vow
904 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: One may pluck green grasses until the colocynth dries up, and collect dry ones until the second rainfall, leaves of reeds and vines until they fall off from their stems, and collect dry ones until the second rainfall. But Rebbi Aqiba says, all until the second rainfall. Similarly, if one rents out a house until the rains, that is until the second rainfall. If somebody makes a vow not to have any profit from another person until the rains, that is until the second rainfall. Until when may the poor enter orchards? Until the second rainfall. Until when may one use and burn Sabbatical straw and chaff? Until the second rainfall.
Rebbi Abin said, only if the roof is at least four [cubits] square. Just as a house does not induce ṭevel unless it is at least four [cubits] square, so the roof does not exempt unless it is at least four [cubits] square, as it is stated: A house less than four [cubits] square is free from the obligations of mezuzah and the parapet, from the obligation of eruv, does not induce ṭevel, is not counted as a connection to a town; he who makes a vow not to be in a house may sit there; one does not give it four cubits before its entrance door; it does not remain with the buyer in the Jubilee; it cannot become impure by scale disease, and its owner does not return from the army because of it.
MISHNAH: If somebody eats the volume of an olive of maẓẓah from them on Passover, he did his duty, the volume of an olive of leavened [bread], he is subject to being cut off. If one of them is mixed with other kinds one transgresses on Passover. He who takes a vow not to use bread or produce is forbidden them, the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, he who takes a vow not to use flour is only forbidden these. They are subject to ḥallah and tithes.
MISHNAH: If somebody eats the volume of an olive of maẓẓah from them on Passover, he did his duty, the volume of an olive of leavened [bread], he is subject to being cut off. If one of them is mixed with other kinds one transgresses on Passover. He who takes a vow not to use bread or produce is forbidden them, the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, he who takes a vow not to use flour is only forbidden these. They are subject to ḥallah and tithes.
Therefore, is he who makes a vow not to use bread or produce forbidden everything according to the rabbis? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, so is the Mishnah: “He who makes a vow not to use flour is only forbidden these.” How do we hold? If he uses “bread” in the biblical sense then also if he says “produce” it is meant in the biblical sense. He should be forbidden everything since it is written (Deut. 22:9): “The produce of the vineyard.” If he simply says “bread”; only from wheat or barley is it simply called “bread”. Rebbi Yose said, I confirmed it, at a place where one eats bread from all [kinds], only from the five kinds it is simply called “bread”.
Therefore, is he who makes a vow not to use bread or produce forbidden everything according to the rabbis? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, so is the Mishnah: “He who makes a vow not to use flour is only forbidden these.” How do we hold? If he uses “bread” in the biblical sense then also if he says “produce” it is meant in the biblical sense. He should be forbidden everything since it is written (Deut. 22:9): “The produce of the vineyard.” If he simply says “bread”; only from wheat or barley is it simply called “bread”. Rebbi Yose said, I confirmed it, at a place where one eats bread from all [kinds], only from the five kinds it is simply called “bread”.
Mishnah: “If there is a doubt whether it is dark or not dark,” etc. It happened that Rebbi Eliezer was dying on a Friday when it got dark. His son Hyrcanus entered to remove his phylacteries. He told him, my son, you neglected the commandment of the light which is for the Sabbath and for which one incurs extirpation and you came to remove phylacteries which is only rabbinical and is only a [positive] commandment. He left crying and said, woe to me that my father has lost his mind. He told him, your mind is lost, my mind is not lost. When his students saw that he answered him wisely they entered to him and started asking him. He answered on the impure impure and the pure pure; at the end he said “pure” and his soul vanished. They said, it is clear that our teacher is pure. Rebbi Mana said, it still is clear. Rebbi Joshua entered, removed his phylacteries, was embracing him, and kissing him, and crying, and said, my teacher, my teacher, the vow has been dissolved; my teacher, chariot of Israel and its riders.
Paragraph. “One who vows not to eat food is permitted water and salt.” There, we have stated: “One who made a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food.” A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse states that “roasted” is called “cooked” as it is said: They cooked the Pesaḥ in fire. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, as is the rule. A Mishnah [states] that scalded is called cooked, and a verse that roasted is called cooked; but did we not state: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? If one said, a qonam that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Also Rebbi Joshia agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.
Paragraph. “One who vows not to eat food is permitted water and salt.” There, we have stated: “One who made a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food.” A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse states that “roasted” is called “cooked” as it is said: They cooked the Pesaḥ in fire. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, as is the rule. A Mishnah [states] that scalded is called cooked, and a verse that roasted is called cooked; but did we not state: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? If one said, a qonam that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Also Rebbi Joshia agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.
Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan ate bake-meats and said, I did not taste (anything) [food] on that day. But did we not state: “He who made a vow not to eat food is permitted water and salt”? Explain it following Rebbi Joshia, who said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. And from where that everything is called food? Rebbi Aḥa bar Ulla said: And tenfemale donkeys carrying grain, bread, and food. Why does the verse say, and food? From here that everything is called food.
If he forbade himself a loaf by a vow it may be used as eruv, if he dedicated it it may not be used as eruv. If he forbade himself a loaf by a vow it may be used as eruv, since another person may eat it. If he dedicated it it may not be used as eruv, since neither he nor another person may eat it. Rebbi Aḥa asked, may not a person ask about his dedication? Rebbi Aḥa said that Rebbi Miasha asked: There Rebbi Simeon said that Ḥiyya the son of Rav said, if one used idolatry to make a lath it permits the alley, and here you are saying so? Rebbi Eleazar said, there in any case the alley was closed; here what do you have?
If he forbade himself a loaf by a vow it may be used as eruv, if he dedicated it it may not be used as eruv. If he forbade himself a loaf by a vow it may be used as eruv, since another person may eat it. If he dedicated it it may not be used as eruv, since neither he nor another person may eat it. Rebbi Aḥa asked, may not a person ask about his dedication? Rebbi Aḥa said that Rebbi Miasha asked: There Rebbi Simeon said that Ḥiyya the son of Rav said, if one used idolatry to make a lath it permits the alley, and here you are saying so? Rebbi Eleazar said, there in any case the alley was closed; here what do you have?
If they were exiled from one place to another and wanted to change their ways? Would it be as Rebbi Abba said, the people of Mesha took it upon themselves not to travel on the ocean. They came, asked Rebbi, and said to him, our forefathers used not to travel by sea; what is our situation? He said to them, since your forefathers treated it as a prohibition, do not change the usage of your deceased ancestors. May a person not ask about his vow? There he asks when he made the vow, but here their ancestors made the vow. Then they should be permitted a fortiori. Rebbi Ḥanania said, it is not because of this but because of the following. Rebbi was the student of Rebbi Jehudah, and Rebbi Jehudah said, one is forbidden to travel by sea.
