whether
2345 occurrences across the corpus
The Mishnah
A nazirite who was in doubt whether he had been defiled and in doubt whether he had been a confirmed leper, may eat consecrated food after sixty days, and drink wine and come into contact with the dead after one hundred and twenty days, since shaving on account of leprosy overrides [the prohibition against] the shaving of the nazirite only when [the leprosy] is certain, but when it is doubtful it does not override it.
On that day Rabbi Joshua ben Hyrcanus expounded: Job only served the Holy One, blessed be He, from love: as it is said, “Though he slay me, yet I will wait for him” (Job 13:15). And it is still evenly balanced whether to read “I will wait for him” or “I will not wait for him”? Scripture states, “Until I die I will maintain my integrity” (Job 27:5), this teaches that what he did was from love. Rabbi Joshua [ben Hananiah] said: who will remove the dust from your eyes, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, since you had expounded all your life that Job only served the Omnipresent from fear, as it is said, “A blameless and upright man that fears God and shuns evil” (Job 1:8) did not Joshua, the student of your student, teach that what he did was from love?
“Then the officers shall address the people saying: ‘Is there anyone who has built a new house but has not dedicated it? Let him go back to his home’” (Deuteronomy 20:5). It is the same whether he built a house for straw, a house for cattle, a house for wood, or a storehouse; It is the same whether he built, purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has planted a vineyard but has never harvested it?’” (vs.. It is the same whether he planted a vineyard or planted five fruit-trees and even of five different species; It is the same whether he planted, bent or grafted it, or whether he purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has betrothed a woman [but who has not yet married her]?’” (vs. It is the same whether he had betrothed a virgin or a widow, or even a shomeret yavam, or even if a man heard that his brother had died in battle, he returns home. All these hear the priest’s words concerning the battles of war and return home, and they supply water and food and repair the roads.
“Then the officers shall address the people saying: ‘Is there anyone who has built a new house but has not dedicated it? Let him go back to his home’” (Deuteronomy 20:5). It is the same whether he built a house for straw, a house for cattle, a house for wood, or a storehouse; It is the same whether he built, purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has planted a vineyard but has never harvested it?’” (vs.. It is the same whether he planted a vineyard or planted five fruit-trees and even of five different species; It is the same whether he planted, bent or grafted it, or whether he purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has betrothed a woman [but who has not yet married her]?’” (vs. It is the same whether he had betrothed a virgin or a widow, or even a shomeret yavam, or even if a man heard that his brother had died in battle, he returns home. All these hear the priest’s words concerning the battles of war and return home, and they supply water and food and repair the roads.
“Then the officers shall address the people saying: ‘Is there anyone who has built a new house but has not dedicated it? Let him go back to his home’” (Deuteronomy 20:5). It is the same whether he built a house for straw, a house for cattle, a house for wood, or a storehouse; It is the same whether he built, purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has planted a vineyard but has never harvested it?’” (vs.. It is the same whether he planted a vineyard or planted five fruit-trees and even of five different species; It is the same whether he planted, bent or grafted it, or whether he purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has betrothed a woman [but who has not yet married her]?’” (vs. It is the same whether he had betrothed a virgin or a widow, or even a shomeret yavam, or even if a man heard that his brother had died in battle, he returns home. All these hear the priest’s words concerning the battles of war and return home, and they supply water and food and repair the roads.
“Then the officers shall address the people saying: ‘Is there anyone who has built a new house but has not dedicated it? Let him go back to his home’” (Deuteronomy 20:5). It is the same whether he built a house for straw, a house for cattle, a house for wood, or a storehouse; It is the same whether he built, purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has planted a vineyard but has never harvested it?’” (vs.. It is the same whether he planted a vineyard or planted five fruit-trees and even of five different species; It is the same whether he planted, bent or grafted it, or whether he purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has betrothed a woman [but who has not yet married her]?’” (vs. It is the same whether he had betrothed a virgin or a widow, or even a shomeret yavam, or even if a man heard that his brother had died in battle, he returns home. All these hear the priest’s words concerning the battles of war and return home, and they supply water and food and repair the roads.
“Then the officers shall address the people saying: ‘Is there anyone who has built a new house but has not dedicated it? Let him go back to his home’” (Deuteronomy 20:5). It is the same whether he built a house for straw, a house for cattle, a house for wood, or a storehouse; It is the same whether he built, purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has planted a vineyard but has never harvested it?’” (vs.. It is the same whether he planted a vineyard or planted five fruit-trees and even of five different species; It is the same whether he planted, bent or grafted it, or whether he purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has betrothed a woman [but who has not yet married her]?’” (vs. It is the same whether he had betrothed a virgin or a widow, or even a shomeret yavam, or even if a man heard that his brother had died in battle, he returns home. All these hear the priest’s words concerning the battles of war and return home, and they supply water and food and repair the roads.
“Then the officers shall address the people saying: ‘Is there anyone who has built a new house but has not dedicated it? Let him go back to his home’” (Deuteronomy 20:5). It is the same whether he built a house for straw, a house for cattle, a house for wood, or a storehouse; It is the same whether he built, purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has planted a vineyard but has never harvested it?’” (vs.. It is the same whether he planted a vineyard or planted five fruit-trees and even of five different species; It is the same whether he planted, bent or grafted it, or whether he purchased, inherited or somebody gave it to him as a present. “‘Is there anyone who has betrothed a woman [but who has not yet married her]?’” (vs. It is the same whether he had betrothed a virgin or a widow, or even a shomeret yavam, or even if a man heard that his brother had died in battle, he returns home. All these hear the priest’s words concerning the battles of war and return home, and they supply water and food and repair the roads.
If a report goes out in the town: “[A certain woman is] betrothed,” she is regarded as betrothed; [If a report goes out in the town: “A certain woman is] divorced,” she is regarded as divorced. [This is only the case] provided the report has no qualification. What is meant by a qualification? [If the report is,] “So-and-so divorced his wife with a stipulation” [or], “He threw her the betrothal money, but it is uncertain whether it landed nearer to her or nearer to him” this is a qualification.
All obligations of the son upon the father, men are obligated, but women are exempt. But all obligations of the father upon the son, both men and women are obligated. All positive, time-bound commandments, men are obligated and women are exempt. But all positive non-time-bound commandments both men and women are obligated. And all negative commandments, whether time-bound or not time-bound, both men and women are obligated, except for, the prohibition against rounding [the corners of the head], and the prohibition against marring [the corner of the beard], and the prohibition [for a priest] to become impure through contact with the dead.
If he [a priest] betroths [a woman] with his portion, whether it is of higher holiness or of lower holiness, she is not betrothed. [If one betroths] with second tithe, whether unwittingly or deliberately, he has not betrothed [her]: the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: if unwittingly, he has not betrothed [her]; if deliberately, he has betrothed [her]. [If] with sanctified property, if deliberately, he has betrothed her; if unwittingly, he has not betrothed [her], the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: if unwittingly, he has betrothed her; if deliberately, he has not betrothed her.
