therefore
5999 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
What is the difference between these and those? Since these are words of the Torah and the words of the Torah [do not] need support, therefore they have ketubah. Those, because they are words of the Sopherim and the words of the Sopherim need support, therefore they do not have ketubah. Some want to say since these are punished together with the child, they did not fine them, therefore they have ketubah. Those, since they are not punished together with the child, they fined them, therefore they do not have ketubah. What is the difference between them? He who remarried his divorced wife after she had remarried. For him who says since these are words of the Torah, and this case is a word of the Torah, therefore she has ketubah. For him who says since these are punished together with the child, this one, since neither she nor the child is punished, therefore, she has no ketubah.
What is the difference between these and those? Since these are words of the Torah and the words of the Torah [do not] need support, therefore they have ketubah. Those, because they are words of the Sopherim and the words of the Sopherim need support, therefore they do not have ketubah. Some want to say since these are punished together with the child, they did not fine them, therefore they have ketubah. Those, since they are not punished together with the child, they fined them, therefore they do not have ketubah. What is the difference between them? He who remarried his divorced wife after she had remarried. For him who says since these are words of the Torah, and this case is a word of the Torah, therefore she has ketubah. For him who says since these are punished together with the child, this one, since neither she nor the child is punished, therefore, she has no ketubah.
What is the difference between these and those? Since these are words of the Torah and the words of the Torah [do not] need support, therefore they have ketubah. Those, because they are words of the Sopherim and the words of the Sopherim need support, therefore they do not have ketubah. Some want to say since these are punished together with the child, they did not fine them, therefore they have ketubah. Those, since they are not punished together with the child, they fined them, therefore they do not have ketubah. What is the difference between them? He who remarried his divorced wife after she had remarried. For him who says since these are words of the Torah, and this case is a word of the Torah, therefore she has ketubah. For him who says since these are punished together with the child, this one, since neither she nor the child is punished, therefore, she has no ketubah.
What is the difference between these and those? Since these are words of the Torah and the words of the Torah [do not] need support, therefore they have ketubah. Those, because they are words of the Sopherim and the words of the Sopherim need support, therefore they do not have ketubah. Some want to say since these are punished together with the child, they did not fine them, therefore they have ketubah. Those, since they are not punished together with the child, they fined them, therefore they do not have ketubah. What is the difference between them? He who remarried his divorced wife after she had remarried. For him who says since these are words of the Torah, and this case is a word of the Torah, therefore she has ketubah. For him who says since these are punished together with the child, this one, since neither she nor the child is punished, therefore, she has no ketubah.
Who is the Tanna of “the gain should be given to the sacred fund”? Rebbi Meïr! For Rebbi Meïr said, one commits sacrilege with prohibitions. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands? Let us hear from the following: “If he said, this loaf shall be dedicated, if he or another person ate it, they committed sacrilege; therefore, it can be redeemed. But if he said, it is for me [as if dedicated], if he ate it he committed sacrilege on goodwill but others would not commit sacrilege.” He said only, if he ate it. Therefore, to warm his hands is permitted. The students of Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: That is if he said I shall not eat it nor taste it; if he forbade only eating to himself. But the question was, if somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands?
Who is the Tanna of “the gain should be given to the sacred fund”? Rebbi Meïr! For Rebbi Meïr said, one commits sacrilege with prohibitions. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands? Let us hear from the following: “If he said, this loaf shall be dedicated, if he or another person ate it, they committed sacrilege; therefore, it can be redeemed. But if he said, it is for me [as if dedicated], if he ate it he committed sacrilege on goodwill but others would not commit sacrilege.” He said only, if he ate it. Therefore, to warm his hands is permitted. The students of Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: That is if he said I shall not eat it nor taste it; if he forbade only eating to himself. But the question was, if somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands?
As it was stated: “If somebody went overseas and another person provided for his wife.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, another. Therefore, the father can recover. Rebbi Yose says, neither the father nor a third party can recover. There is a parallel disagreement, as we have stated there: “He has the right to what she finds and to her earnings, to dissolve her vows, and to receive her bill of divorce, but cannot eat usufruct in her lifetime… He is required to pay for her upkeep, her ransom, and her burial.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, the father. Therefore, a third party cannot recover. Rebbi Yose says, both the father or a third party can recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥaggai, both for burial as for upkeep the father can recover, a third party cannot recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, for burial both the father and also a third party can recover because it is unthinkable that his wife should be thrown to the dogs. For sustenance, neither the father nor a third party can recover.
As it was stated: “If somebody went overseas and another person provided for his wife.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, another. Therefore, the father can recover. Rebbi Yose says, neither the father nor a third party can recover. There is a parallel disagreement, as we have stated there: “He has the right to what she finds and to her earnings, to dissolve her vows, and to receive her bill of divorce, but cannot eat usufruct in her lifetime… He is required to pay for her upkeep, her ransom, and her burial.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, the father. Therefore, a third party cannot recover. Rebbi Yose says, both the father or a third party can recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥaggai, both for burial as for upkeep the father can recover, a third party cannot recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, for burial both the father and also a third party can recover because it is unthinkable that his wife should be thrown to the dogs. For sustenance, neither the father nor a third party can recover.
When does one appraise for them? Rebbi Mana said, one appraises at the end. Rebbi Ḥanina said to him, the words of the rabbis imply that one does not listen to you, for Nathan bar Hoshaia asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, if there was sustenance for twelve months but the estate diminished in value? He answered him, since the heirs started to eat with permission, they continue to eat until the last coin is gone! Therefore, one appraises at the start. Rav Ḥisda asked: If there was sustenance for twelve months and then the property increased in value? Let us hear from the following, for Rebbi Ḥanina, Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If the heirs sold, they sold from their own property. So here, if it increased in value, their property value increased. If the estate was not sufficient for twelve months’ sustenance, may the sons say to the daughters, take what is yours and leave! Rebbi Abba said, is that a question? The Mishnah says that they cannot say so to them, as we have stated there: “If the orphans say, we accept the properties of our father for the value of an extra denar in order to take their mother’s ketubah; one does not listen to them but one appraises the properties in court.”
HALAKHAH: “If two people mutually produced promissory notes of one on the other,” etc. If one borrowed a mina from the other, but the other borrowed from him 200 [zuz]. Rav Huna said, Rav Naḥman bar Jacob and Rab Sheshet disagree. One says, one counts one mina against the other mina, but the other says, each one collects the amount of his note. He who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, learns it from tame oxen who injured one another, where half of the excess damage is paid. He who says, each one collects the amount of his note, learns it from the Sages and Admon. Can the Sages and Admon not agree that one counts one mina against the other mina? Because we have stated: Admon says: “If I owed you, how come you borrowed from me?” Therefore it was necessary to say, each one collects the amount of his note. If the holder of the note of 200 forgave a mina, but the holder of the note of a mina did not forgive. For him who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, already one mina against the other mina was counted. But for him who says, each one collects the amount of his note, then what he forgave he cannot collect but what was not forgiven he can collect. If the note for 200 was written in a document but the loan for a mina was not written. For him who says, one counts one mina against the other mina, already one mina against the other mina was counted. But for him who says, each one collects the amount of his note, the holder of the written note can collect but the recipient of the oral promise cannot collect.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Are there words of Rebbi Meїr that from a negative one understands a positive? There is no sacrifice from this. What I shall not eat from you. Therefore, what I shall eat from you is profane, it is not qorbān.