If they were exiled from one place to another and wanted to change their ways? Would it be as Rebbi Abba said, the people of Mesha took it upon themselves not to travel on the ocean. They came, asked Rebbi, and said to him, our forefathers used not to travel by sea; what is our situation? He said to them, since your forefathers treated it as a prohibition, do not change the usage of your deceased ancestors. May a person not ask about his vow? There he asks when he made the vow, but here their ancestors made the vow. Then they should be permitted a fortiori. Rebbi Ḥanania said, it is not because of this but because of the following. Rebbi was the student of Rebbi Jehudah, and Rebbi Jehudah said, one is forbidden to travel by sea.
If they were exiled from one place to another and wanted to change their ways? Would it be as Rebbi Abba said, the people of Mesha took it upon themselves not to travel on the ocean. They came, asked Rebbi, and said to him, our forefathers used not to travel by sea; what is our situation? He said to them, since your forefathers treated it as a prohibition, do not change the usage of your deceased ancestors. May a person not ask about his vow? There he asks when he made the vow, but here their ancestors made the vow. Then they should be permitted a fortiori. Rebbi Ḥanania said, it is not because of this but because of the following. Rebbi was the student of Rebbi Jehudah, and Rebbi Jehudah said, one is forbidden to travel by sea.
Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba asked before Rebbi Mana: It is impossible to eat without redemption since Temple property cannot leave without redemption. If one redeems and eats it, it would be as if one bought an axe with Sabbatical money. He said to him, the treasurer exchanges it through a third person. Rebbi Mattaniah said, why do we not explain it according to everybody, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose because his vow precedes his declaration of abandonment. But here the vow of abandonment precedes his dedication. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it happened that they gave instructions following Rebbi Yose.
Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba asked before Rebbi Mana: It is impossible to eat without redemption since Temple property cannot leave without redemption. If one redeems and eats it, it would be as if one bought an axe with Sabbatical money. He said to him, the treasurer exchanges it through a third person. Rebbi Mattaniah said, why do we not explain it according to everybody, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose because his vow precedes his declaration of abandonment. But here the vow of abandonment precedes his dedication. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it happened that they gave instructions following Rebbi Yose.
MISHNAH: Even though they said that one does not take pledges from women, slaves, and minors, but if they gave the sheqel one accepts it from them. One does not accept from the Non-Jew and the Samaritan, and from them one does not accept nests of male sufferers from gonorrhea, nests of female sufferers from flux, nests of women having given birth, and purification and reparation sacrifices. This is the principle: Anything which can be given as a vow or a gift one does accept from them; anything which\can be given neither as a vow nor a gift one does not accept from them. So it is spelled out by Ezra, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. The following are liable for agio: Levites, Israelites, proselytes, and freedmen, but not priests, women, slaves, and minors. He who pays the sheqel for a slave, a woman, a priest, or a minor, is not liable. He who paid the sheqel for himself and another person is liable for one agio; Rebbi Meïr says, two agios. He who gives a tetradrachma to receive back a sheqel is liable for two agios. A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person. a neighbor, or a dweller in his town is not liable for the agio, unless it is as a loan, then he is liable. Brothers who are partners who are liable for the agio are not liable for animal tithe; if they are liable for animal tithe they are not liable for the agio. How much is the agio? A silver obolos, the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, half an obolos.
MISHNAH: Even though they said that one does not take pledges from women, slaves, and minors, but if they gave the sheqel one accepts it from them. One does not accept from the Non-Jew and the Samaritan, and from them one does not accept nests of male sufferers from gonorrhea, nests of female sufferers from flux, nests of women having given birth, and purification and reparation sacrifices. This is the principle: Anything which can be given as a vow or a gift one does accept from them; anything which\can be given neither as a vow nor a gift one does not accept from them. So it is spelled out by Ezra, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. The following are liable for agio: Levites, Israelites, proselytes, and freedmen, but not priests, women, slaves, and minors. He who pays the sheqel for a slave, a woman, a priest, or a minor, is not liable. He who paid the sheqel for himself and another person is liable for one agio; Rebbi Meïr says, two agios. He who gives a tetradrachma to receive back a sheqel is liable for two agios. A person who pays the sheqel for a poor person. a neighbor, or a dweller in his town is not liable for the agio, unless it is as a loan, then he is liable. Brothers who are partners who are liable for the agio are not liable for animal tithe; if they are liable for animal tithe they are not liable for the agio. How much is the agio? A silver obolos, the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, half an obolos.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, at the start one accepts from them neither definite objects nor non-definite objects, and at the end one accepts from them definite objects but not non-definite objects. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, both at the beginning and at the end one accepts from them neither definite objects nor non-definite objects. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “One does not accept from them voluntary gifts for Temple property for the upkeep of the Temple.” He explains it, both at the start and at the end, if it is for non-definite objects. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Everybody agrees that they make vows and are objects of vows. He explains it for elevation offerings. One understands that he makes a vow to bring an elevation offering. Can he be the object of a vow for an elevation offering? No, if an Israel says, I undertake to bring an elevation offering, when a Gentile hears him and says, I am undertaking what he says. Does he not bring libations with it? Is not the excess money given for libations used for vessels of Service? Then it turns out that he brought {money for} a definite object! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun objected, did we not state that they may offer their value? Are offerings of one’s value not for the upkeep of the Temple? It is as you are saying there, his intent was for Heaven; automatically it will be used for the upkeep of the Temple; so here you are saying, his intent was for Heaven; automatically it will be used for vessels of Service. How does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish treat this? He explains, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. Rebbi Ḥilkiah said, Rebbi Simon asked: Does this imply that one does not accept from them for an aqueduct, or the city walls, or its towers, because of you have no part, nor rightful claim, nor memorial, in Jerusalem.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, at the start one accepts from them neither definite objects nor non-definite objects, and at the end one accepts from them definite objects but not non-definite objects. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, both at the beginning and at the end one accepts from them neither definite objects nor non-definite objects. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “One does not accept from them voluntary gifts for Temple property for the upkeep of the Temple.” He explains it, both at the start and at the end, if it is for non-definite objects. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Everybody agrees that they make vows and are objects of vows. He explains it for elevation offerings. One understands that he makes a vow to bring an elevation offering. Can he be the object of a vow for an elevation offering? No, if an Israel says, I undertake to bring an elevation offering, when a Gentile hears him and says, I am undertaking what he says. Does he not bring libations with it? Is not the excess money given for libations used for vessels of Service? Then it turns out that he brought {money for} a definite object! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun objected, did we not state that they may offer their value? Are offerings of one’s value not for the upkeep of the Temple? It is as you are saying there, his intent was for Heaven; automatically it will be used for the upkeep of the Temple; so here you are saying, his intent was for Heaven; automatically it will be used for vessels of Service. How does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish treat this? He explains, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. Rebbi Ḥilkiah said, Rebbi Simon asked: Does this imply that one does not accept from them for an aqueduct, or the city walls, or its towers, because of you have no part, nor rightful claim, nor memorial, in Jerusalem.
Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: It is written, and on the eighth day one shall circumcise. If he transgressed and did not circumcise? He answered him, if you make a vow to the Eternal, your God, do not tarry to fulfill it. A matter which is subject to replacement. It excludes this which is not subject to replacement. Do not tarry to fulfill it, but not its substitute. As it was stated: and to the gate of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it, but not its replacement. Rebbi Jonah said, Levi ben Sisi explained it before Rebbi: If one said, upon me is the obligation of an elevation offering. There passed three holidays and he brought another one and sacrificed it immediately. I would say, he is freed from the first one. Therefore it was necessary to say, do not tarry to fulfill it, but not its substitute. Rebbi Yose said, if he said, upon me is the obligation, he transgresses immediately. But we must hold about one who says, this one shall be an elevation offering. There passed two holidays and he brought another one [in its stead but did not sacrifice it immediately] and there passed by another holiday for it. I would say that it combines with its replacement for three holidays. Therefore it was necessary to say, do not tarry to fulfill it, but not its substitute.
“For demanding will demand, these are purification and reparation offerings. The Eternal, your God, this is dedication for the upkeep of the Temple. From with you, this is collecting single stalks, forgotten sheaves, and peah. Or there would be sin in you, but no sin in your sacrifice.” For otherwise what would we say? Rebbi Samuel the son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that you should not say, maybe the sacrifice will be found disqualified; therefore it was necessary to say, (do not tarry to fulfill it, and not its substitute) [there would be sin in you, but no sin in your sacrifice.] The pronouncement of your lips you shall guard and execute. “You shall guard and execute, to alert the court that they should force you.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Avuna: From here the pledge. As you vowed to the Eternal, your God, a voluntary gift. Is there a vow which is called voluntary gift? But to make him liable for each single vow and every single voluntary gift. “What is the vow about which they spoke? He who says, on me is the obligation for an elevation offering. What is the voluntary gift about which they spoke? He who says, this one is for an elevation offering.” Rebbi Ḥama the colleague of the rabbis asked, if he said, “on me is the obligation”, and came back and said, “this one is”? Rebbi Ḥinena asked, would it not be reasonable if he said, “this one is”, and came back and said, “on me is the obligation”? A severe prohibition falls one a simple prohibition but a simple prohibition does not fall on a severe prohibition.
“For demanding will demand, these are purification and reparation offerings. The Eternal, your God, this is dedication for the upkeep of the Temple. From with you, this is collecting single stalks, forgotten sheaves, and peah. Or there would be sin in you, but no sin in your sacrifice.” For otherwise what would we say? Rebbi Samuel the son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that you should not say, maybe the sacrifice will be found disqualified; therefore it was necessary to say, (do not tarry to fulfill it, and not its substitute) [there would be sin in you, but no sin in your sacrifice.] The pronouncement of your lips you shall guard and execute. “You shall guard and execute, to alert the court that they should force you.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Avuna: From here the pledge. As you vowed to the Eternal, your God, a voluntary gift. Is there a vow which is called voluntary gift? But to make him liable for each single vow and every single voluntary gift. “What is the vow about which they spoke? He who says, on me is the obligation for an elevation offering. What is the voluntary gift about which they spoke? He who says, this one is for an elevation offering.” Rebbi Ḥama the colleague of the rabbis asked, if he said, “on me is the obligation”, and came back and said, “this one is”? Rebbi Ḥinena asked, would it not be reasonable if he said, “this one is”, and came back and said, “on me is the obligation”? A severe prohibition falls one a simple prohibition but a simple prohibition does not fall on a severe prohibition.
“For demanding will demand, these are purification and reparation offerings. The Eternal, your God, this is dedication for the upkeep of the Temple. From with you, this is collecting single stalks, forgotten sheaves, and peah. Or there would be sin in you, but no sin in your sacrifice.” For otherwise what would we say? Rebbi Samuel the son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that you should not say, maybe the sacrifice will be found disqualified; therefore it was necessary to say, (do not tarry to fulfill it, and not its substitute) [there would be sin in you, but no sin in your sacrifice.] The pronouncement of your lips you shall guard and execute. “You shall guard and execute, to alert the court that they should force you.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Avuna: From here the pledge. As you vowed to the Eternal, your God, a voluntary gift. Is there a vow which is called voluntary gift? But to make him liable for each single vow and every single voluntary gift. “What is the vow about which they spoke? He who says, on me is the obligation for an elevation offering. What is the voluntary gift about which they spoke? He who says, this one is for an elevation offering.” Rebbi Ḥama the colleague of the rabbis asked, if he said, “on me is the obligation”, and came back and said, “this one is”? Rebbi Ḥinena asked, would it not be reasonable if he said, “this one is”, and came back and said, “on me is the obligation”? A severe prohibition falls one a simple prohibition but a simple prohibition does not fall on a severe prohibition.
Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He has to say, for me and for him who made no eruv. If somebody made no eruv, others who made an eruv are allowed to prepare for him from his own {provisions}. Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Ze`ura: Only if he transfers his property to them, for otherwise it would turn out that they prepare for him from his own. If somebody did not make an eruv and neither did others, he may fry a fish. Rav Ḥuna said, he may heat hot water. Samuel said, he may light a candle. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, “he fills an amphora of (wine) [water] and lights his candle”. “It happened that somebody put a vow on his son to study Torah. The case came before Rebbi Yose ben Ḥalaphta who permitted him to fill him an amphora with water and to light the candle for him.”
HALAKHAH: “Five things were said about burning charcoal and five about the flame. One commits larceny with the burning charcoal of the Temple; one may not use its flame but one cannot commit larceny with the latter. Burning charcoal of idolatry is forbidden, its flame is allowed. He who makes a vow not to use anything of another person may not use his burning charcoal but is allowed his flame. He who carries burning charcoal into the public domain is liable but for the flame he is free of punishment. One makes the benediction over the flame but not over glowing charcoal.” Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: If the charcoal was crackling one makes the benediction. Rebbi Joḥanan from Karṣion in the name of Rebbi Naḥum bar Simai: Only if {the flame} is jumping off.
It is written Elijah the Tisbite, from the inhabitants of Gilead, said to Aḥab: By the Living Eternal One, the God of Israel, before Whom I stood, there will not be dew nor rain these years except by my word. Rebbi Berekhia said, Rebbi Yose and the rabbis. One of them said, he was heard both for dew and for rain; the other one said, he was heard for rain but was not heard for dew, from: Go, appear before Aḥab and I shall give rain on the face of the earth. He who said, he was heard both for dew and for rain, where was the vow of dew dissolved? Rebbi Tanḥum from Edrei said, they are of the opinion that a vow that was dissolved partially is dissolved totally. Some want to say, on the occasion of the son of the woman from Sarepta: He called on the Eternal and said, o Eternal, my God, also the widow with whom I am dwelling You are doing evil to kill her son. Rebbi Judah ben Pazi said, about one who stole a doctor’s bag. When he left, his son was injured. He returned to him and said: Please, sir doctor, heal my son. He said to him: Go and return my bag because it is full of medicines, and I shall heal your son. So the Holy One, praise to Him, said to Elijah: Go and lift the vow of dew because the dead are resurrected only by dew, then I shall resurrect the son of the Sareptan. And from where that the dead will live only by dew? Your dead will live, the corpses will arise. Wake up and jubilate, those who dwell in dust! For a dew of light is Your dew, וָאָרֶ֭ץ רְפָאִ֥ים תַּפִּֽיל. What means וָאָרֶ֭ץ רְפָאִ֥ים תַּפִּֽיל? Rebbi Tanḥum from Edrei said, “the earth will give up what is deposited in it.”
