16755 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 8:15

He cannot bring an animal as purification sacrifice since he does not have the right to an animal purification sacrifice. He cannot bring a bird as purification sacrifice since a rich person who brought the sacrifices prescribed for a poor person did not fulfill his obligation. What can he do? He shall write his property over to another person and bring the sacrifices prescribed for a poor person; this enables the rich person to bring a bird as a purification sacrifice. He stipulates and says: If I was impure, that is my obligation. Otherwise, this is in doubt.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 8:22

What is the status of his hair? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, his hair is forbidden; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his hair is permitted. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Do they disagree about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir or do they disagree about a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease? If you say that they disagree about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir, then for a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease everybody agrees that it is forbidden. If you say that they disagree about a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease, then for a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir everybody agrees that it is permitted. For Rebbi Jeremiah it was obvious that they disagreed about a sufferer from skin disease who made a vow of nazir. Therefore, for a nazir who became a sufferer from skin disease everybody agrees that it is permitted

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 8:23

Does the obligatory shaving push aside the rules of voluntary shaving? Let us hear from the following: “He shaves his head, his beard, and his eyebrows in the way sufferers from skin disease shave.” But there one could say, maybe it was an obligatory shaving. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Yudan: The Mishnah says so; “for Rebbi Simeon says, when one of the bloods was sprinkled, the nazir is permitted to drink wine and to defile himself with the dead.” Is he not forbidden because of “do not destroy”? Samuel bar Abba said, explain it if he was a eunuch. But did we not state “the beard”? How can you say, a eunuch? You have only what Rebbi Jacob said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he removed it from bottom to top it is forbidden. Rebbi Yose bar Abin said, there is no difference between bottom to top or top to bottom.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:3

There, we have stated: “The Non-Jew, Rebbi Meїr says, is evaluated but does not evaluate; Rebbi Jehudah says, he evaluates but is not evaluated. Both agree that they make vows and are objects of vows.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: For him who says there that he evaluates, here can he declare a nazir? For him who says there that he is evaluated, here can he be declared a nazir? How would it be possible for him to [be declared a nazir]? A Israelite can declare a Gentile to be a nazir. Would he listen to him? But the Israelite said, “I am a nazir,” the Gentile heard it and said, “I am responsible for what this one said.” It is only as if he paid a debt. How would it be possible for him to [declare a nazir]? A Gentile can declare an Israelite to be nazir. Since an Israelite cannot declare [another] Israelite to be a nazir, a Gentile cannot declare an Israelite to be a nazir. But it must be that the Gentile said, “I am a nazir”, the Israelite heard it and said, “I am taking upon me what this one said.” What did you exclude from him? An Israelite is subject to “not to desecrate”, a Gentile is not subject to “not to desecrate”. Rebbi Jonah said, Israelites can be relieved by a Sage, Gentiles cannot be relieved by a Sage. Rebbi Yose said, Israelites need a Sage to be relieved, Gentiles do not need a Sage to be relieved. It follows that Rebbi (Jonah) [Yose] follows Rebbi Abbahu. A Gentile woman came before Rebbi Abbahu, who said to Abime bar Tobi: Go and find her an opening by unforeseen circumstances. And Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Aḥa, who said that Laban was Kushan-Riš‘ataim. Why was he called “Kushan the doubly bad”? Because he committed two evils. One that he desecrated his oath, the other that he subjugated Israel for eight years.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:3

There, we have stated: “The Non-Jew, Rebbi Meїr says, is evaluated but does not evaluate; Rebbi Jehudah says, he evaluates but is not evaluated. Both agree that they make vows and are objects of vows.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: For him who says there that he evaluates, here can he declare a nazir? For him who says there that he is evaluated, here can he be declared a nazir? How would it be possible for him to [be declared a nazir]? A Israelite can declare a Gentile to be a nazir. Would he listen to him? But the Israelite said, “I am a nazir,” the Gentile heard it and said, “I am responsible for what this one said.” It is only as if he paid a debt. How would it be possible for him to [declare a nazir]? A Gentile can declare an Israelite to be nazir. Since an Israelite cannot declare [another] Israelite to be a nazir, a Gentile cannot declare an Israelite to be a nazir. But it must be that the Gentile said, “I am a nazir”, the Israelite heard it and said, “I am taking upon me what this one said.” What did you exclude from him? An Israelite is subject to “not to desecrate”, a Gentile is not subject to “not to desecrate”. Rebbi Jonah said, Israelites can be relieved by a Sage, Gentiles cannot be relieved by a Sage. Rebbi Yose said, Israelites need a Sage to be relieved, Gentiles do not need a Sage to be relieved. It follows that Rebbi (Jonah) [Yose] follows Rebbi Abbahu. A Gentile woman came before Rebbi Abbahu, who said to Abime bar Tobi: Go and find her an opening by unforeseen circumstances. And Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Aḥa, who said that Laban was Kushan-Riš‘ataim. Why was he called “Kushan the doubly bad”? Because he committed two evils. One that he desecrated his oath, the other that he subjugated Israel for eight years.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:3

There, we have stated: “The Non-Jew, Rebbi Meїr says, is evaluated but does not evaluate; Rebbi Jehudah says, he evaluates but is not evaluated. Both agree that they make vows and are objects of vows.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: For him who says there that he evaluates, here can he declare a nazir? For him who says there that he is evaluated, here can he be declared a nazir? How would it be possible for him to [be declared a nazir]? A Israelite can declare a Gentile to be a nazir. Would he listen to him? But the Israelite said, “I am a nazir,” the Gentile heard it and said, “I am responsible for what this one said.” It is only as if he paid a debt. How would it be possible for him to [declare a nazir]? A Gentile can declare an Israelite to be nazir. Since an Israelite cannot declare [another] Israelite to be a nazir, a Gentile cannot declare an Israelite to be a nazir. But it must be that the Gentile said, “I am a nazir”, the Israelite heard it and said, “I am taking upon me what this one said.” What did you exclude from him? An Israelite is subject to “not to desecrate”, a Gentile is not subject to “not to desecrate”. Rebbi Jonah said, Israelites can be relieved by a Sage, Gentiles cannot be relieved by a Sage. Rebbi Yose said, Israelites need a Sage to be relieved, Gentiles do not need a Sage to be relieved. It follows that Rebbi (Jonah) [Yose] follows Rebbi Abbahu. A Gentile woman came before Rebbi Abbahu, who said to Abime bar Tobi: Go and find her an opening by unforeseen circumstances. And Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Aḥa, who said that Laban was Kushan-Riš‘ataim. Why was he called “Kushan the doubly bad”? Because he committed two evils. One that he desecrated his oath, the other that he subjugated Israel for eight years.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:9