If he [a priest] betroths [a woman] with his portion, whether it is of higher holiness or of lower holiness, she is not betrothed. [If one betroths] with second tithe, whether unwittingly or deliberately, he has not betrothed [her]: the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: if unwittingly, he has not betrothed [her]; if deliberately, he has betrothed [her]. [If] with sanctified property, if deliberately, he has betrothed her; if unwittingly, he has not betrothed [her], the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: if unwittingly, he has betrothed her; if deliberately, he has not betrothed her.
[If a man declares] “I have given my daughter in betrothal,” [or] “I gave her in betrothal and divorced her while she was still a minor,” and she is [now] a minor, he is believed. “I gave her in betrothal and divorced her while she was still a minor,” and she is now of majority age, he is not believed. “She was taken captive and I redeemed her,” whether she is a minor or of majority age he is not believed. If a man declares at the time of his death “I have sons,” he is believed; “I have brothers,” he is not believed. If one betroths his daughter without specifying which, the daughters of majority age are not included.
If one has two groups of daughters by two wives, and he declares, “I have given in betrothal my eldest daughter, but I do not know whether the eldest of the seniors or the eldest of the juniors, or the youngest of the seniors who is older than the eldest of the juniors,” all are forbidden [to marry other men], except the youngest of the juniors, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: they are all permitted, except the eldest of the seniors. “I have betrothed my youngest daughter, but I do not know whether the youngest of the juniors or the youngest of the seniors, or the eldest of the juniors who is younger than the youngest of the seniors,” they are all forbidden, except the eldest of the seniors, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: they are all permitted, except the youngest of the juniors.
If one has two groups of daughters by two wives, and he declares, “I have given in betrothal my eldest daughter, but I do not know whether the eldest of the seniors or the eldest of the juniors, or the youngest of the seniors who is older than the eldest of the juniors,” all are forbidden [to marry other men], except the youngest of the juniors, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: they are all permitted, except the eldest of the seniors. “I have betrothed my youngest daughter, but I do not know whether the youngest of the juniors or the youngest of the seniors, or the eldest of the juniors who is younger than the youngest of the seniors,” they are all forbidden, except the eldest of the seniors, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yose says: they are all permitted, except the youngest of the juniors.
Human beings are always an attested danger, whether the damage is caused inadvertently or deliberately, whether the person who caused the damage is awake or asleep. If a man blinded his fellow’s eye or broke his utensils he must pay full damages.
Human beings are always an attested danger, whether the damage is caused inadvertently or deliberately, whether the person who caused the damage is awake or asleep. If a man blinded his fellow’s eye or broke his utensils he must pay full damages.
An ox of an Israelite that gored an ox belonging to the Temple, or an ox belonging to the Temple that gored an ox of an Israelite, the owner is exempt, as it says, “The ox belonging to his neighbor” (Exodus 21:35), and not an ox belonging to the Temple. An ox of an Israelite that gores an ox of a gentile, the owner is exempt. And an ox of a gentile that gores the ox of an Israelite, whether the ox is harmless or an attested danger, its owner pays full damages.
If an ox gored a person and he died, if it was an attested danger [its owner] must pay the ransom, if it was accounted harmless he is exempt from paying the ransom. In both cases the ox is obligated for the death penalty. So too [if it killed] a son or a daughter. If it gored a male slave or a female slave its owner pays 30 sela, Whether [the slave] was worth a maneh or not even worth a dinar.
If one handed it to an unpaid guardian, or to a borrower, or to a paid guardian, or to a hirer, they take the place of the owners; if the beast was an attested danger he pays full damages, and if it was accounted harmless he pays half damages. If its owner had tied it with a halter, or locked it up properly, but it came out and caused damage, the owner is liable, whether it was an attested danger or accounted harmless, these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: “If it was accounted harmless he is liable, but if it was an attested danger he is exempt, as it says, “and its owner did not guard it”, but this one has been guarded. Rabbi Eliezer says: “Its only guarding is the knife.”
If a man dug a pit in a private domain and opened it into the public domain, or if he dug it in the public domain and opened it into a private domain, or if he dug it in a private domain and opened it into another private domain, he is liable [if any is injured by the pit]. If he dug a pit in the public domain and an ox or ass fell into and died, he is liable. No matter whether he digs a pit, trench, or cavern, or ditches or channels he is liable. If so, why does it say “a pit” (Exodus 21:33)? Just as a pit which is deep enough to cause death is ten handbreadths deep, so anything is deep enough to cause death if it is ten handbreadths deep. If they were less than ten handbreadths deep and an ox or an ass fell in and died, the owner is not liable; but if it was damaged he is liable.
Even though a man pays [him that suffers the indignity], he is not forgiven until he seeks [forgiveness] from him, for it says: “Therefore restore the man’s wife… [and he shall pray for you]” (Genesis 20:7). And from where do we learn that he who must forgive should not be cruel? As it says: “And Abraham prayed unto God and God healed Avimelech” (Genesis 20:17). If a man said, “Blind my eye”, or “Cut off my hand”, or “Break my foot”, he [that does so] is liable. [If he added] “On the condition that you will be exempt”, he is still liable. [If he said] “Tear my garment”, or “Break my jug”, he that does so is liable. [If he added] “On the condition that you will be exempt”, he is exempt. [If he said], “Do so to so-and-so, on the condition that you will be exempt, he is liable, whether it was [an offense] against his person or his property.
If a man said to his fellow, “I robbed you”, [or], “You lent me [something]”, [or] “You deposited [something] with me, but I do not know whether I returned it or not” he is obligated to repay. But if he said, “I do not know whether I robbed you, [or], “whether you lent me [something]”, or “whether you deposited [something] with me”, he is exempt from repaying.
If a man said to his fellow, “I robbed you”, [or], “You lent me [something]”, [or] “You deposited [something] with me, but I do not know whether I returned it or not” he is obligated to repay. But if he said, “I do not know whether I robbed you, [or], “whether you lent me [something]”, or “whether you deposited [something] with me”, he is exempt from repaying.
If a man said to his fellow, “I robbed you”, [or], “You lent me [something]”, [or] “You deposited [something] with me, but I do not know whether I returned it or not” he is obligated to repay. But if he said, “I do not know whether I robbed you, [or], “whether you lent me [something]”, or “whether you deposited [something] with me”, he is exempt from repaying.
If a man said to his fellow, “I robbed you”, [or], “You lent me [something]”, [or] “You deposited [something] with me, but I do not know whether I returned it or not” he is obligated to repay. But if he said, “I do not know whether I robbed you, [or], “whether you lent me [something]”, or “whether you deposited [something] with me”, he is exempt from repaying.