It is written Elijah the Tisbite, from the inhabitants of Gilead, said to Aḥab: By the Living Eternal One, the God of Israel, before Whom I stood, there will not be dew nor rain these years except by my word. Rebbi Berekhia said, Rebbi Yose and the rabbis. One of them said, he was heard both for dew and for rain; the other one said, he was heard for rain but was not heard for dew, from: Go, appear before Aḥab and I shall give rain on the face of the earth. He who said, he was heard both for dew and for rain, where was the vow of dew dissolved? Rebbi Tanḥum from Edrei said, they are of the opinion that a vow that was dissolved partially is dissolved totally. Some want to say, on the occasion of the son of the woman from Sarepta: He called on the Eternal and said, o Eternal, my God, also the widow with whom I am dwelling You are doing evil to kill her son. Rebbi Judah ben Pazi said, about one who stole a doctor’s bag. When he left, his son was injured. He returned to him and said: Please, sir doctor, heal my son. He said to him: Go and return my bag because it is full of medicines, and I shall heal your son. So the Holy One, praise to Him, said to Elijah: Go and lift the vow of dew because the dead are resurrected only by dew, then I shall resurrect the son of the Sareptan. And from where that the dead will live only by dew? Your dead will live, the corpses will arise. Wake up and jubilate, those who dwell in dust! For a dew of light is Your dew, וָאָרֶ֭ץ רְפָאִ֥ים תַּפִּֽיל. What means וָאָרֶ֭ץ רְפָאִ֥ים תַּפִּֽיל? Rebbi Tanḥum from Edrei said, “the earth will give up what is deposited in it.”
It is written Elijah the Tisbite, from the inhabitants of Gilead, said to Aḥab: By the Living Eternal One, the God of Israel, before Whom I stood, there will not be dew nor rain these years except by my word. Rebbi Berekhia said, Rebbi Yose and the rabbis. One of them said, he was heard both for dew and for rain; the other one said, he was heard for rain but was not heard for dew, from: Go, appear before Aḥab and I shall give rain on the face of the earth. He who said, he was heard both for dew and for rain, where was the vow of dew dissolved? Rebbi Tanḥum from Edrei said, they are of the opinion that a vow that was dissolved partially is dissolved totally. Some want to say, on the occasion of the son of the woman from Sarepta: He called on the Eternal and said, o Eternal, my God, also the widow with whom I am dwelling You are doing evil to kill her son. Rebbi Judah ben Pazi said, about one who stole a doctor’s bag. When he left, his son was injured. He returned to him and said: Please, sir doctor, heal my son. He said to him: Go and return my bag because it is full of medicines, and I shall heal your son. So the Holy One, praise to Him, said to Elijah: Go and lift the vow of dew because the dead are resurrected only by dew, then I shall resurrect the son of the Sareptan. And from where that the dead will live only by dew? Your dead will live, the corpses will arise. Wake up and jubilate, those who dwell in dust! For a dew of light is Your dew, וָאָרֶ֭ץ רְפָאִ֥ים תַּפִּֽיל. What means וָאָרֶ֭ץ רְפָאִ֥ים תַּפִּֽיל? Rebbi Tanḥum from Edrei said, “the earth will give up what is deposited in it.”
“Rain started to drip..” They said, this happened only to eliminate this one’s vow.
MISHNAH: The only difference between one who is under a vow {not to have} usufruct from another and one who is under a vow about use of food is passing through his real estate and vessels that cannot be used to prepare food. The only difference between vows and voluntary gifts is that for vows one is responsible if they died or were lost, and for voluntary gifts one is not responsible if they died or were lost.
MISHNAH: The only difference between one who is under a vow {not to have} usufruct from another and one who is under a vow about use of food is passing through his real estate and vessels that cannot be used to prepare food. The only difference between vows and voluntary gifts is that for vows one is responsible if they died or were lost, and for voluntary gifts one is not responsible if they died or were lost.
HALAKHAH: Therefore vessels used to prepare food are forbidden. But did he not make the vow about food? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: so is the Mishnah: The only difference between one who is under a vow {not to have} usufruct from another and one who is under a vow about use for food. In the House of Rebbi it was stated thus: “One who is under a vow about use of food should not borrow from him a fine or coarse sieve, a grindstone, or an oven.” It was stated: But he may borrow from him cups and bowls and fruit bowls, since these are not used to prepare food, only to serve food. Pans and pots are forbidden. To mill grain and to press grapes is forbidden. Harvesting grain is a problem, harvesting grapes is a problem. What kind of usufruct of food? It was stated: But he may borrow an axe from him. We wanted to say, an axe to split. Explain it by a hatchet for weeding, and you cannot infer anything. Rebbi Abuna said, that zwsta since one removes and separates the bran from flour with it, it is like a sieve.
HALAKHAH: Therefore vessels used to prepare food are forbidden. But did he not make the vow about food? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: so is the Mishnah: The only difference between one who is under a vow {not to have} usufruct from another and one who is under a vow about use for food. In the House of Rebbi it was stated thus: “One who is under a vow about use of food should not borrow from him a fine or coarse sieve, a grindstone, or an oven.” It was stated: But he may borrow from him cups and bowls and fruit bowls, since these are not used to prepare food, only to serve food. Pans and pots are forbidden. To mill grain and to press grapes is forbidden. Harvesting grain is a problem, harvesting grapes is a problem. What kind of usufruct of food? It was stated: But he may borrow an axe from him. We wanted to say, an axe to split. Explain it by a hatchet for weeding, and you cannot infer anything. Rebbi Abuna said, that zwsta since one removes and separates the bran from flour with it, it is like a sieve.
HALAKHAH: Therefore vessels used to prepare food are forbidden. But did he not make the vow about food? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: so is the Mishnah: The only difference between one who is under a vow {not to have} usufruct from another and one who is under a vow about use for food. In the House of Rebbi it was stated thus: “One who is under a vow about use of food should not borrow from him a fine or coarse sieve, a grindstone, or an oven.” It was stated: But he may borrow from him cups and bowls and fruit bowls, since these are not used to prepare food, only to serve food. Pans and pots are forbidden. To mill grain and to press grapes is forbidden. Harvesting grain is a problem, harvesting grapes is a problem. What kind of usufruct of food? It was stated: But he may borrow an axe from him. We wanted to say, an axe to split. Explain it by a hatchet for weeding, and you cannot infer anything. Rebbi Abuna said, that zwsta since one removes and separates the bran from flour with it, it is like a sieve.
