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The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:27

MISHNAH: Of three brothers, two are married to two sisters and one to an unrelated woman. If one of the sisters’ husbands divorced his wife, when the one married to an unrelated woman died and the divorcer married her and then died, that is what they said: Of all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or turned out to be she-rams, the co-wives are permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:27

MISHNAH: Of three brothers, two are married to two sisters and one to an unrelated woman. If one of the sisters’ husbands divorced his wife, when the one married to an unrelated woman died and the divorcer married her and then died, that is what they said: Of all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or turned out to be she-rams, the co-wives are permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:34

MISHNAH: Three brothers are married to three unrelated women. If one of them died, his second brother “bespeaks” her and then dies, these perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate, as it is said: “Her levir shall come to her,” if on her is the candidacy from one brother but not from two. Rebbi Simeon says, he takes in levirate the one he prefers and performs ḥalîṣah with the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:35

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers married to three women,” etc. Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. One understands that he has to perform ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” because the wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Why can the other one not be married in levirate? Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, of any one you cannot marry in levirate, you cannot marry the co-wife in levirate. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar formulated this, he formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “ A boy at least nine years and one day old who had intercourse with his sister-in-law and when he grew up he married another wife; if he never had intercourse with the first again after he became an adult, the second [wife] may perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis. Rebbi Abun bar Bisna in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, but only if first he married in levirate and then performed ḥalîṣah. But if he performed ḥalîṣah first, it is forbidden; perhaps “bespeaking” acquired and she was freed by her co-wife’s ḥalîṣah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:35

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers married to three women,” etc. Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. One understands that he has to perform ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” because the wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Why can the other one not be married in levirate? Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, of any one you cannot marry in levirate, you cannot marry the co-wife in levirate. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar formulated this, he formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “ A boy at least nine years and one day old who had intercourse with his sister-in-law and when he grew up he married another wife; if he never had intercourse with the first again after he became an adult, the second [wife] may perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis. Rebbi Abun bar Bisna in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, but only if first he married in levirate and then performed ḥalîṣah. But if he performed ḥalîṣah first, it is forbidden; perhaps “bespeaking” acquired and she was freed by her co-wife’s ḥalîṣah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:36

MISHNAH: Two brothers are married to two sisters. If one of them died and then the wife of the other died, she is eternally forbidden to him since she was forbidden one moment.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:36

MISHNAH: Two brothers are married to two sisters. If one of them died and then the wife of the other died, she is eternally forbidden to him since she was forbidden one moment.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:37

HALAKHAH: “Two brothers married to two sisters,” etc. Rebbi Avina said, that is what Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yose, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law does not compare with the prohibition of sisters who not are sisters-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:37

HALAKHAH: “Two brothers married to two sisters,” etc. Rebbi Avina said, that is what Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yose, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law does not compare with the prohibition of sisters who not are sisters-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:38

MISHNAH: If two men gave qiddushin to two women and when they entered the bridal chamber they switched each of them to the other, they are guilty of [adultery with] a married woman. If they were brothers, they also are guilty because of [the prohibition of] the brother’s wife. If they were sisters, they are guilty also because of [the prohibition of] “a woman in addition to her sister”. If they were menstruating, they are guilty also because of [the prohibition of] menstruating women. And all of these one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not able yet to have children one returns them at once. If they were from priestly families they are disabled for heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:38

MISHNAH: If two men gave qiddushin to two women and when they entered the bridal chamber they switched each of them to the other, they are guilty of [adultery with] a married woman. If they were brothers, they also are guilty because of [the prohibition of] the brother’s wife. If they were sisters, they are guilty also because of [the prohibition of] “a woman in addition to her sister”. If they were menstruating, they are guilty also because of [the prohibition of] menstruating women. And all of these one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not able yet to have children one returns them at once. If they were from priestly families they are disabled for heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:39

HALAKHAH: If he had intercourse with the second he is two times guilty, for the brother’s wife and for “a woman in addition to her sister”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:40

Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Sometimes four times, sometimes eight times, sometimes twelve times, sometimes sixteen times. They are guilty under the heading of adultery with a married woman, each couple for two. If they were brothers, under the heading of “brother’s wife”, each couple for four. If they were sisters, under the heading of “a wife together with her sister”, each couple six. If they were menstruating, under the heading of “menstruating”, each couple eight. If the men are minors and the women adults, they are free. If the men are adults and the women minors, they are obligated two by two because of menstruation. If their father married them off, for all eight. If one of the men was an adult and the other a minor, the one who had intercourse with the minor is guilty as wife of the adult but the one who had intercourse with the adult is free as wife of the minor.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:40

Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Sometimes four times, sometimes eight times, sometimes twelve times, sometimes sixteen times. They are guilty under the heading of adultery with a married woman, each couple for two. If they were brothers, under the heading of “brother’s wife”, each couple for four. If they were sisters, under the heading of “a wife together with her sister”, each couple six. If they were menstruating, under the heading of “menstruating”, each couple eight. If the men are minors and the women adults, they are free. If the men are adults and the women minors, they are obligated two by two because of menstruation. If their father married them off, for all eight. If one of the men was an adult and the other a minor, the one who had intercourse with the minor is guilty as wife of the adult but the one who had intercourse with the adult is free as wife of the minor.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 3:40

Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Sometimes four times, sometimes eight times, sometimes twelve times, sometimes sixteen times. They are guilty under the heading of adultery with a married woman, each couple for two. If they were brothers, under the heading of “brother’s wife”, each couple for four. If they were sisters, under the heading of “a wife together with her sister”, each couple six. If they were menstruating, under the heading of “menstruating”, each couple eight. If the men are minors and the women adults, they are free. If the men are adults and the women minors, they are obligated two by two because of menstruation. If their father married them off, for all eight. If one of the men was an adult and the other a minor, the one who had intercourse with the minor is guilty as wife of the adult but the one who had intercourse with the adult is free as wife of the minor.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:8

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yose said, in any case where the true fact can be ascertained, one does not have to bring a reparation offering because of doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them and the other is locked up.He says, since I could determine the true fact if I would find the key, does one have to bring a reparation offering in this case of doubt? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody marries his sister-in-law but she turned out to have been pregnant”, as long as it is not known whether the child lives or does not live, does he have to bring a reparation offering because of the doubt? This means that he does not bring.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:9

Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:10

How do we hold? If he came to her immediately after her husband’s death, and the fetus was recognized after two months, one should have stated: A nine-month child of either one of them or a seven-month of either one of them! But it may be that he came to her after two months and the fetus was recognized after three months, one should have stated: The sister-in-law should not perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate until after five months! But it must be that he came to her after 40 days and the fetus was recognized after 50 days. That would be complete months for [a child of] the first [brother] and incomplete ones for the second. This implies that a woman may give birth after full months. This implies that there are two creations. This implies that a woman may give birth after incomplete months. This implies that a woman may become pregnant repeatedly. This implies that a woman cannot become pregnant simultaneously from two men. And it disagrees with the sermonizing rabbis, since the sermonizing rabbis say “the middleman” “from the orders of the Philistines”, from 100 prepuces of Philistines, that 100 prepuces of Philistines touched her. Rebbi Mattaniah said, there is no disagreement. As long as the semen is not spoiled, a woman can become pregnant from several men simultaneously. After the semen is spoiled, a woman cannot become pregnant from several men simultaneously.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:10

How do we hold? If he came to her immediately after her husband’s death, and the fetus was recognized after two months, one should have stated: A nine-month child of either one of them or a seven-month of either one of them! But it may be that he came to her after two months and the fetus was recognized after three months, one should have stated: The sister-in-law should not perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate until after five months! But it must be that he came to her after 40 days and the fetus was recognized after 50 days. That would be complete months for [a child of] the first [brother] and incomplete ones for the second. This implies that a woman may give birth after full months. This implies that there are two creations. This implies that a woman may give birth after incomplete months. This implies that a woman may become pregnant repeatedly. This implies that a woman cannot become pregnant simultaneously from two men. And it disagrees with the sermonizing rabbis, since the sermonizing rabbis say “the middleman” “from the orders of the Philistines”, from 100 prepuces of Philistines, that 100 prepuces of Philistines touched her. Rebbi Mattaniah said, there is no disagreement. As long as the semen is not spoiled, a woman can become pregnant from several men simultaneously. After the semen is spoiled, a woman cannot become pregnant from several men simultaneously.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:10

How do we hold? If he came to her immediately after her husband’s death, and the fetus was recognized after two months, one should have stated: A nine-month child of either one of them or a seven-month of either one of them! But it may be that he came to her after two months and the fetus was recognized after three months, one should have stated: The sister-in-law should not perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate until after five months! But it must be that he came to her after 40 days and the fetus was recognized after 50 days. That would be complete months for [a child of] the first [brother] and incomplete ones for the second. This implies that a woman may give birth after full months. This implies that there are two creations. This implies that a woman may give birth after incomplete months. This implies that a woman may become pregnant repeatedly. This implies that a woman cannot become pregnant simultaneously from two men. And it disagrees with the sermonizing rabbis, since the sermonizing rabbis say “the middleman” “from the orders of the Philistines”, from 100 prepuces of Philistines, that 100 prepuces of Philistines touched her. Rebbi Mattaniah said, there is no disagreement. As long as the semen is not spoiled, a woman can become pregnant from several men simultaneously. After the semen is spoiled, a woman cannot become pregnant from several men simultaneously.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:10