HALAKHAH: “Qorbān [shall be] what I shall not eat at your place,” etc. Why did we not state: An oath that I shall eat from you, he is permitted? Only because we stated: “That is more restrictive for oaths than for vows.” We wanted to say about “an oath that I shall not eat of yours,” that the words of the Sages are: he is forbidden. Therefore it was not stated.
HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.
“This is for me like heave, if Temple heave, he is forbidden,” therefore ‘heave of thanksgiving’ is permitted. “If heave from the threshing floor, he is permitted,” therefore ‘heave of thanksgiving’ is forbidden. Here you say, forbidden; there, you say, permitted. Let us hear from the following: “Like Aaron’s ḥallah and his heave” is permitted, therefore ‘heave of thanksgiving’ is forbidden.
“This is for me like heave, if Temple heave, he is forbidden,” therefore ‘heave of thanksgiving’ is permitted. “If heave from the threshing floor, he is permitted,” therefore ‘heave of thanksgiving’ is forbidden. Here you say, forbidden; there, you say, permitted. Let us hear from the following: “Like Aaron’s ḥallah and his heave” is permitted, therefore ‘heave of thanksgiving’ is forbidden.
“This is for me like heave, if Temple heave, he is forbidden,” therefore ‘heave of thanksgiving’ is permitted. “If heave from the threshing floor, he is permitted,” therefore ‘heave of thanksgiving’ is forbidden. Here you say, forbidden; there, you say, permitted. Let us hear from the following: “Like Aaron’s ḥallah and his heave” is permitted, therefore ‘heave of thanksgiving’ is forbidden.
HALAKHAH: “Vows in connection with acts of God: His friend made him vow,” etc. because he fell ill. Therefore, if he did not fall ill, no. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said, “he is forbidden until he gives.” Rebbi Yose said, why do we not explain it according to everybody? As my teacher said, they disagree when it was indeterminate. Where do we hold? If each one of them said, because of my honor, everybody agrees that he is forbidden. If one of them said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor, everybody agrees he is permitted. Rebbi Hila said, is it the way of people to say χαρίζεσθαι βίᾳ?
Who is the Tanna of “the gain should be given to the sacred fund”? Rebbi Meïr! For Rebbi Meïr said, one commits sacrilege with prohibitions. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands? Let us hear from the following: “If he said, this loaf shall be dedicated, if he or another person ate it, they committed sacrilege; therefore, it can be redeemed. But if he said, it is for me [as if dedicated], if he ate it he committed sacrilege on goodwill but others would not commit sacrilege.” He said only, if he ate it. Therefore, to warm his hands is permitted. The students of Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: That is if he said I shall not eat it nor taste it; if he forbade only eating to himself. But the question was, if somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands?
Who is the Tanna of “the gain should be given to the sacred fund”? Rebbi Meïr! For Rebbi Meïr said, one commits sacrilege with prohibitions. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands? Let us hear from the following: “If he said, this loaf shall be dedicated, if he or another person ate it, they committed sacrilege; therefore, it can be redeemed. But if he said, it is for me [as if dedicated], if he ate it he committed sacrilege on goodwill but others would not commit sacrilege.” He said only, if he ate it. Therefore, to warm his hands is permitted. The students of Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: That is if he said I shall not eat it nor taste it; if he forbade only eating to himself. But the question was, if somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands?
So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?
“This one can come and eat, but Rebbi Yose forbids.” What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? Because his vow preceded his abandonment. Therefore, not if his abandonment preceded his vow. They asked before Rebbi Yose: What is the difference if his vow preceded his abandonment? He said to them, it did not occur to him to forbid what he abandoned. Rebbi Jonah said, so they asked before him: That means, not if it applies to a single person? But did we not state: “This one can come and eat, but Rebbi Yose forbids”? He said to them, it did not occur to him to forbid what he abandoned. Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Joṣadaq: If somebody abandons his field to ten persons he cannot retract. Rebbi Yose said, that follows Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana asked: When you said, “to three,” [did you not mean] “in the presence of three”? Instead of asking about Rebbi Meïr, ask about Rebbi Yose! When you said, “to ten,” [did you not mean] “in the presence of ten”? He said to him, if he abandoned it before two persons, he can retract and it remains subject to tithes. If he abandoned it before three persons, he cannot retract and it is free from tithes.
“This, your house,” because of what do you catch him? Because of “your house,” “this”? If it collapsed and he himself rebuilt it, is it not “this”? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody said to his heirs, give a wedding house to my son or a widow’s house to my daughter, if it collapsed, the heirs are required to rebuild it.” There, we have stated: “If somebody says to his son, ‘a qônām that you can not enjoy anything from me,’ if he dies, [the son] inherits. ‘During my lifetime and after my death,’ if he dies, [the son] does not inherit.” [Did we not state, ‘during my lifetime’, [the son] inherits; ‘after my death’, [the son] inherits?] What is the difference between the one who says it one by one and the one who says it by twos? Rav Jeremiah and Rebbi Yose [ben Ḥanina] both say, ‘a qônām that I cannot enjoy these my properties during my lifetime and after my death,’ from the moment he said “these” he forbade to him during his lifetime and after his death. Rebbi Yose said, we have stated in Nedarim what we did not state in S̄ebuot: “A qônām that I shall not enter your house, or that I shall not buy your field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is permitted. That I shall not enter this house, or that I shall not buy this field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is forbidden.” Because he said “this”. Therefore, if he had not said “this”, he would have forbidden to him both during his lifetime and after his death.
“He is permitted fish cake”; therefore not if it is not ground. Rebbi Jeremiah said, Ze‘ira asked: Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan who said, in matters of vows one follows common usage It is not the way of people that if a man says to his neighbor, sell me a fish, that he should sell him a sardine. Rebbi Abin understood it from the last clause, “if somebody vows not to eat fish cake he is permitted fish fluid and brine,” therefore not if it is not ground? Rebbi [Jeremiah] said, Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan who said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. It is not the way of people that if a man says to his neighbor, sell me a טְרִי, that he sells him a צַחְנָא. There, they call צַחְנָה טְרִית.
“He is permitted fish cake”; therefore not if it is not ground. Rebbi Jeremiah said, Ze‘ira asked: Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan who said, in matters of vows one follows common usage It is not the way of people that if a man says to his neighbor, sell me a fish, that he should sell him a sardine. Rebbi Abin understood it from the last clause, “if somebody vows not to eat fish cake he is permitted fish fluid and brine,” therefore not if it is not ground? Rebbi [Jeremiah] said, Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan who said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. It is not the way of people that if a man says to his neighbor, sell me a טְרִי, that he sells him a צַחְנָא. There, they call צַחְנָה טְרִית.
If somebody makes a vow to abstain from vegetables, would he be permited dried ones? Let us hear from the following: “He is forbidden fresh Egyptian beans and permitted dried ones.” He mentioned only Egyptian beans, a kind which has a threshing floor. Therefore, anything which has no threshing floor is forbidden even if dried. If somebody makes a vow to abstain from bulbous plants he is forbidden green melon, squash, water melon, sweet melon and all tree fruits. If somebody makes a vow to abstain from sheep meat, he is permitted lambs, pidgeon chicks, and milk. But if he said, which grew this year, he is forbidden all of these. If somebody makes a vow to abstain from cider, he is forbidden everything sweet and permitted wine. That is, following those who say that vows are interpreted in the vernacular. But following those who say, vows are interpreted in biblical Hebrew, the Torah used “cider” as an expression for wine; “your cider”, that is wine.