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Joḥanan said, who is the Tanna of “when he had shaved, before he shaved”? Rebbi Eliezer! But for the rabbis it would be before the blood was sprinkled for him. Ulla bar Ismael in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: What is Rebbi Eliezer’s reason? “The nazir shall shave the hair of his crowned head.” The Torah made his nezirut dependent on his hair.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:11

From where about a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of the rabbis: “Or on a far trip for you.” What is open for you, including everything in the open. This excludes the case of a grave in the abyss which is not open.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:13

If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:14

“What is a grave of the abyss? A corpse buried in stubble, straw, dust, or pebbles. But if it was buried in water, a dark spot, or rock crevasses, it does not create a grave of the abyss.” The principle: Any place from where it can be removed creates a grave of the abyss; any place from where it cannot be removed does not create a grave of the abyss. Can stubbles and straw not be removed? Does the Mishnah not follow Rebbi Yose, since Rebbi Yose said, straw said to be disregarded is disregarded. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: It is everybody’s opinion. What Rebbi Yose said, if he mixed it with dust. “There is straw which is treated like dust and dust which is treated like straw. Straw not to be removed is like dust; dust to be removed is like straw.” In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said: If he covered it with mats it is disregarded. Come and see: If he [filled] it with mats it is not disregarded, if he covered it with mats it is disregarded. If he filled it with branches of date palms it is problematic. Rebbi Zeriqan, Rebbi Immi, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Even thin sheets.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:14

“What is a grave of the abyss? A corpse buried in stubble, straw, dust, or pebbles. But if it was buried in water, a dark spot, or rock crevasses, it does not create a grave of the abyss.” The principle: Any place from where it can be removed creates a grave of the abyss; any place from where it cannot be removed does not create a grave of the abyss. Can stubbles and straw not be removed? Does the Mishnah not follow Rebbi Yose, since Rebbi Yose said, straw said to be disregarded is disregarded. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: It is everybody’s opinion. What Rebbi Yose said, if he mixed it with dust. “There is straw which is treated like dust and dust which is treated like straw. Straw not to be removed is like dust; dust to be removed is like straw.” In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said: If he covered it with mats it is disregarded. Come and see: If he [filled] it with mats it is not disregarded, if he covered it with mats it is disregarded. If he filled it with branches of date palms it is problematic. Rebbi Zeriqan, Rebbi Immi, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Even thin sheets.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:15

“What is a grave of the abyss? Any which nobody remembers.” Should we not be cautious and say, maybe one at the end of the world? And is the permanence of the living not like living? Explain that he was found compressed.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:18

Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joshia, since Rebbi Joshia said, if impurity is hidden in the ground below the house, the nazir shaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, here on the side, there on place. Rebbi Ezra said in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Even if you say in both cases on the side, in both cases on place. What means “impure”? Impure and he does not shave?

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:20

HALAKHAH: What means “lying as usual”? His legs straight and his hands over his heart. But if he found him compressed, I am saying that a heap fell on him and killed him. But did we not state: “If he found two with their heads beside their legs, he takes them and their surroundings?” They wanted to say, what means “compressed”? Their heads beside their legs. Rebbi Isaac ben Rebbi Eleazar said, like fried fish, the head of one near the tail of the other and vice versa.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:20

HALAKHAH: What means “lying as usual”? His legs straight and his hands over his heart. But if he found him compressed, I am saying that a heap fell on him and killed him. But did we not state: “If he found two with their heads beside their legs, he takes them and their surroundings?” They wanted to say, what means “compressed”? Their heads beside their legs. Rebbi Isaac ben Rebbi Eleazar said, like fried fish, the head of one near the tail of the other and vice versa.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:21

Rebbi Isaac bar Gufta asked before Rebbi Mana: In a statement you say, “he collects every single bone and everything is pure;” and here, you say so? He answered him, say what comes afterwards: “If he prepared it from the start as a grave, it has surroundings.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:25

There, we have stated: “If a vineyard is planted with less that four cubits of space, Rebbi Simeon says that it is no vineyard. But the Sages say that it is a vineyard and one disregards the plants in the middle as if nonexistent.” Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Just as they disagree here, they disagree about a graveyard. Rebbi Jonah said, one cannot compare these. There, they form a graveyard; here, they do not form a graveyard. Rebbi Yose said, one cannot compare these. There, if they were spaced apart and one moved them closer together, that is the disagreement. If they were close and one moved them apart, everybody would agree. But here, what is their disagreement? When one found them close together. Rebbi Simeon said, a landslide fell on them and compressed them. But the Sages say, were they spaced apart and somebody brought them close together?”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:32

HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:32

HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:32

HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:32

HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:32

HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:4

Only if he says, it was written before me during the day and signed during the day; only if he says, it was written before me especially for her and signed expressly for her. It was asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does he have to know the names of the witnesses at the moment of their signing? He said to them, did the Gentiles Luciani sign it? And you say so? A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “All bills of divorce coming from overseas are valid even if their names sound Gentile since Jews outside the Land of Israel bear Gentile names.” He said only, outside the Land; therefore not in the Land of Israel. What about this? Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Issi: unless he writes, at a Jewish place. If there is no Jewish place, in the synagogue. If there is no synagogue, he assembles there ten people. Rebbi Abun said, it would be better to certify the signatures than to assemble there ten people. What about this? Even in a Jewish store.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:4

Only if he says, it was written before me during the day and signed during the day; only if he says, it was written before me especially for her and signed expressly for her. It was asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does he have to know the names of the witnesses at the moment of their signing? He said to them, did the Gentiles Luciani sign it? And you say so? A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “All bills of divorce coming from overseas are valid even if their names sound Gentile since Jews outside the Land of Israel bear Gentile names.” He said only, outside the Land; therefore not in the Land of Israel. What about this? Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Issi: unless he writes, at a Jewish place. If there is no Jewish place, in the synagogue. If there is no synagogue, he assembles there ten people. Rebbi Abun said, it would be better to certify the signatures than to assemble there ten people. What about this? Even in a Jewish store.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:5

If he did not say: “it was written and signed before me”? Should not an Amora have asked this question? He said to him, that is what Rabin ben Rav said: If he brought a bill of divorce, gave it to her, but did not tell her: “It was written and signed before me”? There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said to him, take it from her and say in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” Does Rebbi Joḥanan follow Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce? Can the position of Rebbi Joḥanan be derived from Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar? Would Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar agree that if he told her at the moment of delivery that it was her bill of divorce it would not be a bill of divorce? But here, even if he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” But Rebbi Joḥanan might hold that a woman cannot be believed if she says, I received a bill of divorce from my husband’s agents. But we did state: “The wife herself can bring her bill of divorce.” Would you not have to be afraid that she might have received the bill from a representative of the husband? How is it? The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan is to make her known as divorcee in front of two [witnesses].

