payment. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected before Rebbi Mana: He who sets fire to his neighbor’s grain stack on the Sabbath is subject to capital punishment from the first ear but only later for payment! One cannot say that because for every single ear there is cautioning for the death penalty. Here also, for every moment of muzzling there is cautioning for flogging. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, two Amoraïm. One said, if he muzzled for heave which is Temple property. The other one said, if he muzzled through an agent. Then the agent is flogged and he is free (Lev. 17:4): “As a blood guilt it will be charged on this man,” not on his employers.