He who makes a vow not to use bread or produce is forbidden them, the words of Rebbi Meїr. Therefore, is he who makes a vow not to use bread or produce forbidden everything according to the rabbis? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, so is the Mishnah: “He who makes a vow not to use flour is only forbidden these.” How do we hold? If he uses “bread” in the biblical sense, then also if he says “produce” it is meant in the biblical sense. He should be forbidden everything since it is written (Deut. 22:9): “The produce of the vineyard.” If he simply says “bread”; only from wheat or barley is it simply called “bread”. Rebbi Yose said, I confirmed it, at a place where one eats bread from all [kinds], only from the five kinds it is simply called “bread”.
There, we have stated: “Until the beginning of Adar, until the beginning of the First Adar. Until the end of Adar, until the end of the First Adar.” Does this imply that Nisan is the beginning of the year as far as vows are concerned? Tishre is the beginning of the year as far as vows are concerned. That you should not say, the beginning of Adar should compensate for Ellul and he would be permitted in Ellul; therefore, it was necessary to say that “he is forbidden it and its intercalary [month]”.
HALAKHAH: Does this imply that Nisan is the beginning of the year as far as vows are concerned? Tishre is is the beginning of the year as far as vows are concerned. That you should not say, the beginning of Adar should compensate for Ellul and he would be permitted in Ellul; therefore, it was necessary to say that “he is forbidden it and its intercalary [month]”.
There, we have stated: “One dissolves vows on the Sabbath.” It was stated: Both vows that intrude on the Sabbath and vows that do not intrude on the Sabbath. “And one asks about vows that intrude on the Sabbath,” therefore not if there is no need for the Sabbath. The Elder can dissolve the next day. Then for Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon who say that the dissolution of vows is from time to time, he should not dissolve even vows that intrude on the Sabbath! Explain it according to everybody, if she made the vow at the start of Friday night.
They asked before Rebbi Zeїra: a Cohen to an Israel, Rebbi forbids. What does Rebbi Yose say? Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa said, so he responded to them: In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina, why is a Cohen to an Israel forbidden, not because it looks badly? Also Rebbi Joḥanan holds that from an Israel to an Israel it is forbidden because it looks badly. In addition, because of the following, as it was stated: “Cohanim and Levites who help at the threshing floor have no right either to heave or to tithe, and if the farmer gave, it is desecrated, as it is said (Lev. 22:15): ‘They should not desecrate the sanctified things of the Children of Israel,’ but they desecrate them! In addition, they said that their heave is no heave, their tithes are no tithes, their dedications are no dedications, and about them the verse says (Micha 3:11): ‘Their heads judge for bribes, [their priests are for hire].’ The Omnipresent brings over them three catastrophies; that is what is written (Micha 3:12): ‘Therefore, because of you Zion will be ploughed over as a field, Jerusalem will be desolate, and the Temple Mount a wooded hill.’
“Rebbi Aqiba said, he has to dissolve.” Rebbi Abba said, if she forbids the yields of her work, [vowing] not to work, he can force her up to the weight of five tetradrachmas. More than that he cannot force, for he has to be afraid that she may work more and it turns out that she profits from what is forbidden. Therefore, Rebbi Aqiba says, he has to dissolve his part. Rebbi Hila said, it is impossible for her to make exactly the weight of five tetradrachmas. He could force her up to the weight of five tetradrachmas; more that that he cannot force. He has to be afraid that she might be over the limit by a minute amount; then he would profit from what is forbidden. Therefore ….
“Rebbi Aqiba said, he has to dissolve.” Rebbi Abba said, if she forbids the yields of her work, [vowing] not to work, he can force her up to the weight of five tetradrachmas. More than that he cannot force, for he has to be afraid that she may work more and it turns out that she profits from what is forbidden. Therefore, Rebbi Aqiba says, he has to dissolve his part. Rebbi Hila said, it is impossible for her to make exactly the weight of five tetradrachmas. He could force her up to the weight of five tetradrachmas; more that that he cannot force. He has to be afraid that she might be over the limit by a minute amount; then he would profit from what is forbidden. Therefore ….
There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ at the end. Rebbi Simeon says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ for every item.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, [Rebbi Simeon implies] if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the baraita supports the colleagues: “A woman made a vow as nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I;’ if the first’s husband heard and told her, ‘it is permitted to you,’ the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. Rebbi Simeon says, if she said, my intention was only to be like her, in her state, the second also is permitted.” Because she said “to be like her, in her state;” therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state,” the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where there was no original nezirut, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? When Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest, if he attaches: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.
Rav Ḥisda said, a nazir’s leftover bread shall be left to decay. Rebbi Yose said, that is correct. You cannot sacrifice it by itself since (reparation sacrifices) cannot be brought alone. You cannot sacrifice it together with another nazir’s since no nazir sacrifices without bread. Therefore, it was necessary to say that a nazir’s leftover bread shall be left to decay. They wanted to say, the same rule applies to his leftover bread as to his leftover wine offering. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, his leftover wine offering is most holy; it should be given to donation accounts. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, Samuel, Rav Ḥisda, and Rebbi Eleazar, all three said the same. Rav Ḥisda, as quoted here. Samuel, as Rebbi Yasa said, when I still was there, I heard the voice of Rav Jehudah asking our teacher Samuel: If he designated his sheqel and died? He said, it should be given as donation. The leftover of his tenth of an epha: Rebbi Joḥanan said, he should bring it to the Dead Sea; Rebbi Eleazar said, it should be given as donation.
HALAKHAH: “If one of the bloods was sprinkled for her,” etc. He dissolves for her because of her hair. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It is a decision of Scripture: “He dissolved her vows,” he dissolves what is on her. Whenever he dissolves her vow, he dissolves what is on her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion, after she was transferred from the prohibition to the positive commandment. The rabbis say, “afterwards, the nazir shall drink wine,” after all these actions. Rebbi Simeon says, even after a single action. Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi (Bevai). “When has this been said? If she shaves in purity. But if she shaves in impurity, he may dissolve since he can say, I cannot stand an unseemly wife.” Therefore, shaving in purity does not make her unseemly. Who holds that shaving does not make unseemly? Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even Rebbi thinks so: “Rebbi says, he may dissolve even if she shaves [in purity], since he can say, I cannot stand a shorn wife.” Should he not say, I cannot stand an unseemly and shorn wife? Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi (Jehudah) said that only for the purification sacrifice, since a purification sacrifice would be invalid if not in her name. That means, as long as it is alive it is surrendered to Heaven only by slaughter.
“With his lips but not in his mind.” I could think that I exclude him who decides in his mind; the verse says (Lev. 5:4): “To articulate”. But Samuel said, he who decides in his mind is not obligated until he pronounces with his lips. But did we not state: “(Ex. 35:5) Everyone who volunteers in his mind,” that is he who decides in his mind. You say, that is he who decides in his mind, but maybe that is he who pronounces with his lips? When he says (Deut. 23:24): “What comes out from your lips you have to keep,” that speaks about him who pronounces with his lips. Therefore, how can I confirm “every one who volunteers in his mind?” That is he who decides in his mind. What Samuel said refers to a sacrifice.
HALAKHAH: “An unspecified nezirut is thirty days,” etc. It is written: “A shaving knife shall not pass over his head;” therefore, if it did pass, he is guilty. “His head’s hair grows wildly;” how much means growing hair? 30 days. {That refers to an impure nazir. A pure nazir? “He has to shave his head on the day be becomes pure.” Why does the verse say: “On the seventh day he shall shave all his hair”? That shows that he shaves a second time.} “He shaves,” all, not in part. From here that if he left two hairs, he [did] nothing. “A shaving knife shall not pass over his head.” Not only a shaving knife, from where to treat a cropper and scissors like a shaving knife? The verse says, “shall not pass over his head.” That means not only a shaving knife; all methods of removal are understood. From here that he starts again only for a [shaving knife].