HALAKHAH: Therefore vessels used to prepare food are forbidden. But did he not make the vow about food? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: so is the Mishnah: The only difference between one who is under a vow {not to have} usufruct from another and one who is under a vow about use for food. In the House of Rebbi it was stated thus: “One who is under a vow about use of food should not borrow from him a fine or coarse sieve, a grindstone, or an oven.” It was stated: But he may borrow from him cups and bowls and fruit bowls, since these are not used to prepare food, only to serve food. Pans and pots are forbidden. To mill grain and to press grapes is forbidden. Harvesting grain is a problem, harvesting grapes is a problem. What kind of usufruct of food? It was stated: But he may borrow an axe from him. We wanted to say, an axe to split. Explain it by a hatchet for weeding, and you cannot infer anything. Rebbi Abuna said, that zwsta since one removes and separates the bran from flour with it, it is like a sieve.
“What is the vow about which they spoke? He who says, on me is the obligation for an elevation offering. What is the voluntary gift about which they spoke? He who says, this one is for an elevation offering.” Rebbi Ḥama the colleague of the rabbis asked, if he said, “on me is the obligation”, and came back and said, “this one is”? Rebbi Ḥinena asked, would it not be reasonable if he said, “this one is”, and came back and said, “on me is the obligation”? A severe prohibition falls one a simple prohibition but a simple prohibition does not fall on a severe prohibition.
There, we have stated: “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve.” Do not the Sages permit all kinds of vows? It is written: Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes of the Children of Israel. He referred the paragraph to the heads of the tribes that they should dissolve their vows. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: He shall not profane his word. He cannot profane his word; this implies that others can profane his words. Who is that? That is the Sage who dissolves the vow.
“And also who asked the Sages and was permitted.” Where do we hold? If he asked before the holiday he should shave; if he did not ask before the holiday he should not shave. But we hold in case that he asked before the holiday and they found an opening only on the holiday. As the following: They did not find an opening for Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi until one of the Sages of Galilee came; some say, he was Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. He took him from one place and put him in another, he took him from one place and put him in another until finally he put him into the sun and told him to check his garments for fleas. They said to him, if you had known that this old man would treat you in such a way, would you have made the vow? He said, No. They permitted him. They asked, from where do you have this? He said to them, I was Meïr’s servant when he fled the second time, but some say that Rebbi Meïr’s staff was in his hand and it taught him knowledge.
MISHNAH: A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow cannot marry her. If she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court. And all who had wives who [subsequently] died may marry them. And to all who were married to others and were divorced or widowed, they can be married. All are permitted to their sons or brothers.
HALAKHAH: “A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow”, etc. “A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow cannot marry her.” I would say, that was his intention from the start. “If she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court”, because two will not usually sin for the benefit of a third. There, we have stated: “If somebody deposits fruit with another person, that one should not touch it even if it spoils. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, he shall sell it under the supervision of a court because one is obliged to return a find to its owners.” Rebbi Abba bar Jacob said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. What does one do with the money? Rav Jehudah said, the disagreement of Rebbi Aqiba and Rebbi Ṭarphon. It is a condition that the members of the court cannot buy. Rebbi Aqiba said, Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Rebbi Sabbatai asked: Here, you say, “if she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court,” and here, you say so? Rebbi Yose said, there, the buy could be in thirds, but here, two will not usually sin for the benefit of a third.
HALAKHAH: “A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow”, etc. “A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow cannot marry her.” I would say, that was his intention from the start. “If she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court”, because two will not usually sin for the benefit of a third. There, we have stated: “If somebody deposits fruit with another person, that one should not touch it even if it spoils. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, he shall sell it under the supervision of a court because one is obliged to return a find to its owners.” Rebbi Abba bar Jacob said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. What does one do with the money? Rav Jehudah said, the disagreement of Rebbi Aqiba and Rebbi Ṭarphon. It is a condition that the members of the court cannot buy. Rebbi Aqiba said, Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Rebbi Sabbatai asked: Here, you say, “if she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court,” and here, you say so? Rebbi Yose said, there, the buy could be in thirds, but here, two will not usually sin for the benefit of a third.
There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel; it is invalid from Gentiles.” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. And Samuel said, publicize in your towns: It is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay Ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?
Rebbi Yoḥanan had a difficulty with the words of Rebbi Joshua. Is her marriage valid by biblical standards? The dissolution of her vows must be by biblical standards! And you say so! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, there is no dissolution of vows here, because of what Rebbi Joḥanan had against the words of Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Nissa asked: Would it be the same for prohibitions? Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions. Would that be as we stated there: “Before that time, even though they said, we know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are no vows and their dedications no dedications. After that time, even though they said, we do not know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are vows and their dedications dedications.” What is the status of that Mishnah? For Cahana it is in dispute, for Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it is everybody’s opinion.
Rebbi Yoḥanan had a difficulty with the words of Rebbi Joshua. Is her marriage valid by biblical standards? The dissolution of her vows must be by biblical standards! And you say so! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, there is no dissolution of vows here, because of what Rebbi Joḥanan had against the words of Rebbi Joshua. Rebbi Nissa asked: Would it be the same for prohibitions? Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for prohibitions. Would that be as we stated there: “Before that time, even though they said, we know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are no vows and their dedications no dedications. After that time, even though they said, we do not know for Whom we made a vow or to Whom we dedicated, their vows are vows and their dedications dedications.” What is the status of that Mishnah? For Cahana it is in dispute, for Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it is everybody’s opinion.
MISHNAH: If an underage levir had intercourse with an underage sister-in-law, they should grow up together. If he had intercourse with an adult sister-in-law, she should raise him. If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṣah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah with her. But if he confesses, one forces him to perform ḥalîṣah with her even after twelve months. If a woman made a vow during her husband’s lifetime forbidding herself any usufruct from her levir, one coerces him until he performs ḥalîṣah with her. After her husband’s death, one begs him that he should perform ḥalîṣah with her. If she had [ḥalîṣah] in mind even during her husband’s lifetime, one begs him that he should perform ḥalîṣah with her.
“If a woman made a vow forbidding herself any usufruct,” etc. Consider the following: He said, I copulated, but she says, I was not copulated with. Even if he changed and then said, I did not copulate, he cannot be believed since from the start he had said, I copulated. But if from the start he said that he had not copulated, the two together can uproot the presumption. The colleagues asked: What are we talking about? If following the early Mishnah, we have understood that one may marry in levirate. If following the later Mishnah, we have understood that one may perform ḥalîṣah. Where did we hear that one coerces? Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose asked, after thirty days, the presumption is that he copulated and you say one coerces? But it must be the following: Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to performḥalîṣah. The following: If he says, I copulated, and she says, I was not copulated with, it is obvious that he has to sustain her. It is obvious that he does not inherit from her. The problem is whether he inherits his brother’s property. If she says, I was copulated with, and he says, I did not copulate, it is obvious that he does not have to sustain her. It is obvious that he inherits his brother’s property. The problem is whether he inherits from her.