How do we hold? If he came to her immediately after her husband’s death, and the fetus was recognized after two months, one should have stated: A nine-month child of either one of them or a seven-month of either one of them! But it may be that he came to her after two months and the fetus was recognized after three months, one should have stated: The sister-in-law should not perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate until after five months! But it must be that he came to her after 40 days and the fetus was recognized after 50 days. That would be complete months for [a child of] the first [brother] and incomplete ones for the second. This implies that a woman may give birth after full months. This implies that there are two creations. This implies that a woman may give birth after incomplete months. This implies that a woman may become pregnant repeatedly. This implies that a woman cannot become pregnant simultaneously from two men. And it disagrees with the sermonizing rabbis, since the sermonizing rabbis say “the middleman” “from the orders of the Philistines”, from 100 prepuces of Philistines, that 100 prepuces of Philistines touched her. Rebbi Mattaniah said, there is no disagreement. As long as the semen is not spoiled, a woman can become pregnant from several men simultaneously. After the semen is spoiled, a woman cannot become pregnant from several men simultaneously.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:11

From where the two creations? Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Huna: “He created”, a creation for seven and a creation for eight. If he was created for seven but born at eight, he lives; so much more if [born] by nine. If he was created for nine and born at eight, he does not live. If he was created for nine and born at seven? Come and see, if he does not live at eight, so much less at seven! They asked before Rebbi Abbahu. From where that a seven-month baby lives? he said to them, from yours I am giving to you: ζῇ τὰ ἑπτὰ, ζῇ τὰ ἑπτὰ.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:18

HALAKHAH: “If he married her, she is his wife in every respect”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” At the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:24

Rav Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: He who “bespeaks” his sister-in-law does not acquire his brother’s property. Even the House of Shammai agree to that; even Rebbi Simeon agrees to that, but not Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh. As Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh said, “bespeaking” acquires the sister-in-law totally. If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one and came to the other. As you take it, either by “bespeaking” he acquires or by intercourse he acquires. Rebbi Yose said, since he cannot keep either one, he did not acquire his brother’s property.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “No sister-in-law should be a party to ḥalîṣah,” etc. How long is it until a pregnancy is recognized? Symmachos said in the name of Rebbi Meїr: After three months. Even though it is no proof, there is a hint: “It was after about three months.” Rebbi Yudan said, even for a phantom pregnancy, “we were pregnant, we were sick, as if we gave birth to wind,” “get pregnant with dry grass, give birth to straw.” Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zuṭra said, Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya: Even most of the first, most of the last, and the middle one complete. Rav Assi said, a full 90 days. Samuel said, they in their fulness. A case came before the rabbis there; we do not know if thirteen of the first and seventeen of the last or seventeen of the first and thirteen of the last, and five complete ones in the middle; they wanted to touch the child because of a doubt of bastardy. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob told them, such a case came before Abba bar Abba and he declared it acceptable. Does Abba bar Abba disagree with his son Samuel? Rebbi Abba said, there is a difference between recognizing a pregnancy and giving birth. A pregnancy is recognized after full months, a birth can happen after fractional months. There, we have stated: “How long can labor be? Rebbi Meїr said, even 40 to 50 days. Rebbi Jehudah said, her month is sufficient. Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon say, no labor is longer than two weeks”. “Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after fractional months. Since otherwise one should have stated “thirty days”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba: This implies that a woman gives birth after full months. Since we have stated: “Her month is sufficient.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:42

The woman who performs ḥalîṣah counts from the moment of death. The one who leaves by a bill of divorce counts from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Ḥanina said, from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the moment of writing. Rav and Samuel, Rav like Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel like Rebbi Joḥanan. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you, since you say from the moment of delivery, about what are you suspicious? Because in the meantime she was alone with him! Then one should worry about an old bill of divorce! Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan: According to you, since you say from the moment of writing, if there were two bills of divorce, one written now and one later, and both delivered on the same day. This one you prohibit and that one you permit! What Rav objected to Samuel, Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan. What Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel objected to Rav. Practice: She counts from the time of writing if he never was alone with her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:44