When a man leaves produce for his fellow, [and his fellow returns it to the owner] he may exact reductions [due to natural depletion of the produce]. For wheat and rice, nine half kabs to the kor. For barley and durra nine kabs to the kor. For spelt and linseed three seahs to the kor. All is in proportion to the quantity and according to the time [it is left]. Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri said: “But what do the mice care about [the quantity]? Won’t they eat [the same amount] whether there is a lot or a little? Rather, he may exact a reduction from only one kor. Rabbi Judah says: “If the quantity was great he may not exact any reduction, since the produce increases in bulk.”
If a man left a jar with his fellow [to guard] and the owner did not assign it a special place [to be kept] and [the guardian] moved it and it broke: If it was broken while he was handling it: If for his own sake he is liable. If for the sake of the jar, he is not liable. But if it was broken after he had put it in place, whether he moved it for his own sake or for the sake of the jar, he is exempt. If the owner had assigned it a special place, and the guardian moved it and it broke: Whether or not it broke while he was handling it or after he had put it in its place; If for his own sake he is liable, if for the sake of the jar, he is not liable.
If a man left a jar with his fellow [to guard] and the owner did not assign it a special place [to be kept] and [the guardian] moved it and it broke: If it was broken while he was handling it: If for his own sake he is liable. If for the sake of the jar, he is not liable. But if it was broken after he had put it in place, whether he moved it for his own sake or for the sake of the jar, he is exempt. If the owner had assigned it a special place, and the guardian moved it and it broke: Whether or not it broke while he was handling it or after he had put it in its place; If for his own sake he is liable, if for the sake of the jar, he is not liable.
If a man left coins with a money-changer: If they were tied up [in a bag], he may not use them. Therefore, if they were lost, he is not responsible. If they were loose, he may use they were. Therefore, they were was lost, he is responsible. [If a man left coins] with a householder, Whether they were loose or tied up, he may not use them. Therefore, if they were lost he his not responsible. A shopkeeper is like a householder, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says a shopkeeper is like a money-changer.
If a man makes personal use of a deposit: Bet Shammai holds that he is at a disadvantage whether the value rises or falls. Bet Hillel says: [He must restore the deposit] at its value at the time at which he put it to use. Rabbi Akiva says: [He must restore the deposit] at its value at the time at which it is claimed. One who expresses his intention to use a deposit [for personal use]: Bet Shammai says he is liable [for any subsequent damage to the deposit, as if he had already made use of it]. Bet Hillel says: He is not liable until he actually uses it, as it says (Exodus 22:7): “If he had not put his hand onto his neighbor’s property”. How is this so? If he tilted the jug and took a quarter-log of wine and the jug was then broken, he only pays the quarter-log. If he lifted it and then took a quarter-log and the jug was then broken, he pays for the whole jug.
A merchant may buy from five threshing floors and put the produce into a storage chamber, or from five wine-presses and put into one jug, as long as he doesn’t intend to mix them [for purposes of fraud]. Rabbi Judah says: “A storekeeper should not distribute parched corn or nuts to children, for that accustoms them to come [only] to him.” But the Sages permit. And he may not lower the price. But the Sages says: “Let him be remembered for good [if he lowers the price].” He may not sift crushed beans, according to Abba Shaul. But the Sages permit. But they agree that he should not sift them [only] at the entry of the storage chamber, since he would be a deceiver of the eye. He should not beautify what he sells, whether humans, cattle or utensils.
If one moved a jar from place to place and broke it, whether he is a paid guardian or an unpaid guardian, he may take an oath [that he did not break it through neglect and be exempt from liability]. Rabbi Eliezer says: “[I too have heard that] in either case he may take an oath, but I wonder whether in either case the oath is valid.”
If one moved a jar from place to place and broke it, whether he is a paid guardian or an unpaid guardian, he may take an oath [that he did not break it through neglect and be exempt from liability]. Rabbi Eliezer says: “[I too have heard that] in either case he may take an oath, but I wonder whether in either case the oath is valid.”
If one leased a house to his fellow in the rainy season, he cannot make him leave it [during the time] from Sukkot to Pesach. In the summer, [he must give him] thirty days [warning]. And in large cities, whether it is during the rainy season or the summer [he must give] twelve months [warning]. [If one leased] a shop [to his fellow], whether in large cities or small towns, [he must give] twelve months [warning]. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If it is a shop occupied by bakers or dyers [he must give] three years [warning].
If one leased a house to his fellow in the rainy season, he cannot make him leave it [during the time] from Sukkot to Pesach. In the summer, [he must give him] thirty days [warning]. And in large cities, whether it is during the rainy season or the summer [he must give] twelve months [warning]. [If one leased] a shop [to his fellow], whether in large cities or small towns, [he must give] twelve months [warning]. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If it is a shop occupied by bakers or dyers [he must give] three years [warning].
If one lent one’s fellow, he may exact a pledge from him only with the permission of a court, and he may not enter his house to take the pledge, as it is states, “You shall stand outside” (Deut. 24:1. If the borrower had two utensils, he may take one but must give back the other. And he must give back the pillow at night and the plow during the day. And if the creditor dies he need not return the pledge to his heirs. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “Even to the debtor himself he need only return the pledge within thirty days [of the loan], and after thirty days he may sell it with the consent of the court. A pledge may not be taken from a widow, whether she be rich or poor, as it states, “Do not take the a widow’s garment as a pledge” (Deut. 24:17). If one takes a millstone as a pledge he violates a negative commandment and he is also in violation of both parts [of the millstone], as it states, “Do not take a mill or an upper millstone as a pledge” (Deut. 24:6). And they didn’t say just an upper millstone or a mill but anything that is necessary for food, as it states, “for that would be taking someone’s life as a pledge” (ibid.).
If one’s wall was adjacent to his friend’s wall he may not build another wall adjoining it unless it is at a distance of four cubits. And [if he builds a wall opposite his friend’s] windows, whether it is higher or lower than them or level with them, it may not be within four cubits.
A tree may not be grown within twenty five cubits of a cistern, or within fifty cubits if it is a carob or a sycamore, whether it is higher or on the same level. If the cistern was there first the tree shall be cut down and compensation given. If the tree was there first it shall not be cut down. If it is in doubt which was there first, the tree shall not be cut down. Rabbi Yose says: “Even if the cistern was there before the tree it should not be cut down, since this one dug within his own domain and the other planted within his own domain.”
A person may not plant a tree near another’s field unless it is four cubits away, no matter whether it be a vine or any other kind of tree. If there was a wall between, each may plant up to the wall on either side. If its roots entered within the other’s property, the other may cut them away to a depth of three handbreadths so that they shall not hinder the plough. If he dug a cistern, trench or cave, he may cut them away as far down as he digs, and the wood shall belong to him.