There, we have stated: “Three categories of people shave and their shaving is a commandment: the nazir, the sufferer from skin disease, and the Levites. All these, if they shaved not with a knife or left two hairs,did not do anything.” Rebbi Eleazar said: The Mishnah [speaks] about an impure nazir. But a pure nazir, once he shaved most of his head, even if not with a knife, has acquitted himself [of his obligation]. Rebbi Immi, following Rebbi Eleazar (ben Azariah), asked: The only place where a knife is mentioned is about a pure nazir: “A shaving knife shall not pass over his head until the days are fulfilled.” Therefore, after he fulfilled them he needs a knife! Perhaps it was said only about an impure nazir with regard to two hairs. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Do you remember when we were studying Nazir, we said that there was no difference between scissors and a knife, and Rebbi Eleazar said: The Mishnah [speaks] about an impure nazir! Why not about a pure nazir? The pure nazir shaves after the blood was sprinkled. When that was sanctified, his vow was completed. But it is as if fallen out.
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi in the name of Bar Pedaiah: All sources of flavor one in a hundred. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi in the name of Bar Pedaiah: All sources of flavor one in sixty. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said to Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Yasa disagrees with you and the Mishnah disagrees with both of you: “Anything which sours, flavors, or creates dema‘? If you say about 100 or 200, even if it does not sour, flavor, or create dema‘! Therefore, we hold even more. Rebbi Jeremiah said, explain it for meat in meat. Rebbi Yose said, meat in meat is the same as all other prohibitions since Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, one estimates as if they were onion or leeks.
What is decayed matter? Flesh of the corpse which was separated and fluid that coagulated. Therefore not when it is still mashed? Did not Rebbi Ḥanina say in the name of Rebbi: Fat from a corpse which was melted remains impure; if he cut it and then melted it, it is pure. Rebbi Yudan and Rebbi Yose, one says to exclude the fluid in the flesh; the other says that if it will fill the volume of an olive when congealed, it will be impure when still mashed.
Rebbi Mana understood it from the following: “They told him, if he wishes, he says that he did it intentionally.” What can he say for an assigned slave girl? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! He can tell him, I touched her but did not finish, or as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, I was forced to it by the spell she put on me. For a nazir what can you say? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated; forced, he is obligated! “Suddenly”, to include in error, “suddenly”, to include intentionally. “There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now. (“There was a condition in my mind that if I should become impure, my nezirut should burst away from me and a new nezirut would fall on me”; in any case he was not obligated to be a nazir until now.) What do you have in case of an oath? In error, he is obligated; intentionally, he is obligated! A condition may apply to words; there is no condition for oaths! It follows what Rebbi Abba said, Rav Jehudah: For error, its sacrifice, for intention, its sacrifice. But if he said, I thought that this was no oath, he is free. Therefore, all these subjects cannot be stated, but the following can be stated.
What is the status of his hair? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, his hair is forbidden; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his hair is permitted. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Do they disagree about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir or do they disagree about a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease? If you say that they disagree about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir, then for a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease everybody agrees that it is forbidden. If you say that they disagree about a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease, then for a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir everybody agrees that it is permitted. For Rebbi Jeremiah it was obvious that they disagreed about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir. Therefore, for a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease everybody agrees that it is permitted
The following is obvious: If he became impure and then was manumitted, he brings a sacrifice of impurity. When is that, if his master forced him or if his master did not force him? If you say that he forced him, how can be bring a sacrifice of impurity? If you say he did not force him, should he not count for his master as long as he still is in the latter’s power? Rebbi Yose said, we are dealing with the case that his master forced him. You should not say that because he was manumitted, the nezirut in impurity was lifted from him. Therefore, it was necessary to say that he counts nezirut in impurity.
It was stated: “Only a corpse creates a grave of the abyss.” Therefore, not a carcass. Would it not be a conclusion de minore ad majus? Since a corpse, which does not cause impurity of couch and seat, creates a grave of the abyss, should a carcasss which causes impurity of couch and seat not create a grave of the abyss? Why was it said that only a corpse creates a grave of the abyss? To exclude couch and seat.
HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”
Only if he says, it was written before me during the day and signed during the day; only if he says, it was written before me especially for her and signed expressly for her. It was asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does he have to know the names of the witnesses at the moment of their signing? He said to them, did the Gentiles Luciani sign it? And you say so? A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “All bills of divorce coming from overseas are valid even if their names sound Gentile since Jews outside the Land of Israel bear Gentile names.” He said only, outside the Land; therefore not in the Land of Israel. What about this? Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Issi: unless he writes, at a Jewish place. If there is no Jewish place, in the synagogue. If there is no synagogue, he assembles there ten people. Rebbi Abun said, it would be better to certify the signatures than to assemble there ten people. What about this? Even in a Jewish store.
Everybody agrees that if [the husband] comes and protests, his protest is invalid. That is, if he protested after she remarried. If he protested before she remarried and then she remarried? Let us hear from the following: It happened that somebody brought a bill of divorce before Rebbi Ismael. He asked him, from where are you? He answered, from Kefar Simai in the region of Acco. He said to him, then you have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence;” you do not need witnesses. After [that person] left, Rebbi Ilai said to him, my teacher, is not Kefar Simai in the Land of Israel, closer to Sepphoris than to Acco? He answered, since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands. What means “since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands”? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that if [the husband] came and protested, his protest would be invalid. But does a person who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel for delivery in the Land of Israel have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence”? Therefore, there cannot be any difference whether he protested after she remarried or before she remarried and then she remarried.
What is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being. Since a scroll is not food, so no food. What is the rabbis’ reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is detached, so everything detached. Are stalks of food in Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s opinion like food? Let us hear from the following: If he wrote it on a deer’s antlers, shaved it off, had it signed, and gave it to him, it is valid. Because he shaved it off before he had it signed. Therefore, not if he had it signed and afterwards shaved it off. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Miasha: Only if he wrote on the male horn. But if he wrote on the sheath it is as if separated and is valid. Rebbi Jonah asked: Is that the same for preparation of produce? If he desired that it should rain on an animal and [the rain] dropped from the animal on food. There, Rebbi Yose said “a scroll”, since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being; and here, does he say so? There is a difference since it is written, “any drinkable drink in any vessel shall be impure”. Then also if it rained into cisterns, ditches and caves? There is a difference here, for it is written: “a vessel”.
HALAKHAH: “If the minor received it and became an adult,” etc. There came a case before Rebbi Immi that a slave brought a bill of divorce; [he declared it] valid. Rebbi Abba said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that if a slave brought a bill of divorce, it would be invalid? Rebbi Assi said, if not for Rebbi Abba, we would have permitted a married woman! Even if you say that Rebbi Assi did not accept what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, did he not accept what the rabbis said? Let us hear from the following which Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave could accept a bill of manumission [for delivery] but he should not accept [a bill of divorce] as we do. They thought, he formulated “he should not accept,” therefore, if he transgressed and accepted, it would be valid. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Hoshaiah: It happened that she was a Cohen’s wife and they were not afraid of a hint of invalidity.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody is transporting a bill of divorce in the Land of Israel when he falls sick,” etc. Because he falls sick; therefore not if he did not fall sick.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate, but from his own he may separate.