MISHNAH: If four brothers were married to four women and died, if their oldest [brother] wants to marry all of them in levirate, he is permitted to do so. If somebody was married to two women and he died, intercourse or ḥalîṣah with one of them frees the co-wife. If one was acceptable and the other blemished, if he performs ḥalîṣah, he performs it with the blemished; if he takes in levirate, he takes the acceptable one.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:46

It is written: “ The ark of the Eternal dwelt in the house of Obed Edom for three months, and the Eternal blessed,” etc. By what did he bless him? With sons. That is what is written: “ All these were from the sons of Obed Edom, they, their sons and relatives, strong men for the service, sixty” etc., because each one of them gave birth to two every month. How was that? She was impure for seven days, pure for seven days, and gave birth, was impure for seven days, pure for seven days, and gave birth. Sixteen every month, in three months 48. And he, six. This makes 54 together. And those eight, sum total 62. That is what was written: “62 for Obed Edom”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:8

Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:8

Is there a possibility of a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” or of “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking” for Rabban Gamliel? What is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he gave a bill of divorce to the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees, anything “bespeaking” had acquired is subject to the bill of divorce; there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. If you say that a bill of divorce does not free, for anything “bespeaking” had acquired there is no bill of divorce; there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. What is “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”? If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one of them and gave her a bill of divorce; then he “bespoke” the second. If you say that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired, it is as if there were no “bespeaking” and there may be “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”. But if you say that a bill of divorce does not free more than he had acquired by “bespeaking”, there is “bespeaking” but no “bespeaking” after a bill of divorce for “bespeaking”.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:18

MISHNAH: If he performed ḥalîṣah, “bespoke” her, gave a bill of divorce, and cohabited, or cohabited, “bespoke”, gave a bill of divorce, and performed ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah. There is no difference between one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:20

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:21

MISHNAH: How? If he “bespoke” both of them, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah . If he “bespoke” one and copulated with the other, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah. If he “bespoke” one and gave a bill of divorce to the other, [the first one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he “bespoke” one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, the first one needs a bill of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:21

MISHNAH: How? If he “bespoke” both of them, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah . If he “bespoke” one and copulated with the other, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah. If he “bespoke” one and gave a bill of divorce to the other, [the first one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he “bespoke” one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, the first one needs a bill of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:24

MISHNAH: If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and copulated, or copulated with both of them, or copulated and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and performed ḥaliṣah, nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, whether there are two sisters-in-law and one levir or two levirs with one sister-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:24

MISHNAH: If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and copulated, or copulated with both of them, or copulated and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and performed ḥaliṣah, nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, whether there are two sisters-in-law and one levir or two levirs with one sister-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:23

Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, it is written: “Between their rows they make oil,” “they to not turn to the way of vineyards”, that their copulation was not for children. Rebbi Simon said, it is written: “They ate and were not satiated, they whored and did not spread,” that their copulation was not for children. It is written: “Lemekh took for himself two wives”, “Adah” who was beautifying her body. “Ṣillah”, who was sitting in the shadow of children.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:25

MISHNAH: A man should not rest from being fruitful and multiply unless he has children. The House of Shammai say two males, but the House of Hillel say a male and a female, as it is said “male and female He created them.” If he married a wife and she stayed with him for ten years and had no child he is not permitted to rest. If he divorced her, she is permitted to marry another and the second [husband] is permitted to stay with her for ten years, and if she had a miscarriage she counts from the moment of the miscarriage. The man is commanded to be fruitful and multiply but not the woman. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said, for both of them it says “God blessed them and God said to them, be fruitful and multiply,” etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:26

HALAKHAH: “A man should not rest from being fruitful and multiply,” etc. The House of Shammai say two males, since “Gershom and Eliezer” are mentioned for Moses. The House of Hillel say a male and a female the way the world was created, as it is said “male and female He created them.” Rebbi Abun said, one has to understand “even a male and a female”. If it were not so, it should have been a Mishnah about the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel. Sons of sons are counted as sons, sons of daughters are not counted as sons. The son’s son and the daughter’s daughter count; the son’s daughter and the daughter’s son do not count. A she-ram, a castrate, and those who cannot have children are not counted.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:30

Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Zimra: The reason of that Tanna: “Be fruitful and multiply, fill the earth and conquer it.” It is written “he shall conquer it.” Who usually conquers? The man, not the woman. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Isaac bar Marion, in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa and Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqula in the name of Rebbi Jehudah Neśia: If she requests to be married, she has the law on her side. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said to him, I was with you and it was only said that if she requests to be married, she has the law on her side. In a similar case, referring to what we have stated there: “In the week in which the Ninth of Av falls, it is forbidden to get a haircut and to wash. But on Thursday one is permitted, in preparation for the Sabbath.” Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Rebbi wanted to do away with the Ninth of Av but they did not let him. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, I was with you and it was only said that Rebbi wanted to do away with the Ninth of Av which happened to be on the Sabbath but they did not let him. He said, since it is pushed away, let it be pushed away. They said to him, it should be pushed to the next day. He recited on these: “Two are better than one.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:4