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:6

A case came before Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. He said to him, it is unnecessary. The opinion of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi seems inverted. There, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce, but here, he says so? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: What you said was in earlier times when no Fellows were found outside the Land, but now that there are Fellows found outside the Land, they are competent. But did we not state, “and one who brings there”? And even if you say that no Fellows are found outside the Land, are we not found in the Land of Israel? In order not to make a distinction in the bills of divorce from outside the Land. But then one who brings from overseas should not have to say: “It was written before me and signed before me.” Not to make a distinction in the bills of divorce in the Land of Israel. What about it? One is restrictive in a simple case because of the complicated one and one is not permissive in the complicated because of the easy one. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Simeon bar Abba: This of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, if it was done. But from the start even Rebbi Joshua ben Levi agrees.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:6

A case came before Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. He said to him, it is unnecessary. The opinion of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi seems inverted. There, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce, but here, he says so? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: What you said was in earlier times when no Fellows were found outside the Land, but now that there are Fellows found outside the Land, they are competent. But did we not state, “and one who brings there”? And even if you say that no Fellows are found outside the Land, are we not found in the Land of Israel? In order not to make a distinction in the bills of divorce from outside the Land. But then one who brings from overseas should not have to say: “It was written before me and signed before me.” Not to make a distinction in the bills of divorce in the Land of Israel. What about it? One is restrictive in a simple case because of the complicated one and one is not permissive in the complicated because of the easy one. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Simeon bar Abba: This of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, if it was done. But from the start even Rebbi Joshua ben Levi agrees.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:13

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan told the people of Sepphoris: You say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a person who brings a bill of divorce from Babylonia does not have to say “it was written and signed before me.” But I am saying that it is necessary, for there is a Mishnah: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East and Reqam belongs to the East.” And even if you say that they disagree with Rebbi Jehudah and say that Reqam does not belong to the East, what about from Babylonia to here? Rav said, we consider ourselves as in the Land of Israel in the matter of bills of divorce. But Samuel said, even from one city quarter to another. He asked before him to change his opinion, when Cahana told him, what would we do with the earlier cases of women who remarried? He said to him, what do you have in your hand? For he was of Rebbi’s opinion as it was stated: If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas which was neither written nor signed in his presence, she has to leave under the thirteen penalties, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages did not agree in this matter.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:13

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan told the people of Sepphoris: You say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a person who brings a bill of divorce from Babylonia does not have to say “it was written and signed before me.” But I am saying that it is necessary, for there is a Mishnah: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East and Reqam belongs to the East.” And even if you say that they disagree with Rebbi Jehudah and say that Reqam does not belong to the East, what about from Babylonia to here? Rav said, we consider ourselves as in the Land of Israel in the matter of bills of divorce. But Samuel said, even from one city quarter to another. He asked before him to change his opinion, when Cahana told him, what would we do with the earlier cases of women who remarried? He said to him, what do you have in your hand? For he was of Rebbi’s opinion as it was stated: If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas which was neither written nor signed in his presence, she has to leave under the thirteen penalties, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages did not agree in this matter.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:13

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan told the people of Sepphoris: You say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a person who brings a bill of divorce from Babylonia does not have to say “it was written and signed before me.” But I am saying that it is necessary, for there is a Mishnah: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East and Reqam belongs to the East.” And even if you say that they disagree with Rebbi Jehudah and say that Reqam does not belong to the East, what about from Babylonia to here? Rav said, we consider ourselves as in the Land of Israel in the matter of bills of divorce. But Samuel said, even from one city quarter to another. He asked before him to change his opinion, when Cahana told him, what would we do with the earlier cases of women who remarried? He said to him, what do you have in your hand? For he was of Rebbi’s opinion as it was stated: If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas which was neither written nor signed in his presence, she has to leave under the thirteen penalties, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages did not agree in this matter.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:14

Everybody agrees that if [the husband] comes and protests, his protest is invalid. That is, if he protested after she remarried. If he protested before she remarried and then she remarried? Let us hear from the following: It happened that somebody brought a bill of divorce before Rebbi Ismael. He asked him, from where are you? He answered, from Kefar Simai in the region of Acco. He said to him, then you have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence;” you do not need witnesses. After [that person] left, Rebbi Ilai said to him, my teacher, is not Kefar Simai in the Land of Israel, closer to Sepphoris than to Acco? He answered, since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands. What means “since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands”? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that if [the husband] came and protested, his protest would be invalid. But does a person who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel for delivery in the Land of Israel have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence”? Therefore, there cannot be any difference whether he protested after she remarried or before she remarried and then she remarried.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:16

Rebbi Ḥiyya [bar] Abba said: If one sold a slave into Acco, the latter was set free. Rebbi Ismael, the father of Rebbi Yudan, asked: Even from Acco to Acco? This follows what Rebbi Aḥa bar Jacob said in the name of Rebbi Immi: From two actions of Rebbi we learn that Acco is partly of the Land of Israel and partly outside the Land. Rebbi was in Acco when he saw them eating clean bread; he asked them, how did you knead [the dough]? They said to him, a student came here and instructed us that egg water does not prepare. We are boiling eggs and use their water to knead. They thought he was talking about cooking water of eggs when he spoke only of the eggs themselves. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said, at that moment they decreed that a student may not render decisions. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: If a student gives instructions even according to practice, his instructions are no instructions.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:17

It was stated: A student who gave instructions about practice in front of his teacher has committed a deadly sin. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: Nadab and Abihu died only because they determined practice in the presence of their teacher Moses. It happened that a student gave instructions about practice in front of his teacher Rebbi Eliezer. The latter said to his wife Imma Shalom: That one will not live out his week. The week was not completed when he died. His students said to him: Rebbi, you are a prophet. He said to them (Amos 7:14) “I am neither a prophet nor the disciple of a prophet” but I have received a tradition that any student who gives instructions about practice in front of his teacher has committed a deadly sin. It was stated: A student is forbidden to give instructions about practice during the lifetime of his teacher unless he be at a distance of at least 12 mil from him, [the breadth of] the camp of Israel. What is the reason? (Num. 33:49) “They encamped along the Jordan from Bet Hayyešimot to Abel Haššiṭṭim in the plains of Moab”; how far is this? Twelve mil. Like this: Rebbi Tanḥum ben Jeremiah was in Ḥefer; they asked him and he gave instructions about practice. They said to him, did the Rabbi not teach us that a student may not give instructions about practice during the lifetime of his teacher unless he be at a distance of at least 12 mil from him, [the breadth of] the camp of Israel; and your teacher Rebbi Ḥana sits at Sepphoris! He said to them, so it should come over me that I did not know! From that moment on he did no longer give instructions.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:19

The villages in the territory of Sepphoris close to Acco, the villages in the territory of Acco close to Sepphoris, what do you do with them? Like Acco, like Sepphoris?