If a convert died and Jews plundered his property, if there were slaves, either adult or underage, they gain their freedom. Abba Shaul said, the adults gain their freedom, the minors do not become free. Why? They are no longer property after their owner’s death. Then even adults? Rebbi Abba said, since adults are competent to acquire themselves, they gain their freedom. Minors, who are not competent to acquire for themselves, do not gain their freedom. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, practice follows Abba Shaul. The opinions of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi are contradictory. There, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi and Rebbi Yossi ben Shaul in the name of Rebbi said: A person who has given up hope to recover his slave is not entitled to enslave him. They said, what Rebbi Joshua said about enslaving, if he did not give, he did not give; perhaps practice would be to enslave him, therefore he has to write him a bill of manumission. And here, he says so! We heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi taught us that correctly, perhaps practice follows Abba Shaul. The slave girl of Rabba bar Zuṭra ran away and he gave up hope to recover her. He went to ask Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. They said, he is not entitled to enslave her. How is it to write her a bill of manumission? They said to him, if you wrote, you did the right thing. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose: A slave who married as a free person in the presence of his master gained his freedom. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and formulating: If somebody writes a document of preliminary marriage for his slave or a document of definitive marriage for his girl slave, Rebbi says, they acquired, but the Sages say, they did not acquire. The first Tanna follows Rebbi: he acquired.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody sells his slave to Gentiles,” etc. To a Gentile even in the Land. Who frees him? His original owner pays for him and the second frees him. “Or outside the Land,” even to a Jew. Let us say that if the second owner knew, both of them split the price; otherwise the first pays for him and the second frees him. “I X ben Y sold my slave Z to Antiochia”, he gains his freedom. But if he is in Lydda, he did not gain his freedom. It was stated: A slave goes outside the Land with his master. Therefore, if he sold him there, he is sold. If he came from outside the Land to the Land with the intention to return, one forces him to return. With the intention not to return, one does not force him to return. If he fled from outside the Land to the Land, he may return him. If he fled from the Land to outside the Land, Rebbi Joshia in the name of the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya said, it is permigtted. The great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is permitted. Rebbi Marinos, the son of the great Rebbi Hoshaia said, it is forbidden. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he is used to flee there. But he who says, it is forbidden, if he is not used to flee there. Rebbi Yose said, they do not disagree. He who says, it is permitted, if he can return him from there; but he who says, it is forbidden, if he cannot return him from there.
HALAKHAH: “For tort victims one estimates with best quality land,” etc. “By an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.” Rebbi Abba bar Pappaios said before Rebbi Yose, where do we hold? If to qualify as damages, is that not what we stated “his neighbor’s ox” but not the ox of Temple property? If for bodily damages, is that not what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: A private person can claim damages but not the Temple? But we must deal with one who said, I obligate myself to give 100 minas to the Temple, when his ox went and did damage. You should not say, [the Temple] is a creditor and should collect from average quality land. Therefore, it was necessary to say that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land, by an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.”
“His field”, except if it was mortgaged. “His vineyard”, except Temple property. Where do we hold? If somebody caused damage and then dedicated to the Temple, that is what we have stated: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas.” If somebody dedicated to the Temple and then caused damage, that is what we have stated: “ ‘His neighbor’s ox’ but not the ox of Temple property.” Rebbi Yudan said, explain it if an ox of Temple property grazed on a private field. Rebbi Mana told him, we require Temple real estate and you say “on a private field”? But we must hold about one who said: I am obligating myself for 100 minas to the Temple; then went and caused damage. You should not say that between damages and a loan given before witnesses damages are privileged, and here damages are privileged against the Temple; therefore it was necessary to say “his vineyard”, except Temple property.
“His field,” except movables. “His vineyard,” except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession. “ ‘His field,’ except movables.” About those who did not claim movables from the start. Is this different from what we stated: There is not only real estate; from where if he wanted to pay money? The verse says: “Money he shall return to its owner.” What did you mean to say that real estate is primary? Or should we say that money is primary? Then it should be irrevocably given to [the claimant] from the start! Do we not see rabbis who irrevocably give him real estate! “ ‘His vineyard,’ except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Nisa: If his father dug a cistern which caused injury during his father’s lifetime. Property fell to him after his father’s death. I might say that this property should be encumbered for that damage; therefore, it was necessary to say “his vineyard” to except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.
HALAKHAH: “There was no law of siqariqon in Judea” etc. In earlier times they decided on a persecution in Judea because they had a tradition from their forefathers that Jehudah had killed Esaw, as it is written: “Your hand is on your enemies’ neck.” They went and enslaved them, took their fields and sold them to third parties. The original owners could come and repossess; therefore the land was left absolutely in the hand of the siqariqon since they refrained from buying. “They decreed that the law of siqariqon should not apply in Jehudah. When was this said? About war killings before the war. But about anybody killed in and after the war, the notion of siqariqon does not apply.” But are those killed before the war not like those killed after the war? Explain it that a siqariqon came and robbed and suppressed; there was no time left to write the sales contract before murder engulfed the entire world, that practice should not be partial.
MISHNAH: Somebody who says, accept this bill of divorce for my wife, or bring this bill of divorce to my wife, may retract if he wants to retract. If a woman said, accept the bill of divorce for me, he cannot retract even if he wants to retract. Therefore, if the husband said, it is not possible for me that you accept for her but bring and deliver it to her, he may retract if he wants to retract. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, even if she says, take my the bill of divorce for me, he cannot retract even if he wants to retract.
MISHNAH: A woman who said, accept my bill of divorce for me, needs two groups of witnesses; two who say that she appointed in their presence and two who say that in their presence he received it and tore it up, even if the first ones are the latter ones, or one of the first together with one of the latter and a third person is associated with them. A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah says, no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce. Any female who cannot take care of her bill of divorce cannot be divorced. If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand. Therefore, if the husband wants to retract he can retract since an underage person cannot appoint an agent. But if her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.
MISHNAH: If one said to two persons, give a bill of divorce to my wife, or to three persons, write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife, they should write and deliver. If he said to three persons, deliver a bill of divorce to my wife, they shall ask others to write since he appointed them as a court, the words of Rebbi Meïr. This instructions for practice did Ḥananiah from Ono send from jail: I know from tradition that if someone said to three persons, deliver a bill of divorce to my wife, they shall ask others to write since he appointed them as a court. Rebbi Yose said, we told the messenger that we also know from tradition that even if he said to the Supreme Court in Jerusalem, deliver a bill of divorce to my wife, they shall learn, write, and deliver. If he said to ten persons, write a bill of divorce for my wife, one writes and two sign. All of you shall write, one writes and all sign. Therefore, if one of them died, the bill of divorce would be void.
“If somebody said to ten persons, ‘bring this bill of divorce’, one transports in the name of all of them. ‘All of you shall bring’, they all transport and one delivers in the name of all of them; therefore, if one of them died, the bill of divorce becomes invalid.” Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Eleazar from Rome: The one who awards it like one who says “all of you”.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody married his sister-in-law,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” Therefore she must leave.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man may send away his wife with an old bill of divorce,” they say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man shall not divorce his wife unless he found in her a matter of immorality,” thy say that she is dirty in his eyes and he is not suspected of having relations with her, therefore she does not need a second bill of divorce from him.. Since the House of Hillel say, “even if she spoiled his food”, they say that she is not dirty in his eyes, he is suspected of having relations with her, and she needs a second bill of divorce from him’.
