whereas
481 occurrences across the corpus
The Writings of Origen
He next returns to the subject of the Seven ruling Demons, whose names are not found among Christians, but who, I think, are accepted by the Ophites. We found, indeed, that in the Diagram, which on their account we procured a sight of, the same order was laid down as that which Celsus has given. Celsus says that “the goat was shaped like a lion,” not mentioning the name given him by those who are truly the most impious of individuals; whereas we discovered that He who is honoured in Holy Scripture as the angel of the Creator is called by this accursed Diagram Michael the Lion-like. Again, Celsus says that the “second in order is a bull;” whereas the Diagram which we possessed made him to be Suriel, the bull-like. Further, Celsus termed the third “an amphibious sort of animal, and one that hissed frightfully;” while the Diagram described the third as Raphael, the serpent-like. Moreover, Celsus asserted that the “fourth had the form of an eagle;” the Diagram representing him as Gabriel, the eagle-like. Again, the “fifth,” according to Celsus, “had the countenance of a bear;” and this, according to the Diagram, was Thauthabaoth, the bear-like. Celsus continues his account, that the “sixth was described as having the face of a dog;” and him the Diagram called Erataoth. The “seventh,” he adds, “had the countenance of an ass, and was named Thaphabaoth or Onoel;” whereas we discovered that in the Diagram he is called Onoel, or Thartharaoth, being somewhat asinine in appearance. We have thought it proper to be exact in stating these matters, that we might not appear to be ignorant of those things which Celsus professed to know, but that we Christians, knowing them better than he, may demonstrate that these are not the words of Christians, but of those who are altogether alienated from salvation, and who neither acknowledge Jesus as Saviour, nor God, nor teacher, nor Son of God.
Let us notice now what follows, where, expressing in a single word his opinion regarding the Mosaic cosmogony, without offering, however, a single argument in its support, he finds fault with it, saying: “Moreover, their cosmogony is extremely silly.” Now, if he had produced some credible proofs of its silly character, we should have endeavoured to answer them; but it does not appear to me reasonable that I should be called upon to demonstrate, in answer to his mere assertion, that it is not “silly.” If any one, however, wishes to see the reasons which led us to accept the Mosaic account, and the arguments by which it may be defended, he may read what we have written upon Genesis, from the beginning of the book up to the passage, “And this is the book of the generation of men,” where we have tried to show from the Holy Scriptures themselves what the “heaven” was which was created in the beginning; and what the “earth,” and the “invisible part of the earth,” and that which was “without form;” and what the “deep” was, and the “darkness” that was upon it; and what the “water” was, and the “Spirit of God” which was “borne over it;” and what the “light” which was created, and what the “firmament,” as distinct from the “heaven” which was created in the beginning; and so on with the other subjects that follow. Celsus has also expressed his opinion that the narrative of the creation of man is “exceedingly silly,” without stating any proofs, or endeavouring to answer our arguments; for he had no evidence, in my judgment, which was fitted to overthrow the statement that “man has been made in the image of God.” He does not even understand the meaning of the “Paradise” that was planted by God, and of the life which man first led in it; and of that which resulted from accident, when man was cast forth on account of his sin, and was settled opposite the Paradise of delight. Now, as he asserts that these are silly statements, let him turn his attention not merely to each one of them [in general], but to this in particular, “He placed the cherubim, and the flaming sword, which turned every way, to keep the way of the tree of life,” and say whether Moses wrote these words with no serious object in view, but in the spirit of the writers of the old Comedy, who have sportively related that “Prœtus slew Bellerophon,” and that “Pegasus came from Arcadia.” Now their object was to create laughter in composing such stories; whereas it is incredible that he who left behind him laws for a whole nation, regarding which he wished to persuade his subjects that they were given by God, should have written words so little to the purpose, and have said without any meaning, “He placed the cherubim, and the flaming sword, which turned every way, to keep the way of the tree of life,” or made any other statement regarding the creation of man, which is the subject of philosophic investigation by the Hebrew sages.
Celsus proceeds as follows: “With regard to the origin of the world and its destruction, whether it is to be regarded as uncreated and indestructible, or as created indeed, but not destructible, or the reverse, I at present say nothing.” For this reason we too say nothing on these points, as the work in hand does not require it. Nor do we allege that the Spirit of the universal God mingled itself in things here below as in things alien to itself, as might appear from the expression, “The Spirit of God moved upon the water;” nor do we assert that certain wicked devices directed against His Spirit, as if by a different creator from the great God, and which were tolerated by the Supreme Divinity, needed to be completely frustrated. And, accordingly, I have nothing further to say to those who utter such absurdities; nor to Celsus, who does not refute them with ability. For he ought either not to have mentioned such matters at all, or else, in keeping with that character for philanthropy which he assumes, have carefully set them forth, and then endeavoured to rebut these impious assertions. Nor have we ever heard that the great God, after giving his spirit to the creator, demands it back again. Proceeding next foolishly to assail these impious assertions, he asks: “What god gives anything with the intention of demanding it back? For it is the mark of a needy person to demand back [what he has given], whereas God stands in need of nothing.” To this he adds, as if saying something clever against certain parties: “Why, when he lent [his spirit], was he ignorant that he was lending it to an evil being?” He asks, further: “Why does he pass without notice a wicked creator who was counter-working his purposes?”
Celsus accordingly, as not understanding the doctrine relating to the Spirit of God (“for the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned”), weaves together [such a web] as pleases himself, imagining that we, in calling God a Spirit, differ in no respect in this particular from the Stoics among the Greeks, who maintain that “God is a Spirit, diffused through all things, and containing all things within Himself.” Now the superintendence and providence of God does extend through all things, but not in the way that spirit does, according to the Stoics. Providence indeed contains all things that are its objects, and comprehends them all, but not as a containing body includes its contents, because they also are “body,” but as a divine power does it comprehend what it contains. According to the philosophers of the Porch, indeed, who assert that principles are “corporeal,” and who on that account make all things perishable, and who venture even to make the God of all things capable of perishing, the very Word of God, who descends even to the lowest of mankind, would be—did it not appear to them to be too gross an incongruity—nothing else than a “corporeal” spirit; whereas, in our opinion,—who endeavour to demonstrate that the rational soul is superior to all “corporeal” nature, and that it is an invisible substance, and incorporeal,—God the Word, by whom all things were made, who came, in order that all things might be made by the Word, not to men only, but to what are deemed the very lowest of things, under the dominion of nature alone, would be no body. The Stoics, then, may consign all things to destruction by fire; we, however, know of no incorporeal substance that is destructible by fire, nor [do we believe] that the soul of man, or the substance of “angels,” or of “thrones,” or “dominions,” or “principalities,” or “powers,” can be dissolved by fire.
After this he returns to the subject of Marcion’s opinions (having already spoken frequently of them), and states some of them correctly, while others he has misunderstood; these, however, it is not necessary for us to answer or refute. Again, after this he brings forward the various arguments that may be urged on Marcion’s behalf, and also against him, enumerating what the opinions are which exonerate him from the charges, and what expose him to them; and when he desires to support the statement which declares that Jesus has been the subject of prophecy,—in order to found a charge against Marcion and his followers,—he distinctly asks, “How could he, who was punished in such a manner, be shown to be God’s Son, unless these things had been predicted of him?” He next proceeds to jest, and, as his custom is, to pour ridicule upon the subject, introducing “two sons of God, one the son of the Creator, and the other the son of Marcion’s God; and he portrays their single combats, saying that the Theomachies of the Fathers are like the battles between quails; or that the Fathers, becoming useless through age, and falling into their dotage, do not meddle at all with one another, but leave their sons to fight it out.” The remark which he made formerly we will turn against himself: “What old woman would not be ashamed to lull a child to sleep with such stories as he has inserted in the work which he entitles A True Discourse? For when he ought seriously to apply himself to argument, he leaves serious argument aside, and betakes himself to jesting and buffoonery, imagining that he is writing mimes or scoffing verses; not observing that such a method of procedure defeats his purpose, which is to make us abandon Christianity and give in our adherence to his opinions, which, perhaps, had they been stated with some degree of gravity, would have appeared more likely to convince, whereas, since he continues to ridicule, and scoff, and play the buffoon, we answer that it is because he has no argument of weight (for such he neither had, nor could understand) that he has betaken himself to such drivelling.”
To the preceding remarks he adds the following: “Since a divine Spirit inhabited the body [of Jesus], it must certainly have been different from that of other beings, in respect of grandeur, or beauty, or strength, or voice, or impressiveness, or persuasiveness. For it is impossible that He, to whom was imparted some divine quality beyond other beings, should not differ from others; whereas this person did not differ in any respect from another, but was, as they report, little, and ill-favoured, and ignoble.” Now it is evident by these words, that when Celsus wishes to bring a charge against Jesus, he adduces the sacred writings, as one who believed them to be writings apparently fitted to afford a handle for a charge against Him; but wherever, in the same writings, statements would appear to be made opposed to those charges which are adduced, he pretends not even to know them! There are, indeed, admitted to be recorded some statements respecting the body of Jesus having been “ill-favoured;” not, however, “ignoble,” as has been stated, nor is there any certain evidence that he was “little.” The language of Isaiah runs as follows, who prophesied regarding Him that He would come and visit the multitude, not in comeliness of form, nor in any surpassing beauty: “Lord, who hath believed our report, and to whom was the arm of the Lord revealed? He made announcement before Him, as a child, as a root in a thirsty ground. He has no form nor glory, and we beheld Him, and He had no form nor beauty; but His form was without honour, and inferior to that of the sons of men.” These passages, then, Celsus listened to, because he thought they were of use to him in bringing a charge against Jesus; but he paid no attention to the words of the 45th Psalm, and why it is then said, “Gird Thy sword upon Thy thigh, O most mighty, with Thy comeliness and beauty, and continue, and prosper, and reign.”