But [one who sold a field] has not sold the stones that are not necessary to it or the canes in a vineyard that are not necessary to it or the produce that is already picked from the ground. But if he had said, “It and all that is in it” all of these are sold also. But in neither case has he sold any partition of reeds that covers a quarter-kav’s space of ground, or the watchman’s hut if it was not fastened down with mortar, or grafted carob trees or cropped sycamores, or any cistern or winepress or dovecote, whether they are lying waste or in use. And [the seller] must purchase [from the buyer] a way thereto, according to Rabbi Akiva. But the sages say: “He need not.” And Rabbi Akiva agrees that if he had said, “Excepting these”, he need not buy himself a way thereto. If he had sold them (the cistern, winepress or dovecote) to another, Rabbi Akiva says: “He [that bought them] need not buy himself a way thereto. But the Sages say: “He must buy himself a way thereto.” When is this so? With regards to he that sells his field. But if he gives it as a gift, he gives everything that is in it. If brothers who divided [an inheritance] came into possession of a field, they come into possession of everything that is in it. If a man secured title by possession of the property of a convert, and secured title by possession of the [convert’s] field, he secures title to everything that is in it. If a man dedicated a field [to the Temple] he has dedicated everything in it. Rabbi Shimon says: “If a man dedicated a field, he has dedicated only the grafted carob trees and cropped sycamores.”
If a man bought two trees in his fellow’s field, he has not bought the ground [in which they grow]. Rabbi Meir says: “He has bought the ground”. When they grow (branches), he (the seller) may not trim them. What comes up from the stem belongs to him (the buyer) but what comes up from the roots belongs to the seller. And if they die, the ground is not his [to replant new trees]. If he bought three trees, he has bought the ground [between them]. When they grow he may trim them, And what comes up whether from the stem or from the roots belongs to him (the buyer). And if they die the ground is his.
[If he said, “I will sell you] a kor’s space of soil as measured by a rope”, and he gave him less, the buyer may reduce the price; and if he gave him more, the buyer must give it back. But if he said, “Whether less or more”, even if he gave the buyer a quarter-kab’s space less in every seah’s space, or a quarter kab’s space more in every seah’s space, it becomes his; if [the error] was more than this, a reckoning must be made. What does he (the buyer) give him back? Its value in money; but if the seller wants, he gives him back the land. And why did they say that he could give back its value in money? To strengthen the power of the seller, for if, in a field [containing a kor’s space] there would still have remained to him nine kab’s space, or, in a garden, a half-kab’s space, or according to Rabbi Akiva a quarter-kab’s space, the buyer must give back to him land. And not only must he give back the quarter-kab’s space, but all of the surplus.
[If he said], “I will sell you [a piece of land] as measured by the rope, whether it is less or more” the condition “whether it is less or more” makes void the condition “as measured by the rope”. [And if he said], “Be it less or more, as measured by the rope”, the condition “as measured by the rope” makes void the condition “be it less or more”, according to Ben Nanas. [If he said, I will sell you a piece of land] by its marks and its boundaries”, and the difference was less than a sixth, the sale stands. If it was as much a sixth the buyer may reduce the price.
[If he said], “I will sell you [a piece of land] as measured by the rope, whether it is less or more” the condition “whether it is less or more” makes void the condition “as measured by the rope”. [And if he said], “Be it less or more, as measured by the rope”, the condition “as measured by the rope” makes void the condition “be it less or more”, according to Ben Nanas. [If he said, I will sell you a piece of land] by its marks and its boundaries”, and the difference was less than a sixth, the sale stands. If it was as much a sixth the buyer may reduce the price.
If a man says, “So and so, my firstborn son, shall not receive a double portion”, or “So and so, my son, shall not inherit with his brothers”, he has said nothing, for he has made a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah. If a man apportioned his property to his sons by word of mouth, and gave much to one and little to another, or made them equal to the firstborn, his words are valid. But if he had said [that it should be so] “by inheritance”, he has said nothing. If he had written down, whether at the beginning or in the middle or at the end [of his will] that it should be as a gift, his words are valid. If a man said, “So and so a man shall inherit from me” and he has a daughter; or “My daughter shall inherit from me”, and he has a son, he has said nothing, for he has made a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah. Rabbi Johanan ben Baroka says: “If he said [that so and so shall inherit from me] of one that was qualified to inherit from him, his words are valid, but if of one that was not qualified to inherit from him his words do not remain valid.” If a man wrote away his property to others and passed over his sons, what he has done is done, but the Sages are not comfortable with it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If has sons did not behave properly, it should be counted to his credit.”
If a man said, “This is my son”, he is believed. If [he said], “This is my brother”, he is not believed, yet the other may join him in his portion. If he died the property returns to its place. If he inherited property from elsewhere the other’s brothers inherit it together with him. If a man died and a testament was found bound to his thigh, this counts as nothing. But if [he had delivered it and] through it granted title to another, whether of his heirs or of those who are not his heirs, his words are valid.
If a man divided his property orally, Rabbi Eliezer says: “Whether he was healthy or at the point of death, property for which there is security (land) can be acquired only by money, by a document or by possession; property for which there is no security (movable objects) can be acquired only by being drawn [into the possession of the one acquiring]. They (the Sages) said to him: “It once happened that the mother of the sons of Rokhel was sick and said, ‘Give my veil to my daughter’, and it was worth twelve hundred maneh (1,200 dinars) and she died and they fulfilled her words. He said to them: “May their mother bury the sons of Rokhel.” The Sages say: “On a Sabbath his words remain valid, since he cannot write, but not on a weekday.” Rabbi Joshua says: “If they have stated this rule on the Sabbath, how much more so on a weekday.” Similarly, others may acquire possession on behalf of a minor, but not on behalf of an adult. Rabbi Joshua says: “If they have stated this rule with regards to a minor, how much more so does the rule apply to an adult.
Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.
How did they admonish witnesses in capital cases? They brought them in and admonished them, [saying], “Perhaps you will say something that is only a supposition or hearsay or secondhand, or even from a trustworthy man. Or perhaps you do not know that we shall check you with examination and inquiry? Know, moreover, that capital cases are not like non-capital cases: in non-capital cases a man may pay money and so make atonement, but in capital cases the witness is answerable for the blood of him [that is wrongfully condemned] and the blood of his descendants [that should have been born to him] to the end of the world.” For so have we found it with Cain that murdered his brother, for it says, “The bloods of your brother cry out” (Gen. 4:10). It doesn’t say, “The blood of your brother”, but rather “The bloods of your brother” meaning his blood and the blood of his descendants. Another saying is, “The bloods of your brother” that his blood was cast over trees and stones. Therefore but a single person was created in the world, to teach that if any man has caused a single life to perish from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had caused a whole world to perish; and anyone who saves a single soul from Israel, he is deemed by Scripture as if he had saved a whole world. Again [but a single person was created] for the sake of peace among humankind, that one should not say to another, “My father was greater than your father”. Again, [but a single person was created] against the heretics so they should not say, “There are many ruling powers in heaven”. Again [but a single person was created] to proclaim the greatness of the Holy Blessed One; for humans stamp many coins with one seal and they are all like one another; but the King of kings, the Holy Blessed One, has stamped every human with the seal of the first man, yet not one of them are like another. Therefore everyone must say, “For my sake was the world created.” And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be involved with this trouble”, was it not said, “He, being a witness, whether he has seen or known, [if he does not speak it, then he shall bear his iniquity] (Lev. 5:1). And if perhaps you [witnesses] would say, “Why should we be guilty of the blood of this man?,” was it not said, “When the wicked perish there is rejoicing” (Proverbs 11:10).]