The condition of validity is stated here and was stated there. It was necessary to state it there. If it had been stated here but not there, we would have said that here it is invalid because of the restrictions connected with adultery but there, since no restrictions connected with adultery are involved, it would be valid. Or if it had been stated there but not here, we would have said that there it is invalid since one comes to collect money based on that document but here, where one does not collect money, it would be valid. Therefore, it was necessary both to state it here and to state it there.
After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.
Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥa in the name of Rav: This is Rebbi Meїr’s. Why did you have to say this? Rebbi Mana said, since Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: “This entire Chapter is Rebbi Meїr’s except for ‘if he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city.’ ” You should not come to say that the first is Rebbi Meїr’s, the second the rabbis’. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s. Rebbi Yose said, since Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar, that you should not be led to say the same here. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s.
Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna, Rav Ada bar Aḥa in the name of Rav: This is Rebbi Meїr’s. Why did you have to say this? Rebbi Mana said, since Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: “This entire Chapter is Rebbi Meїr’s except for ‘if he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city.’ ” You should not come to say that the first is Rebbi Meїr’s, the second the rabbis’. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s. Rebbi Yose said, since Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar, that you should not be led to say the same here. Therefore it is necessary to say that this is Rebbi Meїr’s.
MISHNAH: If two men sent two identical bills of divorce which became mixed up, one delivers both to both women. Therefore, if one of them was lost, the second became unusable.
Rebbi Abin said that Ḥisqiah stated: “After he acquires,” which means that she is acquired by money. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the Hebrew slave girl, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by money, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, should be acquired by money? This is proved by the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money but is acquired by intercourse. Therefore you would not be astonished if this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, might not be acquired by money. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money.
By a document. Since money which does not send out permits to enter, would it not be logical that a document which sends out should permit to enter? No. If you speak about money which eliminates dedication through redemption, what can you say about a document which does not eliminate dedication through redemption? The argument de minore ad majus is broken and you have to return to Scripture. Therefore, it was necessary to say: “He shall write her a bill of divorce, hand it to her, and send her out of his house. If she left his house and went to be another man’s.” It brackets her being with her leaving. Since her leaving was by a document, so her being is by a document.
If he wrote it on material forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi Ḥanin stated: A case came before Rebbi who said, she is divorced. Rebbi Eleazar said, she is not divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the rabbis disagree: For him who said, she is not preliminary married, she is not divorced. For him who said, she is preliminary married, she is divorced. The colleagues say, for restrictions. Rebbi Yose asked, what means “for restrictions”? She is not preliminarily married but divorced, is this “for restrictions”? Or she is not divorced but preliminarily married, is this “for restrictions”? What about it? The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: He who says that she is divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by their words. But he who says that she is not divorced, involving material forbidden for usufruct by words of the Torah. Therefore, by material forbidden for usufruct by their words she is preliminarily married. If you say so, does this not disagree with Rav? For Rav said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: A person who uses leavened material for preliminary marriage after noontime did not do anything. Is leavened material of any use after noontime? There, he used the material for preliminary marriage, but here he effected the preliminary marriage by the [written] conditions. But then she should be preliminarily married even with material forbidden for usufruct by the Torah! What is the difference between this and a document not worth a peruṭah? There, it cannot be used as filler. But here, it can be used as filler.
“She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce,” as it is written: “He shall write her a bill of divorce.” “Or the husband’s death,” as it is written: “Or if the latter husband dies.” So far, if the latter one dies, [what about] the death of the former? Since the latter’s death releases her, even though his death does not cause a complete release, it is only logical that the former’s death should release her since his death will cause a complete release. Rebbi Ḥuna said, the verse implies that death releases, as it is written: “If brothers live together and one of them dies childless, etc.” Therefore, if he had a child, death releases. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if you would say that death does not release, how could we find a widow for a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah for a common priest? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, explain it for a sister-in-law.
Can she regain her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years]? What is the problem? Following Rebbi Aqiba? But Rebbi Aqiba said that the verse speaks about a woman half slave and half free engaged to be married by a free man. Therefore, his problem is following Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael said that the verse speaks about a Canaanite slave girl married to a Hebrew slave, since this is marriage sanctioned by the Torah: “If his master give him a wife.” But his problem is whether she regains her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years] for him who says that the Hebrew slave does not serve the heir.
“By a document.” Rebbi Abbahu said, by a money document; therefore not by a gift document, since maybe he would renege. But then, could he not renege even with a money document? He said to him, maybe there comes a year of famine and his master reneges.
“She leaves gratis,” these are the days of adulthood; “without money,” these are the indicators [of adolescence.] Could He not have mentioned only one of them? If only one of them were mentioned, would I not have said that if she leaves with indicators [of adolescence], then certainly in the days of adulthood? But in that case I would have said that they are identical with the days of adulthood. Would this not be logical? She is emancipated from the power of the father and she is emancipated from the power of the master; since she is emancipated from the power of the father by some indicators [of adulthood], she is emancipated from the power of the master by the same indicators. Therefore, it was necessary to say, “she leaves gratis,” these are the days of adulthood, “without money,” these are the indicators [of adolescence.] Or maybe the other way around? Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: “Without money.” At a place where there is money for the father, there is no money for the master.
Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi Abun preached: The earlobe was pierced, lest a Cohen become disqualified. Rebbi Meïr says, he was pierced at his cartilage. Therefore, Rebbi Meïr says that a Cohen cannot be pierced lest he become blemished and be disqualified for service. Could not the cartilage be pierced less than the size of a vetch seed? Maybe it would result in the size of a vetch seed. Let it be the size of a vetch! The Torah said, “he shall return to his inheritance,” as he was. He cannot be pierced unless he had a wife and children. “By an awl”. Not only an awl, from where even a buck-thorn, even a thorn, even glass? The verse says, “he pierces”. This follows Rebbi Aqiba.
It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, why at the door? Because by the door they went from servitude to freedom. The students asked Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai: Why should the slave be pierced in his ear rather than in any of his other body parts? He said to them, the ear which heard at Mount Sinai: “You shall have no other powers besides Me,” and removed from himself the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven but accepted the yoke of flesh and blood; the ear which heard before Mount Sinai: “For the Children of Israel are My servants,” and went and acquired another master; therefore the ear should come and be pierced for he did not follow what his ear heard.
“By money.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, from another person to his master, therefore not from his master to another person. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even from his master to another person. What brings this? From his master to himself. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: “Here you have money that your field shall be unencumbered.” He answered, it is unencumbered. “That it be ownerless”? He answered, it is not ownerless. What is the difference between the cases? Here he advantaged a thinking person, there he did not advantage any thinking person. Think of it, if he was deaf-mute? He said to him, “a man.” Think of it, if he was underage? He said to him, one usually grows up. Rebbi Jonah said, Rebbi Ze‘ira follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr: Even with a contract through others, not by himself. Does not his master deliver a document to others that his slave regain his freedom? Here also, his master gives money to others that his field become ownerless.
Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Can movables be taken into possession by dragging? Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, what is his problem? With hard hides. But soft hides are not taken into posession until lifted. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: If somebody steals another person’s pouch and removes it on the Sabbath, he is obligated since he already is obligated for the theft of the wallet before he comes in conflict with the holiness of the Sabbath. But if he was dragging it until he left, he is free since the obligations of capital crime and restitution fall on him simultaneously. Therefore, if the obligations of capital crime and restitution do not fall on him simultaneously he is obligated. Rebbi Mattania said, explain it with large pouches which usually are dragged.