Moreover, if it is believed not only among Christians and Jews, but also by many others among the Greeks and barbarians, that the human soul lives and subsists after its separation from the body; and if reason supports the idea that pure souls which are not weighed down with sin as with a weight of lead ascend on high to the region of purer and more etherial bodies, leaving here below their grosser bodies along with their impurities; whereas souls that are polluted and dragged down to the earth by their sins, so that they are unable even to breathe upwards, wander hither and thither, at some times about sepulchres, where they appear as the apparitions of shadowy spirits, at others among other objects on the ground;—if this is so, what are we to think of those spirits that are attached for entire ages, as I may say, to particular dwellings and places, whether by a sort of magical force or by their own natural wickedness? Are we not compelled by reason to set down as evil such spirits as employ the power of prophesying—a power in itself neither good nor bad—for the purpose of deceiving men, and thus turn them away from God, and from the purity of His service? It is moreover evident that this is their character, when we add that they delight in the blood of victims, and in the smoke and odour of sacrifices, and that they feed their bodies on these, and that they take pleasure in such haunts as these, as though they sought in them the sustenance of their lives; in this resembling those depraved men who despise the purity of a life apart from the senses, and who have no inclination except for the pleasures of the body, and for that earthly and bodily life in which these pleasures are found. If the Delphian Apollo were a god, as the Greeks suppose, would he not rather have chosen as his prophet some wise man? or if such an one was not to be found, then one who was endeavouring to become wise? How came he not to prefer a man to a woman for the utterance of his prophecies? And if he preferred the latter sex, as though he could only find pleasure in the breast of a woman, why did he not choose among women a virgin to interpret his will?
Celsus adds, that it was foretold to the Jews, that if they did not obey the law, they would be treated in the same way as they treated their enemies; and then he quotes from the teaching of Christ some precepts which he considers contrary to those of the law, and uses that as an argument against us. But before proceeding to this point, we must speak of that which precedes. We hold, then, that the law has a twofold sense,—the one literal, the other spiritual,—as has been shown by some before us. Of the first or literal sense it is said, not by us, but by God, speaking in one of the prophets, that “the statutes are not good, and the judgments not good;” whereas, taken in a spiritual sense, the same prophet makes God say that “His statutes are good, and His judgments good.” Yet evidently the prophet is not saying things which are contradictory of each other. Paul in like manner says, that “the letter killeth, and the spirit giveth life,” meaning by “the letter” the literal sense, and by “the spirit” the spiritual sense of Scripture. We may therefore find in Paul, as well as in the prophet, apparent contradictions. Indeed, if Ezekiel says in one place, “I gave them commandments which were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live,” and in another, “I gave them good commandments and judgments, which if a man shall do, he shall live by them,” Paul in like manner, when he wishes to disparage the law taken literally, says, “If the ministration of death, written and engraven in stones, was glorious, so that the children of Israel could not stedfastly behold the face of Moses for the glory of his countenance, which glory was to be done away, how shall not the ministration of the Spirit be rather glorious?” But when in another place he wishes to praise and recommend the law, he calls it “spiritual,” and says, “We know that the law is spiritual;” and, “Wherefore the law is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good.”
Seeking God, then, in this way, we have no need to visit the oracles of Trophonius, of Amphiaraus, and of Mopsus, to which Celsus would send us, assuring us that we would there “see the gods in human form, appearing to us with all distinctness, and without illusion.” For we know that these are demons, feeding on the blood, and smoke, and odour of victims, and shut up by their base desires in prisons, which the Greeks call temples of the gods, but which we know are only the dwellings of deceitful demons. To this Celsus maliciously adds, in regard to these gods which, according to him, are in human form, “they do not show themselves for once, or at intervals, like him who has deceived men, but they are ever open to intercourse with those who desire it.” From this remark, it would seem that Celsus supposes that the appearance of Christ to His disciples after His resurrection was like that of a spectre flitting before their eyes; whereas these gods, as he calls them, in human shape always present themselves to those who desire it. But how is it possible that a phantom which, as he describes it, flew past to deceive the beholders, could produce such effects after it had passed away, and could so turn the hearts of men as to lead them to regulate their actions according to the will of God, as in view of being hereafter judged by Him? And how could a phantom drive away demons, and show other indisputable evidences of power, and that not in any one place, like these so-called gods in human form, but making its divine power felt through the whole world, in drawing and congregating together all who are found disposed to lead a good and noble life?
When Celsus here or elsewhere finds himself unable to dispute the truth of what we say, but avers that the same things were said by the Greeks, our answer is, that if the doctrine be sound, and the effect of it good, whether it was made known to the Greeks by Plato or any of the wise men of Greece, or whether it was delivered to the Jews by Moses or any of the prophets, or whether it was given to the Christians in the recorded teaching of Jesus Christ, or in the instructions of His apostles, that does not affect the value of the truth communicated. It is no objection to the principles of Jews or Christians, that the same things were also said by the Greeks, especially if it be proved that the writings of the Jews are older than those of the Greeks. And further, we are not to imagine that a truth adorned with the graces of Grecian speech is necessarily better than the same when expressed in the more humble and unpretending language used by Jews and Christians, although indeed the language of the Jews, in which the prophets wrote the books which have come down to us, has a grace of expression peculiar to the genius of the Hebrew tongue. And even if we were required to show that the same doctrines have been better expressed among the Jewish prophets or in Christian writings, however paradoxical it may seem, we are prepared to prove this by an illustration taken from different kinds of food, and from the different modes of preparing them. Suppose that a kind of food which is wholesome and nutritious has been prepared and seasoned in such a way as to be fit, not for the simple tastes of peasants and poor labourers, but for those only who are rich and dainty in their tastes. Suppose, again, that that same food is prepared not to suit the tastes of the more delicate, but for the peasants, the poor labourers, and the common people generally, in short, so that myriads of persons might eat of it. Now if, according to the supposition, the food prepared in the one way promotes the health of those only who are styled the better classes, while none of the others could taste it, whereas when prepared in the other way it promoted the health of great multitudes of men, which shall we esteem as most contributing to the public welfare,—those who prepare food for persons of mark, or those who prepare it for the multitudes?—taking for granted that in both cases the food is equally wholesome and nourishing; while it is evident that the welfare of mankind and the common good are promoted better by that physician who attends to the health of the many, than by one who confines his attention to a few.
Now, after understanding this illustration, we have to apply it to the qualities of spiritual food with which the rational part of man is nourished. See, then, if Plato and the wise men among the Greeks, in the beautiful things they say, are not like those physicians who confine their attentions to what are called the better classes of society, and despise the multitude; whereas the prophets among the Jews, and the disciples of Jesus, who despise mere elegances of style, and what is called in Scripture “the wisdom of men,” “the wisdom according to the flesh,” which delights in what is obscure, resemble those who study to provide the most wholesome food for the largest number of persons. For this purpose they adapt their language and style to the capacities of the common people, and avoid whatever would seem foreign to them, lest by the introduction of strange forms of expression they should produce a distaste for their teaching. Indeed, if the true use of spiritual food, to keep up the figure, is to produce in him who partakes of it the virtues of patience and gentleness, must that discourse not be better prepared when it produces patience and gentleness in multitudes, or makes them grow in these virtues, than that which confines its effects to a select few, supposing that it does really make them gentle and patient? If a Greek wished by wholesome instruction to benefit people who understood only Egyptian or Syriac, the first thing that he would do would be to learn their language; and he would rather pass for a barbarian among the Greeks, by speaking as the Egyptians or Syrians, in order to be useful to them, than always remain Greek, and be without the means of helping them. In the same way the divine nature, having the purpose of instructing not only those who are reputed to be learned in the literature of Greece, but also the rest of mankind, accommodated itself to the capacities of the simple multitudes whom it addressed. It seeks to win the attention of the more ignorant by the use of language which is familiar to them, so that they may easily be induced, after their first introduction, to strive after an acquaintance with the deeper truths which lie hidden in Scripture. For even the ordinary reader of Scripture may see that it contains many things which are too deep to be apprehended at first; but these are understood by such as devote themselves to a careful study of the divine word, and they become plain to them in proportion to the pains and zeal which they expend upon its investigation.
The Zohar (selections)
Three hollow places are manifested, wherein the letters are expressed. (These are to be understood as symbolizing his threefold brain, of wisdom, understanding, and knowledge, which here appear more plainly; whereas in the supernals they are more concealed.)
In the passage, “Samuel, Samuel” (1 Sam. iii. 10), an accent is also interpolated: wherefore? The latter name denoteth that which is perfect, the former that which is not as yet perfect; for now he is a prophet, whereas before this he was not as yet a prophet.