The more a judge examines the evidence the more he is deserving of praise. Ben Zakkai once checked with regards to the stalks of figs. What is the difference between inquiries and examinations? With regards to inquiries, if one [of the two witnesses] says “I do not know”, their evidence becomes invalid. But if to one of the examinations one answered, “I do not know”, or even if they both answered, “We do not know”, their evidence remains valid. Yet if they contradict each other, whether during the inquiries or examinations, their evidence becomes invalid.
The following are stoned: He who has sexual relations with his mother, with his father’s wife, with his daughter-in-law, with a male; with a beast; a woman who commits bestiality with a beast; a blasphemer; an idolater; one who gives of his seed to molech; a necromancer or a wizard; one who desecrates the Sabbath; he who curses his father or mother; he who commits adultery with a betrothed woman; one who incites [individuals to idolatry]; one who seduces [a whole town to idolatry]; a sorcerer; and a wayward and rebellious son. He who has sexual relations with his mother incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his mother and as his father’s wife. R. Judah says: “He is liable in respect of her as his mother only.” He who has sexual relations with his father’s wife incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his father’s wife, and as a married woman, both during his father’s lifetime and after his death, whether she was widowed from betrothal or from marriage. He who has sexual relations with his daughter-in-law incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his daughter-in-law and as a married woman, both during his son’s lifetime and after his death, whether she was widowed from betrothal or from marriage. He who has sexual relations with a male or a beast, and a woman that commits bestiality: if the man has sinned, how has the animal sinned? But because the human was enticed to sin by the animal, therefore scripture ordered that it should be stoned. Another reason is that the animal should not pass through the market, and people say, this is the animal on account of which so and so was stoned.
The following are stoned: He who has sexual relations with his mother, with his father’s wife, with his daughter-in-law, with a male; with a beast; a woman who commits bestiality with a beast; a blasphemer; an idolater; one who gives of his seed to molech; a necromancer or a wizard; one who desecrates the Sabbath; he who curses his father or mother; he who commits adultery with a betrothed woman; one who incites [individuals to idolatry]; one who seduces [a whole town to idolatry]; a sorcerer; and a wayward and rebellious son. He who has sexual relations with his mother incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his mother and as his father’s wife. R. Judah says: “He is liable in respect of her as his mother only.” He who has sexual relations with his father’s wife incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his father’s wife, and as a married woman, both during his father’s lifetime and after his death, whether she was widowed from betrothal or from marriage. He who has sexual relations with his daughter-in-law incurs a penalty in respect of her both as his daughter-in-law and as a married woman, both during his son’s lifetime and after his death, whether she was widowed from betrothal or from marriage. He who has sexual relations with a male or a beast, and a woman that commits bestiality: if the man has sinned, how has the animal sinned? But because the human was enticed to sin by the animal, therefore scripture ordered that it should be stoned. Another reason is that the animal should not pass through the market, and people say, this is the animal on account of which so and so was stoned.
The following are burnt: he who has sexual relations with a woman and her daughter, and a priest’s adulterous daughter. There is included in [the prohibition of having relations with] a woman and her daughter his own daughter, his daughter’s daughter, his son’s daughter, his wife’s daughter and the daughter of her daughter or son, his mother-in-law, her mother, and his father-in-law’s mother. The following are decapitated: a murderer, and the inhabitants of a city subverted into worshipping idols. A murderer who slew his fellow with a stone or iron, or kept him down under water or in fire, so that he could not get out of there, is executed. If he pushed him into water or fire, but he could get out of there , yet he died, he is not liable [for the death penalty]. If he set a dog or a snake against him [and they killed him], he is free from death. If he caused a snake to bite him, Rabbi Judah ruled that he is liable [for the death penalty] and the Sages, that he is not. If a man struck his fellow, whether with a stone or with his fist, and they [the experts] declared that he would die, but then its effect lessened [so that it was thought that he would live], only to increase subsequently, so that he died he is liable. Rabbi Nehemiah said that he is exempt, since there is a strong possibility [that he did not die as a result of his injuries].
“You shall surely smite the inhabitants of that city with the edge of the sword” (Deut. 13:16): a company of donkey-drivers or camel-drivers passing from place to place saves the city. “Doom it and all that is in it” (ibid.): From here they said that the property of the righteous, which is within [the city] is destroyed, but that which is outside of the city is saved, while that of the wicked, whether in or outside of the city, is destroyed.
How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers? [If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years.
Rabbi Yose bar Judah says: “Initially a slayer is sent in advance to [one of] the cities of refuge, whether he had slain in error or with intent and then the court sends and brings him out. Whoever was found guilty of a capital crime the court had executed, and whoever was found not guilty of a capital crime they acquitted. Whoever was found liable to banishment they restored to his place [of refuge] as it says, “And the congregation shall restore him to the city of refuge to which he fled” (Numbers 35:25). All the same are [the deaths of] the high priest who had been anointed with the anointing oil; or had worn many garments, or had retired from his office all make possible the return of the manslayer. Rabbi Judah says also the [death of the] priest who had been anointed for war makes possible the return of the manslayer. Therefore, mothers of high priests would provide food and clothing for them [who had been exiled] that they might not pray for their son’s death. If the high priest died at the conclusion of the trial, the slayer does not go into banishment. If he died before the trial was concluded and another high priest was appointed in his stead and the trial was then concluded, the slayer returns [home from refuge only] after the latter’s death.
It is the same whether one [while impure] enters the Temple court or the addition to the Temple court, for additions are not made to the city [of Jerusalem], or to the Temple courts except by the king, prophet, Urim and Thummim, the Sanhedrin of seventy one, and with two [loaves] of thanksgiving, and with song. And the court walks in a procession, the two [loaves] of thanksgiving [being carried] after them, and all Israel [following] behind them. The inner one is eaten, and the outer one is burnt. And as to any addition that was made without all these he who enters it [while impure] is not liable.
It is the same [whether he swears of] things concerning himself, or of things concerning others, or of things which have substance, or of things which have no substance. How so? [If] he said, “I swear that I shall give to so-and-so”, or “I shall not give”; “I have given”, or “I have not given”; “I shall sleep”, or “I shall not sleep”; “I have slept”, or “I have not slept”; “I shall throw a pebble into the sea”, or “I shall not throw”; “I have thrown”, or “I have not thrown”; [he is liable.] Rabbi Ishmael says: “He is liable only for [an oath with regards to] the future, for it says, “To do bad or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4). Rabbi Akiva said to him: “If so, we would know only such cases where doing evil and doing good are applicable; but how do we know such cases where doing evil and doing good are not applicable? He said to him: “From the amplification of the verse.” He said to him: “If the verse amplifies for that, it amplifies for this also.”