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:6

It was stated: If she brought them when they were small, she takes them when they are lads. If she brought him two vessels. If one of them was worth the value of her marriage contract, she takes it for her marriage contract. If one and a half was the value of her marriage contract, [disagreement of] Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman bar Jacob. One of them said, he pays for the second vessel and takes it; the other one says, she pays for the second vessel and takes it. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said before Rebbi Immi, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Even if one was worth one and a half times the value of her marriage contract, she pays for the second vessel and takes it, because it is unthinkable that others should use her vessels. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: A baraita says so: If she brought them for their monetary value, she takes them for their monetary value.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:14

“If there are males they enable to eat, females do not enable to eat.” If there are males, they enable to eat since there is one doubt, whether he is male or female. A doubt in biblical matters forces restriction. Females do not enable to eat since there are two doubts, whether he is male or female, (after she was betrothed or maybe before she was betrothed.) A doubt regarding their words forces leniency. However you take it, if he is male, everything is his. Female, she takes her part with them.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:15

MISHNAH: The fetus, the levir, the betrothal, the deaf-and-dumb, and the male nine years and one day old disable but do not enable to eat. If there was a doubt whether or not he had reached nine years and one dayt; whether or not he had grown two pubic hairs; when the house fell on him and his brother’s daughter and it is not known who of them died first, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:18

“Whether he had reached nine years and one day or not”, he is as if he were nine years and one day old to disable; “whether he had grown two pubic hairs or not”, he is as if he had grown two pubic hairs to make her eat.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:18

“Whether he had reached nine years and one day or not”, he is as if he were nine years and one day old to disable; “whether he had grown two pubic hairs or not”, he is as if he had grown two pubic hairs to make her eat.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:31

So is the Mishnah: “Not like my son the High Priest who disables me from heave.” A Cohen’s daughter was married to an Israel and had a daughter from him; an Israel’s daughter was married to a Cohen and had a son from him. The two married and had a son. The latter possibly is a High Priest serving on top of the altar. He enables his mother to eat and disables his mother’s mother. The latter says, not like my son the High Priest who disables me from heave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:12

“Circumcising he shall circumcise.” A decision for two circumcisions, one for the circumcision, the other for the uncovering. One for the uncovering, the other for the fibers. So far following Rebbi Aqiba who said, these are expressions of additions. From where for Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”? Rebbi Judah bar Pazi said, “then she said, a blood bridegroom for circumcisions,” from here that there are two circumcisions, one for the circumcision, the other for the uncovering; one for the uncovering, the other for the fibers. Rav said, “circumcising he shall circumcise,” from here that one has to draw a drop of covenant blood from one born circumcised. “Circumcising he shall circumcise,” from here that an uncircumcised Jew cannot circumcise until he circumcises himself; not to speak of an uncircumcised Gentile. Rebbi Levi said, it is written: “But you have to keep my covenant.” You and yours.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:12

“Circumcising he shall circumcise.” A decision for two circumcisions, one for the circumcision, the other for the uncovering. One for the uncovering, the other for the fibers. So far following Rebbi Aqiba who said, these are expressions of additions. From where for Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”? Rebbi Judah bar Pazi said, “then she said, a blood bridegroom for circumcisions,” from here that there are two circumcisions, one for the circumcision, the other for the uncovering; one for the uncovering, the other for the fibers. Rav said, “circumcising he shall circumcise,” from here that one has to draw a drop of covenant blood from one born circumcised. “Circumcising he shall circumcise,” from here that an uncircumcised Jew cannot circumcise until he circumcises himself; not to speak of an uncircumcised Gentile. Rebbi Levi said, it is written: “But you have to keep my covenant.” You and yours.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:19

“If he did not know her carnally after he was injured in his testicles or his penis was cut off, they may eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Eleazar’s and Rebbi Simeon’s. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion; there is a difference since he did not add an acquisition to disable. It turns out that this disagreement parallels the other disagreement, since they disagreed: A priestly woman waiting for her levir who became eligible to two priestly levirs. If one of them “bespoke” her but did not have occasion to bring her to the marriage chamber before he became injured in his testicles or his penis was damaged, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, since she is a candidate for disabling intercourse, she is disabled. Rebbi Joḥanan said, when he will copulate. If one of them was qualified but the other disqualified, even Rebbi Joḥanan agrees. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada asked before Rebbi Mana, if the qualified one “bespoke” her? He said to him, the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:36