The Book of the Bee
It is well for us to take the materials for our discourse from the divine Scriptures, that we may not stray from the straight paths of the way of truth. The blessed David saith, ‘ Lord, thou hast been our dwelling-place in all generations, before the mountains were conceived.’ David, the harpist of the Spirit, makes known thereby, that although there was a beginning of the framing of Adam and the other creatures when they were made, yet in the mind of God it had no beginning; that it might not be thought that God has a new thought in respect of anything that is renewed day by day, or that the construction of Creation was newly planned in the mind of God: but everything that He has created and is about to create, even the marvellous construction of the world to come, has been planned from everlasting in the immutable mind of God. As the natural child in the womb of his mother knows not her who bears him, nor is conscious of his father, who, after God, is the cause of his formation; so also Adam, being in the mind of the Creator, knew Him not. And when he was created, and recognised himself as being created, he remained with this knowledge six hours only, and there came over him a change, from knowledge to ignorance and from good to evil. Hence, when Divine Providence wished to create the world, the framing of Adam was first designed and conceived in the mind of God, and then that of the (other) creatures; as David saith, ‘ Before the mountains were conceived.’ Consequently, Adam is older than the (other) creatures in respect of his conception, and the (other) creatures are older than Adam in respect of their birth and their being made. And whereas God created all creatures in silence and by a word, He brought forth Adam out of His thoughts, and formed him with His holy hands, and breathed the breath of life into him from His Spirit, and Adam became a living soul, and God gave him the knowledge of the difference between good and evil. When he perceived his Creator, then was God formed and conceived within the mind of man; and man became a temple to God his maker, as it is written, ‘ Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?’ And again, ‘ I will dwell in them, and walk in them.’
The Mishnah
These are the breaks between the sections: between the first blessing and the second, between the second and “Shema,” between “Shema” and “And it shall come to pass if you listen” between “And it shall come to pass if you listen” and “And the Lord said” and between “And the Lord said” and “Emet veYatziv” (true and firm). Rabbi Judah says: between “And the Lord said” and “Emet veYatziv” one should not interrupt. Rabbi Joshua ben Korhah said: Why was the section of “Shema” placed before that of “And it shall come to pass if you listen”? So that one should first accept upon himself the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven and then take upon himself the yoke of the commandments. Why does the section of “And it shall come to pass if you listen” come before that of “And the Lord said”? Because “And it shall come to pass if you listen” is customary during both day and night, whereas [the section] “And the Lord said” is customary only during the day.
These are to be considered ends of the rows: If two men begin [to gather] from the middle of the row, one facing north and the other south and they forget [some sheaves] in front of them and behind them, those left in front of them are “forgotten,” but those left behind them are not “forgotten.” If an individual begins from the end of the row and he forgets [some sheaves] in front of him and behind him, those in front of him are not “forgotten”, whereas those behind him are “forgotten,” for this comes under the category of “you shall not go back [to retrieve it].” This is the general rule: anything that can be said to fall under the law “you shall not go back” is considered “forgotten,” but that to which the principle of “you shall not go back” cannot be applied is not considered “forgotten.”
There were before him two baskets full of tevel, and he said: “Let the tithes of this [basket] be in that [basket],” the first [basket] is tithed. [If he said:] “Let the tithes of this [basket] be in that [basket], and the tithes of that [basket] in this [basket],” the first basket is tithed [whereas the second is not]. [If he said:] “Let the tithes be so that the tithes of each basket be in the other,” he has designated [the tithes of either basket].
[A non-priest drank] honey of dates, wine of apples, vinegar from winter grapes, and all other kinds of fruit juice of terumah: Rabbi Eliezer makes him liable to repay their value and the fifth; But Rabbi Joshua exempts from the fifth. Rabbi Eliezer declares [these] susceptible to uncleanness as liquids. Rabbi Joshua says: the sages have not enumerated seven liquids as those that count spices, but rather they stated: seven liquids make things susceptible to uncleaness, whereas all other liquids do not make susceptible.
He who was unclean or on a far-off journey and did not keep the first [Pesah] must keep the second. If he unwittingly erred or was prevented and did not keep the first, he must keep the second. If so, why does it say “an unclean person” and “one who was one a long journey” specified? That these are not liable to karet, whereas these are liable to karet.
What is the difference between the pesah [which was offered] in Egypt and the pesah of [subsequent] generations? The pesah in Egypt was taken on the tenth [of Nisan], And it required sprinkling with a bunch of hyssop on the lintel and on the two door-posts, And it was eaten in haste on one night, whereas the pesah of [subsequent] generations is kept the whole seven [days].
Rabbi Shimon says: what is the difference between shekels and a sin-offering? Shekels have a fixed value, but a sin-offering has no fixed value. Rabbi Judah says: shekels also have no fixed value. For when the Israelites came up out of the diaspora they used to pay the shekel in darics, then they paid the shekel in selas, then they paid it in tibs, and finally they wanted to pay it in dinars. But Rabbi Shimon said: nevertheless they are all of the same value for everyone, whereas [in the case of] a sin-offering one man may bring it of the value of one sela, another may bring it of the value of two selas, and another in the value of three selas.
There was another way in which Jerusalem was greater than Yavneh, that in every city which could see [Jerusalem] and hear and was near and could get to Jerusalem, they used to blow [on Shabbat], whereas in Yavneh they used to blow in the court only.
There is no difference between scrolls [of the Tanakh] and tefillin and mezuzahs except that scrolls may be written in any language whereas tefillin and mezuzahs may be written only in Assyrian. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that scrolls [of the Tanakh] were permitted [by the sages] to be written only in Greek.
There is no difference between Shiloh and Jerusalem except that in Shiloh sacrifices of lesser sanctity and second tithe could be eaten anywhere within sight [of the town], whereas in Jerusalem [they had to be eaten] within the walls. In both places the most holy sacrifices were eaten within the curtains. After the sanctification of Shiloh there is permission [for altars], but after the sanctification of Jerusalem there is no such permission.
A man died and left a wife, a creditor, and heirs and he also had a deposit or a loan in the possession of others: Rabbi Tarfon says: It shall be given to the one who is under the greatest disadvantage. Rabbi Akiva says: We do not show mercy in a matter of law. Rather it shall be given to the heirs, for whereas all the others must take an oath the heirs need not take any oath.
If he left produce that was detached from the ground, whoever seizes it first acquires possession. If the wife took possession of more than the amount of her ketubah, or a creditor of more than the value of his debt, the balance: Rabbi Tarfon says: it should be given to the one who is under the greatest disadvantage. Rabbi Akiva says: we do not show mercy in a matter of law. Rather it shall be given to the heirs, for whereas all the others must take an oath the heirs need not take any oath.
Three things are forbidden to a nazirite: ritual defilement, shaving and products of the vine. Defilement and shaving have a stringency that products of the vine do not have, in that defilement and shaving annul [the period of naziriteship already observed], whereas [partaking of] products of the vine does not do so. Products of the vine have a stringency that defilement or shaving do not have, in that products of the vine permit of no exception from the general prohibition, whereas defilement and shaving are allowed as exception from the general prohibition in the case where shaving is a religious duty, or where there is a neglected corpse. And defilement has a stringency that shaving does not have, in that defilement annuls the whole [period of naziriteship already served], and [a nazirite who is defiled] is liable for a sacrifice, whereas shaving annuls only thirty days and he is not liable for a sacrifice.
Three things are forbidden to a nazirite: ritual defilement, shaving and products of the vine. Defilement and shaving have a stringency that products of the vine do not have, in that defilement and shaving annul [the period of naziriteship already observed], whereas [partaking of] products of the vine does not do so. Products of the vine have a stringency that defilement or shaving do not have, in that products of the vine permit of no exception from the general prohibition, whereas defilement and shaving are allowed as exception from the general prohibition in the case where shaving is a religious duty, or where there is a neglected corpse. And defilement has a stringency that shaving does not have, in that defilement annuls the whole [period of naziriteship already served], and [a nazirite who is defiled] is liable for a sacrifice, whereas shaving annuls only thirty days and he is not liable for a sacrifice.
Three things are forbidden to a nazirite: ritual defilement, shaving and products of the vine. Defilement and shaving have a stringency that products of the vine do not have, in that defilement and shaving annul [the period of naziriteship already observed], whereas [partaking of] products of the vine does not do so. Products of the vine have a stringency that defilement or shaving do not have, in that products of the vine permit of no exception from the general prohibition, whereas defilement and shaving are allowed as exception from the general prohibition in the case where shaving is a religious duty, or where there is a neglected corpse. And defilement has a stringency that shaving does not have, in that defilement annuls the whole [period of naziriteship already served], and [a nazirite who is defiled] is liable for a sacrifice, whereas shaving annuls only thirty days and he is not liable for a sacrifice.
Shaving on account of defilement: How was it done? He would sprinkle [with purification water] on the third and seventh days, shave on the seventh day and bring his sacrifices on the eighth day. If he shaved on the eighth day, he would bring his sacrifices on that same day, the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Tarfon said to him: what difference is there between this one and a person with scale disease? He said to him: the purification of this one depends on his days, whereas the purification of one with scale disease depends on his shaving, and he cannot bring a sacrifice unless the sun has set upon him [after his purification].
Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: if he brought three animals without specifying [what they were for], the one suitable for a sin offering is sacrificed as a sin offering, for a burnt offering as a burnt offering, and for a well-being offering as a well-being offering. He would then take the hair of his nazirite head and threw it under the cauldron. If he shaved in the province he [also] would throw it under the cauldron. With regard to what was this said? With regard to shaving in ritual purity, whereas in shaving [after] ritual defilement he does not throw it under the cauldron. Rabbi Meir says: all [nazirites] throw it under the cauldron, except for the defiled nazirite [who shaved] in the provinces.