“And because he stole three steals, his father’s opinion, the court’s opinion, and Israel’s opinion.” His father’s opinion, as it is written: “It was after forty years.” David himself did not rule more than forty years, and here, it says so? But it is from the time that Israel demanded a king. “For your servant made a vow.” He said to him, what else do you want? He said to him, write me a tablet that two men should go with me. He said to him, tell me whom you want and I shall write. He said to him, write it to open and I shall take whom I want. He wrote it open. He went and added two people each until he had added 200 people. That is what is written, “with Absalom went 200 invited people from Jerusalem, going in their simplicity.” Invited, from David. Going in their simplicity, of Absalom. “They did not know anything,” of Aḥitophel’s counsel. Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: They all were presiding judges. Then they saw the things. They went to change sides. They said: Master of all universes: Let us fall in David’s hand and do not let fall David in our hands! For if we fall in David’s hand, he will have mercy on us. But if, Heaven forbid, David would fall in our hands, we would not have mercy on him. That is what David said, “He saved me in peace from my confidant, for the majority were with me!” “The court’s opinion”. “And Absalom said, who would make me the judge of the land.” “So Absalom would act.” “And Israel’s opinion.” Absalom insinuated himself with the men of Israel.”
MISHNAH: What is the difference between a man and a woman? A man is dishevelled and with open seams, no woman is dishevelled and with open seams. A man can make his son a nazir, no woman can make her son a nazir. A man can shave using his father’s vow of nazir, no woman can shave using her father’s vow of nazir. A man can betrothe his daughter, no woman can betrothe her daughter. A man can sell his daughter, no woman can sell her daughter. A man is stoned naked, no woman is stoned naked. A man is hanged, no woman is hanged. A man is sold for his theft, no woman is sold for her theft.
MISHNAH: What is the difference between a man and a woman? A man is dishevelled and with open seams, no woman is dishevelled and with open seams. A man can make his son a nazir, no woman can make her son a nazir. A man can shave using his father’s vow of nazir, no woman can shave using her father’s vow of nazir. A man can betrothe his daughter, no woman can betrothe her daughter. A man can sell his daughter, no woman can sell her daughter. A man is stoned naked, no woman is stoned naked. A man is hanged, no woman is hanged. A man is sold for his theft, no woman is sold for her theft.
If the wine is freshly pressed, if the wine is sour? As it was stated: Sour wine may be used to make an eruv and participating, one makes a benediction for it, and one may use it for the preliminary marriage of a bride, for consoling the mourner, and it may be sold in a store as wine. If somebody made an unqualified contract for wine, he did not sell sour wine. One is prohibited from delivering a decision, or to dissolve a vow, or to enter the Temple. Only it is forbidden on the altar. And about the rebellious son it is problematic.
MISHNAH: These are the kinds of work a woman does for her husband: She grinds flour, bakes, launders, nurses her baby, makes his bed, and spins wool. If she brought a slave girl with her, she does not have to grind flour, bake, and launder. Two, she does not have to nurse her baby. Three, she does not have to make his bed or spin wool. Four, she sits in a chair. Rebbi Eliezer says, even if she brought him a hundred slave girls, he forces her to spin wool because indolence causes immorality. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, also a man who by a vow forbids his wife to work must divorce her and pay her ketubah since idleness induces mental illness.
“She nurses her baby.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, is says only “her baby,” therefore not twins. Why does it say “her baby”? As it was stated: “A man cannot force his wife to nurse another man’s child, nor can a woman force her husband to let her nurse another woman’s child. If she made a vow not to nurse her baby, the House of Shammai say that one removes the breast nipple from his mouth, but the House of Hillel say, one forces her. If she was divorced, one cannot force her if [the baby] is not used to her, but if he is used to her one forces her and pays her wages to nurse her baby.” How old is the baby if he can be presumed to know her? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Three months. But Rebbi Ze‘ira was staring at him. He asked him, why are you staring at me? Should I say to you following Samuel, since Samuel said, three days? Samuel follows his opinion, since Samuel said, I recognized the midwives who delivered me. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, I recognized the circumciser who circumcised me. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I recognized the women who kept my mother company.
MISHNAH: If somebody by a vow bars his wife from sexual intercourse, the House of Shammai say two weeks, the House of Hillel say one week. Students can go to study Torah for thirty days without permission; journeymen one week. The period mentioned in the Torah: People who do not have to work every day, journeymen twice a week, donkey drivers once a week, camel drivers once in thirty days, sailors once in three months, the words of Rebbi Eliezer.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody by a vow bars his wife from sexual intercourse,” etc. The House of Shammai say, two weeks as after the birth of a girl. But the House of Hillel say one week, as after the birth of a boy or the days of her menstruation.
MISHNAH: If somebody makes a vow that his wife should not have any usufruct from him, up to thirty days he shall appoint a provider, more than that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah; in the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody makes a vow that his wife should not have any usufruct from him,” etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody by a vow bars his wife from sexual intercourse,” and here you say so? There, he makes a vow to separate her from his body, but here he makes a vow to separate her from his property. But can anybody make a vow not to pay his debt? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, since in the future he will divorce her, pay her the ketubah, and stop her food supply, it is as if there was no debt. Why could she not sit there and wait; if he divorced her everything would be in order, otherwise let him provide her with food? It follows him who said that the wife’s food is not from words of the Torah, as it was stated: The court will not determine food for the wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s. Then should she not be considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah? This proves that she is not considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody makes a vow that his wife should not have any usufruct from him,” etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody by a vow bars his wife from sexual intercourse,” and here you say so? There, he makes a vow to separate her from his body, but here he makes a vow to separate her from his property. But can anybody make a vow not to pay his debt? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, since in the future he will divorce her, pay her the ketubah, and stop her food supply, it is as if there was no debt. Why could she not sit there and wait; if he divorced her everything would be in order, otherwise let him provide her with food? It follows him who said that the wife’s food is not from words of the Torah, as it was stated: The court will not determine food for the wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s. Then should she not be considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah? This proves that she is not considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody makes a vow that his wife should not have any usufruct from him,” etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody by a vow bars his wife from sexual intercourse,” and here you say so? There, he makes a vow to separate her from his body, but here he makes a vow to separate her from his property. But can anybody make a vow not to pay his debt? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, since in the future he will divorce her, pay her the ketubah, and stop her food supply, it is as if there was no debt. Why could she not sit there and wait; if he divorced her everything would be in order, otherwise let him provide her with food? It follows him who said that the wife’s food is not from words of the Torah, as it was stated: The court will not determine food for the wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s. Then should she not be considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah? This proves that she is not considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody makes a vow that his wife should not have any usufruct from him,” etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody by a vow bars his wife from sexual intercourse,” and here you say so? There, he makes a vow to separate her from his body, but here he makes a vow to separate her from his property. But can anybody make a vow not to pay his debt? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, since in the future he will divorce her, pay her the ketubah, and stop her food supply, it is as if there was no debt. Why could she not sit there and wait; if he divorced her everything would be in order, otherwise let him provide her with food? It follows him who said that the wife’s food is not from words of the Torah, as it was stated: The court will not determine food for the wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s. Then should she not be considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah? This proves that she is not considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody makes a vow that his wife should not have any usufruct from him,” etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody by a vow bars his wife from sexual intercourse,” and here you say so? There, he makes a vow to separate her from his body, but here he makes a vow to separate her from his property. But can anybody make a vow not to pay his debt? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, since in the future he will divorce her, pay her the ketubah, and stop her food supply, it is as if there was no debt. Why could she not sit there and wait; if he divorced her everything would be in order, otherwise let him provide her with food? It follows him who said that the wife’s food is not from words of the Torah, as it was stated: The court will not determine food for the wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s. Then should she not be considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah? This proves that she is not considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah.