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:27

Rebbi Aḥa said, the acts of a Gentile court are public knowledge. Then even if both [witnesses] are Samaritan? Did one not say that they are not conversant with the fine points in writing bills of divorce? But Rebbi Simeon validates their bills of divorce! Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It turns out that Rebbi Simeon agrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Just as Rebbi Eleazar said, even if no witnesses signed on it, it is valid, so Rebbi Simeon said, even if no witnesses signed on it, it is valid. But then even if it was made by private persons? This shows that it was necessary that Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the acts of a Gentile court are public knowledge. A bond was executed in Bet Shean, whose witnesses were Gentiles. Rebbi Yose says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree, one said it is invalid, the other said it is valid. Rebbi Abbahu explained: Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said it is valid. What is Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s reason? That a Jew should not lose money. But if that one would not lose money, the other would lose money! Rebbi Yudan said, it must be in order not to close the door before people, for tomorrow one would look to borrow but does not succeed.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:33

Explanation: Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Yose ben Kipper descended to collect there for a colleague when they were slandered. They came and wanted to take it back from them. They answered, we already acquired it. They said, we wish for you to accept it in good faith; they answered, we are unpaid trustees. They approached Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai who told them, there it is, all of it. They took Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, whipped him with ropes, and took it from him. When they returned here, he went to his father and told him, look what your son did to me! He asked him, what did he do to you? He answered, if he had taken my position, they could not have taken anything from us. He asked him, why did you act in such a way? He said, I saw that they were a unanimous court, their hats were a cubit wide, they were directing blows, my brother Yose was bound and the whip ascended and descended. I said, does my father have another Dositheos? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, you say that for somebody who cannot give a warranty in good faith. But if somebody gives a warranty in good faith, one takes from this one and gives to the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:33

Explanation: Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Yose ben Kipper descended to collect there for a colleague when they were slandered. They came and wanted to take it back from them. They answered, we already acquired it. They said, we wish for you to accept it in good faith; they answered, we are unpaid trustees. They approached Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai who told them, there it is, all of it. They took Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, whipped him with ropes, and took it from him. When they returned here, he went to his father and told him, look what your son did to me! He asked him, what did he do to you? He answered, if he had taken my position, they could not have taken anything from us. He asked him, why did you act in such a way? He said, I saw that they were a unanimous court, their hats were a cubit wide, they were directing blows, my brother Yose was bound and the whip ascended and descended. I said, does my father have another Dositheos? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, you say that for somebody who cannot give a warranty in good faith. But if somebody gives a warranty in good faith, one takes from this one and gives to the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:35

“ ‘Give this mina to X,’ then he died. If the heirs want to hinder [the delivery] they are powerless. It is unnecessary to say that it is so if he said, acquire for him, if he said, accept by my orders.” Rebbi Abba barMamal said, this baraita refers to a sick person. If he is sick, does he not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him? Rebbi Mana said, I confirmed this by what Rebbi Abba bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: They treated verbal instructions by a sick person as if they were written and delivered. But only if he died from that sickness, not if he recovered, he did not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:10

Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon stated this only for the night; but on the next day even Rebbi Simeon will agree. But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there is no difference, whether night, or the next day, or after many days. What is the next day? Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mana, one said the next day, the other said the day after the next. The statement of Rebbi Joḥanan about Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish) is difficult! So says Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It turns out that Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish) agrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Just as Rebbi Eleazar said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid, so Rebbi Simeon said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid. Rebbi Samuel, the brother of Rebbi Berekhiah, said: Here, if he wants the document to be signed, there if she does not want the document to be signed. If he said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed today and some the next day. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for the remainder [are signing] only because of the condition. Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid unless all sign on the same day. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: There was a case that one said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed on that day and some the next day. The case came before the rabbis who reluctantly declared it valid. This supports Rebbi Joḥanan from the position of the rabbis and disagrees with Rebbi Simeon. This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from the position of Rebbi Simeon and disagrees with the rabbis.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:12

HALAKHAH: “One writes with anything,” etc. “He shall write”, not engrave. “He shall write”, not dropping points. “He shall write”, not pouring. “He shall write”, not engrave; some Tannaïm state, he even may engrave. Rav Ḥisda said, he who says not to engrave, if the writing stands out as on a denar. He who says even to engrave, as on a writing tablet. “He shall write”, not dropping points; Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom and Rebbi Mattaniah: One said, if he did not connect the points; the other said, even if he connected the points. “He shall write”, not pouring. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, those Orientals are very sophisticated. If one of them wants to write a secret letter to another, he writes with juice of gall-nuts. The recipient pours ink without gall over it, which is absorbed at the place of the writing. If one did that on the Sabbath, what? There, we have stated: “Writing on top of writing is not prosecutable.” Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both said, only if he wrote ink on ink or vermilion on vermilion. But if he wrote ink on vermilion or vermilion on ink, he is guilty. Rebbi Isaac bar Mesharshia in the name of the rabbis from there: He is doubly guilty, once for erasing and once for writing.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:15

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he wrote it on a golden cup and said, the writing is yours but the space between the lines belongs to me? Is that writing? Torn leather is valid, if it was torn it is invalid. If it was not torn by the tear of a court, but if it was torn by the tear of a court. What is the tear of a court? Between the text and the witnesses.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:16

“On a leaf of the olive tree.” Is that not like torn? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Bina bar Shila stated: Even if he only wrote: “I X am divorcing my wife,” it is valid. This follows what Rebbi Ila said, if he detailed it is invalid, if he did not detail it is valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:17

“On a cow’s horn.” The Mishnah in case he says to her, here is your bill of divorce. But if he says to her, here is your bill of divorce and the remainder is for your ketubah, her bill of divorce and the payment of her ketubah were received together. If he said to her, here is your bill of divorce and the payment of your ketubah together? Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: If he delivered the halter to her, what? In commercial law, the buy is acquired, do you say so here? Or is it a difference since it is written: “he shall deliver into her hand,” until it is completely in her hand!