“A promise to Heaven is like delivery to an individual.” How? If he bought a cow from the Temple for 200. If he did not have occasion to pay the 200 until the going rate was a mina, he has to pay 200. That means, a promise to Heaven is like delivery to an individual. A cow from the Temple for a mina. If he did not have occasion to pay the mina until the going rate was 200, he has to pay 200. That is what is written: “He has to add a fifth of its estimated value, then it is delivered to him.” Therefore, if he adds, it is delivered to him; if he does not add, it is not delivered to him. “ ‘This steer as elevation offering, or this house as a qorbān,’ they are in the Temple’s possession wherever they are, for it is written: “The Eternal’s are the earth and what fills it,” etc. But among private persons one obtains possession only be taking hold.”
HALAKHAH: “Everybody who keeps one commandment they treat well,” etc. “Therefore anybody who is passive and refrains from sinning they reward like one who fulfills a commandment,” and you say so? But we hold with one who is 50–50. If he keeps one commandment, they treat him well and prolong his life; he will inherit the Land. But if he commits one sin, they do not treat him well, do not prolong his life, and he does not inherit the Land. There, we have stated: “Therefore anybody who is passive and refrains from sinning they reward like one who fulfills a commandement.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one who had occasion to commit a possible sin and did not act. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one who chose one commandment which he never violated in his lifetime. What kind? Mar Uqban said, for example the honor of father and mother. Rebbi Mana said, “Happy are those on a straight path, who walk in the Eternal’s Torah,” as if they did walk in the Eternal’s Torah. Rebbi Abun said, “Also they did no evil, in His path they went,” as if they went in His path. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, what is written? “ Happy the man who did not walk in the council of the wicked;” since he did not walk in the council of the wicked it is as if he walked in the council of the just.
HALAKHAH: “Everybody who keeps one commandment they treat well,” etc. “Therefore anybody who is passive and refrains from sinning they reward like one who fulfills a commandment,” and you say so? But we hold with one who is 50–50. If he keeps one commandment, they treat him well and prolong his life; he will inherit the Land. But if he commits one sin, they do not treat him well, do not prolong his life, and he does not inherit the Land. There, we have stated: “Therefore anybody who is passive and refrains from sinning they reward like one who fulfills a commandement.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one who had occasion to commit a possible sin and did not act. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one who chose one commandment which he never violated in his lifetime. What kind? Mar Uqban said, for example the honor of father and mother. Rebbi Mana said, “Happy are those on a straight path, who walk in the Eternal’s Torah,” as if they did walk in the Eternal’s Torah. Rebbi Abun said, “Also they did no evil, in His path they went,” as if they went in His path. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, what is written? “ Happy the man who did not walk in the council of the wicked;” since he did not walk in the council of the wicked it is as if he walked in the council of the just.
“If she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The Elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, it would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, because the Elder uproots the vow from its start. Why did they forbid a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. What is the reason of him who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children became bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
“If she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The Elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, it would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, because the Elder uproots the vow from its start. Why did they forbid a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. What is the reason of him who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children became bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody preliminarily marries two women with the value of a peruṭah,” etc. It was stated: “In all these cases, if they had intercourse they acquired. Rebbi Simeon [ben] Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon: In all these cases, if they had intercourse they did acquire since his intercourse was predicated on the preceding preliminary marriage.” What did they acquire? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They acquired for restrictions. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: With any condition which refers to a preceding action, she is preliminarily married for restrictions. Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: Who is the Tanna who stated: “Any condition which refers to a preceding action is invalid”? This does not follow Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She is preliminarily married for restrictions. How is that: “I am marrying you preliminarily by intercourse on condition that rains should fall.” If rain fell, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In matters of a preliminary marriage by a loan for restrictions, for real estate it was not acquired, for movables one does not deliver him to “Him Who exacted retribution.” If [the buyer] insists on the deal? Let us hear from the following: “You have wine to get from me, when he had no wine.” Therefore, if he had wine he would be obligated to deliver. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, if he has wine he is obligated to deliver. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac did (not) say there: You should know that Rebbi Ḥiyya instructed following Rebbi Joḥanan that a preliminary marriage by a loan is for restrictions. Rebbi Ze‘ira resented it. Why? Because they were restrictive in practice and he taught them leniency? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they were lenient in practice and he taught them to be restrictive, that if another man came and married her preliminarily, his marriage would hold. Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ḥanan said, if there is a doubt between adultery and no adultery, decide on no adultery.
They asked before Rebbi Zeïra: a Cohen to an Israel, Rebbi forbids. What does Rebbi Yose say? He did not respond. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa said, so he said to them: In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina, why is a Cohen to an Israel forbidden, not because it looks badly? Also Rebbi Joḥanan holds that from an Israel to an Israel it is forbidden because it looks badly. In addition, because of the following, as it was stated: “Cohanim and Levites who help at the threshing floor have no right either to heave or to tithe, and if the farmer gave, it is desecrated, as it is said (Lev. 22:15): ‘They should not desecrate the sanctified things of the Children of Israel,’ but they do desecrate them! In addition, they said that their heave is no heave, their tithes are no tithes, their dedications are no dedications, and about them the verse says (Micha 3:11): ‘Their heads judge for bribes, their priests instruct for hire, etc.’ The Omnipresent brings over them three catastrophes; that is what is written (Micha 3:12): ‘Therefore, because of you Zion will be ploughed over as a field, Jerusalem will be desolate, and the Temple Mount a wooded hill.’
Therefore, if the second died within thirty days or divorced her, the preliminary marriage of the first is activated after thirty days. If he died after thirty [days] without having divorced her, the preliminary marriage of the first is not activated. That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: With any condition which was fulfilled, even if later it becomes moot, she is preliminarily married. But with any condition which was not satisfied at the moment of preliminary marriage, even if later it became moot, she is not preliminarily married.
Samuel said, in our poverty, she needs a bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the Mishnah [said], “after your levir has given you ḥalîṣah”; but if he said, “after your levir has died,” she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: A one-day-old girl can be preliminarily married by money; a girl of three years and one day can be preliminarily married by intercourse.” Rebbi Mana said, the Mishnah implies this: “Similarly, if somebody say to another, if your wife have a daughter, she shall be preliminarily married to me, he did not say anything,” because she does not exist. Therefore, if she does exist, she is preliminarily married.
When Rebbi Ze‘ira immigrated here, he heard voices call “he-bastard, she-bastard”. He said, what is this? There goes that of Rav Huna, since Rav Huna said, no bastard lives more than thirty days. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said to him, I was with you when Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: No bastard lives more than thirty days, when? If he is not publicly known. Therefore, if he is publicly known, he lives.
“Desecrated priest.” Following “from the sons of Cohanim, the family Ḥavaya, the family Haqqoṣ . . . they tried to find their genealogical documents; but they were not found and they were freed from priesthood. And the tiršata told them.” Why was he called hattiršata? Because they permitted him to drink of the wine. Hatiršata, “I was the king’s cup bearer.” “That they should not eat from what was dedicated as holy.” Therefore, from outside holy food they might eat? Rebbi Yose said, great is the permanence of the status quo ante Since they were used to eat there, they may also eat here. One understands there, as it is written: “Put up signposts for yourself.” What can one say here? Following him who said, they accepted tithes voluntarily. “Until a priest will be appointed for urim and tummim.” But were there any urim and tummim then, in the Second Temple? But [he is] like a person who says until the dead will be resurrected, until David’s son will come.
Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said, one accepts proselytes from Kurds and Palmyrenians. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A Mishnah said that the proselytes from Palmyra are acceptable. There, we have stated: “All stains coming from Petra are pure.” Therefore, the proselytes from Palmyra are acceptable.