He could appoint a provider, as the following: “X is forbidden any profit from me by a vow and I do not know what to do.” Let him appoint a provider! A woman has the right to say, it is impossible for me to be provided for by anybody other than my husband. But did we not state: “If somebody provides for his wife through a third party.” There, if she accepted it; here, if she did not accept it. If she did not accept it then he should not appoint even for one day! She continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow. Samuel says, if he vowed for thirty days. But if he vowed forever, he shall divorce immediately and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Avina in the name of Rav: Even if he vowed forever, she continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow.
He could appoint a provider, as the following: “X is forbidden any profit from me by a vow and I do not know what to do.” Let him appoint a provider! A woman has the right to say, it is impossible for me to be provided for by anybody other than my husband. But did we not state: “If somebody provides for his wife through a third party.” There, if she accepted it; here, if she did not accept it. If she did not accept it then he should not appoint even for one day! She continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow. Samuel says, if he vowed for thirty days. But if he vowed forever, he shall divorce immediately and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Avina in the name of Rav: Even if he vowed forever, she continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow.
He could appoint a provider, as the following: “X is forbidden any profit from me by a vow and I do not know what to do.” Let him appoint a provider! A woman has the right to say, it is impossible for me to be provided for by anybody other than my husband. But did we not state: “If somebody provides for his wife through a third party.” There, if she accepted it; here, if she did not accept it. If she did not accept it then he should not appoint even for one day! She continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow. Samuel says, if he vowed for thirty days. But if he vowed forever, he shall divorce immediately and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Avina in the name of Rav: Even if he vowed forever, she continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow.
MISHNAH: If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not taste any kind of fruits has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah; in the case of the wife of a Cohen for two [months] he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife,” etc. Can anybody cause somebody else’s vow during his lifetime? It must be that the wife made a vow, the husband heard it, and said to her: If you will eat from such and such, my property will be forbidden to you. If she ate from such and such, why should his property not be forbidden to her? Is that not the case from the beginning of the chapter? But if his wife made a vow, her husband was informed, and did not dissolve it, following him who says that he put his finger between her teeth, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ḥuna said, even he who said that she put his finger between her teeth, and should be divorced without ketubah, will agree in case he provoked her to make the vow.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife,” etc. Can anybody cause somebody else’s vow during his lifetime? It must be that the wife made a vow, the husband heard it, and said to her: If you will eat from such and such, my property will be forbidden to you. If she ate from such and such, why should his property not be forbidden to her? Is that not the case from the beginning of the chapter? But if his wife made a vow, her husband was informed, and did not dissolve it, following him who says that he put his finger between her teeth, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ḥuna said, even he who said that she put his finger between her teeth, and should be divorced without ketubah, will agree in case he provoked her to make the vow.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife,” etc. Can anybody cause somebody else’s vow during his lifetime? It must be that the wife made a vow, the husband heard it, and said to her: If you will eat from such and such, my property will be forbidden to you. If she ate from such and such, why should his property not be forbidden to her? Is that not the case from the beginning of the chapter? But if his wife made a vow, her husband was informed, and did not dissolve it, following him who says that he put his finger between her teeth, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ḥuna said, even he who said that she put his finger between her teeth, and should be divorced without ketubah, will agree in case he provoked her to make the vow.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife,” etc. Can anybody cause somebody else’s vow during his lifetime? It must be that the wife made a vow, the husband heard it, and said to her: If you will eat from such and such, my property will be forbidden to you. If she ate from such and such, why should his property not be forbidden to her? Is that not the case from the beginning of the chapter? But if his wife made a vow, her husband was informed, and did not dissolve it, following him who says that he put his finger between her teeth, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ḥuna said, even he who said that she put his finger between her teeth, and should be divorced without ketubah, will agree in case he provoked her to make the vow.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife,” etc. Can anybody cause somebody else’s vow during his lifetime? It must be that the wife made a vow, the husband heard it, and said to her: If you will eat from such and such, my property will be forbidden to you. If she ate from such and such, why should his property not be forbidden to her? Is that not the case from the beginning of the chapter? But if his wife made a vow, her husband was informed, and did not dissolve it, following him who says that he put his finger between her teeth, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ḥuna said, even he who said that she put his finger between her teeth, and should be divorced without ketubah, will agree in case he provoked her to make the vow.
MISHNAH: If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not adorn herself with one of the kinds has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Yose says, among the poor if he did not give a time limit, among the rich for thirty days.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not adorn herself,” etc. Rav Huna said, so is the Mishnah: “Among the poor if he did not give a time limit.” Ulla bar Ismael said, among the poor if he did not give a time limit; but if he gave a time limit even if it were for ten years it is permitted, for no fox dies if he gets dusty from his lair. Nathan bar Hoshaiah said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Except holidays.
MISHNAH: If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not go to her father’s house, if they live in the same city she does, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. If they live in another city, for one holiday he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not go to her father’s house,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they stated there: If he made her make a vow that she should not wash in the bathhouse, in walled cities one week, in villages two weeks. That she should not wear shoes, in villages three months, in walled cities 24 hours.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not go to her father’s house,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they stated there: If he made her make a vow that she should not wash in the bathhouse, in walled cities one week, in villages two weeks. That she should not wear shoes, in villages three months, in walled cities 24 hours.