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:18

What is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being. Since a scroll is not food, so no food. What is the rabbis’ reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is detached, so everything detached. Are stalks of food in Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s opinion like food? Let us hear from the following: If he wrote it on a deer’s antlers, shaved it off, had it signed, and gave it to him, it is valid. Because he shaved it off before he had it signed. Therefore, not if he had it signed and afterwards shaved it off. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Miasha: Only if he wrote on the male horn. But if he wrote on the sheath it is as if separated and is valid. Rebbi Jonah asked: Is that the same for preparation of produce? If he desired that it should rain on an animal and [the rain] dropped from the animal on food. There, Rebbi Yose said “a scroll”, since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being; and here, does he say so? There is a difference since it is written, “any drinkable drink in any vessel shall be impure”. Then also if it rained into cisterns, ditches and caves? There is a difference here, for it is written: “a vessel”.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:18

What is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being. Since a scroll is not food, so no food. What is the rabbis’ reason? “Scroll.” Since a scroll is detached, so everything detached. Are stalks of food in Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s opinion like food? Let us hear from the following: If he wrote it on a deer’s antlers, shaved it off, had it signed, and gave it to him, it is valid. Because he shaved it off before he had it signed. Therefore, not if he had it signed and afterwards shaved it off. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Miasha: Only if he wrote on the male horn. But if he wrote on the sheath it is as if separated and is valid. Rebbi Jonah asked: Is that the same for preparation of produce? If he desired that it should rain on an animal and [the rain] dropped from the animal on food. There, Rebbi Yose said “a scroll”, since a scroll is special in not being a living being, so no living being; and here, does he say so? There is a difference since it is written, “any drinkable drink in any vessel shall be impure”. Then also if it rained into cisterns, ditches and caves? There is a difference here, for it is written: “a vessel”.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:20

HALAKHAH: “One does not write on anything connected to the ground,” etc. This does not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. Samuel bar Abba asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected it again, detached it, and delivered it to her; what does Rebbi Jehudah say? Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Abin asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected again, signed, and detached it, and delivered it to her; what do the rabbis say?

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:20

HALAKHAH: “One does not write on anything connected to the ground,” etc. This does not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. Samuel bar Abba asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected it again, detached it, and delivered it to her; what does Rebbi Jehudah say? Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Abin asked: If he wrote and signed it when detached, then he connected again, signed, and detached it, and delivered it to her; what do the rabbis say?

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:23

HALAKHAH: “Everybody is acceptable to write the bill of divorce,” etc. Rav Huna said, only if a sane person watches over them. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: But is it not written: “He shall write for her,” in her name? Samuel said, it is necessary that one reserve the essential text for him. This follows what Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:25

HALAKHAH: “If the minor received it and became an adult,” etc. There came a case before Rebbi Immi that a slave brought a bill of divorce; [he declared it] valid. Rebbi Abba said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that if a slave brought a bill of divorce, it would be invalid? Rebbi Assi said, if not for Rebbi Abba, we would have permitted a married woman! Even if you say that Rebbi Assi did not accept what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, did he not accept what the rabbis said? Let us hear from the following which Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave could accept a bill of manumission [for delivery] but he should not accept [a bill of divorce] as we do. They thought, he formulated “he should not accept,” therefore, if he transgressed and accepted, it would be valid. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Hoshaiah: It happened that she was a Cohen’s wife and they were not afraid of a hint of invalidity.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:25

HALAKHAH: “If the minor received it and became an adult,” etc. There came a case before Rebbi Immi that a slave brought a bill of divorce; [he declared it] valid. Rebbi Abba said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that if a slave brought a bill of divorce, it would be invalid? Rebbi Assi said, if not for Rebbi Abba, we would have permitted a married woman! Even if you say that Rebbi Assi did not accept what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, did he not accept what the rabbis said? Let us hear from the following which Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable that a slave could accept a bill of manumission [for delivery] but he should not accept [a bill of divorce] as we do. They thought, he formulated “he should not accept,” therefore, if he transgressed and accepted, it would be valid. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rav Hoshaiah: It happened that she was a Cohen’s wife and they were not afraid of a hint of invalidity.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:26

MISHNAH: Even women who cannot be believed if they say that [a woman’s] husband died are trustworthy to bring her bill of divorce: Her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her co-wife, her sister-in-law, and her husband’s daughter. What is the difference between divorce and death? The writing is the proof. A woman may herself bring her own bill of divorce, but she still is required to say that it was written and signed before her.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:27

HALAKHAH: “Also those women who cannot be believed if they say that [a woman’s] husband died,” etc. Would you believe her if it was written but not signed [in her presence]? If she did not say ‘it was written in my presence, it was signed in my presence’, would you permit her to remarry? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that parallels what Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests, his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:2

HALAKHAH: “Every bill of divorce which was not written for a particular wife,” etc. Who is dictating? School teachers. What means “in addition”? There it was not written as a bill of divorce but here it was written as a bill of divorce. What means “in addition”? There it was written neither in his name nor in her name but here it was written in his name but not in her name. What means “in addition”? There it was written in his name but not in her name but here it was written in his name and in her name but it was not written for divorce from the start.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:2

HALAKHAH: “Every bill of divorce which was not written for a particular wife,” etc. Who is dictating? School teachers. What means “in addition”? There it was not written as a bill of divorce but here it was written as a bill of divorce. What means “in addition”? There it was written neither in his name nor in her name but here it was written in his name but not in her name. What means “in addition”? There it was written in his name but not in her name but here it was written in his name and in her name but it was not written for divorce from the start.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:2

HALAKHAH: “Every bill of divorce which was not written for a particular wife,” etc. Who is dictating? School teachers. What means “in addition”? There it was not written as a bill of divorce but here it was written as a bill of divorce. What means “in addition”? There it was written neither in his name nor in her name but here it was written in his name but not in her name. What means “in addition”? There it was written in his name but not in her name but here it was written in his name and in her name but it was not written for divorce from the start.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:4

Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose asked before Rebbi Yose: Concerning what you say that one bill of divorce is invalid for two women, should not two bills of divorce be invalid for two women? He asked him, what is the question? He answered, did we not state: “If two people sent two [identical] bills of divorce which were intermingled, he gives both documents to both women.” There, it is a divorce for this one and a divorce for the other one; the mix-up caused [the problem]. But here, neither this one is divorced in her name nor is that one divorced in her name.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:4

Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose asked before Rebbi Yose: Concerning what you say that one bill of divorce is invalid for two women, should not two bills of divorce be invalid for two women? He asked him, what is the question? He answered, did we not state: “If two people sent two [identical] bills of divorce which were intermingled, he gives both documents to both women.” There, it is a divorce for this one and a divorce for the other one; the mix-up caused [the problem]. But here, neither this one is divorced in her name nor is that one divorced in her name.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:6

Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:6

Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:8

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce he has to leave space for the man, the woman, and the time.” He explains it, with the essential text. It is difficult for Rebbi Joḥanan: Do the Sages declare valid in case he wrote the essential text with the formulaic text? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: From its invalidity you learn its validity. If he wrote everything in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names not in her name, would that be valid? Similarly, if he wrote everything not in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names in her name, it is valid. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Jeremiah: Think of it, if it was paired? He said, so said his teacher Rebbi Ze‘ira to him: Since pairing is infrequent, even if there was pairing it is as if there was no pairing. Then it is difficult for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Even if he did not write the essential text in the formula, Rebbi Jehudah declares invalid! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ze‘ira: Rebbi Jehudah refers to something else; it follows what Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines about one subject is invalid in any case.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:9

What is “the good order”? Rebbi Sabbatai in the name of Ḥizqiah: Because of the good order of Jewish women, lest they frequently be divorced. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac asked Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: It is valid, and you say so? If it were invalid, then [the explanation] would be acceptable. Rebbi Abun said, for the good order of the scribe, that his livelihood be guaranteed.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:12