The oath of utterance applies to men and women, to relatives and non-relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and those not qualified, [whether uttered] before the court, or not before the court, [but it must be uttered] with a man’s own mouth. And he is liable, for intentional transgression, lashes, and for unintentional transgression, a sliding scale sacrifice.
A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and non-relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and those not qualified, [whether uttered] before the court, or not before the court, [but it must be uttered] with a man's own mouth. And he is liable, for intentional transgression, stripes, and for unintentional transgression he is exempt. [In the case of] both this and that [oath], if he was adjured by the mouth of others, he is liable. How so? If he said, “I have not eaten today,” or, “I have not put on tefillin today” [and the another person said,] “I adjure thee,” and he said, “Amen!”, he is liable [if his oath was false].
The oath of testimony applies to men and not to women, to non-relatives and not to relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and not to those unqualified. And it applies only to those eligible to bear witness. Whether [uttered] in front of the court or not in front of the court, if [uttered] with his own mouth; [but if adjured] by the mouth of others he is not liable unless he denies it before the court, these are the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “Whether [uttered] with his own mouth or [adjured] by the mouth of others he is not liable unless he denies it before the court.”
The oath of testimony applies to men and not to women, to non-relatives and not to relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and not to those unqualified. And it applies only to those eligible to bear witness. Whether [uttered] in front of the court or not in front of the court, if [uttered] with his own mouth; [but if adjured] by the mouth of others he is not liable unless he denies it before the court, these are the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “Whether [uttered] with his own mouth or [adjured] by the mouth of others he is not liable unless he denies it before the court.”
The oath of deposit applies to men and women, to non-relatives and relatives, to those qualified [to bear testimony] and those unqualified; before the court and not before the court, [if uttered] from his own mouth. And [if adjured] by the mouth of others, he is not liable unless he denies it before the court, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say, whether [uttered] from his own mouth or [adjured] by the mouth of others since he denied it, he is liable. And he is liable for intentional transgression of the oath, and for its unintentional transgression coupled with intentional [denial of having received the] deposit, but he is not liable for unintentional transgression. And what is he liable for the intentional transgression of the oath? A guilt offering of [the value of] two shekels of silver.
The oath of deposit how? If he said to him: “Give me my deposit which I have in your possession” [and the other replied:] “I swear that you have nothing in my possession”; or he replied to him; “You have nothing in my possession,” [and the depositor said:] “I adjure you”, and he responded, “Amen!”, he is liable. If he adjured him five times, whether before the court or not before the court, and he denied, he is liable for each one. Rabbi Shimon said: “What is the reason? Because he can retract and admit.”
“He whose opponent is suspected of taking a false oath,” How so? Whether it be the oath of testimony, or the oath of deposit, or even a vain oath. If one [of the litigants] was a dice-player, or usurer, or pigeon-flyer, or dealer in the produce of the seventh year, his opponent takes the oath and collects [his claim]. If both are suspect, the oath returns to its place, these are the words of Rabbi Yose. Rabbi Meir says: “They divide [the claim].”
They said three things before Rabbi Akiva, two in the name of Rabbi Eliezer and one in the name of Rabbi Joshua. Two in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: A woman may go out [on the Sabbath adorned] with a “golden-city”; And they that fly pigeons are unfit to bear evidence. And one in the name of Rabbi Joshua: If there was a creeping thing in the mouth of a weasel when it walked over loaves of terumah, and it is doubtful whether it touched them or whether it did not touch them, that about which there is doubt remains pure.
They said three things before Rabbi Akiva, two in the name of Rabbi Eliezer and one in the name of Rabbi Joshua. Two in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: A woman may go out [on the Sabbath adorned] with a “golden-city”; And they that fly pigeons are unfit to bear evidence. And one in the name of Rabbi Joshua: If there was a creeping thing in the mouth of a weasel when it walked over loaves of terumah, and it is doubtful whether it touched them or whether it did not touch them, that about which there is doubt remains pure.
Four cases of doubt Rabbi Joshua pronounces impure, and the Sages pronounce them pure. How is this so? If the impure person stands and the pure person passes by him; or if the pure person stands and the impure person passes by him; or if impurity is in the private domain and something pure is in the public domain; Or if something pure is in the private domain and something impure is in the public domain; If it is doubtful [in all of these case] whether one touched or did not touch the other, or if it is doubtful whether one formed a tent over the other or did not form a tent over the other, or if it is doubtful whether one moved or did not move the other Rabbi Joshua pronounces such a case impure, and the Sages pronounce it pure.
Four cases of doubt Rabbi Joshua pronounces impure, and the Sages pronounce them pure. How is this so? If the impure person stands and the pure person passes by him; or if the pure person stands and the impure person passes by him; or if impurity is in the private domain and something pure is in the public domain; Or if something pure is in the private domain and something impure is in the public domain; If it is doubtful [in all of these case] whether one touched or did not touch the other, or if it is doubtful whether one formed a tent over the other or did not form a tent over the other, or if it is doubtful whether one moved or did not move the other Rabbi Joshua pronounces such a case impure, and the Sages pronounce it pure.
Four cases of doubt Rabbi Joshua pronounces impure, and the Sages pronounce them pure. How is this so? If the impure person stands and the pure person passes by him; or if the pure person stands and the impure person passes by him; or if impurity is in the private domain and something pure is in the public domain; Or if something pure is in the private domain and something impure is in the public domain; If it is doubtful [in all of these case] whether one touched or did not touch the other, or if it is doubtful whether one formed a tent over the other or did not form a tent over the other, or if it is doubtful whether one moved or did not move the other Rabbi Joshua pronounces such a case impure, and the Sages pronounce it pure.
Rabbi Eliezer says: there are two instances of lenient rulings by Beth Shammai and strict rulings by Beth Hillel. The blood of a woman after childbirth who has not immersed herself, Beth Shammai says: [it is] like her spittle and her urine. But Beth Hillel says: it causes impurity whether wet or dry. However, they agree in the case of the blood of a woman who gave birth when she had non-menstrual discharge, that it causes defilement whether wet or dry.
Rabbi Eliezer says: there are two instances of lenient rulings by Beth Shammai and strict rulings by Beth Hillel. The blood of a woman after childbirth who has not immersed herself, Beth Shammai says: [it is] like her spittle and her urine. But Beth Hillel says: it causes impurity whether wet or dry. However, they agree in the case of the blood of a woman who gave birth when she had non-menstrual discharge, that it causes defilement whether wet or dry.
In a place where it is the custom to sell small domesticated animals to non-Jews, such sale is permitted; but where the custom is not to sell, such sale is not permitted. In no place however is it permitted to sell large animals, calves or foals, whether whole or maimed. Rabbi Judah permits in the case of a maimed one. And Ben Bateira permits in the case of a horse.