They asked Rebbi Eliezer, what is the status of the eleventh generation of a bastard? He said to them, bring to me a third generation and I shall declare him pure, for he would not live. Rebbi Eliezer parallels Rebbi Ḥanina? As Rebbi Ḥanina said, once every sixty to seventy years the Holy One, praise to Him, brings a plague into the world to eliminate the bastards and he takes the qualified ones with them in order not to publicize the sinners. This parallels what Rebbi Levi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “In the place where the ascent offering has its throat cut before the Eternal, the purification sacrifice has its throat cut,” in order not to publicize the sinners. “Also He is wise and brings evil;” could one better understand “also He is wise and brings good”? But to teach you that even the evil that the Holy One, praise to Him, brings to the world, He brings in wisdom. “His word He did not remove, He overcomes the house of evildoers and accomplices of workers of iniquity.” Rav Huna said, no bastard lives more than thirty days. When Rebbi Ze‘ira immigrated here, he heard voices call “he-bastard, she-bastard”. He said, what is this? There goes that of Rav Huna, since Rav Huna said, no bastard lives more than thirty days. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said to him, I was with you when Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: No bastard lives more than thirty days, when? If it is unknown. Therefore, if it is known, he lives.
New Paragraph. “If damage was caused the person responsible is obligated to pay for the damages,” etc. Rebbi Ḥanina said, “he who injures an animal has to pay for it,” he has to pay the diminution in value. Bar Pedaiah said, “if it was torn, he shall bring it up to the place of the carcass, for which he does not have to pay.” Rebbi Nasa said, the quote of Rebbi Ḥanina is needed and the quote of Bar Pedaiah is needed. If only the quote of Rebbi Ḥanina was given but not that of Bar Pedaiah, I would have said that if he made the damage possible he should not have to pay anything but for bodily damage he has to pay the diminution in value. Therefore, Bar Pedaiah’s quote is necessary. But if only the quote of Bar Pedaiah was given but not that of Rebbi Ḥanina, I would have said that if he made the damage possible he has to pay the diminution in value, but for bodily damage he has to pay the whole. Therefore, the quote of Rebbi Ḥanina is needed and the quote of Bar Pedaiah is needed.
New Paragraph. “If damage was caused the person responsible is obligated to pay for the damages,” etc. Rebbi Ḥanina said, “he who injures an animal has to pay for it,” he has to pay the diminution in value. Bar Pedaiah said, “if it was torn, he shall bring it up to the place of the carcass, for which he does not have to pay.” Rebbi Nasa said, the quote of Rebbi Ḥanina is needed and the quote of Bar Pedaiah is needed. If only the quote of Rebbi Ḥanina was given but not that of Bar Pedaiah, I would have said that if he made the damage possible he should not have to pay anything but for bodily damage he has to pay the diminution in value. Therefore, Bar Pedaiah’s quote is necessary. But if only the quote of Bar Pedaiah was given but not that of Rebbi Ḥanina, I would have said that if he made the damage possible he has to pay the diminution in value, but for bodily damage he has to pay the whole. Therefore, the quote of Rebbi Ḥanina is needed and the quote of Bar Pedaiah is needed.
HALAKHAH: “How does he pay for what it benefited from,” etc. Rav said, if it bent its neck and ate, he pays for what it damaged. But did we not state: “From the door of a store, he pays what it benefited from; inside the store he pays for what it damaged”? How is that? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it that a donkey carried lambs and when it passed by, they bent their necks and ate; from the door of a store, he pays what they benefited from; inside the store he pays for what they damaged. Rav said, if it ate barley, he pays for straw. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state and disagree? “Therefore, if it ate wheat which is bad for it, it is free. If it changed and ate, he pays full damages. What means ‘if it changed and ate, he pays full damages’? If somebody had his chest hanging on his back and a cow stretched out its neck and ate from it, [its owner] pays full damages. If a large container was at the entrance to a store, partially outside and partially inside; if a cow stretched its neck and ate from it, he pays full damages.”
HALAKHAH: “If his jar was broken in the public domain,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree at the moment of the accident. But after the accident everybody agrees that he must pay. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the disagreement is both at the moment of the accident and afterwards. Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Eleazar: If he does not have to pay at the moment of the accident, is it not an inference de minore ad majus afterwards? Why should he be free at the moment of the accident? For a person declares his damaged property in the public domain as ownerless. A baraita supports both of them, as it was stated: “The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah that somebody who puts down his stone or his load in the public domain does not have to pay if another person stumbled over it, for on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land.” Therefore, if Joshua had not distributed the Land on this condition, he would have to pay. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he intended use of the potsherds. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, if he intended to cause damage. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi La both say that Rebbi Jehudah agrees with the Sages that one has to pay if he declares his bull who gored in the public domain ownerless. Stationary damage cannot be compared to walking damage.
Rebbi Aḥa said, would that not be obvious from the reasoning of the rabbis? Is the rebellious son liable for double restitution for his first theft? Or since he is warned of a capital offense should he be freed? Let us hear from the following: If somebody steals another’s wallet and removes it on the Sabbath he is liable since he already is liable for the theft of the wallet before he comes in conflict with the holiness of the Sabbath. Is he not forewarned of a capital offense and you say, he is liable! Here also, even though he is forewarned of a capital offense, you say that he has to be liable. Rebbi Yannai bar Ismael said, Rebbi Hoshaia follows his own opinion, as we have stated: He who takes out is guilty even if he did not put down. Similarly, he who takes out is guilty even if he did not take up with the intent to take out, for warning is possible only at the moment of his taking out. It was stated: If he was dragging it until he left, he is free since the obligations of capital crime and restitution falls on him simultaneously. Therefore, if both obligations do not fall on him simultaneously, he is liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it with large pouches which usually are dragged; one cannot infer anything from this.
One objects from the Mishnah; sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Joḥanan, sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A person may eat once and be liable for four purification and one reparation sacrifices: An impure person who ate suet which was leftover sacrifice on the Day of Atonement. Rebbi Meïr said, if it was a Sabbath and he took it out on the Sabbath. They told him, it is not from that category.” When they objected in support of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he took it out on the Sabbath, there is no putting down. Why did they say, it is not from that category? When they objected in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Why is he not liable if he took it out on the Day of Atonement? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Meïr follows Rebbi Aqiba, as it was stated: From where that if one unintentionally worked on a Day of Atonement which fell on the Sabbath, he is liable for each one separately? The verse says, “it is Sabbath,” “it is the Day of Atonement.” Rebbi Ismael said, he is liable only once. If he took it out] on the Sabbath and put it down. Why did they say: “it is not from that category”? I would say in explanation that he ate it. Is eating not putting it down? Therefore, it is only reasonable that if he took it out on the Sabbath, he be liable. Then if he took it out [on the Day of Atonement why should he not be liable?
HALAKHAH: “A bull worth a mina” etc. “A bull worth a mina which gored a bull worth a mina; weakened (it) in the amount of 50 zuz; he takes the bull, for he gets only half the amount of the injury and therefore, if the bull died or was weakened, he only has that bull. A bull worth a mina which gored a bull worth 200 and weakened it in the amount of 50 zuz; then the second [bull] couter-attacked and injured it to the amount of three gold [denars]. The first pays half a gold denar to the second. A bull worth 200 which gored a bull worth 200. It increased in value and now is worth 400; but if it had not gored it, it would now be worth 800 zuz. If it improved before the trial it is judged as at the time of the damage. If it was weakened, it is judged as at the time of the trial.” Rebbi La said, so is the baraita: The agressor improved; if it improved before the trial it is judged as at the time of the damage; if it weakened, it is judged as at the time of the trial.