HALAKHAH: “If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it,” etc. What means “on the spot”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as nobody passed by there. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: as long as three people did not pass by there. If a Gentile passed by there? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana transported a bill of divorce; he lost it and a Saracen found it. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan; they declared [the bill] valid. This means that if a Gentile passed by it is valid. Could we say that he had a mark to identify it? But was it not stated: There are no marks for bills of divorce. That is, if he said, two or three lines. But here, the ה in it had a spot. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Why is it invalid here? I say, it was another [husband] whose name was like his name. Think of it, if they checked out that entire place and did not find another man whose name was like his name! But it is because of the severity of adultery. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry”? Rebbi Mana told him: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid, the other invalid. He lost the valid one and threw away the invalid. When he found it, I say that what he found was the invalid bill.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:12

HALAKHAH: “If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it,” etc. What means “on the spot”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as nobody passed by there. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: as long as three people did not pass by there. If a Gentile passed by there? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana transported a bill of divorce; he lost it and a Saracen found it. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan; they declared [the bill] valid. This means that if a Gentile passed by it is valid. Could we say that he had a mark to identify it? But was it not stated: There are no marks for bills of divorce. That is, if he said, two or three lines. But here, the ה in it had a spot. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Why is it invalid here? I say, it was another [husband] whose name was like his name. Think of it, if they checked out that entire place and did not find another man whose name was like his name! But it is because of the severity of adultery. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry”? Rebbi Mana told him: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid, the other invalid. He lost the valid one and threw away the invalid. When he found it, I say that what he found was the invalid bill.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:16

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah said three things before the Sages in the vineyard at Jabne: About [people in] a city which was surrounded by palisades.”What are palisades? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: For example if bells, chains, and dogs, and geese, and chickens, and soldiers surround the town. And Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said, it happened that a blind woman was able to flee from there. If there was one breach, it saved all. If there were hiding places, it is questionable. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abba bar Zavda, Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqula, in the name of Rebbi Yudan the Prince: Only if there were palisades of that government. But palisades from another government are like robbers.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:20

This does not disagree with what Rebbi Joḥanan said, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if an agent handed over to another agent, the first one is responsible. Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya: Because of a condition of the divorce. What is the difference between them? If the husband came earlier and took it. If you say, because of a condition of the divorce, that is understandable. If you say, because I do not want to see my valuables in somebody else’s hand, his valuables are not in somebody else’s hand. Is it the same for preliminary marriages? What is the difference between divorces and preliminary marriages? One can divorce through the agency of anybody. One cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:20

This does not disagree with what Rebbi Joḥanan said, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if an agent handed over to another agent, the first one is responsible. Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya: Because of a condition of the divorce. What is the difference between them? If the husband came earlier and took it. If you say, because of a condition of the divorce, that is understandable. If you say, because I do not want to see my valuables in somebody else’s hand, his valuables are not in somebody else’s hand. Is it the same for preliminary marriages? What is the difference between divorces and preliminary marriages? One can divorce through the agency of anybody. One cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:20

This does not disagree with what Rebbi Joḥanan said, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if an agent handed over to another agent, the first one is responsible. Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya: Because of a condition of the divorce. What is the difference between them? If the husband came earlier and took it. If you say, because of a condition of the divorce, that is understandable. If you say, because I do not want to see my valuables in somebody else’s hand, his valuables are not in somebody else’s hand. Is it the same for preliminary marriages? What is the difference between divorces and preliminary marriages? One can divorce through the agency of anybody. One cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:27

There is no “he does not worry,” since he has to worry lest the poor became rich. It was stated so: “If somebody lends money to a poor and rich person he cannot separate for him, for one does not separate for what was lost.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:28

Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The Mishnah speaks of the heirs in priesthood and Levitic status. But concerning the poor, the poor has no inheritance. Bar Qappara stated: No person is immune from this; if not he then his son, if not his son then his grandson. This means, he can change the terms. Can the creditor change the terms? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody lends money to a first rich and then poor person he cannot separate for him, for one does not separate for what was lost and the poor acquired what is in his hand.” This implies that the creditor cannot change the terms.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:28

Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The Mishnah speaks of the heirs in priesthood and Levitic status. But concerning the poor, the poor has no inheritance. Bar Qappara stated: No person is immune from this; if not he then his son, if not his son then his grandson. This means, he can change the terms. Can the creditor change the terms? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody lends money to a first rich and then poor person he cannot separate for him, for one does not separate for what was lost and the poor acquired what is in his hand.” This implies that the creditor cannot change the terms.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:33

For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:33

For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:33

For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:33

For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:33

For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:34

Rebbi Crispus asked: Does he check every year or only once every three years? Let us hear from the following: If somebody sells unspecified wine to another person, he has to warrant it until after Tabernacles. Rebbi Yudan said, explain it for those Galileans who harvest only after the beginning of Tabernacles and you cannot deduce anything. That which was said, “old from the preceding year, very old aged three years”, should we say because of the tasting? This means that any time it is declared old he has to warrant it for two years. This means that very old [wine] has to be warranted until Tabernacles. This means that he has to check every year. How does he check? May one check one amphora on which all others depend that they would not become vinegar? Rebbi Shammai said, there are people who knock on the barrel from the outside and know what is inside.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sent a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. This disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates the agent appointed by him by a declaration. He explains it by the stringency of the rules of incest. If he appointed an agent to deliver the bill of divorce, the latter has to deliver it in the presence of two [witnesses]; the agent is not counted as one of the two. If another agent went to invalidate the bill of divorce, he has to invalidate it in the presence of two [witnesses] and the agent is counted as one of the two. If he met him on the road and asked him, what about the bill of divorce I gave you? He answered, I delivered it to her. While they were talking there, he dropped it. He said, did you not tell me that you delivered it to her? He explained, I delivered it to her and she said, keep it for me. What? Can he be believed since it is in his power to divorce, or can he not be believed because it is in his hand? If the agent fell sick, how do you treat this? By the rules of divorces or the rules of preliminary marriages? By the rules of divorces one can divorce through the agency of anybody. By the rules of preliminary marriages one cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sent a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. This disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates the agent appointed by him by a declaration. He explains it by the stringency of the rules of incest. If he appointed an agent to deliver the bill of divorce, the latter has to deliver it in the presence of two [witnesses]; the agent is not counted as one of the two. If another agent went to invalidate the bill of divorce, he has to invalidate it in the presence of two [witnesses] and the agent is counted as one of the two. If he met him on the road and asked him, what about the bill of divorce I gave you? He answered, I delivered it to her. While they were talking there, he dropped it. He said, did you not tell me that you delivered it to her? He explained, I delivered it to her and she said, keep it for me. What? Can he be believed since it is in his power to divorce, or can he not be believed because it is in his hand? If the agent fell sick, how do you treat this? By the rules of divorces or the rules of preliminary marriages? By the rules of divorces one can divorce through the agency of anybody. By the rules of preliminary marriages one cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:6

If he transgressed and annulled? Let us hear from the following: “If he annulled it is annulled, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he can neither annul it nor add to his condition.” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says it correctly. What is the reason of Rebbi? It is the word of the Torah that he has the power to annul but they said, he shall not annul. Can their word uproot the words of the Torah? But is it not from the Torah that one may [give as heave] olives for oil and grapes for wine, but because of robbing the tribe they said not only that one may not give heave [in this way] but if he transgressed and gave, his heave is not heave. Rebbi Oshaia bar Abba said to Rebbi Yudan the Prince: Who could tell exactly what your ancestor meant?