If an idolatrous shrine has a garden or bathhouse, one may use either so long as it is not to the advantage [of the idolaters], But one may not use either if it is to its advantage. If [the garden or bathhouse] belonged jointly to it and to others, one may use them whether it be to the advantage [of idolatry] or not.
If the court ruled that one of the commandments mentioned in the Torah may be transgressed, and an individual proceeded and acted through error in accordance with their ruling, whether they acted and he acted with them or they acted and he acted after them or even if they did not act and he acted, he is exempt, because he relied on the court. If the court ruled [in error], and one of them knew that they had erred, or a disciple who was himself fit to rule on matters of law, and [one of these] proceeded and acted in accordance with their ruling, whether they acted and he acted with them or they acted and he acted after them or even if they did not act and he acted, he is liable, since he did not rely upon the court. This is the general rule: he who is [in a position] to rely upon himself is liable, and he who relies upon the court is exempt.
If the court ruled that one of the commandments mentioned in the Torah may be transgressed, and an individual proceeded and acted through error in accordance with their ruling, whether they acted and he acted with them or they acted and he acted after them or even if they did not act and he acted, he is exempt, because he relied on the court. If the court ruled [in error], and one of them knew that they had erred, or a disciple who was himself fit to rule on matters of law, and [one of these] proceeded and acted in accordance with their ruling, whether they acted and he acted with them or they acted and he acted after them or even if they did not act and he acted, he is liable, since he did not rely upon the court. This is the general rule: he who is [in a position] to rely upon himself is liable, and he who relies upon the court is exempt.
If a court ruled, and later discovered that they had erred and changed their decision, whether they brought their offering or whether they did not bring their offering, if an individual proceeded and acted in accordance with their [erroneous] decision, Rabbi Shimon exempts him and Rabb Elazar declares [his case] doubtful. Which case may be regarded doubtful? If he was at home, he is liable. If he went abroad, he is exempt. Rabbi Akiba said: I agree that a person in such a case is nearer to exemption than to culpability. Said Ben Azzai to him: how does such a person differ from one who remains at home? He who remains at home is in a position to ascertain the facts but the other was not in such a position.
If a court ruled, and later discovered that they had erred and changed their decision, whether they brought their offering or whether they did not bring their offering, if an individual proceeded and acted in accordance with their [erroneous] decision, Rabbi Shimon exempts him and Rabb Elazar declares [his case] doubtful. Which case may be regarded doubtful? If he was at home, he is liable. If he went abroad, he is exempt. Rabbi Akiba said: I agree that a person in such a case is nearer to exemption than to culpability. Said Ben Azzai to him: how does such a person differ from one who remains at home? He who remains at home is in a position to ascertain the facts but the other was not in such a position.
These are the things for which one is not liable on account of piggul: The fistful, The incense, The frankincense, The priests’ meal-offering, The anointed priest's meal-offering, The minhah with libation The blood, The libations that are brought separately, the words of Rabbi Meir. The sages say: also those that are brought with an animal [sacrifice]. The log of oil brought by the metzora: Rabbi Shimon says: one is not liable on account of piggul; But Rabbi Meir says: one is liable on account of piggul, because the blood of the asham makes it permitted and whatever has something else that makes it permitted, whether for man or for the altar, one is liable on its account for piggul.
The blood of a disqualified hatat does not necessitate washing, whether it had a period of fitness or did not have a period of fitness. Which had a period of fitness? One [whose blood] was kept overnight, or was defiled, or was taken out [of the Temple courtyard]. Which did not have a period of fitness? One which was slaughtered [with the intention of eating it] after the appropriate time or outside the appropriate bounds; or whose blood was received by unfit persons, and sprinkled by them.
Whether a garment, a sack, or a hide, it requires washing in a holy place. The breaking of an earthen vessel must be in a holy place. And the scouring and rinsing of a copper vessel must be in a holy place. In this the hatat is more stringent than [other] sacrifices of higher sanctity.
Whether one boiled in it or poured boiling [sacrificial flesh] into it, whether most sacred sacrifices or lesser sacrifices, [the pot] requires scouring and rinsing. Rabbi Shimon says: lesser sacrifices do not require scouring and rinsing. Rabbi Tarfon says: if one boiled [sacrifices in a pot] at the beginning of a festival, he can boil in it during the whole festival. But the sages say: until the time of eating, scouring and rinsing. Scouring is done as the scouring of a goblet; and rinsing is as the rinsing of a goblet, Scouring [in hot water] and rinsing in cold [water]. The spit and the grill are cleansed with hot water.
Whether one boiled in it or poured boiling [sacrificial flesh] into it, whether most sacred sacrifices or lesser sacrifices, [the pot] requires scouring and rinsing. Rabbi Shimon says: lesser sacrifices do not require scouring and rinsing. Rabbi Tarfon says: if one boiled [sacrifices in a pot] at the beginning of a festival, he can boil in it during the whole festival. But the sages say: until the time of eating, scouring and rinsing. Scouring is done as the scouring of a goblet; and rinsing is as the rinsing of a goblet, Scouring [in hot water] and rinsing in cold [water]. The spit and the grill are cleansed with hot water.
A tebul yom and one who lacks atonement do not share in sacrifices for consumption in the evening. An onen may handle [sacrifices], but he may not offer them, and he does not receive a share for consumption in the evening. Priests with blemishes, whether permanent or passing, receive a share and may eat [of the sacrifices] but they may not offer them. Whoever is not eligible for service does not share in the flesh. And he who does not share in the flesh does not share in the hides. Even if one was unclean when the blood was sprinkled but clean when the fats were burned [on the altar], he does not share in the flesh, for it is said: “he among the sons of Aaron, that offers the blood of the shelamim, and the fat, shall have the right thigh for a portion” (Leviticus 7:33).
Whenever the altar does not acquire its flesh, the priests do not acquire the hide, for it is said, “[And the priest that offers] any man’s olah [the priest shall have … the hide]” (Leviticus 7:8), [this means,] an olah which went up on the altar on behalf a man. If an olah was slaughtered under a different designation, although it does not count for its owner, its hide belongs to the priests. Whether [it be] a man’s olah or a woman's olah, the hide belong to the priests.
An unclean [person] who eats [of sacrifices], whether unclean sacrifices or clean sacrifices, is liable. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: an unclean person who eats clean [sacrifices] is liable, but an unclean person who eats unclean [sacrifices] is not liable because he ate only that which is unclean. They said to him: even when an unclean person eats clean [sacrifices], when he touches it, he defiles it. A clean person who eats unclean [sacrifices] is not liable, because one is liable only on account of bodily uncleanness.