Two nazirites to whom someone says, “I saw one of you defiled, but I do not know which of you it was,” [Both] must shave and [together] bring sacrifices for defilement and sacrifices [for completing a naziriteship] in purity, [and one of them] must say, “If I am unclean, the sacrifices for defilement are mine, and the sacrifices in purity are yours, whereas if I am the one who is clean, the sacrifices in purity are mine and the sacrifices for defilement are yours.” And they must then count thirty [more] days and bring sacrifices in purity and [one of them] must say, “If I am the one who was unclean, the sacrifices for defilement were mine, the sacrifices in purity were yours, and these are my sacrifices in purity, whereas if I was the one who was clean, the sacrifices in purity were mine, the sacrifices for defilement were yours, and these are your sacrifices in purity.” If one of them dies: Rabbi Joshua said that [the other] should request that someone from the marketplace take a nazirite vow together with him, and say: “If I am unclean, you are to be a nazirite immediately, but if I was clean, you are to become a nazirite at the end of thirty days.” They then count thirty days and bring sacrifices for defilement and sacrifices [for completing a naziriteship] in purity and [the first one] says, “If I am the one who was unclean, the sacrifices for defilement are mine and the sacrifices in purity are yours, whereas if I am the one who is clean, the sacrifices in purity are mine and the sacrifices for defilement are [sacrifices offered] in doubt.” They then count [another] thirty days and bring [one set of] the sacrifices in purity and [the first one] says, “If I am the one who was defiled, the sacrifice for defilement [offered previously] was mine and the sacrifice in purity was yours, and this is my sacrifice in purity, whereas if I was the one who was clean, the sacrifice in purity was mine and the sacrifice for defilement [was offered] in doubt and this is your sacrifice in purity.” Ben Zoma said to him: Who will listen to him and take a nazirite vow together with him? Rather he must bring a bird as a sin offering and an animal as a burnt offering and say, “If I was defiled, the sin offering is part of my obligation and the burnt offering is a voluntary offering, whereas if I remained clean, the burnt-offering is part of my obligation and the sin offering is [a sacrifice offered] in doubt.” ‘ He must then count thirty days and bring the sacrifices in purity and say, “If I was defiled, the former burnt offering was a voluntary offering and this is part of my obligation, whereas if I remained clean, the former burnt offering was part of my obligation and this is the voluntary one. And these are the rest of my sacrifices.” Rabbi Joshua said: the result is that he brings his sacrifices half at a time! But the Sages agreed with Ben zoma.
Two nazirites to whom someone says, “I saw one of you defiled, but I do not know which of you it was,” [Both] must shave and [together] bring sacrifices for defilement and sacrifices [for completing a naziriteship] in purity, [and one of them] must say, “If I am unclean, the sacrifices for defilement are mine, and the sacrifices in purity are yours, whereas if I am the one who is clean, the sacrifices in purity are mine and the sacrifices for defilement are yours.” And they must then count thirty [more] days and bring sacrifices in purity and [one of them] must say, “If I am the one who was unclean, the sacrifices for defilement were mine, the sacrifices in purity were yours, and these are my sacrifices in purity, whereas if I was the one who was clean, the sacrifices in purity were mine, the sacrifices for defilement were yours, and these are your sacrifices in purity.” If one of them dies: Rabbi Joshua said that [the other] should request that someone from the marketplace take a nazirite vow together with him, and say: “If I am unclean, you are to be a nazirite immediately, but if I was clean, you are to become a nazirite at the end of thirty days.” They then count thirty days and bring sacrifices for defilement and sacrifices [for completing a naziriteship] in purity and [the first one] says, “If I am the one who was unclean, the sacrifices for defilement are mine and the sacrifices in purity are yours, whereas if I am the one who is clean, the sacrifices in purity are mine and the sacrifices for defilement are [sacrifices offered] in doubt.” They then count [another] thirty days and bring [one set of] the sacrifices in purity and [the first one] says, “If I am the one who was defiled, the sacrifice for defilement [offered previously] was mine and the sacrifice in purity was yours, and this is my sacrifice in purity, whereas if I was the one who was clean, the sacrifice in purity was mine and the sacrifice for defilement [was offered] in doubt and this is your sacrifice in purity.” Ben Zoma said to him: Who will listen to him and take a nazirite vow together with him? Rather he must bring a bird as a sin offering and an animal as a burnt offering and say, “If I was defiled, the sin offering is part of my obligation and the burnt offering is a voluntary offering, whereas if I remained clean, the burnt-offering is part of my obligation and the sin offering is [a sacrifice offered] in doubt.” ‘ He must then count thirty days and bring the sacrifices in purity and say, “If I was defiled, the former burnt offering was a voluntary offering and this is part of my obligation, whereas if I remained clean, the former burnt offering was part of my obligation and this is the voluntary one. And these are the rest of my sacrifices.” Rabbi Joshua said: the result is that he brings his sacrifices half at a time! But the Sages agreed with Ben zoma.
Two nazirites to whom someone says, “I saw one of you defiled, but I do not know which of you it was,” [Both] must shave and [together] bring sacrifices for defilement and sacrifices [for completing a naziriteship] in purity, [and one of them] must say, “If I am unclean, the sacrifices for defilement are mine, and the sacrifices in purity are yours, whereas if I am the one who is clean, the sacrifices in purity are mine and the sacrifices for defilement are yours.” And they must then count thirty [more] days and bring sacrifices in purity and [one of them] must say, “If I am the one who was unclean, the sacrifices for defilement were mine, the sacrifices in purity were yours, and these are my sacrifices in purity, whereas if I was the one who was clean, the sacrifices in purity were mine, the sacrifices for defilement were yours, and these are your sacrifices in purity.” If one of them dies: Rabbi Joshua said that [the other] should request that someone from the marketplace take a nazirite vow together with him, and say: “If I am unclean, you are to be a nazirite immediately, but if I was clean, you are to become a nazirite at the end of thirty days.” They then count thirty days and bring sacrifices for defilement and sacrifices [for completing a naziriteship] in purity and [the first one] says, “If I am the one who was unclean, the sacrifices for defilement are mine and the sacrifices in purity are yours, whereas if I am the one who is clean, the sacrifices in purity are mine and the sacrifices for defilement are [sacrifices offered] in doubt.” They then count [another] thirty days and bring [one set of] the sacrifices in purity and [the first one] says, “If I am the one who was defiled, the sacrifice for defilement [offered previously] was mine and the sacrifice in purity was yours, and this is my sacrifice in purity, whereas if I was the one who was clean, the sacrifice in purity was mine and the sacrifice for defilement [was offered] in doubt and this is your sacrifice in purity.” Ben Zoma said to him: Who will listen to him and take a nazirite vow together with him? Rather he must bring a bird as a sin offering and an animal as a burnt offering and say, “If I was defiled, the sin offering is part of my obligation and the burnt offering is a voluntary offering, whereas if I remained clean, the burnt-offering is part of my obligation and the sin offering is [a sacrifice offered] in doubt.” ‘ He must then count thirty days and bring the sacrifices in purity and say, “If I was defiled, the former burnt offering was a voluntary offering and this is part of my obligation, whereas if I remained clean, the former burnt offering was part of my obligation and this is the voluntary one. And these are the rest of my sacrifices.” Rabbi Joshua said: the result is that he brings his sacrifices half at a time! But the Sages agreed with Ben zoma.
Two nazirites to whom someone says, “I saw one of you defiled, but I do not know which of you it was,” [Both] must shave and [together] bring sacrifices for defilement and sacrifices [for completing a naziriteship] in purity, [and one of them] must say, “If I am unclean, the sacrifices for defilement are mine, and the sacrifices in purity are yours, whereas if I am the one who is clean, the sacrifices in purity are mine and the sacrifices for defilement are yours.” And they must then count thirty [more] days and bring sacrifices in purity and [one of them] must say, “If I am the one who was unclean, the sacrifices for defilement were mine, the sacrifices in purity were yours, and these are my sacrifices in purity, whereas if I was the one who was clean, the sacrifices in purity were mine, the sacrifices for defilement were yours, and these are your sacrifices in purity.” If one of them dies: Rabbi Joshua said that [the other] should request that someone from the marketplace take a nazirite vow together with him, and say: “If I am unclean, you are to be a nazirite immediately, but if I was clean, you are to become a nazirite at the end of thirty days.” They then count thirty days and bring sacrifices for defilement and sacrifices [for completing a naziriteship] in purity and [the first one] says, “If I am the one who was unclean, the sacrifices for defilement are mine and the sacrifices in purity are yours, whereas if I am the one who is clean, the sacrifices in purity are mine and the sacrifices for defilement are [sacrifices offered] in doubt.” They then count [another] thirty days and bring [one set of] the sacrifices in purity and [the first one] says, “If I am the one who was defiled, the sacrifice for defilement [offered previously] was mine and the sacrifice in purity was yours, and this is my sacrifice in purity, whereas if I was the one who was clean, the sacrifice in purity was mine and the sacrifice for defilement [was offered] in doubt and this is your sacrifice in purity.” Ben Zoma said to him: Who will listen to him and take a nazirite vow together with him? Rather he must bring a bird as a sin offering and an animal as a burnt offering and say, “If I was defiled, the sin offering is part of my obligation and the burnt offering is a voluntary offering, whereas if I remained clean, the burnt-offering is part of my obligation and the sin offering is [a sacrifice offered] in doubt.” ‘ He must then count thirty days and bring the sacrifices in purity and say, “If I was defiled, the former burnt offering was a voluntary offering and this is part of my obligation, whereas if I remained clean, the former burnt offering was part of my obligation and this is the voluntary one. And these are the rest of my sacrifices.” Rabbi Joshua said: the result is that he brings his sacrifices half at a time! But the Sages agreed with Ben zoma.