Rebbi Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: The daughter of an Ammonite convert is enabled, the daughter of an Ammonite woman convert is disabled. Rebbi Joḥanan told him: Babylonian, you crossed three rivers on your way and got lost! But both the daughter of an Ammonite convert and the daughter of an Ammonite woman convert are enabled. Rebbi Yosa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The statement is needed only if her mother was from Israel. That you should not say, since her mother was desecrated, so the daughter is desecrated. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, she is enabled even for the High Priest. What is the reason? “In his peoples”. A people divided into two peoples, the males are forbidden but their females permitted. Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish did not say so, but the daughter of an Ammonite convert is disabled since she comes from a disabled drop. Rebbi Joḥanan said, we have stated thus: Of Gentiles married unconverted, the males are permanently forbidden but their females are immediately permitted. If they converted, the males are permanently forbidden but their females are permitted after three generations. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of [Rebbi] Aḥa: A baraita states this: From where can you say that if one of any of the families of the earth cohabited with a Canaanite woman and she gave birth to a son, that you may buy him as a slave? The verse says, “whom they will father in your land,” not from those who dwell in your land.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:42

Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not investigate a family in which a family disqualification has disappeared. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, a Mishnah says so: “There was a family in Bet Ṣerifa in Transjordan who was forcibly distanced by Ben Ṣion. Another [family] was there who was forcibly integrated by Ben Ṣion.” Nevertheless, the Sages did not want to make their names public. But the Sages transmit them to their sons and students two times in a Week. Rebbi Joḥanan said, by the Temple service, I know them and the leading personalities of the generation have disappeared in them. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, Pashḥur ben Immer the priest had 5000 slaves, and their traces have disappeared in the high priesthood. These are the insolent in the priesthood. Rebbi Eleazar said, their main training: “Your people is like quarrelsome priests.” Rebbi Abbahu said, Samaritans disappeared in thirteen villages in the times of persecution. They said, the village of Moshhan is one of them.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:52

Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, only from the place of masculinity. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: even from the female place. Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi retracted this, from the following verse: “And with a male you should not lie in the way of a woman’s beddings”, one who may lie in two ways, including the female. Who is that? That is the hermaphrodite. Rebbi said, I looked for but did not find words of Ben Shamua about the hermaphrodite, for the entire group ganged up on me. Why? Not to make it public or because he was not worth it? What difference does it make? He usually made public. If you say, it was not to make it public, the publicity is already in his hand. The reason must be that he was not worth it. What could he made public? He inherits, he testifies, his grain offering is burnt completely, one says grace with him as with a male.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:25

HALAKHAH: “A Cohen’s daughter married to an Israel,” etc. Rebbi Leontes asked before Rebbi Yose: One understands that a Cohen’s daughter who was married to an Israel returns to eat. But why does the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen not eat when she should be enabled to eat? He said to him, so said Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Anan in the name of Rav: What means “a Cohen’s daughter”, one who is trained by a Cohen. As you say, “Babylon’s ransacked daughter,” was she the daughter of Babylon? But she behaved in Babylon’s way. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: Two daughters are mentioned in the paragraph. One returns and eats, the other returns but does not eat. A Cohen’s daughter who was married to an Israel returns to eat. A daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen returns but does not eat. Say also, if she was married to a qualified person, she returns and eats, to a disqualified person she returns but does not eat. Rav said, practice is that she returns to eat heave but not to eat breast and foreleg. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she eats breast and foreleg. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated a support for Rav: “of food,” not all the food. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated a support for Rebbi Joḥanan: “of her father’s food she shall eat,” to include the loaves of the thanksgiving sacrifice and the cakes of the nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:19

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:19

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:19

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:19

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:19

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:19

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:19

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:19

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:20

A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:20

A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:20

A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:20

A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:20

A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:20

A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:21

A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:21

A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:21

A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:21

A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:22

If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:22

If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:22

If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:22

If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:22

If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:22

If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:27

How do you explain these? With one witness or with two witnesses? If you explain with one witness, then one witness would permit her to the levir. If you explain with two witnesses, then it disagrees with Rav since Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said in the name of Rav, if she was married by the testimony of two witnesses, even if he returns, she says to him, you are not him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:27

How do you explain these? With one witness or with two witnesses? If you explain with one witness, then one witness would permit her to the levir. If you explain with two witnesses, then it disagrees with Rav since Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said in the name of Rav, if she was married by the testimony of two witnesses, even if he returns, she says to him, you are not him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:27