[As for an ox] that had sexual relations with a woman or one with whom a man had sexual relations; or an animal set aside [for idolatry], or that had been worshipped [as an idol]; or that was the fee of a whore, or [a dog's] exchange; or that was kilayim; or a terefah; or an animal born through caesarean section, if one offered any of these outside, he is not liable, because it says, “Before the Tabernacle of the Lord” (Leviticus 17:4): whatever is not eligible to come before the Tabernacle of the Lord, one is not liable on its account. [As for] blemished animals, whether with permanent blemishes or with passing blemishes, if one offers them outside, he is exempt. Rabbi Shimon says: [if one offers] animals with permanent blemishes, he is exempt; [if one offers] animals with passing blemishes, he violates a negative commandment. [As for] turtledoves before their time and young pigeons after their time, if one offered them outside, he is exempt. Rabbi Shimon says: [if one offers] young pigeons after their time, he is exempt; turtledoves before their time, he violates a negative commandment. [One who offers] an animal together with its young [on the same day], and [one who offers] an animal before its time, is not liable. Rabbi Shimon says: he violates a negative commandment. For Rabbi Shimon would say: whatever is eligible to come [onto the altar] later entails a negative commandment, but does not entail karet. But the sages say: whatever does not entail karet also does not entail a negative commandment.
These require waving but not bringing near: The log of oil of the leper and his guilt-offering, The first fruits, according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, The innards of an individual’s shelamim and its breast and thigh, whether they are the offerings of men or of women, by Israelites but not by others; The two loaves and the two lambs of Shavuot. How does he perform [the waving]? He places the two loaves upon the two lambs and puts his two hands beneath them and waves them forward and backward and upward and downward, for it is written, “which is waved and which is lifted up” (Exodus 29:27). The waving was performed on the east side [of the altar] and the bringing near on the west side. The ceremony of waving comes before that of bringing near. The minhah of the omer and the minhah of jealousy require bringing near and waving. The showbread and the minhah with the libations require neither bringing near nor waving.
Rabbi Ishmael says: On Shabbat the omer was taken out of three seahs [of barley] and on a weekday out of five. But the sages say: whether on Shabbat or on a weekday it was taken out of three seahs. Rabbi Hanina the vice-high priest says: on Shabbat it was reaped by one man with one sickle into one basket, and on a weekday it was reaped by three men into three baskets and with three sickles. But the sages say: whether on Shabbat or on a weekday it was reaped by three men into three baskets and with three sickles.
Rabbi Ishmael says: On Shabbat the omer was taken out of three seahs [of barley] and on a weekday out of five. But the sages say: whether on Shabbat or on a weekday it was taken out of three seahs. Rabbi Hanina the vice-high priest says: on Shabbat it was reaped by one man with one sickle into one basket, and on a weekday it was reaped by three men into three baskets and with three sickles. But the sages say: whether on Shabbat or on a weekday it was reaped by three men into three baskets and with three sickles.
Both the two loaves and the showbread their kneading and their shaping were performed outside [the Temple Court], and their baking was inside. And they do not override the Shabbat. Rabbi Judah says: all of these were performed inside [the Temple Court]. Rabbi Shimon says: One should always accustom himself to say, “The two loaves and the showbread were valid whether made in the Temple Court or in Bet Pagi.”
It is said of the olah of cattle, “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor” (Leviticus 1:9); and of the olah of birds, “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor (vs. 17); and of the minhah, “An offering made by fire of pleasing odor” (Leviticus 2:2): to teach you that it is the same whether one offers much or little, so long as one directs one’s heart to heaven.
If a fetus died within the womb [of its mother] and the shepherd put in his hand and touched it, he is clean, whether it was a clean or unclean animal. Rabbi Yose HaGalili says: if it was an unclean animal he is unclean, and if it was a clean animal he is clean. If the fetus of a woman died within the womb of its mother and the midwife put in her hand and touched it, the midwife is unclean for seven days, but the mother is clean until the fetus comes out.
[The law of] “covering up the blood” applies both within the land of Israel and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, It applies to unconsecrated animals but not to consecrated animals. It applies [only] to wild animals and birds, whether they are at one's disposal or not. It applies also to a koy, for it is an animal about which there is a doubt. It may [therefore] not be slaughtered on a festival; and if it was slaughtered [on a festival] one may not cover up its blood.
In certain respects the prohibition of the fat is stricter than the prohibition of the blood, and in certain respects the prohibition of the blood is stricter than the prohibition of the fat. The prohibition of the fat is stricter, in that the fat is subject to the law of sacrilege, and one is obligated over it for piggul, notar, and uncleanness which is not the case with the blood. And the prohibition of the blood is stricter, for it applies to cattle, wild animals and fowl, whether clean or unclean; but the prohibition of the fat applies to clean cattle only.
With regard to a thigh-bone of a corpse or a thigh-bone of a consecrated animal, he who touches it, whether it be stopped up or pierced, becomes unclean. With regard to a thighbone of a nevelah or of a [dead] sheretz, if it was stopped up, he who touches it remains clean, but if it was at all pierced it conveys uncleanness by contact. From where do we know [the same rules apply] for carrying? Scripture says, “He that touches and he that carries” (Leviticus 11:39-40), anything that [can become unclean] by contact [can become unclean] by carrying. And anything that cannot [become unclean] by contact, cannot become [unclean] by carrying.
The law of the first of the fleece is in force both within the Land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated animals but not consecrated animals. The law of the shoulder and the cheeks and the stomach is of stricter application than the law of the first of the fleece; for the law of the shoulder and the cheeks and the stomach applies both to herds and flocks, whether they are many or few, whereas the law of the first of the fleece applies only to sheep, and only when there are many.
The law of letting [the mother bird] go from the nest is in force both within the holy land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated birds but not consecrated birds. The law of covering up the blood is of broader application than the law of letting [the mother bird] go; for the law of covering up the blood applies to wild animals as well as to birds, whether they are at one's disposal or not, whereas the law of letting [the mother bird] go from the nest applies only to birds and only to those which are not at one's disposal. Which are they that are not at one's disposal? Such as geese and fowls that made their nests in the open field. But if they made their nests within a house or in the case of Herodian doves, one is not bound to let [the mother bird] go.
If one buys an animal from a non-Jew and it is not known whether it had given birth or had not given birth: Rabbi Ishmael says: that born of a goat in its first year certainly belongs to the priest; after that, it is a questionable case [of a first-born]. That born of a ewe two years old certainly belongs to the priest; after that, it is a questionable case [of a first born]. That born of a cow or a donkey three years old certainly belongs to the priest; after that, it is a questionable case [of a first born]. Rabbi Akiva to him: if an animal were exempted [from the law of the first born] only with the birth of [actual] offspring, it would be as you say. But they said: the sign of offspring in small cattle is a discharge [from the womb]. In large cattle, the after-birth; in a woman, the signs are the fetus and the after-birth. This is the general rule: Whenever it is known that it had given birth, the priest receives nothing. Whenever it had never given birth, it belongs to the priest. If there is a doubt, it shall be eaten blemished by the owners. Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: if a large domestic animal has discharged a clot of blood, it [the clot] shall be buried, and it [the mother] is exempted from the law of the first born.