Two nazirites to whom someone says, “I saw one of you defiled, but I do not know which of you it was,” [Both] must shave and [together] bring sacrifices for defilement and sacrifices [for completing a naziriteship] in purity, [and one of them] must say, “If I am unclean, the sacrifices for defilement are mine, and the sacrifices in purity are yours, whereas if I am the one who is clean, the sacrifices in purity are mine and the sacrifices for defilement are yours.” And they must then count thirty [more] days and bring sacrifices in purity and [one of them] must say, “If I am the one who was unclean, the sacrifices for defilement were mine, the sacrifices in purity were yours, and these are my sacrifices in purity, whereas if I was the one who was clean, the sacrifices in purity were mine, the sacrifices for defilement were yours, and these are your sacrifices in purity.” If one of them dies: Rabbi Joshua said that [the other] should request that someone from the marketplace take a nazirite vow together with him, and say: “If I am unclean, you are to be a nazirite immediately, but if I was clean, you are to become a nazirite at the end of thirty days.” They then count thirty days and bring sacrifices for defilement and sacrifices [for completing a naziriteship] in purity and [the first one] says, “If I am the one who was unclean, the sacrifices for defilement are mine and the sacrifices in purity are yours, whereas if I am the one who is clean, the sacrifices in purity are mine and the sacrifices for defilement are [sacrifices offered] in doubt.” They then count [another] thirty days and bring [one set of] the sacrifices in purity and [the first one] says, “If I am the one who was defiled, the sacrifice for defilement [offered previously] was mine and the sacrifice in purity was yours, and this is my sacrifice in purity, whereas if I was the one who was clean, the sacrifice in purity was mine and the sacrifice for defilement [was offered] in doubt and this is your sacrifice in purity.” Ben Zoma said to him: Who will listen to him and take a nazirite vow together with him? Rather he must bring a bird as a sin offering and an animal as a burnt offering and say, “If I was defiled, the sin offering is part of my obligation and the burnt offering is a voluntary offering, whereas if I remained clean, the burnt-offering is part of my obligation and the sin offering is [a sacrifice offered] in doubt.” ‘ He must then count thirty days and bring the sacrifices in purity and say, “If I was defiled, the former burnt offering was a voluntary offering and this is part of my obligation, whereas if I remained clean, the former burnt offering was part of my obligation and this is the voluntary one. And these are the rest of my sacrifices.” Rabbi Joshua said: the result is that he brings his sacrifices half at a time! But the Sages agreed with Ben zoma.
Two nazirites to whom someone says, “I saw one of you defiled, but I do not know which of you it was,” [Both] must shave and [together] bring sacrifices for defilement and sacrifices [for completing a naziriteship] in purity, [and one of them] must say, “If I am unclean, the sacrifices for defilement are mine, and the sacrifices in purity are yours, whereas if I am the one who is clean, the sacrifices in purity are mine and the sacrifices for defilement are yours.” And they must then count thirty [more] days and bring sacrifices in purity and [one of them] must say, “If I am the one who was unclean, the sacrifices for defilement were mine, the sacrifices in purity were yours, and these are my sacrifices in purity, whereas if I was the one who was clean, the sacrifices in purity were mine, the sacrifices for defilement were yours, and these are your sacrifices in purity.” If one of them dies: Rabbi Joshua said that [the other] should request that someone from the marketplace take a nazirite vow together with him, and say: “If I am unclean, you are to be a nazirite immediately, but if I was clean, you are to become a nazirite at the end of thirty days.” They then count thirty days and bring sacrifices for defilement and sacrifices [for completing a naziriteship] in purity and [the first one] says, “If I am the one who was unclean, the sacrifices for defilement are mine and the sacrifices in purity are yours, whereas if I am the one who is clean, the sacrifices in purity are mine and the sacrifices for defilement are [sacrifices offered] in doubt.” They then count [another] thirty days and bring [one set of] the sacrifices in purity and [the first one] says, “If I am the one who was defiled, the sacrifice for defilement [offered previously] was mine and the sacrifice in purity was yours, and this is my sacrifice in purity, whereas if I was the one who was clean, the sacrifice in purity was mine and the sacrifice for defilement [was offered] in doubt and this is your sacrifice in purity.” Ben Zoma said to him: Who will listen to him and take a nazirite vow together with him? Rather he must bring a bird as a sin offering and an animal as a burnt offering and say, “If I was defiled, the sin offering is part of my obligation and the burnt offering is a voluntary offering, whereas if I remained clean, the burnt-offering is part of my obligation and the sin offering is [a sacrifice offered] in doubt.” ‘ He must then count thirty days and bring the sacrifices in purity and say, “If I was defiled, the former burnt offering was a voluntary offering and this is part of my obligation, whereas if I remained clean, the former burnt offering was part of my obligation and this is the voluntary one. And these are the rest of my sacrifices.” Rabbi Joshua said: the result is that he brings his sacrifices half at a time! But the Sages agreed with Ben zoma.
If he betroths a woman and then declares, “I thought that she was a priest’s daughter, and behold she is [the daughter of] a Levite” or “a Levite’s daughter whereas she is [the daughter of] a priest”; “Poor, whereas she is wealthy”, or “wealthy, whereas she is poor,” she is betrothed, since she did not deceive him. If he says to a woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me after I convert,” or “after you convert,” “After I am freed from slavery,” or “after you are freed from slavery”; “After your husband dies” or, “after your sister dies”; “After your yavam performs halizah for you”; she is not betrothed. Similarly, if he says to his friend, “If your wife gives birth to a female, behold she is betrothed to me,” she is not betrothed. [If his wife is pregnant, and her fetus is discernible, his words are valid, and if she bears a female, she is betrothed.]
If he betroths a woman and then declares, “I thought that she was a priest’s daughter, and behold she is [the daughter of] a Levite” or “a Levite’s daughter whereas she is [the daughter of] a priest”; “Poor, whereas she is wealthy”, or “wealthy, whereas she is poor,” she is betrothed, since she did not deceive him. If he says to a woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me after I convert,” or “after you convert,” “After I am freed from slavery,” or “after you are freed from slavery”; “After your husband dies” or, “after your sister dies”; “After your yavam performs halizah for you”; she is not betrothed. Similarly, if he says to his friend, “If your wife gives birth to a female, behold she is betrothed to me,” she is not betrothed. [If his wife is pregnant, and her fetus is discernible, his words are valid, and if she bears a female, she is betrothed.]
If he betroths a woman and then declares, “I thought that she was a priest’s daughter, and behold she is [the daughter of] a Levite” or “a Levite’s daughter whereas she is [the daughter of] a priest”; “Poor, whereas she is wealthy”, or “wealthy, whereas she is poor,” she is betrothed, since she did not deceive him. If he says to a woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me after I convert,” or “after you convert,” “After I am freed from slavery,” or “after you are freed from slavery”; “After your husband dies” or, “after your sister dies”; “After your yavam performs halizah for you”; she is not betrothed. Similarly, if he says to his friend, “If your wife gives birth to a female, behold she is betrothed to me,” she is not betrothed. [If his wife is pregnant, and her fetus is discernible, his words are valid, and if she bears a female, she is betrothed.]
Rabbi Judah said: an unmarried man must not tend cattle, nor may two unmarried men sleep together under the same cover. But the sages permit it. One whose business is with women must not be alone with women. And one should not teach his son a woman’s trade. Rabbi Meir says: one should always teach his son a clean and easy profession, and pray to Him to whom wealth and property belong. For a profession does not contain [the potential for] poverty and wealth, for poverty is not due to one’s profession nor is wealth due to the profession, but all depends on merit. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: have you ever seen a wild beast or a bird with a profession? Yet they are sustained without trouble. Now, were they not created only to serve me, while I was created to serve my master: surely then I should make a living without trouble! But my evil acts have done me in and withheld my livelihood. Abba Gurion a man of Sidon says in the name of Abba Guria: one should not teach his son [to be] a donkey-driver, camel-driver, wagon-driver, sailor, shepherd, or shopkeeper, because their profession is the profession of robbers. Rabbi Judah says in his name: most donkey-drivers are wicked, while most camel-drivers are worthy men; and most sailors are pious. The best of doctors are destined for Gehenna, and the worthiest of butchers is Amalek’s partner. Rabbi Nehorai says: I will abandon every profession in the world and I will not teach my son anything but Torah, for a person enjoys its reward in this world while the principal remains for him in the world to come. But all other professions are not so; for when a man comes to sickness or old age or suffering and cannot engage in his profession, he must die of starvation, whereas the Torah is not so, for it guards him from all evil in his youth and gives him a future and hope in his old age. Of his youth what is said? “But they that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength” (Isaiah 40:31). Of his old age what is said? “They shall still bring forth fruit in old age” (Psalms 92:15). And it is also said of our father Abraham, “And Abraham was old … And the Lord blessed Abraham with everything” (Genesis 24:1). We find that Abraham our father observed the whole Torah before it was given, for it is said, “Because Abraham obeyed My voice, and kept My charge, My commandments, My statutes, and My laws” (Genesis 26:5).
The law is more strict in the case of a man than in the case of an ox: for a man must pay for injury, pain, medical costs, loss of income and indignity, and make restitution for the value of the young; whereas the ox pays only for injury and is not liable for the value of the young.
If he [the owner] said to the unpaid guardian, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied], “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was captured,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “amen”, he is exempt [from having to bring a sacrifice for a false oath].
If he [the owner] said to the unpaid guardian, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied], “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was captured,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “amen”, he is exempt [from having to bring a sacrifice for a false oath].
If he [the owner] said to the unpaid guardian, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied], “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was captured,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “amen”, he is exempt [from having to bring a sacrifice for a false oath].
If he [the owner] said to the unpaid guardian, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied], “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was captured,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “amen”, he is exempt [from having to bring a sacrifice for a false oath].