How do you explain these? With one witness or with two witnesses? If you explain with one witness, then one witness would permit her to the levir. If you explain with two witnesses, then it disagrees with Rav since Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said in the name of Rav, if she was married by the testimony of two witnesses, even if he returns, she says to him, you are not him.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:33

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:43

“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of R. Joḥanan who will explain this for allotments it is understandable; since he acquires by allotment he makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:46

MISHNAH: If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after that his brother, who [also] was nine years and one day old, copulated with her, [the brother] disabled her for [the first levir]. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law, and after that he copulated with her co-wife, he disabled her for himself. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and died, she performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he married a woman and died, she is free. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Rebbi Simeon says, he takes in levirate the one he likes and performs ḥalîṣah with the other. It makes no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twenty years old, as long as he did not grow two pubic hairs.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:48

Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one dead [husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, “any one who cannot marry me in levirate, cannot marry my co-wife in levirate.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Eleazar formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:49

The following is obvious: If a person younger than twenty years of age developed two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively. Older than twenty years of age, he becomes a man from that point into the future. Where do they disagree? If he is twenty. Samuel said, he becomes a man retroactively. Rav said, he becomes a man from that point into the future. A baraita disagrees with both of them: The castrate cannot become a rebellious son since he has no pubic hair. Should one not warn him, maybe he will develop two pubic hairs within the next three months? Following him who says, one does not accept conditional warnings. Our Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: Does it make no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twelve years and one day old, if by then he did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively? Could you say: If he did grow two pubic hairs between the ages of nine years and one day until twelve years and one day, he becomes a man retroactively? Similarly, if he is older than twenty years of age and did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man from that point into the future. How does Samuel handle this? He explains it: soon after he turns twenty.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:49

The following is obvious: If a person younger than twenty years of age developed two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively. Older than twenty years of age, he becomes a man from that point into the future. Where do they disagree? If he is twenty. Samuel said, he becomes a man retroactively. Rav said, he becomes a man from that point into the future. A baraita disagrees with both of them: The castrate cannot become a rebellious son since he has no pubic hair. Should one not warn him, maybe he will develop two pubic hairs within the next three months? Following him who says, one does not accept conditional warnings. Our Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: Does it make no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twelve years and one day old, if by then he did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively? Could you say: If he did grow two pubic hairs between the ages of nine years and one day until twelve years and one day, he becomes a man retroactively? Similarly, if he is older than twenty years of age and did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man from that point into the future. How does Samuel handle this? He explains it: soon after he turns twenty.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:49

The following is obvious: If a person younger than twenty years of age developed two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively. Older than twenty years of age, he becomes a man from that point into the future. Where do they disagree? If he is twenty. Samuel said, he becomes a man retroactively. Rav said, he becomes a man from that point into the future. A baraita disagrees with both of them: The castrate cannot become a rebellious son since he has no pubic hair. Should one not warn him, maybe he will develop two pubic hairs within the next three months? Following him who says, one does not accept conditional warnings. Our Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: Does it make no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twelve years and one day old, if by then he did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively? Could you say: If he did grow two pubic hairs between the ages of nine years and one day until twelve years and one day, he becomes a man retroactively? Similarly, if he is older than twenty years of age and did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man from that point into the future. How does Samuel handle this? He explains it: soon after he turns twenty.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:49

The following is obvious: If a person younger than twenty years of age developed two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively. Older than twenty years of age, he becomes a man from that point into the future. Where do they disagree? If he is twenty. Samuel said, he becomes a man retroactively. Rav said, he becomes a man from that point into the future. A baraita disagrees with both of them: The castrate cannot become a rebellious son since he has no pubic hair. Should one not warn him, maybe he will develop two pubic hairs within the next three months? Following him who says, one does not accept conditional warnings. Our Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: Does it make no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twelve years and one day old, if by then he did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively? Could you say: If he did grow two pubic hairs between the ages of nine years and one day until twelve years and one day, he becomes a man retroactively? Similarly, if he is older than twenty years of age and did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man from that point into the future. How does Samuel handle this? He explains it: soon after he turns twenty.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:49