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:6

If he transgressed and annulled? Let us hear from the following: “If he annulled it is annulled, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he can neither annul it nor add to his condition.” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says it correctly. What is the reason of Rebbi? It is the word of the Torah that he has the power to annul but they said, he shall not annul. Can their word uproot the words of the Torah? But is it not from the Torah that one may [give as heave] olives for oil and grapes for wine, but because of robbing the tribe they said not only that one may not give heave [in this way] but if he transgressed and gave, his heave is not heave. Rebbi Oshaia bar Abba said to Rebbi Yudan the Prince: Who could tell exactly what your ancestor meant?

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:18

If [the master] blinded [the slave’s] two eyes simultaneously, or broke two of his teeth simultaneously, the slave thereby obtains his freedom. One after the other, he obtains his freedom from the first [injury] and [the master] has to pay for the second. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Following the opinion that [the master] does not have to write a bill of manumission for him. But following the opinion that [the master] has to write a bill of manumission for him, can you say that he has to pay him? Not only does this apply to one who gains his freedom for a tooth or an eye, from where also that he may gain his freedom by a cap, or הרנירק טיאונוס, or the king’s freedom? The verse says, “he shall send him to freedom”, in any way. What is the status of his children? The children of him who leaves for a tooth or an eye are slaves, the children of him who leaves by the loss of hope are free. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is unreasonable; it is the other way around. The children of one who leaves for a tooth or an eye are free because the Torah freed him. The children of one who leaves by the loss of hope are slaves because the Torah did not free him.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:19

If a convert died and Jews plundered his property, if there were slaves, either adult or underage, they gain their freedom. Abba Shaul said, the adults gain their freedom, the minors do not become free. Why? They are no longer property after their owner’s death. Then even adults? Rebbi Abba said, since adults are competent to acquire themselves, they gain their freedom. Minors, who are not competent to acquire for themselves, do not gain their freedom. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, practice follows Abba Shaul. The opinions of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi are contradictory. There, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi and Rebbi Yossi ben Shaul in the name of Rebbi said: A person who has given up hope to recover his slave is not entitled to enslave him. They said, what Rebbi Joshua said about enslaving, if he did not give, he did not give; perhaps practice would be to enslave him, therefore he has to write him a bill of manumission. And here, he says so! We heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi taught us that correctly, perhaps practice follows Abba Shaul. The slave girl of Rabba bar Zuṭra ran away and he gave up hope to recover her. He went to ask Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. They said, he is not entitled to enslave her. How is it to write her a bill of manumission? They said to him, if you wrote, you did the right thing. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose: A slave who married as a free person in the presence of his master gained his freedom. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and formulating: If somebody writes a document of preliminary marriage for his slave or a document of definitive marriage for his girl slave, Rebbi says, they acquired, but the Sages say, they did not acquire. The first Tanna follows Rebbi: he acquired.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:20

Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasa’s name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meїr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:36

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sells himself and his children to Gentiles,” etc. The Mishnah, if he sold himself repeatedly. But if he sold himself once, one buys him back, but if he sold himself to the games, one does not buy him back. There was a case of one who sold himself to the games; the case came before Rebbi Abbahu, who said, what can we do? He did it for his livelihood.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:38

Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Even though Rebbi Meїr said that a Gentile may not acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to remove it from tithes, he agrees that he has property rights. What are property rights? Rebbi Abba said, the usufruct; as we have stated: “the buyer brings First Fruits because of the public good,” otherwise he could have brought First Fruits by the word of the Torah.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:2

HALAKHAH: “For tort victims one estimates with best quality land,” etc. “By an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.” Rebbi Abba bar Pappaios said before Rebbi Yose, where do we hold? If to qualify as damages, is that not what we stated “his neighbor’s ox” but not the ox of Temple property? If for bodily damages, is that not what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: A private person can claim damages but not the Temple? But we must deal with one who said, I obligate myself to give 100 minas to the Temple, when his ox went and did damage. You should not say, [the Temple] is a creditor and should collect from average quality land. Therefore, it was necessary to say that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land, by an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:2

HALAKHAH: “For tort victims one estimates with best quality land,” etc. “By an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.” Rebbi Abba bar Pappaios said before Rebbi Yose, where do we hold? If to qualify as damages, is that not what we stated “his neighbor’s ox” but not the ox of Temple property? If for bodily damages, is that not what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: A private person can claim damages but not the Temple? But we must deal with one who said, I obligate myself to give 100 minas to the Temple, when his ox went and did damage. You should not say, [the Temple] is a creditor and should collect from average quality land. Therefore, it was necessary to say that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land, by an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:4

“His field”, except if it was mortgaged. “His vineyard”, except Temple property. Where do we hold? If somebody caused damage and then dedicated to the Temple, that is what we have stated: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas.” If somebody dedicated to the Temple and then caused damage, that is what we have stated: “ ‘His neighbor’s ox’ but not the ox of Temple property.” Rebbi Yudan said, explain it if an ox of Temple property grazed on a private field. Rebbi Mana told him, we require Temple real estate and you say “on a private field”? But we must hold about one who said: I am obligating myself for 100 minas to the Temple; then went and caused damage. You should not say that between damages and a loan given before witnesses damages are privileged, and here damages are privileged against the Temple; therefore it was necessary to say “his vineyard”, except Temple property.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:4

“His field”, except if it was mortgaged. “His vineyard”, except Temple property. Where do we hold? If somebody caused damage and then dedicated to the Temple, that is what we have stated: “If he dedicated 90 minas but his debt was 100 minas.” If somebody dedicated to the Temple and then caused damage, that is what we have stated: “ ‘His neighbor’s ox’ but not the ox of Temple property.” Rebbi Yudan said, explain it if an ox of Temple property grazed on a private field. Rebbi Mana told him, we require Temple real estate and you say “on a private field”? But we must hold about one who said: I am obligating myself for 100 minas to the Temple; then went and caused damage. You should not say that between damages and a loan given before witnesses damages are privileged, and here damages are privileged against the Temple; therefore it was necessary to say “his vineyard”, except Temple property.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:5