MISHNAH: If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not pay condolence visits or go to weddings has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. But if he argues because of another reason, he is in his rights. If he said to her you should tell X what I said to you or that she should fill [vessels] and pour them out on garbage heaps, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not pay condolence visits,” etc. ”If he made her vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since he gives her a bad reputation among her [female] neighbors. And so if she made a vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, she should leave without ketubah since she gives him a bad reputation among his [male] neighbors.” ”If he made her vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since tomorrow a relative of hers will die and nobody will take notice of her. And so if she made a vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, she should leave without ketubah since tomorrow a relative of his will die and nobody will take notice of him.” ”Rebbi Meïr is saying in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba: ‘It is better to pay condolence visits than to go to a wedding since the former is the end of every human, and the living should take notice.’ Why does the verse say, ‘and the living should take notice’? But do so they shall: eulogize so they should eulogize, bury so they should bury, accompany so they should accompany.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not pay condolence visits,” etc. ”If he made her vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since he gives her a bad reputation among her [female] neighbors. And so if she made a vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, she should leave without ketubah since she gives him a bad reputation among his [male] neighbors.” ”If he made her vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since tomorrow a relative of hers will die and nobody will take notice of her. And so if she made a vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, she should leave without ketubah since tomorrow a relative of his will die and nobody will take notice of him.” ”Rebbi Meïr is saying in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba: ‘It is better to pay condolence visits than to go to a wedding since the former is the end of every human, and the living should take notice.’ Why does the verse say, ‘and the living should take notice’? But do so they shall: eulogize so they should eulogize, bury so they should bury, accompany so they should accompany.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not pay condolence visits,” etc. ”If he made her vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since he gives her a bad reputation among her [female] neighbors. And so if she made a vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, she should leave without ketubah since she gives him a bad reputation among his [male] neighbors.” ”If he made her vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since tomorrow a relative of hers will die and nobody will take notice of her. And so if she made a vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, she should leave without ketubah since tomorrow a relative of his will die and nobody will take notice of him.” ”Rebbi Meïr is saying in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba: ‘It is better to pay condolence visits than to go to a wedding since the former is the end of every human, and the living should take notice.’ Why does the verse say, ‘and the living should take notice’? But do so they shall: eulogize so they should eulogize, bury so they should bury, accompany so they should accompany.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not pay condolence visits,” etc. ”If he made her vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since he gives her a bad reputation among her [female] neighbors. And so if she made a vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, she should leave without ketubah since she gives him a bad reputation among his [male] neighbors.” ”If he made her vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since tomorrow a relative of hers will die and nobody will take notice of her. And so if she made a vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, she should leave without ketubah since tomorrow a relative of his will die and nobody will take notice of him.” ”Rebbi Meïr is saying in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba: ‘It is better to pay condolence visits than to go to a wedding since the former is the end of every human, and the living should take notice.’ Why does the verse say, ‘and the living should take notice’? But do so they shall: eulogize so they should eulogize, bury so they should bury, accompany so they should accompany.”
HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not pay condolence visits,” etc. ”If he made her vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since he gives her a bad reputation among her [female] neighbors. And so if she made a vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, she should leave without ketubah since she gives him a bad reputation among his [male] neighbors.” ”If he made her vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since tomorrow a relative of hers will die and nobody will take notice of her. And so if she made a vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, she should leave without ketubah since tomorrow a relative of his will die and nobody will take notice of him.” ”Rebbi Meïr is saying in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba: ‘It is better to pay condolence visits than to go to a wedding since the former is the end of every human, and the living should take notice.’ Why does the verse say, ‘and the living should take notice’? But do so they shall: eulogize so they should eulogize, bury so they should bury, accompany so they should accompany.”
HALAKHAH: “The following leave without ketubah,” etc. “What is the big-voiced,” etc. And all with witnesses. “X tithed, X saw the stains, X cut her ḥallah, X permitted her vow.” They checked and found it was not so.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her,” etc. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house,” etc. We have stated defects. Which vows? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Yoṣadaq: If she vowed not to eat, or not to drink wine, or not to wear dyed garments. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the fine linen garments which come from Bet She‘an have the status of dyed garments. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he said to her, “on condition that you have no obligation of vows on you.” But if he said, “on condition that you have no obligation of any vow on you,” then even if she made a vow not to eat carob fruit it is a vow.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her,” etc. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house,” etc. We have stated defects. Which vows? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Yoṣadaq: If she vowed not to eat, or not to drink wine, or not to wear dyed garments. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the fine linen garments which come from Bet She‘an have the status of dyed garments. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he said to her, “on condition that you have no obligation of vows on you.” But if he said, “on condition that you have no obligation of any vow on you,” then even if she made a vow not to eat carob fruit it is a vow.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her,” etc. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house,” etc. We have stated defects. Which vows? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Yoṣadaq: If she vowed not to eat, or not to drink wine, or not to wear dyed garments. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the fine linen garments which come from Bet She‘an have the status of dyed garments. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he said to her, “on condition that you have no obligation of vows on you.” But if he said, “on condition that you have no obligation of any vow on you,” then even if she made a vow not to eat carob fruit it is a vow.
“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
MISHNAH: If he wrote to her: “I have no vow or oath against you,” he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates. “I have no oath against you, or your heirs, or your business associates,” he cannot ask an oath from her, or her heirs, or her business associates, but the heirs can ask an oath from her, or her heirs, or her business associates.
HALAKHAH: “If he wrote to her: “I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about properties over which she exercised control during her husband’s lifetime but even about properties over which she exercised control after her husband’s death are the heirs prevented from making her swear.
There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.
MISHNAH: “I have no vow or oath against you, neither I, nor my heirs, nor my business associates, against you, or your heirs, or your business associates,” he cannot ask an oath from her, neither he, nor the heirs, nor the business associates, from her, or her heirs, or her business associates. If she went from her husband’s grave to her family, or she remained in her in-law’s family but was not appointed as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. But if she was appointed as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past.
HALAKHAH: ““I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, only if she was made a steward during her husband’s lifetime. But if she was appointed as a steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can(not) make her swear. That is the Mishnah: if she was not appointed a steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If she was appointed a steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past. What is “about the past”? From the time of death to the time of burial. And Rebbi Yose said, even if he appointed her as steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can make her swear. But did we not state: “If he did not appoint her as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If he appointed her as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future but cannot make her swear for the past.” He explains it about the first case. But if it is about the first case, Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about property over which she had control during her husband’s lifetime but even about property over which she acquired control after her husband’s death the heirs cannot make her swear. Explain it, from the time of death to the time of burial. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The heirs cannot make her swear from the time of death to the time of burial. Bar Qappara stated: That she should not abandon him and leave for her family.
There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel; it is invalid from Gentiles.” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?
There, we have stated: “He heals him in the sense of personal healing but not in the sense of financial healing.” Rebbi Judan and Rebbi Yose. One of them said, here if the vow refers to his body, there if the vow refers to his property. But the other said, here if he has somebody else who can heal him, there if there is nobody else who can heal him. If he has somebody else who can heal him, he should not be able to heal him personally! Not by everybody is a person successfully healed.