If he [the owner] said to the unpaid guardian, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied], “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was captured,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “amen”, he is exempt [from having to bring a sacrifice for a false oath].
[If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “I do not know what you are talking about,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost, [and the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen”, he is exempt. [If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It was lost”; [and the owner said,] “I adjure you”, and he said, “Amen”, and witnesses testify against him that he had consumed it, he pays the principal; if he confessed himself, he pays the principal, a fifth, and brings a guilt-offering. [If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It was stolen;” [and the owner said,] “I adjure you, and he said, “Amen”, and witnesses testify against him that he himself stole it, he pays double; if he confessed himself, he pays the principal, fifth, and brings a guilt-offering.
If he [the owner] said to the borrower, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was captured”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt.
If he [the owner] said to the borrower, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was captured”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt.
If he [the owner] said to the borrower, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was captured”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt.
If he [the owner] said to the borrower, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was captured”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt.
If he [the owner] said to the borrower, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was captured”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt.
[If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “I do not know what you are talking about,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [and the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable. If he said to a paid guardian, or hirer, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured; [Or he replied,] “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured; [Or he replied,] “It was captured,” whereas in reality it died or was injured; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen”, whereas in reality it was lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost,” whereas in reality it was stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. [If he replied,] “It died,” or, “It was injured,” or, “It was captured,” whereas in reality it was stolen or lost; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable. [If he replied,] “It was lost,” or, “It was stolen,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. This is the principle: he who [by lying] changes from liability to liability or from exemption to exemption, or from exemption to liability, is exempt; From liability to exemption, is liable. This is the principle: he who takes an oath to make it more lenient for himself, is liable; to make it more stringent for himself, is exempt.
[If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “I do not know what you are talking about,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [and the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable. If he said to a paid guardian, or hirer, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured; [Or he replied,] “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured; [Or he replied,] “It was captured,” whereas in reality it died or was injured; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen”, whereas in reality it was lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost,” whereas in reality it was stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. [If he replied,] “It died,” or, “It was injured,” or, “It was captured,” whereas in reality it was stolen or lost; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable. [If he replied,] “It was lost,” or, “It was stolen,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. This is the principle: he who [by lying] changes from liability to liability or from exemption to exemption, or from exemption to liability, is exempt; From liability to exemption, is liable. This is the principle: he who takes an oath to make it more lenient for himself, is liable; to make it more stringent for himself, is exempt.
[If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “I do not know what you are talking about,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [and the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable. If he said to a paid guardian, or hirer, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured; [Or he replied,] “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured; [Or he replied,] “It was captured,” whereas in reality it died or was injured; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen”, whereas in reality it was lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost,” whereas in reality it was stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. [If he replied,] “It died,” or, “It was injured,” or, “It was captured,” whereas in reality it was stolen or lost; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable. [If he replied,] “It was lost,” or, “It was stolen,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. This is the principle: he who [by lying] changes from liability to liability or from exemption to exemption, or from exemption to liability, is exempt; From liability to exemption, is liable. This is the principle: he who takes an oath to make it more lenient for himself, is liable; to make it more stringent for himself, is exempt.
[If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “I do not know what you are talking about,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [and the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable. If he said to a paid guardian, or hirer, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured; [Or he replied,] “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured; [Or he replied,] “It was captured,” whereas in reality it died or was injured; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen”, whereas in reality it was lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost,” whereas in reality it was stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. [If he replied,] “It died,” or, “It was injured,” or, “It was captured,” whereas in reality it was stolen or lost; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable. [If he replied,] “It was lost,” or, “It was stolen,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. This is the principle: he who [by lying] changes from liability to liability or from exemption to exemption, or from exemption to liability, is exempt; From liability to exemption, is liable. This is the principle: he who takes an oath to make it more lenient for himself, is liable; to make it more stringent for himself, is exempt.
[If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “I do not know what you are talking about,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [and the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable. If he said to a paid guardian, or hirer, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured; [Or he replied,] “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured; [Or he replied,] “It was captured,” whereas in reality it died or was injured; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen”, whereas in reality it was lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost,” whereas in reality it was stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. [If he replied,] “It died,” or, “It was injured,” or, “It was captured,” whereas in reality it was stolen or lost; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable. [If he replied,] “It was lost,” or, “It was stolen,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. This is the principle: he who [by lying] changes from liability to liability or from exemption to exemption, or from exemption to liability, is exempt; From liability to exemption, is liable. This is the principle: he who takes an oath to make it more lenient for himself, is liable; to make it more stringent for himself, is exempt.
[If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “I do not know what you are talking about,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [and the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable. If he said to a paid guardian, or hirer, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured; [Or he replied,] “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured; [Or he replied,] “It was captured,” whereas in reality it died or was injured; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen”, whereas in reality it was lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost,” whereas in reality it was stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. [If he replied,] “It died,” or, “It was injured,” or, “It was captured,” whereas in reality it was stolen or lost; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable. [If he replied,] “It was lost,” or, “It was stolen,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. This is the principle: he who [by lying] changes from liability to liability or from exemption to exemption, or from exemption to liability, is exempt; From liability to exemption, is liable. This is the principle: he who takes an oath to make it more lenient for himself, is liable; to make it more stringent for himself, is exempt.
[If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “I do not know what you are talking about,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [and the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable. If he said to a paid guardian, or hirer, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured; [Or he replied,] “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured; [Or he replied,] “It was captured,” whereas in reality it died or was injured; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen”, whereas in reality it was lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost,” whereas in reality it was stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. [If he replied,] “It died,” or, “It was injured,” or, “It was captured,” whereas in reality it was stolen or lost; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable. [If he replied,] “It was lost,” or, “It was stolen,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. This is the principle: he who [by lying] changes from liability to liability or from exemption to exemption, or from exemption to liability, is exempt; From liability to exemption, is liable. This is the principle: he who takes an oath to make it more lenient for himself, is liable; to make it more stringent for himself, is exempt.
[If the owner said,] “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “I do not know what you are talking about,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [and the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable. If he said to a paid guardian, or hirer, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured; [Or he replied,] “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured; [Or he replied,] “It was captured,” whereas in reality it died or was injured; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen”, whereas in reality it was lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost,” whereas in reality it was stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. [If he replied,] “It died,” or, “It was injured,” or, “It was captured,” whereas in reality it was stolen or lost; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is liable. [If he replied,] “It was lost,” or, “It was stolen,” whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt. This is the principle: he who [by lying] changes from liability to liability or from exemption to exemption, or from exemption to liability, is exempt; From liability to exemption, is liable. This is the principle: he who takes an oath to make it more lenient for himself, is liable; to make it more stringent for himself, is exempt.
Rabbi Akiba declared three things; about two they agreed with him, and about one they disagreed with him. About a lime-burner’s sandal, that it is liable to contract midras impurity; And about the remains of a [broken] oven, that they must be four handbreadths high [in order to retain impurity], whereas they used to say three and [when he said four] they agreed with him. And about one they disagreed with him About a stool, from which two of its covering-boards had been removed, the one beside the other, which Rabbi Akiba pronounces able to contract impurity, but the Sages declare unable to contract impurity.
Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia ben Elinathan, a man of Kefar Habavli, testified concerning a limb [separated] from a corpse that it is impure; whereas Rabbi Eliezer says: they declared [this] only of a limb from a living [man]. They said to him: is not there an inference from the minor to the major (kal vehomer): If in the case of a living man [who is himself pure] a limb severed from him is impure, how much more in the case of a corpse [which is itself impure] should a limb severed from it be impure! He said to them: they have [nevertheless] declared it only of a limb from a living man. Another answer: The impurity of living men is greater than the impurity of corpses, because a living man causes that on which he lies and sits to become capable of making impure a man and clothing, and [he causes also] what is over him to transfer impurity to foods and liquids- which is defilement that a corpse does not cause.
1) An olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man: 1) Rabbi Eliezer pronounces impure and Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Nehunia pronounce pure. a) A barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, b) Rabbi Nehunia pronounces impure and Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua pronounce pure. 2) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it? 3) They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for pronouncing impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man? 1) He said to them: we find that a limb from a living man is like an entire corpse; just as in the case of a corpse, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it is impure, so also in the case of a limb from a living man, a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from it must be impure. 2) They said to him: No! When you pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a corpse, it is because you have pronounced impure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it. But how can you also pronounce impure a barley-grain’s quantity of bone severed from a limb of a living man, seeing that you have pronounced pure an olive’s quantity of flesh severed from it? 1) They said to Rabbi Eliezer: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! 1) He said to them: greater is the impurity of flesh than the impurity of bones, for the defilement of flesh applies both to (animal) carcasses and to creeping things, but it is not so in the case of bones. Another answer: a limb which has on it the proper quantity of flesh causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is still impure, while if the bone is diminished it is pure. They said to Rabbi Nehunia: what reason have you found for dividing your standards? Either pronounce them both impure, or pronounce them both pure! He said to them: greater is the impurity of bones than the impurity of flesh, for flesh severed from a living man is pure, whereas a limb severed from him, while in its natural condition, is impure. Another answer: an olive’s quantity of flesh (from a corpse) causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); and a majority of a corpse’s bones causes impurity by touching and by carrying and by being under the same roof-space (ohel); if the flesh is diminished it is pure, but if a majority of the bones is diminished, although it does not cause impurity by being under the same roof-space, it yet causes defilement by touching and by carrying. Another answer: any flesh of a corpse less than an olive’s quantity is pure, but bones forming the greater portion of the body’ build or the greater portion of the number of the corpse’s bones, even though they do not fill a quarter-kav are yet impure. They said to Rabbi Joshua: what reason have you found for pronouncing them both pure? He said to them: No! When you pronounce impure in the case of a corpse, it is because the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” apply to it. But how can you say the same of a living man, seeing that the rules of “majority”, “quarter-kav”, and “decayed matter” do not apply to him?
Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Zadok testified concerning the redemption (lamb) of a firstborn donkey, that if it died, the priest receives nothing, Whereas Rabbi Eliezer says: the owner must bear the responsibility as with the five selas [in the case] of a [firstborn] son. But the Sages say: he bears no responsibility any more than in the case of the redemption of second tithes.
Rabbi Zadok testified concerning brine of unclean locusts that it is clean, Whereas the first mishnah [said]: unclean locusts that have been preserved together with clean locusts do not make their brine unfit.
Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Yakim, a man of Hadar, testified concerning a jar of ashes of a red heifer which was put over a creeping thing, that they were unclean. Whereas Rabbi Eliezer had pronounced them clean. Rabbi Papias testified concerning one who had vowed two naziriteships, that if he cut his hair after the first one on the thirtieth day, he could cut his hair after the second one on the sixtieth day; and if he cut his hair on the fifty-ninth day he has also fulfilled his duty, for the thirtieth day counts towards the required number.
Rabbi Joshua and Rabbi Papias testified concerning the offspring of a peace-offering, that it can be brought as a peace-offering, whereas Rabbi Eliezer says that the offspring of a peace-offering cannot be brought as a peace-offering. But the sages say: it can be brought. Rabbi Papias said: “I testify that we had a cow, which was a peace-offering, and we ate it at Passover, and its offspring we ate as a peace-offering at the [next] festival.
They testified concerning the boards of bakers, that they are impure (they can receive impurity), whereas Rabbi Eliezer declares them pure (unable to receive impurity). They testified concerning an oven which was cut into rings and sand was put between the rings that it is impure (can receive impurity), whereas Rabbi Eliezer declares it pure (unable to receive impurity). They testified that the year may be intercalated throughout the whole of Adar, whereas they used to say: only until Purim. They testified that the year may be intercalated conditionally. There was such a case with Rabban Gamaliel who went to receive permission from the governor in Syria and he delayed in coming back; and they intercalated the year on condition that rabban gamaliel should approve; and when he came back he said: I approve, and the year was intercalated.
They testified concerning the boards of bakers, that they are impure (they can receive impurity), whereas Rabbi Eliezer declares them pure (unable to receive impurity). They testified concerning an oven which was cut into rings and sand was put between the rings that it is impure (can receive impurity), whereas Rabbi Eliezer declares it pure (unable to receive impurity). They testified that the year may be intercalated throughout the whole of Adar, whereas they used to say: only until Purim. They testified that the year may be intercalated conditionally. There was such a case with Rabban Gamaliel who went to receive permission from the governor in Syria and he delayed in coming back; and they intercalated the year on condition that rabban gamaliel should approve; and when he came back he said: I approve, and the year was intercalated.
They testified concerning the boards of bakers, that they are impure (they can receive impurity), whereas Rabbi Eliezer declares them pure (unable to receive impurity). They testified concerning an oven which was cut into rings and sand was put between the rings that it is impure (can receive impurity), whereas Rabbi Eliezer declares it pure (unable to receive impurity). They testified that the year may be intercalated throughout the whole of Adar, whereas they used to say: only until Purim. They testified that the year may be intercalated conditionally. There was such a case with Rabban Gamaliel who went to receive permission from the governor in Syria and he delayed in coming back; and they intercalated the year on condition that rabban gamaliel should approve; and when he came back he said: I approve, and the year was intercalated.
Menahem ben Signai testified concerning the ledge attached to an olive-boiler’s cauldron, that it is [liable to become] impure; and concerning that of dyers, that it is not [liable to become] impure, whereas they used to say the reverse.
[If blood] which requires one application [was mixed] with blood [also] requiring one application, it [the mixture] should be presented with one application. [If blood] which requires four applications [was mixed] with blood requiring four applications, they should be presented with four applications. [If blood] which requires four applications [was mixed] with blood which requires one application: Rabbi Eliezer says: it [the mixture] should be presented with four applications. Rabbi Joshua says: it should be presented with one application. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Behold, he transgresses the [injunction] not to diminish [from God’s commandment]! Rabbi Joshua said to him: Behold, he transgresses the injunction not to add [to God’s commandments]. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: The injunction not to add applies only where it is by itself. Rabbi Joshua said to him: The injunction not to diminish applies only where it is by itself. Moreover, Rabbi Joshua said: when you make [four] applications you transgress the injunction not to add, and perform an action with your own hands; whereas when you do not make [four] applications you transgress the injunction not to diminish, but do not perform an action with your own hands.
Slaughtering [outside the Temple] is more stringent than offering up [outside], and offering up [is more stringent] than slaughtering. Slaughtering is more stringent, for he who slaughters [a sacrifice] to a man is liable, whereas he who offers up to a man is not liable. Offering up is more stringent: two who hold a knife and slaughter are not liable, [whereas] if two take hold of a limb and offer it up, they are liable. If one offered up, then offered up again, then offered up again, he is liable in respect of each [act of] offering up, the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yose says: he is liable for only one. He is liable only when he offers up on the top of an altar. Rabbi Shimon says: he is liable even if he offers up on the top of a rock or a stone.
Slaughtering [outside the Temple] is more stringent than offering up [outside], and offering up [is more stringent] than slaughtering. Slaughtering is more stringent, for he who slaughters [a sacrifice] to a man is liable, whereas he who offers up to a man is not liable. Offering up is more stringent: two who hold a knife and slaughter are not liable, [whereas] if two take hold of a limb and offer it up, they are liable. If one offered up, then offered up again, then offered up again, he is liable in respect of each [act of] offering up, the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yose says: he is liable for only one. He is liable only when he offers up on the top of an altar. Rabbi Shimon says: he is liable even if he offers up on the top of a rock or a stone.
The [absence of the] bull, or the rams, or the lambs or the goat does not invalidate the bread, neither does the [absence of the] bread invalidate them. The [absence of the] bread invalidates the lambs, but the [absence of the] lambs does not invalidate the bread, the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Shimon b. Nanas said: it is not so, but rather the [absence of the] lambs invalidates the bread, while the [absence of the] bread does not invalidate the lambs; for so we find that when the Israelites were in the wilderness for forty years they offered the lambs without the bread, therefore now too they may offer the lambs without the bread. Rabbi Shimon said: the halakhah is according to the words of Ben Nanas but not for the reason he stated; for every offering stated in the Book of Numbers was offered in the wilderness, but not every offering stated in the book of Leviticus was offered in the wilderness; however, when they came into the land of Israel they offered both kinds. Why then do I say that the lambs may be offered without the bread? Because the lambs render themselves permissible without the bread, whereas bread without lambs, there is nothing that renders it permissible.
The law of the first of the fleece is in force both within the Land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated animals but not consecrated animals. The law of the shoulder and the cheeks and the stomach is of stricter application than the law of the first of the fleece; for the law of the shoulder and the cheeks and the stomach applies both to herds and flocks, whether they are many or few, whereas the law of the first of the fleece applies only to sheep, and only when there are many.
The law of letting [the mother bird] go from the nest is in force both within the holy land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated birds but not consecrated birds. The law of covering up the blood is of broader application than the law of letting [the mother bird] go; for the law of covering up the blood applies to wild animals as well as to birds, whether they are at one's disposal or not, whereas the law of letting [the mother bird] go from the nest applies only to birds and only to those which are not at one's disposal. Which are they that are not at one's disposal? Such as geese and fowls that made their nests in the open field. But if they made their nests within a house or in the case of Herodian doves, one is not bound to let [the mother bird] go.
If [a portion of] the hair of a blemished first born fell out and he placed it in the window, and then he slaughtered the animal, Akavya ben Mahalalel allows it. But the sages forbid it, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Yose said to him: Akavya ben Mahalalel did not allow [only] in this case, but [even] in the case where the hair of a blemished first born which fell out and he placed it in the window, and the animal died subsequently, [even] in this case Akavya ben Mahalalel allows, but the sages forbid. If the wool of a first born is hanging loose, that part which appears [on a level] with [the rest of] the wool is permitted, whereas that which does not appear [on a level] with [the rest of] the wool is forbidden.
All dedicated animals which became unfit [for the altar] are sold in a market, slaughtered in a market and weighed by the liter, except for a first born or a tithed animal, as their profit goes to the owners, [whereas] the profit on dedicated objects which became unfit goes to the Temple. One can weigh one piece of meat of the first-born against another piece of ordinary meat.
If a first born was running after him and he kicked it and thereby blemished it, he may slaughter it on account of this. Any blemish which might have been made by a person, Israelite shepherds are trustworthy whereas shepherds who are priests are not trustworthy. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: he is trustworthy with regard to somebody else's first born, but he is not trustworthy with regard to his own. Rabbi Meir says: one who is suspected of neglecting a religious matter must not issue judgment on it or give evidence concerning it.
These blemishes [named above], whether permanent or transitory, make human beings unfit [to serve in the Temple]. There are more than this concerning human beings: kilon, liftan, makkaban, one whose head is angular or shekifas . A hunchback: Rabbi Judah considers him fit, Whereas the sages consider him unfit.
If two women who had never before given birth married two men and gave birth to two males, the one father gives five selas to the priest and the other gives five selas to the priest. If one of the children died within thirty days [of its birth], if they gave the redemption money to one priest alone, he returns five selas to them, but if they gave the money to two priests, they are not able to recover it from them. If they gave birth to a male and a female, the fathers are exempt, whereas the son must redeem himself [as in any case he is a first-born]. If they gave birth to two females and a male or to two females and two males, the priest receives nothing.