“His field,” except movables. “His vineyard,” except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession. “ ‘His field,’ except movables.” About those who did not claim movables from the start. Is this different from what we stated: There is not only real estate; from where if he wanted to pay money? The verse says: “Money he shall return to its owner.” What did you mean to say that real estate is primary? Or should we say that money is primary? Then it should be irrevocably given to [the claimant] from the start! Do we not see rabbis who irrevocably give him real estate! “ ‘His vineyard,’ except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Nisa: If his father dug a cistern which caused injury during his father’s lifetime. Property fell to him after his father’s death. I might say that this property should be encumbered for that damage; therefore, it was necessary to say “his vineyard” to except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:5

“His field,” except movables. “His vineyard,” except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession. “ ‘His field,’ except movables.” About those who did not claim movables from the start. Is this different from what we stated: There is not only real estate; from where if he wanted to pay money? The verse says: “Money he shall return to its owner.” What did you mean to say that real estate is primary? Or should we say that money is primary? Then it should be irrevocably given to [the claimant] from the start! Do we not see rabbis who irrevocably give him real estate! “ ‘His vineyard,’ except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Nisa: If his father dug a cistern which caused injury during his father’s lifetime. Property fell to him after his father’s death. I might say that this property should be encumbered for that damage; therefore, it was necessary to say “his vineyard” to except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:6

“The best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay,” i. e., the party responsible for the damage, the words of Rebbi Ismael. Rebbi Aqiba says, “the best of his field and the best of his vineyard”, of the person suffering the damage. It is difficult for Rebbi Aqiba, he suffered damage, and you say so? But the court see what the field was worth before it was damaged and estimates accordingly. As it was stated, it is possible if the grazing was on best quality land, one estimates from best quality, from lowest quality one estimates from lowest quality. How is this? The best of the lowest quality is quite good. If you say so you provide a windfall for the person suffering the damage. One looks at the field as if it was full of first quality [produce] and estimates for him from the best quality land; least quality one estimates from least quality land. It turns out that he pays with best quality for best quality and from least quality for least quality. From where has Rebbi Aqiba that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land”? It is not from the Torah, it is a decree. “Why did they say, ‘for tort victims one estimates with best quality land’? Because of the robbers. That a man should say, why should I have robbed [land] in my hand, or land subject to a suit for damages on my hand? Tomorrow, the court will see my good field, take it from me, and support it by the verse, ‘the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay.’ ” So far his real estate. His pledge was inferred from his real estate. Since his real estate [is taken] from the best quality, also his pledge [is taken] from the best.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:13

HALAKHAH: “One cannot collect for usufruct,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due, and some say, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should be eager to marry her. Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there about an adult orphan, here about an underage orphan.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:21

Rav wrote to Rebbi, who transferred it to the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Ḥiyya wrote between the lines. If the orphans sold against the rules, one collects for dowry but one does not collect for sustenance. If they accepted a lien. I do not know what this lien is. Levi stated: Both for a lien made by the father and for a lien made by the son, one collects for dowry but one does not collect for sustenance. Rebbi Abba said, there is no mention of a lien made by the father, only a lien made by the son. If one cannot collect during the father’s lifetime, not so much less after the father’s death? Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If the daughters are married, the widow is sustained by them. Rebbi Abba follows his own [opinion] and Rebbi Jehudah follows his own [opinion]. For the sister of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaggai: Even if they died, the widow is sustained by them.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:22

What is the situation of grandchildren? Rebbi Mana said, grandchildren are like children. Rebbi Yose said, grandchildren are not like children. Rebbi Samuel, son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Mattaniah were sitting together. They wanted to say, the same situation applies to grandchildren here as there. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said to them, inheritance by biblical law jumped on grandchildren.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:25

HALAKHAH: “If orphans rely on a property owner, etc.” (Num. 18:28) “you” excludes partners, “you” excludes guardians, “you” excludes one who gives heave from what is not his. Did we not state (Terumot 3:3): “Partners who gave heave one after the other?” But one must be for Great Heave, the other for heave of the tithe. Did we not infer the laws of the Great Heave from heave of the tithe? But one is for practice, the other for action. “You” excludes guardians; but did we not state: “Orphans dependent on a home owner, or for whom the father had appointed a guardian, must tithe their produce.” The colleagues say, here for a permanent guardian, there for a temporary guardian. Rebbi Yose asked, does that apply to: “he may sell slaves but not real estate?” But here one deals with an adult orphan, there with an underage orphan.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:29

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator, fromthe following: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:36

“If somebody stole a log and used it in building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, for the benefit of repenting sinners, that he has to pay its full value.” Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? If he stole it planed, but if he stole and planed it himself, he owes him money. If he stole and planed it on the spot, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody appropriates another person’s ruin and rebuilds it without prermission, one appraises it and his hand is weak. If he wants to take his logs and stones, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It was asked in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: If somebody stores his bundle in somebody else’s ruin and wants to take it from there, does one not listen to him? He had not heard that Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of civilisation. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. We would have thought that they disagree only in the Land, but not outside the Land. Since Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, because of civilisation, this implies that there is no difference between the Land and outside the Land. If he wants to take [the value of] his logs and stones, what is the rule? One tells him, wait until he dwells in it. Samuel said, one pays him immediately.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:36

“If somebody stole a log and used it in building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, for the benefit of repenting sinners, that he has to pay its full value.” Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? If he stole it planed, but if he stole and planed it himself, he owes him money. If he stole and planed it on the spot, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody appropriates another person’s ruin and rebuilds it without prermission, one appraises it and his hand is weak. If he wants to take his logs and stones, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It was asked in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: If somebody stores his bundle in somebody else’s ruin and wants to take it from there, does one not listen to him? He had not heard that Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of civilisation. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. We would have thought that they disagree only in the Land, but not outside the Land. Since Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, because of civilisation, this implies that there is no difference between the Land and outside the Land. If he wants to take [the value of] his logs and stones, what is the rule? One tells him, wait until he dwells in it. Samuel said, one pays him immediately.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:40

“The law of siqariqon always applies in Galilee.” The law of siqariqon does not apply to movables. It was stated: “The law of siqariqon does not apply to foreclosures for a debt and for tenant fees. [A foreclosure for nonpayment of] tenant fees waits twelve months for the owners.” Rebbi Judah ben Pazi said, after twelve months one announces on four consecutive Sabbaths. He explained it in two ways. If he took it from a tenant and gave it to a tenant and the first wants to foreclose, he says to him, are you not a tenant? Leave it for me and what you cut, you cut. If he took it from the owner and gave it to a tenant, the [owner] wants to foreclose, he tells him, what use do you have if you take it from me and he will take it from you, but what I can afford I shall give to you.