The following is obvious: If a person younger than twenty years of age developed two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively. Older than twenty years of age, he becomes a man from that point into the future. Where do they disagree? If he is twenty. Samuel said, he becomes a man retroactively. Rav said, he becomes a man from that point into the future. A baraita disagrees with both of them: The castrate cannot become a rebellious son since he has no pubic hair. Should one not warn him, maybe he will develop two pubic hairs within the next three months? Following him who says, one does not accept conditional warnings. Our Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: Does it make no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twelve years and one day old, if by then he did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively? Could you say: If he did grow two pubic hairs between the ages of nine years and one day until twelve years and one day, he becomes a man retroactively? Similarly, if he is older than twenty years of age and did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man from that point into the future. How does Samuel handle this? He explains it: soon after he turns twenty.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:4

There, we have stated: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” Rebbi Eleazar said, [Symmachos] and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be guilty because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees to the earlier [part of the Mishnah]. If was found stated, it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:4

There, we have stated: “If he slaughtered her, her daughter’s daughter, and afterwards her daughter, he absorbs forty [lashes]. Symmachos said in Rebbi Meïr’s name, he absorbs eighty.” Rebbi Eleazar said, [Symmachos] and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing, since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he who copulates with his mother-in-law may be guilty because of his mother-in-law, his mother-in-law’s mother and his father-in-law’s mother. They said to him, all three fall under the same law.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Symmachos agrees to the earlier [part of the Mishnah]. If was found stated, it still is in dispute. What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri’s reason? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under two separate prohibitions. What is the reason of the rabbis? Since a woman and her daughter and a woman and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition, also a woman and her son’s daughter and her daughter’s daughter fall under one and the same prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:11

Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah. If there are two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. What is the reason? “On human flesh it may not be rubbed and in its proportions you should not make [a compound] like it.” And it is written: “A man who would compound like it”. Here are two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation. The prohibitions divide the extirpation. This follows Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael said one infers from an argument de minore ad majus but one does not punish from an argument de minore ad majus. Where does he have that from? It comes following what Ḥizqiah stated: “If the daughter of a Cohen is desecrated by whoring.” Why does the verse say, “a man”? To include him who cohabits with his daughter’s daughter from a rape that she should be [under sentence of] burning. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one may even understand this from the warning: “Do not desecrate your daughter.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:11

Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah. If there are two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. What is the reason? “On human flesh it may not be rubbed and in its proportions you should not make [a compound] like it.” And it is written: “A man who would compound like it”. Here are two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation. The prohibitions divide the extirpation. This follows Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael said one infers from an argument de minore ad majus but one does not punish from an argument de minore ad majus. Where does he have that from? It comes following what Ḥizqiah stated: “If the daughter of a Cohen is desecrated by whoring.” Why does the verse say, “a man”? To include him who cohabits with his daughter’s daughter from a rape that she should be [under sentence of] burning. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one may even understand this from the warning: “Do not desecrate your daughter.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:30

May they bring one cereal offering together that would be totally burned? It was stated: They may bring one cereal offering conditionally that would be totally burned. May they bring two cereal offerings one of which should be burned totally and the other have a handful taken and the rest eaten? It was stated: They may bring two cereal offerings of one which is burned totally and of the other a handful is taken and the rest eaten. May they testify together that it should be counted as testimony of one witness? That would follow the rule of Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Assi: Since if they were to be found perjured they could not be executed, the murderer could not be executed. This applies here also.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:30

May they bring one cereal offering together that would be totally burned? It was stated: They may bring one cereal offering conditionally that would be totally burned. May they bring two cereal offerings one of which should be burned totally and the other have a handful taken and the rest eaten? It was stated: They may bring two cereal offerings of one which is burned totally and of the other a handful is taken and the rest eaten. May they testify together that it should be counted as testimony of one witness? That would follow the rule of Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Assi: Since if they were to be found perjured they could not be executed, the murderer could not be executed. This applies here also.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:5

There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is valid. Does he who says, ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid, and he who says, ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is valid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid? Even he who holds that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid will agree that in the presence of two men it is invalid since judgments in civil matters are valid from converts but invalid from two [judges].

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:5

There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is valid. Does he who says, ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid, and he who says, ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is valid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid? Even he who holds that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid will agree that in the presence of two men it is invalid since judgments in civil matters are valid from converts but invalid from two [judges].

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:5

There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is valid. Does he who says, ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid, and he who says, ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is valid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid? Even he who holds that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid will agree that in the presence of two men it is invalid since judgments in civil matters are valid from converts but invalid from two [judges].

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 12:5

There are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid; there are Tannaim who state that ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is valid. Does he who says, ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is invalid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is invalid, and he who says, ḥalîṣah in the presence of two men is valid, hold that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid? Even he who holds that ḥalîṣah in front of converts is valid will agree that in the presence of two men it is invalid since judgments in civil matters are valid from converts but invalid from two [judges].