“The law of the field of possession is sometimes lenient and sometimes strict.”How so? Whether one dedicates a field in the sandy plain of Mahoz or in the orchards of Savaste, [if he would redeem it] he must pay fifty shekels of silver for [every part of the field sufficient for] the sowing of a homer of barley. But if it was a field which he bought, he must pay what it is worth. Rabbi Eliezer says: it is all the same whether it is a field of possession or one that he bought. What is the difference between the field of possession and one that he bought? A field of possession he must pay the [added] fifth, whereas for a field that he has bought he need not pay the added fifth.
It is all the same whether the owner or anyone else [redeems the field]. What is the difference between the owner and any other man? The owner must add one fifth, whereas any other man need not add one fifth.
If one consecrated his field at a time when the [law of the] Jubilee was no longer observed, they say to him: “You open [the bidding]!” because the owner must pay an added fifth, whereas others do not pay an additional fifth. It happened that one consecrated his field because it was bad. They said to him: “You open the bidding.” He said: “I will acquire it for an issar.” Rabbi Yose said: he did say that, but rather “for an egg,” because consecrated objects may be redeemed by either money or money's equivalent. He [the Temple treasurer] said to him: It’s yours. It turns out he lost an issar and the field was his again.
There are [laws relating] to the sacrifices of an individual which do not apply to congregational sacrifices and [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals. For sacrifices of an individual can make a substitute whereas congregational sacrifices cannot make a substitute; Sacrifices of an individual can be either males or females, whereas congregational sacrifices can be only males. For sacrifices of an individual the owner is responsible for them and their libations, whereas for congregational sacrifices they are not liable for them or for their libations, although they are liable for their libations once the sacrifice has been offered. There are [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals: For congregational sacrifices override Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity, whereas sacrifices of individuals do not override the Shabbat or [the laws] of ritual impurity. Rabbi Meir said: but do not the griddle cakes of a high priest and the bull for Yom Hakippurim which are sacrifices of individuals and yet override the Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity? The matter therefore depends on [whether] the time [for the offering up] is fixed.
There are [laws relating] to the sacrifices of an individual which do not apply to congregational sacrifices and [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals. For sacrifices of an individual can make a substitute whereas congregational sacrifices cannot make a substitute; Sacrifices of an individual can be either males or females, whereas congregational sacrifices can be only males. For sacrifices of an individual the owner is responsible for them and their libations, whereas for congregational sacrifices they are not liable for them or for their libations, although they are liable for their libations once the sacrifice has been offered. There are [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals: For congregational sacrifices override Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity, whereas sacrifices of individuals do not override the Shabbat or [the laws] of ritual impurity. Rabbi Meir said: but do not the griddle cakes of a high priest and the bull for Yom Hakippurim which are sacrifices of individuals and yet override the Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity? The matter therefore depends on [whether] the time [for the offering up] is fixed.
There are [laws relating] to the sacrifices of an individual which do not apply to congregational sacrifices and [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals. For sacrifices of an individual can make a substitute whereas congregational sacrifices cannot make a substitute; Sacrifices of an individual can be either males or females, whereas congregational sacrifices can be only males. For sacrifices of an individual the owner is responsible for them and their libations, whereas for congregational sacrifices they are not liable for them or for their libations, although they are liable for their libations once the sacrifice has been offered. There are [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals: For congregational sacrifices override Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity, whereas sacrifices of individuals do not override the Shabbat or [the laws] of ritual impurity. Rabbi Meir said: but do not the griddle cakes of a high priest and the bull for Yom Hakippurim which are sacrifices of individuals and yet override the Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity? The matter therefore depends on [whether] the time [for the offering up] is fixed.
There are [laws relating] to the sacrifices of an individual which do not apply to congregational sacrifices and [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals. For sacrifices of an individual can make a substitute whereas congregational sacrifices cannot make a substitute; Sacrifices of an individual can be either males or females, whereas congregational sacrifices can be only males. For sacrifices of an individual the owner is responsible for them and their libations, whereas for congregational sacrifices they are not liable for them or for their libations, although they are liable for their libations once the sacrifice has been offered. There are [laws relating] to congregational sacrifices which do not apply to the sacrifices of individuals: For congregational sacrifices override Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity, whereas sacrifices of individuals do not override the Shabbat or [the laws] of ritual impurity. Rabbi Meir said: but do not the griddle cakes of a high priest and the bull for Yom Hakippurim which are sacrifices of individuals and yet override the Shabbat and [the laws] of ritual impurity? The matter therefore depends on [whether] the time [for the offering up] is fixed.
A hatat of an individual whose owners have been atoned for is left to die, whereas that of a congregation is not left to die. Rabbi Judah says: it is left to die. Rabbi Shimon said: Just as we have found with regard to the offspring of a hatat, the substitute of a hatat and a hatat whose owners died, that these rules apply only to an individual but not to a congregation, so too [the rules concerning] the hatat whose owners have been atoned for and [a hatat] whose year has passed apply only to an individual but not a congregation.
In some ways [the laws relating to] dedications are more stringent than [that those relating to] a substitute, and in some ways [those relating to] a substitute are more stringent than [those relating to] dedications. In some ways [the laws relating to] dedications are more stringent than [those relating to] a substitute, For dedicated animals can make a substitute whereas a substitute cannot make another substitute. A congregation or partners can dedicate but cannot make a substitute. One can dedicate embryos and limbs, but one cannot make a substitute with them. [The laws relating to] a substitute are more stringent than [those relating to] dedications, since a substitute applies to a permanently blemished animal and it does not become hullin to be sheared or worked. Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah says: they made an error to be the same as intent when it comes to a substitute, but they did not make an error to be the same as intent when it comes to dedication. Rabbi Elazar says: kilayim, terefah, a fetus extracted by means of a cesarean section, a tumtum and a hermaphrodite, cannot become sacred nor can they make sacred.
But cannot a nedavah [freewill-offering] also be an olah? What then is the difference between the opinion of Rabbi Elazar and that of the sages? Only in that when the offering comes as an obligation, he lays his hands on it and he brings libations and the libations must be from him; and if he is a priest, the privilege of officiating and its hide belong to him. Whereas when he brings it as a freewill-offering, he does not lay his hands [on it], he does not bring libations with it, the libations are provided by the congregation, and although he is a priest, the privilege of officiating and its hide belong to the men of the division [officiating that particular week].
The substitute of a first-born and an animal tithed, their young and the young of their young until the end of time, they are all treated like a first-born and an animal tithed, and are eaten by the owners when blemished. What is the difference between a first-born and an animal tithed [on the one hand] and other dedications [on the other]? All [blemished] dedications are sold in the market, killed in the market, and weighed by the pound, but not a first-born and an animal tithed. They [other dedications] and their substitutes are redeemed, but not a first-born and an animal tithed. They [other dedications] come from outside the land [to the land], but not a first-born and an animal tithed. [If] they however came from [outside the holy land] unblemished, they are offered, if blemished they are eaten by their owners with their blemishes. Rabbi Shimon: what is the reason? Because a first-born and an animal tithed have a remedy wherever they are, whereas all other dedications, although a blemish has occurred in them, remain holy.
[Both] persons and vessels can be defiled through a corpse. A greater stringency applies to persons than to vessels and to vessels than to persons. For with vessels [there can be] three [series of defilements], whereas with persons [there can be only] two. A greater stringency applies to persons, for whenever they are in the middle of a [series] there can be four [in the series], whereas when they are not in the middle of a [series] there can be [only] three.
[Both] persons and vessels can be defiled through a corpse. A greater stringency applies to persons than to vessels and to vessels than to persons. For with vessels [there can be] three [series of defilements], whereas with persons [there can be only] two. A greater stringency applies to persons, for whenever they are in the middle of a [series] there can be four [in the series], whereas when they are not in the middle of a [series] there can be [only] three.
Persons and garments can be defiled by a zav. A greater stringency applies to persons than to garments and a greater stringency applies to garments than to persons. For a person who touches a zav can defile garments, whereas garments that touch a zav cannot defile [other] garments. A greater stringency applies to garments, for garments which form the support of a zav can defile persons, whereas a person who forms the support of a zav cannot defile [other] persons.
Persons and garments can be defiled by a zav. A greater stringency applies to persons than to garments and a greater stringency applies to garments than to persons. For a person who touches a zav can defile garments, whereas garments that touch a zav cannot defile [other] garments. A greater stringency applies to garments, for garments which form the support of a zav can defile persons, whereas a person who forms the support of a zav cannot defile [other] persons.
There is one who shows his nega [to the priest] and thereby gains advantage, while there is one who shows and loses. How so? If one was certified unclean and the signs of his uncleanness disappeared, and before he could show it to the priest the nega broke out covering all his skin, he is clean; whereas if he had shown it to the priest he would have been unclean. If he had a bright spot in which there was nothing else, and before he could show it to the priest it broke out covering all his skin, he is unclean; whereas if he had shown it to the priest he would have been clean.
There is one who shows his nega [to the priest] and thereby gains advantage, while there is one who shows and loses. How so? If one was certified unclean and the signs of his uncleanness disappeared, and before he could show it to the priest the nega broke out covering all his skin, he is clean; whereas if he had shown it to the priest he would have been unclean. If he had a bright spot in which there was nothing else, and before he could show it to the priest it broke out covering all his skin, he is unclean; whereas if he had shown it to the priest he would have been clean.